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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom House of Lords Decisions >> White v Jones [1995] UKHL 5 (16 February 1995)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1995/5.html
Cite as: [1995] 1 All ER 691, [1995] 2 AC 207, [1995] 2 WLR 187, [1995] UKHL 5

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JISCBAILII_CASE_TORT

    Parliamentary Archives,
    HL/PO/JU/18/255

    White and another (Respondents)

    v.
    Jones and others (Appellants)


    JUDGMENT

    Die Jovis 16° Februarii 1995

    Upon Report from the Appellate Committee to whom was
    referred the Cause White and another against Jones and others,
    That the Committee had heard Counsel as well on Monday the 7th
    as on Tuesday the 8th, Wednesday the 9th, Thursday the 10th and
    Monday the 14th days of March last upon the Petition and Appeal
    of John Brynmor Jones of 37 Manor Road, Button Coalfield, West
    Midlands, David John King of 606 Bromford Lane, Ward End,
    Birmingham B8 2DP and Giles Horton Peppercorn of The Citadel, 190
    Corporation Street, Birmingham B4 6TU, praying that the matter
    of the Order set forth in the Schedule thereto, namely an Order
    of Her Majesty's Court of Appeal of the 3rd day of March 1993,
    might be reviewed before Her Majesty the Queen in Her Court of
    Parliament and that the said Order might be reversed, varied or
    altered or that the Petitioners might have such other relief in
    the premises as to Her Majesty the Queen in Her Court of
    Parliament might seen meet; as upon the case of Carol Brenda
    White and Pauline Elizabeth Heath lodged in answer to the said
    Appeal; and due consideration had this day of what was offered
    on either side in this Cause:

    It is Ordered and Adjudged, by the Lords Spiritual and
    Temporal in the Court of Parliament of Her Majesty the Queen
    assembled, That the said Order of Her Majesty's Court of Appeal
    of the 3rd day of March 1993 complained of in the said Appeal be,
    and the same is hereby, Affirmed and that the said Petition and
    Appeal be, and the same is hereby, dismissed this House: And it
    is further Ordered. That the Appellants do pay or cause to be
    paid to the said Respondents the Costs incurred by them in
    respect of the said Appeal, the amount thereof to be certified
    by the Clerk of the Parliaments if not agreed between the
    parties.

    Cler: Parliamentor:

    HOUSE OF LORDS

    OPINIONS OF THE LORDS OF APPEAL FOR JUDGMENT

    IN THE CAUSE


    WHITE AND ANOTHER
    (RESPONDENTS)

    v.

    JONES AND OTHERS
    (APPELLANTS)


    ON 16TH FEBRUARY 1995


    Lord Keith of Kinkel
    Lord Goff of Chieveley
    Lord Browne-Wilkinson
    Lord Mustill
    Lord Nolan


    LORD KEITH OF KINKEL


    My Lords,

    I have had the advantage of reading in draft the speech to be delivered
    by my noble and learned friend Lord Mustill, and I agree with it.

    I am unable to reconcile the allowance of the plaintiffs' claim with
    principle, or to accept that to do so would represent an appropriate advance
    on the incremental basis from decided cases. The position is that the
    defendant Mr. Jones contracted with the testator, Mr. Barratt, to perform a
    particular service for him, namely to take the appropriate steps to enable Mr.
    Barratt's revised testamentary intentions to receive effect. He negligently
    failed to take these steps with due expedition with the result that upon Mr.
    Barratt's death the plaintiffs did not become entitled to the testamentary
    provisions which but for that failure they would have been taken.

    The contractual duty which Mr. Jones owed to the testator was to
    secure that his testamentary intention was put into effective legal form
    promptly. The plaintiffs' case is that precisely the same duty was owed to
    them by Mr. Jones in tort. If the intended effect of the contract between Mr.
    Jones and the testator had been that an immediate benefit, provided by Mr.
    Jones, should be conferred on the plaintiffs, and by reason of Mr. Jones's
    deliberate act or his negligence the plaintiffs had failed to obtain the benefit,
    the plaintiffs would have had no cause of action against Mr. Jones for breach
    of contract, because English law does not admit of jus quaesitum tertio. Nor
    would they have had any cause of action against him in tort, for the law
    would not, I think, allow the rule against jus quaesitum tertio to be
    circumvented in that way. To admit the plaintiffs' claim in the present case
    would in substance, in my opinion, be to give them the benefit of a contract
    to which they were not parties.

    - 1 -

    Further there is, in my opinion, no decided case the grounds of
    decision in which are capable of being extended incrementally and by way of
    analogy so as to admit of a remedy in tort being made available to the
    plaintiffs. Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners Ltd. [1964] A.C.
    465 was a case where the defendants, in response to a request from the
    plaintiffs, had made a representation about the financial soundness of a certain
    concern, in reliance upon which the plaintiffs had acted and in doing so had
    suffered financial loss. This House held that but for a disclaimer of liability
    the defendants would have been liable in damages for negligence in the
    making of the representation. In that case there was a direct relationship
    between the parties creating such proximity as to give rise to a duty of care.
    Here there was no relationship between the plaintiffs and Mr. Jones, nor did
    Mr. Jones do or say anything upon which the plaintiffs acted to their
    prejudice. No damage was done by Mr. Jones to any existing financial or
    other interest of the plaintiffs. The intention to benefit the plaintiffs existed
    only in the mind of the testator, and if it had received legal effect would have
    given them only a spes successions of an ambulatory character

    In Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd. [1994] 3 W.L.R. 761 the
    managing agents were engaged in conducting the financial affairs of the
    Names belonging to the syndicates under their charge. It was alleged that
    they managed these affairs with a lack of due care which involved the Names
    in enormous losses. It was held by this House that the managing agents owed
    to the Names a duty of care in tort, it being irrelevant that no contractual
    relationship existed between them. Here Mr. Jones was not engaged in
    managing any aspect of the plaintiffs' affairs. He was employed only to deal
    with a particular aspect of the testator's affairs.

    Upon the whole matter I have found the conceptual difficulties involved
    in the plaintiffs' claim, which are fully recognised by all your Lordships, to
    be too formidable to be resolved by any process of reasoning compatible with
    existing principles of law.

    I would therefore allow the appeal

    LORD GOFF OF CHIEVELEY

    My Lords,

    In this appeal, your Lordships' House has to consider for the first time
    the much discussed question whether an intended beneficiary under a will is
    entitled to recover damages from the testator's solicitors by reason of whose
    negligence the testator's intention to benefit him under the will has failed to
    be carried into effect. In Ross v. Caunters [1980] Ch. 297, a case in which
    the will failed because, through the negligence of the testator's solicitors, the
    will was not duly attested, Sir Robert Megarry V.C. held that the disappointed

    - 2 -

    beneficiary under the ineffective will was entitled to recover damages from the
    solicitors in negligence. In the present case, the testator's solicitors
    negligently delayed the preparation of a fresh will in place of a previous will
    which the testator had decided to revoke, and the testator died before the new
    will was prepared. The plaintiffs were the two daughters of the testator who
    would have benefited under the fresh will but received nothing under the
    previous will which, by reason of the solicitors' delay, remained unrevoked.
    It was held by the Court of Appeal, reversing the decision of Turner J., that
    the plaintiffs were entitled to recover damages from the solicitors in
    negligence. The question which your Lordships have to decide is whether, in
    cases such as these, the solicitors are liable to the intended beneficiaries who,
    as a result of their negligence, have failed to receive the benefit which the
    testator intended they should receive.

    The facts

    I shall now set out the facts of the present case, and for this purpose
    I shall gratefully adopt the account of the Vice-Chancellor, Sir Donald
    Nicholls, set out in [1993] 3 W.L.R. 730, 733E-734H, which reads as
    follows:

    "The action arises out of an unfortunate family rift. Mr. Arthur
    Barratt and his wife lived at 84, Whitecroft Road, Sheldon,
    Birmingham. They had two children, Carol and Pauline. Carol
    married twice, first to Peter Gould, and later to David White. She
    lived next door at 82, Whitecroft Road. She moved there to be close
    to her parents after her father had a stroke in 1983. Carol had three
    girls: Mandy and Maxine by her first marriage, Karen by her second.
    Pauline, the other daughter, also lived nearby, three or four minutes'
    walk away. She was married to John Heath, and they had two boys,
    Stephen and Andrew.

    Mrs. Barratt died on 23 January 1986. There was then a family row
    between Mr. Barratt and Pauline (Mrs. Heath) about the removal of a
    money box belonging to Mrs. Barratt. Carol (Mrs. White) sided with
    her sister. Mr. Barratt felt so strongly that he made a will cutting both
    his daughters out of his estate. There was no evidence that he had
    previously made a will. The will, executed on 4 March 1986, was
    prepared by the defendant firm of solicitors, Philip Baker King & Co.
    The first defendant, Mr. John Jones, was a legal executive employed
    by the firm. He had known Mr. Barratt for some years. Mr.
    Barratt's estate consisted principally of a house worth £27,000, about
    £1,000 in a building society, and insurances totalling some £1,000.
    By his will Mr. Barratt appointed his former son-in-law Peter Gould,
    his granddaughter Mandy, and Mr. Jones to be his executors. He gave
    £100 each to two of his grandchildren, Karen and Andrew. Apart
    from these small legacies he left his estate equally between Peter
    Gould, Mandy and Maxine. He left nothing to either daughter.

    - 3 -

    Happily, the estrangement between Mr. Barratt and his daughters did
    not continue for long. By mid-June 1986 they were reconciled. Mr.
    Barratt became concerned at the terms of the will he had made. He
    told his daughters what he had done and what he wished to happen.
    He told Mr. Jones on the telephone that he wanted to change his will.
    Carol White also spoke to Mr. Jones on the telephone about her
    father's wishes. Mr. Jones suggested that Mr. Barratt should jot down
    what he wanted and he, Mr. Jones, would deal with it. Mr. Barratt
    destroyed his copy of the March 1986 will. Mr. Heath was in the
    habit of writing letters for Mr. Barratt. In the middle of July he wrote
    out a letter addressed to Mr. Jones setting forth instructions for the
    new will: Carol and Pauline were to have £9,000 each, the five
    grandchildren £1,600 each, Carol and Pauline were to be responsible
    for the legal costs, and they were to dispose of the contents of the
    house. The letter said: 'I have destroyed the original will ... I trust
    the above is as required.' The letter was signed by Mr. Barratt. It
    was posted to the solicitors and received by them on 17 July.

    Regrettably, nothing was done by Mr. Jones to give effect to these
    instructions for a month. Appointments were made for Mr. Jones to
    call round to see Mr. Barratt on three successive Thursdays but Mr.
    Jones did not keep them. Then on 16 August he dictated an internal
    memorandum to a member of the firm's probate department, which
    read:

    'Re: Arthur Thomas Barrett [sic] - New Will. Keith Amos
    drew up a will which is filed away under reference 30C.
    Please see Mr. Barrett's instructions in his letter received on 17
    July. I have considered the matter and feel possibly a new will
    should be drawn up if an addendum cannot be made. Would
    you be kind enough to do it as soon as possible and let me
    know the amount of your costs. Mr. Barrett is a friend of
    mine and I [will] pop along to his house to witness the will and
    obtain costs. I have an appointment to see Mr. Barrett on
    [blank] and if at all possible could you let me have the will by
    that date.'

    On the following day Mr. Jones went away on holiday. A week later,
    on 23 August, Mr. Barratt went off to Weston-super-Mare for a
    fortnight's holiday. Mr. Jones returned to the office on Monday, 1
    September, and Carol arranged an appointment for him to call and see
    Mr. Barratt on 17 September. That was the first available date after
    Mr. Barratt's return from holiday. Meanwhile nothing further had
    been done within the firm regarding Mr. Barratt's will. Indeed, the
    memo dictated by Mr. Jones on 16 August was not even transcribed
    until 5 September, four days after Mr. Jones came back from holiday.

    - 4 -

    While on holiday Mr. Barratt, who was aged 78, fell and hit his head.
    He returned home on 6 or 7 September. At the weekend he suffered
    a heart attack, and he died on 14 September.

    In due course the will executed in March 1986 was admitted to
    probate. So there were the two documents: the will and the letter of
    instructions for a new will. The letter was not witnessed as required
    by the Wills Act 1837 (7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 26), so it could not
    itself stand and take effect as a will. The family were unable to agree
    on how the estate should be divided. The daughters took the view that
    Mr. Jones's inexcusable delay was the cause of their not having
    received £18,000 from their father's estate. Had Mr. Jones done what
    he should have done, the March 1986 will would have been revoked
    and replaced with a new will benefiting them. So they brought an
    action for damages for negligence."

    The decisions of the courts below

    The action was heard by Turner. J. He dismissed the plaintiffs' claim.
    First, he decided not to apply Ross v. Caunters [1980] Ch. 297 in a case
    where there had been a failure to draw up the will for execution, as opposed
    to a case where (as in Ross v. Caunters) the will had been drawn up and
    executed, but had not been properly attested. Second, he held that on the
    facts of the present case the damage was too speculative and uncertain in
    extent to be recoverable. The Court of Appeal [1993] 3 W.L.R. 730,
    however, reversed Turner J.'s decision on both these issues and so allowed
    the appeal, holding that the solicitors owed a duty of care to the two plaintiffs,
    and were in breach of that duty. They assessed the damages recoverable by
    the two plaintiffs at £9,000 each, being the minimum sum which each would
    have received under the second will if it had been drawn up and duly
    executed. The decision of the Court of Appeal to reverse the decision of
    Turner J. on the first of these issues raises a point of principle to which I will
    return later.

    Experience in other countries

    I turn to the principal issue which arises on the appeal, which is
    whether in the circumstances of cases such as Ross v. Caunters
    [1980] Ch. 297 and the present case the testator's solicitors are liable to the
    disappointed beneficiary. As I have already stated, the question is one which
    has been much discussed, not only in this country and other common law
    countries, but also in some civil law countries, notably Germany. There can
    be no doubt that Ross v. Caunters has been generally welcomed by academic
    writers (see, e.g., Salmond and Heuston on the Law of Torts, 20th ed., (1992)
    pp. 215, 217; Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort, 13th ed., (1989) pp. 88-89, 96,
    106; Fleming on Torts, 8th ed., (1992) p. 184, and Markesinis and Deakin
    on Tort Law,
    3rd ed., (1994) pp. 95-98). Furthermore it does not appear to

    - 5 -

    have been the subject of adverse comment in the higher courts in this country,
    though it has not been approved except by the Court of Appeal in the present
    case. Indeed, as far as I am aware, Ross v. Caunters has created no serious
    problems in practice since it was decided nearly fifteen years ago. A similar
    conclusion has been reached in the courts of New Zealand (see Gartside v.
    Sheffield, Young & Ellis
    [1983] N.Z.L.R. 37), and the law appears to be
    developing in the same direction in Canada (see, in particular Peake v. Vernon
    & Thompson
    (1990) 49 B.C.L.R. (2d) 245, and Heath v. Ivens (1991) 57
    B.C.L.R. (2d) 39). The position in Australia (to which I will refer in a
    moment), is at present less clear. In the United States, following two earlier
    decisions in California (Biakanja v. Irving 320 P. 2d 16 (1958), in which
    liability was held to arise in tort, and Lucas v. Hamm 364 P. 2d. 685 1961,
    in which the disappointed beneficiary was treated as a third party beneficiary
    of the testator's right of action against the negligent attorney), the trend now
    appears to be moving strongly in favour of liability (see 61 A.L.R. (4th) 464
    (1988) at pp. 473-475 (Joan Teshima). For the American position generally,
    see the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, Tentative Draft No. 7
    (April 7 1994), para. 73(3), and in particular Comment f., and Illustration 2.
    Other cases are cited in the Reporter's Note under para. 73.) In Germany, a
    disappointed beneficiary may be entitled to claim damages from the testator's
    negligent solicitor under the principle known as contract with protective effect
    for third parties (Vertrag mit Schutzwirkung fur Dritte). I shall discuss the
    relevant German law on the subject in greater detail at a later stage in this
    opinion. It also appears that a similar conclusion would be reached in France:
    see Jurisprudence (1979) 19243, Cass. civ. ler, 23 Nov. 1977; and
    Jurisprudence (1982) 19728, Cass. civ. ler, 14 Jan. 1981, which appears to
    be based on the broad principle that a notary is responsible, even as against
    third parties, for all fault causing damage committed by him in the exercise
    of his functions. On facts very similar to those of the present case, the Court
    of Appeal of Amsterdam has held a notary liable in negligence to the intended
    beneficiary: see NJ No. 740 31 Jan. 1985.

    The conceptual difficulties

    Even so, it has been recognised on all hands that Ross v. Caunters
    [1980] Ch. 297 raises difficulties of a conceptual nature, and that as a result
    it is not altogether easy to accommodate the decision within the ordinary
    principles of our law of obligations. Perhaps the most trenchant criticism of
    Ross v. Caunters is to be found in the judgments of Lush J. and (especially)
    Murphy J. in the decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria
    in Seale v. Perry [1982] V.R. 193, in which particular stress is laid upon the
    conceptual difficulties which it raises. It is however right to point out that,
    in that case, McGarvie J. took a rather different view; and further that the
    court, in declining to follow Ross v. Caunters, had also to decline to follow
    the decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Western Australia in
    Watts v. Public Trustee of Western Australia [1980] W.A.R. 97, in which
    Ross v. Caunters was followed. Moreover in Finlay v. Rowlands, Anderson

    - 6 -

    & Hine [1987] Tas. R. 60, Seale v. Perry was not followed, the reasoning in
    Ross v. Caunters being preferred. The decision of the High Court of
    Australia in Hawkins v. Clayton (1988) 164 C.L.R. 539, in which it was held
    by a majority that a solicitor who had retained custody of a will was liable in
    tort to the executor for loss suffered by reason of the solicitor's failure to
    locate and notify him in due time of the testatrix's death, provides an
    indication that the High Court may be prepared to take a less strict approach
    to cases such as Ross v. Caunters than that adopted by the majority of the
    court in Seale v. Perry.

    It is right however that I should immediately summarise these
    conceptual difficulties. They are as follows:

    (1) First, the general rule is well established that a solicitor acting on
    behalf of a client owes a duty of care only to his client. The relationship
    between a solicitor and his client is nearly always contractual, and the scope
    of the solicitor's duties will be set by the terms of his retainer; but a duty of
    care owed by a solicitor to his client will arise concurrently in contract and
    in tort (see Midland Bank Trust Co. Ltd. v. Hett, Stubbs & Kemp [1979] Ch.
    384, recently approved by your Lordships' House in Henderson v. Merrett
    Syndicates Ltd.
    [1994] 3 W.L.R. 761). But, when a solicitor is performing
    his duties to his client, he will generally owe no duty of care to third parties.
    Accordingly, as Sir Donald Nicholls V.-C. pointed out in the present case, a
    solicitor acting for a seller of land does not generally owe a duty of care to
    the buyer: see Gran Gelato Ltd. v. Richcliff (Group) Ltd. [1982] Ch. 560.
    Nor, as a general rule, does a solicitor acting for a party in adversarial
    litigation owe a duty of care to that party's opponent: see Al-Kandari v. J.R.
    Brown & Co.
    [1988] Q.B. 665, 672, per Lord Donaldson of Lymington M.R.
    Further it has been held that a solicitor advising a client about a proposed
    dealing with his property in his lifetime owes no duty of care to a prospective
    beneficiary under the client's then will who may be prejudicially affected: see
    Clarke v. Bruce Lance & Co. [1988] 1 W.L.R. 881.

    As I have said, the scope of the solicitor's duties to his client are set
    by the terms of his retainer; and as a result it has been said that the content
    of his duties are entirely within the control of his client. The solicitor can,
    in theory at least, protect himself by the introduction of terms into his contract
    with his client; but, it is objected, he could not similarly protect himself
    against any third party to whom he might be held responsible, where there is
    no contract between him and the third party.

    In these circumstances, it is said, there can be no liability of the
    solicitor to a beneficiary under a will who has been disappointed by reason of
    negligent failure by the solicitor to give effect to the testator's intention.
    There can be no liability in contract, because there is no contract between the
    solicitor and the disappointed beneficiary; if any contractual claim was to be
    recognised, it could only be by way of a ius quaesitum tertio, and no such

    - 7 -

    claim is recognised in English law. Nor could there be liability in tort,
    because in the performance of his duties to his client a solicitor owes no duty
    of care in tort to a third party such as a disappointed beneficiary under his
    client's will.

    (2) A further reason is given which is said to reinforce the conclusion that
    no duty of care is owed by the solicitor to the beneficiary in tort. Here, it is
    suggested, is one of those situations in which a plaintiff is entitled to damages
    if, and only if, he can establish a breach of contract by the defendant. First,
    the plaintiffs claim is one for purely financial loss; and as a general rule,
    apart from cases of assumption of responsibility arising under the principle in
    Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd v. Heller & Partners Ltd. [1964] A.C. 465, no
    action will lie in respect of such loss in the tort of negligence. Furthermore,
    in particular, no claim will lie in tort for damages in respect of a mere loss
    of an expectation, as opposed to damages in respect of damage to an existing
    right or interest of the plaintiff. Such a claim falls within the exclusive zone
    of contractual liability; and it is contrary to principle that the law of tort
    should be allowed to invade that zone. Of course, Parliament can create
    exceptions to that principle by extending contractual rights to persons who are
    not parties to a contract, as was done, for example, in the Bills of Lading Act
    1855 and the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992. But as a matter of
    principle a step of this kind cannot be taken by the courts, though they can
    redefine the boundaries of the exclusive zone, as they did in Donoghue v.
    Stevenson
    [1932] A.C. 562.

    The present case, it is suggested, falls within that exclusive zone.
    Here, it is impossible to frame the suggested duty except by reference to the
    contract between the solicitor and the testator - a contract to which the
    disappointed beneficiary is not a party, and from which, therefore, he can
    derive no rights. Second, the loss suffered by the disappointed beneficiary is
    not in reality a loss at all; it is, more accurately, a failure to obtain a benefit.
    All that has happened is that what is sometimes called a spes succesionis has
    tailed to come to fruition. As a result, he has not become better off; but he
    is not made worse off. A claim in respect of such a loss of expectation falls,
    it is said, clearly within the exclusive zone of contractual liability.

    (3) A third, and distinct, objection is that, if liability in tort was
    recognised in cases such as Ross v. Caunters [1980] Ch. 297, it would be
    impossible to place any sensible bounds to cases in which such recovery was
    allowed. In particular, the same liability should logically be imposed in cases
    where an inter vivos transaction was ineffective, and the defect was not
    discovered until the donor was no longer able to repair it. Furthermore,
    liability could not logically be restricted to cases where a specific named
    beneficiary was disappointed, but would inevitably have to be extended to
    cases in which wide, even indeterminate, classes of persons could be said to
    have been adversely affected.

    -8-

    (4) Other miscellaneous objections were taken, though in my opinion they
    were without substance. In particular:

    1. Since the testator himself owes no duty to the beneficiary, it
      would be illogical to impose any such duty on his solicitor. I
      myself cannot however see any force in this objection.

    2. To enable the disappointed beneficiary to recover from the
      solicitor would have the undesirable, and indeed fortuitous,
      effect of substantially increasing the size of the testator's estate
      - even of doubling it in size; because it would not be possible
      to recover any part of the estate which had lawfully devolved
      upon others by an unrevoked will or on an intestacy, even
      though that was not in fact the testator's intention. I cannot
      however see what impact this has on the disappointed
      beneficiary's remedy. It simply reflects the fact that those who
      received the testator's estate, either under an unrevoked will or
      on an intestacy, were lucky enough to receive a windfall; and
      in consequence the estate is, so far as the testator and the
      disappointed beneficiary are concerned, irretrievably lost.

    (5) There is however another objection of a conceptual nature, which was
    not adumbrated in argument before the Appellate Committee. In the present
    case, unlike Ross v. Counters itself, there was no act of the defendant solicitor
    which could be characterised as negligent. All that happened was that the
    solicitor did nothing at all for a period of time, with the result that the testator
    died before his new testamentary intentions could be implemented in place of
    the old. As a general rule, however, there is no liability in tortious
    negligence for an omission, unless the defendant is under some pre-existing
    duty. Once again, therefore, the question arises how liability can arise in the
    present case in the absence of a contract.

    Point (5) apart, such were the principal arguments addressed to the
    Appellate Committee by Mr. Matheson Q.C. on behalf of the appellants in the
    present case. In addition Professor Jolowicz Q.C. developed, on behalf of the
    appellants, the argument based upon the principle of an exclusive zone of
    contractual liability. I myself was much assisted by these arguments, as I was
    by the admirable argument addressed to the Committee by Mr. Mitting Q.C.
    on behalf of the respondents.

    Robertson v. Fleming

    There is undoubted force in the principal contentions advanced on
    behalf of the appellants. Moreover the appellants were able to rely, in support
    of their argument, on a decision of your Lordships' House, Robertson v.
    Fleming
    1861 4 Macq. 167, which came before this House on appeal from the
    Court of Session. In that case, sureties were seeking to claim damages from
    a solicitor, instructed by the debtor "for behoof of" the sureties to prepare

    - 9 -

    documentation designed to enable the sureties to have the benefit of security
    in the form of leasehold property to which the debtor was entitled. The
    relevant document, which took the form of a bond of relief and assignation in
    favour of the sureties, failed to achieve the desired effect because, through the
    negligence of the solicitor, notice of the assignation was not given to the
    landlord. In the litigation, the principal issue related to the meaning of the
    expression "for behoof of", the question being whether it meant "by authority
    of", so that it was effective to create the necessary privity between the sureties
    and the solicitor; or whether it simply meant "for the benefit of", in which
    case it did not have that effect. In the course of their speeches in the House
    some of their Lordships, when stating that the mere fact that the work was
    done for the benefit of the sureties was not sufficient to give rise to liability
    on the part of the solicitor to the sureties, referred to the example of a claim
    against a solicitor by a disappointed legatee as being so contrary to principle
    as to illustrate clearly why the claim in the case before them was unfounded:
    see p. 177, per Lord Campbell L.C.; p. 185, per Lord Cranworth; and pp.
    200-201, per Lord Wensleydale. Lord Campbell spoke in particularly strong
    terms, when he said of the sureties' argument (at p. 177):

    "If this were law a disappointed legatee might sue the solicitor
    employed by a testator to make a will in favour of a stranger, whom
    the solicitor never saw or before heard of, if the will were void for not
    being properly signed and attested. I am clearly of opinion that this
    is not the law of Scotland, nor of England, and it can hardly be the
    law of any country where jurisprudence has been cultivated as a
    science."

    Statements such as these no doubt represented the law as understood
    in this country over a century ago. Moreover, as I have already observed, the
    general rule today is that, subject to his duties to the court and the
    professional duties imposed upon his profession, a solicitor when acting for
    his client owes no duty to third parties. But the problem which arises in the
    present case relates to the particular position of an intended beneficiary under
    a will or proposed will to which the solicitor has negligently failed to give
    effect in accordance with the instructions of his client, the testator; and the
    question is whether exceptionally a duty of care should be held to be owed by
    the solicitor to the disappointed beneficiary in those circumstances. I myself
    do not consider that the existence of such a duty of care can simply be
    dismissed by reference to the sweeping statements made in Robertson v.
    Fleming.
    For the law has moved on from those days. Nowadays questions
    such as that in the present case have to be considered anew, and statements
    of the law, such as that of Lord Campbell, cannot be allowed to foreclose the
    argument of the plaintiffs in the present case; indeed, although they
    demonstrate the importance attached to the doctrine of privity of contract in
    1861, nevertheless they did not form part of the ratio decidendi of the case,
    in which the question at issue in the present case did not fall to be decided.
    It follows that, although the views expressed on the point in Robertson v.
    Fleming
    are still entitled to great respect, your Lordships are in my opinion

    - 10 -

    free to depart from them without having recourse to the Practice Direction of
    1966 for that purpose. Even so, they add force to the conceptual argument
    advanced on behalf of the appellants in the present case.

    The impulse to do practical justice

    Before addressing the legal questions which lie at the heart of the
    present case, it is, I consider, desirable to identify the reasons of justice which
    prompt judges and academic writers to conclude, like Megarry V.-C. in Ross
    v. Caunters,
    that a duty should be owed by the testator's solicitor to a
    disappointed beneficiary. The principal reasons are, I believe, as follows.

    1. In the forefront stands the extraordinary fact that, if such a duty is not
      recognised, the only persons who might have a valid claim (i.e., the testator
      and his estate) have suffered no loss, and the only person who has suffered a
      loss (i.e., the disappointed beneficiary) has no claim: see Ross v. Caunters
      [1980] Ch. 297, 303A, per Sir Robert Megarry V.-C. It can therefore be said
      that, if the solicitor owes no duty to the intended beneficiaries, there is a
      lacuna in the law which needs to be filled. This I regard as being a point of
      cardinal importance in the present case.

    2. The injustice of denying such a remedy is reinforced if one considers
      the importance of legacies in a society which recognises (subject only to the
      incidence of inheritance tax, and statutory requirements for provision for near
      relatives) the right of citizens to leave their assets to whom they please, and
      in which, as a result, legacies can be of great importance to individual
      citizens, providing very often the only opportunity for a citizen to acquire a
      significant capital sum; or to inherit a house, so providing a secure roof over
      the heads of himself and his family; or to make special provision for his or
      her old age. In the course of the hearing before the Appellate Committee
      Mr. Matheson Q.C. (who was instructed by the Law Society to represent the
      appellant solicitors) placed before the Committee a schedule of claims of the
      character of that in the present case notified to the Solicitors' Indemnity Fund
      following the judgment of the Court of Appeal below. It is striking that,
      where the amount of the claim was known, it was, by today's standards, of
      a comparatively modest size. This perhaps indicates that it is where a testator
      instructs a small firm of solicitors that mistakes of this kind are most likely
      to occur, with the result that it tends to be people of modest means, who need
      the money so badly, who suffer.

    3. There is a sense in which the solicitors' profession cannot complain if
      such a liability may be imposed upon their members. If one of them has been
      negligent in such a way as to defeat his client's testamentary intentions, he
      must regard himself as very lucky indeed if the effect of the law is that he is
      not liable to pay damages in the ordinary way. It can involve no injustice to
      render him subject to such a liability, even if the damages are payable not to
      his client's estate for distribution to the disappointed beneficiary (which might
      have been the preferred solution) but direct to the disappointed beneficiary.

    - 11 -

    (4) That such a conclusion is required as a matter of justice is reinforced
    by consideration of the role played by solicitors in society. The point was
    well made by Cooke J. in Gartside v. Sheffield, Young & Ellis [1983]
    N.Z.L.R. 37, 43, when he observed that:

    "To deny an effective remedy in a plain case would seem to imply a
    refusal to acknowledge the solicitor's professional role in the
    community. In practice the public relies on solicitors (or statutory
    officers with similar functions) to prepare effective wills."

    The question therefore arises whether it is possible to give effect in law
    to the strong impulse for practical justice which is the fruit of the foregoing
    considerations. For this to be achieved, I respectfully agree with the
    Sir Donald Nicholls V.-C. when he said (see [1993] 3 W.L.R. 730, 739) that
    the court will have to fashion "an effective remedy for the solicitor's breach
    of his professional duty to his client" in such a way as to repair the injustice
    to the disappointed beneficiary.

    Ross v. Caunters and the conceptual problems

    In Ross v. Caunters [1980] 1 Ch. 297, Sir Robert Megarry V.-C.
    approached the problem as one arising under the ordinary principles of the tort
    of negligence. He found himself faced with two principal objections to the
    plaintiff's claim. The first, founded mainly upon the decision of the Court of
    Appeal in Groom v. Crocker [1939] 1 K.B. 194, was that a solicitor could not
    be liable in negligence in respect of his professional work to anyone except
    his client, his liability to his client arising only in contract and not in tort.
    This proposition Sir Robert rejected without difficulty, relying primarily upon
    the judgment of Oliver J. in Midland Bank Trust Co. Ltd. v. Hett, Stubbs &
    Kemp
    [1979] Ch. 384 (recently approved by this House in Henderson v.
    Merrett Syndicates Ltd.
    [1994] 3 W.L.R. 761). The second, and more
    fundamental, argument was that, apart from cases falling within the principle
    established in Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners Ltd. [1964] A.C.
    465, no action lay in the tort of negligence for pure economic loss. This
    argument Sir Robert approached following the path traced by Lord
    Wilberforce in Anns v. Merton London Borough Council [1978] A.C. 728,
    751-752; and on that basis, relying in particular on Ministry of Housing and
    Local Government v. Sharp
    [1970] 2 Q.B. 223 (which he regarded as
    conclusive of the point before him), he held that here liability could properly
    be imposed in negligence for pure economic loss, his preferred basis being by
    direct application of Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] A.C. 562 itself.

    It will at once be seen that some of the conceptual problems raised by
    the appellants in argument before the Appellate Committee were not raised in
    Ross v. Caunters [1980] Ch. 297. Others which were raised plainly did not
    loom so large in argument as they have done in the present case. Thus the
    point founded on the fact that in cases of this kind the plaintiff is claiming

    - 12 -

    damages for the loss of an expectation was briefly touched upon by Sir Robert
    (at p. 322) and as briefly dismissed by him, but (no doubt for good reason,
    having regard to the manner in which the case was presented) there is no
    further analysis of the point. It is however my opinion that, these conceptual
    arguments having been squarely raised in argument in the present case, they
    cannot lightly be dismissed. They have to be faced; and it is immediately
    apparent that they raise the question whether the claim properly falls within
    the law of contract or the law of tort. This is because, although the plaintiffs'
    claim has been advanced, and indeed held by the Court of Appeal to lie, in
    the tort of negligence, nevertheless the response of the appellants has been that
    the claim, if properly analysed, must necessarily have contractual features
    which cannot ordinarily exist in the case of a an ordinary tortious claim. Here
    I refer not only to the fact that the claim is one for damages foi pure
    economic loss, but also to the need for the defendant solicitor to be entitled
    to invoke as against the disappointed beneficiary any terms of the contract
    with his client which may limit or exclude his liability; to the fact that the
    damages claimed are for the loss of an expectation; and also to the fact (not
    adverted to below) that the claim in the present case can be said to arise from
    a pure omission, and as such will not (apart from special circumstances) give
    rise to a claim in tortious negligence. Faced with points such as these, the
    strict lawyer may well react by saying that the present claim can lie only in
    contract, and is not therefore open to a disappointed beneficiary as against the
    testator's solicitor. This was indeed the reaction of Lush and Murphy JJ. in
    Seale v. Perry [1982] V.R. 193, and is one which is entitled to great respect.

    It must not be forgotten however that a solicitor who undertakes to
    perform services for his client may be liable to his client for failure to
    exercise due care and skill in relation to the performance of those services not
    only in contract, but also in negligence under the principle in Hedley Byrne
    & Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners Ltd.
    [1964] A.C. 465: (see Midland Bank
    Trust Co. Ltd. v. Hett, Stubbs & Kemp
    [1977] Ch. 384,) on the basis of
    assumption of responsibility by the solicitor towards his client. Even so there
    is great difficulty in holding, on ordinary principles, that the solicitor has
    assumed any responsibility towards an intended beneficiary under a will which
    he has undertaken to prepare on behalf of his client but which, through his
    negligence, has failed to take effect in accordance with his client's
    instructions. The relevant work is plainly performed by the solicitor for his
    client; but, in the absence of special circumstances, it cannot be said to have
    been undertaken for the intended beneficiary. Certainly, again in the absence
    of special circumstances, there will have been no reliance by the intended
    beneficiary on the exercise by the solicitor of due care and skill; indeed, the
    intended beneficiary may not even have been aware that the solicitor was
    engaged on such a task, or that his position might be affected. Let me take
    the example of an inter vivos gift where, as a result of the solicitor's
    negligence, the instrument in question is for some reason not effective for its
    purpose. The mistake comes to light some time later during the lifetime of
    the donor, after the gift to the intended donee should have taken effect. The
    donor, having by then changed his mind, declines to perfect the imperfect gift

    - 13 -

    in favour of the intended donee. The latter may be unable to obtain
    rectification of the instrument, because equity will not perfect an imperfect
    gift (though there is some authority which suggests that exceptionally it may
    do so if the donor has died or become incapacitated: see Lister v. Hodgson
    (1867) L.R. 4 Eq. 30, 34-35 per Romilly M.R.). I for my part do not think
    that the intended donee could in these circumstances have any claim against
    the solicitor. It is enough, as I see it, that the donor is able to do what he
    wishes to put matters right. From this it would appear to follow that the real
    reason for concern in cases such as the present lies in the extraordinary fact
    that, if a duty owed by the testator's solicitor to the disappointed beneficiary
    is not recognised, the only person who may have a valid claim has suffered
    no loss, and the only person who has suffered a loss has no claim. This is a
    point to which I will return later in this opinion, when I shall give further
    consideration to the application of the Hedley Byrne principle in circumstances
    such as those in the present case.

    The German experience

    The fact that the problems which arise in cases such as the present
    have troubled the courts in many jurisdictions, both common law and civil
    law, and have prompted a variety of reactions, indicates that they are of their
    very nature difficult to accommodate within the ordinary principles of the law
    of obligations. It is true that our law of contract is widely seen as deficient
    in the sense that it is perceived to be hampered by the presence of an
    unnecessary doctrine of consideration and (through a strict doctrine of privity
    of contract) stunted through a failure to recognise a jus quaesitum tertio. But
    even if we lacked the former and possessed the latter, the ordinary law could
    not provide a simple answer to the problems which arise in the present case,
    which appear at first sight to require the imposition of something like a
    contractual liability which is beyond the scope of the ordinary jus quaesitum
    tertio. In these circumstances, the effect of the special characteristics of any
    particular system of law is likely to be, as indeed appears from the authorities
    I have cited, not so much that no remedy is recognised, but rather that the
    system in question will choose its own special means for granting a remedy
    notwithstanding the doctrinal difficulties involved.

    We can, I believe, see this most clearly if we compare the English and
    German reactions to problems of this kind. Strongly though I support the
    study of comparative law, I hesitate to embark in an opinion such as this upon
    a comparison, however brief, with a civil law system; because experience has
    taught me how very difficult, and indeed potentially misleading, such an
    exercise can be. Exceptionally however, in the present case, thanks to
    material published in our language by distinguished comparatists, German as
    well as English, we have direct access to publications which should
    sufficiently dispel our ignorance of German law and so by comparison
    illuminate our understanding of our own.

    - 14 -

    I have already referred to problems created in the English law of
    contract by the doctrines of consideration and of privity of contract. These,
    of course, encourage us to seek a solution to problems of this kind within our
    law of tortious negligence. In German law, on the other hand, in which the
    law of delict does not allow for the recovery of damages for pure economic
    loss in negligence, it is natural that the judges should extend the law of
    contract to meet the justice of the case. In a case such as the present, which
    is concerned with a breach of duty owed by a professional man (A) to his
    client (B), in circumstances in which practical justice requires that a third
    party (C) should have a remedy against the professional man (A) in respect
    of damage which he has suffered by reason of the breach, German law may
    have recourse to a doctrine called Vertrag mit Schutzwirkung fur Dritte
    (contract with protective effect for third parties), the scope of which extends
    beyond that of an ordinary contract for the benefit of a third party. (See
    Professor Werner Lorenz in The Gradual Convergence, ed. Markesinis (OUP
    1994), pp. 65, 68-72.) This doctrine was invoked by the German Supreme
    Court in the Testamentfall case (BGH 6 July 1965, NJW 1965, 1955) which
    is similar to the present case in that the plaintiff (C), through the dilatoriness
    of a lawyer (A) (instructed by her father (B)) in making the necessary
    arrangements for the father's will, was deprived of a testamentary benefit
    which she would have received under the will if it had been duly made. The
    plaintiff (C) was held to be entitled to recover damages from the lawyer (A).
    Professor Lorenz has expressed the opinion (p. 70) that the ratio of that case
    would apply to the situation in Ross v. Caunters itself. In these cases, it
    appears that the court will examine "whether the contracting parties intended
    to create a duty of care in favour of" the third person (BGH NJW 1984 355,
    356), or whether there is to be inferred "a protective obligation . . . based on
    good faith ..." (BGHZ 69, 82, 85 et seq.). (Quotations taken in each case
    from Professor Markesinis' article on "An Expanding Tort Law - the Price of
    a Rigid Contract Law" (1987) 103 L.Q.R. 354, 363, 366, 368.) But any such
    inference of intention would, in English law, be beyond the scope of our
    doctrine of implied terms; and it is legitimate to infer that the German
    judges, in creating this special doctrine, were extending the law of contract
    beyond orthodox contractual principles.

    I wish next to refer to another German doctrine known as
    Drittschadensliquidation, which is available in cases of transferred loss
    (Schadensverlagerung). In these cases, as a leading English comparatist has
    explained:

    " ... the person who has suffered the loss has no remedy while the
    person who has the remedy has suffered no loss. If such a situation
    is left unchallenged, the defaulting party may never face the
    consequences of his negligent conduct; his insurer may receive an
    unexpected (and undeserved) windfall; and the person on whom the
    loss has fallen may be left without any redress." See Markesinis, The
    German Law of Torts,
    3rd ed., (1994) p. 56.

    - 15 -

    Under this doctrine, to take one example, the defendant (A), typically a
    carrier, may be held liable to the seller of goods (B) for the loss suffered by
    the buyer (C) to whom the risk but not the property in the goods has passed.
    In such circumstances the seller is held to have a contractual claim against the
    carrier in respect of the damage suffered by the buyer. This claim can be
    pursued by the seller against the carrier; but it can also be assigned by him
    to the buyer. If, exceptionally, the seller refuses either to exercise his right
    for the benefit of the buyer or to assign his claim to him, the seller can be
    compelled to make the assignment. (See Professor Werner Lorenz in Essays
    in Memory of Professor F.H. Lawson
    (1986) 86, 89-90), and in The Gradual
    Convergence
    (OUP 1994) ed. Markesinis, 65, 88-89, 92-93; and Professor
    Hein Kotz in (1990) 10 Tel Aviv University Studies in Law 195, 209.)
    Professor Lorenz (Essays at p. 89) has stated that it is at least arguable that
    the idea of Drittschadensliquidation might be "extended so as to cover" such
    cases as the Testamentfall case, an observation which is consistent with the
    view expressed by the German Supreme Court that the two doctrines may
    overlap (BGH 19 January 1977, NJW 1977, 2073 = VersR 1977, 638:
    translated in Markesinis, German Law of Torts, 3rd ed., 293). At all events
    both doctrines have the effect of extending to the plaintiff the benefit of what
    is, in substance, a contractual cause of action; though, at least as seen
    through English eyes, this result is achieved not by orthodox contractual
    reasoning, but by the contractual remedy being made available by law in order
    to achieve practical justice.

    Transferred loss in English law

    I can deal with this topic briefly. The problem of transferred loss has
    arisen in particular in maritime law, when a buyer of goods seeks to enforce
    against a shipowner a remedy in tort in respect of loss of or damage to goods
    at his risk when neither the rights under the contract nor the property in the
    goods has passed to him (see Leigh & Sillivan Ltd. v. Aliakmon Shipping Co.
    Ltd.
    [1985] Q.B. 350, 399, per Robert Goff L.J. and [1986] A.C. 785, 820,
    per Lord Brandon of Oakbrook). In cases such as these (with all respect to
    the view expressed by Lord Brandon in [1986] A.C. 785, 819) there was a
    serious lacuna in the law, as was revealed when all relevant interests in the
    city of London called for reform to make a remedy available to the buyers
    who under the existing law were without a direct remedy against the
    shipowners. The problem was solved, as a matter of urgency, by the Carriage
    of Goods by Sea Act 1992, I myself having the honour of introducing the Bill
    into your Lordships' House (acting in its legislative capacity) on behalf of the
    Law Commission. The solution adopted by the Act was to extend the rights
    of suit available under section 1 of the Bills of Lading Act 1855 (there
    restricted to cases where the property in the goods had passed upon or by
    reason of the consignment or endorsement of the relevant bill of lading) to all
    holders of bills of lading (and indeed other documents): see section 2(1) of
    the Act of 1992. Here is a sweeping statutory reform, powered by the needs
    of commerce, which has the effect of enlarging the circumstances in which

    - 16 -

    contractual rights may be transferred by virtue of the transfer of certain
    documents. For present purposes, however, an important consequence is the
    solution in this context of a problem of transferred loss, the lacuna being filled
    by statute rather than by the common law. Moreover this result has been
    achieved, as in German law, by vesting in the plaintiff, who has suffered the
    relevant loss, the contractual rights of the person who has stipulated for the
    carrier's obligation but has suffered no loss.

    I turn next to English law in relation to cases such as the present.
    Here there is a lacuna in the law, in the sense that practical justice requires
    that the disappointed beneficiary should have a remedy against the testator's
    solicitor in circumstances in which neither the testator nor his estate has in law
    suffered a loss. Professor Lorenz (Essays in Memory of Professor F.H.
    Lawson,
    p.90) has said that "this is a situation which comes very close to the
    cases of 'transferred loss', the only difference being that the damage due to
    the solicitor's negligence could never have been caused to the testator or to his
    executor". In the case of the testator, he suffers no loss because (in contrast
    to a gift by an inter vivos settlor) a gift under a will cannot take effect until
    after the testator's death, and it follows that there can be no depletion of the
    testator's assets in his lifetime if the relevant asset is, through the solicitors'
    negligence, directed to a person other than the intended beneficiary. The
    situation is therefore not one in which events have subsequently occurred
    which have resulted in the loss falling on another. It is one in which the
    relevant loss could never fall on the testator to whom the solicitor owed a
    duty, but only on another; and the loss which is suffered by that other, i.e. an
    expectation loss, is of a character which in any event could never have been
    suffered by the testator. Strictly speaking, therefore, this is not a case of
    transferred loss.

    Even so, the analogy is very close. In practical terms, part or all of
    the testator's estate has been lost because it has been despatched to a
    destination unintended by the testator. Moreover, had a gift been similarly
    misdirected during the testator's lifetime, he would either have been able to
    recover it from the recipient or, if not, he could have recovered the full
    amount from the negligent solicitor as damages. In a case such as the present,
    no such remedies are available to the testator or his estate. The will cannot
    normally be rectified: the testator has of course no remedy: and his estate
    has suffered no loss, because it has been distributed under the terms of a valid
    will. In these circumstances, there can be no injustice if the intended
    beneficiary has a remedy against the solicitor for the full amount which he
    should have received under the will, this being no greater than the damage for
    which the solicitor could have been liable to the donor if the loss had occurred
    in his lifetime.

    A contractual approach

    It may be suggested that, in cases such as the present, the simplest
    course would be to solve the problem by making available to the disappointed

    - 17 -

    beneficiary, by some means or another, the benefit of the contractual rights
    (such as they are) of the testator or his estate against the negligent solicitor,
    as is for example done under the German principle of Vertrag mit
    Schutzwirkung fur Dritte. Indeed that course has been urged upon us by
    Professor Markesinis in (1987) 103 L.Q.R. 354, 396-397, echoing a view
    expressed by Professor Fleming in (1986) 4 O.J.L.S. 235, 241. Attractive
    though this solution is, there is unfortunately a serious difficulty in its way.
    The doctrine of consideration still forms part of our law of contract, as does
    the doctrine of privity of contract which is considered to exclude the
    recognition of a jus quaesitum tertio. To proceed as Professor Markesinis has
    suggested may be acceptable in German law, but in this country could be open
    to criticism as an illegitimate circumvention of these long established
    doctrines; and this criticism could be reinforced by reference to the fact that,
    in the case of carriage of goods by sea, a contractual solution to a particular
    problem of transferred loss, and to other cognate problems, was provided only
    by recourse to Parliament. Furthermore, I myself do not consider that the
    present case provides a suitable occasion for reconsideration of doctrines so
    fundamental as these.

    The Albazero principle

    Even so, I have considered whether the present problem might be
    solved by adding cases such as the present to the group of cases referred to
    by Lord Diplock in The Albazero [1977] A.C. 774, 846-847. In these cases,
    a person may exceptionally sue in his own name to recover a loss which he
    has not in fact suffered, being personally accountable for any damages so
    recovered to the person who has in fact suffered the loss. Lord Diplock was
    prepared to accommodate within this group the so-called rule in Dunlop v.
    Lambert
    (1839) 6 Cl. & F. 600, on the principle that:

    "... in a commercial contract concerning goods where it is in the
    contemplation of the parties that the proprietary interests in the goods
    may be transferred from one owner to another after the contract has
    been entered into and before the breach which causes loss or damage
    to the goods, an original party to the contract, if such be the intention
    of them both, is to be treated in law as having entered into the contract
    for the benefit of all persons who have or may acquire an interest in
    the goods before they are lost or damaged, and is entitled to recover
    by way of damages for breach of contract the actual loss sustained by
    those for whose benefit the contract is entered into." [Emphasis
    supplied].

    Furthermore, in Linden Gardens Trust Ltd. v. Lenesta Sludge
    Disposals Ltd.
    [1994] A.C. 85, your Lordships' House extended this group
    of cases to include a case in which work was done by the defendants under a
    contract with the first plaintiffs who, despite a contractual bar against
    assignment of their contractual rights without the consent of the defendants,
    had without consent assigned them to the second plaintiffs who suffered

    - 18 -

    damage by reason of defective work carried out by the defendants. It was
    held that, by analogy with the cases referred to in The Albazero, [1977] A.C.
    774 the first plaintiffs could recover the damages from the defendants for the
    benefit of the second plaintiffs. In so holding, your Lordships' House relied
    upon a passage in Lord Diplock's speech (at p. 847) that "there may still be
    occasional cases in which the rule [in Dunlop v. Lambert] would provide a
    remedy where no other would be available to a person sustaining loss which
    under a rational legal system ought to be compensated by the person who has
    caused it".

    The decision is noteworthy in a number of respects. First, this was a
    case of transferred loss; and Lord Diplock's dictum, as applied by your
    Lordships' House, reflects a clear need for the law to find a remedy in cases
    of this kind. Second, your Lordships' House felt able to do so in a case in
    which there was a contractual bar against assignment without consent; and as
    a result, unlike Lord Diplock, did not find it necessary to look for a common
    intention that the contract was entered into for the benefit of persons such as
    the second plaintiffs, which in this case, having regard to the prohibition
    against assignment, it plainly was not. Third, the consequence was that your
    Lordships' House simply made the remedy available as a matter of law in
    order to solve the problem of transferred loss in the case before them.

    Even so, the result was only to enable a person to recover damages in
    respect of loss which he himself had not suffered, for the benefit of a third
    party. In the present case, there is the difficulty that the third party (the
    intended beneficiary) is seeking to recover damages for a loss (expectation
    loss) which the contracting party (the testator) would not himself have
    suffered. In any event, under this principle, the third party who has suffered
    the loss is not able to compel the contracting party to sue for his benefit, or
    to transfer the right of action to him; still less is he entitled to sue in his own
    name. In the last analysis, this is because any such right would be contrary
    to the doctrine of privity of contract. In consequence a principle such as this,
    if it could be extended to cases such as the present, would be of limited value
    because, quite apart from any other difficulties, the family relationship may
    be such that the executors may be unwilling to assist the disappointed
    beneficiary by pursuing a claim of this kind for his benefit. Certainly, it
    could not assist the plaintiffs in the present case, who very understandably are
    proceeding against the solicitors by a direct action in their own name.

    The tortious solution

    I therefore return to the law of ton for a solution to the problem. For
    the reasons I have already given, an ordinary action in tortious negligence on
    the lines proposed by Sir Robert Megarry V.-C. in Ross v. Caunters [1980]
    Ch. 297 must, with the greatest respect, be regarded as inappropriate,
    because it does not meet any of the conceptual problems which have been
    raised. Furthermore, for the reasons I have previously given, the Hedley
    Byrne
    principle cannot, in the absence of special circumstances, give rise on

    - 19 -

    ordinary principles to an assumption of responsibility by the testator's solicitor
    towards an intended beneficiary. Even so it seems to me that it is open to
    your Lordships' House, as in the Lenesta Sludge case [1994] A.C. 85, to
    fashion a remedy to fill a lacuna in the law and so prevent the injustice which
    would otherwise occur on the facts of cases such as the present. In the
    Lenesta Sludge case [1994] A.C. 85, as I have said, the House made available
    a remedy as a matter of law to solve the problem of transferred loss in the
    case before them. The present case is, if anything, a fortiori, since the nature
    of the transaction was such that, if the solicitors were negligent and their
    negligence did not come to light until after the death of the testator, there
    would be no remedy for the ensuing loss unless the intended beneficiary could
    claim. In my opinion, therefore, your Lordships' House should in cases such
    as these extend to the intended beneficiary a remedy under the Hedley Byrne
    principle by holding that the assumption of responsibility by the solicitor
    towards his client should be held in law to extend to the intended beneficiary
    who (as the solicitor can reasonably foresee) may, as a result of the solicitor's
    negligence, be deprived of his intended legacy in circumstances in which
    neither the testator nor his estate will have a remedy against the solicitor.
    Such liability will not of course arise in cases in which the defect in the will
    comes to light before the death of the testator, and the testator either leaves
    the will as it is or otherwise continues to exclude the previously intended
    beneficiary from the relevant benefit. I only wish to add that, with the benefit
    of experience during the fifteen years in which Ross v. Caunters has been
    regularly applied, we can say with some confidence that a direct remedy by
    the intended beneficiary against the solicitor appears to create no problems in
    practice. That is therefore the solution which I would recommend to your
    Lordships.

    As I see it, not only does this conclusion produce practical justice as
    far as all parties are concerned, but it also has the following beneficial
    consequences:

    1. There is no unacceptable circumvention of established
      principles of the law of contract.

    2. No problem arises by reason of the loss being of a purely
      economic character.

    3. Such assumption of responsibility will of course be subject to
      any term of the contract between the solicitor and the testator
      which may exclude or restrict the solicitor's liability to the
      testator under the principle in Hedley Byrne. It is true that
      such a term would be most unlikely to exist in practice; but as
      a matter of principle it is right that this largely theoretical
      question should be addressed.

    4. Since the Hedley Byrne principle is founded upon an
      assumption of responsibility, the solicitor may be liable for

    - 20 -

    negligent omissions as well as negligent acts of commission:
    see the Midland Bank Trust Co. case [1979] Ch. 384, 416, per
    Oliver J., and Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd.
    [1994] 3 W.L.R. 761, 777, per Lord Goff of Chieveley. This
    conclusion provides justification for the decision of the Court
    of Appeal to reverse the decision of Turner J. in the present
    case, although this point was not in fact raised below or before
    your Lordships.

    (5) I do not consider that damages for loss of an expectation are
    excluded in cases of negligence arising under the principle in
    Hedley Byrne, simply because the cause of action is classified
    as tortious. Such damages may in principle be recoverable in
    cases of contractual negligence; and I cannot see that, for
    present purposes, any relevant distinction can be drawn
    between the two forms of action. In particular, an expectation
    loss may well occur in cases where a professional man, such as
    a solicitor, has assumed responsibility for the affairs of
    another; and I for my part can see no reason in principle why
    the professional man should not, in an appropriate case, be
    liable for such loss under the Hedley Byrne principle.

    In the result, all the conceptual problems, including those which so
    troubled Lush and Murphy JJ. in Seale v. Perry [1982] V.R. 193, can be seen
    to fade innocuously away. Let me emphasise that I can see no injustice in
    imposing liability upon a negligent solicitor in a case such as the present
    where, in the absence of a remedy in this form, neither the testator's estate
    nor the disappointed beneficiary will have a claim for the loss caused by his
    negligence. This is the injustice which, in my opinion, the judges of this
    country should address by recognising that cases such as these call for an
    appropriate remedy, and that the common law is not so sterile as to be
    incapable of supplying that remedy when it is required.

    Unlimited claims

    I come finally to the objection that, if liability is recognised in a case
    such as the present, it will be impossible to place any sensible limits to cases
    in which recovery is allowed. Before your Lordships, as before the Court of
    Appeal, Mr. Matheson conjured up the spectre of solicitors being liable to an
    indeterminate class, including persons unborn at the date of the testator's
    death. I must confess that my reaction to this kind of argument was very
    similar to that of Cooke J. in Gartside v. Sheffield, Young & Ellis [1983]
    N.Z.L.R. 37, 44, when he said that he was not "persuaded that we should
    decide a fairly straightforward case against the dictates of justice because of
    foreseeable troubles in more difficult cases". We are concerned here with a
    liability which is imposed by law to do practical justice in a particular type of
    case. There must be boundaries to the availability of a remedy in such cases;
    but these will have to be worked out in the future, as practical problems come

    - 21 -

    before the courts. In the present case Sir Donald Nicholls V.-C. observed
    that, in cases of this kind, liability is not to an indeterminate class, but to the
    particular beneficiary or beneficiaries whom the client intended to benefit
    through the particular will. I respectfully agree, and I also agree with him
    that the ordinary case is one in which the intended beneficiaries are a small
    number of identified people. If by any chance a more complicated case
    should arise to test the precise boundaries of the principle in cases of this
    kind, that problem can await solution when such a case comes forward for
    decision.

    Conclusion

    For these reasons I would dismiss the appeal with costs.

    LORD BROWNE-WILKINSON

    My Lords,

    I have read the speech of my noble and learned friend Lord Goff of
    Chieveley and agree with him that this appeal should be dismissed. In
    particular, I agree that your Lordships should hold that the defendant solicitors
    were under a duty of care to the plaintiffs arising from an extension of the
    principle of assumption of responsibility explored in Hedley Byrne and Co.
    Ltd. v. Heller and Partners Ltd.
    [1964] A.C. 465. In my view, although the
    present case is not directly covered by the decided cases, it is legitimate to
    extend the law to the limited extent proposed using the incremental approach
    by way of analogy advocated in Caparo Industries Plc. v. Dickman
    [1990] 2 A.C. 605. To explain my reasons requires me to attempt an analysis
    of what is meant by "assumption of responsibility" in the law of negligence.
    To avoid misunderstanding I must emphasise that I am considering only
    whether some duty of care exists, not with the extent of that duty which will
    vary according to the circumstances.

    Far from that concept having been invented by your Lordships House
    in Hedley Byrne, its genesis is to be found in Nocton v. Lord Ashburton
    [1914] A.C. 932. It is impossible to analyse what is meant by "assumption
    of responsibility" or "the Hedley Byrne principle" without first having regard
    to Nocton's case. In that case, the plaintiff, Lord Ashburton, had relied on
    advice by his solicitor, Nocton, in relation to certain lending transactions.
    The determination of the case was bedeviled by questions of pleading. The
    trial judge and the Court of Appeal took the view that on the pleadings the
    plaintiff could only succeed if he proved fraud. In their view Lord Ashburton
    could not succeed in negligence since it had not been pleaded. This House
    (whilst rejecting the finding of fraud against Nocton) held that the pleadings
    sufficiently alleged a fiduciary duty owed to Lord Ashburton by Nocton as his
    solicitor and held that Nocton had breached that fiduciary duty by giving

    - 22 -

    negligent advice. In rejecting the notion that Derry v. Peek (1889) 14 App.
    Cas. 337 precluded a finding of such liability, Viscount Haldane L.C. said,
    at p. 948:

    "Although liability for negligence in word has in material respects
    been developed in our law differently from liability for negligence in
    act, it is none the less true that a man may come under a special duty
    to exercise care in giving information or advice. I should accordingly
    be sorry to be thought to lend countenance to the idea that recent
    decisions have been intended to stereotype the cases in which people
    can be held to have assumed such a special duty. Whether such a duty
    has been assumed must depend on the relationship of the parties, and
    it is at least certain that there are a good many cases in which that
    relationship may be properly treated as giving rise to a special duty of
    care in statement."

    Lord Haldane reverted to the same point in Robinson v. National Bank of
    Scotland Ltd.
    1916 S.C. (H.L.) 154, 157:


    "I wish emphatically to repeat what I said in advising this House in the
    case of Nocton v. Lord Ashburton, that it is a great mistake to suppose
    that, because the principle in Derry v. Peek clearly covers all cases of
    the class to which I have referred, therefore the freedom of action of
    the courts in recognising special duties arising out of other kinds of
    relationship which they find established by the evidence is in any way
    affected. I think, as I said in Nocton's case, that an exaggerated view
    was taken by a good many people of the scope of the decision in Derry
    v. Peek.
    The whole of the doctrine as to fiduciary relationships, as to
    the duty of care arising from implied as well as expressed contracts,
    as to the duty of care arising from other special relationships which the
    courts may find to exist in particular cases, still remains, and I should
    be very sorry if any word fell from me which should suggest that the
    courts are in any way hampered in recognising that the duty of care
    may be established when such cases really occur."

    In my judgment, there are three points relevant to the present case
    which should be gathered from Nocton. First, there can be special
    relationships between the parties which give rise to the law treating the
    defendant as having assumed a duty to be careful in circumstances where,
    apart from such relationship, no duty of care would exist. Second, a fiduciary
    relationship is one of those special relationships. Third, a fiduciary
    relationship is not the only such special relationship: other relationships may
    be held to give rise to the same duty.

    The second of those propositions merits further consideration, since if
    we can understand the nature of one "special relationship" it may cast light on
    when, by analogy, it is appropriate for the law to treat other relationships as

    - 23 -

    being "special". The paradigm of the circumstances in which equity will find
    a fiduciary relationship is where one party, A, has assumed to act in relation
    to the property or affairs of another, B. A, having assumed responsibility,
    pro tanto, for B's affairs, is taken to have assumed certain duties in relation
    to the conduct of those affairs, including normally a duty of care. Thus, a
    trustee assumes responsibility for the management of the property of the
    beneficiary, a company director for the affairs of the company and an agent
    for those of his principal. By so assuming to act in B's affairs, A comes
    under fiduciary duties to B. Although the extent of those fiduciary duties
    (including duties of care) will vary from case to case some duties (including
    a duty of care) arise in each case. The importance of these considerations for
    present purposes is that the special relationship (i.e. a fiduciary relationship)
    giving rise to the assumption of responsibility held to exist in Nocton does not
    depend on any mutual dealing between A and B, let alone on any relationship
    akin to contract. Although such factors may be present, equity imposes the
    obligation because A has assumed to act in B's affairs. Thus, a trustee is
    under a duty of care to his beneficiary whether or not he has had any dealing
    with him: indeed he may be as yet unborn or unascertained and therefore any
    direct dealing would be impossible.

    Moreover, this lack of mutuality in the typical fiduciary relationship
    indicates that it is not a necessary feature of all such special relationships that
    B must in fact rely on A's actions. If B is unaware of the fact that A has
    assumed to act in B's affairs (e.g. in the case of B being an unascertained
    beneficiary) B cannot possibly have relied on A. What is important is not that
    A knows that B is consciously relying on A, but A knows that B's economic
    well being is dependent upon A's careful conduct of B's affairs. Thus, in my
    judgment Nocton demonstrates that there is at least one special relationship
    giving rise to the imposition of a duty of care that is dependent neither upon
    mutuality of dealing nor upon actual reliance by the plaintiff on the defendants
    actions.

    I turn then to consider Hedley Byrne [1964] A.C. 465. In that case
    this House had to consider the circumstances in which there could be liability
    for negligent misstatement in the absence of either a contract or a fiduciary
    relationship between the parties. The first, and for present purposes perhaps
    the most important, point is that there is nothing in Hedley Byrne to cast doubt
    on the decision in Nocton. On the contrary, each of their Lordships treated
    Nocton as their starting point and asked the question "in the absence of any
    contractual or fiduciary duty, what circumstances give rise to a special
    relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant sufficient to justify the
    imposition of the duty of care in the making of statements?" The House was
    seeking to define a further special relationship in addition to, not in
    substitution for, fiduciary relationships: see per Lord Reid, p. 486; Lord
    Morris of Borth-y-Gest, p. 502; Lord Hodson, p. 511; Lord Devlin, p. 523;
    Lord Pearce, p. 539.

    - 24 -

    Second, since this House was concerned with cases of negligent
    misstatement or advice, it was inevitable that any test laid down required both
    that the plaintiff should rely on the statement or advice and that the defendant
    could reasonably foresee that he would do so. In the case of claims based on
    negligent statements (as opposed to negligent actions) the plaintiff will have
    no cause of action at all unless he can show damage and he can only have
    suffered damage if he has relied on the negligent statement. Nor will a
    defendant be shown to have satisfied the requirement that he should foresee
    damage to the plaintiff unless he foresees such reliance by the plaintiff as to
    give rise to the damage. Therefore, although reliance by the plaintiff is an
    essential ingredient in a case based on negligent misstatement or advice, it
    does not follow that in all cases based on negligent action or inaction by the
    defendant it is necessary in order to demonstrate a special relationship that the
    plaintiff has in fact relied on the defendant or the defendant has foreseen such
    reliance. If in such a case careless conduct can be foreseen as likely to cause
    and does in fact cause damage to the plaintiff that should be sufficient to
    found liability.

    Third, it is clear that the basis on which (apart from the disclaimer) the
    majority would have held the bank liable for negligently giving the reference
    was that, were it not for the disclaimer, the bank would have assumed
    responsibility for such reference. Although there are passages in the speeches
    which may point the other way, the reasoning of the majority in my judgment
    points clearly to the fact that the crucial element was that, by choosing to
    answer the enquiry, the bank had assumed to act, and thereby created the
    special relationship on which the necessary duty of care was founded. Thus
    Lord Reid, at p. 486, pointed out that a reasonable man knowing that he was
    being trusted, had three possible course open to him: to refuse to answer, to
    answer but with a disclaimer of responsibility, or simply to answer without
    such disclaimer. Lord Reid then said:

    "If he chooses to adopt the last course he must. I think, be held to
    have accepted some responsibility for his answer being given carefully,
    or to have accepted a relationship with the inquirer which requires him
    to exercise such care as the circumstances require."

    Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest said, at p. 503:

    "Furthermore, if in a sphere in which a person is so placed that others
    could reasonably rely upon his judgment or his skill or upon his ability
    to make careful inquiry, a person takes it upon himself to give
    information or advice to, or allows his information or advice to be
    passed on to, another person who, as he knows or should know, will
    place reliance upon it, then a duty of care will arise."

    Lord Hodson, at p. 514, in agreeing with the formulation of Lord Morris
    referred to the maker of the careless statement being a person who "takes it
    upon himself to give information or advice to ... another person." Although

    - 25 -

    Lord Devlin did not find it necessary for the decision of that case to go
    further than to hold that a special relationship giving rise to a duty of care
    would exist when the relationship was "equivalent to contract" he indicated (at
    p. 530) that he agreed with the formulation by the other members of the
    committee of the general rules giving rise to a "voluntary undertaking to
    assume responsibility". Moreover he had previously (at p. 526) referred to
    Coggs v. Bernard (1703) 2 Ld. Raym. 909 (where Gould J. held a gratuitous
    bailee liable because of "the particular trust reposed in the defendant, to which
    he has concurred by his assumption, and in the executing which he has
    miscarried by his neglect") and the statement of Lord Finlay L.C. in Banbury
    v. Bank of Montreal
    [1918] A.C. 626, 654 "He is under no obligation to
    advise, but if he takes it upon himself to do so, he will incur liability if he
    does so negligently". Lord Devlin, at p. 530, drew a distinction between the
    case where there is a general relationship (such as solicitor and client or
    banker and customer) where the pre existing relationship is enough to create
    the special relationship necessary and a case such as that before the House
    where what is relied upon is a particular relationship created ad hoc. He said
    that in such a case it would be necessary to examine the particular facts to see
    whether there is an express or implied undertaking of responsibility. This and
    the other passages that I have quoted indicates that even in the case of an ad
    hoc special relationship the requirement is to show that the defendant has
    assumed to act by giving an answer.

    Just as in the case of fiduciary duties, the assumption of responsibility
    referred to is the defendants, assumption of responsibility for the task not the
    assumption of legal liability. Even in cases of ad hoc relationships, it is the
    undertaking to answer the question posed which creates the relationship. If
    the responsibility for the task is assumed by the defendant he thereby creates
    a special relationship between himself and the plaintiff in relation to which the
    law (not the defendant) attaches a duty to carry out carefully the task so
    assumed. If this be the right view, it does much to allay the doubts about the
    utility of the concept of assumption of responsibility voiced by Lord Griffiths
    in Smith v. Eric S. Bush [1990] 1 A.C. 831, 862 and by Lord Roskill in
    Caparo Industries Plc v. Dickman [1992] A.C. 605, 628: see also Barker
    Unreliable Assumptions in the Modern Law of Negligence (1993) 109 L.Q.R.
    461. As I read those judicial criticisms they proceed on the footing that the
    phrase "assumption of responsibility" refers to the defendant having assumed
    legal responsibility. I doubt whether the same criticisms would have been
    directed at the phrase if the words had been understood, as I think they should
    be, as referring to a conscious assumption of responsibility for the task rather
    than a conscious assumption of legal liability by the plaintiff for its careful
    performance. Certainly, the decision in both cases is consistent with the view
    I take.

    In Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd. [1994] 3 W.L.R. 761 your
    Lordships recently applied the concept of assumption of liability to cases
    where the defendants (the managing agents) had pursuant to a contract with
    a third party (the members' agents) undertaken the management of the

    -26-

    underwriting affairs of the plaintiffs. For the present purposes the case is
    important for two reasons. First, it shows (if it was previously in doubt) that
    the principle of a special relationship arising from the assumption of
    responsibility is as applicable to a case of negligent acts giving rise to pure
    economic loss as it is to negligent statement. Second, it demonstrates that the
    fact that the defendant assumed to act in the plaintiffs' affairs pursuant to a
    contract with a third party is not necessarily incompatible with the finding
    that, by so acting, the defendant also entered into a special relationship with
    the plaintiff with whom he had no contract. (I should add that I agree with
    my noble and learned friend Lord Mustill that this factor should not lead to
    the conclusion that a duty of care will necessarily be found to exist even
    where there is a contractual chain of obligations designed by the parties to
    regulate their dealings).

    Let me now seek to bring together these various strands so far as is
    necessary for the purposes of this case: I am not purporting to give any
    comprehensive statement of this aspect of the law. The law of England does
    not impose any general duty of care to avoid negligent misstatements or to
    avoid causing pure economic loss even if economic damage to the plaintiff
    was foreseeable. However, such a duty of care will arise if there is a special
    relationship between the parties. Although the categories of cases in which
    such special relationship can be held to exist are not closed, as yet only two
    categories have been identified, viz. (1) where there is a fiduciary relationship
    and (2) where the defendant has voluntarily answered a question or tenders
    skilled advice or services in circumstances where he knows or ought to know
    that an identified plaintiff will rely on his answers or advice. In both these
    categories the special relationship is created by the defendant voluntarily
    assuming to act in the matter by involving himself in the plaintiff's affairs or
    by choosing to speak. If he does so assume to act or speak he is said to have
    assumed responsibility for carrying through the matter he has entered upon.
    In the words of Lord Reid in Hedley Byrne [1964] A.C. 465, 486 "he has
    accepted a relationship ... which requires him to exercise such care as the
    circumstances require", i.e. although the extent of the duty will vary from
    category to category, some duty of care arises from the special relationship.
    Such relationship can arise even though the defendant has acted in the
    plaintiffs affairs pursuant to a contract with a third party.

    I turn then to apply those considerations to the case of a solicitor
    retained by a testator to draw a will in favour of an intended beneficiary. As
    a matter of contract, a solicitor owes a duty to the testator to use proper skill
    in the preparation and execution of the will and to act with due speed. But as
    the speech of Lord Goff demonstrates that contractual obligation is of little
    utility. Breach by the solicitor of such contractual duty gives rise to no
    damage suffered by the testator or his estate; under our existing law of
    contract, the intended beneficiary, who has suffered the damage, has no cause
    of action on the contract.

    - 27 -

    Has the intended beneficiary a cause of action based on breach of a
    duty of care owed by the solicitor to the beneficiary? The answer to that
    question is dependent upon whether there is a special relationship between the
    solicitor and the intended beneficiary to which the law attaches a duty of care.
    In my judgment the case does not fall within either of the two categories of
    special relationships so far recognised. There is no fiduciary duty owed by
    the solicitor to the intended beneficiary. Although the solicitor has assumed
    to act in a matter closely touching the economic wellbeing of the intended
    beneficiary, the intended beneficiary will often be ignorant of that fact and
    cannot therefore have relied upon the solicitor.

    However, it is clear that the law in this area has not ossified. Both
    Viscount Haldane L.C. (in the passage I have quoted [1914] A.C. 932, 948)
    and Lord Devlin (in Hedley Byrne [1964] A.C. 465, 530-531) envisage that
    there might be other sets of circumstances in which it would be appropriate
    to find a special relationship giving rise to a duty of care. In Caparo Lord
    Bridge of Harwich [1990] 2 A.C. 605, 618, recognised that the law will
    develop novel categories of negligence "incrementally and by analogy with
    established categories". In my judgment, this is a case where such
    development should take place since there is a close analogy with existing
    categories of special relationship giving rise to a duty of care to prevent
    economic loss.

    The solicitor who accepts instructions to draw a will knows that the
    future economic welfare of the intended beneficiary is dependent upon his
    careful execution of the task. It is true that the intended beneficiary (being
    ignorant of the instructions) may not rely on the particular solicitor's actions.
    But, as I have sought to demonstrate, in the case of a duty of care flowing
    from a fiduciary relationship liability is not dependent upon actual reliance by
    the plaintiff on the defendant's actions but on the fact that, as the fiduciary is
    well aware, the plaintiffs economic wellbeing is dependent upon the proper
    discharge by the fiduciary of his duty. Second, the solicitor by accepting the
    instructions has entered upon, and therefore assumed responsibility for, the
    task of procuring the execution of a skilfully drawn will knowing that the
    beneficiary is wholly dependent upon his carefully carrying out his function.
    That assumption of responsibility for the task is a feature of both the two
    categories of special r