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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> European Court of Human Rights >> VO v. FRANCE - 53924/00 [2004] ECHR 326 (8 July 2004) URL: https://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2004/326.html Cite as: 79 BMLR 71, [2005] Inquest LR 129, [2004] ECHR 326, 17 BHRC 1, (2004) 79 BMLR 71, [2004] 2 FCR 577, (2005) 40 EHRR 12 |
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(Application no. 53924/00)
Judgment
Strasbourg, 8 July 2004
(Application no. 53924/00)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
8 July 2004
This judgment is final but may be subject to editorial revision.
The European Court of Human Rights, sitting as a Grand Chamber composed of:
Mr L. WILDHABER, President,
Mr C.L. ROZAKIS,
Mr J.-P. COSTA,
Mr G. RESS,
Sir Nicolas BRATZA,
Mr L. CAFLISCH,
Mrs V.
STRážNICKá,
Mr P. LORENZEN
Mr K. JUNGWIERT,
Mr M. FISCHBACH,
Mr J. HEDIGAN,
Mrs W. THOMASSEN,
Mr A.B. BAKA,
Mr K. TRAJA,
Mr M. UGREKHELIDZE,
Mrs A. MULARONI,
Mr K. HAJIYEV, judges,
and Mr P.J. MAHONEY, Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 10 December 2003 and 2 June 2004,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-mentioned date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 53924/00) against
the French Republic lodged with the Court under Article
34 of the Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a French national,
Mrs Thi-Nho Vo
(“the
applicant”), on 20 December 1999.
2. The applicant was represented by Mr Le Griel, of the Paris Bar. The French Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr Ronny Abraham, Director of Legal Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
3. The applicant alleged, in particular, a violation
of Article 2
of the Convention on the ground that the conduct of
a doctor who was responsible
for the death of her child in utero was not classified as unintentional
homicide.
4. The application was allocated to the Third Section of the Court (Rule 52 § 1 of the Rules of Court). Within that Section, the Chamber to which the case had been assigned decided on 22 May 2003 to relinquish jurisdiction in favour of the Grand Chamber with immediate effect, none of the parties having objected to relinquishment (Article 30 of the Convention and Rule 72).
5. The composition of the Grand Chamber was determined according to the provisions of Article 27 §§ 2 and 3 of the Convention and Rule 24 of the Rules of Court.
6. The applicant and the Government each filed written observations on the admissibility and merits of the case. In addition, observations were also received from the Center for Reproductive Rights and the Family Planning Association, which had been given leave by the President to intervene in the written procedure (Article 36 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 44 § 2).
7. A hearing on the admissibility and merits of the case took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 10 December 2003 (Rule 59 § 3).
There appeared before the Court:
(a) for the Government
Mr F. ALABRUNE, Deputy Director of Legal Affairs,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Agent,
Mr G. DUTERTRE, draftsman, Human-Rights Section,
Directorate of Legal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mrs J. VAILHE,
draftswoman, European and International Affairs
Service, Ministry of Justice,
Mr P. PRACHE, Department of Criminal Affairs and Pardons,
Ministry of Justice,
Mr H. BLONDET, judge of the Court of Cassation,
Mrs V.
SAGANT, European and International Affairs Service,
Ministry of Justice, Counsel;
(b) for the applicant
Mr B. LE GRIEL, of the Paris Bar, Counsel.
The Court heard addresses by Mr Le Griel and Mr Alabrune.
8. In accordance with the provisions of Article 29 § 3 of the Convention and Rule 54A § 3, the Court decided to examine the issue of admissibility of the application with the merits.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
9. The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Bourg-en-Bresse.
10. On 27 November 1991 the applicant, Mrs Thi-Nho Vo,
who is of
Vietnamese
origin, attended the Lyons General Hospital
for a medical examination
scheduled during the sixth month of pregnancy.
11. On the same day another woman, Mrs Thi Thanh Van
Vo,
was due
to have a coil removed at the same hospital. When the
doctor who was to remove
the coil called out the name “Mrs
Vo”
in the waiting room, it was
the applicant who answered.
After a brief interview, the doctor noted that the applicant had difficulty in understanding French. Having consulted the medical file he sought to remove the coil without examining her beforehand. In so doing, he pierced the amniotic sac causing the loss of a substantial amount of amniotic fluid.
After finding on clinical examination that the uterus was enlarged, the doctor ordered a scan. He then discovered that one had just been performed and realised that there had been a mistake of identity. The applicant was immediately admitted to hospital.
Dr G. then attempted to remove the coil from Mrs Thi Thanh Van
Vo,
but was
unsuccessful and so prescribed an operation under general
anaesthetic for the
following morning. A further error was then made when the applicant was taken to
the operating theatre instead
of Mrs Thi Thanh
Van
Vo,
and only escaped the
surgery intended for her namesake after she protested and was recognised by an
anaesthetist.
12. The applicant left the hospital on 29 November 1991. She returned on 4 December 1991 for further tests. The doctors found that the amniotic fluid had not been replaced and that the pregnancy could not continue further. The pregnancy was terminated on health grounds on 5 December 1991.
13. On 11 December 1991 the applicant and her partner lodged a criminal complaint and applied to be joined as civil parties to the proceedings in which they alleged unintentional injury to the applicant entailing total unfitness for work for a period not exceeding three months and unintentional homicide of her child. Three expert reports were subsequently lodged.
14. The first, which was lodged on 16 January 1992, concluded that
the foetus, a baby girl, was between 20 and 21 weeks
old, weighed 375 grams, was
28 centimetres long, had a cranial perimeter of 17 centimetres and had not
breathed after delivery.
The expert also concluded that there was no indication
that the foetus had been subjected to violence
or was malformed and no evidence
that the death was attributable to a morphological cause or to damage to an
organ. Further, the autopsy performed after the abortion
and an
anatomico-pathological examination of the body indicated that the foetal lung
was 20 to 24 weeks old.
15. On 3 August 1992 a second report was lodged concerning the applicant’s injuries:
“(a) There is a period of temporary total unfitness for work from 27 November 1991 to 13 December 1991, when the patient was admitted to the Tonkin Clinic with an entirely unconnected pathology (appendectomy)
(b) the date of stabilisation can be put at 13 December 1991
(c) there is no loss of amenity
(d) there is no aesthetic damage
(e) there is no occupational damage
(f) there is no partial permanent unfitness for work
Damages for the pain and suffering resulting from this incident still have to
be assessed. The assessment should be carried out with
a doctor of Vietnamese
extraction specialising in psychiatry or psychology.”
16. The third report, which was issued on 29 September 1992, referred to the malfunctioning of the hospital department concerned and to negligence on the part of the doctor:
“1. The manner in which appointments in the departments run by Professors T. and R. at Lyons General Hospital are organised is not beyond reproach, in particular in that namesakes are common among patients of foreign origin and create a risk of confusion, a risk that is undoubtedly increased by the patients’ unfamiliarity with or limited understanding of our language.
2. The fact that patients were not given precise directions and
the consulting rooms and names of the doctors holding
surgeries in them were not
marked sufficiently clearly increased the likelihood of confusion between
patients with similar surnames
and explains why, after Dr G. had acquainted
himself with Mrs Thi Than Van
Vo’s
medical file, it was [the applicant]
who
came forward in response to his call.
3. The doctor acted negligently, by omission, and relied solely on the paraclinical examinations. He did not examine his patient and by an unfortunate error ruptured the amniotic sac causing the pregnancy to terminate at five months. He is accountable for that error, although there are mitigating circumstances.”
17. On 25 January 1993, following supplemental submissions by the prosecution on 26 April 1994, Dr G. was charged with causing unintentional injury at Lyons on 27 November 1991 by:
(i) through his inadvertence, negligent act or inattention,
perforating the amniotic sac in which the applicant’s
live and viable
foetus was developing, thereby unintentionally causing the child’s death
(a criminal offence under Article
319 of the former Criminal Code – which
was applicable at the material time – now Article 221-6 of the Criminal
Code);
(ii) through his inadvertence, negligent act, inattention, negligent omission or breach of a statutory or regulatory duty of protection or care, causing the applicant bodily injury that resulted in her total unfitness for work for a period not exceeding three months (a criminal offence under Article R. 40, subparagraph 4, of the former Criminal Code – which was applicable at the material time – now Articles R. 625-2 and R. 625-4 of the Criminal Code).
18. By an order of 31 August 1995, Dr G. was committed to stand trial in Lyons Criminal Court on counts of unintentional homicide and unintentionally causing injuries.
19. By a judgment of 3 June 1996 the Criminal Court found that the accused was entitled as of right to an amnesty under the Amnesty Law of 3 August 1995 in respect of the offence of unintentionally causing injuries entailing temporary unfitness for work of less than three months. As to the offence of unintentional homicide of the foetus, it held:
“The issue before the court is whether the offence of unintentional homicide or the unintentional taking of the foetus’s life is made out when the life concerned is that of a foetus, if a 20 to 21 week old foetus is a human person (‘another’ within the meaning of Article 221-6 of the Criminal Code).
...
The expert evidence must be accepted. The foetus was between 20 and 21 weeks old.
At what stage of maturity can an embryo be considered a human person?
The Law of 17 January 1975 on the Voluntary
Termination of Pregnancy
provides: `The law guarantees respect of every human being from
the beginning of
life.`
The Law of 29 July 1994 (Article 16 of the Civil Code) provides: ‘The law secures the primacy of the person, prohibits any assault on human dignity and guarantees the respect of every human being from the beginning of its life’.
The laws of 29 July 1994 expressly employed the terms ‘embryo’ and ‘human embryo’ for the first time. However, the term ‘human embryo’ is not defined in any of them.
When doing the preparatory work for the legislation on bioethics, a number of
parliamentarians (both members of the National Assembly
and senators) sought to
define ‘embryo’. Charles de Courson proposed the following
definition: ‘Every human being
shall be respected from the start of life;
the human embryo is a human being’. Jean-François Mattéi stated:
‘The
embryo is in any event merely the morphological expression of one and
the same life that begins with impregnation and continues
till death after
passing through various
stages. It is not yet known with precision when the
zygote becomes an embryo and the embryo
a foetus, the only indisputable fact
being that the life process starts with impregnation’.
It thus appears that there is no legal rule to determine the position of the
foetus in law either when it is formed or during its
development. In view
of
this lack of a legal definition it is necessary to return to the known
scientific facts. It has been established
that a foetus is
viable
at six months
and on no account, on present knowledge, at 20 or 21 weeks.
The court must have regard to that fact (viability
at six months) and cannot
create law on an issue which the legislators have not
yet succeeded in
defining.
The court thus notes that a foetus becomes viable
at the age of six months; a
20 to 21 week-old foetus is not
viable
and is not a
‘human person’
or ‘another’ within the meaning of former Article 319 and Article
221-6 of the Criminal
Code.
The offence of unintentional homicide or of unintentionally taking the life of a 20 to 21 week-old foetus has not been made out, since the foetus was not a ‘human person’ or ‘another’...
Acquits Dr G. of the charge without penalty or costs...”
20. On 10 June 1996 the applicant appealed against that judgment.
She argued that Dr. G. had been guilty of personal negligence
severable from the
functioning of the public service and sought the following amount: 1,000,000
French francs
(FRF) in damages,
comprising FRF 900,000 for the death of the
child and FRF 100,000 for the injury she had sustained. The public
prosecutor’s
office, as second appellant, submitted that the acquittal
should be overturned. It observed: “By failing to carry out a clinical
examination, the accused was guilty of negligence that caused the death of the
foetus, which at the time of the offence was between
20 and 24 weeks old
and following, normally and inexorably, the path of life on which it had
embarked, there being no medical
doubt over its future.”
21. In a judgment of 13 March 1997, the Lyons Court of Appeal upheld the judgment in so far as it had declared the prosecution of the offence of unintentionally causing injuries statute-barred but overturned the remainder of the judgment and found the doctor guilty of unintentional homicide. It imposed a six-months suspended prison sentence and a fine of FRF 10,000, holding:
“... In the instant case Dr G.’s negligence is characterised in
particular by the fact that the patient’s knowledge
of French was
insufficient to enable her to explain her condition to him, to answer his
questions or to give him the date of her
last period, circumstances that should
have further impressed upon on him the need for a thorough clinical examination.
The assertion
that he was entitled to rely on the medical records alone shows
that, though an able scientist, this young doctor was nonetheless
unaware of one
of the essential skills of the practice of medicine: listening to, getting to
know and examining the patient. Indeed,
before this court Dr G. said that the
accident had impressed upon him how vital
it was to take precautions before
operating.
There is a clear causal link between this negligent act and omission and the
death of the child Mrs Vo
was carrying. The accused
has himself acknowledged,
with commendable honesty, that a clinical examination would have alerted him to
the fact that the patient
was pregnant and had been mistaken for another
patient.
As regards the classification of the offence as unintentional homicide, it is first necessary to reiterate the legal principles governing this sphere.
Various
provisions of international treaties, such as Article 2 of the
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Article 6 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 6 of the
Convention on the Rights of the Child
signed in New York on 26 January 1990,
recognise a right to life protected by law for everyone, and notably
children.
Under domestic law, section 1 of the Voluntary
Termination of Pregnancy Act
of 17 January 1975 (Law no. 75-17) specifies: ‘The law guarantees
respect of every human being from the beginning of life... this principle may
only be derogated from in the event
of necessity and in accordance with the
conditions set out in this statute’.
Further, Law no. 94-653 of 29 July 1994 on the Respect of the Human Body lays down in Article 16 of the Civil Code: ‘The law secures the primacy of the person, prohibits any assault on human dignity and guarantees the respect of every human being from the beginning of its life’.
These statutory provisions cannot be regarded as mere statements of intent, devoid of any legal effect, since Article 16-9 of the Civil Code indicates that the provisions of Article 16 are mandatory.
For its part the Criminal Division of the Court of Cassation applied these rules of international and domestic law in two judgments it delivered on 27 November 1996, specifying that the Act of 17 January 1975 only permits derogation from the rule stated in section 1 thereof that every human being is entitled to respect from the beginning of life in cases of necessity and subject to the conditions and limitations set out in it.
The Court of Cassation added that having regard to the conditions laid down
by the legislature, the provisions of that statute and
of the laws of 31
December 1979 on the Voluntary
Termination of Pregnancy, taken as a whole, were
not incompatible with the aforementioned
treaty provisions.
In a different case, moreover, the Court of Cassation pointed out that on
signing the Convention on the Rights of the Child in New
York on 26 January
1990, France
made a declaration concerning interpretation in which it stated
that the Convention could not be
interpreted as constituting any obstacle to the
implementation of the provisions of French legislation on the
voluntary
termination
of pregnancy. That reservation shows, by converse implication, that
that Convention could concern a foetus aged less than ten weeks,
the statutory
maximum foetal age in
France
for a
voluntary
termination of pregnancy.
It follows that, subject to the provisions on the voluntary
termination of
pregnancies and therapeutic abortions, the right to respect
for every human
being from the beginning of life is guaranteed by law, without any requirement
that the child be born as a
viable
human being, provided it was alive when the
injury occurred.
Indeed, viability
is a scientifically indefinite and uncertain concept, as
the accused, who is currently studying in the United States,
himself
acknowledged, informing the court that foetuses born between 23 and 24 weeks
after conception could now be kept alive,
a situation that was inconceivable a
few years ago. In the opinion prepared by Professor Thouvenin and adduced in
evidence by Dr
G., reference is made to a report by Professor Mattéi in
which it is indicated that the embryo is merely the morphological
expression of
one and the same life that begins with impregnation and continues till death
after passing through
various
stages.
It is not yet known with precision when
the zygote becomes an embryo and the embryo a foetus, the only indisputable fact
being
that the life process starts with impregnation. ...
Thus the issue of viability
at birth, a notion that is uncertain
scientifically, is in addition devoid of all legal effect, as the
law makes no
distinction on that basis.
In the instant case it has been established that when the scan was performed
on 27 November 1991 – before the amniotic
fluid was lost later that
day – the [applicant’s] pregnancy had been proceeding normally and
the child she was carrying
was alive. When the therapeutic abortion was
performed on 5 December 1991, it was noted that a comparison of the
child’s
measurements with published tables suggested that the foetus was
between 20 and 21 weeks old and possibly older, as it is not certain
that the
tables take into account the specific morphology of children of Vietnamese
origin. Dr G., when questioned on this point
at the hearing, was unable to
provide any further information. The conclusion from the anatomo-pathological
examination was that
the foetal lung indicated an age of between 20 and 24
weeks, its measurements suggesting that an age at the lower end of that range
was the most likely. In any event, as Dr G. said in evidence, the age of the
foetus was
very
close to that of certain foetuses
that have managed to survive
in the United States. The photographs at page D 32 of the trial bundle
show a perfectly
formed child whose life was cut short by the accused’s
negligence.
As the Douai Court of Appeal observed in its judgment of 2 June 1987, had the assault on the child concerned inflicted a non-fatal wound, it would have been classified without any hesitation as an offence of unintentionally causing injuries. A fortiori, an assault leading to the child’s death must be classified as unintentional homicide.
Thus, the strict application of the legal principles, established scientific fact and elementary common sense all dictate that a negligent act or omission causing the death of a 20 to 24 week-old foetus in perfect health should be classified as unintentional homicide.
Consequently, the impugned judgment must be overturned...
While the applicant’s civil action is admissible, if only to corroborate the prosecution case, this court has no jurisdiction to hear the claim for reparation. This is because despite the serious nature of the negligent act and omission of Dr. G., a doctor in a public hospital, they do not constitute personal misconduct of such exceptional gravity entailing a total disregard for the most elementary principles and duties inherent in his function as to make them severable from public service.
Nonetheless, it is appropriate to order Doctor G. to pay to this civil party
compensation in the sum of 5,000 francs
under Article
475-1 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure on account of costs which she has incurred, but which have
not been paid by the State...”
22. On 30 June 1999, on an appeal on points of law by the doctor, the Court of Cassation reversed the judgment of the Lyons Court of Appeal and ruled that there was no reason to remit the case for retrial:
“Having regard to Article 111-4 of the Criminal Code;
Criminal-law provisions must be strictly construed.
...
In convicting [the doctor] of unintentional homicide, the appellate court
noted that Article 2 of the European Convention on Human
Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms and Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights recognise the existence
for all persons of a right to life protected by
law. The appellate court stated that the Voluntary
Termination of Pregnancy Act
of 17 January 1975 establishes the rule that the life of every human being must
be respected from the beginning of life. That rule
is now restated in Article 16
of the Civil Code as worded following the amendment made by the Law of 29 July
1994. The appellate
court went on to state that by operating without performing
a prior clinical examination, the doctor was guilty of a negligent act
or
omission that had a definite causal link with the death of the child the patient
was carrying.
However, by so holding, when the matters of which the defendant was accused did not come within the definition of the offences set out in former Article 319 and Article 221-6 of the Criminal Code, the Court of Appeal misinterpreted the aforementioned provisions.”
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
A. Criminal Code
23. The provision dealing with the unintentional taking of life at the material time and until 1 March 1994 was Article 319 of the Criminal Code, which read as follows:
Article 319
“Anyone who through his or her inadvertence, negligent act,
inattention, negligent omission or breach of regulation unintentionally
commits
homicide or unintentionally causes death, shall be liable to imprisonment of
between three months and two years and a fine
of between 1,000 and 30,000
francs.”
24. Since 1 March 1994, the relevant provision has been Article 221-6 of the Criminal Code (as amended by Law no. 2000-647 of 10 July 2000 and Order no. 2000-916 of 19 September 2000) which is to be found in Section II (“Unintentional taking of life”) of Chapter I (“Offences against the human person”) of Part II (“Serious crimes and other offences against the person”). Article 221-6 provides:
Article 221-6
“It shall be an offence of unintentional homicide punishable by three years’ imprisonment and a fine of 45,000 euros to cause the death of another in the conditions and in accordance with the distinctions set out in Article 121-3 by inadvertence, negligent act, inattention, negligent omission or breach of a statutory or regulatory duty to ensure safety or of care.
In the event of a manifestly deliberate breach of a special statutory or regulatory duty to ensure safety or of care, the maximum sentences shall be increased to five years’ imprisonment and a fine of 75,000 euros.”
25. Article 223-10 of the Criminal Code, which concerns the
voluntary
termination of pregnancy by a third party without
the mother’s
consent, is to be found in Section
V
under the heading “Unlawful
termination of pregnancy” of Chapter
III, entitled “Endangering the
person” in Part II. It reads as follows:
Article 223-10
“It shall be an offence punishable by five years’ imprisonment
and a fine of 500,000 francs
to terminate a pregnancy
without the
mother’s consent.”
26. Section III entitled “Protection of the embryo” of
Chapter I (Public-health offences) of Book V
(Other
serious crimes
(crimes) and other major offences (délits)) prohibits
various
types of conduct on grounds of medical ethics (Article 511-15 to 511-25),
including the conception of human
embryos in
vitro
for research or
experimental purposes (Article 511-18).
B. The Public-Health Code
27. At the material time the limitation period for an action in
damages in the administrative courts was four years while
the period in which a
pregnancy could be voluntarily
terminated lawfully was ten weeks following
conception.
28. The provisions of the Public-Health Code as worded since the Patients’ Rights and Quality of the Health-Service Act (Law no. 2002-303) of 4 March 2002 came into force read as follows.
Article L. 1142-1
“Save when they incur liability as a result of a defect in a health product, the medical practitioners mentioned in the Fourth Part of this Code and all hospitals, clinics, departments and organisations in which preventive medicine, diagnosis or treatment is performed on individuals shall only be liable for damage caused by preventive medicine, diagnosis or treatment if they have been at fault. ...”
Article L.1142-2
“Private medical practitioners, the hospitals, clinics, health services and organisations mentioned in Article L. 1142-1 and any other legal entity other than the State that is engaged in preventive medicine, diagnosis or treatment and the producers and suppliers of and dealers in health products in the form of finished goods mentioned in Article L. 5311-1 with the exception of subparagraph 5 thereof, subject to the provisions of Article L. 1222-9 and subparagraphs 11, 14 and 15, that are used in connection with such activities shall be under a duty to take out insurance in respect of any third-party or public-authority liability they may incur for damage sustained by third parties as a result of an assault against the person in the course of that activity taken as a whole. ...”
Article L 1142-28
“The limitation period for actions against medical practitioners and public or private hospitals or clinics in respect of preventive medicine, diagnosis or treatment shall be ten years from the date the condition stabilises.”
Article L.2211-1
“As stated in Article 16 of the Civil Code as hereafter reproduced: ‘The law secures the primacy of the person, prohibits any assault on human dignity and guarantees the respect of every human being from the beginning of its life’”.
Article L.2211-2
“The principle referred to in Article L. 2211-1 may only be derogated from in the event of necessity and in accordance with the conditions set out in this Part. It shall be the nation’s duty to educate society on this principle and its consequences, [to provide] information on life’s problems and on national and international demography, to inculcate a sense of responsibility, to receive children into society and to uphold family life. The State, aided by the local and regional authorities, shall perform these obligations and support initiatives that assist it to do so.”
Article L. 2212-1
“A pregnant woman whose condition causes her distress may ask a doctor to terminate her pregnancy. The pregnancy may only be terminated within the first twelve weeks.”
Article L. 2213-1
“A pregnancy may be voluntarily
terminated at any time if two doctors
from a pluridisciplinary team certify, after the team
has issued a consultative
opinion, that either the woman’s continued pregnancy puts her health at
serious risk or that it
is highly likely that the unborn child is suffering from
a particularly serious affection which is recognised as incurable at the
time of
diagnosis. ...”
C. The position taken by the Court of Cassation
29. The Court of Cassation has followed its decision in the instant case (see paragraph 22 above) on two occasions (in its judgments of 29 June 2001, Full Court, Bulletin no. 165, and of 25 June 2002, Criminal Division, Bulletin no. 144), despite submissions from the advocates-general concerned to the contrary.
1. Judgment of the full court of 29 June 2001
“As regards the two grounds of appeal of the Public Prosecutor at the Metz Court of Appeal and of Mrs X which have been joined together... :
On 29 July 1995 a vehicle
being driven by Mr Z ... collided with a
vehicle
being driven by Mrs X. ..., who was six months pregnant.
She was injured and as
a result of the impact lost the foetus she was carrying. In the impugned
judgment (Metz Court of Appeal,
3 September 1998), Mr Z. ... was convicted of
unintentionally injuring Mrs X..., aggravated by the fact that he was under
the influence of drink. However, he was acquitted of the unintentional killing
of the unborn child.
The grounds of appeal against that decision are, firstly, that Article 221-6
of the Criminal Code, which makes it an offence to cause
the death of another,
does not exclude from its scope a viable
unborn child and that, by holding that
this provision applied only
to a child whose heart was beating at birth and who
was breathing, the Court of Appeal had added a condition that was not contained
in the statute, and, secondly, unintentionally causing the death of an unborn
child constituted the offence of unintentional homicide
if the unborn child was
viable
at the material time, irrespective of whether or not it breathed when it
was separated from the
mother, with the result that there had been a
violation
of Articles 111-3, 111-4 and 221-6 of the Criminal Code and Article 593
of the
Code of Criminal Procedure.
The rule that offences and punishment must be defined by law, which requires that criminal statutes be construed strictly, pleads against extending the scope of Article 221-6 of the Criminal Code, which makes unintentional homicide an offence, to cover unborn children whose status in law is governed by special provisions concerning embryos and foetuses...”
2. Judgment of the Criminal Division of 25 June 2002
“... Having regard to former Article 319, Article 221-6 and Article 111-4 of the Criminal Code.
The rule that offences and punishment must be defined by law, which requires that criminal statutes be construed strictly, pleads against a charge of unintentional homicide lying in the case of a child that is not born alive.
The impugned judgment established that Z., whose pregnancy under the supervision of X. came to term on 10 November 1991, attended the clinic in order to give birth on 17 November. She was placed under observation at about 8.30 p.m. and drew the attention of the midwife, Y., to an anomaly in the child’s cardiac rhythm. Y. refused to call the doctor. A further test carried out at 7 a.m. the following morning showed a like anomaly and subsequently that the heart had stopped beating altogether. At about 8 a.m., X. pronounced the baby dead. In the evening he proceeded to extract a stillborn child by caesarean section. According to the autopsy report, the child did not present any malformation but had suffered from anoxia.
In finding Y. guilty of unintentional homicide and X..., who was acquitted by the criminal court, liable for the civil consequences of that offence, the Court of Appeal held that the child’s death was a result of the negligent acts and omissions of both the doctor in failing to place the patient, who was beyond term, under closer observation and of the midwife in failing to notify an unequivocal anomaly noted when the child’s cardiac rhythm was recorded.
After noting that the stillborn child did not present any organic lesion capable of explaining its death, the Court of Appeal stated: ‘This child had reached term several days previously and, but for the fault that has been found, would have been capable of independent survival, with a human existence separate from its mother’s’.
However, by so holding, the Court of Appeal misapplied the provisions referred to above and the aforementioned principles.
It follows that this appeal on points of law is allowed. The case will not be remitted, as the facts are not capable of coming within the definition of any criminal offence. ...”
30. The Criminal Division of the Court of Cassation has held that
a court of appeal gave valid
reasons for finding a defendant
guilty of the
unintentional homicide of a child who died an hour after its birth on the day of
a road-traffic accident in which
its mother, who was eight months pregnant, was
seriously injured, when it held that, by failing to control his
vehicle,
the
driver
had caused the child’s death an hour after birth as a result of
irreversible lesions to
vital
organs sustained at the moment
of impact (Court of
Cassation, Criminal Division, 2 December 2003).
31. An article entitled “Unintentional violence
on pregnant
women and the offence of unintentional homicide”
(Recueil Dalloz
2004,
p. 449) notes that in twenty-eight out of a total of thirty-four articles
commenting on the Criminal Division of the Court
of Cassation’s judgment
of 2 December 2003 (see paragraph 30 above) the authors are critical of the
Court of Cassation’s
case-law (see paragraph 29 above).
The criticism includes: the laconic reasoning of the Court of
Cassation’s judgments and incoherence of the protection afforded,
as a
person causing unintentional injury is liable to criminal prosecution while a
person who unintentionally causes the death
of the foetus goes unpunished; the
fact that a child who has lived for a few minutes is recognised as having
standing as a victim,
whereas a child that dies in utero is ignored by
the law; and the fact that freedom to procreate is less well protected than
freedom to have an abortion.
D. The Garraud amendment
32. On 27 November 2003 the National Assembly adopted on its second reading a bill to adapt the criminal-justice system to changes in criminality The bill included the Garraud amendment, so named after the member of parliament who moved it, which created an offence of involuntary termination of pregnancy (ITP).
33. The adoption of this amendment gave rise to fierce controversy
and, after a week of consultations, the Minister of
Justice, Mr Perben, declared
on 5 December 2003 that the member’s proposal “caused more problems
than it solved”
and that he was in favour of abandoning it. On 23 January
2004
the Senate unanimously deleted the amendment. This was the second
time the
senators had rejected such a proposal, as they had already opposed it in April
2003 when examining the Reinforcement of
Protection against Road
Violence
Act,
passed on 12 June 2003.
E. The Laws on Bioethics
34. On 11 December 2003 the National Assembly adopted on its
second reading a bill on bioethics with a view
to reforming
the 1994 Laws on the
Donation and Use of Parts and Products of the Human Body, Medically Assisted
Procreation and Pre-Natal Diagnosis,
as the legislature had envisaged at the
time in order to take into account subsequent scientific and medical progress
and new issues
with which society was confronted. In
view
of the speed at which
technical advances have been made, the bill reinforces the guarantees
on the
provision of information and on seeking and obtaining consents and prohibits
certain practices that are technically feasible
(reproductive cloning), while
providing a framework for those with a proven medical interest (research on
embryos in
vitro).
It establishes a regulatory and supervisory body (The
Procreation, Embryology and Human-Genetics Agency) whose functions also
include
acting as a watchdog and providing support and expert guidance in these spheres
(http://www.assemblée-nat.fr/dossiers/bioethiques.asp).
III. EUROPEAN LAW
1. The Oviedo Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine
35. The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine, also known as the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, which was opened for signature on 4 April 1997 in Oviedo, entered into force on 1 December 1999. In this Convention, the member States of the Council of Europe, the other States and the European Community signatories to it agreed as follows:
“Resolving to take such measures as are necessary to safeguard human dignity and the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual with regard to the application of biology and medicine,
Have agreed as follows:
Chapter I – General provisions
Article 1 – Purpose and object
Parties to this Convention shall protect the dignity and identity of all human beings and guarantee everyone, without discrimination, respect for their integrity and other rights and fundamental freedoms with regard to the application of biology and medicine.
Each Party shall take in its internal law the necessary measures to give effect to the provisions of this Convention.
Article 2 – Primacy of the human being
The interests and welfare of the human being shall prevail over the sole interest of society or science.
...
Chapter V
– Scientific research
...
Article 18 – Research on embryos in
vitro
1. Where the law allows research on embryos in vitro,
it
shall ensure adequate protection of the embryo.
2. The creation of human embryos for research purposes is prohibited.
...
Chapter XI – Interpretation and follow-up of the Convention
Article 29 – Interpretation of the Convention
The European Court of Human Rights may give, without direct reference to any specific proceedings pending in a court, advisory opinions on legal questions concerning the interpretation of the present Convention at the request of:
the Government of a Party, after having informed the other Parties;
the Committee set up by Article 32, with membership restricted to the
Representatives of the Parties to this Convention, by a decision
adopted by a
two-thirds majority of votes
cast.
...”
36. The commentary on Article 1 (see paragraphs 16 to 19 of the Explanatory Report on the Convention) states:
Article 1 – Purpose and object
16. This article defines the Convention’s scope and purpose.
17. The aim of the Convention is to guarantee everyone’s rights and fundamental freedoms and, in particular, their integrity and to secure the dignity and identity of human beings in this sphere.
18. The Convention does not define the term ‘everyone’
(in French ‘toute personne’). These two terms are
equivalent and found in the English and French versions
of the European
Convention on Human Rights, which
however does not define them. In the absence
of a unanimous agreement on the definition of these terms among member States of
the
Council of Europe, it was decided to allow domestic law to define them for
the purposes of the application of the present Convention.
19. The Convention also uses the expression ‘human being’ to state the necessity to protect the dignity and identity of all human beings. It was acknowledged that it was a generally accepted principle that human dignity and the identity of the human being had to be respected as soon as life began. ...”
2. Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, on the Prohibition of Cloning Human Beings (12 January 1998)
37. Article 1 of the Protocol provides:
Article 1
1. Any intervention seeking to create a human being genetically identical to another human being, whether living or dead, is prohibited.
2. For the purpose of this article, the term human being ‘genetically identical’ to another human being means a human being sharing with another the same nuclear gene set.”
3. Draft additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, on biomedical research
38. This draft was approved by the Steering Committee on Bioethics
on 20 June 2003. It was submitted for approval to the
Committee of Ministers,
which sought a consultative opinion from the Parliamentary Assembly. On 30 April
2004
the Assembly issued
an opinion (no. 252 (
2004))
in which it declared itself
in favour of the draft protocol and in consequence recommended that the
Committee of Ministers open it for signature as soon as possible.
Article 1 – Object and purpose
“Parties to this Protocol shall protect the dignity and identity of all human beings and guarantee everyone, without discrimination, respect for their integrity and other rights and fundamental freedoms with regard to any research involving interventions on human beings in the field of biomedicine.”
Article 2 – Scope
“This Protocol covers the full range of research activities in the health field involving interventions on human beings.
This Protocol does not apply to research on embryos in vitro.
It does apply
to research on foetuses and embryos in
vivo.
...”
Article 3 – Primacy of the human being
“The interests and welfare of the human being participating in research shall prevail over the sole interest of society or science.”
Article 18 – Research during pregnancy or breastfeeding
“Research on a pregnant woman which does not have the potential to produce results of direct benefit to her health, or to that of her embryo, foetus or child after birth, may only be undertaken if the following additional conditions are met:
(i) the research has the aim of contributing to the ultimate attainment of results capable of conferring benefit to other women in relation to reproduction or to other embryos, foetuses or children; ...”
The draft explanatory report repeats the terms of the explanatory report on the Convention.
4. The Working Party on the Protection of the Human Embryo and
Foetus: protection of the human embryo in vitro
(2003)
39. The Working Party on the Protection of the Human Embryo and Foetus set up by the Steering Committee on Bioethics reached the following conclusion in a report drawn up in 2003:
“This report aimed at giving an overview of current positions found in
Europe regarding the protection of the human embryo
in vitro
and the arguments
supporting them.
It shows a broad consensus on the need for the protection of the embryo in
vitro.
However, the definition of the status of the embryo remains an area
where fundamental differences are encountered, based on strong
arguments. These
differences largely form the basis of most divergences around the other issues
related to the protection of the
embryo in
vitro.
Nevertheless, even if agreement cannot be reached on the status of the
embryo, the possibility of reexamining certain issues in the
light of the latest
developments in the biomedical field and related potential therapeutic advances
could be considered. In this
context, while acknowledging and respecting the
fundamental choices made by the different countries, it seems possible and
desirable
with regard to the need to protect the embryo in vitro
on which
all countries have agreed, that common approaches be identified to ensure proper
conditions for the application of procedures
involving the creation and use of
embryos in
vitro.
The purpose of this report is to aid reflection towards
that objective.”
5. The European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies at the European Commission
40. The Group has issued, inter alia, the following opinion on the Ethical aspects of research involving the use of human embryo in the context of the 5th framework programme (23 November 1998):
“LEGAL BACKGROUND
Controversies on the concept of beginning of life and ‘personhood’
1.13 Existing legislation in the Member States differs considerably from one another regarding the question of when life begins and about the definition of ‘personhood’. As a result, no consensual definition, neither scientifically nor legally, of when life begins exists.
Two main views
about the moral status of the embryo and thus regarding the
legal protection afforded to them with respect to scientific
research exist:
(i) human embryos are not considered as human beings and consequently have a relative worth of protection;
(ii) human embryos have the same moral status as human beings and consequently are equally worthy of protection.
1.14 The discussion of common rules on embryo research is
continuing. Recently many European countries, when discussing
and signing the
Council of Europe Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, failed to reach a
consensus concerning the definition
of the embryo, and, therefore, were unable
to find common ground on which to place the admissibility of human embryo
research within
the Convention. Hence, it is up to the Member States to
legislate in this area. Yet, nevertheless, Article 18.1 of the Convention
stipulates ‘where the law allows research on embryos in vitro,
it
shall ensure adequate protection of the embryo’. ...
Different approaches regarding the definition of the human embryo
1.17 In most Member States there is presently no legal definition
of the human embryo (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden). Among those Member States which
define the embryo in their
legislation, the existing definitions
vary
considerably from one country to another (Austria, Germany, Spain and the United
Kingdom).
...
Different scope of national legislation
1.19 Among the Member States with legal provisions on embryo research, there are many differences regarding the activities allowed and prohibited.
There are countries where embryo research is allowed only for the benefit of
the particular embryo (Austria, Germany). There are
Member States where embryo
research is exceptionally allowed (France,
Sweden), or allowed under strict
conditions (Denmark, Finland,
Spain, United Kingdom). ...
Diversity of views
1.23 The diversity of views
regarding the question whether or not
research on human embryos in
vitro
is morally acceptable, depends on
differences in ethical approaches, philosophical theories and national
traditions, which are
deeply rooted in European culture. Two contrasting
approaches exist: a deontological approach, in which duties and principles
control
the ends and consequences of our actions; and utilitarian or
consequentialist approaches in which human actions are evaluated in
terms of
means and ends or consequences. ...
THE GROUP SUBMITS THE FOLLOWING OPINION
2.1 In the preamble it appeared crucial to recall that the
progress of knowledge of life sciences, which in itself has
an ethical value,
cannot, in any case, prevail over fundamental human rights and the respect which
is due to all the members of
the human family.
2.2 The human embryo, whatever the moral or legal status conferred upon it in the different European cultures and ethical approaches, deserves legal protection. Even if taking into account the continuity of human life, this protection ought to be reinforced as the embryo and the fetus develop.
2.3 The Treaty on European Union, which does not foresee
legislative competence in the fields of research and medicine,
implies that such
protection falls within the competence of national legislation (as is the case
for medically assisted procreation
and voluntary
interruption of pregnancy).
However, Community authorities should be concerned with ethical questions
resulting from
medical practice or research dealing with early human
development.
2.4 However, when doing so, the said Community authorities have to address these ethical questions taking into account the moral and philosophical differences, reflected by the extreme diversity of legal rules applicable to human embryo research, in the 15 Member States. It is not only legally difficult to seek harmonisation of national laws at Community level, but because of lack of consensus, it would be inappropriate to impose one exclusive moral code.
2.5 The respect for different philosophical, moral or legal approaches and for diverse national culture is essential to the building of Europe.
From an ethical point of view,
the multicultural character of European
society requires mutual tolerance to be shown by the citizens
and political
figures of the European Nation States that have chosen uniquely to tie their
destiny together, while at the same
time ensuring mutual respect for different
historical traditions which are exceedingly strong.
From a legal point of view,
this multiculturalism is based upon Article 6 of
the Amsterdam Treaty (ex Article F of the Treaty on
European Union) which
recognises fundamental rights at Union level notably based on
‘constitutional traditions common to
the Member States’. It also
declares that ‘the Union shall respect the national identity of its Member
States’.
2.6 It results from the aforementioned principles, that, in the scope of European research programmes, the question of research on the human embryo has to be approached, not only with regard to the respect for fundamental ethical principles, common to all Member States, but equally taking into consideration diverse philosophical and ethical conceptions, expressed through the practices and the national regulations in force in this field. ...”
IV. COMPARATIVE LAW
41. In the majority of the member States of the Council of
Europe, the offence of unintentional homicide does not apply to the foetus.
However, three countries have chosen to create specific offences. In Italy a
person negligently causing a pregnancy to terminate
is liable to a prison
sentence of between three months and two years under section 17 of the Abortion
Act of 22 May 1978. In Spain
Article 157 of the Criminal Code makes it a
criminal offence to cause damage to the foetus and Article 146 an offence to
cause
an abortion through gross negligence. In Turkey Article 456 of the
Criminal Code lays down that a person who causes damage to another
shall be
liable to a prison sentence of between six months and one year; if the victim
is
a pregnant woman and the damage results
in premature birth, the Criminal Code
prescribes a sentence of between two and five years’ imprisonment.
THE LAW
I. ADMISSIBILITY OF THE APPLICATION
42. The Government’s main submission was that the application was incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention in that Article 2 of the Convention did not apply to the unborn child. They further submitted that the applicant had had a legal remedy capable of redressing her complaint, namely an action for damages against the hospital in the administrative courts. Accordingly, she had not exhausted domestic remedies as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. In the alternative, they considered that the application should be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded.
43. The applicant complained of the lack of protection of the unborn child under French criminal law and argued that the State had failed to discharge its obligations under Article 2 of the Convention by not allowing the offence of unintentional homicide to cover injury to an unborn child. She further submitted that the remedy available in the administrative courts was ineffective as it was incapable of securing judicial acknowledgment of the homicide of her child as such. Lastly, the applicant asserted that she had had a choice between instituting criminal and administrative proceedings and that, while her recourse to the criminal courts had, unforeseeably, proved unsuccessful, the possibility of applying to the administrative courts had in the meantime become statute-barred.
44. The Court observes that an examination of the application
raises the issue whether Article 2 of the Convention is
applicable to the
involuntary termination of pregnancy and, if so, whether that provision required
a criminal remedy to be available
in the circumstances of the case or whether
its requirements were satisfied by the possibility of an action for damages in
the
administrative courts. Considered in those terms, the objections that the
application is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions
of the Convention and of a failure to exhaust domestic remedies are very
closely
linked to the substance of
the applicant’s complaint under Article 2 of
the Convention. Consequently, the Court considers it appropriate to join them
to
the merits (see, among other authorities, Airey
v.
Ireland, judgment of
9 October 1979, Series A no. 32, p. 11, § 19).
45. The application cannot therefore be declared inadmissible either as being incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention or for failure to exhaust domestic remedies within the meaning of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. The Court further considers that the application raises issues of fact and law which require examination on the merits. It accordingly concludes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded. Having also established that no other obstacle to its admissibility exists, the Court declares it admissible.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION
OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE CONVENTION
46. The applicant complained of the authorities’ refusal to classify the taking of her unborn child’s life as unintentional homicide. She argued that the absence of criminal legislation to prevent and punish such an act breached Article 2 of the Convention, which provides:
“1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.
2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this Article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary:
(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence;
(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained;
(c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.”
A. The parties’ submissions
1. The applicant
47. The applicant asserted that the point at which life began had a universal meaning and definition. Even though that was in the nature of things, it was now scientifically proven that all life began at fertilisation. That was an experimental finding. A child that had been conceived but not yet born was neither a cluster of cells nor an object, but a person. Otherwise, it would have to be concluded that in the instant case she had not lost anything. Such an argument was unacceptable for a pregnant woman. Accordingly, the term “everyone” (“toute personne”) in Article 2 of the Convention was to be taken to mean human beings rather than individuals with the attributes of legal personality. Indeed, that had been the position taken by the Conseil d’Etat and the Court of Cassation, which, having agreed to review the compatibility of the Termination of Pregnancy Act with Article 2, had been compelled to accept that, from the first moments of its life in the womb, the unborn child came within the scope of that provision (Conseil d’Etat, full court, 21 December 1990, Recueil Lebon, p. 368; Criminal Division of the Court of Cassation, 27 November 1996, Bulletin criminel no. 431).
48. In the applicant’s submission, French law guaranteed all
human beings the right to life from conception, subject
to certain exceptions
provided for by law in the case of abortion. In that connection, she added that
all forms of abortion, with
the exception of therapeutic abortion, were
incompatible with Article 2 of the Convention on account of the interference
with the
right to life of the conceived child. Even if it were accepted that,
subject to certain conditions, States could allow women to
have an abortion if
they requested one, the Contracting States were not at liberty to exclude the
unborn child from the protection
of Article 2. A distinction should be made
between the rule and the exception. Section 1 of the Voluntary
Termination of
Pregnancy
Act 1975 (reproduced in Article 16 of the Civil Code and Article L.
2211-1 of the Public-Health Code – see paragraph 28 above)
laid down the
rule, that of respect for every human being from the beginning of its life, and
subsequently provided for an exception
in case of necessity and in accordance
with conditions defined by law. The legislature had also implicitly accepted
that life began
at the moment of conception by laying down a number of rules
protecting the embryo in
vitro
in the Bioethics Laws of 29 July 1994 (see
paragraph 34 above). Accordingly, although death could in exceptional cases
prevail
over life, life remained the fundamental
value
protected by the
Convention. The exception should not rule out the possibility of
punishing a
third party who, through negligence, caused an unborn child to die. The
mother’s wishes could not be equated
with negligence on the part of a
third party. The Court could therefore
validly
hold that the Contracting
Parties’ legislation
should ensure the protection of the conceived child
by making unintentional homicide of it a criminal offence, even if their
legislation
also permitted abortion.
49. The applicant pointed out that, as the Court had held, States
had “a primary duty ... to secure the right to
life by putting in place
effective criminal-law provisions to deter the commission of offences against
the person, backed up by
law-enforcement machinery for the prevention,
suppression and punishment of breaches of such provisions” (see
Kiliç v. Turkey,
no. 22492/93, § 62, ECHR 2000-III, and
Mahmut Kaya
v.
Turkey, no. 22535/93, § 85, ECHR 2000-III). In her
submission, the new line of case-law adopted by the Court in the Calvelli and
Ciglio
v.
Italy judgment ([GC], no. 32967/96, § 51, ECHR
2002-I), to the effect that where the right to life had been infringed
unintentionally,
the judicial system did not necessarily require the provision
of a criminal-law remedy, could not be followed in the instant case,
because a
civil remedy did not “satisfy the requirement of expressing public
disapproval of a serious offence, such as the
taking of life” (partly
dissenting opinion of Judge Rozakis joined by Judges Bonello and
Strážnická in Calvelli and Ciglio, cited above). That
would amount to debasing the right to life protected by Article 2. The applicant
therefore considered that
creating the offence of involuntary termination of
pregnancy would fill the
vacuum
created by the Court of Cassation and would
compensate for the State’s failure to fulfil its duty to protect the human
being at the earliest stages of its development
(see paragraph 32 above).
50. The applicant argued that she had had the option of
instituting criminal or administrative proceedings and had been
able to choose
between the two types of court. She explained that she had chosen to bring
criminal proceedings because, firstly,
they were the only remedy capable of
securing judicial acknowledgment of the unintentional homicide of her child as
such and, secondly,
because a criminal investigation aided in the task of
establishing responsibility. In her submission, there had been nothing to
suggest that the criminal proceedings were bound to fail, as the position
adopted by the Court of Cassation in her case in 1999
and subsequently confirmed
in 2001 and 2002 had by no means been definitively established, in view
of the
resistance shown in decisions
by courts of appeal and the
virtually
unanimous
criticism by legal writers (see paragraph 31 above). For example, in a judgment
of 3 February 2000 (Reims Court of Appeal, Dalloz 2000, case-law, p. 873)
the Court of Appeal had convicted a motorist of unintentional homicide for
driving into another
vehicle,
seriously injuring the driver, who was eight
months pregnant, and subsequently causing the death of the baby (see also
Versailles
Court of Appeal, 19 January 2000, unreported). The applicant
submitted in conclusion that, on the face of it, she had had no reason
to apply
to the administrative courts and contended that she could not have known whether
to do so until Dr G. had been acquitted
by the Criminal Court. However, by that
time an action against the administrative authorities had already become
statute-barred.
The remedy in the administrative courts could therefore not be
regarded as effective within the meaning of Article 35 § 1 of
the
Convention.
2. The Government
51. After emphasising that neither metaphysics nor medicine had
given a definitive answer to the question whether and
from what moment a foetus
was a human being, the Government asserted that from a legal standpoint, Article
2 of the Convention
did not protect the foetus’s right to life as a
person. The use of the term “everyone” (“toute
personne”) in Article 2 and in Articles 5, 6, 8 to 11 and 13 of the
Convention was such that it could apply only postnatally (X v.
the United
Kingdom, no. 8416/79, Commission decision of 13 May 1980, Decisions and
Reports (DR) 19, p. 244). The same observation applied to Article
2 taken
separately, as the restrictions on “everyone’s” right to life
provided for in paragraph 2 all concerned,
by their
very
nature, persons who had
already been born.
52. Nor could the “right to life” referred to in the
same Article be construed as applying to the foetus;
it concerned only the life
of persons who had already been born alive, since it would be neither consistent
nor justified to detach
that right from the entity in which it was vested,
namely the person. Whereas, by contrast, Article 4 § 1 of the 1969 American
Convention on Human Rights provided: “Every person has the right to have
his life respected. This right shall be protected
by law and, in general, from
the moment of conception”, the signatories to the Convention would not
have envisaged such an
extension of Article 2 of the Convention since by 1950
virtually
all the Contracting Parties had already authorised abortion in
certain
circumstances. To acknowledge that the foetus had the right to life within the
meaning of Article 2 would place the mother’s
life and that of the foetus
on an equal footing. Furthermore, prioritising the protection of the
foetus’s life or restricting
it solely in the event of a severe, immediate
and insurmountable risk to the mother’s life would constitute a step
backwards
historically and socially and would call into question the legislation
in force in many States Parties to the Convention.
53. The Government pointed out that the Commission had considered
whether it was appropriate to recognise the foetus as
having the right to life
subject to certain restrictions relating to the protection of the mother’s
life and health (see
X. v.
the United Kingdom, cited above). They
submitted that such a limitation would not allow recourse to abortion for
therapeutic, moral or social reasons,
which at the time when the text of the
Convention was being negotiated had nonetheless already been authorised by the
legislation
of a number of countries. It would amount to penalising States that
had opted for the right to abortion as an expression and application
of a
woman’s autonomy over her own body and her right to control her maternity.
The States Parties had not intended to confer
on the expression “right to
life” a meaning that extended to the foetus and was manifestly contrary to
their domestic
legislation.
54. Having regard to the foregoing, the Government considered that
the Convention was not designed to cover the foetus
and that if the European
States wished to ensure effective protection of the foetus’s right to
life, a provision separate
from Article 2 would have to be drawn up. To construe
Article 2 as allowing implicit exceptions to the right to life would be at
variance
with both the letter and the spirit of that Article. Firstly, the
permissible exceptions formed an exhaustive list, there
being no other option
where such a fundamental right was concerned; here, the Government referred to
the Pretty case in which the Court had stated: “[Article 2] sets
out the limited circumstances when deprivation of life may be justified”
(Pretty
v.
the United Kingdom, no. 2346/02, § 37, ECHR 2002-III).
Secondly, the exceptions were to be understood and construed strictly
(Öcalan
v.
Turkey, no. 46221/99, § 201, 12 March 2003).
55. The Government observed that in the instant case the applicant
had undergone a therapeutic abortion as a result of
acts carried out by the
doctor outside the statutory period within which abortion was permitted, which
had been ten weeks at the
time and was now twelve weeks (see paragraphs 27-28
above). However, if the Court were to take the view
that that factor rendered
Article 2 applicable, and that the foetus should therefore be regarded as a
person protected by that provision, they pointed out
that in several European
States the statutory period for abortion was more than twenty weeks, for example
in the Netherlands or
in England (where abortions could be carried out at up to
twenty-four weeks). Unless domestic legislation and the national
authorities’
margin of appreciation in this sphere were to be called into
question, Article 2 could consequently not apply to the unborn child.
That also
meant, in the Government’s submission, that the issue of the
viability
of
the foetus was irrelevant in the instant
case. It would be paradoxical for
States to have a margin of appreciation allowing them to exclude the foetus from
protection under
Article 2 where a pregnancy was terminated intentionally with
the mother’s consent – and sometimes on that condition
alone –
if they were not granted the same margin of appreciation in excluding the foetus
from the scope of that provision
where a pregnancy was interrupted on account of
unintentional negligence.
56. In the alternative, the Government pointed out that in French law the foetus was protected indirectly through the pregnant woman’s body, of which it was an extension. That was the case where abortion was carried out intentionally but not in one of the cases exhaustively listed in the relevant legislation (Article 223-10 of the Criminal Code – see paragraph 25 above) or in the event of an accident. In the latter case, the ordinary remedies for establishing civil liability could be used, and the mother could be awarded compensation for personal, pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage, her pregnant state being necessarily taken into account. Furthermore, under the criminal law, anyone who through inadvertence caused a pregnancy to be terminated could be prosecuted for causing unintentional injury, the destruction of the foetus being regarded as damage to the woman’s organs.
57. The Government argued that the applicant could have sought
damages from the hospital for the doctor’s negligence
within the four-year
limitation period for actions for damages in the administrative courts. They
explained that victims
of damage
caused by public servants had two distinct
remedies available. If the damage resulted from personal negligence on the part
of the
public servant, not intrinsically connected with the performance of his
or her duties, the
victim
could obtain compensation by suing
the person
concerned in the ordinary courts, whereas if the damage resulted from negligence
that disclosed failings on the part
of the authority in question, the matter
would be classified as official negligence within the jurisdiction of the
administrative
courts. The Government submitted that in the
V.
judgment
of 10 April 1992, the Conseil d’Etat had abandoned its position
that a hospital department could incur liability only in cases of gross
negligence. Furthermore, an exception to the rule that the hospital was
liable in the event of medical negligence occurred where negligence
was deemed
to be severable from the public service, either because it was purely personal
and thus wholly unrelated to the performance
of official duties – which
had not been the case in this instance – or because it was intentional or
exceptionally
serious, amounting to inexcusable professional misconduct of such
gravity that it ceased to be regarded as indissociable from the
performance of
the official duties in question. The Government explained that personal and
official negligence were in fact usually
interlinked, particularly in cases of
unintentional injury or homicide. For that reason, the Conseil
d’Etat had accepted long ago that the personal liability of a public
servant did not exclude of the liability of the authority to which
he or she was
attached (Lemonnier judgment, 1918). The Government therefore considered
that the applicant had had the possibility of seeking redress in the
administrative
courts as soon as the damage had occurred, without having to wait
for the criminal proceedings to end. Such an action would have
been all the more
likely to succeed as for the hospital to be held liable only ordinary negligence
had to be made out, and the
expert reports ordered by the courts had referred
precisely to the hospital department’s organisational problems. The
administrative
courts could therefore legitimately have been expected to reach
the same conclusion.
58. The Government asserted that that remedy had been effective and adequate in terms of the positive obligations under Article 2 of the Convention (see Calvelli and Ciglio, cited above) and that the applicant had, through her own inaction or negligence, deprived herself of a remedy which had nonetheless been available to her for four years from the time when the damage had occurred, and in respect of which she could have received advice from her lawyers. In the Calvelli and Ciglio case there had been no doubt that Article 2 of the Convention was applicable to a newborn child. In the instant case, in which the applicability of Article 2 was questionable, there were therefore additional reasons for considering that the possibility of using civil or administrative remedies to establish liability was sufficient. In the Government’s submission, such an action for damages could have been based on the taking of the life of the child the applicant was carrying, since the relevant case-law of the administrative courts did not appear thus far to preclude the possibility of affording embryos protection under Article 2 of the Convention (Conseil d’Etat, full court, Confédération nationale des associations familiales catholiques and Others, judgment of 21 December 1990 – see paragraph 47 above). At the material time, in any event, the issue had not been clearly resolved by the Conseil d’Etat.
59. In conclusion, the Government considered that, even supposing that Article 2 was applicable in the instant case, that provision did not require the life of the foetus to be protected by the criminal law in the event of unintentional negligence, as was the position in many European countries.
B. Third-party interventions
(1) Center for Reproductive Rights
60. The Center for Reproductive Rights (CRR) submitted that unborn foetuses could not be treated as persons under the law and hence covered by Article 2 of the Convention because there was no legal basis for such an approach (i) and because granting them that status would interfere with women’s basic human rights (ii). Lastly, they argued that it would be inadvisable to extend rights to the foetus because the loss of a wanted foetus constituted an injury to the expectant mother (iii).
61. (i) The assertion that a foetus was a person ran counter to
the case-law of the Convention institutions, the legislation
of the member
States of the Council of Europe, international standards and the case-law of
courts throughout the world. Relying
on the decisions of X v.
the United
Kingdom (Commission decision cited above), H.
v.
Norway (no.
17004/90, Commission decision of 19 May 1992, DR 73, p. 155) and, most recently,
Boso
v.
Italy (no. 50490/99, ECHR 2002-
VII),
in which the Commission and
the Court had held that granting a foetus the same rights as a person
would
place unreasonable limitations on the Article 2 rights of persons already born,
the CRR saw no reason to depart from that
conclusion unless the right to
abortion in all Council of Europe member States were to be called into
question.
62. The foetus was not recognised as a person in European domestic
legislation or by the national courts in interpreting
it. The CRR drew attention
to the Court of Cassation’s settled position (see paragraph 29 above),
which was consistent with
the distinction made in French law between the
concepts of “human being” and “person”, the former being
a biological concept and the latter a legal term attached to a legal category
whose rights took effect and were perfected at birth,
although in certain
circumstances the rights acquired at birth were retroactive to conception. The
national courts had also addressed
the issue of the legal status of the person
in the context of abortion. For example, the Austrian and Netherlands
Constitutional
Courts had held that Article 2 should not be interpreted as
protecting the unborn child, and the French Constitutional Council had
found no
conflict between legislation on the voluntary
termination of pregnancy and the
constitutional protection of the child’s
right to health (decision no.
74-54 of 15 January 1975). That reading was consistent with the relevant
legislation throughout Europe:
thirty-nine member States of the Council of
Europe – the exceptions being Andorra, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Malta,
Poland
and San Marino, which had maintained severe restrictions on abortion
(with only
very
narrow therapeutic exceptions) – permitted
a woman to
terminate a pregnancy without restriction during the first trimester or on
very
broad therapeutic grounds.
63. With regard to international and regional standards, the CRR observed that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provided no indication that the right to life applied to a foetus. It added that the Human Rights Committee had routinely emphasised the threat to women’s lives posed by illegal abortions. The same was true of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the interpretation by the Committee on the Rights of the Child of Article 6, which provided: “Every child has the inherent right to life”. On several occasions the Committee had stated its concern about the difficulties of adolescent girls in having their pregnancies terminated in safe conditions and had expressed its fears as to the impact of punitive legislation on maternal mortality rates. The case-law of the Inter-American regional system, notwithstanding Article 4 of the American Convention on Human Rights (see paragraph 52 above), did not provide absolute protection to a foetus before birth. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights had held in the Baby Boy case (1981) that Article 4 did not preclude liberal national-level abortion legislation. Furthermore, the Organisation of African Unity had adopted the Protocol on the Rights of Women on 11 July 2003 to supplement the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights of 27 June 1981, broadening the protection of the right of women to terminate a pregnancy.
64. Lastly, with regard to non-European States, the CRR noted that
the Supreme Courts of Canada and the United States
had declined to treat unborn
foetuses as persons under the law (in the cases of Winnipeg Child Family
Services v.
G. (1997) and Roe
v.
Wade (1973)). The United States
Supreme Court had reaffirmed that position in a recent case in 2000 (Stenberg
v.
Carhart), in which it had declared unconstitutional a State law
prohibiting certain methods of abortion and providing no protection for
women’s health. Similarly, in South Africa, ruling on a constitutional
challenge to the recently enacted Choice on Termination
of Pregnancy Act, which
permitted abortion without restriction during the first trimester and on broad
grounds at later stages
of pregnancy, the High Court had considered that the
foetus was not a legal person (case of Christian Lawyers Association of South
Africa and Others
v.
Minister of Health and Others, 1998).
65. (ii) In the CRR’s submission, recognition of the
foetus’s rights interfered, in particular, with women’s
fundamental
right to a private life. In the case of Brüggemann and Scheuten v.
the
Federal Republic of Germany, no. 6959/75, Commission’s report of 12
July 1977, DR 10, p. 100), the Commission had implicitly accepted that an
absolute
prohibition on abortion would be an impermissible interference with
privacy rights under Article 8 of the Convention. Subsequently,
while rejecting
the suggestion that Article 2 protected the right to life of foetuses, the
Convention institutions had further
recognised that the right to respect for the
private life of the pregnant woman, as the person primarily concerned by the
pregnancy
and its continuation or termination, prevailed over the father’s
rights (see paragraph 61 above). In addition to respect for private life,
the preservation of the pregnant woman’s life and health took precedence.
In holding
that restrictions on the exchange of information on abortion created
a risk to the health of women whose pregnancies posed a threat
to their lives,
the Court had ruled that the injunction in question had been
“disproportionate to the aims pursued”
and that, consequently, a
woman’s health interest prevailed over a State’s declared moral
interest in protecting the
rights of a foetus (see Open Door and Dublin Well
Woman
v.
Ireland, judgment of 29 October 1992, Series A no. 246-A).
66. (iii) In the CRR’s submission, declining to recognise the foetus as a person under Article 2 did not preclude a remedy for injuries such as the one that had given rise to the instant case. The loss of a wanted foetus was an injury suffered by the expectant mother. Consequently, the rights that were entitled to protection in the instant case were those of the applicant and not those of the foetus she had lost. It was within the power of the legislature of every Council of Europe member State to recognise both civil and criminal offences committed by individuals who injured a woman by causing the termination of a wanted pregnancy.
(2) Family Planning Association
67. The Family Planning Association (FPA) set out primarily to argue that the right to life enshrined in Article 2 of the Convention should not be interpreted as extending to the unborn (i). In support of that argument, the FPA provided the Court with information on the current legal position on abortion in the member States of the Council of Europe (ii) and a summary of the legal status of the unborn in United Kingdom law (iii).
68. (i) The FPA pointed out that Article 2 was drafted in such a
way as to allow only very
limited exceptions to the prohibition
it imposed on
intentional deprivation of life.
Voluntary
termination of pregnancy was not one
of those exceptions; nor could any
of the exceptions be interpreted to include
that practice. Recent evidence showed that
voluntary
termination of pregnancy on
request
in the first trimester was now widely accepted across Europe, as was
termination on certain grounds in the second trimester. If
Article 2 were
interpreted as applying to the unborn from the moment of conception, as
contended by the applicant, the Court would
be calling into question the laws on
abortion enacted in most Contracting States. Furthermore, that would render
illegal the majority
of methods of contraception currently in use throughout
Europe, since they acted or could act after conception to prevent implantation.
There would therefore be devastating implications in terms of both individual
choices and lives and social policy. The English
High Court had recently
acknowledged that that would be the undesirable consequence if it were to accept
the argument of the Society
for the Protection of Unborn Children that emergency
hormonal contraceptives were abortifacients because pregnancy began at
conception
(see Society for the Protection of Unborn Children
v.
Secretary of
State for Health [2002] EWHC 610 (Admin)).
69. The possibility that Article 2 applied to the foetus but with
certain implied limitations, for example only after
a critical point in time
(viability
or some other gestational stage) should likewise be rejected. Recent
evidence showed that,
beyond the broad consensus identified above, there was a
complete lack of any generally accepted standard in relation to the gestational
limit on the availability of abortion, the grounds on which termination was
available after that point in time or the conditions
that had to be
satisfied.
70. (ii) Recent survey information was available
(Abortion Legislation in Europe, International Planned Parenthood
Federation (IPPF) European Network, July 2002, and Abortion Policies: a
Global Review, UN Population Division, June 2002) in relation to the legal
position on abortion in the Council of Europe member States with the
exception
of Serbia and Montenegro. The surveys showed that four States essentially
prohibited abortion, except where the pregnant
woman’s life was endangered
(Andorra, Liechtenstein, San Marino and Ireland), whereas the great majority of
member States
provided for much wider access to abortion services. Such evidence
of the availability of abortion across Europe was in keeping
with the general
trend towards the liberalisation of abortion laws. No general consensus emerged
from the practice of the member
States as to the period during which abortion
was permitted after the first trimester or the conditions that had to be
satisfied
for abortion to be available in the later stages of pregnancy.
Furthermore, the grounds on which abortion was permitted without
a time-limit
were many and varied.
The FPA accordingly contended that if Article 2 were
interpreted as applying to the unborn from
some particular point in time, that
would call into question the legal position in a number of States where
termination was available
on certain grounds at a later stage than that
determined by the Court.
71. (iii) It was now a settled general principle of the common law that in the United Kingdom legal personality crystallised upon birth. Up until that point, the unborn had no legal personality independent of the pregnant woman. However, despite that lack of legal personality, the interests of the unborn were often protected while they were in the womb, even though those interests could not be realised as enforceable rights until the attainment of legal personality on birth.
72. In the civil law, that specifically meant that prior to birth,
the unborn had no standing to bring proceedings for
compensation or other
judicial remedies in relation to any harm done or injury sustained while in the
womb, and that no claim could
be made on their behalf (see Paton v.
British
Pregnancy Advisory Service Trustees [1979] QB 276). Efforts had been made to
persuade the courts dealing with such cases that according to the law of
succession, the
unborn could be deemed to be “born” or
“persons in being” whenever their interests so demanded. However,
the Burton case confirmed that that principle was also subject to the
live birth of a child ([1993] QB 204, 227).
73. In the criminal law, it was well established that the unborn
were not treated as legal persons for the purpose of
the common-law rules of
murder or manslaughter. In Attorney-General’s Reference (no. 3,
1994), the House of Lords had concluded that the injury of the unborn
without a live birth could not lead to a conviction for murder,
manslaughter or
any other violent
crime. The rights of the unborn were further protected by the
criminal law on abortion. Sections
58 and 59 of the Offences against the Person
Act 1861 had introduced the statutory offences of procuring abortion and
procuring
the means to cause abortion. Similarly, by section 1 of the Infant
Life (Preservation) Act 1929 the destruction of the unborn, where
capable of
live birth, was a serious offence. Those Acts were still in effect. Abortion and
child destruction remained illegal,
subject to the application of the Abortion
Act 1967.
C. The Court’s assessment
74. The applicant complained that she had been unable to secure
the conviction of the doctor whose medical negligence
had caused her to have to
undergo a therapeutic abortion. It has not been disputed that she intended to
carry her pregnancy to
full term and that her child was in good health.
Following the material events, the applicant and her partner lodged a criminal
complaint, together with an application to join the proceedings as civil
parties, alleging unintentional injury to the applicant
and unintentional
homicide of the child she was carrying. The courts held that the prosecution of
the offence of unintentional
injury to the applicant was statute-barred and,
quashing the Court of Appeal’s judgment on the second point, the Court of
Cassation held that, regard being had to the principle that the criminal law was
to be strictly construed, a foetus could not be
the victim
of unintentional
homicide. The central question raised by the application is whether the absence
of a criminal remedy
within the French legal system to punish the unintentional
destruction of a foetus constituted a failure on the part of the State
to
protect by law the right to life within the meaning of Article 2 of the
Convention.
1. Existing case-law
75. Unlike Article 4 of the American Convention on Human Rights, which provides that the right to life must be protected “in general, from the moment of conception”, Article 2 of the Convention is silent as to the temporal limitations of the right to life and, in particular, does not define “everyone” (“toute personne”) whose “life” is protected by the Convention. The Court has yet to determine the issue of the “beginning” of “everyone’s right to life” within the meaning of this provision and whether the unborn child has such a right.
To date it has been raised solely in connection with laws on abortion.
Abortion does not constitute one of the exceptions expressly
listed in paragraph
2 of Article 2 but the Commission has expressed the opinion that it is
compatible with the first sentence of
Article 2 § 1 in the interests of
protecting the mother’s life and health because “if one assumes that
this provision
applies at the initial stage of the pregnancy, the abortion is
covered by an implied limitation, protecting the life and health
of the woman at
that stage, of the ‘right to life’ of the foetus” (see X v.
the United Kingdom, Commission decision cited above, at p. 253).
76. Having initially refused to examine in abstracto the
compatibility of abortion laws with Article 2 of the Convention (see X v.
Norway, no. 867/60, Commission decision of 29 May 1961, Collection of
Decisions 6, p. 34, and X
v.
Austria, no. 7045/75, Commission
decision of 10 December 1976, DR 7, p. 87), the Commission acknowledged in
the case of Brüggemann and Scheuten
v.
the Federal Republic of
Germany (cited above) that women complaining under Article 8 of the
Convention about the Constitutional Court’s decision restricting
the
availability of abortions had standing as
victims.
It stated on that occasion:
“... pregnancy cannot be said to pertain
uniquely to the sphere of private
life. Whenever a woman is pregnant her private life becomes closely connected
with the developing
foetus” (ibid., at p. 116, § 59). However, the
Commission did not find it “necessary to decide, in this context,
whether
the unborn child is to be considered as ‘life’ in the sense of
Article 2 of the Convention, or whether it could
be regarded as an entity which
under Article 8 § 2 could justify an interference ‘for the protection
of others’”
(ibid., at p. 116, § 60). It expressed the opinion
that there had been no
violation
of Article 8 of the Convention because
“not every regulation of the termination of unwanted pregnancies
constitutes an interference with the right to respect for
the private life of
the mother” (ibid., at pp. 116-17, § 61), while emphasising:
“There is no evidence that it
was the intention of the Parties to the
Convention to bind themselves in favour of any particular solution”
(ibid., at pp.
117-18, § 64).
77. In the X v.
the United Kingdom decision cited above the
Commission considered an application by a man complaining that his wife had been
allowed to have an abortion
on health grounds. While it accepted that the
potential father could be regarded as the “
victim”
of a
violation
of
the right to life, it considered that the term “everyone” in several
Articles of the Convention could not apply prenatally,
but observed that
“such application in a rare case – e.g. under Article 6, paragraph 1
– cannot be excluded”
(see X
v.
the United Kingdom, cited
above, at p. 259, § 7; for such an application in connection with access to
a court, see Reeve
v.
the United Kingdom, no. 24844/94, Commission
decision of 30 November 1994, DR 79-A, p. 146). The Commission added that
the general usage
of the term “everyone” (“toute
personne”) and the context in which it was used in Article 2 of the
Convention did not include the unborn. As to the term “life”
and, in
particular, the beginning of life, the Commission noted a “divergence of
thinking on the question of where life begins”
and added: “While
some believe that it starts already with conception, others tend to focus upon
the moment of nidation,
upon the point that the foetus becomes
‘
viable’,
or upon live birth” (see X
v.
the United
Kingdom, cited above, at p. 250, § 12).
The Commission went on to examine whether Article 2 was “to be
interpreted: as not covering the foetus at all; as recognising
a ‘right to
life’ of the foetus with certain implied limitations; or as recognising an
absolute ‘right to life’
of the foetus”. Although it did not
express an opinion on the first two options, it categorically ruled out the
third interpretation,
having regard to the need to protect the mother’s
life, which was indissociable from that of the unborn child: “The
‘life’ of the foetus is intimately connected with, and it cannot be
regarded in isolation of, the life of the pregnant
woman. If Article 2 were held
to cover the foetus and its protection under this Article were, in the absence
of any express limitation,
seen as absolute, an abortion would have to be
considered as prohibited even where the continuance of the pregnancy would
involve
a serious risk to the life of the pregnant woman. This would mean that
the ‘unborn life’ of the foetus would be regarded
as being of a
higher value
than the life of the pregnant woman” (ibid., at p. 252,
§ 19). The Commission adopted that
solution, noting that by 1950
practically all the Contracting Parties had “permitted abortion when
necessary to save the
life of the mother” and that in the meantime the
national law on termination of pregnancy had “shown a tendency towards
further liberalisation” (ibid., at p. 252, § 20).
78. In the case of H. v.
Norway, concerning an abortion
carried out on non-medical grounds against the father’s wishes, the
Commission added that Article
2 required the State not only to refrain from
taking a person’s life intentionally but also to take appropriate steps to
safeguard life (see H.
v.
Norway, cited above, at p. 167). It considered
that it did not have to decide “whether the foetus may enjoy a certain
protection
under Article 2, first sentence”, but did not exclude the
possibility that “in certain circumstances this may be the
case
notwithstanding that there is in the Contracting States a considerable
divergence of
views
on whether or to what extent Article
2 protects the unborn
life” (ibid.). It further noted that in such a delicate area the
Contracting States had to have a certain
discretion, and concluded that the
mother’s decision, taken in accordance with Norwegian legislation, had not
exceeded that
discretion (ibid., p. 168).
79. The Court has only rarely had occasion to consider the
application of Article 2 to the foetus. In the case of Open Door and Dublin
Well Woman (previously cited judgment) the Irish Government relied on the
protection of the life of the unborn child to justify their legislation
prohibiting the provision of information concerning abortion facilities abroad.
The only issue that was resolved was whether the
restrictions on the freedom to
receive and impart the information in question had been necessary in a
democratic society, within
the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 10 of the
Convention, to pursue the “legitimate aim of the protection of morals of
which the protection in Ireland of the right to life of the unborn is one
aspect” (see Open Door and Dublin Well Woman, cited above, pp.
27-28, § 63), since the Court did not consider it relevant to
determine “whether a right to abortion
is guaranteed under the Convention
or whether the foetus is encompassed by the right to life as contained in
Article 2” (ibid.,
p. 28, § 66). Recently, in circumstances
similar to those in the above-mentioned case of H. v.
Norway, where a
woman had decided to terminate her pregnancy against the father’s wishes,
the Court held that it was not required
to determine “whether the foetus
may qualify for protection under the first sentence of Article 2 as interpreted
[in the
case-law relating to the positive obligation to protect life]”,
and continued: “Even supposing that, in certain circumstances,
the foetus
might be considered to have rights protected by Article 2 of the Convention, ...
in the instant case ... [the] pregnancy
was terminated in conformity with
section 5 of Law no. 194 of 1978” – a law which struck a fair
balance between the
woman’s interests and the need to ensure protection of
the foetus (see Boso
v.
Italy (dec.), no. 50490/99, ECHR 2002-
VII).
80. It follows from this recapitulation of the case-law that in
the circumstances examined to date by the Convention institutions
– that
is, in the various
laws on abortion – the unborn child is not regarded as
a “person” directly protected
by Article 2 of the Convention and
that if the unborn do have a “right” to “life”, it is
implicitly limited
by the mother’s rights and interests. The Convention
institutions have not, however, ruled out the possibility that in certain
circumstances safeguards may be extended to the unborn child. That is what
appears to have been contemplated by the Commission
in considering that
“Article 8 § 1 cannot be interpreted as meaning that pregnancy and
its termination are, as a principle,
solely a matter of the private life of the
mother” (see Brüggeman and Scheuten, cited above, at pp.
116-17, § 61) and by the Court in the above-mentioned Boso decision.
It is also clear from an examination of these cases that the issue has always
been determined by weighing up
various,
and sometimes conflicting, rights or
freedoms claimed by a woman, a mother or a father in relation to one another or
vis-à-vis
an unborn child.
2. Approach in the instant case
81. The special nature of the instant case raises a new issue. The
Court is faced with a woman who intended to carry her
pregnancy to term and
whose unborn child was expected to be viable,
at the
very
least in good health.
Her pregnancy had to be terminated
as a result of an error by a doctor and she
therefore had to have a therapeutic abortion on account of negligence by a third
party.
The issue is consequently whether, apart from cases where the mother has
requested an abortion, harming a foetus should be treated
as a criminal offence
in the light of Article 2 of the Convention, with a
view
to protecting the
foetus under that Article. This
requires a preliminary examination of whether it
is advisable for the Court to intervene in the debate as to who is a person and
when life begins, in so far as Article 2 provides that the law must protect
“everyone’s right to life”.
82. As is apparent from the above recapitulation of the case-law,
the interpretation of Article 2 in this connection has
been informed by a clear
desire to strike a balance, and the Convention institutions’ position in
relation to the legal,
medical, philosophical, ethical or religious dimensions
of defining the human being has taken into account the various
approaches
to the
matter at national level. This has been reflected in the consideration given to
the diversity of
views
on the point at which
life begins, of legal cultures and
of national standards of protection, and the State has been left with
considerable discretion
in the matter, as the opinion of the European Group on
Ethics at Community level appositely puts it: “the ... Community
authorities
have to address these ethical questions taking into account the
moral and philosophical differences, reflected by the extreme diversity
of legal
rules applicable to human embryo research... It is not only legally difficult to
seek harmonisation of national laws at
Community level, but because of lack of
consensus, it would be inappropriate to impose one exclusive moral code”
(see paragraph
40 above).
It follows that the issue of when the right to life begins comes within the
margin of appreciation which the Court generally considers
that States should
enjoy in this sphere, notwithstanding an evolutive interpretation of the
Convention, a “living instrument
which must be interpreted in the light of
present-day conditions” (see Tyrer v.
the United Kingdom, judgment
of 25 April 1978, Series A no. 26, pp. 15-16, § 31, and subsequent
case-law). The reasons for that conclusion are,
firstly, that the issue of such
protection has not been resolved within the majority of the Contracting States
themselves, in
France
in particular, where it is the subject of debate (see
paragraph 83 below) and, secondly, that there is no European consensus on
the
scientific and legal definition of the beginning of life (see paragraph 84
below).
83. The Court observes that the French Court of Cassation, in
three successive judgments delivered in 1999, 2001 and 2002
(see paragraphs 22
and 29 above), considered that the rule that offences and punishment must be
defined by law, which required
criminal statutes to be construed strictly,
excluded acts causing a fatal injury to a foetus from the scope of
Article 221-6
of the Criminal Code, under which unintentional homicide of
“another” is an offence. However, if, as a result of unintentional
negligence, the mother gives birth to a live child who dies shortly after being
born, the person responsible may be convicted of
the unintentional homicide of
the child (see paragraph 30 above). The first-mentioned approach, which
conflicts with that of several
courts of appeal (see paragraphs 21 and 50
above), was interpreted as an invitation to the legislature to fill a legal
vacuum.
That was also the position of the Criminal Court in the instant case:
“The court ... cannot create law on an issue which [the
legislature has]
not yet succeeded in defining.” The French parliament attempted such a
definition in proposing to create
the offence of involuntary termination of
pregnancy (see paragraph 32 above), but the Bill containing that proposal was
lost, on
account of the fears and uncertainties that the creation of the offence
might arouse as to the determination of when life began,
and the disadvantages
of the proposal, which were thought to outweigh its advantages (see paragraph 33
above). The Court further
notes that alongside the Court of Cassation’s
repeated rulings that Article 221-6 of the Criminal Code does not apply to
foetuses, the French parliament is currently revising the 1994 bioethics laws,
which added provisions to the Criminal Code on the
protection of the human
embryo (see paragraph 25 above) and required re-examination in the light of
scientific and technological
progress (see paragraph 34 above). It is
clear from this overview that in
France,
the nature and legal status of the
embryo and/or the foetus are currently not defined
and that the manner in which
it is to be protected will be determined by
very
varied
forces within French
society.
84. At European level, the Court observes that there is no
consensus on the nature and status of the embryo and/or foetus
(see paragraphs
39 and 40 above), although they are beginning to receive some protection in the
light of scientific progress and
the potential consequences of research into
genetic engineering, medically assisted procreation or embryo experimentation.
At best,
it may be regarded as common ground between States that the
embryo/foetus belongs to the human race. The potentiality of that being
and its
capacity to become a person – enjoying protection under the civil law,
moreover, in many States, such as France,
in the context of inheritance and
gifts, and also in the United Kingdom (see paragraph 72 above) – require
protection in
the name of human dignity, without making it a
“person” with the “right to life” for the purposes of
Article
2. The Oviedo Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, indeed, is
careful not to give a definition of the term “everyone”
and its
explanatory report indicates that, in the absence of a unanimous agreement on
the definition, the member States decided
to allow domestic law to provide
clarifications for the purposes of the application of that Convention (see
paragraph 36 above).
The same is true of the Additional Protocol on the
Prohibition of Cloning Human Beings and the draft Additional Protocol on
Biomedical
Research, which do not define the concept of “human
being” (see paragraphs 37 and 38 above). It is worth noting that
the Court
may be requested under Article 29 of the Oviedo Convention to give advisory
opinions on the interpretation of that instrument.
85. Having regard to the foregoing, the Court is convinced that it
is neither desirable, nor even possible as matters
stand, to answer in the
abstract the question whether the unborn child is a person for the purposes of
Article 2 of the Convention
(“personne” in the French text).
As to the instant case, it considers it unnecessary to examine whether the
abrupt end to the applicant’s
pregnancy falls within the scope of Article
2, seeing that, even assuming that that provision was applicable, there was no
failure
on the part of the respondent State to comply with the requirements
relating to the preservation of life in the public-health sphere.
With regard to
that issue, the Court has considered whether the legal protection afforded the
applicant by France
in respect of
the loss of the unborn child she was carrying
satisfied the procedural requirements inherent in Article 2 of the
Convention.
86. In that connection, it observes that the unborn child’s lack of a clear legal status does not necessarily deprive it of all protection under French law. However, in the circumstances of the present case, the life of the foetus was intimately connected with that of the mother and could be protected through her, especially as there was no conflict between the rights of the mother and the father or of the unborn child and the parents, the loss of the foetus having been caused by the unintentional negligence of a third party.
87. In the aforementioned Boso v.
Italy decision, the
Court said that even supposing that the foetus might be considered to have
rights protected by Article 2 of the Convention
(see paragraph 79 above),
Italian law on the
voluntary
termination of pregnancy struck a fair balance
between the woman’s
interests and the need to ensure protection of the
unborn child. In the present case, the dispute concerns the involuntary killing
of an unborn child against the mother’s wishes, causing her particular
suffering. The interests of the mother and the child
clearly coincided. The
Court must therefore examine, from the standpoint of the effectiveness of
existing remedies, the protection
which the applicant was afforded in seeking to
establish the liability of the doctor concerned for the loss of her child in
utero and to obtain compensation for the abortion she had to undergo. The
applicant argued that only a criminal remedy would have been
capable of
satisfying the requirements of Article 2 of the Convention. The Court does not
share that
view,
for the following reasons.
88. The Court reiterates that the first sentence of Article 2,
which ranks as one of the most fundamental provisions in
the Convention and also
enshrines one of the basic values
of the democratic societies making up the
Council of Europe (see McCann and Others
v.
the United Kingdom, judgment
of 27 September 1995, Series A no. 324, pp. 45-46, § 147), requires the
State not only to refrain from the “intentional”
taking of life, but
also to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its
jurisdiction (see, for example, L.C.B.
v.
the United Kingdom, judgment of
9 June 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-III, p. 1403,
§ 36).
89. Those principles apply in the public-health sphere too. The
positive obligations require States to make regulations
compelling hospitals,
whether private or public, to adopt appropriate measures for the protection of
patients’ lives. They
also require an effective independent judicial
system to be set up so that the cause of death of patients in the care of the
medical
profession, whether in the public or the private sector, can be
determined and those responsible made accountable (see Powell v.
the United
Kingdom (dec.), no. 45305/99, ECHR 2000-
V,
and Calvelli and
Ciglio, cited above, § 49).
90. Although the right to have third parties prosecuted or
sentenced for a criminal offence cannot be asserted independently
(see Perez
v.
France
[GC], no. 47287/99, § 70, ECHR
2004-
), the Court has stated
on a number of occasions that an effective judicial system, as
required by
Article 2, may, and under certain circumstances must, include recourse to the
criminal law. However, if the infringement
of the right to life or to physical
integrity is not caused intentionally, the positive obligation imposed by
Article 2 to set
up an effective judicial system does not necessarily require
the provision of a criminal-law remedy in every case. In the specific
sphere of
medical negligence, “the obligation may for instance also be satisfied if
the legal system affords
victims
a remedy
in the civil courts, either alone or
in conjunction with a remedy in the criminal courts, enabling any liability of
the doctors
concerned to be established and any appropriate civil redress, such
as an order for damages and for the publication of the decision,
to be obtained.
Disciplinary measures may also be envisaged” (see Calvelli and
Ciglio, cited above, § 51; Lazzarini and Ghiacci
v.
Italy
(dec.), no. 53749/00, 7 November 2002; and Mastromatteo
v.
Italy
[GC], no. 37703/97, § 90, ECHR 2002-
VIII).
91. In the instant case, in addition to the criminal proceedings
which the applicant instituted against the doctor for
unintentionally causing
her injury – which, admittedly, were terminated because the offence
was covered by an amnesty,
a fact that did not give rise to any complaint on her
part – she had the possibility of bringing an action for damages against
the authorities on account of the doctor’s alleged negligence (see
Kress v.
France
[GC], no. 39594/98, §§ 14 et seq., ECHR
2001-
VI).
Had she done so, the applicant would have been entitled to have an
adversarial
hearing on her allegations of negligence (see Powell, cited
above) and to obtain redress for any damage sustained. A claim for compensation
in the administrative courts would have
had fair prospects of success and the
applicant could have obtained damages from the hospital. That is apparent from
the findings
clearly set out in the expert reports (see paragraph 16 above) in
1992 – before the action had become statute-barred –
concerning the
poor organisation of the hospital department in question and the serious
negligence on the doctor’s part,
which nonetheless, in the Court of
Appeal’s opinion (see paragraph 21 above), did not reflect a total
disregard for the most
fundamental principles and duties of his profession such
as to render him personally liable.
92. The applicant’s submission concerning the fact that the
action for damages in the administrative courts was
statute-barred cannot
succeed in the Court’s view.
In this connection, it refers to its
case-law to the effect that the “right to a court”, of which the
right of access
is one aspect, is not absolute; it is subject to limitations
permitted by implication, in particular where the conditions of admissibility
of
an appeal are concerned, since by its
very
nature it calls for regulation by the
State, which enjoys a certain margin of appreciation
in this regard (see, among
other authorities, Brualla Gómez de la Torre
v.
Spain, judgment of
19 December 1997, Reports 1997-
VIII,
p. 2955, § 33). These
legitimate restrictions include the imposition of statutory limitation periods,
which, as
the Court has held in personal injury cases, “serve several
important purposes, namely to ensure legal certainty and finality,
protect
potential defendants from stale claims which might be difficult to counter and
prevent the injustice which might arise
if courts were required to decide upon
events which took place in the distant past on the basis of evidence which might
have become
unreliable and incomplete because of the passage of time” (see
Stubbings and Others
v.
the United Kingdom, judgment of 22 October 1996,
Reports 1996-IV, pp. 1502-03, § 51).
93. In the instant case, a four-year limitation period does not in
itself seem unduly short, particularly in view
of the
seriousness of the damage
suffered by the applicant and her immediate desire to prosecute the doctor.
However, the evidence indicates
that the applicant deliberately turned to the
criminal courts, apparently without ever being informed of the possibility of
applying
to the administrative courts. Admittedly, parliament recently extended
the time allowed to ten years under the Law of 4 March 2002
(see paragraph 28
above). It did so with a
view
to standardising limitation periods for actions
for damages in all courts, whether
administrative or ordinary. This enables the
general emergence of a system increasingly favourable to
victims
of medical
negligence
to be taken into account, an area in which the administrative courts
appear capable of striking an appropriate balance between consideration
of the
damage to be redressed and the excessive “judicialisation” of the
responsibilities of the medical profession.
The Court does not consider,
however, that these new rules can be said to imply that the previous period of
four years was too
short.
94. In conclusion, the Court considers that in the circumstances of the case, an action for damages in the administrative courts could be regarded as an effective remedy that was available to the applicant. Such an action, which she failed to use, would have enabled her to prove the medical negligence she alleged and to obtain full redress for the damage resulting from the doctor’s negligence, and there was therefore no need to institute criminal proceedings in the instant case.
95. The Court accordingly concludes that, even assuming that
Article 2 was applicable in the instant case (see paragraph
85 above), there has
been no violation
of Article 2 of the Convention.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT
1. Joins to the merits unanimously the Government’s preliminary objections of the application’s incompatibility ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention and of failure to exhaust domestic remedies, and dismisses them;
2. Declares unanimously the application admissible;
3. Holds by fourteen votes
to three that there has been no
violation
of Article 2 of the Convention.
Done in English and in French, and delivered at a public hearing in the Human
Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 8 July 2004.
Luzius WILDHABER
President
Paul MAHONEY
Registrar
In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 § 2 of the Rules of Court, the following separate opinions are annexed to this judgment:
(a) separate opinion of Mr Rozakis, joined by Mr Caflisch, Mr Fischbach, Mr Lorenzen and Mrs Thomassen;
(b) separate opinion of Mr Costa, joined by Mr Traja;
(c) dissenting opinion of Mr Ress;
(d) dissenting opinion of Mrs Mularoni joined by Mrs Strážnická.
L.W.
P.J.M.
SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE ROZAKIS, JOINED BY JUDGES CAFLISCH, FISCHBACH, LORENZEN
AND THOMASSEN
I have voted,
together with the majority of the Grand Chamber, in favour of
finding that there has been no
violation
of Article 2
in the instant case. Yet,
my approach differs in certain respects from that of the majority and I would
therefore like to append
to the judgment this separate opinion setting out the
points on which my assessment of the law is at
variance
with that of the
majority.
The Court in this case correctly stresses that research into French domestic
law shows that the nature and legal status of the embryo
and/or the foetus are
currently not defined in France
and that the manner in which it is to be
protected will ultimately be determined
by
very
varied
forces within French
society (paragraph 83, in fine). It also stresses (and this was a
forceful argument in the eyes of the Court) that at European level there is no
consensus on
the nature and status of the embryo and/or foetus and, at best,
“it may be regarded as common ground between States that the
embryo/foetus
belongs to the human race. The potentiality of that being and its capacity to
become a person – enjoying protection
under the civil law, moreover, in
many States, such as
France,
in the context of inheritance and gifts, and also
in the United
Kingdom – require protection in the name of human dignity,
without making it a ‘person’ with the ‘right
to life’
for the purposes of Article 2” (paragraph 84).
Despite these findings, with which I readily agree, the Court refuses to draw
the relevant conclusions, namely that in the present
state of development of
science, law and morals, both in France
and across Europe, the right to life of
the unborn child has yet
to be secured. Even if one accepts that life begins
before birth, that does not automatically and unconditionally confer on this
form of human life a right to life equivalent to the corresponding right of a
child after its birth. This does not mean that the
unborn child does not enjoy
any protection by human society, since – as the relevant legislation of
European States, and
European agreements and relevant documents show – the
unborn life is already considered to be worthy of protection. But as
I read the
relevant legal instruments, this protection, though afforded to a being
considered worthy of it, is, as stated above,
distinct from that given to a
child after birth, and far narrower in scope. It consequently transpires from
the present stage of
development of the law and morals in Europe that the life
of the unborn child, although protected in some of its attributes, cannot
be
equated to post-natal life, and, therefore, does not enjoy a right in the sense
of “a right to life”, as protected
by Article 2 of the Convention.
Hence, there is a problem of applicability of Article 2 in the circumstances of
the case.
Instead of reaching that unavoidable conclusion, as the very
reasoning of the
judgment dictated, the majority of the Grand Chamber
opted for a neutral stance,
declaring: “the Court is convinced that it is neither desirable, nor even
possible as matters
stand, to answer in the abstract the question whether the
unborn child is a person for the purposes of Article 2 of the Convention”
(paragraph 85).
What also seems problematic with the majority’s reasoning is that,
despite their obvious doubts or, at any rate, their reluctance
to accept that
Article 2 was applicable in this case, the majority ended up abandoning their
neutral stance and based their finding
of no violation
on the argument that the
procedural guarantees inherent in the protection of Article 2 had been satisfied
in the
circumstances of the case. By using the “even assuming”
formula as to the applicability of Article 2, and by linking
the life of the
foetus to the life of the mother (“the life of the foetus was intimately
connected with that of the mother
and could be protected through her...”
– see paragraph 86), the majority has surreptiously brought Article 2 of
the
Convention to the fore of the case. Yet, it is obvious from the case-law
that reliance on the procedural guarantees of Article 2
to determine whether or
not there has been a
violation
presupposes the prima facie applicability of that
Article (and using the
“even assuming” formula does not alter the
position if, in the end, the only real ground for the Court’s findings
is
the hypothesis referred to in the formula); and in the circumstances of the case
there was not even the remotest threat to the
mother’s right of life such
as would justify bringing the procedural guarantees of Article 2 of the
Convention into play.
For the reasons explained above, I am unable to agree with the reasoning of the majority and conclude that, as matters presently stand, Article 2 is inapplicable in this case.
SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE COSTA,
JOINED BY JUDGE TRAJA
(translation)
1. In this case, in which a doctor’s negligence caused a
pregnancy to be terminated after almost six months against
the wishes of the
woman carrying the unborn child, the Court has found no violation
of Article 2
of the Convention.
2. Its reasoning, however, is cautious: the Court decided that it
was unnecessary to determine whether Article 2 was applicable,
holding that even
assuming it was, there has been no violation
on the facts.
3. I voted
in favour of finding no
violation
of Article 2, but
would have preferred the Court to hold that Article 2 was
applicable, even if
such a conclusion is not self-evident. As I will attempt to demonstrate, such a
decision would perhaps have
been clearer with only minimal inconvenience as
regards the scope of the judgment.
4. It seems to me, firstly, that it is not the Court’s role
as a collegiate body to consider cases from a primarily ethical or
philosophical standpoint (and, in my view,
it has successfully avoided this
pitfall
in this judgment). The Court must endeavour to remain within its own
– legal – sphere of competence, although I accept
that law does not
exist in a
vacuum
and is not a chemically pure substance detached from moral or
societal considerations. Whether
or not they choose to express their personal
opinions as Article 45 of the Convention entitles (but does not oblige) them to
do,
individual judges are not, in my opinion, subject to the same constraints.
The present case enters into the realm of deep personal
convictions and for my
part I thought it necessary and perhaps helpful to set out my
views.
As the
reader will have understood,
they slightly differ from those of the
majority.
5. From the ethical standpoint, the most natural way to attempt to
interpret Article 2 of the Convention (“Everyone’s
right to life
shall be protected by law” – “le droit de toute personne
à la vie
est protégé par la loi” in the French text) is
to ask what is meant by “everyone” (personne) and when does
life begin. It is
very
difficult to obtain unanimity or agreement here, as
ethics are too heavily dependent on individual
ideology. In
France,
the National
Advisory Committee, which has been doing a remarkable job for the past twenty
years and has issued
a number of opinions on the human embryo (a term it
generally prefers to “foetus” at all stages of development), has
not
been able to come up with a definitive answer to these questions. This is only
to be expected, particularly bearing in mind
the Committee’s composition,
which President Mitterrand decided at its inception should be pluralist. To say
(as the Committee
has done since issuing its first opinion in 1984) that
“the embryo must be recognised as a potential human
person” does not solve the problem because a being that is recognised as
potential is not necessarily a being and may
in fact, byconverse implication,
not be one. As to life and, therefore, the point at which life begins, everybody
has his or her
own conception (see the Committee’s fifth opinion issued in
1985). All this shows is that there perhaps exists a right for
a potential
person to a potential life; for lawyers, however, there is a world of difference
between the potential and the actual.
6. What is true for the ethical bodies of States such as the respondent State is also true internationally. The judgment rightly notes that the Oviedo Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (a Council of Europe sponsored instrument signed in 1997) does not define what is meant by “everyone”. Nor does it provide any definition of “human being”, despite the importance it attaches to the dignity, identity, primacy, interests and welfare of human beings. Nor is there any reference to the beginning of life.
7. Does the present inability of ethics to reach a consensus on what is a person and who is entitled to the right to life prevent the law from defining these terms? I think not. It is the task of lawyers, and in particular judges, especially human-rights judges, to identify the notions – which may, if necessary, be the autonomous notions the Court has always been prepared to use – that correspond to the words or expressions in the relevant legal instruments (in the Court’s case, the Convention and its Protocols). Why should the Court not deal with the terms “everyone” and the “right to life” (which the European Convention on Human Rights does not define) in the same way it has done from its inception with the terms “civil rights and obligations”, “criminal charges” and “tribunals”, even if we are here concerned with philosophical, not technical, concepts?
8. Indeed, the Court has already embarked upon this course in the
sphere of Article 2, at least as regards the right to
life, for instance, by
imposing positive obligations on States to protect human life, or holding that
in exceptional circumstances
the use of potentially lethal force by State agents
may lead to a finding of a violation
of Article 2. Through its case-law,
therefore,
the Court has broadened the notions of the right to life and unlawful
killing, if not the notion of life itself.
9. Conversely, I do not believe that it is possible to take the convenient
way out of saying that Mrs Vo,
a “person”,
had a right to life (of
her unborn child). It is true that the notion of who constitutes a
victim
has
been enlarged by the case-law:
a complaint by a nephew alleging a
violation
of
Article 2 on account of his uncle’s murder has thus been declared
admissible
(Yaşa
v.
Turkey, judgment of 2 September 1998,
Reports 1998-
VI).
However, in the instant case, the Court is concerned
with a pleaded right to life of the unborn child and this type of
decision can
only apply to the applicant’s case if it is accepted that the unborn child
itself has a right to life, since,
in order to be a
victim
within the meaning of
Article 34 of the Convention, Mrs
Vo
must also be a
victim
of a
violation
that
is
recognised by the Convention, quod est demonstrandum.
10. Indeed, it seems to me that the Commission and the Court have
already worked on the assumption that Article 2 is applicable
to the unborn
child (without, however, affirming that the unborn child is a person). In
a number of cases they have held that, even if they did not have to decide the
question of applicability, there was
in any event no violation
of Article 2 on
the facts, for instance in the case of a termination of pregnancy in accordance
with
legislation “which struck a fair balance between the woman’s
interests and the need to ensure protection of the foetus”
(see Boso
v.
Italy, decision of 5 September 2002, which is cited in the judgment; but
also, in less forthright terms, the Commission’s decision
of 19 May 1992
in another cited case, H.
v.
Norway). Had Article 2 been considered to be
entirely inapplicable, there would have been no point – and this applies
to the present
case also – in examining the question of foetal protection
and the possible
violation
of Article 2, or in using this reasoning
to find that
there had been no
violation
of that provision.
11. It is possible to turn to the law of the respondent State, not
because it is a model to be imposed on others, but
because it is directly in
issue in the present case. As far back as 1990, the Conseil d’Etat
held that the French Voluntary
Termination of Pregnancy Act (which the
Constitutional Council had declared in its decision no.
74–DC of
15 January 1975 was not unconstitutional, while at the same time declining
jurisdiction to examine its compatibility
with the Convention) was not
incompatible with Article 2 of the Convention or Article 6 of the International
Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (which provides: “Every human being
has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by
law...”).
Above all, the Conseil d’Etat thereby recognised unambiguously,
albeit implicitly, that that Act came within the scope of Article 2 (see its
decision of 21 December
1990, Confédération nationale des
associations familiales catholiques, published at page 369 of the Recueil
Lebon, and the submissions of Mr Bernard Stirn, which clarify it).
12. To my mind, this judgment of the highest French administrative
court demonstrates that a decision by the European
Court of Human Rights in
which it is plainly stated that the “end of life” of an unborn child
is within the scope of
Article 2 of the Convention would not threaten – at
least not in essence – the domestic legislation of a large number
of
European countries that makes the voluntary
termination of pregnancy lawful,
subject, of course, to compliance with certain
conditions. In a number of
European States, such legislation has been held to be consistent with the
domestic Constitution and
even with Article 2 of the Convention. The Norwegian
Supreme Court so found in 1983. The German Federal Constitutional Court and
the
Spanish Constitutional Court have also accepted that the right to life, as
protected by Article 2 of the Convention, can apply
to the embryo or the foetus
(the question whether that right is absolute being a separate issue).
These are examples of decisions in which the highest courts of individual
countries have recognised that
the right to life, whether set out in Article 2
of the European Convention on Human Rights or enshrined in domestic
constitutional
principles of like content and scope, applies to the
foetus, without being absolute. Is there any reason why the Court, which aspires
to the role of a constitutional court within
the European human-rights order,
should be less bold?
13. Obviously, were the Court to rule that Article 2 was applicable, either on its wording or in substance, it would have to examine in any event (and not just on the facts of the individual case as here) whether or not it had been complied with. This, though, should not be of concern to it either. In the aforementioned Boso decision, it applied the “fair balance” test to the impugned statute, so that it would have had to reach the opposite conclusion had the legislation been different and not strike a fair balance between the protection of the foetus and the mother’s interests. Potentially, therefore, the Court reviews compliance with Article 2 in all cases in which the “life” of the foetus is destroyed.
14. Similarly, it might be contended that, since Article 15 of the
Convention states that no derogation may be made from
Article 2, it would be
preposterous for the Court to find that Article 2 is not absolute, or is subject
to implied exceptions other
than those exhaustively set out in the second
paragraph thereof. This would militate in favour of holding that Article 2 does
not
apply to the unborn child (as the unborn child is not one of the exceptions
set out in the second paragraph). However, I am not
persuaded by either of these
two arguments. The non-derogation rule only prohibits States parties that
derogate from the Convention
in time of war or other public emergency, as they
are entitled to do by Article 15, from infringing Article 2. However, quite
clearly
situations and exceptional circumstances of this kind are quite
unrelated to the killing of an unborn child. More disconcerting
from a logical
perspective is an argument based on the actual wording of Article 2. However,
not only has the Court already decided
the point (as it indisputably did in
Boso), Article 2 cannot be conclusively construed as clearly
prohibiting all voluntary
terminations of pregnancy, if only because
a number of
Contracting States have ratified the Convention without any apparent problem,
despite already possessing legislation
permitting
voluntary
termination in
certain circumstances. Even more persuasive when it comes to an evolutive
interpretation of
Article 2 is the fact that a large number of European
countries passed legislation in the 1970s permitting the
voluntary
termination
of pregnancy within a strict framework.
15. As regards the potential effects of finding Article 2
applicable, it could perhaps be objected, conversely, that the
present case can
be distinguished from the voluntary
termination of pregnancy cases and that the
destruction of a foetus as a result
of medical error, or any other negligent act
or omission, is different from termination at the request of the mother in
distress
herself. In other words, those who, in the name of women’s
freedom of choice, defend the principle of
voluntary
termination
of pregnancy
might fear that such legislation would indirectly be at risk if Article 2 was
found to be applicable. It is true that
the “Garraud Amendment”,
which is mentioned in the judgment and was finally withdrawn from Parliament,
was fiercely
opposed by sections of French society, in particular (but not only)
supporters of the
Voluntary
Termination of Pregnancy Act, precisely
for this
reason (as it was intended to create an offence of involuntary termination of
pregnancy).
16. However, I do not believe that such fears are legitimately
justified, if only because a woman who loses her unborn
child against her wishes
and sees her hopes of maternity dashed is in an entirely different situation
from a woman resigned –
albeit likewise in circumstances of suffering and
bereavement – to ask for her pregnancy to be brought to an end. In any
event, it is not a judicial decision (on the applicability or otherwise of
Article 2 of the Convention) which will resolve this
ethical debate, still less
justify society’s policy choices. In addition, since the Vo
v.
France
judgment does not require States to afford criminal-law
protection against the risk of the loss of the foetus (and on that I agree), it
does not, in any event, plead in favour of making
the involuntary termination of
pregnancy a criminal offence.
17. In sum, I see no good legal reason or decisive policy
consideration for not applying Article 2 in the present case.
On a general
level, I believe (in company with many senior judicial bodies in Europe) that
there is life before birth, within the
meaning of Article 2, that the law must
therefore protect such life, and that if a national legislature considers that
such protection
cannot be absolute, then it should only derogate from it,
particularly as regards the voluntary
termination of pregnancy, within
a
regulated framework that limits the scope of the derogation. The actual
circumstances of Mrs
Vo’s
case made it all the
more appropriate to find
that Article 2 was applicable: she was six months pregnant (contrast this
– purely for illustration
purposes – with the German Federal
Constitutional Court’s
view
that life begins after fourteen days
gestation), there
was every prospect that the foetus would be born
viable
and,
lastly, the pregnancy was clearly ended by an act of negligence, against
the
applicant’s wishes.
18. I have nothing further to add, since, with minor differences,
I agree with what the judgment has to say in finding
that there has been no
violation
of Article 2.
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE RESS
(translation)
1. France’s
positive obligation to protect the unborn children against
unintentional homicide, that is to say against negligent
acts that could cause a
child’s death, can only be discharged if French law has effective
procedures in place to prevent
the recurrence of such acts. On this point, I am
unable to agree with the opinion expressed by the majority that an action in
damages
in the administrative courts (on account of the hospital doctor’s
alleged negligence) afforded the unborn child adequate and
effective protection
against medical negligence. As Judge Rozakis, joined by Judges Bonello and
Strážnická, pointed
out in his dissenting opinion in the case of
Calvelli and Ciglio
v.
Italy (no. 32967/96, judgment of 17 January
2002), an action in pecuniary and even non-pecuniary damages will not in all
circumstances
be apt to protect against the unintentional taking of life,
especially in a case such as the present one in which a mother lost
her child as
a result of a doctor’s negligence. Even though I accepted the outcome in
the case of Calvelli and Ciglio
v.
Italy, which was based on the fact
that the applicants had agreed to compensation under a friendly settlement,
criminal proceedings were
commenced in that case (although they were not
continued because prosecution of the offence became statute-barred).
It is not retribution that makes protection by the criminal law desirable,
but deterrence. In general, it is through the criminal
law that society most
clearly and strictly conveys messages to its members and identifies values
that
are most in need of protection.
Life, which is one of the
values,
if not the
main
value,
protected by the Convention (Streletz, Kessler and Krenz
v.
Germany, judgment of 22 March 2001, Reports of Judgments and
Decisions 2001-II, §§ 92-94; and McCann and Others
v.
the
United Kingdom, judgment of 27 September 1995, Series A no. 324, §
147), will in principle require the protection of the criminal law if it
is to
be adequately safeguarded and defended. Financial liability to pay compensation
is only a secondary form of protection. In
addition, hospitals and doctors are
usually insured against such risks, so that the “pressure” on them
is reduced.
2. One might consider that imposing a disciplinary penalty on a doctor could
be regarded as equivalent to imposing a criminal penalty
in certain
circumstances. Disciplinary measures were viewed
as an alternative means of
discouraging negligence in the case of Calvelli and Ciglio
v.
Italy
(§ 51). However, it is equally clear that, as unpleasant as the
consequences may be professionally, a disciplinary penalty
does not amount to
general condemnation (Unwerturteil). Disciplinary penalties depend on
conditions that are entirely specific to the profession concerned (the bodies
being self-regulating)
and in general do not afford the deterrence necessary to
protect such an important
value
as life. Nevertheless, the question has
to be
asked
2.
whether in the present case a disciplinary penalty for such a serious error
could have provided sufficient deterrence. Here, though,
is where the problem
lies, as the authorities at no stage brought disciplinary proceedings against
the doctor. For an error as
serious as that committed by Dr G., such
disciplinary proceedings accompanied by an adequate measure could at least have
sent an
appropriate signal to the medical profession to prevent the recurrence
of such tragic events. I do not think it necessary to say
that France
requires
criminal legislation. However, it does need to take strict disciplinary action
in order to meet its obligation
to afford effective protection of the life of
the unborn child. In my opinion, therefore, there was no effective
protection.
3. In order to reach that conclusion, it seems necessary to find out whether Article 2 applies to the unborn child. I am prepared to accept that there may be differences in the level of protection afforded to an embryo and to a child after birth. Nevertheless, that does not justify the conclusion (at paragraph 85 of the judgment) that it is not possible to answer in the abstract the question whether the unborn child is a person for the purposes of Article 2 of the Convention. All the Court’s case-law and the Commission’s decisions (see paragraphs 75-80 of judgments) are based on the “assuming that” argument (in eventu). Yet the failure to give a clear answer can no longer be justified by reasons of procedural economy. Nor can the problem of protecting the embryo through the Convention be solved solely through the protection of the mother’s life. As this case illustrates, the embryo and the mother, as two separate “human beings”, need separate protection.
4. The Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (Article 31 § 1)
requires treaties to be interpreted in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to
be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its
objects and purpose. The ordinary
meaning can only be established from the text
as a whole. Historically, lawyers have understood the notion of
“everyone”
(toute personne) as including the human
being before birth and, above all, the notion of “life” as covering
all human life commencing
with conception, that is to say from the moment an
independent existence develops until it ends with death, birth being but
a stage in that development.
The structure of Article 2 and, above all the exceptions set out in paragraph
2 thereof, appear to indicate that persons are only
entitled to protection
thereunder once they have been born and that it is only after birth that they
are regarded as having rights
under the Convention. In view
of the
“aim” of the Convention to provide extended protection, this does
not appear to
be a conclusive argument. Firstly, a foetus may enjoy protection,
especially within the framework of Article 8 § 2 (see Odiè
vre
v.
France
[GC] no. 42326/98, § 45, ECHR 2003-III). In addition, the
decisions of the Commission and the Court contain indications that
Article 2 is
applicable to
the unborn child. In all the cases in which that issue has been considered,
the Commission and the Court have developed a concept
of an implied limitation
or of a fair balance between the interests of society and the interests of the
individual, that is to
say the mother or the unborn child. Admittedly, these
concepts were developed in connection with legislation on the voluntary,
but
not
the involuntary, termination of pregnancy. However, it is clear that they would
not have been necessary if the Commission and
the Court had considered at the
outset that Article 2 could not apply to the unborn child. Even though the
Commission and the Court
have left the question open formally, such a legal
structure proves that both institutions were inclined to adopt the ordinary
meaning of “human life” and “everyone” rather than the
other meaning.
Similarly, the practice of the Contracting States, virtually
all of which had
constitutional problems with their laws on abortion
(
voluntary
termination of
pregnancy), clearly shows that the protection of life also extends in principle
to the foetus. Specific
laws on
voluntary
abortion would not have been necessary
if the foetus did not have a life to protect and was fully dependent till
birth
on the unrestricted wishes of the pregnant mother. Nearly all the Contracting
States have had problems because, in principle,
the protection of life under
their constitutional law also extends to the prenatal stage.
5. It is obvious that the premise of the debate on genetic safeguards in a
number of recent conventions and the prohibition on the
reproductive cloning of
“human beings” in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union (Article 3 §
2, final subparagraph) is that the protection of life
extends to the initial phase of human life. The Convention, which was conceived
as a living instrument to be interpreted in present-day conditions in society,
must take such a development into account in order
to confirm the
“ordinary meaning”, in accordance with Article 32 of the Vienna
Convention.
Even if it is assumed that the ordinary meaning of human life in Article 2 of
the Convention is not entirely clear and can be interpreted
in different ways,
the obligation to protect human life requires more extensive protection,
particularly in view
of the techniques
available for genetic manipulation and
the unlimited production of embryos for
various
purposes. The manner in which
Article 2
is interpreted must evolve in accordance with these developments and
constraints and confront the real dangers now facing human
life. Any restriction
on such a dynamic interpretation must take into account the relationship between
the life of a person who
has been born and the unborn life, which means that
protecting the foetus to the mother’s detriment would be unacceptable.
6. The fact that various
provisions of the Convention contain guarantees
which by their nature cannot extend to the unborn cannot
alter that position.
If, by their
very
nature, the scope of such provisions can only extend to
natural persons or legal entities,
or to persons who have been born or are
adults, that does not preclude the conclusion that other provisions such as the
first sentence
of Article 2 incorporate protection for the lives of human beings
in the initial stage of their development.
7. It should be noted that the present case is wholly unrelated to laws on
the voluntary
termination of pregnancy. That is a separate
issue which is
fundamentally different from interference, against the mother’s wishes, in
the life and welfare of her child.
The present case concerns wrongdoing by a
third party resulting in the loss of a foetus, if not the death of the mother,
whereas
voluntary
abortion is solely concerned with the relationship between the
mother and the child and the question of their protection
by the State. Although
holding that Article 2 applies to human life before birth may have repercussions
on the laws regulating
the
voluntary
termination of pregnancy, that is not a
reason for saying that Article 2 is not applicable. Quite the opposite.
Furthermore, it is not necessary in the instant case to decide when life
begins. It was noted that the twenty-one week old foetus
was viable,
although I
believe that the notion of
viability
cannot limit the States’ positive
obligation to protect the unborn
child against interference and negligence by
doctors.
8. There can be no margin of appreciation on the issue of the applicability of Article 2. A margin of appreciation may, in my opinion, exist to determine the measures that should be taken to discharge the positive obligation that arises because Article 2 is applicable, but it is not possible to restrict the applicability of Article 2 by reference to a margin of appreciation. The question of the interpretation or applicability of Article 2 (an absolute right) cannot depend on a margin of appreciation. If Article 2 is applicable, any margin of appreciation will be confined to the effect thereof.
9. Since I consider that Article 2 applies to human beings even
before they are born, an interpretation which seems to
me to be consistent with
the approach of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and
since France
does not afford
sufficient protection to the foetus against the
negligent acts of third parties, I find that there has been a
violation
of
Article
2 of the Convention. As regards the specific measures necessary to
discharge that positive obligation, that is a matter for the
respondent State,
which should either take strict disciplinary measures or afford the protection
of the criminal law (against unintentional
homicide).
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE MULARONI
JOINED BY JUDGE STRÁŽNICKÁ
(Translation)
I am unable to concur with the majority’s finding that there has been
no violation
of Article 2 of the Convention because the
applicant could have
brought an action in negligence in the administrative courts for the damage
caused by the hospital doctor
(see paragraph 91 of the judgment). According to
the majority, since the applicant did not bring such an action, there was no
violation
of Article 2.
I agree with the majority that it is necessary to consider “whether the
legal protection afforded the applicant by France
in
respect of the loss of the
unborn child she was carrying satisfied the procedural requirements inherent in
Article 2 of the Convention”
(see paragraph 85 of the judgment) and that:
“the first sentence of Article 2, which ranks as one of the most
fundamental
provisions in the Convention and also enshrines one of the basic
values
of the democratic societies making up the Council of Europe
(see
McCann and Others
v.
the United Kingdom, judgment of 27 September 1995,
Series A no. 324, pp. 45-46, § 147), requires the State not only to refrain
from the “intentional”
taking of life, but also to take appropriate
steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction (see, among other
authorities,
L.C.B.
v.
the United Kingdom, judgment of 9 June 1998,
Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-III, p. 1403, § 36)”
(see paragraph 88 of the judgment).
However, I come to entirely different conclusions.
I note that in December 1991, when the applicant and her partner lodged a criminal complaint with an application to be joined to the proceedings as civil parties for unintentional injury to the applicant entailing total unfitness for work for a period not exceeding three months and unintentional homicide of her child, the Conseil d’Etat had not yet abandoned its position that a hospital department could incur liability only in cases of gross negligence (see paragraph 57 of the judgment, the Government’s submissions).
It is true that, as the majority note, the applicant could have tried to bring an action in damages against the authorities before it became statute-barred. However, it seems to me that the Court may be demanding too much of this applicant when it is recalled that the position taken by the Court of Cassation in its judgment of 30 June 1999, and which it subsequently followed in its judgments of 29 June 2001 (sitting as a full court) and 25 June 2002 (see paragraph 29 of the judgment), was far from established, as witnessed by the court of appeal decisions to the contrary, the submissions of the advocates general at the Court of Cassation and, lastly, the almost universal criticism it attracted from legal commentators (see paragraph 31 of the judgment). Since it was doubtful that she would be
successful in an action in the administrative courts, the applicant brought
criminal proceedings under the only two provisions of
the Criminal Code that
were open to her. She told the Court that she chose that course of action
because a criminal investigation
would aid in the task of establishing
responsibility (see paragraph 50 of the judgment). That explanation is entirely
logical:
it is precisely what most victims
of crime do in countries that offer a
choice between proceedings in the criminal courts or in
the civil or
administrative courts.
It could be argued that the French legal system did not afford the applicant any “effective” remedy when these sad events took place.
Nevertheless, let us assume that the applicant had a choice between criminal
and administrative remedies. Since a victim
cannot claim
compensation for his or
her damage twice over, it would to my mind be disproportionate to criticise the
applicant for not having
exercised both remedies simultaneously. It would also
represent a departure from the Court’s case-law.
Under the case-law of the Convention institutions, where there is a choice of
remedies open to the applicant, Article 35 must be
applied to reflect the
practical realities of the applicant’s position in order to ensure the
effective protection of the
rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention
(Allemeine Gold- und Silberscheideanstalt A.G. v.
the United Kingdom, no.
9118/80, Commission decision of 9 March 1983, Decisions and Reports (DR) 32, p.
165). The applicant must have made normal
use of domestic remedies which are
likely to be effective and sufficient. When a remedy has been attempted, use of
another remedy
which has essentially the same objective is not required
(Wójcik
v. Poland,
no. 26757/95, Commission decision of 7 July
1997, DR 90, p. 28; Günaydin
v.
Turkey (dec.), no. 27526/95, 25
April 2002; Anagnostopoulos
v.
Greece, no. 54589/00, § 32, 3
April 2003). Furthermore, the applicant is only required to have recourse to
such remedies as
are both available and sufficient, that is to say capable of
providing redress for his or her complaints (Airey
v.
Ireland, judgment
of 9 October 1979, Series A no. 32, p. 11, § 19; Deweer
v.
Belgium,
judgment of 27 February 1980, Series A no. 35, p. 16, § 29).
I would also note that the amount at stake in the aforementioned
Anagnostopoulos v.
Greece case was 15,000 drachmas (approximately
44 euros), whereas in the present case we are dealing with an unborn
child.
***
The majority make a number of references to the Calvelli and Ciglio v.
Italy judgment ([GC], no. 32967/96, ECHR 2002-I), in which the Court stated
(at § 51): “[I]f the infringement of the right to life or
to personal
integrity is not caused intentionally, the positive obligation imposed by
Article 2 to set up an effective judicial system does not necessarily require
the provision of a criminal-law remedy”. It added:
“In the specific
sphere of medical negligence the obligation may for instance also be satisfied
if the legal system affords
victims
a remedy in the civil courts, either alone
or in conjunction with a remedy in the criminal courts, enabling any liability
of the doctors concerned to be established and any appropriate civil redress,
such as an order for damages and for the publication
of the decision, to be
obtained. Disciplinary measures may also be envisaged”.
I consider that the differences between the solutions afforded by the two domestic legal systems must outweigh the similarities. In Calvelli and Ciglio, the applicants – the father and mother of a newborn child who died two days after birth – had brought criminal proceedings which ended when the offence of involuntary manslaughter with which the obstetrician was charged became statute-barred. However, the applicants were able to summon the doctor to appear in the civil courts after he was convicted at first instance in the criminal courts almost seven years after the death of the child and, with the civil proceedings still pending, they reached a settlement with the doctor’s and clinic’s insurers in respect of the damage they had sustained. The Court recognised that the Italian legal system afforded the applicants an effective alternative to criminal proceedings (Calvelli and Ciglio cited above, §§ 54-55) that enabled the respondent State to discharge its positive obligations under Article 2 of the Convention. In my opinion, the same cannot be said of its French counterpart in the present case.
I must confess that, had I been sitting in the Calvelli and Ciglio case, I would undoubtedly have concurred with the partly dissenting opinion of Judges Rozakis, Bonello and Strážnická. However, even if I had agreed with the majority, it does not seem to me that their conclusion in Calvelli and Ciglio can be transposed to the present case, in which the limitation period for an action in the administrative courts, which at the time was four years from the date of stabilisation of the damage, had expired by the time the criminal proceedings ended. The applicant received no reparation for her loss, not even for the offence of unintentionally causing injuries, for which the doctor was given an amnesty by the law of 3 August 1995.
I conclude that, in the light of the loss of the child she was carrying, the
legal protection France
afforded the applicant did not
satisfy the procedural
requirements inherent in Article 2 of the Convention.
***
Obviously, since I do not accept the reasoning that led the majority to hold
that there has been no violation
of Article 2 on procedural
grounds and that it
is therefore unnecessary to determine whether Article 2 is applicable, I must
explain why I consider that that
provision is applicable and has been
violated.
Up till now, while the Convention institutions have refrained from deciding
whether or not Article 2 applies to unborn children (see
paragraphs 75-80
of the judgment), they have not excluded the possibility that the foetus may
enjoy a certain protection under
Article 2, first sentence (H. v.
Norway,
Commission decision of 19 May 1992, DR 73, p. 167; Boso
v.
Italy (dec.),
no. 50490/99, 5 September 2002).
Firstly, I think it necessary to bear in mind that the task of the national and international judge is not always easy, especially when a text may be construed in ways that are diametrically opposed.
The travaux préparatoires on the Convention are silent on the scope of the words “everyone” and “life” and as to whether Article 2 is applicable prior to birth.
Yet since the 1950s, considerable advances have been made in science, biology and medicine, including at the prenatal stage.
The political community is engaged at both national and international level in trying to identify the most suitable means of protecting, even prenatally, human rights and the dignity of the human being against certain biological and medical applications.
I consider that it is not possible to ignore the major debate that has taken place within national parliaments in recent years on the subject of bioethics and the desirability of introducing or reforming legislation on medically assisted procreation and prenatal diagnosis, in order to reinforce guarantees, prohibit techniques such as the reproductive cloning of human beings and provide a strict framework for techniques with a proven medical interest.
The aim of the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, which was opened
for signature on 4 April 1997 in Oviedo and entered into
force on 1 December
1999, is to protect the dignity and identity of human beings and to guarantee
everyone, without discrimination,
respect for their integrity and other rights
and fundamental freedoms with regard to the application of biology and medicine.
It
protects the dignity of everyone, including the unborn, and its main concern
is to ensure that no research or intervention may be
carried out that would
undermine respect for the dignity and identity of the human being. Although this
Convention is very
recent,
it does not define the terms “everyone”
and “human being” either, although it affirms their primacy in
Article 2 in these terms: “The interests and welfare of the human being
shall prevail over the sole interests of society or
science”. As to the
problem of defining the term “everyone”, the Explanatory Report
produced by the Directorate
General of Legal Affairs at the Council Europe
states, at paragraph 18: “In the absence of a unanimous agreement on the
definition
of these terms among member States of the Council of Europe, it was
decided to allow domestic law to define them for the purposes
of the application
of the present Convention”.
Furthermore, I note that this Convention unquestionably contains provisions on the prenatal phase (see, for instance, Chapter IV – Human Genome). Requests may be made to the European Court of Human Rights under Article 29 of the Convention for advisory opinions on its interpretation. The Contracting States did not impose any restriction on the scope of such referrals confining the Court’s jurisdiction to questions arising postnatally.
Although the texts are either silent or full of cross-references, the applicant is nevertheless entitled to an answer.
Secondly, I would stress that the Court must deliver a decision on the concrete case before it. The application concerns the termination of a pregnancy as a result of medical negligence that caused the loss of a foetus aged between 20 and 24 weeks, against the mother’s wishes.
In that connection, I consider that one should not overlook the fact that the
foetus in the instant case was almost as old as foetuses
that have survived and
that scientific advances now make it possible to know virtually
everything about
a foetus of that age: its
weight, sex, exact measurements, and whether it has
any deformities or problems. Although it does not yet have any independent
existence from that of its mother (though having said that, in the first years
of its life, a child cannot survive alone without
someone to look after it
either) I believe that it is a being a separate from its mother.
Although legal personality is only acquired at birth, this does not to my
mind mean that there must be no recognition or protection
of
“everyone’s right to life” before birth. Indeed, this seems to
me to be a principle that is shared by all
the member States of the Council of
Europe, as domestic legislation permitting the voluntary
termination of
pregnancy would not
have been necessary if the foetus was not regarded as having
a life that should be protected. Abortion therefore constitutes an
exception to
the rule that the right to life should be protected, even before birth.
In any event, this case is wholly unconcerned with the States’ domestic abortion laws, which have long been the subject matter of applications to the Convention institutions and have been found to be consistent with the Convention (see paragraphs 75-80 of the judgment).
I consider that, as with other Convention provisions, Article 2 must be
interpreted in an evolutive manner so that the great dangers
currently facing
human life can be confronted. This is made necessary by the potential that
exists for genetic manipulation and
the risk that scientific results will be
used for a purpose that undermines the dignity and identity of the human being.
The Court
has, moreover, often stated that the Convention is a living
instrument, to be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions
(see, among
other authorities, Tyrer v.
the United Kingdom, judgment of 25 April
1978, Series A no. 26, pp. 15-16, § 31; Loizidou
v.
Turkey, judgment
of 23 March 1995, Series A no. 310, p. 26, § 71; Mazurek
v.
France,
no 34406/97, § 49, ECHR 2000-II).
I therefore find that Article 2 the Convention is applicable in the present
case and has been violated, as the right to life has
not been protected by the
law of the respondent State.