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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (King's Bench Division) Decisions >> University College Union v Persons Unknown [2025] EWHC 192 (KB) (03 February 2025) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/KB/2025/192.html Cite as: [2025] EWHC 192 (KB) |
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KING'S BENCH DIVISION
MEDIA AND COMMUNICATIONS LIST
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
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Claimant |
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- and - |
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PERSONS UNKNOWN (responsible for obtaining data from the Claimant's IT systems on or about 12 August 2024 to 16 August 2024 and/or who has disclosed or is intending or threatening to disclose the information thereby obtained) |
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The Defendant was not represented
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Crown Copyright ©
Mr Justice Sheldon :
Introduction
Determination without a hearing
[7] It is unlikely that the Court could or would deal on the papers with an application for a final order that determines civil rights, if that way of proceeding was opposed by one of the parties. But there are cases like the present, where one party has failed to engage with the proceedings and has therefore expressed no view about the matter. It is not necessary to decide whether that involves a waiver of the party's rights. I did not consider a hearing to be 'appropriate' in this case, because it would have added to the expense of this claim without serving any sufficiently useful purpose. On the facts of this case, and this application, the open justice principle can be properly respected and compliance with Article 6 [ECHR] achieved without the need for a hearing. That can be done by making the order and, through this judgment, publicising the fact it has been made and the basis for making it. Indeed, a process of this kind may even represent a more practical and effective way to give effect to the open justice principle and the Convention requirement for a public judgment, than holding a hearing.
[8] This is a claim brought against a Person or Persons Unknown and, as is quite common in such cases, the identity of the defendant(s) remains unknown. So, there is nobody defending the claim who could benefit from the advantages that a hearing often brings with it for the litigant. The case has not proceeded in secret. There have already been two public hearings, at each of which a public judgment has been given and recorded. Transcripts of those judgments are available as of right. There is little that has changed since the last hearing, at which I granted an interim order and gave a reasoned judgment explaining why. This is not a case in which there is any likelihood that a public hearing of this application would be more effective in bringing the attention of others to matters of importance than the method I am adopting. Rather the contrary. Transcripts are not created or published as a matter of course. They are not often applied for by third parties. This written judgment, by contrast, will be posted on a public website. The reality is that information about these proceedings will be more accessible, if the case is dealt with in this way, than it would be if the matter had been dealt with at a hearing".
Default Judgment
12. According to CPR 12.3, the basic conditions to be satisfied for entering default judgment are that a claimant has duly filed and served a claim form and particulars of claim, the defendant has not filed acknowledgment of service or defence to the claim, and the time for doing so has expired.
13. CPR 12.12(1) directs a court considering a default judgment application to 'give such judgment as the claimant is entitled to on the statement of case'. I have directed myself to the guidance set out in Glenn v Kline [2020] EWHC 3182 (QB) at [24]-[27] as to the correct approach to applying this rule. Nicklin J said this:
[25] Although, under this rule, the Court must consider the judgment to which the claimant is entitled, the effect of default judgment is that the pleaded facts are treated as established. If those facts support the cause of action, the Court need go no further. The purpose of the requirement for an application is either to enable the court to tailor the precise relief, so that it is appropriate to the cause of action asserted, or otherwise to scrutinise the application in particular circumstances calling for more than a purely administrative response. Within these parameters, the Court must make an assessment of whether the applicant is entitled to the default judgment sought, or to some lesser or different default judgment: Football Dataco Ltd -v-Smoot Enterprises [2011] 1 WLR 1978 [16]-[19] per Briggs J.
[26] Evidence going to the merits is not required. The relief granted will normally be sought and granted on the basis of the claimant's statement of case.
That procedure is efficient and proportionate. Such a judgment is final and, to the extent it involves consideration of what relief is justified on the basis of the facts alleged in the statement of case, it does have an element of merits assessment: QRS -v- Beach [2015] 1 WLR 2701 [53] per Warby J.
Approved Judgment Armstrong Watson v Persons Unknown
[27] In Brett Wilson LLP -v- Person(s) Unknown [2016] 4 WLR 69, Warby J explained:
[18] The claimant's entitlement on such an application is to "such judgment as it appears to the court that the claimant is entitled to on his statement of case": CPR r 12.11(1) [CPR 12.12(1)]. I accept Mr Wilson's submission that I should interpret and apply those words in the same way as I did in Sloutsker -v- Romanova [2015] EWHC 2053 (QB) [84]:
"This rule enables the court to proceed on the basis of the claimant's unchallenged particulars of claim. There is no need to adduce evidence or for findings of fact to be made in cases where the defendant has not disputed the claimant's allegations. That in my judgment will normally be the right approach for the court to take. Examination of the merits will usually involve unnecessary expenditure of time and resources and hence [be] contrary to the overriding objective. It also runs the risk of needlessly complicating matters if an application is later made to set aside the default judgment: see QRS -v- Beach [2015] 1 WLR 2701 esp at [53]-[56]."
[19] As I said in the same judgment at para 86:"the general approach outlined above could need modification in an appropriate case, for instance if the court concluded that the claimant's interpretation of the words complained of was wildly extravagant and impossible, or that the words were clearly not defamatory in their tendency."
Those instances of circumstances which might require departure from the general rule are not exhaustive, but only examples. I have considered whether there is any feature of the present case that might require me to consider evidence, rather than the claimant's pleaded case, verified by a statement of truth and uncontradicted by the defendants. I do not think there is any such feature. I have therefore proceeded on the basis of the pleaded case, both in my introductory description of the facts above, and in reaching the conclusion that the claimant has established its right to recover damages for libel, and to appropriate injunctions to ensure that the libel is not further published by the defendants".
i) the information with which we are concerned has the necessary quality of confidence;
ii) the information has been obtained by the Defendants without consent or authorisation, and in circumstances where that was known by the Defendants;
iii) the Defendants knew or ought to have known that the Claimant reasonably expected the information to be private or confidential and to remain so, and that the Defendant was not entitled to publish or use it without the consent of the Claimant;
iv) the Defendants therefore owed the Claimant a duty of confidence in respect of the information; and
v) by obtaining, retaining, and disclosing the information or threatening to do so, the Defendants are in breach of confidence.
"the circumstances in which these decisions came to be made – often urgent interim injunction applications where only one party was represented – mean that the fact that CPR 6.37(1)(c) was not considered is not altogether surprising. Many of the cases were instances where, wherever the defendant was located, the assessment of appropriate forum plainly favoured England & Wales. In several of the cases, the grant of permission to serve the Claim Form out of the jurisdiction was very much an insurance against a possibility that the defendant turned out not to be within the jurisdiction of the Court. Not all cases will be that straightforward."
Remedy
Order