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Cite as: [1970] AC 132, [1969] UKHL 1

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JISCBAILII_CASE_CRIME

    Parliamentary Archives,
    HL/PO/JU/4/3/1188

    HOUSE OF LORDS

    SWEET (A.P.)

    v.
    PARSLEY

    Lord Reid
    Lord Morris of Borth-y-Guest

    Lord Pearce

    Lord Wilberforce

    Lord Diplock


    Lord Reid

    MY LORDS,

    The Appellant was convicted at Woodstock Petty Sessions on 14th
    September 1967 on a charge that on the 16th June 1967 she was concerned
    in the management of certain premises at Fries Farm, Oxfordshire, which
    were used for the purpose of smoking cannabis contrary to section 5(6) of the
    Dangerous Drugs Act 1965. She was fined £25 and ordered to pay £12 18s. 0d.
    costs. It appears from the Case Stated by the Justices that the tenant of this
    farm had sublet the farmhouse to her at a rent of £28 per four weeks. She
    was a teacher at a school in Oxford and she had intended to reside in this
    house and travel daily by car to Oxford. This proved to be impracticable
    so she resided in Oxford and let rooms in the house at low rents to tenants
    allowing them the common use of the kitchen. She retained one room for her
    own use and visited the farm occasionally to collect her letters, to collect
    rent from her tenants and generally to see that all was well. Sometimes she
    stayed overnight but generally she did not.

    On 16th June, while she was in Oxford, the police went to the premises
    with a search warrant. They found receptacles hidden in the garden which
    contained cannabis resin and L.S.D. They also found in the kitchen cigarette
    ends containing cannabis, and an ornamental hookah pipe which belonged to
    the Appellant and which had, admittedly without her knowledge, been used
    for smoking this substance.

    The Justices found that " she did not enter the rooms of tenants except
    " by invitation and she had no reason to go into their rooms. Her own room
    " was occasionally used in her absence by other persons who lived in the house.
    " She had no knowledge whatever that the house was being used for the
    " purpose of smoking cannabis or cannabis resin. Once or twice when staying
    " overnight at the farmhouse the Appellant shouted if there was excessive
    " noise late at night but otherwise she did not exercise any control over the
    " tenants except that she collected rent from them ".

    A Divisional Court dismissed her appeal, holding that she had been
    concerned in the management of those premises. The reasons given for
    holding that she was managing the property were that she was in a position
    to choose her tenants: that she could put them under as long or as short
    a tenancy as she desired: and that she could make it a term of any letting
    that smoking of cannabis was not to take place. All these reasons would
    apply to every occupier who lets out parts of his house or takes in lodgers
    or paying quests. But this was held to be an absolute offence following the
    earlier decision in Yeandel v. Fisher [1966] 1 Q.B. 440.

    How has it come about that the Court of Appeal has felt bound to reach
    such an obviously unjust result? It has in effect held that it was carrying
    out the will of Parliament because Parliament has chosen to make this an
    absolute offence. And of course if Parliament has so chosen the Courts must
    carry out its will, and they cannot be blamed for any unjust consequences. But
    has Parliament so chosen?

    I dealt with this matter at some length in Warner v. Metropolitan Police
    Commissioner
    [1968] 2 All E.R. 356. On reconsideration I see no reason to
    alter anything which I there said. But I think that some amplification is
    necessary. Our first duty is to consider the words of the Act: if they shew
    a clear intention to create an absolute offence that is an end of the matter.
    But such cases are very rare. Sometimes the words of the section which
    creates a particular offence make it clear that mens rea is required in one

    2

    form or another. Such cases are quite frequent. But in a very large number
    of cases there is no clear indication either way. In such cases there has for
    centuries been a presumption that Parliament did not intend to make criminals
    of persons who were in no way blameworthy in what they did. That means
    that whenever a section is silent as to mens rea there is a presumption that,
    in order to give effect to the will of Parliament, we. must read in words
    appropriate to require mens rea.

    Where it is contended that an absolute offence has been created, the words
    of Alderson B. in Attorney-General v. Lockwood 9 R.W. 378 have often been
    quoted:

    " The rule of law, I take it, upon the construction of all statutes, and
    " therefore applicable to the construction of this, is, whether they be penal
    " or remedial, to construe them according to the plain literal and
    " grammatical meaning of the words in which they are expressed unless
    " that construction leads to a plain and clear contradiction of the apparent
    " purpose of the Act or to some palpable and evident absurdity." (page
    398)

    That is perfectly right as a general rule and where there is no legal
    presumption. But what about the multitude of criminal enactments where
    the words of the Act simply make it an offence to do certain things but
    where everyone agrees that there cannot be a conviction without proof of
    mens rea in some form? This passage, if applied to the present problem,
    would mean that there is no need to prove mens rea unless it would be " a
    " plain and clear contradiction of the apparent purpose of the Act" to
    convict without proof of mens rea. But that would be putting the presumption
    the wrong way round: for it is firmly established by a host of authorities that
    mens rea is an essential ingredient of every offence unless some reason can
    be found for holding that that is not necessary.

    It is also firmly established that the fact that other sections of the Act
    expressly require mens rea, for example because they contain the word
    " knowingly ", is not in itself sufficient to justify a decision that a section
    which is silent as to mens rea creates an absolute offence. In the absence of
    a clear indication in the Act that an offence is intended to be an absolute
    offence, it is necessary to go outside the Act and examine all relevant
    circumstances in order to establish that this must have been the intention
    of Parliament. I say " must have been " because it is a universal principle
    that if a penal provision is reasonably capable of two interpretations, that
    interpretation which is most favourable to the accused must be adopted.

    What, then, are the circumstances which it is proper to take into account?
    In the well known case of Sherras v. de Rutzen [1895] 1 Q.B. 918 Wright J.
    only mentioned the subject matter with which the Act deals. But he was
    there dealing with something which was one of a class of acts which " are
    " not criminal in any real sense but are acts which in the public interest
    " are prohibited under a penalty ". It does not in the least follow that when
    one is dealing with a truly criminal act it is sufficient merely to have regard
    to the subject matter of the enactment. One must put oneself in the position
    of a legislator. It has long been the practice to recognise absolute offences
    in this class of quasi-criminal acts, and one can safely assume that, when
    Parliament is passing new legislation dealing with this class of offences, its
    silence as to mens rea means that the old practice is to apply. But when one
    comes to acts of a truly criminal character, it appears to me that there are
    at least two other factors which any reasonable legislator would have in
    mind. In the first place a stigma still attaches to any person convicted of a
    truly criminal offence, and the more serious or more disgraceful the offence
    the greater the stimga. So he would have to consider whether, in a case of
    this gravity, the public interest really requires that an innocent person should
    be prevented from proving his innocence in order that fewer guilty men may
    escape. And equally important is the fact that fortunately the Press in this
    country are vigilant to expose injustice and every manifestly unjust conviction
    made known to the public tends to injure the body politic by undermining
    public confidence in the justice of the law and of its administration. But I

    3

    regret to observe that, in some recent cases where serious offences have
    been held to be absolute offences, the Court has taken into account no more
    than the wording of the Act and the Character and seriousness of the
    mischief which constitutes the offence.

    The choice would be much more difficult if there were no other way
    open than either mens rea in the full sense or an absolute offence; for there
    are many kinds of case where putting on the prosecutor the full burden of
    proving mens rea creates great difficulties and may lead to many unjust
    acquittals. But there are at least two other possibilities. Parliament has not
    infrequently transferred the onus as regards mens rea to the accused, so that,
    once the necessary facts are proved, he must convince the jury that on
    balance of probabilities he is innocent of any criminal intention. I find it
    a little surprising that more use has not been made of this method: but
    one of the bad effects of the decision of this House in Woolmington's case
    [1935] A.C. 462 may have been to discourage its use. The other method
    would be in effect to substitute in appropriate classes of cases gross negligence
    for mens rea in the full sense as the mental element necessary to constitute
    the crime. It would often be much easier to infer that Parliament must have
    meant that gross negligence should be the necessary mental element than
    to infer that Parliament intended to create an absolute offence. A variant
    of this would be to accept the view of Cave J. in Reg. v. Tolson 23 Q.B.D.
    165 at page 181. This appears to have been done in Australia where authority
    appears to support what Sir Owen Dixon said in Proudman v. Dayman
    [1941] 67 C.L.R. 536 at page 540:

    " As a general rule an honest and reasonable belief in a state of facts
    " which, if they existed, would make the defendant's act innocent affords
    " an excuse for doing what would otherwise be an offence."

    It may be that none of these methods is wholly satisfactory but at least
    the public scandal of convicting on a serious charge persons who are in no
    way blameworthy would be avoided.

    If this section means what the Court of Appeal have held that it means,
    then hundreds of thousands of people who sublet part of their premises or
    take in lodgers or are concerned in the management of residential premises
    or institutions are daily incurring a risk of being convicted of a serious offence
    in circumstances where they are in no way to blame. For the greatest vigilance
    cannot prevent tenants, lodgers or inmates or guests whom they bring in
    from smoking cannabis cigarettes in their own rooms. It was suggested in
    argument that this Appellant brought this conviction on herself because it
    is found as a fact that when the police searched the premises there were
    people there of the " beatnik fraternity ". But surely it would be going a
    very long way to say that persons managing premises of any kind ought to
    safeguard themselves by refusing accommodation to all who are of slovenly
    or exotic appearance, or who bring in guests of that kind. And unfortunately
    drug taking is by no means confined to those of unusual appearance.

    Speaking from a rather long experience of membership of both Houses, I
    assert with confidence that no Parliament within my recollection would have
    agreed to make an offence of this kind an absolute offence if the matter had
    been fully explained to it. So, if the Court ought only to hold an offence to
    be an absolute offence where it appears that that must have been the intention
    of Parliament, offences of this kind are very far removed from those which
    it is proper to hold to be absolute offences.

    I must now turn to the question what is the true meaning of section 5 of
    the 1965 Act. It provides:

    " If a person:

    " (a) being the occupier of any premises, permits those premises
    " to be used for the purpose of smoking cannabis or cannabis resin
    " or of dealing in cannabis or cannabis resin (whether by sale or
    " otherwise); or


    4

    " (b) is concerned in the management of any premises used for
    " any such purpose as aforesaid:

    " he shall be guilty of an offence against this Act."

    We are particularly concerned with paragraph (b), and the first question is
    what is meant by " used for any such purpose ". Is the " purpose " the
    purpose of the smoker or the purpose of the management? When in Warner's
    case I dealt briefly with Yeandel's case I thought it was the purpose of the
    smoker, but fuller argument in the present case brought out that an identical
    provision occurs in section 8(d) which deals with opium. This latter pro-
    vision has been carried on from the Dangerous Drugs Act 1920 and has
    obviously been copied into the later legislation relating to cannabis. It
    would require strong reasons—and there are none—to justify giving this
    provision a new meaning in section 5 different from that which it had in the
    1920 Act and now has in section 8 of the 1965 Act. I think that in section 8
    it is clear that the purpose is the purpose of the management. The first
    purpose mentioned is the purpose of the preparation of opium for smoking
    which can only be a purpose of the management. I believe that opium
    cannot be smoked casually anywhere at any time as can a cannabis cigarette.
    The section is dealing with " opium dens " and the like when the use of
    opium is the main purpose for which the premises are used. But it is a
    somewhat strained use of language to say that an ordinary room in a house is
    " used for the purpose " of smoking cannabis when all that happens is that
    some visitor lights a cannabis cigarette there. Looking to the origin and
    context of this provision, I have come to the conclusion that it cannot be
    given this wide meaning. No doubt this greatly reduces the scope of this
    provision when applied to the use of cannabis. But that is apt to happen
    when a draftsman simply copies an existing provision without regard to the
    different circumstances in which it is to operate. So if the purpose is the
    purpose of the management the question whether the offence with regard to
    opium in 1920 and now with regard to cannabis can hardly arise. It could
    only arise if, although the manager not only knew about cannabis smoking
    but conducted the premises for that purpose, some person concerned in the
    management had no knowledge of that. One would first have to decide
    whether a person who is not actually assisting in the management can be
    regarded as being " concerned in the management" although ignorant of the
    purpose for which the manager was using the premises. Even if such a
    person could be regarded as " concerned in the management" I am of
    opinion that, for the reasons which I have given, he could not be convicted
    without proof of mens rea.

    I would allow the appeal and quash the Appellant's conviction.

    Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest

    MY LORDS,

    It has frequently been affirmed and should unhesitatingly be recognised
    that it is a cardinal principle of our law that mens rea, an evil intention or
    a knowledge of the wrongfulness of the act, is in all ordinary cases an
    essential ingredient of guilt of a criminal offence. It follows from this that
    there will not be guilt of an offence created by statute unless there is mens
    rea
    or unless Parliament has by the statute enacted that guilt may be
    established in cases where there is no mens rea.

    To this effect were the words of Wright J. in Sherras v. De Rutzen [1895]
    1 Q.B.D. 918 and in Derbyshire v. Houlston in 1897 (66 L.J. Q.B.569). In
    the judgment of the Privy Council in Lim Chin Aik v. The Queen [1963]
    A.C. 160 the principle was amply expressed. At page 172 it was said:
    " That proof of the existence of a guilty mind is an essential ingredient of
    a crime at common law is not at all in doubt."

    5

    But as Parliament is supreme it is open to Parliament to legislate in
    such a way that an offence may be created of which someone may be found
    guilty though mens rea is lacking. There may be cases in which, as
    Channell J. said (at page 11) in Pearks Gunston & Tee Ltd. v. Southern
    Counties Dairies Ltd.
    [1902] 2 K.B.1—"the Legislature has thought it so
    important to prevent the particular act from being committed that it
    absolutely forbids it to be done; and if it is done the offender is liable to
    a penalty whether he had any mens rea or not and whether or not he
    intended to commit a breach of the law ".

    Thus in diverse situations and circumstances and for any one of a
    variety of reasons Parliament may see fit to create offences and make people
    responsible before criminal courts although there is an absence of mens rea.
    But I would again quote with appreciation (as I did in Warner's case the
    words of Lord Goddard C.J., in Brend v. Wood [1946] (175 L.T. 306), when
    he said (at page 307)—

    " It is of the utmost importance for the protection of the liberty
    " of the subject that a Court should always bear in mind that unless
    " a statute either clearly or by necessary implication rules out mens
    " rea as a constituent part of a crime, the Court should not find a
    " man guilty of an offence against the criminal law unless he has a
    " guilty mind."

    The intention of Parliament is expressed in the words of an enactment.
    The words must be looked at in order to see whether either expressly or
    by necessary implication they displace the general rule or presumption that
    mens rea is a necessary prerequisite before guilt of an offence can be found.
    Particular words in a statute must be considered in their setting in the
    statute and having regard to all the provisions of the statute and to its
    declared or obvious purpose. In 1848 in Attorney-General v. Lockwood
    9 M. & W. 378 Alderson B. at page 398 said—

    " The rule of law, I take it, upon the construction of all statutes

    " . . . . is whether they be penal or remedial, to construe them

    " according to the plain literal and grammatical meaning of the words
    " in which they are expressed, unless that construction leads to a
    " plain and clear contradiction of the apparent purpose of the Act
    " or to some palpable and evident absurdity."

    It must be considered, therefore, whether by the words of a penal statute
    it is either express or implied that there may be a conviction without mens
    rea
    or, in other words, whether what is called an absolute offence is created.

    In Dyke v. Elliott, The " Gauntlet" L.R.4 P.C. App. 184 it was said
    at page 191—

    " No doubt all penal statutes are to be construed strictly, that is to
    " say, the Court must see that the thing charged as an offence is within
    " the plain meaning of the words used, and must not strain the words
    " on any notion that there has been a slip, that there has been a casus
    " omissus, that the thing is so clearly within the mischief that it must
    " have been intended to be included and would have been included if
    " thought of. On the other hand, the person charged has a right to
    " say that the thing charged, although within the words, is not within
    " the spirit of the enactment. But where the thing is brought within
    " the words and within the spirit, there a penal enactment is to be
    " construed, like any other instrument, according to the fair common-
    " sense meaning of the language used, and the Court is not to find or
    " make any doubt or ambiguity in the language of a penal statute,
    " where such doubt or ambiguity would clearly not be found or made
    " in the same language in any other instrument."

    The inquiry must be made, therefore, whether Parliament has used words
    which expressly enact or impliedly involve that an absolute offence is
    created. Though sometimes help in construction is derived from noting
    the presence or the absence of the word " knowingly " no conclusive test

    6

    can be laid down as a guide in finding the fair, reasonable and common-
    sense meaning of language. But in considering whether Parliament has
    decided to displace what is a general and somewhat fundamental rule it
    would not be reasonable lightly to impute to Parliament an intention to
    create an offence in such a way that someone could be convicted of it who
    by all reasonable and sensible standards is without fault.

    There have been many cases in recent periods in which in reference
    to a variety of different statutory enactments questions have been raised
    whether absolute offences have been created. Some of these cases illustrate
    the difficulties that are created if Parliament uses language or phrases as to
    the meaning of which legitimate differences of opinion can arise. I do not
    propose to recite or survey these cases because, in my view, the principles
    which should guide construction are clear and, save to the extent that
    principles are laid down, the cases merely possess the interest which is
    yielded by seeing how different questions have, whether correctly or in-
    correctly, been decided in reference to varying sets of words in various
    different statutes.

    The question must always be—what has Parliament enacted? That is the
    question in the present case and to that I now turn. The wording of section 5
    of the Dangerous Drugs Act, 1965, is as follows: —

    " 5. If a person—

    " (a) being the occupier of any premises, permits those premises
    " to be used for the purpose of smoking cannabis or cannabis resin
    " or of dealing in cannabis or cannabis resin (whether by sale or
    " otherwise); or

    " (b) is concerned in the management of any premises used for
    " any such purpose as aforesaid he shall be guilty of an offence
    " against this Act."

    The words are nearly the same as and presumably were devised from words
    in section 5 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, 1920, concerning opium.

    In the present case the Appellant was charged with being concerned in the
    management of certain premises situate at Fries Farm which were used for
    the purpose of smoking cannabis or cannabis resin. I need not recite the
    facts which are set out in the Case Stated.

    It was for the prosecution to prove the guilt of the Appellant. It was
    found by the Magistrates that the Appellant had no knowledge whatsoever
    that cannabis had been smoked in the house. The prosecution contended
    that guilt can be established of the offence created by section 5(b) if a person
    is concerned in the management of premises in which cannabis is in fact
    smoked. The consequence was acknowledged and indeed asserted that if
    some persons managed a hostel containing say 50 to 100 rooms, and if on
    one day in one room an occupant smoked one cannabis cigarette without the
    knowledge of the persons managing, they would have no defence to a charge
    under section 5(b). If Parliament has so enacted, then the law must be
    enforced. But I am sure that that is not what Parliament has decreed.

    If someone is concerned in management there must at least be knowledge
    of what it is that is being managed: otherwise there could be no concern in
    it. If someone is concerned in the management of a building containing a
    number of separately let residential flats the concern in such case would be in
    the arrangements for the lettings and in the arrangements relating to lifts or
    staircases or the structure of the building as a whole. The concern would be
    in the management of premises used for residential purposes. In the ordinary
    course of things the landlord or the manager would have no right of entry
    into a flat and would have no concern with any normal reasonable and
    lawful activity within a flat. If a tenant, who was a non-smoker, had a
    guest one day who smoked a pipe of tobacco in the flat, it would be a
    strained and unnatural use of language to describe the flat which the tenant
    rented as being premises used for the purpose of smoking. It would be

    7

    equally strained and unnatural to describe the landlord or his agent as being
    concerned in the management of premises used for the purpose of smoking.
    If on an isolated occasion a tenant gave a showing of some cinematograph
    films to his friends, it would be unreasonable to describe the manager of the
    flats (who had no occasion to know of the film showing) as being one who
    was concerned in the management of premises used for the purpose of
    exhibiting films.

    If a tenant took sugar with his tea it would be fanciful to describe the flat
    as premises used for the purpose of putting sugar into tea.

    It seems to me, therefore, that the words " premises used for the purpose of
    smoking cannabis " are not happily chosen if they were intended to denote
    premises in which at any time cannabis is smoked. In my opinion, the words
    " premises used for the purpose of ..." denote a purpose which is other
    than quite incidental or casual or fortuitous: they denote a purpose which is
    or has become either a significant one or a recognised one though certainly
    not necessarily an only one. There is no difficulty in appreciating what is
    meant if it is said that premises are used for the purposes of a dance hall or
    a billiard hall or a bowling alley or a hairdressing saloon or a cafe. A new
    or additional use might, however, arise. It might happen that a house let as
    a private dwelling might come to be used as a brothel or for the purposes of
    prostitution. A room let for private occupation might come to be the resort
    of a number of people who wished to smoke opium so that the time would
    come when the room could rationally be described as a room used for the
    purpose of smoking opium.

    The words " concerned in the management of premises used for the
    purpose of " are, in my view, to be considered together and as one phrase.
    Even so the phrase may be capable of two meanings. It could denote the
    management of premises used for a certain purpose in the sense that the
    management is limited to management in respect of the premises themselves.
    It could denote the management of premises used for a certain purpose in
    the sense that the management was concerned either additionally or perhaps
    separately with the purpose for which the premises were used. Thus, if
    someone is said so be concerned in the management of premises used for
    the purpose of dancing, he could be someone concerned only in the manage-
    ment of the premises themselves, or he could be someone who additionally
    or possibly separately was concerned with the dancing. On either approach
    and with an ordinary use of words, it would seem to me that the person
    would be one who would have and would need to have knowledge of the
    use of the premises for the particular purpose.

    It is said that the intention of Parliament was to impose a duty on all
    persons concerned in the management of any premises to exercise vigilance
    to prevent the smoking of cannabis. If that had been the intention of
    Parliament different words would have been used. It would be possible
    for Parliament to enact, though it would be surprising if it did, that if
    anyone should at any time smoke cannabis on any premises then all those
    concerned in the management of those premises, whether they knew of the
    smoking or not, should automatically be guilty of a criminal offence. Yet
    this is in effect what it is now said that Parliament has enacted. The impli-
    cations are astonishing. Parliament would not only be indirectly imposing a
    duty upon persons concerned in the management of any premises requiring
    them to exercise complete supervision over all persons who enter the
    premises to ensure that no one of them should smoke cannabis, but Parlia-
    ment would be enacting that the persons concerned in the management would
    become guilty of an offence if, unknown to them, someone by surreptitiously
    smoking cannabis eluded the most elaborately devised measures of super-
    vision. There would not be guilt by reason of anything done nor even by
    reasons of any carelessness, but by reason of the unknown act of some
    unknown person whom it had not been found possible to control. When
    the range of possible punishments is remembered the unlikelihood that
    Parliament intended to legislate in such way becomes additionally apparent.


    8

    For the reasons that I have indicated I consider that on a fair reading
    of the phrase "concerned in the management of premises used for the
    " purpose of" a link is denoted between management and user for a
    purpose. To say that someone is concerned in the management of premises
    used for the purpose of smoking cannabis involves, in my view, that his
    management is with knowledge that the premises are so used. The wording
    of section 5(b) contains positive indications that mens rea is an essential
    ingredient of an offence. Even if, contrary to my view, it is not affirmatively
    enacted that there must be mens rea I cannot read the wording as enacting
    that there need not be mens rea. I find it wholly impossible to say that
    the statute has either clearly, or by necessary implication, ruled out mens rea
    as a constituent part of guilt.

    On the findings of the magistrates it follows that the Appellant was not
    guilty. I would, therefore, allow the appeal. Accordingly in my view the
    case should be remitted to the Divisional Court with a direction to quash
    the conviction.

    Lord Pearce

    MY LORDS,

    The prosecution contend that any person who is concerned in the
    management of premises where cannabis is in fact smoked even once, is
    liable, though he had no knowledge and no guilty mind. This is, they
    argue, a practical act intended to prevent a practical evil. Only by convicting
    some innocents along with the guilty can sufficient pressure be put upon
    those who make their living by being concerned in the management of
    premises. Only thus can they be made alert to prevent cannabis being
    smoked there. And if the prosecution have to prove knowledge or mens
    rea,
    many prosecutions will fail and many of the guilty will escape. I find
    that argument wholly unacceptable.

    The notion that some guilty mind is a constituent part of crime and
    punishment goes back far beyond our common law. And at common law
    mens rea is a necessary element in a crime. Since the Industrial Revolution
    the increasing complexity of life called into being new duties and crimes
    which took no account of intent. Those who undertake various industrial
    and other activities especially where these affect the life and health of the
    citizen may find themselves liable to statutory punishment regardless of
    knowledge or intent both in respect of their own acts or neglect and those of
    their servants. But one must remember that normally mens rea is still an
    ingredient of any offence. Before the Court will dispense with the necessity
    for mens rea it has to be satisfied that Parliament so intended. The mere
    absence of the word " knowingly " is not enough. But the nature of the
    crime, the punishment, the absence of social obloquy, the particular mischief
    and the field of activity in which it occurs, and the wording of the particular
    section and its context, may show that Parliament intended that the act
    should be prevented by punishment regardless of intent or knowledge.

    Viewing the matter on these principles, it is not possible to accept the
    prosecution's contention. Even granted that this were in the public health
    class of case, such as, for instance, are offences created to ensure that food
    shall be clean, it would be quite unreasonable. It is one thing to make a
    man absolutely responsible for all his own acts and even vicariously liable for
    his servants if he engages in a certain type of activity. But it is quite another
    matter to make him liable for persons over whom he has no control. The
    innocent hotel-keeper, the lady who keeps lodgings or takes paying guests,
    the manager of a cinema, the warden of a hostel, the matron of a hospital,
    the house-master and matron of a boarding school, all these, it is conceded,
    are on the prosecution's argument liable to conviction the moment that
    irresponsible occupants smoke cannabis cigarettes. And for what purpose
    is this harsh imposition laid on their backs? No vigilance by night or day
    can make them safe. The most that vigilance can attain is advance

    9

    knowledge of their own guilt. If a smell of cannabis comes from a sitting-
    room, they know that they have committed the offence. Should they then
    go at once to the police and confess their guilt in the hope that they will not
    be prosecuted? They may think it easier to conceal the matter in the hope
    that it may never be found out. For if, though morally innocent, they are
    prosecuted they may lose their livelihood, for thereafter, even though not
    punished, they are objects of suspicion. I see no real, useful object achieved
    by such hardship to the innocent. And so wide a possibility of injustice to
    the innocent could not be justified by any benefit achieved in the determent
    and punishment of the guilty. If, therefore, the words creating the offence
    are as wide in their application as the prosecution contend, Parliament
    cannot have intended an offence to which absence of knowledge or mens
    rea
    is no defence.

    Parliament might, of course, have taken what was conceded in argument
    to be a fair and sensible course. It could have said, in appropriate words,
    that a person is to be liable unless he proves that he had no knowledge or
    guilty mind. Admittedly, if the prosecution have to prove a defendant's
    knowledge beyond reasonable doubt, it may be easy for the guilty to escape.
    But it would be very much harder for the guilty to escape if the burden of
    disproving mens rea or knowledge is thrown on the defendant. And if
    that were done, innocent people could satisfy a jury of their innocence on
    a balance of probabilities. It has been said that a jury might be confused
    by the different nature of the onus of satisfying " beyond reasonable doubt"
    which the prosecution have to discharge and the onus " on a balance of
    probabilities " which lies on a defendant in proving that he had no know-
    ledge or guilt. I do not believe that this would be so in this kind of case.
    Most people can easily understand rules that express in greater detail that
    which their own hearts and minds already feel to be fair and sensible. What
    they find hard to understand is rules that go " against the grain " of their
    own commonsense. If a judge on a drug case, feeling disheartened, perhaps,
    after a close study of Warner's case, had given the jury no direction as to
    the law, and had simply said that they must consider the facts and do their
    best with the charge, I believe that they would evolve their duty in some
    such form as this ; " First, I suppose, we must make sure that there really
    was drug smoking on the premises " (or " that he really had drugs on him "
    or whatever the charge may be) "and then it is up to the defendant to
    persuade us that he did not know, or was not guilty for some other good
    reason ". If I am right in this surmise, any judicial elaboration of their own
    instinctive reactions would be quite easy for them to understand.

    If it were possible in some so-called absolute offences to take this sensible
    half-way house, I think that the courts should do so. This has been referred
    to in Warner's case. 1 see no difficulty in it apart from the opinion of
    Viscount Sankey L.C. in Woolmington's case. But so long as the full width
    of that opinion is maintained, I see difficulty. There are many cases where
    the width of that opinion has caused awkward problems. But before
    reducing that width your Lordships would obviously have to consider all
    the aspects of so far-reaching a problem. In the present case Miss Heilbron
    was wisely loth to involve herself in this when she had easier and surer paths
    to pursue.

    The Australian High Court, founding on Cave J. (at page 181) and
    Wills J. (at 175) in Re Tolson 23 Q.B.D. 168 have evolved a defence of
    reasonable mistake of fact and the burden of proving this on a balance of
    probabilities rests upon the Defendant. The whole matter is discussed in
    an interesting article by Professor Howard in the Law Quarterly Review
    (Volume 76 page 547). He concludes:

    " When a statutory prohibition is cast in terms which at first sight
    " appear to impose strict responsibility, they should be understood
    " merely as imposing responsibility for negligence but emphasising that
    " the burden of rebutting negligence by affirmative proof of reasonable
    " mistake rests upon the defendant. (Matur v. Mussen [1934] 52 C.L.R.

    10

    " 100 at page 105, per Dixon J., and at page 108 per Evatt and
    " McTiernan JJ. cf. Sherras v. De Rutzen [1895] 1 Q.B. 918, 921 per
    " Day J.)"

    That decision was before Woolmington's case [1935] A.C. 462. In Thomas
    v. The King [1937] 59 C.L.R. 279 the matter was further discussed, but I
    see no reference to Woolmington's case. I should be happy to be per-
    suaded either that it does not prevent us from adopting such a satisfactory
    concept as the Australian courts have evolved or that its wide effect should
    be limited. But it has not been necessary for the purposes of the present
    case to go fully into that aspect of the matter.

    Although the subsection cannot constitute an absolute offence in the
    wide application for which the prosecution contend, it does not follow that
    on a narrower construction it may not constitute an absolute offence. By
    the term " absolute" I mean an offence to which the normal assumption
    of mens rea does not apply, but in which the actual words of the offence
    (without any additional implication of mens rea) may well import some
    degree of knowledge, e.g. the word " possession " as in Warner's case. In
    saying that the section relating to possession (which was there under dis-
    cussion) was absolute, I was using it (as the context was intended to show)
    in that loose and convenient sense which had been used in the argument.

    The history of the subsection and the words themselves lend strong
    support to the view that a narrow meaning was intended. In the Dangerous
    Drugs Act, 1920, section 4 (c) and (d) identical words are used save that the
    " purpose " there was " the preparation of opium for smoking or the sale
    or smoking of prepared opium" instead of " the purpose of smoking
    cannabis or cannabis resin or of dealing in cannabis or cannabis resin
    whether by sale or otherwise". Section 4 of the 1920 Act was in fact
    re-enacted in section 8 of the 1965 Act now under consideration. The
    words thus taken from the 1920 Act cannot have a different sense when
    used in the 1965 Act, especially when they are re-enacted in another part
    of the 1965 Act itself. Any guide provided by their context in 1920 can,
    therefore, be useful in deciding their meaning in 1965, when applied to
    cannabis smoking. The prosecution point out that opium smoking needs
    more paraphernalia and preparation (in what are sometimes called " opium
    dens") and that considerations applicable to them are out of place in
    dealing with cannabis which may be smoked casually and without prepara-
    tion. Anyone may carry a cannabis cigarette and light it in normal places
    and in normal circumstances of life. But that very fact makes it the
    more unlikely that responsibility for such casual acts of invitees or licensees
    should fall on those who manage premises unless they are managing them
    for just such a purpose.

    The whole context and content of the original section 5 of the 1920 Act
    shows that it was considering premises one of whose " purposes" was
    opium smoking. The " purpose " there referred to is thus the purpose of
    the management or a purpose known to or acquiesced in by them. I
    think that the words which were lifted from that section and enacted in
    relation to cannabis in section 5 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, 1965, must
    be given a similar narrow construction. There was no need to insert the
    word " purpose", if all that was intended was premises where cannabis
    is in fact smoked. Being concerned in the management of premises used
    for the purpose of smoking cannabis necessarily imports some knowledge
    of the use of the premises for the purpose. Admittedly Miss Sweet had no
    knowledge.

    I appreciate that this limitation will, as the prosecution contend, rob the
    section of much of its force. If a wider application or efficiency were
    desired it could be achieved by a change of onus and a consideration of
    what exactly is being required of landladies and the like. They cannot
    reasonably be branded with guilt whenever there happens to be on their
    premises someone who without their knowledge or assent smokes cannabis.

    I would allow the appeal.

    11

    Lord Wilberforce

    MY LORDS,

    In my opinion Miss Stephanie Sweet, who was found to have "no
    " knowledge whatever that (her) house was being used for the purpose of
    " smoking cannabis " ought not to have been convicted.

    Her conviction was based upon section 5(b) of the Dangerous Drugs Act,
    1965, and upon an interpretation of the words "concerned in the manage-
    " ment of any premises used [for the purpose of smoking cannabis or cannabis
    " resin or of dealing in cannabis or cannabis resin]" which makes a person
    liable to prosecution who lets, or licenses the occupation of premises, upon
    which cannabis or cannabis resin is smoked or dealt in. It requires no
    amplification to show how wide a category of persons would thus be brought
    into the category of potential offenders. So, for this appeal, the essential
    question is to determine whether this interpretation is correct.

    The words " concerned in the management" are not, on the face of them,
    very clear, but at least they suggest some technical or acquired meaning, some
    meaning other than one which refers merely to such common transactions as
    letting or licensing the occupation of premises. For if it had been intended to
    penalise anyone who lets or licenses premises on which cannabis comes to be
    smoked, it would have been easy to do so in simple language. This impression
    is strengthened when the following words of the subsection are read. They
    reflect what I would think to be logically correct—namely, that one does
    not " manage " premises, the inert subject of a conveyance or a lease, but
    rather some human activity on the premises which the manager has an
    interest in directing. And so, when the subsection speaks of management of
    premises, and for a purpose, I would expect the purpose for which the
    premises are used to be that of the manager: otherwise, what would be
    the nature and object of the management?

    A consideration of previous and analogous legislation removes any doubt
    that these words are intended to refer to such a special and limited class as I
    have described, one which quite clearly excludes such persons as Miss Sweet.
    This legislation deals with other " anti-social" activities such as the keeping
    of brothels, opium " dens " and gaming houses.

    1. The Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1885, section 13 dealt with the
    keeping of brothels. It penalised a person who " keeps or manages or acts
    " or assists in the management of a brothel ". It dealt also with persons,
    other than managers, tenants, occupiers, lessors and (by an amendment in
    1912) persons in charge, but in relation to them it stated explicitly the
    requirement of knowledge—" knowingly permits ", " lets with knowledge ",
    " is wilfully party to the continued use ". These fit in with and emphasise
    the conception of purposeful management.

    Substantially similar language is taken into the modern Sexual Offences
    Act, 1956, which refers to managing or acting or assisting in management.
    It is perhaps worth observation that this Act refers both to " used as a
    " brothel " and " used for the purposes of habitual prostitution ", showing
    that when a convenient noun exists which includes the concept of a
    prohibited purpose, it is adopted, and that " used for the purposes " is
    employed to denote a similar type of situation as to which no convenient
    noun can be found or coined.

    2. The Dangerous Drugs Act, 1921, dealt with opium. The relevant
    sections are reproduced in the Act of 1965 (s. 8), and it is obvious that
    the provisions regarding cannabis are based upon them. In dealing with
    management of premises it seems clear enough that what is in mind is not
    the lessor of premises on which opium may come to be smoked, but a
    manager of what, if a noun is required, might be called " opium dens "
    No doubt opium smoking is a more elaborate and prolonged process than
    smoking of cannabis, so that the transferance of legislation from one
    activity to the other is not completely appropriate, but the difference (perhaps
    not understood by the draftsman) is not sufficient to impel us to a fresh
    conception of management.

    12

    3. The use of the word " management" in relation to gaming houses goes
    back at least to the Gaming Act, 1845 (section 4). The expression "con-
    cerned in the management" is used in section 5. The Betting Act, 1853
    (section 3) combines prohibition of " permitting " by occupiers and manage-
    ment of a house or place used for the purposes of betting, a comparable
    structure to that of section 5 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, 1965, I need not
    trace this wording through the mountains of later enactments.

    I am left with no doubt after examination of this legislation that when
    the Dangerous Drugs Act, 1964, (the predecessor of that of 1965) adopted
    in relation to cannabis language which penalised on the one hand
    " permitting to be used " and on the other hand being " concerned in the
    " management of premises used for the purposes. ..." it must, in the latter
    provision, have had in mind the same kind of purposeful management activity
    as was referred to, in analogous connections, in previous legislation. One
    can describe what is penalised as being concerned in the management of a
    cannabis shop, or a cannabis smoking den or parlour, a type of activity
    which no doubt includes not only one where this was the direct or main
    purpose of the manager, or person concerned in the management, but also
    cases where, by extension or infiltration and acquiescence, this purpose had
    come to be included in the purposes for which the premises are being
    managed or, one might say, run.

    If this is the correct meaning to extract from the language, when one
    considers that there is also a wide area of penalisation elsewhere of possession
    and of permitting by occupiers, there is a rational statutory scheme of consider-
    able scope. I see no reason to strain the language of section 5(b) so as to
    convert it into, in effect, an instrument of amateur law enforcement which
    may catch many innocent persons: whether the section, as so interpreted, is
    too severe or not severe enough, is something for Parliament to consider.

    On this admittedly prosaic interpretation of the subsection, I do not
    embark upon a wider examination of the problem of absolute offences, or of
    guilty intention. As in Warner's case [1968] 2 All E.R. 356 the word
    " possession " carried its own content of mental intention so, perhaps a
    fortiori,
    do the words " concerned in the management of premises used for the
    purpose ..." and there is no occasion to look beyond them for some
    separate ingredient which might, in fact, be difficult to define.

    I would allow the appeal.

    Lord Diplock

    MY LORDS,

    On premises of which Miss Sweet was the occupier but from which she
    was frequently absent cannabis was smoked without her permission or
    knowledge. She was charged before the Woodstock magistrates with an
    offence under section 5 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, 1965. She was not
    charged under paragraph (a) as an occupier of premises who "permits those
    " premises to be used for the purpose of smoking cannabis " but under
    paragraph (b) as a person " concerned in the management of ... premises used
    " for that purpose ". She was convicted and fined £25.

    That conviction was upheld by the Court of Appeal who gave leave to
    appeal to your Lordships' house and certified that the following points of
    law of general public importance are involved in their decision, viz.:

    " (1) Whether section 5(b) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1965 creates
    " an absolute offence

    " (2) What, if any, mental element is involved in the offence ; and
    " (since leave to Appeal is given in regard to (1) and (2) above)

    " (3) Whether on the facts found a reasonable bench of Magistrates,
    " properly directing their minds as to the law, could have convicted the
    " Appellant."

    13

    The expression " absolute offence" used in the first question is an
    imprecise phrase currently used to describe an act for which the doer is
    subject to criminal sanctions even though when he did it he had no mens rea,
    but mens rea itself also lacks precision and calls for closer analysis than is
    involved in its mere translation into English by Wright J. in Sherras v. de
    Rutzen
    [1895] 1 Q.B. 918 as " evil intention or knowledge of the wrongfulness
    " of the act"—a definition which suggests a single mental element common
    to all criminal offences and appears to omit thoughtlessness which, at any
    rate if it amounted to a reckless disregard of the nature or consequences of an
    act, was a sufficient mental element in some offences at common law.

    A more helpful exposition of the nature of mens rea in both common law
    and statutory offences is to be found in the judgment of Sir James Fitzjames
    Stephen in R. v. Tolson (1889) 23 Q.B.D. 168. " The full definition of every
    " crime " he said (at page 187) " contains expressly or by implication a
    " proposition as to a state of mind. Therefore if the mental element of any
    " conduct alleged to be a crime is proved to have been absent in any given
    " case the crime so denned has not been committed ; or again if a crime is
    " fully defined nothing amounts to that crime which does not satisfy that
    " definition."

    Where the crime consists of doing on act which is prohibited by statute
    the proposition as to the state of mind of the doer which is contained in the
    full definition of the crime must be ascertained from the words and subject-
    matter of the statute. The proposition, as Stephen J. pointed out, may be
    stated explicitly by the use of such qualifying adverbs as " maliciously "
    " fraudently ", " negligently " or " knowingly "—expressions which in rela-
    tion to different kinds of conduct may call for judicial exegesis. And even
    without such adverbs the words descriptive of the prohibited act may
    themselves connote the presence of a particular mental element. Thus,
    where the prohibited conduct consists in permitting a particular thing to be
    done the word " permit " connotes at least knowledge or reasonable grounds
    for suspicion on the part of the permittor that the thing will be done and an
    unwillingness to use means available to him to prevent it and, to take a
    recent example, to have in one's " possession " a prohibited substance con-
    notes some degree of awareness of that which was within the possessor's
    physical control (Warner v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1968] 2
    All E.R. 356).

    But only too frequently the actual words used by Parliament to define
    the prohibited conduct are in themselves descriptive only of a physical
    act and bear no connotation as to any particular state of mind on the part
    of the person who does the act. Nevertheless, the mere fact that Parliament
    has made the conduct a criminal offence gives rise to some implication about
    the mental element of the conduct proscribed. It has, for instance, never
    been doubted since McNaghten's case that one implication as to the mental
    element in any statutory offence is that the doer of the prohibited act should
    be sane within the McNaghten rules ; yet this part of the full definition
    of the offence is invariably left unexpressed by Parliament. Stephen J. in
    R. v. Tolson suggested other circumstances never expressly dealt with in
    the statute where a mental element to be implied from the mere fact that
    the doing of an act was made a criminal offence would be absent, such as
    where it was done in a state of somnambulism or under duress, to which one
    might add inevitable accident. But the importance of the actual decision of
    the nine judges who constituted the majority in R. v. Tolson which concerned
    a charge of bigamy under section 57 of the Offences Against the Person
    Act, 1861, was that it laid down as a general principle of construction of any
    enactment, which creates a criminal offence that, even where the words
    used to describe the prohibited conduct would not in any other context
    connote the necessity for any particular mental element, they are never-
    theless to be read as subject to the implication that a necessary element in
    the offence is the absence of a belief held honestly and upon reasonable
    grounds in the existence of facts which if true would make the act innocent.

    14

    As was said by the Privy Council in Bank of New South Wales v. Piper
    [1897] A.C. 383 at pages 389, 390, the absence of mens rea really consists in
    such a belief by the accused.

    This implication stems from the principle that it is contrary to a rational
    and civilised criminal code, such as Parliament must be presumed to have
    intended, to penalise one who has performed his duty as a citizen to ascertain
    what acts are prohibited by law (ignorantia juris non excusat) and has taken
    all proper care to inform himself of any facts which would make his con-
    duct lawful.

    Where penal provisions are of general application to the conduct of
    ordinary citizens in the course of their everyday life the presumption is that
    the standard of care required of them in informing themselves of facts which
    would make their conduct unlawful, is that of the familiar common law duty
    of care. But where the subject matter of a statute is the regulation of a
    particular activity involving potential danger to public health, safety or
    morals in which citizens have a choice as to whether they participate or not,
    the Court may feel driven to infer an intention of Parliament to impose by
    penal sanctions a higher duty of care on those who choose to participate and
    to place upon them an obligation to take whatever measures may be necessary
    to prevent the prohibited act without regard to those considerations of
    cost or business practicability which play a part in the determination of what
    would be required of them in order to fulfil the ordinary common law duty
    of care. But such an inference is not lightly to be drawn, nor is there any
    room for it unless there is something that the person on whom the obligation
    is imposed can do directly or indirectly, by supervision or inspection, by
    improvement of his business methods or by exhorting those whom he may
    be expected to influence or control, which will promote the observance of
    the obligation (see Urn Chin Aik v. The Queen [1962] A.C. 160 at page 174).

    The numerous decisions in the English courts since R. v. Tolson in which
    this later inference has been drawn rightly or, as I think, often wrongly are
    not easy to reconcile with others where the court has failed to draw the
    inference, nor are they always limited to penal provisions designed to
    regulate the conduct of persons who choose to participate in a particular
    activity as distinct from those of general application to the conduct of
    ordinary citizens in the course of their everyday life. It may well be that
    had the significance of R. v. Tolson been appreciated here, as it was in the
    High Court of Australia, our courts, too, would have been less ready to
    infer an intention of Parliament to create offences for which honest and
    reasonable mistake was no excuse.

    Its importance as a guide to the construction of penal provisions in
    statutes of general application was recognised by Dixon J. in Maher v.
    Musson [1934] 52 C.L.R. 104, and by the majority of the High Court of
    Australia in Thomas v. The King [1957] 59 C.L.R. 279. It is now regularly
    adopted in Australia as a general principle of construction of statutory
    provisions of this kind.

    By contrast, in England the principle laid down in JR. v. Tolson has been
    overlooked until recently (see R. v. Gould [1968] 1 All.E.R. 849) partly
    because the ratio decidendi was misunderstood by the Court of Criminal
    Appeal in R. v. Wheat, R. v. Stocks [1921] 2 K.B. 119 and partly, I suspect,
    because the reference in R. v. Tolson to the mistaken belief as being a
    "defence" to the charge of bigamy was thought to run counter to the
    decision of your Lordships' House in Woolmington v. D.P.P. [1935] A.C.
    462. That expression might have to be expanded in the light of what was
    said in Woolmington's case, though I doubt whether a jury would find the
    expansion much more informative than describing the existence of the
    mistaken belief as a defence to which they should give effect unless they felt
    sure either that the accused did not honestly hold it or, if he did, that he
    had no reasonable grounds for doing so.

    15

    Woolmington's case affirmed the principle that the onus lies upon the
    prosecution in a criminal trial to prove all the elements of the offence with
    which the accused is charged. It does not purport to lay down how that
    onus can be discharged as respects any particular elements of the offence.
    This, under our system of criminal procedure, is left to the common sense
    of the jury. Woolmington's case did not decide anything so irrational as
    that the prosecution must call evidence to prove the absence of any mistaken
    belief toy the accused in the existence of facts which, if true, would make the
    act innocent any more than it decided that the prosecution must call
    evidence to prove the absence of any claim of right in a charge of larceny.
    The jury is entitled to presume that the accused acted with knowledge of
    the facts, unless there is some evidence to the contrary originating from the
    accused who alone can know on what belief he acted and on what ground
    the belief if mistaken was held. What Woolmington's case did decide is
    that where there is any such evidence the jury after considering it and also
    any relevant evidence called by the prosecution on the issue of the existence
    of the alleged mistaken belief should acquit the accused unless they feel
    sure that he did not hold the belief or that there were no reasonable grounds
    upon which he could have done so.

    This, as I understand it, is the approach of Dixon J. to the onus of proof
    of honest and reasonable mistaken belief as he expressed it in Proud man v.
    Dayman
    [1941] 67 C.L.R. 536 at page 541. Unlike the position where a
    statute expressly places the onus of proving lack of guilty knowledge on the
    accused, the accused does not have to prove the existence of mistaken
    belief on the balance of probabilities ; he has to raise a reasonable doubt as
    to its non-existence.

    It has been objected that the requirement laid down in R. v. Tolson and
    the Bank of New South Wales v. Piper that the mistaken belief should be
    based on reasonable grounds introduces an objective mental element into
    mens rea. This may be so, but there is nothing novel in this. The test of
    the mental element of provocation which distinguishes manslaughter from
    murder has always been at common law and now is by statute the objective
    one of the way in which a reasonable man would react to provocation.
    There is nothing unreasonable in requiring a citizen to take reasonable care
    to ascertain the facts relevant to his avoiding doing a prohibited act.

    It is, then, with these principles in mind that I approach the construction
    of section 5 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, 1965, under which Miss Sweet
    was charged. It contains separate prohibitions in paragraphs (a) and (b)
    respectively. The offence under (a), with which Miss Sweet was not charged,
    can only be committed by the occupier of premises. The act of the occupier
    which is prohibited is to " permit" those premises to be used for the
    purpose of smoking cannabis or cannabis resin or of dealing in cannabis or
    cannabis resin. Here the word " permits " used to define the prohibited act
    in itself connotes as a mental element of the prohibited conduct knowledge
    or grounds for reasonable suspicion on the part of the occupier that the
    premises will be used by someone for that purpose and an unwillingness on
    his part to take means available to him to prevent it. As regards this offence
    there is no need to have recourse to the more general implication as to the
    need for mens rea where the words are in themselves descriptive only of a
    physical act.

    In paragraph (b) the phrase "concerned with the management of any
    premises" unlike the phrase " being the occupier of any premises " in
    paragraph (a) is not descriptive of a class of person to whom a particular
    kind of conduct subsequently defined is prohibited. It is part of the
    definition of the offence itself. The conduct prohibited is to be " concerned
    in the management of premises used for the purpose of smoking cannabis ".
    etc. What, if any, mental element does this compound phrase connote?
    The premises of which it is an offence to be concerned in the management
    are defined not by reference merely to what happens on them (e.g. " premises
    on which cannabis is smoked ") but by the purpose for which they are used.

    16

    " Purpose" connotes an intention by some person to achieve a result
    desired by him. Whose purpose must it be that the premises should be used
    for smoking cannabis? The answer is, in my opinion, to be found in the
    words " is concerned in the management". To manage or to be concerned
    in the management itself connotes control or direction of an activity to
    achieve a result desired by those who control or direct the activity. In my
    opinion, in the compound phrase " is concerned in the management of
    premises used for the purpose of smoking cannabis" etc., the purpose
    described must be the purpose of the person concerned in the management of
    the premises.

    But at its highest against Miss Sweet the words of the paragraph are
    ambiguous as to whose is the relevant purpose. That ambiguity in a penal
    statute which, on the alternative construction that it would be sufficient if
    the purpose to use the premises for smoking cannabis were that of anyone
    who in fact smoked cannabis, would render her liable, despite lack of any
    knowledge or acquiescence on her part, should be unhesitatingly resolved in
    her favour.

    In view of the finding that Miss Sweet " had no knowledge whatever that
    the house was being used for the purpose of smoking cannabis or cannabis
    resin " she could not properly be convicted of the offence charged. I, too,
    would allow this appeal.

    (323489) 197024 St.S/PA/19 150 1/69


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