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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> Ayinde, R (On the Application Of) v The London Borough of Haringey [2025] EWHC 1040 (Admin) (03 April 2025) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2025/1040.html Cite as: [2025] WLR(D) 249, [2025] EWHC 1040 (Admin) |
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KING'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Strand London WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
____________________
THE KING (on the application of) FREDERICK AYINDE |
Claimant |
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- and - |
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THE LONDON BOROUGH OF HARINGEY |
Defendant |
____________________
DAVID MOLD (C) for the Defendant
____________________
Crown Copyright ©
Mr Justice Ritchie:
"d) Relief from sanctions so that we can participate in the trial of this matter on 3 April2025
despite not having filed detailed grounds of resistance".
Then 2:
"To make a wasted costs order under section 51(6) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 against:
a) Haringey Law Centre, andb) Ms Sarah Forey of counsel".
"The Defendant who wishes to contest the claim or support it on additional grounds shall within 35 days of the date of service of this order file and serve a detailed grounds of contesting and any written evidence".
"(1) Where a person served with a claim form has failed to file an acknowledgement of service in accordance with rule 54.8e(a), he may not take part in a hearing to decide whether permission should be given, but provided he complies with rule 54.14 or any other direction of the court regarding file and service of:
i) detailed grounds for contesting a claim or supporting it on additional grounds and
ii) any written evidence,
may take part in a hearing of the judicial review".
The Defendant has not filed an acknowledgement of service and has not filed detailed grounds for contesting the claim and therefore may not take part in the hearing of the judicial review, which is the hearing today. The Defendant is debarred from doing so.
"A Defendant and any other person served with a claim form who wishes to contest the claim or support it on additional grounds must file and serve detailed grounds for contesting the claim or supporting it and any written evidence within 35 days of the order giving permission".
Submissions were heard
MR JUSTICE RITCHIE:
"There is nothing serious to suggest he requires urgent or operative intervention or that his kidney disease adversely affects him day to day".
I must say, I find that evidence remarkable and surprising, when compared with the evidence from the North Mids hospital, the Royal Free hospital and from the Claimant's GP.
Submissions on the Wasted Costs application
MR JUSTICE RITCHIE:
(1) The first is that the Claimant's barrister and solicitor put five fake cases in the Claimant's statement of facts and grounds for the judicial review. Those are in paragraphs 17, 20, 24, 27 and 28.
(2) Secondly, that when requested to produce copies of those cases, they did not.
(3) Thirdly, that in the statement of facts and grounds at paragraphs 15 and 16 and by implication throughout, the Claimant's lawyers asserted that section 188(3) of the Housing Act 1996 was a "Must" provision instead of a discretionary "May" provision.
"(1) This rule applies where the court is considering whether to make an order under section 51(6) of the Senior Courts Act of 1981 (court's power to disallow or (as the case may be) order a legal representative to meet 'wasted costs')."
(2) the court will give the legal representative a reasonable opportunity to make written submissions or if the legal representative prefers, to attend a hearing before it makes such an order.
(3) when the court makes a wasted costs order it will:
a) specify the amount to be disallowed or paid; or
b) direct a costs judge or a district judge to decide the amount of costs to be disallowed or paid.
(4) The court may direct that notice be given to the legal representative's client in such manner as the court may direct".
Para. 5.1 states:
"A wasted costs order is an order that the legal representative pay a sum, either specified or to be assessed, in respect of costs to a party", or (b): "For costs relating to a specified sum or item of work to be disallowed".
Para. 5.2 states that rule 46.8 deals with wasted costs orders against legal representatives:
"Such orders can be made at any stage in the proceedings up to and including the detailed assessment proceedings. In general, applications for wasted costs are best left until after the end of the trial".
5.3: "The court may make a wasted costs order against a legal representative on its own initiative".
5.4: "A party may apply for a wasted costs order by filing an application notice in accordance with part 23 or (b) by making an application orally in the course of the hearing".
5.5: "It is appropriate for the court to make a wasted costs order against a legal representative only if:
a) the legal representative has acted improperly, unreasonably or negligently;
b) the legal representative's conduct has caused a party to incur unnecessary costs or has meant that costs incurred by a party prior to the improper, unreasonable or negligent act or omission have been wasted;
c) it is just in all the circumstances to order a legal representative to compensate that party for the whole or part of those costs".
"Thank you for your email. We write in respect of your letter dated 13 February2025
on the matter at subject is referred (sic)".
(I have not made an error in reading that part out.)
"We regret to say that we still do not see the point you are making by correlating any errors in citations to the issues addressed in the request for judicial review in this matter. Admittedly, there could be some concessions from our side in relation to any erroneous citation in the grounds, which are easily explained and can be corrected on the record if it were immediately necessary to do so. What you have not done is to refute the veracity of the points and legal arguments that prevailed against your position and any failures of your client to measure up to its obligations under the 1996 Act. Indeed, it appears that you have not only taken any and all of our paraphrases and references out of context, but that you have also misinterpreted the context, scope and authority of section 188(3) of the said Act.
We do not think that our duty of care should go so far as to provide legal interpretation of the laws for your benefit, but we hasten to say that section 188(3) provides for discretionary action in relation to section 202 and so long as that duty falls outside section 189B(2). It is not a broad brushed discretion that results from the 'May' in that subsection. We therefore do not quite grasp in what context you say: Haringey have a discretion. There is no obligation.
So let us agree that the citation errors can be corrected on the record ahead of our April hearing. Apart from adding our deepest apologies, we do not consider that we are obliged to explain anything further to you directly. You may better serve your organisation by giving attention not to the normative discoveries you have made, but whether you can locate the authorities in support of the points raised, which points you are clearly in agreement with, as demonstrated both by conduct in offering the necessary relief to our client and acting in accordance with the mandate of your client.
We hope that you are not raising these errors as technicalities to avoid undertaking really serious legal research. Treating with citations is a totally separate matter for which we will take full responsibility. It appears to us improper to barter our client's legal position for cosmetic errors as serious as those can be for us as legal practitioners. For the foregoing reasons alone, your claim for costs and the costs of your letters are rejected as without foundation. Your response or arguments in defence cannot rely on errors in citation to prevail but on the evidential and meritorious basis of your points. We will prepare the bundle index and send this to you shortly for your consideration".
"Under section 188(3) of the Housing Act 1996, the respondent is obliged to provide interim accommodation pending the review decision. The failure to do so violates statutory and procedural obligations".
"The statutory duty under section 188(3) of the Housing Act 1996 requires a local authority to provide interim accommodation when an individual has applied for a review of a homelessness decision. The Respondent's failure to provide such accommodation despite the ongoing review process presents a clear breach of this duty. This procedural impropriety has deprived the Claimant of his statutory rights and placed him in a situation of continued homelessness".
"In R (on the application of El Gendi) v Camden London Borough Council [2020]EWHC 2435 (Admin),
the High Court emphasised that failing to provide interim accommodation during the review process undermines the protective purposes of homelessness legislation. The court found that such a failure not only constitutes a breach of statutory duty but also creates unnecessary hardship for vulnerable individuals. The respondent's similar failure in the present case demonstrates a procedural impropriety warranting judicial review".
"Moreover, in R (on the application of Ibrahim) v Waltham Forest LBC [2019]EWHC 1873 (Admin),
the court quashed the local authority decision due to its failure to properly consider the applicant's medical needs, underscoring for necessity the careful evaluation of such evidence in homelessness determinations. The respondent's failure to consider the appellant's medical conditions in their entirety, despite being presented with comprehensive medical documentation, renders their decision procedurally improper and irrational".
"The appellant's situation mirrors the facts in R (on the application of H) v Ealing London Borough Council [2021]EWHC 939 (Admin)
where the court found the local authority's failure to provide interim accommodation irrational in light of the appellant's vulnerability and the potential consequences of homelessness. The respondent's conduct in this case similarly lacks a rational basis and demonstrates a failure to properly exercise its discretion".
"The respondent's failure to provide a timely response and its refusal to offer interim accommodation have denied the appellant a fair opportunity to secure his rights under the homelessness legislation. This breach is further highlighted in R (on the application of KN) v Barnet LBC [2020]EWHC 1066 (Admin)
where the court held that procedural fairness includes timely decision-making and the provision of necessary accommodation during the review process. The respondent's failure to adhere to these principles constitutes a breach of the duty to act fairly".
That sounds fine. The trouble is, the case does not exist, it was a fake.
"The appellant's case further aligns with the principles set out in R (on the application of Balogun) v London Borough of Lambeth [2020] EWCA Civ 1442 — where the Court of Appeal emphasise that local authorities must ensure fair treatment of applicants in the homelessness review process. The respondent's conduct in failing to provide interim accommodation or a timely decision breaches the standard of fairness".
"For the avoidance of doubt, we confirm this statement only includes work relating to these judicial review proceedings from 4 February onwards".
It does not say that it only relates to the costs of the wasted costs application. In those circumstances I will assess it down £4,000. I do not assess down counsel's brief fee for the hearing, which is £2,100 plus VAT on top. I allow that in full, I allow the court fees in full. Therefore, when assessing it down to £4,000 in total, it is the solicitors' fees that are being reduced.
Submissions
MR JUSTICE RITCHIE:
_________________________
END