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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Carr v Vehicle Control Services Ltd [2025] EWCA Civ 713 (11 June 2025) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2025/713.html Cite as: [2025] EWCA Civ 713 |
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ON APPEAL FROM MANCHESTER CIVIL JUSTICE CENTRE
HER HONOUR JUDGE EVANS
F9QZ07M8
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
LORD JUSTICE MOYLAN
and
LORD JUSTICE PHILLIPS
____________________
PHILLIP CARR |
Appellant/defendant |
|
- and - |
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VEHICLE CONTROL SERVICES LTD |
Respondent/claimant |
____________________
Jackson
Yamba
(instructed by Lawrence and Associates) for the Appellant
John Craggs (instructed by ELMS Legal Ltd) for the Respondent
Hearing date: 4 March 2025
____________________
Crown Copyright ©
Lord Justice Moylan:
Background
Legal Framework
"Service of the claim form where the defendant does not give an address at which the defendant may be served
6.9 (1) This rule applies where –
(a) rule 6.5(1) (personal service);
(b) rule 6.7 (service of claim form on solicitor); and
(c) rule 6.8 (defendant gives address at which the defendant may be served), do not apply and the claimant does not wish to effect personal service under rule 6.5(2).
(2) Subject to paragraphs (3) to (6), the claim form must be served on the defendant at the place shown in the following table."
The table provides, under entry 1, that an individual must be served at their "Usual or last known residence".
"(3) Where a claimant has reason to believe that the address of the defendant referred to in entries 1, 2 or 3 in the table in paragraph (2) is an address at which the defendant no longer resides or carries on business, the claimant must take reasonable steps to ascertain the address of the defendant's current residence or place of business.
(4) Where, having taken the reasonable steps required by paragraph (3), the claimant –
(a) ascertains the defendant's current address, the claim form must be served at that address; or
(b) is unable to ascertain the defendant's current address, the claimant must consider whether there is –
(i) an alternative place where; or
(ii) an alternative method by which,
service may be effected.
(5) If, under paragraph (4)(b), there is such a place where or a method by which service may be effected, the claimant must make an application under rule 6.15.
(6) Where paragraph (3) applies, the claimant may serve on the defendant's usual or last known address in accordance with the table in paragraph (2) where the claimant –
(a) cannot ascertain the defendant's current residence or place of business; and
(b) cannot ascertain an alternative place or an alternative method under paragraph (4)(b)." (emphasis added)
"(1) Where the claim form is served within the jurisdiction, the claimant must complete the step required by the following table in relation to the particular method of service chosen, before 12.00 midnight on the calendar day four months after the date of issue of the claim form."
"[67] It follows that, in the absence of some other identifiable error, such as (without attempting an exhaustive account) a material error of law, or the making of a critical finding of fact which has no basis in the evidence, or a demonstrable misunderstanding of relevant evidence, or a demonstrable failure to consider relevant evidence, an appellate court will interfere with the findings of fact made by a trial judge only if it is satisfied that his decision cannot reasonably be explained or justified."
"[18] Finally, it is relevant to note the limited function of an appellate court in relation to a lower court's finding as to habitual residence. Where the lower court has applied the correct legal principles to the relevant facts, its evaluation is not generally open to challenge unless the conclusion which it reached was not one which was reasonably open to it."
District Judge Iyer's Judgment
"[2] However, if they get information that gives them reason to believe he is not at that address, they do not need to know what the new address is, but reason to believe that he is not at that address, then 6.9(3) is engaged."
He decided that the Claimant did have reason to believe that the Defendant was not at the address provided by the DVLA because he had telephoned the Claimant and told them that he was a tenant at the Premises and had the right to park there. His finding in the last sentence of paragraph 2 was as follows:
"I find that ringing [the Claimant] up and saying, I am a tenant here, you can have the right to park here, that should have told them that he was not living at [the address given by the DVLA], but he was living at the apartments where the alleged breach of parking occurred."
"[5] I do not think that the mere number of tickets issued would be sufficient, but these two phone calls, plus the fact that they were not getting any response from the Defendant, put them on notice.
[6] For that reason I do set aside judgment. I would add that I think the Defendant would have had some difficulty on the other grounds, but these two phone calls are sufficient."
Her Honour Judge Evans' judgment
"[12] Notwithstanding that high bar, in my judgment the appeal must succeed on this ground [that the District Judge was wrong to decide that service was defective] and it must succeed for this reason. The district judge referred in his judgment to two telephone calls which should have put the Claimant on notice of the change of address. In fact, although there were two telephone calls, only one of them makes any reference to this Defendant being a tenant. The district judge appears to have proceeded on the basis that in both calls the Defendant referred to being a tenant. That is an error, it seems to me, in terms of the evidence upon which he based his decision. It may be, had he identified that in fact there was only one call in which the Defendant made this point, that he would have come to a different conclusion." (emphasis added)
Appeal
Determination
Conclusion
Lord Justice Phillips:
Lord Justice Bean: