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URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1972/6.html
Cite as: [1973] AC 854, [1972] UKHL 6

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    Parliamentary Archives,
    HL/PO/JU/4/3/1219

    HOUSE OF LORDS

    BRUTUS

    v.

    COZENS

    Lord Reid
    Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest
    Viscount Dilhorne
    Lord Diplock

    Lord Kilbrandon


    Lord Reid

    my lords,

    The charge against the Appellant is that on 28th June, 1971, during the
    annual tournament at the All England Lawn Tennis Club, Wimbledon, he
    used insulting behaviour whereby a breach of the peace was likely to be
    occasioned, contrary to section 5 of the Public Order Act, 1936, as amended.

    While a match was in progress on No. 2 Court he went on to the Court,
    blew a whistle and threw leaflets around. On the whistle being blown nine
    or ten others invaded the court with banners and placards. I shall assume
    that they did this at the instigation of the Appellant though that is not made
    very clear in the Case Stated by the Magistrates. Then the Appellant sat
    down and had to be forcibly removed by the police. The incident lasted for
    two or three minutes. This is said to have been insulting behaviour.

    It appears that the object of this demonstration was to protest against the
    Apartheid policy of the Government of South Africa. But it is not said
    that that Government was insulted. The insult is said to have been offered
    to or directed at the spectators.

    The spectators at No. 2 court were upset: they made loud shouts,
    gesticulated and shook their fists and while the Appellant was being removed
    some showed hostility and attempted to strike him.

    The Magistrates came to the conclusion that the Appellant's behaviour was
    not insulting within the terms of the offence alleged. They did not consider
    the other points raised in argument but dismissed the information without
    calling upon the Appellant.

    On a Case Stated a Divisional Court set aside the judgment of the
    Magistrates and remitted the case to them to continue the hearing of the case.
    They certified as a point of law of general public importance:

    " Whether conduct which evidences a disrespect for the rights of
    " others so that it is likely to cause their resentment or give rise to
    " protests from them is insulting behaviour within the meaning of
    " section 5 of the Public Order Act, 1936."

    Section 5 is in these terms:

    " Any person who in any public place or at any public meeting uses
    " threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour with intent to
    " provoke a breach of the peace or whereby a breach of the peace is
    " likely to be occasioned shall be guilty of an offence."

    Subsequent amendments do not affect the question which we have to consider.

    It is not clear to me what precisely is the point of law which we have to
    decide. The question in the Case Stated for the opinion of the Court is
    " Whether, on the above statement of facts, we came to a correct determina-
    " tion and decision in point of law ". This seems to assume that the meaning
    of the word " insulting " in section 5 is a matter of law. And the Divisional
    Court appear to have proceeded on that footing.

    In my judgment that is not right. The meaning of an ordinary word of
    the English language is not a question of law. The proper construction of a
    statute is a question of law. If the context shows that a word is used in an
    unusual sense the Court will determine in other words what that unusual
    sense is. But here there is in my opinion no question of the word " insulting "
    being used in any unusual sense. It appears to me, for reasons which I shall
    give later, to be intended to have its ordinary meaning. It is for the tribunal
    which decides the case to consider, not as law but as fact, whether in the
    whole circumstances the words of the statute do or do not as a matter of
    ordinary usage of the English language cover or apply to the facts which

    2

    have been proved. If it is alleged that the tribunal has reached a wrong
    decision then there can be a question of law but only of a limited character.
    The question would normally be whether their decision was unreasonable in
    the sense that no tribunal acquainted with the ordinary use of language could
    reasonably reach that decision.

    Were it otherwise we should reach an impossible position. When consider-
    ing the meaning of a word one often goes to a dictionary. There one finds
    other words set out. And if one wants to pursue the matter and find the
    meaning of those other words the dictionary will give the meaning of those
    other words in still farther words which often include the word for whose
    meaning one is searching.

    No doubt the Court could act as a dictionary. It could direct the tribunal
    to take some word or phrase other than the word in the statute and consider
    whether that word or phrase applied to or covered the facts proved. But
    we have been warned time and again not to substitute other words for the
    words of a statute. And there is very good reason for that. Few words
    have exact synonyms. The overtones are almost always different.

    Or the Court could frame a definition. But then again the tribunal would
    be left with words to consider. No doubt a statute may contain a definition
    —which incidentally often creates more problems than it solves—but the
    purpose of a definition is to limit or modify the ordinary meaning of a word
    and the Court is not entitled to do that.

    So the question of law in this case must be whether it was unreasonable to
    hold that the Appellant's behaviour was not insulting. To that question
    there could in my view be only one answer—No.

    But as the Divisional Court have expressed their view as to the meaning
    of " insulting " I must, I think, consider it. It was said: " The language of
    " section 5, omitting words which do not matter for our present purpose,
    " is this: 'Any person who in any public place . . . uses . . . insult-
    " ' ing .... behaviour with intent to provoke a breach of the peace or
    " 'whereby a breach of the peace is likely to be occasioned, shall be guilty
    " ' of an offence '. It therefore becomes necessary to consider the meaning
    " of the word 'insulting' in its context in that section. In my view it is not
    " necessary, and is probably undesirable, to try to frame an exhaustive
    " definition which will cover every possible set of facts that may arise for
    " consideration under this section. It is, as I think, quite sufficient for the
    " purpose of this case to say that behaviour which affronts other people, and
    " evidences a disrespect or contempt for their rights, behaviour which reason-
    " able persons would foresee is likely to cause resentment or protest such as
    " was aroused in this case, and I rely particularly on the reaction of the crowd
    " as set out in the case, is insulting for the purpose of this section."

    I cannot agree with that. Parliament had to solve the difficult question
    how far freedom of speech or behaviour must be limited in the general public
    interest. It would have been going much too far to prohibit all speech or
    conduct likely to occasion a breach of the peace because determined
    opponents may not shrink from organising or at least threatening a breach
    of the peace in order to silence a speaker whose views they detest. There-
    fore vigorous and it may be distasteful or unmannerly speech or behaviour
    is permitted so long as it does not go beyond any one of three limits. It
    must not be threatening. It must not be abusive. It must not be insulting.
    I see no reason why any of these should be construed as having a specially
    wide or a specially narrow meaning. They are all limits easily recognisable
    by the ordinary man. Free speech is not impaired by ruling them out. But
    before a man can be convicted it must be clearly shown that one or more
    of them has been disregarded.

    We were referred to a number of dictionary meanings of "insult" such
    as treating with insolence or contempt or indignity or derision or dishonour
    or offensive disrespect. Many things otherwise unobjectionable may be said
    or done in an insulting way. There can be no definition. But an ordinary
    sensible man knows an insult when he sees or hears it.

    Taking the passage which I have quoted, "affront" is much too vague a
    word to be helpful ; there can often be disrespect without insult, and I do

    3

    not think that contempt for a person's rights as distinct from contempt for
    the person himself would generally be held to be insulting. Moreover there
    are many grounds other than insult for feeling resentment or protesting. I
    do not agree that there can be conduct which is not insulting in the ordinary
    sense of the word but which is " insulting for the purpose of this section ".
    If the view of the Divisional Court was that in this section the word
    " insulting " has some special or unusually wide meaning, then I do not
    agree. Parliament has given no indication that the word is to be given any
    unusual meaning. Insulting means insulting and nothing else.

    If I had to decide, which I do not, whether the Appellant's conduct insulted
    the spectators in this case, I would agree with the Magistrates. The spectators
    may have been very angry and justly so. The Appellant's conduct was
    deplorable. Probably it ought to be punishable. But I cannot see how it
    insulted the spectators.

    I would allow the appeal with costs.

    Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest

    MY LORDS,

    The charge which was brought against the Appellant was that he " Did
    " use insulting behaviour whereby a breach of the peace was likely to be
    " occasioned at the All England Lawn Tennis Club, Church Road, Wimble-
    don, S.W.10 on 28th June, 1971 ". Having found the facts the Magistrates
    came to the conclusion that the Appellant's behaviour was not " insulting
    " behaviour " within the terms of the offence charged under section 5 of
    the Public Order Act, 1936, as amended: it was therefore unnecessary for
    them to consider any further matters. Under that section, provided other
    matters are proved, a person will commit an offence if he uses threatening
    behaviour or if he uses abusive behaviour or if he uses insulting behaviour.
    In the present case the Magistrates had to consider whether the Appellant
    had used insulting behaviour. The words " insulting behaviour " are words
    that permit of ready comprehension. Having found the facts it was for
    the Magistrates applying rational judgment and commonsense to reach
    decision. Manifestly they thought that however else the Appellant's
    behaviour might be characterised it was not to be described as insulting.
    Having had the case of Bryan v. Robinson [I960] 2 All.E.R. 173 cited to
    them, in which Lord Parker C.J. had pointed out that persons may be
    annoyed by behaviour which is not insulting behaviour, the Magistrates may
    have thought that the Appellant's behaviour was annoying or very annoying
    but yet was not on that account to be held to have been insulting. The
    Magistrates may have considered that in most cases insulting behaviour is
    behaviour which insults some person or persons: they may have thought
    that after the incident neither a spectator nor a player, however displeased
    or annoyed he might have been, could sensibly have complained that he had
    been " insulted ".

    In my view, the Magistrates' decision was really a decision of fact just as
    would be the decision of a jury if called upon to decide whether someone
    had used insulting behaviour. The decision either of Magistrates or of a jury
    could be attacked if there had been misdirection. In the present case I can
    see no ground at all for suggesting that the Magistrates had misdirected
    themselves.

    The decision of the Magistrates could, in my view, only be reversed if it is
    held that the facts as found show as a matter of law that the Appellant's
    behaviour was insulting. What the Divisional Court have done is to lay
    down a definition of the words " insulting behaviour " and then to say that
    the Appellant's behaviour came within the definition. But the Act contains
    no such definition and indeed no words of definition are needed. The words
    of the section are clear and they convey of themselves a meaning which the
    ordinary citizen can well understand. The suggested definition would enlarge
    what Parliament has enacted, and it would do this in relation to a criminal
    offence. It would lay down that behaviour which affronts other people and

    4

    evidences a disrespect or contempt for their rights and which reasonable
    people would foresee would be likely to cause resentment or protest is
    insulting behaviour for the purposes of section 5. It may well be that
    behaviour which is insulting will often be behaviour which shows a disrespect
    or contempt for people's rights but it does not follow that whenever there is
    disrespect or contempt for people's rights there must always be insulting
    behaviour. Furthermore, there may be many manifestations of behaviour
    which will cause resentment or protest without being insulting.

    In the submissions made on behalf of the Respondent it was acknowledged
    that the definition laid down by the Divisional Court was too wide and
    that it would embrace conduct going beyond what Parliament had intended.
    It was not supported. An alternative definition was propounded. It was
    suggested that in the concept of insulting behaviour there are the two
    elements (a) that it is deliberate behaviour which is intended or is likely to
    give offence and (b) that it is behaviour which is contemptuous of or about
    those who are to be offended. My Lords, I find it unnecessary and indeed
    undesirable to compose a definition of a word which is in general use and
    which presents no difficulty of application or understanding. If the facts as
    found by the Magistrates (which I do not recount because they are recorded
    in the Case Stated) were put to a juryman who was asked to say whether,
    in his view, they constituted insulting behaviour I would think it probable
    that his answer would be the same as that given by the Magistrates. But
    whether this be so or not I find it impossible to say that on the facts as they
    found them the Magistrates were obliged as a matter of law to find that the
    behaviour was insulting.

    For the reasons which I have given I would allow the appeal and set aside
    the order made by the Divisional Court.

    Viscount Dilhorne

    MY LORDS,

    After the magistrates at Wimbledon had dismissed the information laid
    against the Appellant without calling on him to answer the prosecution's
    case, they were asked to state a case. They did so and in paragraph 7
    thereof said:

    " Having considered the evidence and the authorities cited to us, we
    " came to the conclusion that the Respondent's " (the present Appellant)
    " behaviour was not insulting within the terms of the offence alleged
    " against him ".

    and in paragraph 8 that

    " The question for the opinion of the High Court is whether, on the
    " above statement of facts, we came to a correct determination and
    " decision in point of law."

    The case stated did not state precisely what was the question of law on
    which the opinion of the High Court was sought. It may be because the
    Magistrates found some difficulty in formulating it. The Divisional Court,
    however, treated the case as raising the question of the meaning to be given
    to the word " insulting " in the expression " insulting behaviour " in section 5
    of the Public Order Act, 1936.

    The Divisional Court allowed the appeal but, while refusing leave to appeal
    to this House, certified that a point of law of general public importance was
    involved, namely:

    " Whether conduct which evidences a disrespect for the rights of
    "others so that it is likely to cause their resentment or give rise to
    " protests from them is insulting behaviour within the meaning of
    " section 5 of the Public Order Act 1936 ".

    The Appellant now appeals with the leave of this House.

    In the Divisional Court in the course of his judgment, with which the other
    members of the Court agreed, Melford Stevenson J. said : —

    " behaviour which affronts other people, and evidences a disrespect
    " or contempt for their rights, behaviour which reasonable persons would

    5

    " foresee is likely to cause resentment or protest such as was aroused
    " in this case, and I rely particularly on the reaction of the crowd as set
    " out in the case, is insulting for the purpose of this section."

    I do not think that this is right. The Public Order Act, 1936, by section 5
    made it an offence for a person to use threatening, abusive or insulting
    behaviour whereby a breach of the peace is likely to be occasioned. It does
    not make any kind of behaviour which is likely to lead to a breach of the
    peace an offence. Behaviour which evidences a disrespect or contempt for
    the rights of others does not of itself establish that that behaviour was
    threatening, abusive or insulting. Such behaviour may be very annoying to
    those who see it and cause resentment and protests but it does not suffice
    to show that the behaviour was annoying and did annoy for a person can
    be guilty of annoying behaviour without that behaviour being insulting. And
    what must be established to justify conviction of the offence is not that the
    behaviour was annoying but that it was threatening, abusive or insulting.

    The reaction of those who saw the behaviour may be relevant to the
    question whether a breach of the peace was likely to be occasioned but it
    is not, in my opinion, relevant to the question, was the behaviour threatening,
    abusive or insulting.

    The Act does not define the meaning to be given to the word " insulting "
    and the cases cited in this House, the Divisional Court and before the
    Magistrates do not say or suggest that it should be given any special
    meaning. Unless the context otherwise requires, words in a statute have to
    be given their ordinary natural meaning and there is in this Act, in my
    opinion, nothing to indicate or suggest that the word " insulting " should
    be given any other than its ordinary natural meaning.

    The Magistrates had two questions to decide ; first, was the Appellant's
    behaviour insulting and, secondly, if so, was it likely to occasion a breach
    of the peace. Both were questions of fact for them to decide. In considering
    the first, it was relevant for them to consider whether the behaviour was
    such as to indicate an intention to insult anyone, and if so whom ; and if
    the Magistrates in this case did so, they may well have concluded that the
    Appellant's behaviour did not evince any intention to insult either players
    or spectators, and so could not properly be regarded as insulting.

    In my opinion, the answer to the question certified by the Divisional Court
    is in the negative for proof of the matters therein referred to does not suffice
    to show or tend to show that the behaviour was insulting and the decision of
    the Divisional Court was wrong.

    I would therefore allow the appeal with costs.

    Lord Diplock

    MY LORDS,

    I agree with your Lordships that this appeal should be allowed.

    Lord Kilbrandon

    MY LORDS,

    I agree that this appeal should be allowed. At the close of the prosecution
    evidence, the Magistrates found no case to answer, and gave their decision
    in the following terms: " Having considered the evidence and the authorities
    " cited to us, we came to the conclusion that the Respondent's behaviour
    " was not insulting within the terms of the offence alleged against him
    " ' Insulting behaviour' being an essential element of an offence within
    " section 5 of the Public Order Act, 1936, we did not consider the other
    " points raised before us and accordingly dismissed the information without
    " calling upon the Respondent." The authorities were Bryan v. Robinson
    [1960] 2 All E.R. 173, Jordan v. Burgoyne [1963] 2 Q.B. 744 and Cooper &
    Ors
    v. Shield [19711 2 All E.R. 917. In the first, a case of alleged insulting
    behaviour, Lord Parker C.J. had laid it down that " Somebody may be

    6

    " annoyed by behaviour which is not insulting behaviour." We must assume
    that the Magistrates weighed the evidence against this ruling, and appreciated
    accordingly that, while the spectators may have been annoyed, that did not
    necessarily mean that they had been insulted. The second relates to insulting
    words which might have been expected to, and did, cause a riot to break
    out at a public meeting; this could not have assisted the Magistrates or
    affected their decision. The third is concerned with whether the locus of
    the incident was a public place, and the present point did not arise. No
    authority was cited to the Magistrates, or indeed before this House, which
    declares that any positive test is available by which insulting behaviour can
    be recognised as such ; nevertheless, we were in effect invited to apply some
    such test. We were asked to hold that, accepting as facts the incidents
    described in the stated case, it followed as matter of law that the conduct
    of the accused was insulting and therefore, in the circumstances, criminal.
    This seems to me to be impossible. It may well be that if the Magistrates
    had found the Appellant's behaviour to have been insulting, their decision
    would not have been challengeable, but that only means that their decision,
    whichever way it went, must have been a decision on a question of fact; no
    question of law can be spelled out of their evaluation of behaviour which,
    in the absence of a specific finding that it was of an insulting character, is
    capable of more than one interpretation. The drawing of inferences from
    behaviour is a fact-finding process. It would be unwise, in my opinion, to
    attempt to lay down any positive rules for the recognition of insulting
    behaviour as such, since the circumstances in which the application of the
    rules would be called for are almost infinitely variable ; the most that can
    be done is to lay down limits, as was done in Bryan v. Robinson (supra), in
    order to ensure that the statute is not interpreted more widely than its terms
    will bear.

    I did not myself find the quotation of dictionary definitions helpful, as it
    might perhaps have been had the question been whether, the Magistrates
    having convicted, there is any accepted meaning of the word " insulting "
    which they might be said legitimately to have adopted in coming to their
    conclusion. But " insulting " is an ordinary uncomplicated English word.
    Boswell defends Dr. Johnson, to whose work we were referred, against a
    charge of obscurity in his definitions, by quoting from the preface to the
    dictionary: "To explain, requires the use of terms less abstruse than that
    " which is to be explained, and such terms cannot always be found. . . . The
    " easiest word, whatever it may be, can never be translated into one more
    " easy." One felt the force of this upon being offered as exegetical sub-
    stitutions for the word " insult" such words as " insolence " or " affront".
    All three words are as much, or as little, in need of interpretation.

    It was conceded before us that the question which has been submitted to
    us as involving a point of law of public importance could not be answered
    in the affirmative. To do so would be to declare that, among other mani-
    festations, " conduct which evidences a disrespect for the rights of others
    " which is likely to cause their resentment " must as matter of law be held
    to be insulting, and punishable under the Public Order Act, 1936. A
    common example might be, an assertion, by throwing down a gate, of a
    public right of way. This would be showing disrespect of a right of property,
    and would certainly be resented, but the behaviour might in certain circum-
    stances be in fact lawful. I would accordingly allow this appeal.

    327123 Dd 197094 100 7/72 St.S.



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