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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Commercial Court) Decisions >> A Corporation v Firm B & Anor (Rev1) [2025] EWHC 1092 (Comm) (08 May 2025) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Comm/2025/1092.html Cite as: [2025] EWHC 1092 (Comm) |
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BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES
KING'S BENCH DIVISIONCOMMERCIAL
COURT
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
____________________
A CORPORATION |
Claimant |
|
- and - |
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(1) FIRM B (2) MR W |
Defendants |
____________________
Nicholas Vineall KC for the Defendants
Hearing dates: 3 April 2025
Further evidence: 8 April
2025
Further written submissions: 11, 15 and 16 April
2025
Draft judgment to the parties: 16 April
2025
____________________
Rev 1
Crown Copyright ©
Mr Justice Foxton :
i) the First Defendant ("Firm B"), including any of its branches, to cease acting for C Corporation in an ongoing arbitration reference against D Corporation involving Vessel 2 and defined by the parties as the "Vessel 2 Reference";
ii) Firm B to procure a partner with no previous involvement in that reference to "cleanse" the files held by Firm B in relation to the Vessel 2 Reference of "any confidential information", being information said to be subject to a duty of arbitral confidentiality in another, concluded, arbitration reference between A Corporation and B Corporation involving Vessel 1 and defined by the parties as the "the Vessel 1 Reference";
iii) Firm B to refrain from providing any confidential information to C Corporation or anyone assisting C Corporation in relation to their claims in the Vessel 2 Reference; and
iv) an affidavit to be sworn by the Second Defendant ("Mr W"), a partner in Firm B's London Office, giving details of the extent to which he, Ms X of Firm B and other fee earners based in Firm B's London office involved in the Vessel 1 Reference had provided information to persons working in Firm B's Asia office, C Corporation or others.
By way of further explanation of the individuals and entities referred to:
v) Mr Y is a partner in Firm B's Asia Office and is acting for C Corporation in the Vessel 2 Reference.
vi) Mr Z is a partner in Firm A's London Office, who acted for A Corporation in the Vessel 1 Reference and continues to act for D Corporation in the Vessel 2 Reference.
vii) A Corporation and D Corporation are companies in the same ultimate ownership.
The test to be applied
i) The applicant must show by way of a threshold requirement that there is a serious question to be tried.
ii) If that requirement is satisfied, the court must ask whether damages be an adequate remedy for a party injured by the court's grant of, or its failure to grant, an injunction?
iii) If the answer to that enquiry is no, the court must ask where the balance of convenience lies.
The confidentiality obligations at play in this case
i) Contractual confidentiality provisions in the various Memoranda of Agreement ("MOA"s) entered into by B Corporation as buyer, which provided that "all negotiations and eventual sale are to be kept strictly private and confidential", with a carve out for disclosure "in connection with and for the purposes of any litigation, arbitration or other proceedings or dispute".
ii) The confidentiality clause in the Co-operation Agreement of 31 October 2023, the terms of which are set out in Annex 1(confidential).
iii) The confidentiality clause in the MOA entered into by B Corporation as seller under the transaction just referred to, which was similar to that quoted in i), save that the relevant carve-out was "for the purposes of any litigation or disputes in respect of the Vessel in which the Sellers are a party or are involved".
iv) The Settlement Agreement of 22 September 2024 between A Corporation and B Corporation which provided that "this Settlement Agreement and the terms recorded herein are private & confidential to the Parties and their advisers, and are subject to the same ongoing duties of confidentiality that apply to the Arbitration and shall not be disclosed by either Party, their servants or agents to any third party without the express written consent of the other Party, except: (a) to any legal or regulatory authority as may be required by law, tax, or such regulatory authority or corporate reporting/listing requirement; (b) to its auditors, lawyers, bankers or insurers where it is necessary for obtaining legal or other professional advice or assistance, on terms which preserve confidentiality; or (c) to protect or pursue any legal right or to enforce this Settlement Agreement, or implement any of its terms."
v) The implied obligation of confidentiality in relation to arbitrations arising under English law.
The factual position
The legal principles relating to the obligation of confidentiality in relation to arbitral proceedings
Introduction
i) what material does the obligation of arbitral confidentiality extend to; and
ii) to the extent that the obligation of arbitral confidentiality is engaged, what are the relevant exceptions?
To what documents and information does the obligation of arbitral confidentiality extend?
i) The hearing or hearings in the arbitration (Emmott, [62]) which would include transcripts or notes of the hearing (Emmott, [81], [105]; Hassneh Insurance v Mew [1993] 2 Lloyd's Rep 243, 247).
ii) Documents disclosed by a party in the arbitration to other parties in the arbitration in the hands of those other parties (Emmott, [79]). Hassneh Insurance, 247; Mustill & Boyd: Commercial
and Investor State Arbitration (3rd) (LexisNexis, 2024), [11.53]).
iii) Documents "generated" or "prepared for" and then used or produced in the arbitration (Emmott, [79]. [81], [105]; Hassneh Insurance, 247). This would extend to pleadings, witness statements and expert reports, written submissions and correspondence between the parties or their representatives relating to the arbitration.
iv) The arbitral award (Emmott, [105]; Hassneh Insurance).
"The starting point is that parties to an arbitration agreement are to be taken as impliedly agreeing to treat documents and information emanating from the arbitration as confidential. The implication arises from the nature of the arbitral process, i.e. that it is an essentially private process, and from what the courts have accepted to be the long held assumptions of those who use arbitration..." (emphasis added).
i) If a shipowner delivers a charterer's cargo in defective condition, the fact of the contract, its performance or the charterer's complaint are not confidential simply because an arbitration is thereafter commenced
in respect of the charterer's claim.
ii) If a party buys goods which it concludes are defective, that fact does not become confidential simply because the buyer commences
an arbitration against the seller.
iii) This is also the case where one party alleges it has been induced to enter into a defective transaction by the other party's fraud.
"There can in my judgment be no breach of duty in disclosing the fact ofcommencement
of an arbitration, the existence of an arbitration or the result of that arbitration where there is any legitimate reason to do so. Equally, the existence of any challenge to an award, the existence of litigation relating to it and the result of that litigation would for similar reasons not amount to a breach if disclosed."
The words "where there is any legitimate reason to do so" suggest that Cooke J may have had in mind a case where a legitimate exception to the obligation of confidentiality could be invoked. The editors of Russell on Arbitration (24th) (Sweet & Maxwell 2015), [5-217] refer to these comments
as obiter and suggests that they "perhaps reflect a more liberal approach than some would consider warranted". However, an alternative approach might be that rather less is required to relieve a party from any obligation of arbitral confidentiality in relation to that very limited set of information than would be the case, say, for material disclosed by the other party in the arbitration (such that what the "interests of justice" require, or what is "reasonably necessary for the protection of the legitimate interests of an arbitrating party" may vary depending on the sensitivity of the information concerned).
"As to Class A, the deployment by Mr Ablyazov of his own documents or of his own information in an arbitration, whether in a statement of case, a witness statement or by exhibiting the documents themselves, does not make the information itself confidential if it was not originally of the inherently confidential type. Arbitration confidentiality in that context means only that the fact of its use in the arbitration is confidential."
i) This is particularly necessary in an area of disputes practice which involves a relatively small group of specialist practitioners such as those involved in maritime arbitration. This is a context which involves repeat litigating parties on a significant scale; a recurrence of similar complaints; and a cadre of solicitors and counsel who regularly feature on both sides of particular questions, sometimes for the same client (someone arbitrating as a buyer or charterer in one case will frequently be a seller or disponent / actual owner in another, in a context in which chains of contracts are clear), or for and against the same party in different disputes.
ii) This can, without limitation, involve acquiring knowledge about the type of documents generally available in relation to particular types of issues; more specifically how major players and "repeat litigators" in this field structure their businesses or record-assembly and keeping; the litigation strategies of particular opponents and their approach to certain contested issues; which document requests have and have not yielded results; and the outlook on issues such as the construction of contracts, readiness to find dishonesty, disclosure, amendments and security for costs, of particular arbitrators acting in this field.
iii) Counsel may often find themselves cross-examining a factual and (a fortiori) expert witness that they have previously cross-examined or seen cross-examined in an earlier arbitration (I certainly did during my career as an advocate), and shape their cross-examination strategy accordingly.
"A lawyer who takes cases regularly must have acquired a great deal of information subject to implied undertakings. In these days of specialised education and long work hours for junior lawyers, it is possible that a significant percentage of a lawyer's general knowledge will have been acquired in his practice of law, there having been little other opportunity for him to acquire the same. It is equally possible that a large portion of that general knowledge will be subject to implied undertakings. If the defendant's submissions are correct, few lawyers who have been called for any length of time will be able to take part in litigation. It is to be remembered that the undertaking is to the court and is not limited to deploying information in cases involving one or more of the same parties."
Exceptions to arbitral confidentiality
"the first is where there is consent, express or implied; second, where there is an order, or leave of the court (but that does not mean that the court has a general discretion to lift the obligation of confidentiality); third, where it is reasonably necessary for the protection of the legitimate interests of an arbitrating party; fourth, where the interests of justice require disclosure, and also (perhaps) where the public interest requires disclosure."
i) founding an issue estoppel from an award against the arbitrating party in other proceedings (Associated Electric and Gas Insurance Services, supra) or alleged privies of those parties (CDE v NOP [2021] EWCA Civ 1908, [8]);
ii) permitting statements, reports or transcripts to be deployed where witness or expert evidence is being deployed in one arbitration which is contrary to evidence from the same individual in a prior arbitration (Mustill & Boyd, [11.62]); and
iii) for the purposes of making claims against or defending claims by a third party (Mustill & Boyd, [11.63]).
Do any relevant exceptions apply to the obligation of confidentiality inherent in "without prejudice" negotiations?
The alleged misuses of confidential information
i) I am not persuaded A Corporation has an arguable complaint about the disclosure by the Defendants to Firm B Asia office of the identity of B Corporation's own counsel and experts, nor of the identity of its party-appointed arbitrator, or in recommending C Corporation appoint that arbitrator.
ii) To the extent the Defendants discussed the issues and allegations in the Vessel 1 Reference with Firm B Asia office, there was an arguable communication
of information subject to arbitral confidentiality, but the Defendants have the better of the argument that this would fall within one of the exceptions to arbitral confidentiality to the extent it went beyond the facts of the pre-arbitration complaints and the events giving rise to them.
iii) The Defendants have the better of the argument that they were reasonably entitled to conclude that they were permitted to pass on Mr Z's comments
about C Corporation's claim on 2 May 2024 to Firm B Asia office for transmission to C Corporation, alternatively that this information fell within an exception to the obligation of arbitral confidentiality having regard to the
common
interest and ongoing co-operation between B Corporation and C Corporation.
iv) It is conceded that the Defendants breached obligations of confidentiality in passing on A Corporation's settlement offer as communicated
on 26 July 2024. On the premise of that concession, it is strongly arguable that the Defendants breached an obligation of confidentiality in informing Firm B Asia office that a "serious settlement offer" had been made on 18 September 2024 (but Mr W's expression of a view as to why such an offer had been made has no independent significance for confidentiality purposes).
v) It is arguable that Requests 1 to 9 and 29 in C Corporation's early disclosure request were to some extent influenced by confidential information in the Vessel 1 Reference, but the link with confidential material is weak, and the Defendants have the better of the argument that no enduring advantage was derived from that fact, as the Requests would have been made at some point in any event. The Defendants have the better of the case that A Corporation has no legitimate grounds for complaining that some early requests for disclosure in the Vessel 1 Reference were not repeated in the Vessel 2 Reference.
vi) A Corporation does not have an arguable claim that the Defendants breached confidentiality by informing Firm B Asia office that the Vessel 1 Reference had settled, and that B corporation were pleased it had.
vii) A Corporation does not have an arguable claim that confidential information was misused when Mr W advised Mr Y to seek to tie off any security for costs issue when agreeing security for C Corporation's claim.
The application for injunctive relief
The legal principles
"Once the defendants have established, as I think that they have, (a) that there is a duty of confidentiality not to disclose the contents of the settlement agreement; and (b) that there is a real risk of the knowledge of the contents of that settlement agreement being employed wittingly or unwittingly to the defendants' advantage, I do not believe that I have any discretion to exercise."
"It is usually enough to rely upon the recognition by a solicitor of the duty not to make any ulterior use of information obtained by disclosure. The Adex International case (unreported) 17 November 2000 was correctly decided, but it is a rare example of a situation where a solicitor was precluded from acting for a different claimant against the same defendant in respect of a similar claim as a result of confidential information obtained about the defendant in the earlier proceedings. The approach of the Court of Appeal of New Zealand in the Carter Holt Harvey Forests case [2001] 3 NZLR 343 was adopted in a case involving an express confidentiality agreement in mediation. It is not an approach that can be generally applied whenever information has been obtained by lawyers in a case as a result of disclosure."
"The policy in both cases is that parties must retain the freedom to be candid, in the one circumstance to their solicitors and in the other, in a mediation. Those freedoms should not be eroded. However, it seems to me that the two freedoms are not identical. Candour in a mediation will take the form of disclosing information to an adversary or potential adversary. Candour on the part of a client to his lawyer, whose duty and interest lies in promoting the cause of his client, is likely to be the product of little or no inhibition and a complete assumption that the information disclosed will go no further without the client's consent. It would follow that higher safeguards against the wrongful disclosure of information are proportionate in the Bolkiah type of case when compared to a case of the present type."
"Where there has been the previous relationship of solicitor and client and the solicitor at the date of his proposed new retainer possesses relevant confidential information, in the ordinary course the court will in my view grant an injunction restraining the solicitor acting, as in In re A Firm of Solicitors [1992] QB 959 …. But, in the case where without any such previous relationship a party's solicitor illegitimately becomes possessed of confidential information of the other party to the suit or dispute, in the ordinary course the court will merely grant an injunction restraining the solicitor making use of that information: it will not prohibit his continuing to act."
"In any event, the judgment was ex tempore and is of limited assistance, not least because it is apparent from the end of the judgment that the judge may not in fact have imposed an injunction restraining the opposing solicitors firm from acting, but may have accepted an undertaking that the particular partner involved in the previous Time mediation would not be involved in any settlement discussions in the Adex litigation."
At [77], Flaux LJ stated "that the decision of the Court of Appeal of New Zealand in Carter Holt [2001] 3 NZLR 343 does not represent English law", and he noted that "the actual order made as it appears from para 36 of the judgment is surprising, as it imposed an injunction not just on the three lawyers involved in the previous mediation but the entire firm."
49. At [80], Flaux LJ approved the judge's conclusion that in a "no relationship case", the court must conduct "a balancing exercise taking account of the prejudice to the opposing party if such an injunction were to be granted and of whether some less onerous form of injunctive relief, such as an injunction to restrain the use of the privileged, confidential information, would protect the applicant sufficiently."
The position at the point the injunction is sought
i) On the evidence, the figure of the first offer, and the fact and the description of the second offer, have already been passed onto C Corporation. Removing Firm B Asia office from the picture will not change the position nor can an injunction be granted preventing communication
of that which has already been
communicated.
ii) A Corporation has settled its claim with B Corporation, and there can be no prejudice to it from the communication
of this information.
iii) Assuming that prejudice to D Corporation as a company in the same ultimate ownership as A Corporation is relevant (and cf. Ali Shipping Corp v Shipyard Trogir [1999] 1 WLR 314, 329), the significance of the information provided is very limited, and so is any prejudice to D Corporation. The first offer made was of limited relevance, for reasons which appear in the confidential annexes. No other figures crossed the line. The quantum claimed in the two references was significantly different, and driven by facts particular to each vessel (its physical condition, what repairs were done, trading opportunities lost etc). The total claimed by B Corporation was a multiple of the figure in C Corporation's letter before action. Further, Mr Z was at pains to make it clear at all times that these references were seen by his clients as very different cases, and C Corporation's case significantly weaker, not least because of what were said to be significant differences in the pre-sale report, the absence of many of the repairs found on the Vessel 1 which were said to demonstrate knowledge of issues and the different terms of the MOAs. The two cases here are markedly less similar than those in issue in Adex International (Ireland) Ltd v IBM United Kingdom Ltd; British Sky Broadcasting plc v Virgin Media Communications
Ltd; and Glencairn IP Holdings Ltd v Product Specialities.
iv) D Corporation will, in any confidential discussions with C Corporation, know a great deal more than C Corporation about the settlement history of the Vessel 1 Reference – the amount of each offer and counteroffer, and the amount and terms of the final settlement. This further minimises any prejudice to D Corporation.
i) It is accepted that a section from the report of one its experts in the Vessel 1 Reference report addressing the Vessel 2, the CCC Statement and the attached Vessel 2 documents were passed to Mr Y. It seems likely that this was passed onto C Corporation (it did, after all, concern C Corporation's witness, vessel and documents). In any event, any suggestion that A Corporation had a legitimate expectation that passages of a draft expert report prepared by B Corporation in this very particular set of circumstances using this material (which could not have come from A Corporation) would nonetheless be kept confidential from C Corporation is weak.
ii) I accept that Mr W passed on the view of his expert that the UTM readings provided for Vessel 1 were false and an extract from the report of another expert that the ballast tank coating applied to the vessel in 2008 would have required replacement in 2018, and that this was done after Firm A response to C Corporation's Letter of Claim of 17 May 2024 was shared with Mr W. I do not know if Mr Y passed this information on to C Corporation, but there must be a real risk that he would have done so. The CCC Statement referred to UTM measurements provided for the Vessel 2 and attached a ballast tank condition report from October 2023 stating, "refer to the UTM report which provided by DDD dated November 2021, it shows the max diminution of the related area is only [X]%, there was obvious falsification, and cause owner heavy financial losses." The Letter of Claim sent on C Corporation's behalf on 30 April 2024 had already complained that the extent of corrosion was misdescribed by D Corporation before the sale, and the actual corrosion inconsistent with the UTM readings D Corporation had provided. The letter also complained of the condition of the ballast tank coatings, attaching a tank condition report. So, I think it likely that the substance of this information will already have reached C Corporation, with the Defendants having the better of the argument on this issue.
iii) In any event, the information already available to C Corporation independent of this material makes it most unlikely that it derived any enduring advantage from these disclosures. C Corporation was clearly alive to the issues generally, given the terms of its Letter of Claim as set out above. It obtained its own expert report suggesting that the Vessel 2 UTM results were forged on 10 June 2024 and had access to expert evidence on the issue of the tank coatings. It is likely that experienced maritime solicitors (whatever the firm) would have followed these questions with the aid of experts (whoever the experts).
i) Mr W has provided evidence to the court identifying what information he passed to Mr Y relating to B Corporation's claims against A Corporation. While I cannot reach a final decision, I feel able to place considerable reliance on Mr W's evidence as it now stands.
ii) A Corporation has suggested that I should be wary of Mr W's approach. It is said "his grasp of the boundaries of arbitral confidentiality is less than secure". However, Mr W's understanding of the requirements of arbitral confidentiality accords, in the main, with what I regard as the better view of the scope of, and exceptions to, that doctrine. In relation to the communication
of settlement offers, it has been conceded that this involved a breach of arbitral confidentiality, but the position here was nuanced, rather than being an obvious disregard of a clear rule (see [34] above).
iii) A Corporation also suggest that Mr W's account of what he told Mr Y has involved additional detail emerging over time, the most recent example being the additional witness statement served after the hearing at my request. I am not persuaded, however, that this reflects any conscious reluctance on Mr W's part to set the complete position before the court, but the greater focus which the intensity of forensic scrutiny inevitably brings and the fact that the information which is being sought relates to matters a solicitor would not expect to have to disclose to the other side in litigation (viz communications
undertaken for the purpose of advancing their client's claim). The court having specifically sought a further and final witness statement, I am not persuaded that there is a real risk that Mr W held anything back.
iv) A Corporation also points to the fact that Mr W did not initially put his cards on the table with Mr Z about the fact that he and Ms X had been working on the Vessel 2 Reference prior to the settlement of the Vessel 1 Reference. I accept that criticism, and the terms of Mr W's email were unwise. However, the material before me suggest that throughout Mr W was seeking to walk what he understood to be the appropriate line between what could and could not be said to Mr Y. The fact that he did not wish to have his homework marked by an as experienced and "front foot" a litigator as Mr Z is not wholly surprising.
v) In particular, Mr W raised the need to comply with confidentiality obligations at the outset in his first conversation with Mr Y and in his advice to B Corporation, B Corporation's P&I Club and counsel. He ensured from the outset that no documents produced by A Corporation in the Vessel 1 Reference were provided to Mr Y. He only provided an extract from one of B Corporation's expert's report dealing with the Vessel 2, not the whole report, and only the conclusions from another report, and the only settlement figure he passed on was the first, which he regarded as wholly non-serious. He put in place an information barrier on the Vessel 1 file, which meant information contained in it could not be accessed by Firm B Asia office save where, having applied his mind to it, he thought it appropriate. This was not someone who was oblivious to the need to respect arbitral confidentiality, but someone who had it well in mind.
vi) If information at a more granular level was passed, it is likely to have left a trace in the Vessel 2 file in the form of reports, emails or attendance notes. That file has been reviewed and cleansed by Mr W, whose evidence to the court is provided with the benefit of that review.
i) Mr W and Ms X agreed to stand down from the Vessel 2 Reference on 24 October 2024. It has been confirmed that the same is true of any other personnel who worked on the Vessel 1 Reference, with the exception of the court clerk, head of costs and senior costs draftsperson ("the Excepted Personnel"), who perform firm wide roles but who are not involved in the conduct of litigation outside these specialist and limited roles.
ii) Mr W and Ms X (who I accept are the individuals best placed to do so) have reviewed the Vessel 2 file and deleted all emails between Firm B London office and Firm B Asia office and from Firm B Asia office and C Corporation relating to communications
concerning B Corporation's claim, and have confirmed that there are no attendance notes or other documents recording exchanges on these matters. They are now willing to be locked out of the Vessel 2 file. I am satisfied that there is nothing to be gained by ordering another partner at Firm B to review or supervise that work and am sceptical as to the ability of someone without prior involvement in the dispute to conduct this exercise effectively.
iii) It has been agreed that the Vessel 1 counsel team will not act in the Vessel 2 Reference.
"There is no rule of law that Chinese walls or other arrangements of a similar kind are insufficient to eliminate the risk. But the starting point must be that, unless special measures are taken, information moves within a firm. In MacDonald Estate v Martin, 77 D.L.R. (4th) 249, 269 Sopinka J. said that the court should restrain the firm from acting for the second client 'unless satisfied on the basis of clear and convincing evidence that all reasonable measures have been taken to ensure that no disclosure will occur.' With the substitution of the word 'effective' for the words 'all reasonable' I would respectfully adopt that formulation." (emphasis added)".
i) With the exception of the settlement information, the Defendants have the stronger of the argument that there has been no breach.
ii) The settlement information has already reached C Corporation, and is of limited utility.
iii) The broad effect of other information where there is an arguable case of breach is likely already to be known to C Corporation (e.g. the alleged similarities in the cases), and the remainder is information which is unlikely to have offered C Corporation any enduring advantage.
iv) There is no prejudice to A Corporation in the status quo, and limited prejudice to D Corporation as compared with the position that the arguable breaches had not occurred.
v) Granting the injunction would involve real prejudice to C Corporation, who would be deprived of their choice of lawyer (reached for reasons unconnected with the Vessel 1 Reference), who has been acting for them for a year, and would do so without C Corporation having any opportunity to oppose the application.
vi) It would, however, leave in place lawyers acting for D Corporation who know a great deal more about the Vessel 1 Reference (and about what the arbitrator common to both references knows about the Vessel 1 Reference) than the lawyers involved in the case for Firm B Asia office.
vii) Applying the American Cyanamid test, but having regard to the likelihood of A Corporation succeeding at trial given the consequences of granting interim relief, I am satisfied that granting an injunction would occasion significant prejudice to Firm B (given its pre-existing client relationship with C Corporation) and to C Corporation, whereas not granting the injunction will not occasion any prejudice to A Corporation, and very limited prejudice to D Corporation.
i) First, A Corporation seeks an injunction restraining Firm B through any of its offices acting for C Corporation in the Vessel 2 Reference. For the reasons given in the preceding paragraph I am not persuaded that it would be just and equitable to grant this relief. Firm B has confirmed that no lawyer who acted in the Vessel 1 Reference will act for C Corporation in the Vessel 2 Reference, save for the Excepted Personnel, and have offered an undertaking to the court to this effect. The requirements for a mandatory injunction preventing Firm B Asia office from continuing to act are not made out.
ii) Having regard to the review conducted by Mr W and Ms X, and the "cleansing" of the Vessel 2 file they performed, I am not persuaded that there would be any utility in ordering another partner to repeat that task, or requiring the task to be repeated under such a lawyer's supervision.
iii) I am satisfied that there is no realistic possibility of lawyers who worked on the Vessel 1 Reference providing confidential information to C Corporation going forward. So far as information already known to Firm B Asia office is concerned, either the information or its general gist has already been provided or is known to C Corporation, or, to the extent that it is arguable it is not, I am not persuaded that injunctive relief is appropriate, as (i) the Defendants have the better of the argument that no improper transfer of information has taken place; (ii) I am not persuaded that there is a real risk of prejudice to A Corporation or D Corporation, on the basis that any such information would confer no enduring advantage to C Corporation; and (iii) it would, in any event, require a more compelling case to grant injunctive relief before I would be willing to do so without having heard the evidence and position of the Firm B Asia office lawyers.
iv) At the court's request, the Second Defendant has sworn a short affidavit confirming the contents of his first, second and third witness statements, taken as a whole. This having been done, I am satisfied that no further affidavit is required.