Case No: 2 LS 40452
Neutral Citation Number: [2017] EWHC 2273 (QB) 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEENS BENCH DIVISION
LEEDS DISTRICT REGISTRY 
MERCANTILE COURT

The Court House
Oxford Row
Leeds LS1 3BG
12 September 2017
Before :

His Honour Judge Saffman sitting as a Judge of the High Court

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Between :

	Montpelier Business Reorganisation Ltd	Claimant	
			
	- and –
		
	(1) Armitage Jones LLP
(2) LPA Direct LLP
(3) Christopher Jones
(4) Anthony Armitage
(5) Simon Padgett
(6) Montpelier Professional (Leeds) Ltd
(7) Montpelier Professional Ltd
(8) Montpelier group Ltd LLC (a limited liability company incorporated under the laws of the state of Delaware in the USA	

Defendants
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Miss C Toman (instructed by Shulmans) for the 4th defendant
Mr S Fennell (instructed by Lupton Fawcett Dennison Till) for the 6th and 7th defendants
No other party appeared or was represented

Hearing date: 1 August 2017
Date draft circulated to the Parties 9 August 2017
Date handed down  12 September 2017
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I direct that, pursuant to CPR PD 39A para 6.1, no official shorthand note shall be taken of this Judgment and that copies of this version as handed down may be treated as authentic.

JUDGMENT
Introduction

1.	On 5 July 2016, I handed down judgment in this claim and counterclaim. I do not intend to set out in this judgment the facts, issues and determinations that I made in the course of my earlier judgment save in the very briefest form. It is reported at 2016 EWHC 977 should anyone care to read it.

2.	Suffice it to say that the dispute between the parties concerned an Asset Purchase Agreement and a Management Services Agreement entered into between the claimant and the 1st to 5th defendants. By the Asset Purchase Agreement the claimant agreed to purchase the business and assets of the 1st and 2nd defendants. The claim arose because the claimant asserted that the defendants were in breach of the agreements with the result that the claimant was absolved from liability to make a payment of £250,000 being the final part of the sale price of £500,000 and, in addition, that the breaches gave rise to a liability on the part of the defendants to pay damages of in excess of £1million. The defendants denied breach of contract and asserted that, albeit that it was accepted that monies were due to the claimant pursuant to the agreements, those monies were considerably less than the £250,000 owed by the claimant to the defendants. It was not disputed that, in the circumstances, the claimant was entitled to set off monies due to it but there was still the balance due to the defendants. 

3.	I rejected the claimant’s assertion that they were absolved from the obligation to pay the sum of £250,000. I found that they were liable to the defendants for that sum less such sums as they were entitled to set off from it which I found to be £198,906.72. I determined that, in the result, the defendants were entitled to £51,093.28, plus interest less a nominal sum which I set at £93.28, to reflect some breaches of the agreements by at least one of the defendants but which had not resulted in any loss to the claimant or gain to the defendants. The claimant’s claim for in excess of £1million was therefore rejected.

4.	The judgment clearly favoured the defendants and thus those defendants who had taken an active part in the litigation namely the 3rd, 4th and 5th defendants were awarded their costs together with a payment on account of costs. The payment on account was £7000 to each of the 3rd and 5th defendants on the basis that they had not incurred legal fees but had acted in person and £100,000 in favour of the 4th defendant who had been legally represented throughout. 

5.	Neither the damages nor the costs on account have been paid by the claimant nor will they be since the claimant is insolvent. Because even at the time of handing down the judgment and considerably before then, it was clear, by virtue of its insolvency, that the claimant would be unable to discharge the costs order, Mr Hugh Jory QC counsel  for the 4th defendant made an application for the 6th , 7th and 8th defendants to be joined into these proceedings in order for the court to consider whether it was appropriate to make a non-party costs order against them. I acceded to that request and indeed the order that I made that day sets out briefly why I did so. 

6.	It records as a recital that Mr Philip Nuttall, a director of the claimant and of the 6th defendant had given evidence at the trial that the 6th and 7th defendant had assisted in the funding of the action by the claimant and it further recited that Mr Edward Watkin Gittins a director of the 7th defendant had given evidence that the 8th defendant had also assisted in the funding of the action. The order also recited that the 7th defendant was a 50% shareholder in the claimant and that the 8th defendant was the 7th defendant’s parent company and that both therefore stood to gain from any successful recovery by the claimant in the action.

7.	Subsequently, on 8 May 2017, an order was made which gave directions in relation to the service and filing of evidence leading to the hearing on 1 August 2017 of the 4th defendant’s application for a non-party costs order against the 6th and 7th defendants. Evidence has been exchanged in accordance with the order of 8 May. On 1st August I heard very helpful oral argument from Miss Cristin Toman, counsel on behalf of the 4th defendant and from Mr Steven Fennell, counsel behalf of the 6th and 7th defendants and of course I have their helpful skeleton arguments.

8.	The claim against the 8th defendant for a non-party costs order was stayed on 8 May 2017 at the request of the 4th defendant. It should be emphasised that that request was made not because the 4th defendant was not confident that his claim against the 8th defendant was justified but rather on the basis that it would be inappropriate at this stage to pursue it on pragmatic grounds.

9.	In my judgment of July 2016 I set out the dramatis personae but for ease of reference it is wise to do so again. In doing so and hereafter and to avoid confusion I shall refer to the defendants not by reference to the order in which they appear in the title of the pleadings but rather by an abbreviation of their names. Thus the 4th defendant shall be called “Mr Armitage”, the 6th defendant shall be called “MP Leeds”, the 7th defendant shall be called “MPL” and the 8th defendant shall be called “the LLC”

a.	The shares in the claimant are held as to 50% by MPL and 50% by Messrs Jones, Padgett and Armitage. Mr Armitage therefore is a minority shareholder in the claimant. Mr Philip Nuttall was the sole director of the claimant company for the duration of the proceedings although initially, and before the parties fell out, Messrs Padgett, Jones and Armitage were also directors.

b.	MP Leeds is a subsidiary of MPL. 80% of the shares in MP Leeds are held by MPL and 20% by Mr Nuttall who is one of its directors.

c.	Mr Gittins is the sole director and majority shareholder of MPL.  By virtue of this he and MPL have a direct interest in MP Leeds and the claimant.

d.	The LLC is the ultimate parent company of MPL. As I understand it, Mr Gittins is the majority shareholder in the LLC.

The Law

10.	The jurisdiction of the court to make an order that the costs of any litigation be borne by someone who was not a party to that litigation is derived from section 51 Senior Courts Act 1981 which provides so far as it is relevant as follows:

Subject to the provisions of this or any other enactment and to rules of court the costs of and incidental to all proceedings in -

…. (b) the High Court

shall be in the discretion of the court……

(3) The court shall have full power to determine by whom and to what extent the costs are to be paid.

11.	It is common ground that, although the section does not say so in terms, it bestows upon the court the jurisdiction to make, in appropriate cases, an order that the costs of litigation be borne by a person who was not a party to the litigation.

12.	The procedure to be adopted in an application for a non-party costs order should be summary in nature with the judge making an order based on the evidence given and the facts found at trial, together with his assessment of the behaviour of those involved in the proceedings. The authority of that proposition is Deutsche Bank v Sebastian Holdings [2016] EWCA Civ 23 at paragraph 17. 

13.	The principles by which a court must be guided when considering whether to make a non-party costs order have been considered by the courts on a number of occasions but a codification of the principles is perhaps best set out by Lord Browne in the Privy Council case of Dymocks Franchise Systems (NSW) Pty Ltd v Todd [2004] UK PC 39 paragraphs 25 to 29: 

25.  A number of the decided cases have sought to catalogue the main principles governing the proper exercise of this discretion and their Lordships rather than undertake an exhaustive further survey of the many relevant cases, would seek to summarise the position as follows.
1 ) Although costs orders against non-parties are to be regarded as "exceptional", exceptional in this context means no more than outside the ordinary run of cases where parties pursue or defend claims for their own benefit and at their own expense. The ultimate question in any such "exceptional" case is whether in all the circumstances it is just to make the order. It must be recognised that this is inevitably to some extent a fact-specific jurisdiction and that there will often be a number of different considerations in play, some militating in favour of an order, some against. 

2 ) Generally speaking the discretion will not be exercised against "pure funders", described in paragraph 40 of Hamilton v Al Fayed as "those with no personal interest in the litigation, who do not stand to benefit from it, are not funding it as a matter of business, and in no way seek to control its course". In their case the court's usual approach is to give priority to the public interest in the funded party getting access to justice over that of the successful unfunded party recovering his costs and so not having to bear the expense of vindicating his rights. 

3 ) Where, however, the non-party not merely funds the proceedings but substantially also controls or at any rate is to benefit from them, justice will ordinarily require that, if the proceedings fail, he will pay the successful party's costs. The non-party in these cases is not so much facilitating access to justice by the party funded as himself gaining access to justice for his own purposes. He himself is "the real party" to the litigation, a concept repeatedly invoked throughout the jurisprudence - see, for example, the judgments of the High Court of Australia in the Knight case 174 CLR 174 and Millett LJ's judgment in Metalloy Supplies Ltd  v MA (UK) Ltd [1997] 1 WLR 1613. Consistently with this approach, Phillips LJ described the non-party underwriters in TGA Chapman Ltd v Christopher [1998] 1 WLR 12 as "the defendants in all but name". Nor, indeed, is it necessary that the non-party be "the only real party" to the litigation in the sense explained in the Knight case, provided that he is "a real party in ... very important and critical respects" : see Arundel Chiropractic Centre Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2001) 179 ALR 406, 414 referred to in the Kebaro case [2003] FCAFC 5 at [96], [103] and [111]. Some reflection of this concept of "the real party" is to be found in CPR 25.13 (2) (f) which allows a security for costs order to be made where "the claimant is acting as a nominal claimant". 

4 ) Perhaps the most difficult cases are those in which non-parties fund receivers or liquidators (or, indeed, financially insecure companies generally) in litigation designed to advance the funder's own financial interests. Since this particular difficulty may be thought to lie at the heart of the present case, it would be helpful to examine it in the light of a number of statements taken from the authorities. First, Tompkins J's judgment in the Carborundum case [1992] 3 NZLR 757,765:
 
"Where proceedings are initiated by and controlled by a person who, although not a party to the proceedings, has a direct personal financial interest in their result, such as a receiver or manager appointed by a secured creditor, a substantial unsecured creditor or a substantial shareholder, it would rarely be just for such a person pursuing his own interests, to be able to do so with no risk to himself should the proceedings fail or be discontinued. That will be so whether or not the person is acting improperly or fraudulently. In many cases a major consideration will be the reason for the non-party causing a party, normally but not always an insolvent company, to bring or defend the proceedings. If a non-party does so for his own financial benefit, either to gain the fruits of the litigation or to preserve assets in which the person has an interest, it may, depending upon the circumstances, be appropriate to make an order for costs against that person. Relevant factors will include the financial position of the party through whom these proceedings are brought or defended and the likelihood of it being able to meet any order for costs, the degree of possible benefit to the non-party and whether, in all the circumstances, the bringing or defending of the claim - although in the end unsuccessful - was a reasonable course to adopt. The directors of a company may frequently be in a position different from other non-parties with a direct financial interest in promoting or defending proceedings. Even where a company is in receivership, directors may have a duty to prosecute or defend a claim through the company in the interests of creditors other than the creditor that had appointed the receiver, or in the interests of the shareholders. Other creditors and shareholders are entitled to expect that those responsible for the management of the company will use all proper endeavours to ensure that their financial interests are protected or that there is a fund out of which such creditors can be paid ..."

26. In a more recent case in the High Court of New Zealand, Arklow Investments Ltd v MacLean (unreported) 19 May 2000, Fisher J said: 

"19. The guiding principle here is that costs orders against third parties are exceptional but that they are warranted in cases where there would otherwise be a situation in which a person could fund litigation in order to pursue his or her own interests and without risk to himself or herself should the proceedings fail or be discontinued. 

20. ... [W]here a person is a major shareholder and dominant director in a company which brings proceedings, that alone will not justify a third party costs order. Something additional is normally warranted as a matter of discretion. The critical element will often be a fresh injection of capital for the known purpose of funding litigation.

21. ... [T]he overall rationale [is] that it is wrong to allow someone to fund litigation in the hope of gaining a benefit without a corresponding risk that that person will share in the costs of the proceedings if they ultimately fail."

27. In the High Court of Australia in the Knight case 174 CLR 178, 192-193, Mason CJ and Deane J said: 

"For our part, we consider it appropriate to recognise a general category of case in which an order for costs should be made against a non-party and which would encompass the case of a receiver of a company who is not a party to the litigation. The category of case consists of circumstances where the party to the litigation is an insolvent person or man of straw, where the non-party has played an active part in the conduct of the litigation and where the non-party, or some person on whose behalf he or she is acting or by whom he or she has been appointed, has an interest in the subject of the litigation. Where the circumstances of a case fall within that category, an order for costs should be made against the non-party if the interests of justice require that it be made."

28. The final judgment from which their Lordships would cite in this connection is that of Millett LJ in the Metalloy Supplies case [1997] 1 WLR 1613 already referred to, at 1620: 

"[An order] may be made in a wide variety of circumstances where the third party is considered to be the real party interested in the outcome of the suit ... It is not, however, sufficient to render a director liable for costs that he was a director of the company and caused it to bring or defend proceedings which he funded and which ultimately failed. Where such proceedings are brought bona fide and for the benefit of the company, the company is the real plaintiff. If in such a case an order for costs could be made against a director in the absence of some impropriety or bad faith on his part, the doctrine of the separate liability of the company would be eroded and the principle that such orders should be exceptional would be nullified.

The position of a liquidator is a fortiori. Where a limited company is in insolvent liquidation, the liquidator is under a statutory duty to collect in its assets. This may require him to bring proceedings. ... If he brings the proceedings in the name of the company, the company is the real plaintiff and he is not. He is under no obligation to the defendant to protect his interests by ensuring that he has sufficient funds in hand to pay their costs as well as his own if the proceedings fail." 

29. In the light of these authorities their Lordships would hold that, generally speaking, where a non-party promotes and funds proceedings by an insolvent company solely or substantially for his own financial benefit, he should be liable for the costs if his claim or defence or appeal fails. As explained in the cases, however, that is not to say that orders will invariably be made in such cases, particularly, say, where the non-party is himself a director or liquidator who can realistically be regarded as acting rather in the interests of the company (and more especially its shareholders and creditors) than in his own interests.

14.	At paragraph 31 of Dymocks Lord Browne makes clear that the authorities establish that a failure to warn the non-party during the litigation of an intention to make an application for a non-party costs order is “no more than material consideration in the case” and is thus not determinative in any way. At paragraph 33 Lord Browne makes clear that “whilst any impropriety or the pursuit of speculative litigation may of itself support the making of an order against a non-party, its absence does not preclude the making of such an order”. 

15.	In paragraph 25(3) of his judgement in Dymocks it will be recalled that Lord Browne was considering the issue of control and who is the “real party” to the litigation. He concluded that it is not necessary that the non-party be the only real party to the litigation provided that he is “a real party in very important critical respects”. In paragraph 35 Lord Browne continues the theme of considering that question. 

16.	The theme of establishing who was the real party to the litigation was taken up in the Deutsche Bank case above referred to. At paragraph 59 the Court of Appeal recognised that the basis for the judge’s non-party costs order made at first instance was that the non-party was the real party to the litigation. The court went on to say that “there is no reason in principle, therefore, why he (the non-party) should not be required to pay the whole of the costs for which Sebastian is liable.” As the 2017 White Book puts it at paragraph 46.2.2, the crucial factor is the nature and degree of the non-party’s connection with proceedings.
 
17.	In Weatherford Global Products Ltd v Hydropath Holdings Limited [2014] EWHC 3243 (TCC) Akenhead J had also had occasion to review the authorities. He too cited in full the extract from Dymocks that I set out in paragraph 13 above. He observed that the guidance given is merely guidance and not rules and that the issue of whether to make a non-party costs order is one of discretion to be exercised only to the extent that it is just to do so. The categories of case in which it is appropriate to make a non-party costs order are not rigid or closed and are very much fact sensitive. That indeed was a point made by the Court of Appeal in Symphony Group Plc v Hodgson [1994] QB 179 in which Balcombe LJ undertook a very comprehensive review of the law as at 1994 as established by the authorities to that date. He identified various factors to be considered in the exercise of the discretion including whether a person has some management of the action, whether a person has maintained or financed the action and whether he has caused the action. 

18.	 In Weatherford one of the factors that the learned judge regarded as being relevant to take into account in considering whether to make a non-party costs order was that the respondent to the application with which he had to deal was at all times the major shareholder in the company against whom costs orders had been made (see paragraph 24 (a) of the judgment).

19.	In PR Records Ltd v Vinyl 2000 [2008] EWHC 192 (Ch) it was recognised that a relevant consideration in whether to make a non-party costs order may be whether the party being funded was bringing the claim or defending it. It is clear from that case however that that particular issue cannot be determinative particularly in a jurisdiction like this which is clearly fact sensitive. 

20.	Miss Toman, counsel for Mr Armitage also cites PR Records to support the contention that merely because one non-party may have a prominent role in either funding or control that does not necessarily exclude another non-party from a non-party costs order if he has some role to play in funding or control. In that connection she refers me to paragraph 35 of that judgment. It has to be said however that in that case the court was considering the dominance of a non-party over his wife who was actually a party to the action and against whom a costs order had been made as a party. The court was not considering the dominance of one non-party over another non-party both of whom were respondents to an application for a non-party costs order.

21.	The position of a company director in the context of this particular jurisdiction is a special one. This is because it is vital not to lose sight of the fundamental principle of English law that a company is a separate legal entity independent of its members and officers. The fact that the position of the director in the context of this jurisdiction is special derives from cases such as Taylor v Pace [1991] BCC 406 at page 409 in which Lloyd LJ had this to say:

“The controlling director of a one-man company is inevitably the person who causes the costs to be incurred, in one sense, by causing the company to defend the proceedings. But it could not be right that in every such case he should be made personally liable for the costs even if he knows that the company will not be able to meet the plaintiff’s costs, should the company prove unsuccessful. That would be too great an inroad on the principle of limited liability ………….. In the great majority of cases the directors of an insolvent company which defends proceedings brought against it should not be at personal risk of costs.” 

22.	The special position of a company director has most recently been emphasised in the case of Housemaker Services Ltd v Cole [2017] EWHC 924 (Ch) in particular paragraph 11 to 15:

“11.  However, the director of a limited company is in a special position. It is not an abuse of the process for a limited company with no assets to bring a claim in good faith. It is always open to a defendant to such a claim to apply for security of the costs. The mere fact that a director who controls the company’s litigation also funds the claim is not enough in the ordinary course to justify a non-party costs order against him if the company’s case fails.

12. A company is indeed owned by its members. But this does not mean that the shareholder is the “real” party to the claim. In law, the assets of the company (including any claim) belong to the company, and not to the members. Where the proceedings are brought in good faith and for the benefit of the company (rather than for some collateral purpose), the company is indeed the real claimant. If it were otherwise, the principle of the separate liability of the company from its members would be eroded.

13. Moreover, it is not an unusual thing let alone wrong, that a director who is a shareholder of a company and who funds the company’s claim will ultimately benefit from it if it is successful. It is simply a consequence of the policies adopted by our company law, allowing businessmen to take some risks in seeking profit without incurring unlimited liability. Subject to certain exceptions, such as the rules on wrongful trading, a director and shareholder can simply walk away from an insolvent company.

14.  A person choosing to deal voluntarily with (or to sue) a limited company does so against that legal background. Any potential unfairness caused to a party who is (involuntarily) pursued by such a company is remedied by the security of the costs jurisdiction.

15.  Accordingly, in order to make it just to order a director to pay the costs of unsuccessful company litigation, it is necessary to show something more. This might be for example that the claim is not made in good faith, or for the benefit of the company, or it might be that the claim has been improperly conducted by the director. So, for example, in both Gardiner v FX Music Ltd and Deutsche Bank v Sebastian Holdings Inc, a director of the unsuccessful corporate party was ordered to pay the costs to the successful party. But in each case the director had given false evidence and fabricated documents.”

23.	Mr Fennell draws particular attention to the observation in paragraph 15 of the report of that case that there is a need to show something more than simply that the funder is a director. The examples given by the court in that case are based upon improper conduct of some description by the funding director. 

24.	In Gardiner v FX Music 2000 WL 3311 6500 the court considered issues of impropriety in the context of whether it was just to exercise the power to make a non-party costs order and said the following:

“Whatever the limits of the court’s jurisdiction to order a sole or guiding director of an insolvent company to pay the costs of an action brought by or against that company, it is clear that such discretion may be exercised in circumstances in which:-

1.	The director had the management of the litigation on behalf of the company; and

2.	The director acted improperly in conducting the litigation

There may be many categories of relevant impropriety. But such impropriety must be of a serious nature. I have no doubt however that sufficient impropriety might be shown if a director (a) deliberately pursues a concocted claim or defence, knowing it to be false; or (b) swears false evidence in support of such a claim or defence with the intention of misleading the court”

In this case of course MP Leeds is not a director of the claimant and nor is MPL.

25.	In Housemaker it will be seen that the learned Deputy High Court judge makes specific reference to the ability of a defendant to protect itself against an insolvent corporate claimant by making an application for security of the costs. A point made by Mr Fennell in this case is that no such application was made. Paragraph 17 of Housemaker makes it clear that the failure to apply for security for costs does not preclude a successful application under section 51 of the 1981 Act. It is merely a factor to take into account in deciding the manner in which the discretion to make a non-party costs order is exercised. There is indeed higher authority for that proposition since precisely the same point is made by Moore Bick LJ in the Deutsche Bank case at paragraph 49.

26.	In Metalloy Supplies Ltd v M. A. (UK) Ltd [1997] 1 WLR 1613 Millet LJ observed at page 1619

“it is not an abuse of the process of the court or in any way improper or unreasonable for an impecunious plaintiff to bring proceedings which are otherwise proper and bona fide while lacking the means to pay the defendant’s costs if they should fail. Litigants do it every day with or without legal aid. If the plaintiff is an individual the defendant’s only recourse is to threaten the plaintiff with bankruptcy. If the plaintiff is a limited company the defendant may apply for security for costs and have the proceedings dismissed if the plaintiff fails to provide whatever security is ordered”

27.	Deutsche Bank provides some guidance on what is meant by “funding”. It will be recalled that this is the issue which Lord Browne raises in Dymocks at paragraph 25.2). Funding is given a broad definition. It not only includes furnishing funds by which the litigation can be conducted but it also includes waiving entitlement to those funds. In short allowing the company to retain funds sufficient to enable it to conduct litigation was tantamount to funding. In Vaughan v Jones [2006] EWHC 2123 (Ch) David Richards J (as he then was) had to consider whether to make a non-party costs order and in that context he too considered the question of funding. At paragraphs 23 to 25 he observed that:

“23 …… If funds are provided to a litigant by way of loan with no further involvement by the lender and no interest in the litigation conferred on the lender, a costs order against the lender would not ordinarily be appropriate…… In my judgment, this is the correct approach as regards ordinary commercial lenders. Loans made on non-commercial terms for ulterior purposes are in a different category and may, depending on the circumstances, constitute funding which can justify an order for costs against the lender.

24.  Those who not only fund litigation but benefit from it will ordinarily find that the discretion to make an order for costs against them is exercised……….

25.  The relevant benefits have in all the authorities to which I was referred been a financial benefit which would have resulted directly from success by the funded party in the litigation…”

28.	There is a further principle to be derived from Vaughan to which Mr Fennell referred me and which can be found at paragraph 41 of the report of that case:

“41.  An unsatisfactory feature of the case was that the grounds relied on by Mr Vaughan were not clearly set out in one document. Mr and Mrs Fowler were faced with something of a moving target and it was a matter about which their counsel protested at an earlier directions hearing as well as at the hearing before me. I consider it desirable, both for the respondents and for the court, that there should in these cases be a concise statement of the grounds and essential allegations of fact relied on by the applicant. This could be amended or supplemented, if the need arose”.

29.	A complaint made by Mr Fennell is that the case before me has been put on the basis that not only did MP Leeds and MPL fund the claimant but they also controlled the litigation whereas hitherto the application had been put on the basis that MPL and/or MP Leeds merely funded the litigation. 

30.	Finally, since this is an exercise in discretion, it is acknowledged that there is jurisdiction appropriate to make an order that a non-party pay a percentage of the costs or the costs incurred over a specific period. The power to do so is not gained from the court’s general costs jurisdiction provided by Part 44 but rather simply part of the exercise of its discretion to reach a just result. The authority of that proposition is Myatt v National Coal Board [2007] EWCA Civ 307.

Discussion

31.	The application is supported by a witness statement by Ms Marie Broadhead. It sets out the evidence given at trial which prompts this application. In his evidence, Mr Nuttall stated expressly that MPL and MP Leeds have funded the action. The following exchange took place between Mr Jory and Mr Nuttall:

Q. “I want to know about the funding of these proceedings because clearly MBR (the claimant) has not been funding them”

A. “The funding has come partly from MPL… Well, the majority has come from MPL. MP Leeds has also assisted with the funding

Q. Even though it is not a shareholder?

A.  No just out of my moral obligation. I’m only a 20% shareholder. MPL is an 80% shareholder anyway

Q.  So Mr Gittins has said you got us into this mess you can pay for getting us out of it

A.  He’s a nice man and never actually said it in such terms but I’m sure that is exactly how he feels.

Q.  And you have understood that from the communications you have had with him?

A.   I feel more guilty than he is accused me of being.

Q.  All right. In terms of giving instructions for how this litigation is to be conducted where do those instructions come from?

A.  Ultimately from Mr Gittins

Q.  He has the final word?

A.  He’s got the cheque book

32.	Mr Jory’s exchanges with Mr Gittings in relation to funding was slightly more extensive. They were as follows:

Q. Mr Gittins, finally, in relation to funding this action how has it been funded? Who has provided the money? MBR does not have it.

A.  By the ultimate parent company.

Q.  The ultimate parent company is? The American company?

A. The American company

Q. So the American company has provided the money?

A. Yes

Q. Did you see to that yourself?

A. Yes

Q. As the American company has been providing the money, has the American company been directing what happens in the litigation through you?

A. No it’s been more than interested in the litigation but not directing.

Q. Through you? You have been involved in this?

A. Well, Mr Nuttall and I clearly have had many conversations about it.

Q. Yes

A. Yes

Q. My understanding from Mr Nuttall was that he has no financial interest in the outcome of these proceedings.

A. No

Q. And you do?

A. I do

Q. You, either directly or indirectly through your business interests, do

A. I do

Q. So would it be a fair assumption for me to make that for that reason as well Mr Nuttall takes his orders from you?

A. I don’t think Mr Nuttall takes his orders from anybody.

Q. I’m going to suggest to you, understanding his evidence, he is prepared to accept you are the owner of everything. Effectively ultimately you are the person with the last shout.

A. I think that slightly different isn’t it? If he’s saying that if there is a major decision to be taken it will be down to me, probably. Probably.

Q. Yes, I think that is what I am asking.

A. But that’s probably different to him taking orders from me.

33.	Mr Nuttall and Mr Gittings have both filed witness statements in response to this application. Mr Nuttall’s written evidence is that the claimant’s legal bills were paid by MPL. He does not accept that any payments were made by MP Leeds. He does not deny that on occasions money was transferred from MP Leeds to MPL but the control of the movement of funds lay with MPL and not MP Leeds. His evidence was that these transfers were characterised by MP Leeds as loans to MPL and that ultimately MPL’s indebtedness to MP Leeds exceeded £1 million. The purpose to which the loans were put, even if that included funding the legal costs of the litigation, were not matters within the control of MP Leeds. 

34.	At paragraph 20 of his witness statement he explains that his reference to “moral obligation” in his oral evidence at trial was simply “a reference to the transfer of funds from MP Leeds to MPL” and, whilst he did not have control of this movement of funds and did not know what the funds were used for, it may have been that some of them were used to contribute towards the claimant’s legal costs. He was clear that not only do MP Leeds have no interest in the outcome of the litigation or stand to benefit from it, MP Leeds did not at any time fund the litigation knowingly or actively.

35.	There is clearly some tension between this account and that given at trial. It is difficult to see how what he says in his witness statement squares with his belief that he had a moral obligation to assist in the funding of this litigation. 

36.	Mr Fennell makes the point that Mr Nuttall has made a witness statement in which he denies that MP Leeds consciously or directly made a contribution to the costs of the litigation and that if Mr Armitage took issue with that contention then he should have required Mr Nuttall to come and subject himself to cross examination. He points out that the directions leading to this hearing made provision for that. In those circumstances he argues that I must determine this matter on the basis of what Mr Nuttall says in his witness statement.

37.	Miss Toman makes the point that this is intended to be a summary procedure with the court making its order based on the evidence given and facts found at trial. She argues that in the circumstances there is no need to deal with this matter on the basis that what Mr Nuttall says in his witness statement is true because the authorities make it clear that what matters is what he said at trial. 

38.	There is perhaps an analogy with applications for summary judgement. The commentary in the White Book paragraph 24.2.5 when dealing with summary judgement states:

“the respondent’s case must carry some degree of conviction: the court is not required to accept without analysis everything said by a party in his statements before the court……. In evaluating the prospects of success of the claim or defence judges are not required to abandon the critical faculties. However, the proper disposal of an issue under Part 24 does not involve the judge in conducting a mini trial. Therefore, the court hearing a Part 24 application should be wary of trying issues of fact on evidence where the facts are apparently credible and are to be set against the facts being advanced by the other side. Choosing between them is the function of the trial judge, not the judge on an interim application, unless there is some inherent improbability in what is being asserted or some extraneous evidence which would contradict it”. 

39.	Miss Toman points out that, over and above what he said at the trial which itself is compelling enough, there is some extraneous documentary evidence which contradicts Mr Nuttall’s evidence that MP Leeds made no direct contribution to the claimant’s costs and that I am entitled to take that into account in concluding whether in fact credence can be given to what Mr Nuttall says in his witness statement even though he was not subjected to cross-examination.   

40.	In the hearing bundle at volume 2 page 546 there is an extract from MPL’s ledger which shows that, on 30 April 2015, at least one legal bill was paid by MP Leeds. In addition, there is an email dated 31 March 2015 from Lupton Fawcett Dennison Till, MPL and MP Leeds’s solicitors, in which they say unequivocally state that MPL and MP Leeds have both contributed to costs.

41.	Furthermore, and in any event, she argues that the evidence given by Mr Nuttall in his witness statement clearly indicates that MP Leeds has an interest in the outcome of the litigation. It will be remembered that in the litigation the claimant asserted that its losses for breach of contract exceeded £1 million. MP Leeds is, according to Mr Nuttall’s witness statement, owed in excess of £1 million by MPL. MPL’s balance sheet, to be found at page 204 is negative. It is axiomatic, suggests Miss Toman, that in those circumstances MP Leeds has an obvious interest in the claimant securing victory in the litigation since it will put MPL in funds with which to repay its debt.

42.	Mr Gittins in his witness statement agrees that MPL funded this litigation for the claimant. He argues that a Shareholders Agreement which was entered into coincident with the execution of the Asset Purchase Agreement and the Management Services Agreement gave MPL a contractual right to commence legal proceedings on behalf of MBR in the event of any breach of any of the agreements entered into by the defendants. At paragraph 12 of his witness statement he recounts that there was a verbal agreement reached regarding the loan between himself acting for MPL and Mr Nuttall acting for the claimant and that, since it was felt that the defendants were in breach of the agreements, MPL would lend the claimant money in respect of the litigation. 

43.	Mr Gittins makes it clear that the loan was not secured and no interest was applied. It was due for repayment on demand at the conclusion of the litigation. He makes the point at paragraph 16, that had the claimant been successful in its litigation and recovered its costs it would have been in a position to repay the loan given it by MPL. The litigation having been unsuccessful, the loan has now been written off. He too says that MP Leeds paid no legal bills albeit that there is apparently the ledger to which I refer at  paragraph 40 above which suggests otherwise.

44.	He contends in his witness statement that MPL has no interest in the outcome of the litigation other than the recovery of the funds it lent to the claimant, it was simply providing financial assistance to the claimant so that it could fund litigation. Miss Toman asks me to regard that assertion with some scepticism. She argues that there is contemporaneous documentation which contradicts it. The Asset Purchase Agreement provides that MPL guarantee and indemnify the defendants against any breach by the claimant of its obligations. A crucial aspect of the litigation concerned the claimant’s liability to pay £250,000 to the defendants. If the claimant was liable for that money then the agreement provided that MPL underwrote that liability. In addition, Mr Armitage has undertaken an exercise as to what MPL would have gained had this litigation been successful for it. He sets this out in witness statement dated 3 July 2017 at paragraph 35. He calculates that, in broad terms, bearing in mind the losses that the claimant asserted had arisen by virtue of the defendants’ alleged breaches of contract, success would have seen something like £638,000 available to come into the coffers of MPL. It is obvious under those circumstances, argues Miss Toman, that MPL had a powerful interest in the outcome of the litigation over and above just the repayment of their loan.

45.	Mr Gittins’s witness statement does not seek to clarify in any way the exchanges that he had from the witness box with Mr Jory at the trial in which he acknowledged that either directly or indirectly he was the person with the “last shout” in connection with the direction that the relevant companies took with regard to this litigation. The witness statement does however indicate that MPL was funding the litigation rather than the LLC but that in itself is not inconsistent with his oral evidence if the LLC was in turn lending money to MPL to fund the litigation.

46.	As has been emphasised, a crucial question is to consider who is the real party in this litigation. On 3 July 2017 Mr Armitage’s solicitors asked Lupton Fawcett Dennison Till for a copy of its letter of engagement with MPL and the claimant in respect of the work undertaken during the litigation. On 18 July 2017 Lupton Fawcett Dennison Till responded to the effect that to the extent that they existed, they are subject to litigation privilege. A list of documents produced by MPL on 20 July 2017 also asserts privilege in respect of certain documents. Miss Toman argues that this is itself evidence that MPL was a client of Lupton Fawcett Dennison Till on the basis that how else would that privilege arise?

47.	Miss Toman argues that in the circumstances the position of MPL falls squarely within the criteria for the making of an order as set out in the authorities to which I have referred and in particular Dymocks on the basis:

a.	That it is obvious that MPL funded the litigation to a very large extent, indeed not only is that not denied, Mr Gittins argues that MP Leeds made no contribution to the funding at all, in which event one may assume that MPL provided all the funding.  Whatever Mr Gittins said at trial about the funding coming from the LLC, the fact is that it is not disputed that funding came directly from MPL.

b.	That clearly MPL was not a pure funder in the sense used in Dymocks paragraph 25. 2). MPL did have an interest in the litigation and stood to benefit from its successful outcome. The obligation to pay the defendants any monies due to them pursuant to the agreement was guaranteed by MPL. MPL’s interest in the outcome of this litigation was considerable and, contrary to the assertions Mr Gittins, well exceeded simply the prospects of recovering the loan made to the claimant to fund this litigation. 

c.	Any loan made was clearly a non-commercial one. It was an unsecured, interest free loan to an insolvent company to fund litigation which was hotly contested. 

d.	It is evident from Mr Gittins’ own mouth at the trial, and indeed that of Mr Nuttall, that MPL, through Mr Gittins, exercised control and that MPL was the real party to this litigation. She refers me to the evidence of Mr Gittins at trial that he had the “last shout”. And the evidence of Mr Nuttall that Mr Gittins had the final word on how this litigation was to be conducted because he had “the cheque book”. In addition, there is the suggestion that MPL was indeed a client of Lupton Fawcett Dennison Till in respect of the litigation, for the reasons set out in paragraph 46 above.

e.	Insofar as special considerations apply to directors, MPL was not a director of the claimant and thus so far as the absence of impropriety is a bar to a non-party order against a director, that is not relevant in this case. The fact that MPL was a major shareholder does not engage the special considerations applicable to directors who may have obligations to take proceedings to protect the company’s interests if necessary and who, as officers the company, are in a wholly different position to shareholders. She reminds me that in Weatherford, Akenhead J took into account, as one of the factors to be considered in the exercise of the discretion, the fact that the non-party was at all material times the major shareholder in the unsuccessful companies in the litigation with which he was concerned. (See paragraph 24 (a) of that judgment).

f.	Citing PR Records Ltd to which I refer in paragraph 19 above, MPL funded the claimant who was thus the party on the offensive. The choice to bring this litigation was that of the claimant. Mr Armitage had no choice but to defend it.

g.	Whilst a cost warning is not a prerequisite for a non-party costs order, a costs warning was given in this case in a letter written by Mr Armitage’s solicitors on 20 March 2015.

h.	Whilst no application for security of costs was made, such an application is not a prerequisite and in fact the decision not to make such an application was made not least because the claimant’s solicitors clearly indicated in a letter dated 12 November 2012 that it would be resisted on the basis that the claimant had a bona fide claim with reasonable prospects of success, any award of security of costs would be likely to have a stifling effect on a genuine claim and that the claimant’s financial circumstances had been brought about by the unlawful conduct of the defendants. It was therefore, suggests Miss Toman, a perfectly reasonable decision to make in this case, not to incur the costs involved in such an application where the prospects of its success may have been questionable.

i.	Whilst Dymocks makes clear that a non-party costs order is exceptional, that does not mean that it is necessarily unusual. It means no more than “outside the ordinary run of cases where parties pursue or defend claims for their own benefit and at their own expense”.

j.	That in answer to the ultimate question posed in Dymocks paragraph 25.1 namely whether in all the circumstances it is just to make the order, Miss Toman argues that in the light of the above that question must clearly be answered in the affirmative. In the end, she argues that Mr Armitage has been put to enormous expense in defending a claim which, if successful, would have benefited MPL, that the claimant could only bring the claim on the basis that it was funded on a non-commercial basis by (at least) MPL which, through Mr Gittins was the guiding hand in this litigation and clearly played an active part in it and that if an order is not made a vindicated defendant will be left enormously out of pocket.

48.	I now turn to her submissions in relation to the appropriateness of an order against MP Leeds. Miss Toman argues:

a.	There is evidence of funding notwithstanding what is said by Mr Nuttall in his witness statement and notwithstanding that he was not cross-examined about it. There is his evidence given at the trial. She reminds me that, on the authority of Deutsche Bank, consideration of the appropriateness or otherwise of an order should be based on evidence given at the trial. There is in addition the purchase ledger entry and the email of the 31 March 2015 from the claimant solicitor confirming that MP Leeds as well as MPL has contributed towards costs both of which I refer in paragraph 38 above. Furthermore, bearing in mind the “moral obligation” that Mr Nuttall seems to have felt towards MPL in respect of the situation in which the claimant found itself, it is unlikely that in so far as any funding advanced by MP Leeds was by way of a loan, that it was on commercial terms.

b.	It does not matter that MPL, through Mr Gittins, played a more predominant role behind the scenes in this litigation than MP Leeds. She refers me to the principles enunciated in PR Records Ltd to which I refer at paragraph 20 above to the effect that if the non-party had some role to play in funding or control then they are vulnerable to a non-party costs order.

c.	That MP Leeds had much to gain from the claimant’s success in this litigation. If the financial benefits to MPL of successful litigation are even remotely like those suggested by Mr Armitage, to which I referred in paragraph 44 above, then this would put MPL in a position to repay its loans to MP Leeds which, it will be remembered, exceeded £1 million. She reminds me that MPL’s balance sheet was negative and it is thus difficult to see how this loan could be repaid save from the proceeds of the successful litigation.

d.	For the reasons set out in paragraph 46 above, there is a suggestion that MP Leeds was also a client of Lupton Fawcett Dennison Till for the purposes of this litigation.

e.	In paragraph 18 of her skeleton argument, Miss Toman argues that;

“it is appropriate that where, as here, one group company (MP Leeds) has been used to fund a claim by another group company (the claimant) for the benefit of a 3rd group company (MPL) then all 3 companies should be liable for costs. Otherwise, the group as a whole would be able to avoid liability for costs by ensuring that neither the claimant nor the company in whose interest the litigation is pursued is in funds. In the present case orders should be made against MP Leeds and MPL to ensure that this does not occur”

49.	Mr Fennell argues that it would be unjust to make a non-party costs order against either MPL or MP Leeds. He makes some general assertions applicable to both of his clients:

a.	That this application should be dealt with on the basis of what Mr Gittins and Mr Nuttall say in their witness statements since they were available for cross examination but Miss Toman declined the opportunity to do so. 

b.	That this application has been presented on a basis which is at variance with that which was presaged by the application itself and the witness statement in support. He argues that much has been made at the hearing of the issue of control as well as the issue of funding. He draws attention to the fact that at no stage prior to exchange of skeleton arguments has there been a reference to an allegation of control by MPL and/or MP Leeds over the claimant as a basis for a non-party costs order. He argues therefore that there has been a moving target in the sense used by David Richard J in Vaughan to which I refer in paragraph 28 above.

c.	That there can be no sensible suggestion of impropriety in the manner in which this litigation was conducted. He points out that the substantive judgment in the litigation found that there had been breaches of the agreement by one or more of the defendants and the fact that they may not have resulted in loss is neither here nor there in so far as this application is concerned. More importantly, he points out that there were no adverse findings of fact or conclusions in the substantive judgment in relation to the claimant’s conduct and there is nothing therefore to suggest any bad faith, improper motive or anything similar on the part of the claimant or its management.

d.	He acknowledges that issues relating to impropriety are particularly germane in consideration of whether a director of a party to the litigation should be made the subject of a non-party costs order and that neither MPL nor MP Leeds were directors of the claimant. He argues however that nonetheless issues of impropriety or the absence of it are relevant in a consideration of the exercise of discretion particularly where, as here, MPL is a major shareholder in the claimant. He points out that the White Book sets out a list of entities who are vulnerable to a non-party costs order and shareholders and members of the same group of companies as the claimant are conspicuous by their absence.

e.	That it would be unjust to make a non-party costs order (which is after all the critical test). He points out that if MPL and/or MP Leeds had been directors of the claimant then in the absence of impropriety a non-party costs order would be highly unlikely. Why, he asks, should it be different when the claimant goes to a group member to obtain financial assistance because such assistance will be to the mutual benefit of the group?

f.	That no application for security of costs was made and that whilst this is not fatal to a non-party costs order, it is a consideration. He cites the observations of Millet LJ in Metalloy Supplies Ltd to which I refer in paragraph 26 above. He argues that Mr Armitage chose to deal with a company (the claimant) with limited resources when entering into an agreement with it. If litigation arises out of it then that was a risk that he took. He argues that the mere fact that the claimant’s solicitors pointed out to the defendants’ solicitors the basis upon which they may resist an application for security of the costs does not mean that such an application should not be made and that the reason for not doing so is inadequate.

g.	That there is very little evidence of control of this litigation by either MPL or MP Leeds. For the purpose of this argument he does not dispute that there is evidence that Mr Gittins may have had some control but he argues that this does not mean that MPL and/or MP Leeds have such control. They are after all separate entities both to each other and to Mr Gittins.

h.	That this satellite litigation concerning non-party costs orders is disproportionate in all circumstances bearing in mind that the ultimate outcome of the case was simply an order for the payment by the claimant to the defendants of £51,000.

50.	Mr Fennell has some specific observations in relation to each of his clients;

51.	As regards MPL:

a.	There is of course the point that I make above in paragraph 48g that there is no evidence that Mr Gittins as opposed to MPL exercised control over the litigation insofar as any control was exercised.

b.	That this litigation was for the benefit of a subsidiary company and thus the Montpelier Group as a whole. The support of the holding company under those circumstances namely MPL is valid and justified.

52.	As regards MP Leeds:

a.	The contemporaneous evidence given by Mr Nuttall at trial and supported by Mr Gittins does not support the contention that MP Leeds had any control over the course of this litigation at all. 

b.	Even if one ignores what Mr Nuttall has to say in his witness statement on the basis that what matters is what he said at trial, there is little in the way of evidence of funding to any significant degree by MP Leeds. Even Mr Nuttall’s evidence at trial cannot be taken to imply that MP Leeds contributed a great deal. Mr Nuttall’s evidence was that MPL was the funder but MP Leeds “has also assisted with the funding”. That does not throw any light on the extent of the funding. The ledger entry to which reference has been made does not take the matter much further because it is unclear what amount was involved and the email from the claimant’s solicitors cannot be assumed to mean that MP Leeds’s contribution was significant or indeed that if that contribution had not been made that this litigation would not have been pursued.

Conclusion

53.	I have concluded that it is appropriate to make a non-party costs order against MPL but not against MP Leeds.

54.	As regards MPL, I come to that conclusion for the following reasons and based upon the matters that I set out above: 

a.	I am satisfied that MPL was the vehicle through which Mr Gittins funded this litigation. Since, even on Mr Gittins’ evidence, this litigation was funded by means of an interest-free unsecured loan it clearly cannot be said that it was funded on commercial terms.

b.	It is clear that MPL had much to gain from the successful outcome to this litigation both in terms of its ceasing to be vulnerable for the payment of £250,000 under its guarantee but also on the basis that a successful outcome would give rise to the prospect of the significant additional payments to which I have already referred. It is for this reason that I take the view that the distinction that Mr Fennell draws between Mr Gittins on the one hand and MPL on the other and which I refer to in paragraph 48g above does not really assist him. I am satisfied that MPL was the real party in this litigation even if the fact they became so was decision of Mr Gittins. It may be that Mr Gittins is susceptible to a non-party costs order, on the other hand he may not be.  That is not a matter that I have to decide but whether he is or not does not mean that MPL is not on the basis that it was the vehicle through which this funding was provided and which would directly benefit from the successful outcome to the litigation.

c.	There is clear evidence that MPL was exercising control. That was the evidence of Mr Nuttall at trial and it was not in any real sense disputed by Mr Gittins at trial. Even however if MPL was not exercising control that is not a bar to an order on the basis of paragraph 29 of Dymocks which indicates that an order should generally be made simply where it is established that the non-party has promoted or funded proceedings by an insolvent company solely or substantially for his own benefit.

d.	I acknowledge the fact that MPL owns 50% of the shares in the claimant. I do not accept that that shareholding gives rise to the same special rules that apply to directors funding litigation. I acknowledge that the interests of directors and shareholders may well often elide but the status of directors and shareholders is completely different. The former are officers of the company in respect of whom various responsibilities to act in the best interests of the company repose by statute. I accept that there has been no impropriety but I do not accept that that gives rise to the same problems for an applicant for a non-party costs order against a shareholder as it would if such an application were made against a director. I remind myself that in Weatherford the very fact that the non-party was a major shareholder went into the scales in favour of making a non-party costs order.

e.	As I have already said, I am satisfied that in effect MPL was the real party in this litigation and essentially had a great deal to gain from it, particularly bearing in mind that the claimant was a dormant company. I do not see how in those circumstances, once again quoting from paragraph 29 of Dymocks, that it can realistically be said that MPL was acting in the interests of the claimant rather than in its own interests when it funded (or predominantly funded) this litigation.

f.	I recognise that non-party costs orders are exceptional but it is also appropriate to recognise the specific meaning that that word is given in the context of these applications namely that it means simply that they are outside the usual run of orders made in cases.

g.	I accept that this application was based predominantly on funding rather than control and that issues of control were raised for the first time only in Miss Toman’s skeleton argument. I agree with her that it must have been very clear that control was also being asserted in the light of the evidence given at trial by Mr Nuttall and Mr Gittins and which was set out verbatim in the witness statement in support of the application. However even if I am wrong in taking account of control for the purposes of this application my conclusion would have been the same. It is clear that control is not a prerequisite. Control is important and, on the basis of paragraph 25.3 of Dymocks, if both funding and control are established, justice will normally require a non-party costs order, but absence of control of the litigation is not a bar to an order where otherwise it would be just to make it.

h.	I accept that there has been no impropriety and while that is a factor where, as here, the respondent to the application is not the director of the unsuccessful party the absence of impropriety does not preclude the making of a non-party costs order. That much is clear from paragraph 33 of Dymocks.

i.	I do not overlook that no application for security of the costs was made. That of course is not fatal to an application for a non-party costs order but it is a factor to be considered. The decision not to apply for security was in my view one which the defendants could reasonably reach in the circumstances in the light of the response that they got from the claimant’s solicitors when they raise the issue of security. In my view, it would be wrong to make an application for security of the costs a prerequisite to a successful application for a non-party costs order. It would essentially mean that generally a non-party costs order could only be made where the claimant was a company where there had been an unsuccessful application for security of costs.

j.	I do not consider a non-party costs order to be disproportionate. This was a significant claim for over £1million and the costs are clearly substantial. 

k.	In the end, it seems to me that it is just that MPL, as the predominant if not the only funder and who had much to gain by the successful litigation should be responsible for the costs incurred by the defendants in successfully defending it. To borrow the words of Fisher J in the New Zealand case of Arklow which I refer to in paragraph 26 above, it would be wrong “to allow someone to fund litigation in the hope of gaining a benefit without the corresponding risk that that person will share in the costs of the proceedings if they ultimately fail.”  In addition, it must be regarded as highly unlikely that this litigation would have seen the light of day in the form that it did had MPL not been prepared to fund it bearing in mind the fact that the claimant was a dormant and insolvent company. Even if that were not so however, there is simply ample evidence that MPL was the real party to this litigation because it held the purse strings and it would have predominantly benefited from a successful outcome.

55.	I have concluded that MP Leeds should not be subject to an order for the following reasons:

a.	I am not satisfied that they were a real party to this litigation. I accept that there can be more than one real party to the litigation but there is no evidence that MP Leeds’s contribution to funding was so meaningful that this litigation depended upon it. There is equally no significant evidence of MP Leeds exerting any control.
b.	I accept that it had something to gain from a successful outcome in that MPL would then be in funds which could be used to discharge debts it owed to MP Leeds. But it had no control over how MPL spent its money. MPL may have used any monies received by way of dividend or otherwise to reduce its indebtedness to MP Leeds, on the other hand it may not have done. The benefit to MP Leeds therefore of a successful outcome to this litigation was not in that sense a direct benefit but really no more than a contingent benefit. At any rate, it is hard to see it as the sort of benefit that derives directly from success by the funded party to which David Richards J referred in paragraph 25 of Vaughan.

c.	I do not accept the argument put by Miss Toman to which I refer in paragraph 48e above, namely that it is appropriate to make an order against MP Leeds on the basis that it funded one group company for the benefit of another group company. As I have made clear, I do not accept that it has been established that MP Leeds funded the litigation to a sufficient extent to justify the making of a non-party costs order against it, nor that it had any material control over the litigation or that it was the real party or even one of two real parties.

d.	I acknowledge that the position may conceivably arise where the group as a whole might endeavour to avoid liability of the costs by ensuring that neither the claimant nor MPL is in funds. I observe that it is not normally the position that the court will make an order against an entity just because there is a possibility that another party against whom an order is made may take steps to avoid satisfaction of a judgment.  I do observe however that if that were to occur with the result that MPL was unable to pay the costs to the 4th defendant then he has the option of petitioning for the winding up of MPL and, as the 4th defendant well knows, if a winding up order is made and a liquidator appointed, the liquidator could then investigate the circumstances in which MPL may have divested itself of assets or otherwise put them beyond reach of its creditors and, if that was done in contemplation of avoiding liability, the appropriate proceedings to set aside that transaction or those transactions could be taken. In any event, it strikes me that the position of the 4th defendant is far stronger in this case where it will have a right of recovery against the holding company which owns 80% of the shares in MP Leeds. 

e.	In addition, in the event that it is being asserted, I do not accept that it is right in principle to make an order against MP Leeds simply because it is a group company. Nowhere in the jurisprudence is it suggested that that is a basis for a non-party costs order where the other criteria to which I have extensively referred have not been established. 

f.	I have considered whether it is appropriate to make a partial order for costs against MP Leeds on the authority of Myatt to which I refer in paragraph 30 above. I do not think that such an order against MP Leeds is appropriate. Such an order would only be appropriate if I had concluded that at least to some extent MP Leeds was a real party to the litigation and that it was just to make such an order. I am not satisfied that MP Leeds was a real party to this litigation in any material degree at all because all the evidence points to the guiding hand or what can colloquially be termed the “organ grinder” here being Mr Gittins through the vehicle of his company, MPL.

Proposed order

56.	In the circumstances, I propose to order that MPL do pay the costs of Mr Armitage of the litigation on the same terms as such order was made against the claimant but to refuse Mr Armitage’s application for a non-party costs order against MP Leeds.

57.	I should add for the sake of completeness that the conclusions that I have reached would be the same even if the evidence of Mr Nuttall and Mr Gittins contained in their witness statements was accepted in its entirety. Having said that I do agree with Miss Toman that the authorities clearly suggest that applications of this nature require to be considered on the basis of any evidence relating to funding/control that was given at trial rather than that contained in subsequent witness statements. 

Final Remarks

I am grateful to counsel for their very able assistance in this matter.

HHJ Saffman