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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Commercial Court) Decisions >> XL Insurance Company SE v Ipors Underwriting Ltd & Ors [2021] EWHC 1407 (Comm) (26 May 2021) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Comm/2021/1407.html Cite as: [2021] EWHC 1407 (Comm) |
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QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
COMMERCIAL COURT
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
____________________
XL INSURANCE COMPANY SE |
Claimant |
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- and - |
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(1) IPORS UNDERWRITING LIMITED (2) PAUL ALAN ![]() (3) ![]() (4) HER MAJESTY'S REVENUE AND CUSTOMS |
Defendants |
____________________
The Defendants were not present and were not represented.
Hearing date: 23 April 2021
____________________
VERSION
OF APPROVED JUDGMENT
Crown Copyright ©
Mrs Justice Cockerill :
Introduction
Factual Background
The claim
The Injunctions and disclosure obtained by IPORS
"6. Until judgment or further order of the Court, the Respondents [IPORS and MrCorcoran]
must not:
(1) remove from England and Wales any of its assets which are in England and Wales up to thevalue
GBP 4,500,000; or
(2) dispose of, deal with or diminish thevalue
of any of its assets whether they are in or outside of England and Wales up to the same
value.[
]
10.
(1) Unless sub-paragraph (3) below applies, the Respondents must within 72 hours of service of this order provide and to the best of their ability inform the Applicant's legal representatives all their assets worldwide exceeding £10,000 invalue
whether in their own name(s) or not and whether solely or jointly owned, giving the
value,
location and details of all such assets.
(2) The Respondents must inform the Applicant's legal representatives, to the best of the Respondents' knowledge and belief in writing within 72 hours of service of this order, in relation to funds in the Accounts [as defined in paragraph 5 of the order, constituting the proprietary injunction], save for those relating to insurers other than the Applicant:
(a) What has become of such funds?
(b) What assets were acquired in whole or part for such funds?
(c) Any transfer of such funds from the Premium Accounts including:
(i) The purpose of any transfer.
(ii) The transferee
(iii) What has become of any funds transferred
(iv) What assets were acquired in whole or part by the transfer of such funds.
(3) If the provision of any of the information in paragraph 10(1) is likely to incriminate the Respondents, it may be entitled to refuse to provide it, but is recommended to take legal advice before refusing to provide the information. Wrongful refusal to provide the information is contempt of court and may render the Respondents liable to be imprisoned, fined or have its assets seized.
(4) Within 5 days after being served with this Order, the Respondents must swear and serve on the Applicant's legal representatives an affidavit setting out the information referred to at paragraphs 10(1) and (2) of this Order.
(5) The requirements of sub-paragraphs (1)-(4) above are without prejudice to the Applicant's rights, including to bring contempt of court proceedings, for the Respondents' non-compliance with the disclosure orders contained in the orders of HHJ Waksman QC (Sitting as Judge of the High Court) dated 16 June 2017, 30 June 2017 and 20 September 2017 respectively.
11.
(1) This Order does not prohibit the First Respondent from spending £500 a week towards his ordinary living expenses and does not prohibit the Respondents from spending a reasonable sum on legal advice and representation. But before spending any money the Respondents must tell the Applicant's legal representatives where the money is to come from. However, the assets referred to at paragraphs 5(1) and (2) of this Order cannot be sold or otherwise dealt with in order to fund such expenditure as is otherwise permitted under this paragraph."
Service of the Injunctions on Mr Corcoran
Mr Corcoran's
disclosure
Proceeding in absence and adjournment
Factual Background
"I feel that it is only fair that I get legal assistance to protect my position and rights. I would like them to be able to represent me at the hearing today on the 23rd April 2021 as they arranged at the last hearing or if not at a future hearing to be arranged between all parties."
The relevant legal principles
"12. Contempt proceedings are quasi-criminal proceedings, as Lord Justice Oliver there emphasises, and they are criminal proceedings for the purposes of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. I was therefore referred to consideration by the House of Lords as to when a criminal trial can take place in the absence of the defendant. This was in the case of Rv
Jones (Anthony) [2002] UKHL 5 [2003] I AC 1. There their Lordships approved, with one qualification, the guidance given in that case in the Court of Appeal in a judgment of the court delivered by Lord Justice Rose, R
v
Hayward [2001] QB 862. The Court of Appeal, after noting the general right of a defendant to be present at his trial and indeed to be legally represented, and the discretion of the trial judge to proceed without him, said this (at para.22):
'That discretion must be exercised with great care and it is only in rare and exceptional cases that it should be exercised in favour of a trial taking place or continuing, particularly if the defendant is unrepresented. In exercising that discretion fairness to the defence is of prime importance, but fairness to the prosecution must also be taken into account. The judge must have regard to all the circumstances of the case, including in particular ...'
The Court of Appeal then set outvarious
factors to be considered:
'(1) The nature and circumstances of the defendant's behaviour in absenting himself from the trial or disrupting it, as the case may be and, in particular, whether his behaviour was deliberate,voluntary
and such as plainly waived his right to appear;
(2) Whether an adjournment might result in the defendant being caught or attendingvoluntarily
and/or not disrupting the proceedings;
(3) The likely length of such an adjournment;
(4) Whether the defendant, though absent, is, or wishes to be, legally represented at the trial or has, by his conduct, waived his right to representation.
(6) The extent of the disadvantage to the defendant in not being able to give his account of events, having regard to the nature of the evidence against him. .
(9) The general public interest and the particular interest ofvictims
and witnesses that a trial should take place within a reasonable time of the events to which it relates.'"
"(i) Whether the respondents have been served with the relevant documents, including notice of this hearing;
(ii) Whether the respondents have had sufficient notice to enable them to prepare for the hearing;
(iii) Whether any reason has been advanced for their non-appearance;
(iv) Whether by reference to the nature and circumstances of the respondents' behaviour, they have waived their right to be present; [i.e. is it reasonable to conclude that the respondents knew of or were indifferent to the consequences of the case proceeding in their absence?]
(v)
Whether an adjournment would be likely to secure the attendance of the respondent or facilitate their representation;
(vi)
The extent of the disadvantage to the respondents in not being able to present their account of events;
(vii)
Whether undue prejudice would be caused to the applicant by any delay;
(viii)
Whether undue prejudice would be caused to the forensic process if the application was to proceed in the absence of the respondents;
(ix) The terms of the 'overriding objective' [including the obligation on the court to deal with the case justly, including doing so expeditiously and fairly and taking any step or making any order for the purposes of furthering the overriding objective]."
Application
a) Service: Mr Corcoran
has been deemed to have been served on 3 February 2021 by the order of Waksman J of 19 February 2021.
b) Sufficiency of notice: Mr Corcoran
has had sufficient notice of the hearing. Mr
Corcoran
has been deemed served over two months before the hearing of this application and RHF, while not formally instructed, attended the listing hearing on his behalf, which hearing itself was over a month before this hearing. His email to the Court the morning of the hearing also confirms that he has had notice.
c) Reason: Mr Corcoran
did not expressly give any reason for his non-attendance in his correspondence, including his email to the court on the day of the hearing. His concern about lack of legal representation is addressed below, but I do not regard it as a matter which would preclude the Court proceeding in absence if the balance otherwise tilted in that direction.
d) Waiver of right to be present: I find that Mr Corcoran
has waived his right to be present. Mr
Corcoran
clearly knew of this hearing and chose not to be here. He was well aware of the consequences of the case proceeding in his absence as made clear by RHF's email of 16 February 2021.
e) Adjournment facilitating representation/attendance: at the outset of the hearing I raised the question of whether I should adjourn the hearing and issue a bench warrant. Mr England, for XL, submitted that in the light of the difficulties of effecting personal service and the continuing uncertainty as to whether Mr Corcoran
was even within the jurisdiction, it would be unlikely that issuing a bench warrant would secure attendance. Mr England described Mr
Corcoran
as "a mobile character" and expressed doubts as to the usefulness of an adjournment and issuing of a bench warrant. With some reluctance, I accept Mr England's submission. The affidavit evidence shows that XL went to great length to identify Mr
Corcoran's
whereabouts. While XL's agents were not invested with the power of arrest that a bench warrant would grant, I am satisfied that they took all reasonable steps to find Mr
Corcoran
and that they did not succeed in doing so. Despite all their efforts it is entirely unclear where Mr
Corcoran
is or whether he is susceptible to the powers of compulsion of this court. In the light of this, it appears unlikely that issuing a bench warrant would secure the attendance of Mr
Corcoran.
I address the issue of representation separately below.
f) Disadvantage to Mr Corcoran:
Mr
Corcoran
has not adduced any evidence challenging XL's allegations. I was taken to the relevant documentary evidence by Mr England and I do not see that Mr
Corcoran
would have been in a better position, had he been present.
g) Undue prejudice from delay: I am satisfied that there would be undue prejudice to XL in further delay. Given the apparently uncontentious facts and my findings below, there is a continued risk of dissipation of undisclosed assets.
h) Undue prejudice to the forensic process: There is no reason for thinking that proceeding in Mr Corcoran's
absence would cause undue prejudice to the forensic process.
i) Overriding objective: I find that considering the overriding objective supports the exceptional course of proceeding in Mr Corcoran's
absence.
Funding of representation
"[20] I summarised the applicable legal principles in the case of GFH Capital Limitedv
Haigh [2018] EWHC 1187 (Comm) at [34] (I add comments in square brackets for ease of reference): '[ ] The law is now well established and is summarised as a three-stage test.
(i) before there can be any question of using funds to which a claimant has a strong proprietary claim, the defendant must show that he has an arguable case for denying they belong to the claimant; [The First Stage]
(ii) where there are assets which may belong to the claimant, the defendant should not be entitled to use those funds unless the court is convinced that the defendant has no other assets to use for this purpose, and the onus is firmly on the defendant to satisfy the court of this, and where there are any such funds, they should be expended before there is any question of expending funds subject to a proprietary claim; [The Second Stage]
(iii) if the court can be satisfied that there are no assets other than those subject to a proprietary claim, the court must nevertheless still weigh whether the balance of justice militates in favour of permitting or refusing the payment [The Third Stage] '"
Conclusion on proceeding in the defendant's absence
The substantive application
"In order to establish that someone is in contempt it is necessary to show that (i) that he knew of the terms of the order; (ii) that he acted (or failed to act) in a manner which involved a breach of the order; and (iii) that he knew of the facts which made his conduct a breach: Marketmaker Technology (Beijing) Co Ltdv
Obair Group International Corporation & Ors [2009] EWHC 1445 (QB)."
"once knowledge of the order is proved, and once it is proved that the contemnor knew that he was doing or omitting to do certain things, then it is not necessary for the contemnor to know that his actions put him in breach of the order; it is enough that as a matter of fact and law, they do so put him in breach."
Knowledge of the terms of the Injunctions
Breach
Mr Corcoran's
asset position
a) Mr Corcoran's
main known property, Moseley Road, was purchased in 2014 for £840,000. There is evidence that an offer of £1,050,000 has recently been made. However, NatWest has a charge over the property and, on 9 March 2020, obtained a possession order which stated that there was an outstanding balance of £853,354.39.
b) Mr Corcoran's
Nationwide account had a balance of £313,737.25 on 26 October 2017, shortly after it was opened. The last balance shown on 31 October 2018 was £6.06.
c) Mr Corcoran's
Coutts account was opened on 3 May 2017. The greatest balance it had was £54,986.79 on 20 February 2018. The account's closing balance on 1 March 2019 was -£47,936.60.
d) Mr Corcoran's
NatWest account contained £217,345.07 when it was frozen by NatWest on 21 September 2017.
e) Mr Corcoran's
email of 23 April 2021 suggests that XL managed to freeze the Monzo account in February 2021 and that it contains £11,000 in rent payments.
f) Mr Corcoran
declared nil income for the 2016-17 tax year.
g) The draft tax schedule prepared by Harold Sharp, but not approved by Mr Corcoran,
records dividends from IPORS in the
value
of £1,701,704.00. Harold Sharp states that it does not hold dividend
vouchers
or board meeting minutes of IPORS. That contradicts his nil income declaration to
HMRC.
Even if true, that figure is well below the relevant level and apart from the IPORS dividends, the draft tax schedule does not record any significant income.
a) IPORS' last available balance sheet (filed for the year ending on 31 March 2016) shows current assets of £630,833 and maximum trading fees/commission of £2,836,800. IPORS' NatWest business account had a balance of £2,569.08 when it was frozen by NatWest on or around 16 June 2017.
b) Cheshire Cars has not filed any accounts since it was incorporated on 25 June 2016.
c) Companies House does not show Mr Corcoran
as being a director or Person of Significant Control with respect to any other company.
Disclosure
Spending
a) Payments of £8,359.20 on 3 November 2017 and £880 on 14 December 2017 to the Savoy Hotel, London.
b) A payment of £9,360 to MUFC (Manchester United Football Club) on 16 November 2017.
c) A payment of £6,460.52 to the Ritz Carlton Hotel, Aruba on 16 November 2017.
d) A payment of 26,892.73 to Luxury Resort Hotels in Paris on 29 November 2017.
e) A payment of £4,800 to Boodles at the Savoy Hotel, London on 2 December 2017.
f) A payment of £673.70 to Oddfellows on the Park (a luxury hotel in Cheadle ) on 4 December 2017.
g) A payment of £3,248.98 for a luxury resort in Male in The Maldives dated 22 January 2018.
a) A payment of £2,230 to Selfridges on 20 October 2017.
b) A payment of £5,110,00 to Selfridges on 7 November 2017.
c) A payment of £775.00 to Selfridges on 8 November 2017.
d) Payment of £6,063.99 on 29 June 2018 to Sumners (a Manchester based electronics retailer).
Awareness of relevant facts
a) A conscious decision over spending after the date of the Injunctions, and regarding disclosure.
b) That he wanted to provide XL with "any information they required" and also at [6] of his email to have always provided information to XL. That is manifestly inaccurate.
c) He blames the absence of disclosure on not having lawyers. This is no answer. A litigant in person can perfectly well provide disclosure of his assets. Mr Corcoran
has failed to provide even basic disclosure, notwithstanding being a sophisticated businessman. This relates to all his bank accounts, even those XL has shown he currently uses, such as at Monzo Bank.
d) It is of course no defence that (even if true) the defendant believed what he was doing did not infringe the requirements of the injunctions. (Gee at [19-005]).
e) The allegations at [7] regarding the alleged credits relate to the underlying claim and have no bearing on the contempt application. These allegations, like the others made, have never been evidenced. The matters pleaded in the RRRPOC [16], however are supported by forensic accountancy analysis and based on bank statements. Mr Corcoran
has never offered any explanation or documentation to explain the unpaid premium funds or the payments to him listed in Annex C of the RRRPOC. The Injunctions also make clear the freezing injunction applies to his assets as well as the proprietary assets (listed in the separate section titled "Proprietary Injunction").
f) Mr Corcoran's
points at [14] of his email also gain no traction. It is wrong to suggest that XL's actions prevented him from providing financial information in relation to the First Defendant or any other business. Certain business expenditure is permitted on the terms set out in the exceptions to the Injunctions. The Companies House records show that the reason IPORS and the Third Defendant faced suspension from the Register of Companies was because Mr
Corcoran
has been several years late in providing the accounts for these companies.
Conclusion
Sentencing
"whereas it will always remain appropriate to consider in individual cases whether committal is necessary, and what is the shortest time necessary for such imprisonment, and whether a sentence of imprisonment can be suspended, or dispensed with altogether: nevertheless, it must now be accepted that the attack on the administration of justice which is made when a freezing order is breached usually merits an immediate sentence of imprisonment of some not insubstantial amount."
"55. I derive the following propositions concerning sentence for civil contempt, when such contempt consists of non-compliance with the disclosure provisions of a freezing order:
(i) Freezing orders are made for good reason and in order to prevent the dissipation or spiriting away of assets. Any substantial breach of such an order is a serious matter, which merits condign punishment.
(ii) Condign punishment for such contempt normally means a prison sentence. However, there may be circumstances in which a substantial fine is sufficient: for example, if the contempt has been purged and the relevant assets recovered.
(iii) Where there is a continuing failure to disclose relevant information, the court should consider imposing a long sentence, possibly even the maximum of two years, in order to encourage future co-operation by the contemnor.
56. In the case of continuing breach, out of fairness to the contemnor, the court may see fit to indicate (a) what portion of the sentence should be served in any event as punishment for past breaches and (b) what portion of the sentence the court might consider remitting in the event of prompt and full compliance thereafter. Any such indication would be persuasive, but not binding upon a future court.
57. It should also be noted that what the court is passing is a nominal sentence. The actual time spent in prison will be less, because of remission, possible release on tagging and so forth. The court does not have regard to those factors in determining the proper sentence in any case."
a) The time that has passed in respect of non-compliance;
b) The lack of any attempt to comply with the Injunctions or respond to this application or the proceedings.
c) The number and nature of the acts of contempt, which have persisted for so long. These acts go well beyond those in the cases cited earlier involving disclosure failures, and involve misappropriation of assets as well as significant and deliberate flouting of the Injunctions, with spending on personal luxury expenditure and attempts (e.g. with the Nationwide account) to hide assets. This is, of course, likely to be only the tip of iceberg given that it is all XL has managed to find out by itself in the face of Mr Corcoran's
non-compliance.
d) The lack of disclosure also relates to XL's proprietary funds which it has been unable to trace because of Mr Corcoran's
lack of disclosure, which Mr
Corcoran
has taken advantage of in emptying accounts like at Nationwide and Coutts before XL discovered and had to apply to Court to obtain disclosure of them.
e) A suspended sentence is unlikely to secure compliance with the Court's order. Mr Corcoran
has shown no attempt to recognise or purge his contempt.
a) She emphasised that: "There are a number of authorities which make clear where assets are dissipated in breach of a freezing injunction, an immediate prison sentence is necessary both to protect the applicant and to punish the defendant." [8];
b) She cited with approval the Court of Appeal's judgment in Lightfoot v
Lightfoot, where it was held that the Courts should consider imposing a two year sentence when the contemnor was in continuing and wilful breach of Court orders. Rose J said the 22 month-sentence in Ablyazov was not specifically justified as against a sentence of 24 months, and was not a cap for future decisions to follow. She said that the Courts (as she did) should impose a maximum sentence for serious and wilful breaches [23, 27], and that the defendant could then try to replace the money and apply to reduce his sentence. [28];
c) Even in relation to "relatively small amounts of money compared to the amounts at stake" (car sales for under £100,000 each): "they are still substantial sums and this was a cynical and deliberate breach of the court's order for which Mr Pugachev continued to deny responsibility and express no regret. The Applicants have been prejudiced by this breach by the dissipation of assets that they thought were protected and available for judgment I consider that a sentence of 24 months is appropriate for this breach." [29];
d) She thus imposed a two year sentence just for the contempt in relation to the two car sales. The other contempts relating to dissipations led to similar sentences, running concurrently although subject to an overall two year maximum see [33], where she concluded: "In my judgment in a case where a freezing order is in force for a substantial period of time and covers a range of different assets, it is important that the defendant realises he will face punishment for each occasion on which he decided to breach the order and not that he should believe that once he has dissipated some assets there is nothing more to be lost by dissipating more because he will only face concurrent sentences in respect of breaches of the same order."
a) There are multiple acts of contempt.
b) The disclosure contempts (Counts 9-20) are as serious as they can be. Each alone would justify a sentence close to the maximum. As regards the non-disclosures relating to proprietary assets I would tend to the view
that a 24 month sentence would be justified for each of these alone.
c) The expenditure contempts (Counts 1-8) might each alone attract a sentence of somewhat short of 24 months perhaps 21 or 22 months.
"Where concurrent sentences are to be passed the sentence should reflect the overall criminality involved. The sentence should be appropriately aggravated by the presence of the associated offences."
Nationwide Expenditure
1. Counts 1(1)-(12): Mr Corcoran's
breach of paragraph 6(2) of Injunction 3 by the 12 acts listed in ARH1 [44(a)-(l)] on the dates specified therein.
2. Counts 2(1)-(12): Mr Corcoran's
breach of paragraph 6(2) of Injunction 4 by the 12 acts listed at ARH1 [44(a)-(l)] on the dates specified therein.
3. Counts 3(1)-(12): Mr Corcoran's
breach of paragraph 6(2) of Injunction 5 by the 12 acts listed at ARH1 [44](a)-(l)] on the dates specified therein.
4. Counts 4(1)-(12): Mr Corcoran's
breach of paragraph 6(2) of Injunction 6 by the 12 acts listed at ARH1 [44(a)-(l)] on the dates specified therein.
Coutts Expenditure
5. Counts 5(1)-(198): Mr Corcoran's
breach of paragraph 6(2) of Injunction 3 by the expenditures/transfers highlighted in yellow in the bank statements referred to in ARH1 [45] on the dates specified therein.
6. Counts 6(1)-(198): Mr Corcoran's
breach of paragraph 6(2) of Injunction 4 by the expenditures/transfers highlighted in yellow in the bank statements referred to in ARH1 [45] on the dates specified therein.
7. Counts 7(1)-(198): Mr Corcoran's
breach of paragraph 6(2) of Injunction 5 by the expenditures/transfers highlighted in yellow in the bank statements referred to in ARH1 [45] on the dates specified therein.
8. Counts 8(1)-(198): Mr Corcoran's
breach of paragraph 6(2) of Injunction 6 by the expenditures/transfers highlighted in yellow in the bank statements exhibited to ARH1 [45] on the dates specified therein.
Failure to Give Asset Disclosure
9. Count 9: Mr Corcoran's
breach of paragraph 10(1) of Injunction 3 by failing to to inform XL's legal representatives within 72 hours of service of Injunction 3 (deemed served on 23 September 2017) or at all of any of his assets worldwide exceeding £10,000.
10. Count 10: Mr Corcoran's
breach of paragraph 10(1) of Injunction 4 by failing to inform XL's legal representatives within 72 hours of service of Injunction 4 (deemed served on 10 October 2017) or at all of any of his assets worldwide exceeding £10,000.
11. Count 11: Mr Corcoran's
breach of paragraph 10(1) of Injunction 5 by failing to inform XL's legal representatives within 72 hours of service of Injunction 5 (deemed served on 20 November 2017) or at all of any of his assets worldwide exceeding £10,000.
12. Count 12: Mr Corcoran's
breach of paragraph 10(1) of Injunction 6 by failing to inform XL's legal representatives within 72 hours of service of Injunction 6 (deemed served on 30 November 2017) or at all of any of his assets worldwide exceeding £10,000.
Failure to Give Disclosure Relating to XL's Proprietary Assets
13. Count 13: Mr Corcoran's
breach of paragraph 10(2) of Injunction 3 by failing to inform XL's legal representatives within 72 hours of service of Injunction 3 (deemed served on 23 September 2017) or at all of any of the information relating to XL's proprietary funds listed in sub-paragraphs 10(2)(a)-(c) of Injunction 3.
14. Count 14: Mr Corcoran's
breach of paragraph 10(2) of Injunction 4 by failing to inform XL's legal representatives within 72 hours of service of Injunction 4 (deemed served on 10 October 2017) or at all of any of the information relating to XL's proprietary funds listed in sub-paragraphs 10(2)(a)-(c) of Injunction 4.
15. Count 15: Mr Corcoran's
breach of paragraph 10(2) of Injunction 5 by failing to inform XL's legal representatives within 72 hours of service of Injunction 5 (deemed served on 20 November 2017) or at all of any of the information relating to XL's proprietary funds listed in sub-paragraphs 10(2)(a)-(c) of Injunction 5.
16. Count 16: Mr Corcoran's
breach of paragraph 10(2) of Injunction 6 by failing to inform XL's legal representatives within 72 hours of service of Injunction 6 (deemed served on 30 November 2017) or at all of any of the information relating to XL's proprietary funds listed in sub-paragraphs 10(2)(a)-(c) of Injunction 6.
Failure to Provide an Asset Disclosure Affidavit
17. Count 17: Mr Corcoran's
breach of paragraph 10(4) of Injunction 3 by failing to swear and serve on XL's legal representatives within 5 days of service of Injunction 3 (deemed served on 23 September 2017) or at all any affidavit setting out the asset disclosure information referred to at sub-paragraphs 10(1) and (2) of Injunction 3.
18. Count 18: Mr Corcoran's
breach of paragraph 10(4) of Injunction 4 by failing to swear and serve on XL's legal representatives within 5 days of service of Injunction 4 (deemed served on 10 October 2017) or at all any affidavit setting out the asset disclosure information referred to at sub-paragraphs 10(1) and (2) of Injunction 4.
19. Count 19: Mr Corcoran's
breach of paragraph 10(4) of Injunction 5 by failing to swear and serve on XL's legal representatives within 5 days of service of Injunction 5 (deemed served on 20 November 2017) or at all any affidavit setting out the asset disclosure information referred to at sub-paragraphs 10(1) and (2) of Injunction 5.
20. Count 20: Mr Corcoran's breach of paragraph 10(4) of Injunction 6 by failing to swear and serve on XL's legal representatives within 5 days of service of Injunction 6 (deemed served on 30 November 2017) or at all any affidavit setting out the asset disclosure information referred to at sub-paragraphs 10(1) and (2) of Injunction 6.