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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Turner v East Midlands Trains Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 1470 (16 November 2012) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2012/1470.html Cite as: [2012] EWCA Civ 1470, [2013] ICR 525, [2012] WLR(D) 353, [2013] 3 All ER 375, [2013] IRLR 107 |
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ON APPEAL FROM THE EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
HHJ SEROTA QC
UKEATPA/1052/11/DA
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
VICE
PRESIDENT OF THE COURT OF APPEAL
LORD JUSTICE ELIAS
and
SIR STEPHEN SEDLEY
____________________
TURNER | Appellant |
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| - and - |
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EAST MIDLANDS TRAINS LTD |
Respondent |
____________________
WordWave International Limited
A Merrill Communications Company
165 Fleet Street, London EC4A 2DY
Tel No: 020 7404 1400, Fax No: 020 7831 8838
Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
Mr Jason Galbraith-Marten and Ms Sheryn Omeri (instructed by Kennedys Solicitors) for the Respondent
Hearing date : 9 October 2012
____________________
VERSION
OF JUDGMENT
Crown Copyright ©
Lord Justice Elias :
view
for that of the reasonable employer. That principle has been enunciated in the line of cases beginning with British Home Stores
v
Burchell [1978] IRLR 379 and affirmed in cases such as Post Office
v
Foley [2000] IRLR 827, Sainsbury's Supermarkets
v
Hitt [2003] ICR 111, London Ambulance Service NHS Trust
v
Small [2009] IRLR 563 and, most recently, Orr
v
Milton Keynes Council [2011] ICR 704.
The facts.
train
conductor who had continuously worked for the respondent or its predecessors for more than 12 years. At the time of her dismissal she had a clean disciplinary record. She would issue tickets using a computerised ticket machine (an Avantix machine). Sometimes the machine would produce what was termed a "non-issued" ticket. There are two kinds of non-issued tickets. The first arises in those
very
exceptional cases where a passenger changes his or her mind as to the ticket requirements during the transaction. Such tickets must always be returned by the conductor and should be recorded on the shift sheet i.e. the record for the particular shift. The second kind is what are termed "automatic non-issued tickets" (ANIs). These are tickets which are faulty in some respect so that they ought not to be sold to the customer. These tickets should also be returned, but in this case there is no requirement to record them on the shift sheet.
"It is correct that in the course of the Hearing the Judge did observe that there are no instances of potentially suspect tickets having been issued "en bloc" but that rather the evidence relied upon points to a single, usually lowvalue,
ticket being generated occasionally and usually only once per shift. Whilst the Judge might, therefore, have been inclined to question the likelihood of this pattern being in fact indicative of the dishonesty alleged it is highly significant that the lay members of the tribunal have no such scruples. From their long experience of both sides of industry both Mr Bratby and Mrs Bullock readily accept that the evidence before the Respondents was more than sufficient to justify the conclusion that this was indeed indicative of repetitive, albeit spasmodic pilfering, and that the relatively low sums involved are not at all atypical of this type of dishonesty in the workplace. There is certainly no reason to say that the
view
taken by the Respondents was, therefore, outside the band of reasonable responses. To hold otherwise would indeed be inappropriately to substitute our own
view
for that of the reasonable employer with specific knowledge of their own industry."
variety
of reasons it was not legitimate to draw this inference because there were other factors which tended to suggest that the statistics may be inaccurate or misleading and that the appellant may be innocent. Indeed, at the heart of the appeal is the contention that there was an inadequate investigation of
various
matters which, if properly explored, might have demonstrated that the statistics were unreliable. I deal with these points later in the judgment. It is important to note, however, that it is conceded that on the traditional band of reasonable responses test, the employment tribunal's conclusion that the investigation was fair is unassailable. The submission is that the effect of the dismissal was to engage the rights of the appellant under Article 8 of the Convention and that the investigation did not satisfy what is alleged to be the stricter procedural requirements which the proper protection of Article 8 rights requires.
The decision of the Employment Tribunal on the Article 8 points.
v
Y [2004] ICR 1634 in which His Lordship analysed in considerable detail the effect of Article 8 on the law of unfair dismissal. The Tribunal emphasised certain passages in that judgment, and in particular the following observations of Mummery LJ at para 59(4):
"It is not immediately obvious, on a reading of section 98 without reference to a particular set of facts, as to how it could be incompatible with or be applied so as toviolate
article 8 and article 14 and so attract the application of s3. Considerations of fairness, the reasonable response of a reasonable employer, equity and substantial merits ought, when taken together, to be sufficiently flexible, without even minimal interpretative modification under s3, to enable the employment tribunal to give effect to applicable Convention rights. How, it might be asked, could the proper application by the employment tribunal of the objective standards of fairness, reasonableness, equity and the substantial merits of the case result in the determination of a claim for unfair dismissal that was incompatible with article 8?"
v
Y and that it would have to be for the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court to choose to depart from that decision. He concluded therefore that the appeal had no reasonable prospect of success before the EAT but accepted that the appellant had raised interesting and important arguments which at least merited consideration by the Court of Appeal. Hence he granted permission to appeal.
v
Y. She was not asking the EAT to depart from it but rather to recognise that this was an exceptional case where Mummery LJ's observations in paragraph 59(4), set out above, were not apposite. Whether HH Judge Serota QC misunderstood the argument or not (and I am not satisfied that he did), it is accepted that nothing in fact turns on it. The focus of the appeal is the decision of the Employment Tribunal and we have to consider the merits of the appellant's argument as to why that decision was wrong.
The statutory provisions.
"(1) In determining for the purposes of this Part whether the dismissal of an employee is fair or unfair, it is for the employer to show –
"(a) the reason (or, if more than one, the principal reason) for the dismissal,
and
(b) that it is either a reason falling within subsection (2) or some other substantial reason of a kind such as to justify the dismissal of an employee holding the position which the employee held."
"In any case where the employer has fulfilled the requirements of sub-section (1), the determination of the question whether the dismissal is fair or unfair (having regard to the reason shown by the employer) –
(a) depends on whether in the circumstances (including the size and administrative resources of the employer's undertaking) the employer acted reasonably or unreasonably treating it as a sufficient reason for dismissing the employer, and
(b) shall be determined in accordance with equity and the substantial merits of the case."
v
Burchell [1980] ICR 303 at 304C-E, the range or band of reasonable responses test has been affirmed in numerous decisions. The most recent
valuable
summary of the relevant principles is contained in the judgment of Aikens LJ in the Orr case. As regards the fairness test in section 98(4), he summarised the position as follows (para 78):
"…(4) In applying that subsection, the employment tribunal must decide on the reasonableness of the employer's decision to dismiss for the "real reason". That involves a consideration, at least in misconduct cases, of three aspects of the employer's conduct. First, did the employer carry out an investigation into the matter that was reasonable in the circumstances of the case; secondly, did the employer believe that the employee was guilty of the misconduct complained of; and, thirdly, did the employer have reasonable grounds for that belief. If the answer to each of those questions is "yes", the employment tribunal must then decide on the reasonableness of the response of the employer.
(5) In doing the exercise set out at (4), the employment tribunal must consider, by the objective standards of the hypothetical reasonable employer, rather than by reference to its own subjectiveviews,
whether the employer has acted within a "band or range of reasonable responses" to the particular misconduct found of the particular employee. If it has, then the employer's decision to dismiss will be reasonable. But that is not the same thing as saying that a decision of an employer to dismiss will only be regarded as unreasonable if it is shown to be perverse.
(6) The employment tribunal must not simply consider whether they think that the dismissal was fair and thereby substitute their decision as to what was the right course to adopt for that of the employer. The tribunal must determine whether the decision of the employer to dismiss the employee fell within the band of reasonable responses which "a reasonable" employer might have adopted.
(7) A particular application of (5) and (6) is that an employment tribunal may not substitute their own evaluation of a witness for that of the employer at the time of its investigation and dismissal, save in exceptional circumstances.
(8) An employment tribunal must focus their attention on the fairness of the conduct of the employer at the time of the investigation and dismissal (or any appeal process) and not on whether in fact the employee has suffered an injustice."
v
Hall [2001] IRLR 275 CA; and whether the pre-dismissal investigation was fair and appropriate: see Sainsbury's Supermarkets
v
Hitt [2003] IRLR 23 CA.
v
Foley [2000] ICR 1283 the Court of Appeal had to consider the decision of the EAT in Haddon
v
Van
den Bergh Foods Ltd [1999] ICR 1150 in which the EAT had concluded that the band of reasonable responses test subverted the statutory language and required the tribunals to adopt what was in effect a perversity test. Lord Justice Mummery trenchantly observed that this was a misunderstanding, and a dilution, of the proper test (p.1292D):
"It was made clear in Iceland Frozen Foods Ltd.v.
Jones [1983] ICR 17 , 25 b-d , that the provisions of section 57(3) of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 (which were re-enacted in section 98(4) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 ) did not require "such a high degree of unreasonableness to be shown that nothing short of a perverse decision to dismiss can be held to be unfair within the section." The tribunals were advised to follow the formulation of the band of reasonable responses approach instead. If an employment tribunal in any particular case misinterprets or misapplies that approach, so as to amount to a requirement of a perverse decision to dismiss, that would be an error of law with which an appellate body could interfere."
v
B [2003] IRLR 405, para 60, when giving judgment in the EAT in a case involving alleged criminal behaviour by the employee, I said this:
"Serious allegations of criminal misbehaviour, at least where disputed, must always be the subject of the most careful investigation, always bearing in mind that the investigation is usually being conducted by laymen and not lawyers. Of course, even in the most serious of cases, it is unrealistic and quite inappropriate to require the safeguards of a criminal trial, but a careful and conscientious investigation of the facts is necessary and the investigator charged with carrying out the inquiries should focus no less on any potential evidence that may exculpate or at least point towards the innocence of the employee as he should on the evidence directed towards proving the charges against him."
This dictum was approved by the Court of Appeal in Salford Royal NHS Foundation Trust
v
Roldan [2010] ICR 1457 para 13.
v
B and Roldan is still whether a reasonable employer could have acted as the employer did. However, more will be expected of a reasonable employer where the allegations of misconduct, and the consequences to the employee if they are proven, are particularly serious.
The grounds of appeal.
(1) Section 3 of the Human Rights Act requires that, where possible, legislation should be construed so as to be in conformity with the requirements of the Convention. Even though the respondent is not a public authority, the Section 3 obligation does not distinguish between legislation governing public authorities and that governing private individuals. Section 98(4) should if possible be read compatibly with Article 8, and the fact that the employee could not directly enforce Convention rights against this respondent employer is immaterial.
(2) The consequences of the dismissal in this case were of a nature and quality to engage Article 8 rights.
(3) Strasbourg authorities establish that respect for Article 8 rights requires the employer to comply with certain procedural safeguards before taking steps that will infringe those rights. This is a necessary part of the Article 8(2) evaluation.
(4) It is for the court to determine whether what is colloquially known as the proportionality test in Article 8(2) is met. This includes being satisfied that fair procedures, including fair and proper investigations, have been adopted.
(5) The Employment Tribunal did not adopt that approach; it simply applied the traditional unfair dismissal test, asking itself whether a reasonable employer could consider that the investigations undertaken were adequate. That is not a sufficiently rigorous evaluation of the fairness of the investigations.
(6) Had the Employment Tribunal adopted the appropriate Article 8 test, it might have reached a different conclusion as to whether the procedures were adequate. If it had concluded that Article 8 had not been complied with, it would have been compelled to find the dismissal unfair.
(7) Hence the decision of the Employment Tribunal should be quashed and the case should be remitted to another tribunal to hear the matter afresh.
v
Y para 59. The employer also accepts that where Article 8 rights are engaged as a result of a dismissal, that will attract a procedural duty to act fairly. However, the employer disputes the other steps in the reasoning. In brief, the employer's response is as follows:
(1) Article 8 rights were not engaged, not least because such adverse consequences as resulted from the decision were brought about by the employee's own conduct.
(2) In any event the band of reasonable responses test provides a sufficiently objective test to satisfy any Article 8 procedural obligation to act fairly, as the Employment Tribunal rightly concluded.
(3) Even if the Article 8 procedural test is more rigorous, any failure by the Employment Tribunal to apply the right test is immaterial in this case since the procedures were manifestly fair and were in accordance with any sensible objective test that could be applied.
(4) It is not, and could not be, contended that dismissal was not a fair sanction once a proper finding of dishonesty had been made.
(5) Accordingly, the dismissal was clearly fair, as the Employment Tribunal found.
Was Article 8 engaged?
"Article 8 – Right to respect for private and family life
(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others."
very
wide and the Strasbourg court has, no doubt wisely, been unwilling to define the coverage in an exhaustive way. Indeed, in Niemitz
v
Germany (1992) EHRR 97 the Court said that it was neither possible nor necessary to define the scope of private life. The Court did, however, conclude (para 30) that "respect for private life must also comprise to a certain degree the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings" and that it would extend to activities of a professional or business nature.
v
Austria (2009) 48 EHRR 8 (para 35) that:
"a person's reputation, even if that person is criticised in the context of a public debate, forms part of his or her personal identity and psychological integrity and therefore also falls within the scope of his or her private life".
In that case a person had committed suicide as a result of a highly critical article. In Petrenco
v
Moldova [2011] EMLR 5, another case involving an alleged defamatory newspaper article, the Strasbourg court held that a state's positive obligation to protect Article 8 rights might require it to take steps to protect the right to reputation from interference by private bodies.
v
Secretary of State for Health [2009] 1 AC 739. Baroness Hale, with whose judgment Lords Phillips, Hope, Hoffmann and Brown agreed, held that where care workers were entered on a list for alleged misconduct without any right to make representations, the effect of which was to bar them from working in their chosen profession because they were considered unsafe to work with
vulnerable
adults, their Article 8 rights were infringed. This was partly because of the practical effect on their ability to earn a living, but also because of the inevitable stigma attached to being on the list. This was so even though the list was supposed to be kept private.
v
United Kingdom (2005) 40 EHRR 9 at para 82.
v
Lithuania [2006] 42 EHRR 6 ECtHR the applicants both worked for the Lithuanian branch of the KGB prior to independence and were subject, some ten years after independence had been achieved, to significant employment restrictions as a result. In particular they were banned from applying for public positions as well as for numerous private sector posts. The ECtHR said this (para 48):
"The ban has, however, affected the applicants' ability to develop relationships with the outside world to avery
significant degree, and has created serious difficulties for them as regards the possibility to earn their living with obvious repercussions on their enjoyment of their private life."
v
UK [2010] 50 E.H.R.R. SE6 at para 41:
"…It cannot be said that, because an activity allows an individual to establish and develop relationships, it falls within the scope of Article 8 such that any regulation of that activity will automatically amount to an interference with that individual's private life."
virtue
of the adverse effect on the appellant's reputation, it is strictly unnecessary to determine whether the consequences for future relationships or job prospects would of themselves be sufficient to engage it. I am inclined to think that they would not, although the damage to these interests does reinforce the conclusion that prima facie Article 8 is engaged because of the adverse effect of the dismissal on the appellant's reputation.
Article 8 and the employee's own conduct.
"[Article 8] cannot be relied upon in order to complain of a loss of reputation which is the foreseeable consequence of one's own actions such as the commission of a criminal offence."
v
Slovakia [2011] Application No 4479/03 although the Court found that it was inapplicable in that case because the applicant was never charged or proved to have committed the wrong-doing whose communication to third parties had caused damage to her reputation. It was not possible to say that she had been the author of her own misfortune.
v
Cyprus [2009] Application No 39058/05 ECtHR which again reiterated the Sidabras principle. In that case a senior police officer was dismissed for negligently permitting torture by his subordinates. It was found by the Supreme Court in Cyprus that he had been dismissed in
violation
of a constitutional right to be presumed innocent. The ECtHR held that his Article 8 rights had been infringed, given the damage to his moral and psychological integrity and reputation. The court repeated the principle that Article 8 cannot be relied upon where the damage to reputation is the foreseen consequence of one's own actions but continued:
"[The court] notes however that the applicant had never been convicted of the commission of the offences in relation to which he had been dismissed. His responsibility in this respect had never been determined or established in criminal, civil or even disciplinary proceedings while the officers under his command had been acquitted of the offences with which they had been charged and the domestic court had found that there had been no case for the defence to answer."
view,
these cases clearly establish the principle relied on by the employer. However, they also confirm that an employee must have been shown to have committed any wrong-doing before the principle can be invoked. Although these cases do not say so in terms, in my judgment logically they would also require that the process leading to that determination has been conducted properly.
Procedural fairness and Article 8.
v
UK (1995) 20 EHRR 205 para 102, the Commission in its opinion observed:
"While there are no explicit procedural requirements contained in Article 8, the case law of the Commission and Court establish that in this area, where decisions may have a drastic effect on the relations between parent and child and become irreversible, there is particular need for protection against arbitrary interferences. In a case where it was alleged that the local authority had not consulted the parents of a child in its care before taking crucial decisions as to its future, the Court adopted the following approach:
In the Court'sview,
what therefore has to be determined is whether, having regard to the particular circumstances of the case and notably the serious nature of the decisions to be taken, the parents have been involved in the decision-making process, seen as a whole, to a degree sufficient to provide them with the requisite protection of their interests. If they have not, there will have been a failure to respect their family life and the interference resulting from the decision will not be capable of being regarded as 'necessary' within the meaning of Article 8."
v
UK (1997) 23 EHRR 101, para76, the court used the language of fairness, observing that:
"the decision making process leading to measures of interference must be fair and such as to afford due respect to the interests safeguarded to the individual by Article 8."
verbatim
in many subsequent decisions including in the more recent case of Turek
v
Slovakia (2007) 44 EHRR 43 where, after citing the passage in Buckley, the court later added, with respect to Article 8 procedures (para.113) :
"In particular, the Court will examine whether the procedural protection enjoyed by the applicant at the domestic level in respect of his right to respect for his private life under Art.8 of the Convention was practical and effective and consequently compatible with that Article."
Bringing the consequences on herself.
view
this is an academic debate. On the employer's case, Article 8 is only excluded once it is shown that dismissal was an appropriate sanction to impose for the misconduct in issue following a fair procedure. But if that is the case, the dismissal will be in accordance with Article 8. Paradoxically, therefore, in order to demonstrate that the employee has brought the consequences upon herself and that Article 8 is not engaged, it is first necessary to show that the principles of Article 8 have been complied with. Whether at that stage the case fails on the grounds that Article 8 was not engaged, or on the basis that it was engaged but the dismissal was justified under Article 8(2) is of no practical significance (although strictly I think that the former is the correct analysis).
Is there a difference between the two tests?
v
Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45; [2010] 3 WLR 1441, that it is for the court to determine whether Article 8 has been infringed or not; it is not enough simply to review on traditional administrative law grounds the assessment of the decision maker. A test which focuses on the conduct of the hypothetical reasonable employer fails to provide the necessary protection.
v
Y (para 59(4)) I find it
very
difficult to see how a procedure which could be considered objectively fair if adopted by a reasonable employer could nonetheless be properly described as an unfair procedure within the meaning of Article 8. I accept that where Article 8 interests are engaged, matters bearing on the culpability of the employee must be investigated with a full appreciation of the potentially adverse consequences to the employee. But the band of reasonable responses test allows for a heightened standard to be adopted where those consequences are particularly grave. A
v
B and the Roldan cases exemplify that approach. The assessment of the procedure is made by the tribunal and not the employer, and in making it the tribunal is adopting an objective test of whether the employer has acted as a reasonable employer might do. Accordingly, I see no breach of Article 8.
v
Spain (2012) 54 EHRR 24 four applicants before the Court had published two articles, worded in
vulgar
language, which criticised two fellow employees for giving evidence in favour of the employer in proceedings brought against the employer by the trade union. The articles were published in the workplace. In addition they published a cartoon showing the two employees giving sexual favours to the director of human resources. The applicants were dismissed for serious misconduct. They alleged a breach of their Article 10 rights and also claimed that the real reason for their dismissal was their trade union activities. Their dismissals were found to be justified under Spanish law and their appeal to the Strasbourg Court was unsuccessful. The majority of the Grand Chamber (presided over by Judge Bratza) recognised that disproportionate penalties could conceal anti-union hostility but concluded that the courts had carefully examined the facts and reached a legitimate conclusion taking account of the competing interests at stake. Two passages in the judgment of the court demonstrate that even in the Strasbourg context some deference is paid to the
views
of the employer. In the part of the judgment setting out the facts, in a section headed "Elements of comparative law", the following observation is made (para. 29):
"Disciplinary authority is one of the essential prerogatives of the employer, whether private or public. In this connection employers have a broad discretion to impose the sanction that they consider the best adapted to the accusations against the employee; the scale of possible sanctions encompasses the power to dismiss a person who has seriously compromised the interests of the company or the public service. In parallel, this power of dismissal is accompanied by a prohibition on dismissing employees on grounds relating to trade-union activity. A measure of dismissal may be based on misconduct or on a legitimate ground. In the first case it relates to a given – identified – form of conduct. In the second, the conduct is considered in general terms."
"Moreover, an examination of the comparative-law material available to the Court reveals that employers generally enjoy broad discretion in determining the sanction that is best adapted to accusations against an employee; the scale of possible sanctions encompasses the power to dismiss a person who has seriously compromised the interests of the company. In the countries examined, the domestic legislation seeks to reconcile the employee's right to freedom of expression with the employer's rights and prerogatives, requiring in particular that a dismissal measure be proportionate to the conduct of the employee against whom it is taken. The homogeneity of European legal systems in this area is a relevant factor in balancing thevarious
rights and interests at stake in the present case."
"the measure of dismissal taken against the applicants was not a manifestly disproportionate or excessive sanction…"
The word "manifestly" of itself suggests that some deference should be paid to the
views
of management that dismissal is an appropriate sanction.
The alleged procedural failures in this case.
(1) The appellant claimed that sometimes when her machine issued an ANI this was because the machine was temporarily broken. She would return to the back cab and fix the machine. It may be that one of the ticket inspectors (those who inspect tickets and randomly check that passengers have bought tickets) may have sold passengers the appropriate ticket before the appellant had fixed her machine and been able to do so. The appellant submitted that the employers would have been able to show from their records which inspectors were on the appellant's
train
during
various
journeys and for what stages of those journeys, and that might have indicated that there were occasions when this had in fact happened.
(2) The appellant contended that she had particular problems with the Avantix machine and was regularly returning to the back cab to fix it.
(3) She contended that it was extremely difficult to manipulate an Avantix machine so as to produce a sufficiently authentic ANI.
(4) She also claimed that the ANIs had not necessarily been retained satisfactorily by the employers and some of her missing ANIs could be ascribed to the fact that they may have been lost after having been returned by her.
"The explanation for not pursuing this line of enquiry is perfectly satisfactory. It does not constitute a failure on the part of any investigating officer to look for exculpating matters. This is not, of course, any more than a possible means of establishing that at some point an identical ticket to one of the missing ANIs may have been issued by another person, it would not establish that this was in fact a replacement ticket in any particular case nor would it answer the question of why the ANI was missing or go directly to the issue of why the claimant had a disproportionate number of suspicious ANIs."
train
given that it would have provided equivocal information at best. Moreover, the possibility would apply equally to the other conductors. The other matters were investigated as thoroughly as could be expected.
view
the inference was legitimate and there is no perceptible bias or error in the judgment.
If the test is different, would it have made any difference?
Sir Stephen Sedley:
view
anything which tends to diminish respect for the individual's private life, in the generous sense in which the Strasbourg court construes that phrase, engages article 8(1) and calls for justification under 8(2). But on the
view
which I prefer, an adjudication which accords proper respect to the individual's personality and capacity for social interaction does not "engage" article 8(1) at all in the sense of disclosing an apparent breach. On this
view, the task of the employment tribunal is to invigilate the employment relationship by requiring the dismissal process to conform to a standard of fairness calibrated, among other things, to the grounds and consequences of the threatened dismissal. By this means, which is of a piece with s.98(4), the state complies with its obligation under the Convention and the individual secures the benefit of the Convention right.
Lord Justice Maurice Kay: