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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Abu Dhabi Global Market judgments (Court of First Instance) >> Masaood Developments LLC v Soulaf Bensalem [2026] ADGMCFI 0025 (23 September 2026) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ae/cases/ADGMCFI/2026/25.html Cite as: [2026] ADGMCFI 25, [2026] ADGMCFI 0025 |
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In the name of
His Highness Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan
President of the United Arab Emirates/ Ruler of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
REAL PROPERTY DIVISION
BETWEEN
MASAOOD DEVELOPMENTS LLC
CLAIMANT
and
SOULAF BENSALEM
DEFENDANT
JUDGMENT OF JUSTICE PAUL HEATH KC
ai images of people
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Neutral Citation: |
[2026] ADGMCFI 0025 |
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Before: |
Justice Paul Heath KC |
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Decision Date: |
23 September 2026 |
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Decision: |
See paragraphs 24 to 28 |
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Hearing Date(s): |
On the papers |
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Date of Order: |
23 September 2026 |
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Catchwords: |
Real property, Default judgment, Real Property Division, CPR 340, Termination of sale and purchase agreement, Liquidated damages, Penalty clause, Possession of property, Non-monetary relief |
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Legislation Cited: |
ADGM Application of English Law Regulations 2015 ADGM Court Procedure Rules 2016 |
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Cases Cited: |
Sowwah Square Investment - Sole Proprietorship LLC v Forever Rose Retail Ltd [2026] ADGMCFI 0024 Al Khaleej Investment PSC v Ocean Pearl Real Estate Comp LLC [2026] ADGMCFI 0017 Awad v 3AM Property Investment Co LLC [2025] ADGMCFI 0003 Kireeva v Bedzhamov [2025] AC 812 (UKSC) Lux Locations Ltd v Yida Zhang [2023] UKPC 3 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67 Football Dataco Ltd v Smoot Enterprises Ltd [2011] 1 WLR 1978 |
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Case Number: |
ADGMCFI-2026-256 |
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Parties and representation: |
Claimant Mr Jincy Jaime Stephen Alexander, Monther Al Hammadi Lawyers and Legal Consultancy Office Defendant No appearance by or on behalf of the Defendant |
1. On 15 July 2019, Masaood Developments LLC ("Masaood") entered into a sale and purchase agreement (the "Agreement") with Ms Soulaf Bensalem ("Ms Bensalem"), pursuant to which Masaood agreed to sell to Ms Bensalem residential unit 1101, including a parking space (the "Unit"), located at plot no. C12, in Azure Tower, Shams, Al Reem Island (the "Building"). Masaood had developed the Building and, at the time of the sale, owned both the Building and the Unit. On settlement of the purchase, Masaood transferred the Unit to Ms Bensalem, and an ownership certificate was issued in her name.
2. Excluding maintenance fees for the property, the total sale price was AED 988,019. The price was to be paid in 182 instalments during the period from 15 July 2019 to 15 June 2034 under Clause 5 of the Agreement. Masaood alleges that Ms Bensalem made payments under the Agreement from the time of acquisition until 23 July 2023 and paid service charges until 2021. Masaood also relies upon the "Customer Account" attached at Exhibit 6 to the claim form (the "Customer Account"), which records total payments received from Ms Bensalem in the sum of AED 479,503.58. Masaood asserts that no payments have been made since those dates, either in respect of the purchase price or service charges.
3. As a result of Ms Bensalem's failure to pay instalments since 23 July 2023, Masaood alleges that she has breached the Agreement. By a Claim filed on 28 April 2026, Masaood seeks relief of both a monetary and non-monetary nature against Ms Bensalem. [1] The monetary relief is said to arise from Ms Bensalem's alleged payment defaults under the Agreement and consequences of termination, including by reference to an "Agreed Termination Amount" [2].
4. A Notice of Service of the claim form was filed on 1 June 2026, confirming that Ms Bensalem was served on 29 April 2026. She has taken no steps to defend the Claim. As a result, Masaood sought default judgment on 1 June 2026 (the "Default Judgment Application") seeking orders: (a) terminating the Agreement; (b) directing Ms Bensalem to deliver vacant possession of the Unit to Masaood; and (c) requiring Ms Bensalem to pay the sum of AED 521,054.77 (USD 141,880.13), comprising AED 182,609.98, being the alleged "shortfall of the Agreed Termination Amount" calculated under clause 17.3.2(c) of the Agreement, and AED 338,444.79 being the alleged "outstanding amount due to [Masaood]" as shown in the Customer Account (the "Outstanding Amount").
The Agreement
5. Clause 22.1 of the Agreement provides that "in all respects [the Agreement would] be governed by and be construed and interpreted and take effect in accordance with the laws in force in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi and the federal laws of the UAE applicable in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi". At the time that the Agreement was signed, Al Reem Island was not part of the Abu Dhabi Global Market ("ADGM"). As Al Reem Island is now part of ADGM, Masaood accepts that, notwithstanding that governing law clause, questions of remedy, evidence and procedure are to be determined under the law of the ADGM. [3]
6. Questions of remedy arise in respect of both monetary and non-monetary claims. They are governed by ADGM law. The Agreement will remain to be construed and interpreted in accordance with laws of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi, including relevant UAE Federal laws. [4]
7. Clause 22.2 deals with the question of jurisdiction, stating:
"22.2 Jurisdiction
In the event of a Dispute the Parties agree to submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Courts of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi (excluding the courts of the Abu Dhabi Global market)."
8. Only a Court of the jurisdiction in which the land is situated has the power to adjudicate upon the title to or the right to possession of real property. [5] The ADGM Courts are the only Courts with jurisdiction in respect of land situated on Al Reem Island. As Masaood correctly accepts, this Court has jurisdiction to consider and determine the proceeding it has brought.
9. Clause 17 of the Agreement deals with default, enforcement and termination. Clause 17.1(a) provides that, if the purchaser breaches an obligation to pay an instalment or other moneys payable under the Agreement and fails to remedy that default under a notice to be given by the seller under that provision, a default event occurs that triggers the termination rights of the seller under the Agreement.
"17.3 Termination of Agreement
...
17.3.2 ... if this Agreement is terminated by [Masaood] prior to the transfer to [Ms Bensalem] of the Real Estate Rights in the Apartment, [Ms Bensalem] agrees that:
(a) the Agreed Termination Amount shall be absolutely forfeited to [Masaood] as pre-estimated liquidated damages;
(b) forfeiture of the Agreed Termination Amount pursuant to clause 17.3.2(a) constitutes a genuine pre-estimate of the damages suffered by [Masaood] as a result of [Ms Bensalem's] breach and it irrevocably authorises [Masaood] to deduct the Agreed Termination Amount from the Instalments Paid to the extent that sufficient funds are available to do so;
(c) if the Instalments Paid are insufficient to pay the Agreed Termination Amount in accordance with clause 17.3.2(a), [Ms Bensalem] shall immediately pay to [Masaood] an amount equivalent to such shortfall which shall be considered to be a debt payable to [Masaood] on demand; and
(d) any balance of the Instalments Paid that is lawfully due to be refunded by [Masaood] to [Ms Bensalem] shall not be refunded until [Masaood] has procured the sale of the Apartment to an alternative purchaser (or such other time period as is prescribed by Applicable Law)."
(Emphasis added)
The Default Judgment Application
(a) The Application
"1. Judgment in favour of [Masaood] in the amount of USD 141,880.13 (USD 49,723.62 (AED 182,609.98) representing the shortfall of the Agreed Termination Amount pursuant to Clause 17.3.2(c) plus USD 92,156.51 (AED 338,444.79) representing the total outstanding amount).
2. Interest on the judgment sum at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of judgment until payment.
3. [Ms Bensalem] pays [Masaood's] filing fees.
4. [Ms Bensalem] pays [Masaood's] costs (to be assessed by the Court in accordance with Practice Direction 9).
5. An order terminating the sale contract dated 17 July 2019 relating to [the Unit], due to [Ms Bensalem's] material breach, and directing that ownership of the [Unit] be reverted to [Masaood], including all necessary amendments to the official real estate registry.
6. An order directing [Ms Bensalem] to deliver vacant possession of the Property to [Masaood], free from occupants and personal belongings."
13. Following consideration of the Default Judgment Application, the Court identified a number of issues on which further submissions were sought. On 13 July 2026, the Court made an order (the "July 2026 Order") by which written submissions, together with any additional witness statement evidence, were to be provided. Relevantly, the July 2026 Order stated:
"1. By 4.00 pm on 30 July 2026, the Claimant shall file written submissions, together with any witness statement evidence in support of such submissions, addressing the following matters:
Applicable law
a. What is the applicable law in respect of the remedies sought by way of default judgment?
Monetary relief
b. The basis on which the "[Outstanding Amount] due to the Claimant" of AED 338,444.79 has been calculated.
c. What that sum represents including whether this sum consists of unpaid instalments and other charges in connection with the Property and if so:
i. the amount that relates to unpaid instalments; and
ii. the amount that relates to other charges in connection with the Property.
d. Why the Claimant avers that it is entitled to these amounts in addition to:
i. the Agreed Termination Amount; and/or
ii. the non-monetary relief sought.
e. In relation to the "Agreed Termination Amount" of AED 662,113.56:
i. The basis on which this amount has been calculated to 31 March 2026 in circumstances where:
1. the "Agreed Termination Amount" is to be calculated "from the Effective Date to the date of termination of this Agreement" under sub-paragraph (a) of that defined term in Schedule 1, Part A, of the Sale and Purchase Agreement; and
2. the Claimant notified the Defendant by Legal Notice dated 30 July 2024 that "your Right to Occupy the Apartment is hereby terminated with immediate effect" and "the Sale and Purchase Agreement is considered terminated".
ii. Whether the Agreed Termination Amount is liable to be struck down (if ADGM law applies) as a penalty in accordance with the principles set out in Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi; ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67 or adjusted (if UAE law applies) in accordance with section 390(2) of the UAE Civil Code.
f. Any revised calculations for monetary relief that the Claimant seeks to rely on having regard to sub-paragraphs (b) to (e) above (and sub-paragraph (i) below).
Non-monetary relief
g. The basis on which the Claimant says that it is entitled to non-monetary relief and the return of the Property in addition to the monetary relief sought and the clauses of the Sale and Purchase Agreement that the Claimant relies on.
h. Whether, on its proper construction, clause 17.3.2 of the Sale and Purchase Agreement indicates that there is to be an accounting exercise to be undertaken if the Property is forfeited or sold with the balance of any instalments paid to be refunded to the Defendant and how (if at all) this ought to be taken into account in the present circumstances if the non-monetary relief is granted.
i. Whether the Claimant wishes to pursue its claim for non-monetary relief and:
i. if yes, what adjustments (if any) ought to be made in relation to the amounts sought as part of the monetary claim; or
ii. if no, what adjustments (if any) ought to be made in relation to the amounts sought as part of the monetary claim."
14. On 31 July 2026, Masaood filed a witness statement from its legal representative and submissions on the points raised in the July 2026 Order. I deal only with those matters that are material to my decision on the Default Judgment Application.
(b) Legal Principles
(1) In this Rule, "default judgment" means judgment without trial or a hearing where a defendant has failed to file a defence.
(2) Unless the Court otherwise orders, default judgment only may be obtained in relation to a money claim.
(3) Judgment in default of a defence may be obtained where the defendant:
(a) at the date on which judgment is entered has not filed a defence and the relevant time for doing so has expired; or
(b) has filed a counterclaim and at the date on which judgment is entered a defence to the counterclaim has not been filed and the relevant time for doing so has expired.
(4) A default judgment may include interest as provided for by a practice direction.
(5) The provisions of Rules 40, 40A and 41 apply to default judgments entered in the Real Property Division.
(6) A default judgment will be made available to the applicant through the eCourts Platform and will be served by the registry on all other parties to the proceeding where those parties are within the United Arab Emirates by any method permitted under Part 4 of these Rules."
(Emphasis added)
16. Rule 340(5) incorporates certain provisions that apply to applications for default judgment in the Commercial and Civil Division of this Court. In particular:
a. Rule 40 identifies circumstances in which a claimant may not obtain a default judgment under rule 340. None of the circumstances listed in rule 40(1) apply in this case.
b. Rule 40A contains "supplementary provisions" when default judgment is sought. Rule 40A(1) and (2) provide:
(1) Where the claimant makes an application for default judgment, the judgment shall be such judgment as it appears to the Court that the claimant is entitled to on his statement of case.
(2) Unless it appears to the Court that judgment should be given for a lesser amount, a default judgment on a claim for a specified amount of money obtained on the filing of an application will be judgment for the amount of the claim (less any payments made), costs and post judgment interest (pre-judgment interest may be included if the conditions in paragraph (3) are satisfied).
..."
c. Rule 41 deals with applications to set aside or vary a default judgment. Those provisions have no application at the stage at which the Court considers an application for default judgment.
17. Rule 340(2) of the CPR (dealing with Real Property Division claims) and rule 40A(1) (dealing with claims in the Commercial and Civil Division) [6] are expressed differently. For reasons that follow, while it may have been intended that rule 340(2) was to be more restrictive than rule 40A(1), the principles I apply [7] would appear to apply with equal force under rule 40A. The former [8] restricts a default judgment in a Real Property Division claim to money claims, "unless the Court otherwise orders". The latter requires the Court to inquire into questions of relief because it may only enter "such judgment as it appears to [it] that the claimant is entitled to on his statement of case". Both require a judicial evaluation of the question of relief.
18. In Lux Locations Ltd v Yida Zhang, [9] the Privy Council considered, on appeal from the Court of Appeal of the Eastern Caribbean (Antigua and Barbuda), the approach that a Court should take on a default judgment seeking non-monetary relief on an application made under rules 12.10(4) and (5) of the Eastern Caribbean Civil Procedure Rules, which states:
"(4) Default judgment where the claim is for some other remedy shall be in such form as the Court considers the claimant to be entitled to on the statement of claim.
(5) An application for the court to determine the terms of the judgment under paragraph (4) need not be on notice but must be supported by evidence on affidavit ...".
19. In Lux Locations, the claimant had sought default judgment to set aside a consent order that had been made in an earlier proceeding between the same parties, and to recover moneys paid by him under that order. [10] The question was whether, having regard to the way in which rule 12.10(4) of the Eastern Caribbean Civil Procedure Rules was expressed, such an order could be made administratively or only on a judicial inquiry into the appropriateness of the relief sought.
20. The Privy Council confirmed that, when asked to give default judgment, the Court is not called upon to form any view about the merits of the claimant's claim. It adopted observations made by Briggs J in Football Dataco Ltd v Smoot Enterprises Ltd [11], to the effect that the Court's role was to tailor the relief to ensure it was appropriate to the cause of action; or to scrutinise the relief sought to determine whether it was appropriate for more than "a purely administrative response". [12] That inquiry is, in itself, part of the judicial role.
21. In the context of considering the non-monetary relief claimed, Lord Leggatt, delivering the advice of the Privy Council, emphasised that "granting [a non-monetary remedy] potentially involves greater interference with rights and freedoms of the Defendant (and perhaps others) than entering a money judgment which the Defendant can apply to set aside". His Lordship said: [13]
"51. It is true, as Briggs J pointed out in the Football Dataco case (see para 45 above), that the need for an application to the court is triggered not by anything connected with the legal foundation of the claim, but by the nature of the relief sought. Where the remedy sought is an award of money only, a default judgment can be obtained automatically by an administrative process without any judicial scrutiny. But it does not follow that, where an application to the court is required, the court should only ever consider what remedy is appropriate given the allegations made and have no regard to whether those allegations have any legitimate basis. The underlying policy reason for requiring the safeguard of judicial scrutiny where a remedy other than money is claimed must be that granting such a remedy potentially involves greater interference with rights and freedoms of the defendant (and perhaps others) than entering a money judgment which the defendant can apply to set aside. If the safeguard is to be meaningful, it should operate as a filter for manifestly ill-founded or improper claims."
Analysis
22. Applying the Privy Council's reasons to rule 340(2) of the CPR, [14] I find that, while the question whether Ms Bensalem breached the Agreement and the validity of Masaood's termination of it should be treated as having been established for default judgment purposes, I am required to inquire into whether it is appropriate to grant the relief sought. In a case where monetary and non-monetary relief are closely intertwined, it is necessary for the Court to assess the appropriateness of entering a default judgment on both aspects. Rule 340(2) does not require the Court in all circumstances to enter a monetary judgment; it simply states that "unless the Court otherwise orders" default judgment may be obtained for a money claim. It is clear that the Court retains a discretion in respect of each class of claim.
23. Counsel for Masaood submitted that "the monetary and non-monetary relief sought ... [were] complementary and do not result in double recovery". On the basis of a strict application of clause 17.3.2, read in conjunction with clause 17.3.4 of the Agreement, that is, at least arguably so. However, given the impact on a person such as Ms Bensalem of a claim based on the calculation of the "Agreed Termination Amount", an issue arises as to whether the amount claimed can be characterised as an unenforceable penalty under ADGM law [15]. Masaood takes the position that the penalty rule does not apply and contends that the issue should be determined under UAE law. If that were correct, the Court would need to consider whether rule 390(2) of the UAE Civil Code applied. The question whether UAE or ADGM law applies is yet to be determined.
24. Applying the test enunciated by the Privy Council, I am not convinced that it would be appropriate to enter default judgment for the relief sought. In those circumstances, I dismiss the Default Judgment Application. I make procedural directions to enable the Claim to be determined following a witness hearing.
Case management
25. Under paragraph 15.41 of Practice Direction 15 (which deals with claims in the Real Property Division), the Court has a broad discretion to "give any direction or take any step it considers appropriate for the purpose of managing the proceedings".
26. I do not consider it is necessary to convene a case management conference. Ms Bensalem has not sought to participate in the proceeding. Therefore, the only case management directions involve a timetable for pre-hearing steps and the fixing of a hearing date. [16]
27. In order to expedite an early trial, I make the following directions:
a. Any further witness statements in support of the Claim shall be filed and served by midday on 9 October 2026. I give permission for expert evidence to be given on whether the Agreed Termination Amount should be characterised as an unenforceable penalty [17], if ADGM law applies, or, if UAE law applies, as to whether any adjustment should be made under rule 390 (2) of the UAE Civil Code. Any expert report filed pursuant to that permission shall be filed and served by that date.
b. A hearing bundle shall be compiled and filed by midday on 23 October 2026.
c. A skeleton argument of not more than 15 pages shall be filed by 4.00 pm on 27 October 2026.
d. A hearing shall be allocated on the first available date after 30 October 2026, with an estimated duration of no more than one half day. All witnesses who have provided witness statements in support of the Claim shall be made available at the hearing for questioning by the Court.
Costs
28. All questions of costs are reserved.
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Issued by: Linda Fitz-Alan |
[1] See paragraph 12 below.
[2] Defined in Part A of Schedule 1 to the Agreement. See paragraph 11 below.
[3] For example, see Awad v 3AM Property Investment Co LLC [2025] ADGMCFI 0003, at paragraphs 21 and 26.
[4] Generally, see Al Khaleej Investment PSC v Ocean Pearl Real Estate Comp LLC [2026] ADGMCFI 0017, at paragraphs 81–82.
[5] Kireeva v Bedzhamov [2025] AC 812 (UKSC) at paragraph 26, applied in Al Khaleej Investment PSC v Ocean Pearl Real Estate Comp LLC [2026] ADGMCFI 0017, at paragraphs 10-12. This is a common law rule applicable in ADGM by section 1 of the ADGM Application of English Law Regulations 2015.
[6] Incorporated by rule 340(5) of the CPR.
[7] See paragraphs 18–21 below.
[8] Set out at paragraph 16 above.
[9] Lux Locations Ltd v Yida Zhang [2023] UKPC 3, at paragraph 51.
[10] Ibid, at paragraph 16.
[11] Football Dataco Ltd v Smoot Enterprises Ltd [2011] 1 WLR 1978, at paragraph 19.
[12] Lux Locations Ltd v Yida Zhang [2023] UKPC 3, at paragraph 45.
[13] Ibid, at paragraph 51.
[14] Set out at paragraph 15 above.
[15] Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi; ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67
[16] Practice Direction 15, paragraph 15.45.
[17] Sowwah Square Investment - Sole Proprietorship LLC v Forever Rose Retail Ltd [2026] ADGMCFI 0024, at paragraph 17.