BAILII [Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback]

United Kingdom House of Lords Decisions


You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom House of Lords Decisions >> Farrell v Alexander [1976] UKHL 5 (24 June 1976)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1976/5.html
Cite as: [1976] UKHL 5, [1977] AC 59

[New search] [Help]


JISCBAILII_CASE_ENGLISH_LEGAL_SYSTEM

    Parliamentary Archives,
    HL/PO/JU/4/3/1285

    HOUSE OF LORDS

    FARRELL AND ANOTHER (A.P.)
    (APPELLANTS)

    v.
    ALEXANDER (RESPONDENT)

    Lord Wilberforce
    Viscount Dilhorne
    Lord Simon of Glaisdale
    Lord Edmund-Davies
    Lord Russell of Killowen


    Lord Wilberforce

    MY LORDS,

    The appellants, Mrs. Farrell and her daughter, have brought an action to
    recover from the respondent, Mrs. Alexander, a sum of money which, was
    paid to her in order to obtain the tenancy of a flat. They claim that this
    money was a premium which it was illegal for the respondent to require or
    to receive and that they have the right to recover it by virtue of section 90
    of the Rent Act 1968 (" The Act").

    The respondent had a protected tenancy of this flat with some four years
    unexpired from the Church Commissioners. There were negotiations with
    the appellants with a view to an assignment of it and the appellants were
    asked for a sum of £4,000 for the fixtures and fittings. Though the actual
    value of these fixtures and fittings has not been determined, it was certainly
    less than £4,000 so that the balance was a premium for the proposed assign-
    ment. In asking for it, the respondent may have committed an offence
    under section 89 of the Act. But the matter was not carried through by
    assignment because the Church Commissioners, in accordance, it seems,
    with their normal practice, and in accordance with a clause in the existing
    lease, required the respondent to surrender the lease with a view to the
    grant of a new tenancy to the appellants. The transaction proceeded in this
    way. A formal agreement was drawn up under which the respondent
    agreed to surrender the lease subject to acceptance of the surrender by the
    landlords and to the simultaneous grant by them of a new lease to the
    appellants. On completion the new lessees were to pay to the respondent
    the sum of £4,000 for fixtures and fittings, and this money was in fact paid.

    It seems to have been suggested at one time that the transaction might be
    regarded as, in substance, an assignment, in which case the respondent would
    have had no answer to the appellants' claim, but in my opinion this is not a
    maintainable contention. It cannot be said that the surrender and grant
    was a sham, or a subterfuge: it was what the landlords required for reasons,
    understandable enough, of their own. They had, of course, no interest in
    the " premium ". So the question to be decided is whether it is illegal for
    a lessee to require or to receive a premium as a condition of surrendering
    her lease, and in order that a new lease may be granted to the payer of the

    premium.


    The directly relevant sections are section 85 of the Rent Act 1968, which
    contains the following:

    " (1) Any person who. as a condition of the grant, renewal or con-
    " tinuance of a protected tenancy, requires, in addition to the rent, the
    " payment of any premium or the making of any loan (whether secured
    " or unsecured) shall be guilty of an offence under this section.

    " (2) Any person who, in connection with the grant, renewal or
    " continuance of a protected tenancy, receives any premium in addition
    " to the rent shall be guilty of an offence under this section ".

    and section 90(1), which provides:

    " Where under any agreement (whether made before or after the
    " commencement of this Act) any premium is paid after the commence-
    " ment of this Act and the whole or any part of that premium could
    " not lawfully be required or received under the preceding provisions
    " of this Part of this Act, the amount of the premium or, as the case

    2

    " may be, so much of it as could not lawfully be required or received,
    " shall be recoverable by the person by whom it was paid."

    Section 92 says that in Part VII of the Act, in which the above sections
    are, " premium " includes any fine or other like sum and any other pecuniary
    consideration in addition to rent.

    My Lords, I must say that, in relation to the facts which I have stated,
    these sections are to me, if not transparently clear, at least unambiguous
    in the legal sense. They refer to " any person ", words wide enough to
    include landlords, tenants, agents or middlemen. They apply to what was
    done here because the respondent required the premium as a condition of
    the grant of a protected tenancy (see the words " subject to ... the
    "simultaneous grant" mentioned above). The words "any person" which
    are common to subsections (1) and (2), and also to section 86(1) and (2) and
    to section 87(2), are words of wide generality and fit, without any strain
    whatever, the present facts. I am unable to follow the argument that the
    words " in addition to the rent " or " in addition to rent " which appear in
    section 85 and in the interpretation section 92 and which on any view are
    used with, some surplusage, have the effect of limiting "any persons" to
    " persons in receipt of rent". The words are descriptive of the character of
    the payment and not of the recipient.

    Is there any reason why the general words should be restricted, and what
    restricted meaning can be found which would exclude this transaction?
    What is argued by the respondent quite simply is that " any person " in
    section 85 means, or more exactly, should be confined to " any landlord
    " or lessor" or " any potential landlord or lessor " and this restricted
    meaning is said to be imposed by the history of this legislation and by
    authority.

    Before I attempt to deal with this argument I must say something as to
    the correct method, as I see it, of interpreting this Act, the key to which, in
    my opinion, lies in the proposition stated above that what we are called upon
    to construe is section 85 of the Rent Act 1968. This proposition, apparently
    ingenuous in fact, contains within it the reasoning which follows.

    The Rent Act 1968 is a consolidation Act of a comprehensive character
    built up after a process of enactment, amendment, addition and repeal of a
    number of statutes starling with an Act of 1915. The respondent's argument
    depends, for any plausibility, upon a process which involves starting from
    that wartime Act—which had a very limited scope and whose language shows
    that it was referring only to landlords—and tracing the development through
    an Act of 1920 (re-enacting the 1915 provision in different language) and Acts
    of 1949 and 1965 (both adding further provisions and re-arranging the sec-
    tions) and asking at each stage the question, did Parliament extend the reach
    of the prohibition beyond landlords? To reinforce a negative answer to this,
    the respondent is able to rely on a decision of the Court of Appeal in 1921
    (Remmington v. Larchin [1921] 3 K.B. 404) in which it was held that the
    word " person " in the Act of 1920 (section 8(1)) meant " landlord ". This
    holding is sought to be extended to the present Act through a recent decision
    of the Court of Appeal (Zimmerman v. Grossman [1972] 1 Q.B. 167). The
    judge and the majority of the Court of Appeal in the present case followed,
    as they were clearly bound to follow, Zimmerman v. Grossman, but your
    Lordships are free to reconsider that case.

    On this argument it is necessary to decide what consequences follow from
    the fact that the Rent Act 1968 was a consolidation Act. This question has
    already concerned this House, see Maunsell v. Olins [1975] 1 All.E.R. 16,
    which, I must regret to say, contains more discussion than conclusion. I
    will try to clarify the latter. The case was concerned with the meaning of the
    word " premises " in another section of the Act, and led to sharp differences
    of view. There were those who thought that the meaning of this word was
    clear (Lord Diplock and Lord Simon of Glaisdale) and there were those who
    thought it ambiguous (Lord Reid, Viscount Dilhorne and myself). It was
    because I thought that the word has no primary or certain meaning, except

    3

    perhaps in a conveyance or lease, and that the section in question " admits,
    " almost invites, opposing constructions " (p. 20) that I found it necessary to
    look at the antecedents of the section, and Lord Reid and Viscount Dilhorne
    took the same view. Lord Diplock and Lord Simon of Glaisdale, on the other
    hand, thought the word was clear and for that reason considered that it was
    not legitimate to go back into the legislative history. If I may say so, on
    that hypothesis I would agree with them. I would agree and endorse the
    principle that it is quite wrong that, in every case where a consolidation Act
    is under consideration, one should automatically look back through the history
    of its various provisions, and the cases decided upon them, and minutely
    trace the language from Act to Act—a process, which, incidentally, has led
    to an argument of four days' length in this House. In recent times, because
    modern statutes have become so complicated, the courts myself included (cf.
    I.R.C. v. Joiner [1975] 3 All.E.R. 1050) rather too easily accept this process,
    whether under persuasion of counsel or from their own scholarly inclinations.
    But, unless the process of consolidation, which involves much labour and
    careful work, is to become nothing but a work of mechanical convenience, I
    think that this tendency should be firmly resisted ; that self-contained statutes,
    whether consolidating previous law, or so doing with amendments, should be
    interpreted, if reasonably possible, without recourse to antecedents, and
    that the recourse should only be had when there is a real and substantial
    difficulty or ambiguity which classical methods of construction cannot resolve.
    This is particularly true of Acts such as the Rent Act 1968 which have to
    be applied by county courts, and which have to be understood or at least
    explained to great numbers of citizens.

    In this field of capital payments in relation to changes of occupation, we
    find that in this Act there are provisions about the grant, renewal or con-
    tinuance of protected tenancies—prohibiting the requiring of a sum as a
    condition and the receiving of a sum in connection—(section 85)—similar
    provisions about assignments of protected tenancies (section 86), similar
    provision about grants, renewals, continuance or assignments of certain
    furnished lettings (section 87) in which " any person " indisputably covers all
    who may be concerned with any of these things, similar provisions about
    offering furniture at an excessive price (section 89), provisions as to payments
    asked or received as a condition of giving up statutory tenancies (section 13),
    payments required as consideration for changes by agreement of statutory
    tenancies (sections 14, 15). All of this, coupled with the width of expression
    of section 85 itself points towards a general interpretation covering the
    requiring or receipt of capital sums.

    In my opinion this process of interpretation should lead to a conclusion that
    section 85(1) covers the kind of tripartite arrangement we have here.

    This brings me to the question of judicial authority. Remmington v.
    Larchin (u.s.) was decided upon section 8(1) of the Act of 1920 which fol-
    lowed and modified section 1(2) of the Act of 1915. Section 8(1) was as
    follows:

    " A person shall not, as a condition of the grant, renewal, or con-
    " tinuance of a tenancy or sub-tenancy of any dwelling house to which
    " this Act applies, require the payment of any fine, premium, or other
    " like sum, or the giving of any pecuniary consideration, in addition to
    " the rent, and where any such payment or consideration has been made
    " or given in respect of any such dwelling house under an agreement
    " made after the twenty-fifth day of March nineteen hundred and twenty,
    " the amount or value thereof shall be recoverable by the person by
    " whom it was made or given . . ."

    It was decided by a Court of Appeal of great eminence, any of whose judg-
    ments I would have the strongest disposition to accept as correct. I do not
    think there is any need to differ from it. It is certain that all three Lords
    Justices felt great difficulty about the case and that what ultimately weighed
    with them were three things ; first, that the Act of 1915 looked to be confined
    to landlords, second, that the Act of 1920 was penal in character, third, that
    it contained no provision against the requiring of a premium on an assign-
    ment of a tenancy. Atkin L.J. is explicit on this point (I.c. p. 411). This
    was an argument of considerable strength against bringing tripartite

    4

    arrangements under the prohibition. I am quite content to leave this decision
    there. It was followed by the appeal of Zimmerman v. Grossman upon the
    Act of 1968, by which time the prohibition against requiring premiums on
    assignments, as well as other prohibitions, had been added and the form and
    structure of' the enactment had been changed. The Court of Appeal, again
    finding difficulty in their decision, followed Remmington v. Larchin and
    reached the same result. It is not necessary to decide whether the court was,
    in fact, bound by their earlier decision—they were clearly entitled to follow
    it, but I think that we should take a different view.

    There are three other points which I must mention. (1) It was said in
    Zimmerman's case, and the argument was repeated in this House, that there
    was some Parliamentary endorsement of the decision in Remmington v. Lar-
    chin
    by reason of the fact that, in 1949, and later in 1965, Parliament, having
    the opportunity to reverse it, had in substance re-enacted the section on which
    Remmington v. Larchin was based and so must be taken to have validated
    Remmington v. Larchin. Widgery L.J. in his judgment cited the well-known
    passage from the judgment of James L.J. in Greaves v. Tofield (1880)
    14 Ch.D. 563, 571, and reliance was duly placed upon such cases as Barras v.
    Aberdeen Steam Trawling and Fishing Co. Ltd. [1933] A.C. 402, and Webb v.
    Out rim ([1907] A.C. 81) and, in the opposite sense, Reg. v. Bow Road Justices
    ins. parte Adedigba
    [1968] 2 Q.B. 572.

    My Lords, I have never been attracted by the doctrine of Parliamentary
    endorsement of decided cases: it seems to me to be based upon a theory of
    legislative formation which is possibly fictional. But if there are cases in
    which this doctrine may be applied, and I must respect the opinions of those
    judges who have so held, any case must be a clear one. James L.J. must have
    thought so when he used the words " well-known words upon which there
    " have been well-known decisions " (I.c.). This case is certainly not such a
    case. It really cannot be said if our reasoning is to have any contact with
    reality that the draftsman of the Act of 1949 (a) must have had in mind a
    decision of 1921, whose reported headnote opens with the words "that
    "section 8(1) was reasonably capable of two constructions" and all of the
    judgments which underlined the ambiguity and obscurity of the enactment,
    (b) decided to perpetuate this ambiguity while removing one of the grounds
    of the decision, (c) should have committed Parliament to the continued
    existence of a lacuna or loophole which had no merits to commend it.

    To impute such a process of thought to the architect of the new section,
    and to those who voted it into existence really strains credibility.

    1. I have given careful thought to the question whether it is right for this
      House to over-rule, in effect, a decision which has stood for 55 years. Not
      forgetting that Remmington's case was referred to without disapproval in this
      House in 1960 (Elmdene Estate Ltd. v. White [1960] A.C. 528), I have
      reached the conclusion that it is. To do so does not involve upsetting titles
      or, except as to the present respondent, any expectations. The respondent was
      willing to proceed by an assignment, which on any view was contrary to
      the Act, and there is no suggestion that she proceeded as she did on some
      view of the law which made it safer to do so.

    2. There is the point that the section is a penal section—not one of great
      criminality—but still, if infringed, liable to attract prosecution and some
      degree of discredit. But this consideration only has weight where " after
      " full inquiry and consideration one is left in real doubt" (Reg. v. Ottewell
      [1970] A.C. 642, 649 per Lord Reid). I do not agree with Widgery L.J. (as
      he then was) in Zimmerman v. Grossman when he said that a principle of
      restrictive application should be considered when a penal provision is framed
      " in such wide and therefore necessarily ambiguous language" (I.c. p. 179),
      On the view which I take, the Act is wide, and deliberately so, and this is
      not " ambiguity " which attracts the principle.

    I would allow the appeal with costs. The case must be remitted to the
    county court at Wandsworth to determine the excess of the sum of £4 000
    over the real value of the fixtures and fittings. The appellants are entitled
    to have this sum repaid.


    5

    Viscount Dilhorne

    my lords,

    The particulars issued by the respondent's agents stated that her flat was
    for sale for £4,500, a price which was to include some fittings and other
    articles. The appellants offered £4,000 and this offer was accepted. It was
    then intended that for this sum the respondent should assign her tenancy
    to the appellants. Later in correspondence, the respondent's agents referred
    to the £4,000 as the price for the fixtures and fittings.

    It was not disputed that this price was substantially in excess of the value
    of the fixtures and fittings.

    Section 89(1) of the Rent Act, 1968, so far as material, reads as follows:

    " Any person who, in connection with the proposed grant, renewal,
    " continuance or assignment, on terms which require the purchase of
    " furniture, of a protected tenancy—

    " (a) offers the furniture at a price which he knows or ought to know
    " is unreasonably high . . .

    " . . .


    " shall be liable to a fine not exceeding £100."
    Section 92(1) defines furniture as including fittings and other articles.

    The respondent appears to have committed an offence under section 89(1)
    but the plan was changed. The respondent's landlords, when approached
    for their consent to the proposed assignment, said that they would prefer
    the respondent to surrender her lease and then to grant the appellants a new
    lease.

    This was agreed to and the £4,000 of which £400 had been previously paid
    to the respondent's agents as a deposit was paid not in connection with any
    assignment but in connection with the grant of a new lease to the appellants
    and, in my view, as a condition of that grant.

    In these circumstances the main question for determination is whether by
    requiring payment of and by receiving this money the respondent contravened
    section 85 of the Rent Act 1968. That section reads as follows:

    "85.—(I) Any person who, as a condition of the grant, renewal or
    "continuance of a protected tenancy, requires, in addition to the rent.
    " the payment of any premium or the making of any loan (whether
    " secured or unsecured) shall be guilty of an offence under this section.

    " (2) Any person who, in connection with the grant, renewal • or
    " continuance of a protected tenancy, receives any premium in addition
    " to the rent shall be guilty of an offence under this section.

    " (3) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable
    " to a fine not exceeding £100.

    " (4) The court by which a person is convicted of an offence under
    " this section relating to requiring or receiving any premium may order
    " the amount of the premium to be repaid to the person by whom it was
    " paid."

    Section 88 provides that:

    " Where the purchase of any furniture has been required as a con-
    " dition of the grant, renewal, continuance or assignment—

    " (a) of a protected tenancy,

    " (b) . . .

    " . . .

    " then, if the price exceeds the reasonable price of the furniture, the
    " excess shall be treated, for the purposes of this Part of this Act, as if
    " it were a premium required to be paid as a condition of the grant,
    " renewal, continuance or assignment of the protected tenancy . . .".


    6

    Section 90 provides that where under any agreement any premium is paid
    and it could not lawfully be required or received under the preceding pro-
    visions, the amount of the premium

    " shall be recoverable by the person by whom it was paid ".
    and section 92(1) states that, unles the context otherwise requires:

    " ' premium ' includes any fine or other like sum and any other pecuniary

    " consideration in addition to rent ".

    That the £4,000 was paid as a condition of the grant of the lease to the
    appellants though not paid to the lessors but to the respondent, cannot I
    think be disputed. It was a price exceeding the reasonable price for the
    fixtures and fittings. That is conceded. The excess must, by virtue of
    section 88, be treated as a premium : and if the fixtures and fittings were
    offered at a price which the respondent knew or ought to have known was
    an unreasonably high price, as would appear to have been the case, it was a
    premium which could not lawfully be required and so one recoverable under
    section 90(1).

    The respondent, however, contends that this case is governed by section
    85. While not disputing that " Any person " means what it says, it is
    contended that only a landlord or potential landlord can commit the offences
    defined in the section. It was argued clearly and persuasively by Mr.
    Barnes, for the respondent, that section 85(1) properly interpreted could
    only apply to a person who, as a condition of the grant etc. of a protected
    tenancy, required the payment of rent and also required the payment of a
    premium ; and section 85(2) only to a person who receives the premium
    and also receives the rent. The opposing argument is that the words " in
    " addition to the rent" are there merely to indicate that the premium must
    be a sum over and above the rent. For the respondent, it was suggested
    that in section 85(1) the fact that the words "in addition to the rent"
    followed immediately after the word " requires " supported the contention
    advanced on her behalf. I am unable to attach any significance to this or
    to the punctuation. The words " in addition to the rent " must have the
    same meaning in section 85(2) as in section 85(1), and in section 85(2) they
    do not appear after " receives " but after " any premium ".

    Mr. Barnes conceded, and in my view rightly, that in section 92(1), the
    interpretation clause, " in addition to rent" meant over and above the rent
    and that being so I cannot regard it as right to read section 85(1) as if it
    read " any person who requires the rent and also requires a premium " or
    section 85(2) as saying " receives any premium and also receives the rent".
    The context does not require the words " in addition to the rent" to be
    interpreted differently in the same part of the Act.

    That the Rent Act 1968, a pure consolidation Act, has incorporated in its
    drafting inadequacies contained in earlier Acts, I acknowledge.

    The inclusive definition of premiums in section 92(1) does not fit in with
    either section 85(1) or 85(2) so far as it relates to the words "in addition
    " to rent". It really is not possible to read section 85(1) as if it said

    " requires in addition to the rent the payment of any premium in
    " addition to rent "

    or section 85(2) as saying

    " receives any premium in addition to the rent in addition to rent"
    In my opinion in view of the definition in section 92(1) it was unnecessary to
    insert the words " in addition to the rent" in section 85(1) and (2) and mere
    surplusage to do so. Those words in the definition are necessary in con-
    nection with the use of the word premium in other sections of the Act, for
    example, sections 86, 87, 88 and 90.

    Looking at the Rent Act 1968 alone, I would have no hesitation in saying
    that, in my view, the amount paid by the appellants in excess of a reasonable
    price for the fixtures and fittings constituted a premium ; that it was an
    offence under section 85(1) to require the payment of it as a condition of
    the grant of the protected tenancy, an offence under section 85(2) to receive

    7

    it in connection with the grant of such a tenancy; and also that it was a
    premium which could not under sections 89 and 88 be lawfully required
    and so a premium recoverable under section 90(1).

    I do not regard section 85(1) and (2) as ambiguous. Though they might
    have been better phrased I think their meaning and effect is clear. The
    object of these provisions was to protect protected tenants by making it
    impossible to extract from them as the condition of the grant, renewal,
    continuance or assignment of a tenancy or in connection with such a grant
    etc., any sum over and above the rent. That seems to me to be clear
    and that being so I can see no valid reason why, as a matter of policy,
    Parliament should have intended the section only to apply to landlords
    though it may have been thought that they were the most likely offenders.

    Section 86 makes it an offence for any person to require the payment of
    any premium as the condition of the assignment of a protected tenancy.
    It is therefore contrary to the law for a tenant to require a premium for
    assigning. If section 86 is not restricted to landlords or potential landlords,
    and it clearly is not, I cannot see how section 85 can properly be construed
    as so restricted.

    It is, however, said that the legislative history and two decisions of the
    Court of Appeal make it wrong to give this interpretation to these sections.

    Section 1(2) of the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (War
    Restrictions) Act 1915 reads as follows:

    " A person shall not in consideration of the grant, renewal or con-
    " tinuance of a tenancy of any dwelling-house to which this Act applies
    " require the payment of any fine, premium or other like sum in
    " addition to the rent, and where any such payment has been made in
    " respect of any such dwelling-house after the 25th November 1915,
    " then the amount shall be recoverable by the tenant by whom it was
    " made from the landlord . . ."

    This subsection only applied to landlords. That is made clear by its
    express reference to landlords in the latter part of the subsection. But that
    does not mean that the words " require any payment of any fine, premium
    " or other like sum in addition to the rent" are to be interpreted as if they
    were " require any payment of any fine, premium or other like sum in
    " addition to requiring the payment of the rent ".

    That subsection was repealed and replaced by section 8(1) of the Increase
    of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act, 1920 which made a
    number of changes in the language. The words " in consideration of " were
    replaced by " as a condition of ". The words " or sub-tenancy " were inserted
    after " tenancy " though in view of the definition of tenancy in section
    12(11)(g), this change would not appear to have been necessary. The words
    " or the giving of any pecuniary consideration " were inserted after " other
    " like sum " so that that part of the subsection read as follows:

    " require the payment of any fine, premium or other like sum, or the
    " giving of any pecuniary consideration, in addition to the rent ".

    Under the 1915 Act payment of such premiums, etc. made after the 25th
    November 1915, were made recoverable. Under the 1920 Act only such
    payments made after 25th March 1920 were recoverable. But to my mind
    the most significant and important change was in the concluding words of
    the subsection. Instead of reading " recoverable by the tenant by whom
    it was made from the landlord " section 8(1) of the 1920 Act reads:

    " recoverable by the person by whom it was made or given ".

    Why the change in language? Parliament, it can be assumed, does not
    change the language of a section unless it intends to change its meaning.
    The change from " tenant" to " person " clearly was intended to secure that
    any person who paid such a premium, whether or not the tenant, should
    be able to recover it. Why the omission of the reference to " landlord "
    if in 1920 Parliament intended that such a premium should only be recover-
    able from a landlord? I do not myself see that it can be said that this was

    8

    made necessary by the specific inclusion of sub-tenancies. , In my opinion
    the language of section 8(1) contrasted with that, of the 1915 Act shows it to
    have been the intention of Parliament that anyone who paid, such a premium
    should be entitled to recover it from the person to whom it was paid, whether
    or not he was the landlord.

    Where there are only two parties to the transaction, a landlord would
    be the most likely person to require the payment of a premium .as a condition
    of a grant of a tenancy ; but where there is, as there was in the instant case,
    a tripartite arrangement, with the tenant requiring a premium on the terms
    that the existing tenancy would be surrendered and a new tenancy granted
    by the landlord to the payer of the premium, 1 fail to see why the tenant
    should not be regarded as requiring the payment of the premium as a condition
    of the grant of the tenancy.

    This conclusion is contrary to that of a strong court of appeal in
    Remmington v. Larchin [1921] 3 K.B. 404 (Bankes, Scrutton and Atkin L.JJ.).
    The tenant of premises to which the 1920 Act applied had agreed that upon
    payment of a premium he would surrender his tenancy, his landlord having
    agreed that if he did so he would grant a new tenancy to the payer of the
    premium. It was held that section 8(1) was reasonably capable of two
    constructions and that, as it was a penal section, the more lenient should
    be adopted, namely, that it only applied to landlords. Bankes L.J. did not
    think the matter plain and he did not attach any significance to the alteration
    of language from that in the 1915 Act by the omission of any reference to
    landlords and the omission of any definition of the persons from whom
    repayment might be obtained. Scrutton L.J. thought the construction of
    section 8(1) "a matter of very considerable doubt " but, as it was a penal
    section, he reached the same conclusion. Atkin L.J. said that he had had
    great difficulty with regard to the construction of the section and that if it
    had stood alone he would have been inclined to the view that it applied.
    In the light of the language of section 1(2) of the 1915 Act which clearly
    refers to landlords, he thought that the similar language of section 8(1) must
    also be interpreted as applying only to them.

    Scarman L.J. in the present case said he thought a wrong turning had been
    taken in 1921. I agree, and while it is with considerable reluctance that I
    venture to differ from the opinions of such eminent judges I am comforted
    by the fact that each expressed doubt as to the construction to be placed on
    the section.

    Twenty-eight years later the Landlord and Tenant (Rent Control) Act.
    1949, was enacted. Section 8(1) of the 1920 Act was repealed and replaced
    by section 2 of that Act.

    Section 2(1) and (2) read as follows:

    " (1) A person shall not, as a condition of the grant, renewal or
    " continuance of a tenancy to which this sections applies, require the
    " payment of any premium in addition to the rent

    " (2) Subject to the provisions of Part II of the First Schedule to this
    " Act, a person shall not, as a condition of the assignment of a tenancy
    " to which this section applies, require the payment of any premium."

    Section 2(4) made it permissible for the assignor to obtain certain payments
    from the assignee. Section 2(5) provided that a premium paid which could
    not lawfully be required should be " recoverable by the person by whom it
    " was paid " and section 2(6) made the requiring of a premium in contra-
    vention of the section an offence.

    I recognise :the force of the contention that if Parliament wished the
    decision in Remmington v. Larchin not to apply, it should have made
    that clear by express words and that it could have done so by the insertion
    of the words after " a person ", " whether or not a landlord ", but the omission
    to do so does not in my view justify the conclusion that a person to whom
    section 2(1) applies must be a landlord when "a person" in section 2(2)
    dearly applies to a person who is not a landlord.


    9

    In Woods v. Wise [1955] 2 Q,B. 29, Romer LJ. at page 57 pointed out
    that a landlord did not infringe section 2(1) by receiving a premium which
    had not been required by him as a condition of granting or renewing or
    continuing a tenancy. This no doubt led to the substitution of a new sub-
    section in place of section 2(1) ten years later.

    The Rent Act 1965 by section 37 and Schedule 5 enacted that the following
    subsection should be substituted for section 21(1):

    " (1) A person shall not—

    " (a) as a condition of the grant, renewal or continuance of a
    " tenancy to which this section applies, require the payment of
    " any premium ; or (b) in connection with such a grant, renewal
    " or continuance, receive any premium ;

    " in addition to the rent".

    The fact that in paragraph (b) the words are " in connection with " and
    not as in paragraph (a) "as a condition of" may have been intended to
    secure that paragraph (b) applies to cases where it could not be established
    that the receipt of the premium was a condition of the grant.

    In Zimmerman v. Grossman [1972] 1 Q.B. 167 the defendant had agreed
    to pay £300 to the tenant of a fiat for fixtures and fittings if the landlord
    agreed to accept her as a tenant. She paid £100 but refused to pay the
    balance claiming that £300 was far in excess of the true value of the fixtures
    and fittings. The county court judge assessed their true value at £100 and
    held that the balance of £200 was not a premium and that the plaintiff was
    entitled to it. The defendant's appeal to the Court of Appeal (Davies,
    Widgery and Karminski L.JJ.) was dismissed. The other members of the
    court agreed with the judgment of Widgery L.J. and the case was decided
    on the Rent Act 1968. He thought that the principle stated by James L.J.
    in Greaves v. Tofield [1880] 14 Ch.D. 563 at page 571 that

    " If an Act of Parliament uses the same language which was used
    " in a former Act of Parliament referring to the same subject, and
    " passed with the same purpose, and for the same object, the safe and
    " well-known rule of construction is to assume that the legislature when
    " using well-known words upon which there have been well-known
    " decisions uses those words in the sense which the decisions have
    " attached to them "

    applied.

    My Lords, although the first part of section 1(2) of the 1915 Act and
    of section 8(1) of the 1920 Act are the same, I do not think, as I have said,
    that section 8(1) was passed for the same purpose and for the same object
    as section 1(2). The changes made by the Acts of 1949 and 1965 appear
    to me to reinforce the view that the language of section 8(1), which was
    repeated in section 2(1) of the 1949 Act and in the re-draft of that subsection
    effected by the 1965 Act, was not regarded or intended by Parliament to be
    limited in its application to landlords. It may be that in 1949 the decision
    in Remmington v. Larchin escaped the notice of the draftsman when it
    should not have done, and that when the subsection was re-drafted in 1965
    the draftsman was content to model the re-draft on the 1949 Act. However
    this may be, our task is to give effect to the intention of Parliament and
    the language used by Parliament does not, in my opinion, support the
    conclusion that the operation of the subsection was limited to landlords.

    It follows that in my opinion Zimmerman v. Grossman was wrongly
    decided. His Honour Judge Ifor Lloyd rightly thought that he was bound
    by these two decisions of the Court of Appeal, as indeed was the Court
    of Appeal in the present case. That court is bound, as Scarman L.J. stated
    in his judgment in the present case, by precedent, for the reasons given
    by him with which, if I may say so, I entirely agree and which I need not
    repeat. But for that, it would seem that the decision of the Court of Appeal
    in this case would have been to allow the appeal.


    10

    For the reasons I have stated, in my opinion this appeal should be allowed
    with costs and the case sent back to the county court for the determination
    of the amount by which the sum of £4,000 exceeded the value of the fixtures

    and fittings.


    Lord Simon of Glaisdale

    MY LORDS,

    My noble and learned friends who have preceded me have apprised your
    Lordships of the facts which have led to this appeal and the relevant statutory
    provisions. The following questions arise thereupon: (1) What is the proper
    approach to the interpretation of a consolidation Act? (2) Adopting such
    an approach, what is the proper construction of section 85 of the Rent
    Act 1968 in relation to the facts judicially ascertained in the instant case?
    (3) Was Remmington v. Larchin [1921] 3 K.B.404 correctly decided;
    involving also the question how much weight should be put on the factor
    that the statutory provision to be construed there (as here) had penal
    consequences? (4) Was Zimmerman v. Grossman [1972] 1 Q.B. 167 correctly
    decided ; involving also the question of the validity of an alleged canon
    of statutory construction arising from a presumed parliamentary endorsement
    by re-enactment of a word or phrase previously the subject of judicial inter-
    pretation (" the rule in Barms v. Aberdeen Steam Trawling and Fishing Co.
    "[1933] A.C.402 ")? (5) Was the Court of Appeal in the instant case bound
    to follow Zimmerman v. Grossman?

    There are certain fundamental considerations which impinge on more than
    one of these questions. First, in the construction of all written instruments
    including statutes, what the court is concerned to ascertain is, not what the
    promulgators of the instruments meant to say, but the meaning of what
    they have said. It is in this sense that " intention " is used as a term of
    art in the construction of documents. In order to avoid wearying your
    Lordships with repetition, for the authority and rationale of this rule may
    I refer to what I said about it in Wickman Tools v. Schuler A.G. [1974|
    A.C.235, 263 and Black-Clawson v. Papierwerke [1975] A.C.591, 645 et seq!
    Suffice it to repeat that, provided draftsmen and courts operate correctly,
    the court's elucidation of the meaning of what is said should accord with what
    the promulgator meant to say. But, secondly, such an accord can only be
    achieved if courts frame their approach to statutory interpretation in the
    light of the actual parliamentary processes which evolve the statutory
    enactment in question.

    Construction of consolidation Acts

    All consolidation Acts are designed to bring together in a more convenient,
    lucid and economical form a number of enactments related in subject-matter
    (and often by cross-reference) previously scattered over the statute book.
    All such previous enactments are repealed in the repeal schedule of the
    consolidation Act. It follows that, once a consolidation Act has been passed
    which is relevant to a factual situation before a court, the " intention " of
    parliament as to the legal consequences of that factual situation is to be
    collected from the consolidation Act, and not from the repealed enactments.
    It is the relevant provision of the consolidation Act, and not the
    corresponding provision of the repealed Act, which falls for interpretation.
    It is not legitimate to construe the provision of the consolidation Act as if it
    were still contained in the repealed Act—first, because Parliament has
    provided for the latter's abrogation; and, secondly, because so to do would
    nullify much of the purpose of passing a consolidation Act.

    There are three sorts of consolidation Act: (1) "pure" consolidation
    (i.e., re-enactment); (2) consolidation under the Consolidation of Enactments
    (Procedure) Act 1949, which allows consolidation with "corrections and
    " minor improvements " (for their definition see Lawton L.J. in the instant
    case [1976] Q.B. at page 366D); (3) consolidation "with Law Commission

    11

    "amendments" under a procedure adopted by parliament in 1965. What
    all three types of consolidation have in common is that there is a short*
    circuiting of the normal parliamentary procedures. This can be seen by
    comparison with the nearest parliamentary analog—an Act " to consolidate
    " and amend " the previous law. This was formerly a very common legisla-
    tive exercise, and very advantageous to all except government business
    managers. Its objection for the latter is that all stages of the bill leading
    to the Act are subject to normal and full parliamentary control; so that
    amendments may be made, not only to the amending provisions of the bill,
    but also to those provisions which merely re-enact the pre-existing statute
    law. Such measures therefore make the full normal demand on the
    parliamentary timetable. By contrast, the detailed scrutiny of every type of
    consolidation bill is referred to a joint select committee of both Houses of
    Parliament; and, in reliance on the report of this committee, the Houses
    forego discussion (and, other than exceptionally, amendment) of the
    consolidation bill in so far as it merely re-enacts pre-existing statute law
    (including re-enactment with " corrections and minor improvements " in the
    case of 1949-Act-procedure bills). The long title of the statute shows
    whether it is a consolidation Act: if it is merely " to consolidate . . . ", it is
    a " pure " consolidation Act; while if it is under the 1949 or 1965 procedures
    this will be specifically indicated in the long title (see, e.g., Juries Act 1974;
    Friendly Societies Act 1974). Special parliamentary practice governs
    consolidation under the 1949 and 1965 procedures respectively; and, should
    a consolidation Act passed under either of these procedures fall for
    interpretation, I would hope that the court of construction would not make
    heavy weather of discovering how much of the Act in question represents
    amendment and would in interpretation discriminate between 1949-and 1965-type
    amendments. But no such questions arise on the instant
    appeal; the Rent Act 1968 is " pure " consolidation.

    In the case of such a statute it is the primary task of the joint committee
    to ensure that the bill when it passes into law does not depart from the
    pre-existing statutory enactments which are to be consolidated. That does
    not involve a literal transcription. The language will be modernised.
    Contemporary drafting techniques will be adopted, so long as they do not
    change the sense. The lay-out will if possible be improved to promote
    perspicuousness. Obvious slips in the pre-existing legislation will be corrected.
    Sometimes, through inadvertence, there are overlapping provisions or varying
    terminology dealing with the same subject-matter: the joint committee will
    then choose the one which most felicitously accords with the obvious
    parliamentary intention (though doubts or ambiguities must be dealt with
    by the 1949 procedure). Thus, in a "pure" consolidation Act it must be
    assumed that it was not necessary to have recourse to the 1949 procedure—
    i.e., that the consolidation Act reproduces pre-existing statute law without
    even "corrections" or "minor improvements" as defined in the 1949 Act.

    This does not mean that the initial approach to the construction of a
    " pure " consolidation Act must be via the statutes it has replaced. On the
    contrary, it is the consolidation Act itself which falls for interpretation.
    The initial judicial approach is the same as with the interpretation of any
    other statute. The judge places himself, as the saying goes, in the
    draftsman's chair. He will ascertain what facts were within the draftsman's
    knowledge, and what statutory objective he had both generally and as to
    the particular provision to be construed. The facts available to the draftsman
    of a consolidation Act will be all those which had been available to the
    draftsmen of the enactments to be consolidated. These facts and (closely
    related) the statutory objectives will generally be obvious from the statute
    falling for construction itself; but the court may, in default or by way of
    supplement or confirmation, have recourse to matters of which judicial
    notice may be taken or to official reports in the light of which any part
    of the legislation has been framed (see Eastman Photographic v. Comptroller-
    General
    [1898] A.C. 571 ; Black-Clawson v. Papierwerke). The judge will
    then ascertain and tune in to the linguistic register of the statute (see
    Maunsell v. Olins [1975] A.C. 373. 391E-392C). Having done all this the
    judge will be in a position to read the statutory language in the primary and

    12

    most natural sense which it bears in its context. Since the draftsman will
    himself have endeavoured to express the parliamentary meaning by words
    used in the primary and most natural sense which they bear in that same
    context, the court's interpretation of the meaning of the statutory words used
    should thus coincide with what parliament meant to say.

    There is one rare situation in which it is permissible for—indeed, incum-
    bent on—the court to construe a consolidation Act at this primary stage of
    construction by reference to a consolidated enactment. This is where the
    purpose of a statutory word or phrase can only be grasped by examination
    of the social context in which it was first used. George He fisher Ltd. v.
    Restawile Upholstery (Lanes.) Ltd.
    [1976] A.C. 64 provides an example.
    The phrase " work of artistic craftsmanship " in the Copyright Act 1956
    could only be properly understood by investigating the social and aesthetic
    circumstances in which it was first used in the Copyright Act 1911. (The
    1956 Act, though not a consolidation Act, was relevantly in pari materia).
    I can, however, find nothing in section 85 of the Rent Act 1968 which would
    bring its interpretation within this exception.

    It might be objected that the statutory objective of a consolidation Act is
    merely to consolidate the previous law ; so that it is necessary to look back
    to the superseded legislation to ascertain its various statutory objectives.
    But in vindicating the paramount objective of consolidating the preceding
    statute law the consolidation Act is also furthering the statutory objectives
    of the legislation which is consolidated. Apart from the exceptional case I
    mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the various statutory objectives will
    be apparent from a scrutiny of the provisions of the consolidation Act itself
    (possibly aided by judicial notice and perusal of official reports). The
    primary approaches to statutory interpretation (which I have tried to sum-
    marize earlier) are therefore as appropriate for construction of a consolidation
    Act as for any other type of statute. It is only on failure of the primary aids
    to construction that the fact that the statute to be construed is a consolidation
    Act permits any special approach: what it does then is to provide an
    additional secondary canon of construction which will sometimes be of
    service—namely, a presumption that a consolidation Act (in so far as it
    merely re-enacts) does not change the law.

    If a court of construction places itself in the position of the draftsman,
    acquires his knowledge, recognizes his statutory objectives, tunes in to his
    linguistic register, and then ascertains the primary and natural meaning in
    their context of the words he has used, that will generally be an end of the
    task of construction. But occasionally something will go wrong. It may
    become apparent that the primary and natural meaning cannot he what
    Parliament intended: it produces injustice, absurdity, anomaly or contradic-
    tion, or it stultifies or runs counter to the statutory objective. Or sometimes
    the words have no primary meaning in their context; they are fairly capable
    in all the circumstances of being taken in two senses: there is, in other words,
    an ambiguity. There are a number of secondary canons of construction avail-
    able to resolve ambiguity: which of them is most helpful will vary from
    case to case. But in nothing of the foregoing does the construction of a
    consolidation Act differ from that of any other statute. Its only peculiarity
    is that if the primary approach to construction discloses an ambiguity in a
    consolidation Act, that may sometimes (though rarely) be resolved by
    examination of the superseded legislation. Since, as will appear, I cannot
    for myself see any ambiguity in section 85, I venture merely to refer sum-
    marily to what, in a speech prepared in collaboration with my noble and
    learned friend, Lord Diplock, I said, in Maunsell v. Olins at pp. 392H
    393B, about this exceptional use of the superseded enactments.

    There is, however, one canon of construction relevant to the interpretation
    of section 85, which is deducible from the submissions I have been making
    to your Lordships. It is not peculiar to the construction of consolidation
    Acts, though it -is equally applicable to them. The first or " golden " rule
    is to ascertain the primary and natural sense of the statutory words in their
    context, since it is to be presumed that it is in this sense that the draftsman

    13

    is using the words in order to convey what it is that Parliament meant to say.
    They will only be read in some other sense if that is necessary to obviate
    injustice, absurdity, anomaly or contradiction, or to prevent impediment of
    the statutory objective. It follows that where the draftsman uses the same
    word or phrase in similar contexts, he must be presumed to intend it in each
    place to bear the same meaning, see Courtauld v. Legh (1869) L.R. 4
    Ex. 126, 130 ; Black-Clawson v. Papier-werke at p. 651 A-B.

    Construction of Section 85

    At least before your Lordships, if not in the Court of Appeal, it was not
    sought to argue that " any person " should, merely by reason of the historical
    statutory background, be read as " any landlord ". Nor, on the other hand,
    was the difference between " a person " in the repealed legislation and "any
    person" in section 85(1) relied on. It was accepted on behalf of the
    respondent that, in their primary and natural meaning, the words " any
    " person " are all-embracing. What was argued, with great force and skill,
    was that it is the position and punctuation of ", in addition to the rent,"
    which shows that " any person " must be limited to landlords or their
    agents. The person who requires the premium must require it in addition
    to requiring the rent; but only a landlord (or his agent) can require the
    rent; so that it is only a landlord (or his agent) who meets the description
    of " any person . . . who requires ... the rent" and therefore of " any
    person" at the beginning of section 85(1). In so placing and punctuating
    the phrase the draftsman, it was claimed, was advisedly reflecting the inter-
    pretation put on the pre-existing law in Remmington v. Larchin, where a
    very powerful Court of Appeal was left in doubt as to the meaning of
    similar words in the 1920 Act; and, since the provision involved penal
    consequences, construed them narrowly, reading them as applicable only to
    landlords, and not to third parties, taking a premium. It was further argued
    that it has been open to Parliament, on the numerous occasions when it has
    since then dealt with rent restriction, to make it plain, did it so desire, that
    the sanction was meant to extend to third parties as well as landlords
    requiring a premium as a condition of the grant of a protected tenancy—
    not least in 1949, when it was made an offence to require a premium as a
    condition, not merely of the grant, renewal or continuance of a protected
    tenancy, but also of its assignment. Parliament, whether from oversight or
    error or intention, has left the statutory provision as it was interpreted in
    Remmington v. Larchin. Alternatively, there is still at the very least the
    ambiguity perceived in Remmington v. Larchin; and, since the provision
    is still penal, it should be resolved by a strict construction limiting " any
    " person " to those requiring payment of rent, i.e. landlords (or their agents).

    In so far as this argument was based, in the absence of ambiguity, on
    recourse to legislation now repealed, it was, in my respectful opinion,
    fallacious for the reasons I ventured to give in the preceding section of this
    speech.

    In so far as the argument was based on the placing and punctuation of
    ", in addition to the rent," in section 85(1), it fails as a matter of literal
    construction. Whether or not Widgery L.J. (tentatively, in Zimmerman v.
    Grossman at p. 180 and Scarman L.J. in the instant case at p. 368B were
    right as to the relationship of section 85(1) and 85(2), the two subsections
    are, at least from the point of view of drafting, mirror provisions. This is
    borne out by the recovery provisions of section 90, which reads:

    " (1) Where . . . any premium is paid . . . and the whole or any
    " part of that premium could not lawfully be required or received . . ."

    " Any person who . . . requires, in addition to the rent, the payment of
    any premium . . ." in section 85(1) must be a counterpart of "Any person
    who . . . receives any premium in addition to the rent ... in sec-
    tion 85(2). As a matter of literal construction I would therefore read " in
    "addition to the rent" in section 85(1) as qualifying the payment rather
    than the requirement, and thus the character of the payment rather than
    the character of the recipient.


    14

    I go so far with the respondent as to accept that the words " in addition
    " to the rent" are capable of being understood in two senses—either " as
    " well as the rent" or " over and above the rent"—and that if it means
    the former it would prevent the subsection extending to tripartite arrange-
    ments like that in the instant case. But most words in English are capable
    of more than one sense: for the words to be read in two possible senses
    does not make them ambiguous unless they can be fairly read in either
    sense in their context. The general purpose of this Act and the particular
    purpose of this provision show conclusively, to my mind, that "in addition
    "to the rent" means "over and above the rent". So does the context,
    So do the absurd anomalies which would arise if the alternative reading

    were adopted.

    r

    (Incidentally, if there were an ambiguity, one of the means of resolving
    it would be to have recourse to the provision in the 1965 Act which was
    re-enacted in section 85(1). There is no sign there of the placing of the
    phrase and its punctuation to which counsel for the respondent attached such
    significance. The provision (Schedule 5, Part I, paragraph 1) amended
    section 2 of the 1949 Act to read :

    " (1) A person shall not—

    " (a) as a condition of the grant, renewal or continuance of a
    " tenancy to which this section applies, require the payment of
    " any premium ; or

    " (b) in connection with such a grant, renewal or continuance, receive
    " any premium ;

    " in addition to the rent.")

    Although the statutory objectives and the linguistic register are the most
    potent elements in eliminating the penumbra of possible meanings from
    the true meaning, it is convenient to deal first with context, since I have
    already touched on this in comparing sections 85(1) and 85(2). I venture
    to pray in aid the analysis of my noble and learned friend. Viscount Dilhorne.
    In my view, the conclusive argument here is from the interpretation of
    " premium " in section 92 (" includes . . . any pecuniary consideration in
    " addition to rent"). Although this statutory interpretation involves some
    tautology when applied to section 85, it obviously and admittedly means
    " over and above rent", which is also the sense required by the sections
    other than 85 to which it applies. The presumption against change of
    meaning of similar words used in the same context is a strong pointer against
    the words meaning " as well as the rent" in section 85(1).

    Counsel for the respondent made adroit use of the tautology apparent
    when section 85(1) is read together with the interpretation of "premium"
    in section 92(1). This showed, he claimed, that the words must be used
    in different senses in the respective sections, so that the presumption in favour
    of consistency of terminology is displaced. With every respect, I find this
    altogether too far-fetched. A tautology, unlike a contradiction, does not
    necessarily call for any modification of meaning. Legal language is frequently
    tautological: a draftsman will prefer to repeat himself rather than leave
    his meaning in doubt. Nor, indeed, does even the extreme recourse of reading
    "in addition to {the] rent" as having different meanings in sections 85(1)
    and 92(1) respectively—" as well as the rent" in the former and " over
    " and above rent" in the latter—eliminate all tautology.

    The construction urged on behalf of the respondent involves reading
    section 85(1) as if it went "in addition to requiring the rent". "It is a
    " strong thing to deal into an Act of Parliament words which are not there,
    " and in the absence of clear necessity it is a wrong thing to do," said Lord
    Mersey in Thompson v. Goold & Co. [1910] A.C. 409, 420. There is certainly
    no such clear necessity here: on the contrary.

    I turn, then, from such linguistic minutiae to examination of the general
    and particular parliamentary objectives, which, to my mind, put the meaning
    beyond any possible doubt. The general purpose of the Act was to hold
    rents artificially below their market price, thus penalising relatively the

    15

    financial return on one type of property. The result of such an interference
    with a market is a matter of common knowledge: supply does not expand
    to meet demand, and demand is on the other hand artificially inflated. There
    is thus apt to be a substantial difference between the statutory price of the
    goods or services in question and a black market price. If the statutory
    control is to be effective, strict steps must be taken to obviate the black market
    and to prevent evasions of the control. Loopholes in the control will be
    sought by those offering or seeking the goods or services; and, as they
    are recognised by those enforcing the control, those loopholes will be closed.
    This is the picture clearly disclosed by the history of rent restriction in
    this country culminating in the Rent Act 1968, the terms of which reveal
    the whole story like a fossil bed recapitulating natural history.

    In the context of housing accommodation the most obvious and facile
    way of operating a black market where rents are controlled is to demand a
    premium—i.e., a capital payment in connection with the grant etc. of a
    tenancy over and above the rent as held statutorily below its true market
    rate. The history of rent control is a history of attempts to control the
    black market in rented housing accommodation by penalising criminally
    and nullifying civilly the taking of premiums. Whatever might be thought
    of a tenant or assignee who gets occupation of premises by promising to
    pay a premium and then resiles from his promise, it is obviously necessary
    (given the paramount parliamentary objective) to permit him to do so.
    Moreover, given the paramount statutory objective of holding rents below
    their market price, parliament must be concerned, not merely to penalise
    landlords evading the controls, but also to prevent tenants from doing so.

    This leads me to the closely related consideration of anomaly. It would
    indeed be the most extraordinary anomaly were a tenant penalised for
    requiring or receiving the payment of a premium on assignment of his
    tenancy (section 87) and made liable to reimburse it (section 90), but yet
    permitted to require or receive a premium if the transfer were carried out
    by way of surrender and new lease. Similarly, if he were to be penalised
    for attempting to obtain an excessive price for furniture on assignment of
    his tenancy (section 89) and made liable to reimburse the excess (sections 88
    and 90). but yet could freely obtain such an excessive price provided the
    transfer was carried out by surrender and new lease.

    In Beswick v. Beswick [1968] A.C. 58, 105, Lord Upjohn, having described
    the practice of the Joint Committee on Consolidation Bills (of which he was
    then chairman), referred to the proceedings of that committee on the Law of
    Property Bill 1925 " not with a view to construing the Act, that is of course
    " not permissible, but to see whether the weight of the presumption as to the
    " effect of consolidation Acts (that they are not intended to alter the law] is
    " weakened by anything that took place in those proceedings ". My Lords,
    I have taken the same course in relation to the Rent Act 1968—though I
    postponed doing so until I had otherwise completed writing this speech.
    I found that clause 85(1) passed without comment (see 4th Report of the
    Committee, 1967-68, p. 14). If the punctuation and positioning of ", in
    " addition to the rent ", had had the significance which counsel for the
    respondent attached to it, the draftsman would certainly have drawn the
    committee's attention to it. Therefore, were it necessary to look behind the
    1968 Act itself, the presumption would apply with full force that section 85(1)
    means the same as section 2(1) of the 1949 Act as amended in 1965 ; and
    I have already ventured to point out how adverse that is to the respondent's
    argument.

    In my respectful opinion, a reading of section 85 in its relationship with
    the other sections of Part VII, recognition of the general and specific
    statutory objectives, and consideration of the extraordinary anomalies con-
    stituted by any other reading, make it clear that " in addition to the rent"
    in section 85 means " over and above the rent " ; and that the other possible
    sense (" as well as the rent") cannot reasonably be the meaning. There is
    therefore nothing to indicate that " any person " is used in anything other
    than its natural, primary and universal sense—specifically there is nothing
    to suggest that it is only landlords or prospective landlords or their agents

    16

    who can fall within the ambit of these words. I would therefore allow the
    appeal

    This conclusion enables me to deal summarily with the other questions
    raised in the appeal.

    Remmington v. Larchin and the construction of penal provisions

    I humbly recognize the eminence of the judges who decided Remmington
    v. Larchin. But, for the reasons given by my noble and learned friend,
    Viscount Dilhorne, I think it was wrongly decided.

    The Court of Appeal in that case was left in doubt (wrongly, as I venture
    to think) whether the statute was intended to reach further than landlords—
    it must be remembered that it was not until 1949 that the loophole of the
    taking of a premium on an assignment of a protected tenancy was closed.
    The Court of Appeal was thus led, by consideration that a more liberal
    reading would lead to extended penal consequences, to adopt a strict
    reading, confining the operation of the provision to landlords. But, in my
    view, the canon of strict construction of a penal statute is a secondary canon
    of construction—generally one of the most potent to be applied where there
    is a real ambiguity in the statutory language. I do not think that there was
    any such real ambiguity in the language which fell for consideration in
    Remmington v. Larchin ; and, for the reasons I ventured to put forward in
    the preceding section of this speech, I certainly cannot find any such ambiguity
    in section 85(1) of the 1968 Act. Restrictive interpretation of a statutory
    provision because it has penal consequences is inappropriate where the
    language has in its context, bearing in mind the statutory objectives, a plain
    and primary meaning.

    I would only add that, where strict construction of a penal statutory
    provision does become called for, the strictness of the construction will vary
    directly with the heinousness of the crime and the severity of the penalty.

    Zimmerman v. Grossman and the Barras doctrine

    What I have called " the Barras doctrine " appears from some (not all)
    of the speeches in Barras v. Aberdeen Steam Trawling & Fishing Co. It
    is to the effect that, where a statutory word or phrase of doubtful meaning
    has received clear judical interpretation in a well-known decision, and the
    word or phase is then repeated in a subsequent statute which is in pari
    materia,
    parliament must be presumed in this latter statute to be using the
    word or phrase in the sense in which it had been judicially interpreted (see
    Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 12th ed. (1969), p. 71, citing James L.J.
    in Greaves v. Tofield (1880) 14 Ch.D.563, 571). In Zimmerman v. Grossman
    at p. 177H Widgery L.J. took the doctrine to its logical conclusion and stated
    it with exemplary clarity:

    ". . . one ought to approach section 2(1) of the Act of 1949 as though it
    " had added in parenthesis, ' it is the intention of Parliament that those
    " ' words be given the meaning given to them in Remmington v.
    " ' Larchin: ".

    It is to be noted that, thus logically and clearly stated, the doctrine becomes
    a primary canon of construction (displacing even " the golden rule ") and
    applies equally to interpretations at first instance or on appeal (provided the
    decision can be said to be " well-known ", whatever that means in the context)
    and even though the interpretation was clearly erroneous. On this doctrine
    parliamentary endorsement has transmuted the judicial error into juristic
    authenticity.

    I do not myself believe that any such doctrine was at all applicable to
    interpret the 1949 Act in the light of Remmington v. Larchin. All the
    members of the Court of Appeal in that case arrived at their decision with
    doubt and difficulty. I do not think it can be said to be a " clear " judicial
    interpretation. Moreover, Atkin L.J. placed reliance on the fact that the
    1920 Act did not preclude the requiring or receipt of a premium on assign-
    ment of a tenancy: whereas the 1949 Act itself, as I have pointed out, closed
    that loophole in the controls and put the general parliamentary objective

    17

    beyond question. It would be an absurd fiction to hold that Parliament was
    endorsing Remmington v, Larchin in derogation of that general objective
    and was giving specific statutory sanction to another loophole in the controls.
    This very example indicates that at best the profferred canon of construction
    would need to be closely scrutinised in its application.

    The Barras doctrine is, however, so frequently invoked that I venture to
    detain your Lordships for a moment or two in examining its validity and
    scope. For this it is necessary to return to the two general considerations
    I mentioned at the outset of this speech.

    It is a fact that a parliamentary draftsman (like any draftsman) does
    acquaint himself thoroughly with the existing law (statutory and judge-made)
    before starting to draft. Any draftsman of a rent restriction Act after 1921
    must be presumed (nor is it an idle presumption) to have had Remmington v.
    Larchin in mind. When, then, he used language which had been interpreted
    in Remmington v. Larchin he presumptively used it in the sense in which it
    had there been interpreted. If therefore the object of statutory interpreta-
    tion were to ascertain what Parliament meant to say, the Barras doctrine
    would indeed be potent and primary. But the object of statutory interpre-
    tation is rather to ascertain the meaning of what parliament has said. On
    this approach the previous judicial interpretation is merely one of the facts
    within the knowledge of the draftsman in the light of which he will draft. It
    carries to his knowledge as much authority as it bears under the general
    doctrine of precedent, but no more. If the decision is of long standing it is
    unlikely to be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous (and sometimes not
    even then). If it has been frequently followed it gains added authority.
    Still more if it has been endorsed by the Court of Appeal. And again if it
    has been the basis of commercial or proprietary transactions or of criminal
    responsibility. And so on. A decision of your Lordships' House on statutory
    construction is most unlikely to be overruled under the 1966 declaration
    (Ex parte Jones [1972]1 A.C. 944). In short, the previous decision carries its
    own authority. So long as courts are conscientious in applying the doctrine
    of precedent, the draftsman will rarely be led astray. If Parliament wishes
    to endorse the previous interpretation it can do so in terms (cf., just by way
    of one striking example, the Law of Property Act 1925, section 40(2)).
    The sovereignty of parliament is fundamental constitutional law ; but courts
    of law have their own constitutional duties, important amongst which is to
    declare the meaning of a statutory enactment. To pre-empt a court of
    construction from performing independently its own constitutional duty of
    examining the validity of a previous interpretation, the intention of parlia-
    ment to endorse the previous judicial decision would have to be expressed or
    clearly implied. Mere repetition of language which has been the subject of
    previous judicial interpretation is entirely neutral in this respect—or at most
    implies merely the truism that the language has been the subject of judicial
    interpretation for whatever (and it may be much or little) that is worth.

    Was Zimmerman v. Crossman binding on the Court of Appeal?

    Applying the Burros doctrine, the Court of Appeal in Zimmerman v.
    Grossman held itself bound to follow Remmington v. Larchin. But neither
    case is binding on your Lordships, and, with all the temerity incumbent in
    venturing to differ from the great judges who constituted the courts in those
    cases. I am judicially bound to say, for the reasons I have already indicated,
    that I think both cases were wrongly decided.

    However, in the instant case counsel for the appellants understandably
    conceived that the Court of Appeal was bound by a previous Court of Appeal
    decision on the same point, subject to the rare exceptions indicated in
    Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. [1944] K.B. 718: [1946] A.C. 163. So
    counsel for the appellants sought to bring the case within one of those rare
    exceptions. Feeling unable to argue that Zimmerman v. Grossman was
    wrongly decided or was distinguishable, he argued that it was decided per
    incurlam.


    18

    The majority in the Court of Appeal (Lawton and Scarman L.JJ.) dealt
    with the point scrupulously. They held that Zimmerman v. Grossman did
    not come within the per incuriam doctrine. The point does not arise in your
    Lordships' House; so I content myself with merely expressing, with respect,
    my entire agreement with Lawton and Scarman L.JJ.

    The learned Master of the Rolls did not deal with the point at all. But
    he must have concluded that Zimmerman v. Grossman was neither distin-
    guishable nor decided per incuriam ; for he based his dissent on the ground
    that Zimmerman v. Grossman " was wrongly decided. So much so that I
    " do not think it is binding on us ".

    The relevant law on this point has been laid down beyond all question by
    two of the most eminent judges who have ever held the great office of Master
    of the Rolls—Lord Greene (in Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co., Ltd.) and
    Lord Denning (in Miliangos v. George Frank (Textiles) Ltd. [1975] 1 Q.B.
    487). I content myself with citing the latter (pp. 499, 503):

    " We have further considered this case and we consider that we are
    " bound by the earlier decision [of the Court of Appeal in Schorsch
    " Meier G.m.b.H.
    v. Hennin [19751 Q.B. 416] ...

    " The law on this subject has been authoritatively stated in Young v.
    " Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd. [1944] K.B. 718 and Morelle Ltd. v. Wake-
    " ling
    [1955] 2 Q.B. 379. This court is bound to follow its own decisions
    "—including majority decisions—except in closely denned circum-
    " stances ... I have myself often said that this court is not absolutely
    " bound by its own decisions and may depart from them just as the
    " House of Lords from theirs: but my colleagues have not gone so far,
    " so that I am in duty bound to defer to their view."

    The learned Master of the Rolls explained the relevant defined circum-
    stances in which the Court of Appeal could depart from a previous decision
    of that court. They did not, of course, extend to a case where the court con-
    ceived that the result of an appeal to your Lordships' House was "a foregone
    " conclusion ".

    It is sufficient to say that the law, as stated by Lord Greene M.R. (giving
    the judgment of the full Court of Appeal, subsequently endorsed by the House
    of Lords) in Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd. and by Lord Denning M.R.
    in Miliangos v. George Frank (Textiles) Ltd. is part of the law of the land.
    But there are powerful practical reasons why the law should be as laid down
    by Lord Greene in Young's case and by Lord Denning in Miliangos. The
    reasons have been cogently stated by Scarman L.J. in Tiverton Estates Ltd. v.
    Wearwell [1975] Ch. 146, 172 and again in the instant case. The Court of
    Appeal occupies a crucial position in one judicial system. Most appeals stop
    there. It handles an immense volume of business. It sits in a number of
    divisions. Unless it follows its own decisions, as the law directs, litigation will
    be a gamble on which division of the court is to handle the appeal and what
    law will be declared there. Most actions which are threatened or begun are
    settled by agreement—to the great advantage of the public generally and the
    litigants in particular. They are settled on the basis of a prognostication of
    the applicable law. If the law becomes unpredictable, changing from court to
    court and from case to case, it will be failing the public. I therefore respect-
    fully agree with the majority of the Court of Appeal that, having held that
    Zimmerman was indistinguishable and was not decided per incuriam. they
    were bound to follow that decision.

    Lord Edmund-Davies

    MY LORDS,

    The question arising for decision in this appeal is whether it is illegal under
    the Rent Act 1968 for a lessee occupying premises under a protected tenancy

    19

    to require or receive a premium from a person desiring to replace him as
    occupier as a condition of surrendering his lease so that his landlord may
    grant a fresh lease to that other person.

    As others of your Lordships have dealt in detail with the facts of the case
    and the relevant statutory provisions, I seek to state with much greater brevity
    than would otherwise have been possible my reasons for forming the conclu-
    sions at which I have arrived. The answer to the question posed by the ap-
    peal depends upon the construction of section 85 of the Rent Act 1968
    (" Prohibition of premiums and loans on grant of protected tenancies "). This
    provides that—

    " (1) Any person who, as a condition of the grant, renewal or continu-
    " ance of a protected tenancy, requires, in addition to the rent, the pay-
    " ment of any premium . . . shall be guilty of an offence under this
    " section.

    " (2) Any person who, in connection with the grant, renewal or
    " continuance of a protected tenancy, receives any premium in addition
    " to the rent shall be guilty of an offence under this section.

    " (3) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable
    " to a fine not exceeding £100 ".

    Section 88 provides (inter alia) that

    " Where the purchase of any furniture has been required as a
    " condition of the grant, renewal, continuace or assignment—

    " (a) of a protected tenancy, . . . then, if the price exceeds the
    " reasonable price of the furniture, the excess shall be treated . . .
    " as if it were a premium required to be paid as a condition

    " of the grant, renewal, continuance or assignment of the pro-

    " tected tenancy. . . ."

    Section 90 provides for the recovery of any premium or as the case may be,
    so much of it as could not lawfully be required or received.

    Before considering the construction of section 85, it is convenient to deal
    with the alternative way in which the appellants have based their claim to
    recover that part of the £4,000 paid by them to the respondent which was
    admittedly in excess of the value of the fixtures and fittings in the Little
    Venice flat. It was submitted that in the circumstances the respondent was
    a person who, as a condition of or in connection with, the assignment of her
    protected tenancy had required the payment of a premium and that this
    exaction was prohibited by section 86 of the Act. Counsel for the appellants
    urged that the substance of the tripartite transaction involving them and the
    respondents and the Church Commissioners as landlords was that it
    " remained an assignment from beginning to end, though the machinery by
    " which it was effected ultimately took the form of a surrender and fresh
    " grant." In my judgment this will not do and this for the reasons cogently
    advanced by Mr. Barnes on the respondent's behalf. As he submitted, the
    relevant document was not in form an assignment and, were this House to
    go behind it and uphold the appellants' submission that it was in substance
    an assignment, it could do so only by holding that the ostensible agreement
    was merely a label which the parties gave to the transaction when in truth
    they were doing something quite different; see I.R.C. v. Duke of Westminster
    [19361 A.C. 1. Even assuming an initial agreement to assign, it was overtaken
    by subsequent events which rendered it impossible to regard the transaction
    as an assignment simply because thereby the desire of the parties that the
    appellants should succeed the respondent as contractual tenants of the Little
    Venice flat was accomplished.

    Section 13 of the 1968 Act, also relied upon by the appellants, can be
    disposed of with even greater brevity. It makes it an offence in certain
    circumstances for payment to be demanded as a condition of giving up
    possession of a dwelling-house, but as it relates only to the case of statutory
    tenants and as in the present case the parties throughout remained contractual
    tenants, section 13 can have no application to the circumstances in which

    20

    the payment of £4,000 was here made. Section 15 of the Act, to which
    reference was also made, is likewise restricted to changes of statutory
    tenancies and therefore again has no application.

    This appeal therefore falls to be decided solely on the construction of
    section 85 of the Act. As the main controversy which arose during the
    hearing relates to the extent to which reference may be had to the construction
    placed upon earlier Rent Acts, it is desirable to see what happened to the
    previous legislation which, so it has been submitted (particularly for the
    respondent), has a bearing on the outcome of this appeal. The Increase of
    Rent and Mortgage Interest (War Restrictions) Act 1915 was repealed
    in toto by the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act
    1920, and re-enacted in a consolidated and amended form. Section 8(1) of
    the 1920 Act, which (so it was urged) is of particular interest, was repealed
    by the Landlord and Tenant (Rent Control) Act 1949, and replaced by
    section 2(1) thereof, and what still remained of the 1920 Act was wholly
    repealed by the Rent Act 1968. Section 2(1) of the 1949 Act was amended
    by section 37 of the Rent Act 1965, and what still remained of the 1949 Act
    was also repealed by the 1968 Act. Finally, section 37 of the 1965 Act was
    repealed by the same Act.

    Although it effected amendments to sections 32 and 34 of the Rent Act
    1965, the 1968 Act was, and was described as, a consolidating enactment.
    As such, there is a presumption that it was not intended to alter the law and
    accordingly, if the need arises, regard may be had to decisions on the
    construction of the earlier enactments which are consolidated, even if the
    words used are not identical, though this presumption must yield to plain
    words to the contrary; see Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd ed. Vol. 36,
    p. 406 and the cases there cited. But where earlier legislation has been
    substantially altered by amending legislation before consolidation, decisions
    on the earlier provision cannot affect the construction of the later ; ibid,
    p. 407. It is legitimate to refer to an earlier statute in pari materia, even if
    it has expired or has been repealed, but " only where there is an ambiguity "
    (per Lord Russell of Killowen, C.J., Reg. v. Titterton {1895] 2 Q.B. 61, at 66).
    As my noble and learned friend, Lord Simon of Glaisdale, said in Maunsell v.
    Olins [1974] 3 W.L.R. 835, at 847D)—

    " It has been generally accepted in the past that there is a presump-
    " tion that Parliament does not intend by a consolidation Act to alter
    " the pre-existing law: see Maxwell pp. 20-25 and Beswick v. Beswick
    " [1968] A.C. 58, 73 ... But . . . such a presumption has no scope
    " for operation where the actual words of the consolidation Act are
    " not, as a matter of legal language, capable of bearing more than one
    " meaning. The docked tail must not be allowed to wag the dog ".

    I therefore begin by asking: Is section 85 of the Rent Act 1968, ambiguous
    in the sense that it is a matter of uncertainty whether the tripartite arrange-
    ment with which your Lordships are presently concerned falls within its
    wording? Since it has been argued for the respondent that this House
    should tend towards a narrow construction of the section on the ground
    that it attaches a penalty to any contravention, it is well to have in mind
    the observations of Lord Reid in D.P.P. v. Ottewell [1970] A.C. 642, who
    said (at p. 649): —

    " The Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) refer to the well-established
    " principle that in doubtful cases a penal provision ought to be given
    " that interpretation which is least unfavourable to the accused. I
    " would never seek to diminish in any way the importance of that
    " principle within its proper sphere. But it only applies where after
    " full inquiry and consideration one is left in real doubt. It is not
    " enough that the provision is ambiguous in the sense that it is capable
    " of having two meanings. The imprecision of the English language
    " (and, so far as I am aware, of any other language) is such that it is
    " extremely difficult to draft any provision which is not ambiguous In
    " that sense. This section [section 37(2) of the Criminal Justice Act
    " 1967] is clearly ambiguous in that sense: the Court of Appeal

    21

    " Criminal Division) attach one meaning to it, and your Lordships are
    " attaching a different meaning to it. But if, after full consideration,
    " your Lordships are satisfied, as I am, that the latter is the meaning
    " which Parliament must have intended the words to convey, then this
    " principle does not prevent us from giving effect to our conclusions "

    That the language of section 85 is in that sense ambiguous is demonstrated
    by, for example, the totally different conclusions as to its applicability to
    the instant case arrived at by my noble and learned friends, Viscount
    Dilhorne and Lord Russell of Killowen, the former holding it " clear " that
    *he Little Venice flat arrangement is caught by the section, the latter
    evincing equal firmness in concluding that it is no