![]() |
[Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback] [DONATE] | |
England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions |
||
|
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Reed Employment Ltd v HM Revenue and Customs [2014] EWCA Civ 32 (23 January 2014) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2014/32.html Cite as: [2014] STI 868, [2014] STC 1026, [2014] BVC 6, [2014] EWCA Civ 32, [2014] WLR(D) 23 |
||
[New search]
[Context
]
[View without highlighting]
[Printable RTF version]
[View ICLR summary: [2014] WLR(D) 23]
[Help]
ON APPEAL FROM THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
(TAX AND CHANCERY CHAMBER)
THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
(TAX AND CHANCERY CHAMBER)
FTC 392011
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
||
B e f o r e :
LORD JUSTICE AIKENS
and
LORD JUSTICE VOS
____________________
Reed Employment Limited |
Appellant |
|
| - and - |
||
| Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs |
Respondent |
____________________
WordWave International Limited
A Merrill Communications Company
165 Fleet Street, London EC4A 2DY
Tel No: 020 7404 1400, Fax No: 020 7831 8838
Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
Ms Philippa Whipple QC and Mr Richard Smith (instructed by HMRC Solicitor's Office) for the Respondent
____________________
Crown Copyright ©
Lady Justice Arden :
Reed")
seeks to recover from the respondent ("HMRC") amounts of £63.8m and £75.8m which it paid to HMRC in the years 1973- 1990 and 1991-1995 respectively in excess of the amounts which it was due to pay on account of VAT. EU law confers on taxpayers the right to be claim repayment of overpaid VAT. However, the EU legislature has not harmonised national procedural laws and so the procedure for recovering overpaid VAT is a matter of domestic law. This procedure must, however, satisfy the general principles of EU law, such as the equal treatment principle. Domestic law can, therefore, on this basis prescribe the limitation periods for such claims. Those limitation periods can also be reduced, though it is established that, to comply with the principle of effectiveness, national law must allow a reasonable transitional period in which claims that could be made under the old limitation period can still be made after the reduction takes effect (Marks and Spencer plc v Customs and Excise Commissioners (Case C-62/00) [2002] STC 1036 ("M&S 1")).
Reed's
way is that it did not file its two claims for repayment until 27 March 2009. By that date, Parliament had given HMRC a possible defence of unjust enrichment. That defence works in the following way. As stated, a trader who has accounted to HMRC for VAT in excess of the amounts due from him has in general the right under EU law to reclaim the amount of the excess from HMRC. Where, as here, the trader made the overpayment of VAT because he charged his customers VAT when they were not liable to pay it, the customers, when they find out that they were not bound to pay VAT, may seek a refund from the trader. However, many will not do so because they were themselves liable to pay VAT and set the VAT that they paid to the trader against their own liability for VAT in the relevant accounting period. As a result they may be "payment" traders, that is, traders liable in that period to account to HMRC for VAT or "repayment" traders, that is, traders who are entitled in that period to a credit for the VAT paid as the VAT they pay on their purchases (input tax) is more than the VAT received by them on sales (output tax). There may be little point in payment or repayment traders seeking a refund from
Reed
since they would simply have to account for it to HMRC. Other customers may be exempt from VAT altogether and thus be unable to reclaim VAT paid from HMRC.
Reed
wrongly accounted for payments of VAT received from both payment and repayment traders and from exempt customers, but its present claims are in respect of the VAT received only from payment and repayment traders (together known as the "recoverable sector"). In 1996 and 1997
Reed
made two claims for repayment of VAT on supplies to exempt customers (known as the "irrecoverable sector") in respect of periods starting on 1 February 1991. HMRC contends that these earlier claims show that its present claims are something of an afterthought.
Reed
accepts these elements of the unjust enrichment defence and stresses that it is not claiming a right to be unjustly enriched. Although we are not concerned with this point,
Reed
does, however, say that it was not unjustly enriched on the facts of this case. It contends that it suffered loss by charging its customers VAT when it did not need to do so.
Reed
seeks to find a way of challenging the application of the cut off date to its claims. Before the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal it pursued the route of contending that its first claim was made by way of amendment to an earlier claim filed before the cut off date. It lost on this issue and there is no appeal on it.
Reed
seeks to pursue a second route, applying to both of its claims. It claims that the 2005 amending provision infringes EU law principles, namely equal treatment, alternatively the allied principle of fiscal neutrality.
Reed's
case is further that, if the 2005 amending provision infringed the EU principles of equal treatment and fiscal neutrality, it should not have applied to any repayment claim filed after the cut off date in respect of periods before the cut off date. It goes on to argue that the principle of effectiveness requires that
Reed
should be put in the same position as if it had made a claim for repayment prior to the cut off date, since it was unable to make a claim before that date due to the absence of the requisite transitional period at that time. That was belatedly introduced after the cut off date.
i) the conclusion that the equal treatment and fiscal neutrality principles are not infringed by the introduction of the cut off date applying to claims in respect of the same period as claims that have already been filed before that date follows from the decision of the CJEU in Weber's Wine World Handels-Gmbh v AblabenberufungsKommission Wien (Case C-147/01) [2004] 1 CMLR 7.
ii) The 2005 amending provision applies across the board. It made no distinctions between claimants except by introducing the cut off date.
iii) Since EU law permitted the introduction of the unjust enrichment defence, its introduction cannot give rise to any impermissible unequal treatment.
iv) In so far asReed's
argument on effectiveness only arises if the court has to consider a remedy for breach of the other two principles, the court does not have to consider it, and, in so far as it is a self-standing argument, there is no substance in it.
v) The application of the principles of equal treatment and fiscal neutrality to the facts of this case is clear. Therefore, it is not appropriate to make any preliminary reference to the CJEU on these issues.
PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL TREATMENT
Reed's
claims and a claim for repayment in respect of the same period but made before the cut off date are relevantly similar ("the similar claim point").
(1) Effect of Weber's Wine World and M&S 2
Weber's Wine World
- impose more restrictions on repayment claims under EU law than other comparable claims;
- be specifically targeted at avoiding the effects of a judgment of the CJEU or
- make it impossible or excessively difficult to pursue claims conferred by EU law.
"93. The court has consistently held that individuals are entitled to obtain repayment of charges levied in a member state in breach of Community provisions. That right is the consequence and the complement of the rights conferred on individuals by Community provisions as interpreted by the court. The member state in question is therefore required, in principle, to repay charges levied in breach of Community law (see, in particular, the Comateb case (para 20), Metallgesellschaft Ltd v IRC, Hoechst AG v IRC Joined cases C-397/98 and C-410/98 [2001] All ER (EC) 496, [2001] ECR I-1727 (para 84) and the Marks & Spencer case (para 30)).
94. According to the case law, there is only one exception to that obligation to make repayment. A member state may resist repayment to the trader of a charge levied though not due only where it is established by the national authorities that the charge has been borne in its entirety by someone other than the taxable person and that reimbursement of the charge would constitute unjust enrichment of the latter. It follows that, if the burden of the charge has been passed on only in part, the national authorities are required to repay the amount not passed on (see to that effect, in particular, the Comateb case (paras 27, 28))."
"67. Where such a rule applies to claims in respect of situations which arose before its enactment, that effect does not seem to me incompatible with Community law. On the one hand, in so far as it seeks to preclude unjust enrichment, it in fact precludes only enrichment which would have occurred after its enactment, provided that there is no provision for recovery of any amount already reimbursed. On the other hand, there can in any event be no legitimate expectation of any such enrichment, since the very concept of legitimacy cannot embrace what is unjust."
" 69…since Community law does not require a right to reimbursement at all where unjust enrichment would ensue, the fact that, following a change to national law, a claim which might previously have succeeded can on that ground no longer succeed has no impact on the effectiveness of a right conferred by Community law."
"92. It must be concluded on this point, therefore, that the adoption by a member state of rules which retroactively restrict the right to repayment of a sum levied but not due, in order to forestall the possible effects of a judgment of the court holding that Community law precludes the maintenance of a national duty, is contrary to Community law and, more particularly, to art 10 EC only in so far as it is aimed specifically at that duty, a point which falls to be determined by the national court. Accordingly, the fact that such a measure has retroactive effect does not in itself amount to an infringement of Community law, where the measure is not aimed specifically at the duty which formed the subject matter of a judgment of the court."
Reed,
submits that Weber's Wine World is not authority for the proposition that retroactive treatment is lawful where there is a difference in treatment:
i) Neither the CJEU nor the Advocate General determined whether the exception for claims that the tax was unconstitutional infringed the principle of equivalence. This was left to the national courts to determine.
ii) What the CJEU said in Weber's Wine World about breach of equivalence was a good steer. However, I note that the CJEU said no more than that the application of the equivalence principle was a matter for the domestic court.
iii) The exception for constitutional claims was the only difference in treatment. There was no question in Weber's Wine World of different conditions for claims relating to the same claim period. It was not suggested in Weber's Wine World that some people had been paid and some not paid so that the question of equal treatment that arises inReed's
case did not arise.
iv) It is notReed's
case that Weber's Wine World would have been decided differently if the principle of equal treatment had been argued. What it says is that it would be likely to have been decided differently if there had been a difference.
v) The real issue considered was that of effectiveness, which was expressly referred to in the decision of the CJEU.
"65. The limitation of the temporal effect of the ruling in the EKW judgment does not mean that whenever a person had raised a claim before the date of the judgment that claim must be free from any other restriction laid down by national law but rather that, in relation to the period specified, no other claims may be allowed to proceed. Nor is there is anything in the judgment which itself imposes or implies any general condition as to the date of enactment of any applicable national rules or which precludes any retroactive effect thereof. "
i) If the claim had in fact been filed by the date of the CJEU's judgment in EKW, the state could in an appropriate case rely on the unjust enrichment defence. Likewise, if a claim for a credit had in fact been filed by the date of the CJEU's judgment in EKW, the new law expressly provided that the state could in an appropriate case determine that there was no entitlement to such a credit where the credit would lead to unjust enrichment.
ii) If the claimant could establish a constitutional right to receive payment under the Austrian constitution, he had to be excepted from any unjust enrichment defence. I do not accept that this possibility is to be completely discounted because the constitutional right may itself have contravened the equivalence principle. The CJEU held that that question had to be determined by the national court, and so it had to proceed on the basis that the national court might hold that there was no breach of the equivalence principle.
iii) If claims for repayment had been filed and paid by the date of the introduction of the unjust enrichment defence, the state could not seek to recover on the basis of the unjust enrichment defence (see [67] of the Opinion of the Advocate General, set out at paragraph 23 of this judgment). The Advocate General did not find it necessary to state a principle which would prevent this but it was no doubt the principle of legal certainty. It would seem to follow from this carve-out for claims that had been reimbursed that, once it had been determined by that date that a claimant should be entitled to a credit for tax which was not lawfully due, that too could not be disturbed under the new law.
"20. It appears that a large number of claims had in fact been raised, in one form or another, before the date of the judgment in the EKW case (when the court had been informed of a total which might have to be reimbursed if all claims were to succeed, but not of the number of claims estimated to have been brought already). In its observations in the present case, the Austrian government states that 16,000 such claims, representing some ATS 3,000m, are pending for Vienna alone, and suggests that their number is due at least in part to the fact that the Verwaltungsgerichtshof has decided that the concept of 'equivalent administrative claims', used by the court in the EKW judgment, must be given a broad interpretation."
Reed's
argument were correct, it would mean that the CJEU's own adoption of prospective overruling had in fact caused an independent breach of the equal treatment principle.
Reed
can show that M&S 2 has undermined the decision in Weber's Wine World or that it succeeds on the "similar claim" point.
M&S 2
Reed's
submissions in this case would be that there is a new and fundamental breach of the law. However, Miss Whipple accepted that M&S 2 is confined to the particular defect which was identified and that it is not much help in the present case where the distinction is between pre and post 2005 claims.
(2) Are
Reed's
claims and a claim for repayment in respect of the same period but made before the cut off date "relevantly similar"?
i) a claim cannot sensibly be described except by stating its period but the date of the claim is not essential in this sense.
ii) the date on which a claim is paid cannot be an inherent characteristic of a claim since it is a matter for the executive.
iii) for the purposes of the unjust enrichment defence the issue is whether the burden of the payment has been passed on in the same period and so it is necessary to analyse what happened in the relevant accounting period.
iv) there is no rational connection between the unjust enrichment defence and the date of the claim which would justify treating claims differently according to their date.
v) the date of the claim is relevant to any limitation period, but not thereafter: once (as here) a claim is made within the applicable filing period, it cannot be treated differently from claims for the same claim period.
vi) it follows that Weber's Wine World would be decided differently in a post-M&S 2 world.
i) the defect identified in M&S 2, which was the unjustified distinction between payment and repayment traders, was of an entirely different nature from that alleged on this appeal.
ii) Advocate General Jacobs considered that unjust enrichment did not occur until the member state actually repays the overpaid VAT (see his Opinion in Weber's Wine World at [67]).
iii) to ignore the date of the claim is contrary to Weber's Wine World. Once it is clear that an unjust enrichment defence may be introduced for some claims with retroactive effect, it is inevitable that differences of one kind or another will be created and that they are compatible with EU law.
iv) ifReed
were right, the unjust enrichment defence could never be retroactive.
v) a purely prospective or fully retroactive unjust enrichment defence would have created differences between post- 2005 claims for pre-2005 periods and post-2005 claims for other periods.
Reed
could have made its current claims promptly as and when they arose and so avoided the restrictions later imposed on its right to repayment. It could not claim any expectation of making a claim for which it would be unjustly enriched.
Reed
were right about equal treatment, there could never be a retroactive unjust enrichment defence. Furthermore, if the unjust enrichment defence could not be introduced retroactively, it would seem to follow that any change in the procedural rules governing claims for the repayment of overpaid VAT could only ever be prospective and this would be a serious restriction on the member state's competence to set the procedural rules for repayment claims.
PRINCIPLE OF FISCAL NEUTRALITY
Reed
accepts that, if it does not succeed on the equal treatment principle it cannot succeed on fiscal neutrality. It chose to raise it because a breach of the fiscal neutrality principle, unlike a breach of the equal treatment principle, cannot be objectively justified but HMRC does not seek to say that it is justified. Thus fiscal neutrality does not in my judgment need to be determined on this appeal.
Reed
bears any evidential burden in showing that there were competitors who were advantaged by the present rules. These points likewise do not have to be determined on this appeal.
PRINCIPLE OF EFFECTIVENESS
Reed
relies on the doctrine of effectiveness as a self-standing argument, and therefore we must consider that doctrine on the basis that the above conclusions are correct and that there is no breach of the equal treatment and fiscal neutrality principles. The argument on this basis is that, even absent a breach of those principles, the doctrine of effectiveness means that its claims are to be treated as not subject to any time limit or unjust enrichment defence simply because it could, if the UK had not been in breach of EU law (see M&S 1 and M&S2) have made claims at a time when there was no unjust enrichment defence. It has the right under EU law on its argument to make those claims as if those breaches had not occurred. It is clear that the UK law does not allow it to make claims on that basis. In my judgment there is no substance in this argument.
Reed
did not then have any "accrued" right to repayment, as it suggests. It only had a right to claim repayment when it made its claims. By then, those breaches of EU law had been duly rectified and the UK had duly introduced an unjust enrichment defence. Its claims were necessarily subject to the applicable law at that date. In addition, the UK could have introduced the unjust enrichment defence at any time with retroactive effect.
SHOULD THERE BE A PRELIMINARY REFERENCE TO THE CJEU?
Reed,
the applicable EU law is clear. Accordingly this is not an appropriate case for this court to make a preliminary reference to the CJEU.
CONCLUSION
Lord Justice Aikens:
Reed
made two claims on 27 March 2009, under section 80 of the Value Added Tax Act 1994 ("VATA"), for the repayment of overpaid VAT for the period 1 April 1973 to 2 July 1995. These two claims are now known as the 2009 Claims. The question is whether the 2009 Claims can, as a matter of EU law, be subject to a defence of "unjust enrichment". This defence was given its final statutory form in the UK in section 80(3) of the VATA, as it was amended by the Finance (No 2) Act 2005 ("the 2005 Act").
Reed's
case is that HMRC cannot take advantage of this unjust enrichment defence because to do so would infringe one or more of three principles of European law known as "Equal Treatment"; "Fiscal Neutrality" and "Effectiveness".
Reed
argues that this principle would be offended here if HMRC can rely on the unjust enrichment defence to defeat the 2009 Claims because the effect of the change in the law in 2005 bringing in the current version of the unjust enrichment defence is that a claim made before the 2005 Act for a repayment of overpaid VAT in respect of a period before that Act could not be met with an unjust enrichment defence, whereas the same claim brought after that Act came into force will be. But, it is said, the two claims (i.e. the one made before the 2005 Act and the one after) are, in all material respects, in the same situation for EU law purposes. Therefore if HMRC could rely on the unjust enrichment defence there would be "Unequal Treatment" of the 2009 Claims by comparison with a trader in a similar line of business as
Reed
who made its claim to be repaid its overpaid VAT for the same period as
Reed,
but had done so prior to the 2005 Act.
Reed,
accepted in argument that this principle only became relevant if, in respect of the principle of "Equal Treatment", the court had to consider issues of objective justification for unequal treatment of the 2009 Claims. HMRC did not advance any argument on objective justification.
Reed's
case is that the 2005 Act, creating the unjust enrichment defence, makes it excessively difficult or impossible now for
Reed
to exercise its EU law right to claim its overpaid VAT, whereas it could have done in an unfettered way prior to the 2005 Act being passed. (Attempts to introduce the defence by statute before then had fallen foul of EU law and had been ineffective). Therefore, it is said, the change offends the principle of "Effectiveness".
Reed's
argument on "Fiscal Neutrality".
Reed
makes in respect of its EU law right to be repaid VAT are not improperly fettered in any way, because that EU law right is always capable of being subject to an EU law defence of unjust enrichment.
Lord Justice Vos:
Reed
contended before us that the vice in the 2005 amending provision was that it treated claims made after the cut off date (26th May 2005) differently from claims made before it. That disparity was said to give rise to breaches of the EU law principles of equal treatment, fiscal neutrality, and effectiveness. There is less authority on the principle of equal treatment, but it is acknowledged by the parties to be a higher level principle than either fiscal neutrality, which is a reflection in VAT matters of equal treatment (see paragraph 49 of M&S2), or equivalence.
Reed
in support of its appeal.
CHRONOLOGICAL BACKGROUND
Reed
provides recruitment services, and invoices its clients for the weekly wages and commission in respect of the temporary staff
Reed
finds for them.
Reed's
practice of only charging its clients VAT on the commission element of its charges for temporary
employees.
It had, however, charged VAT on the wages element of its invoices up to that time in relation to workers outside the health sector. In 1995, an appeal to the High Court was dismissed in
Reed
Personnel Services Ltd. v. Customs & Excise Commissioners [1995] STC 588. Accordingly,
Reed
had overpaid VAT on the wages element of its invoices in its other sectors.
Reed
effectively made a repayment claim in respect of VAT overpaid between 1993 and 1996 (because of the 3-year cap). With HMRC's agreement,
Reed
recovered these overpayments administratively.
Reed
made a second repayment claim for the recovery of overpaid output tax paid in the period 1st February 1991 to 27th October 1993 (outside the 3-year cap).
Reed's
second repayment claim on the basis of
Reed's
confirmation that it would not be unjustly enriched.
Reed
submitted a third repayment claim for the period from 1st April 1973 to 31st December 1990. That claim was not accepted, but the First-tier Tribunal ("FTT") decided in
Reed's
favour that it was only liable to account for output tax on the commission element of the charges for that period, and that decision was not appealed to the UT.
Reed
submitted two claims for overpaid VAT, the first in respect of the years 1973-1990 for an additional £63.8m (plus interest), and the second in respect of 1991-1995 for an additional £75.8m (plus interest). It is these claims to which this appeal relates.
First issue: does the EU principle of equal treatment mean that the 2005 amending provision is unlawful?
Reed
were right, it would not actually have been possible for the Government to introduce a lawful defence of unjust enrichment at all, because of the need always to "level up" by applying the "same arrangements as those enjoyed by the persons in the favoured category" (i.e. the absence of an unjust enrichment defence) to the "members of the disadvantaged group".
Second issue: does the EU principle of fiscal neutrality mean that the 2005 amending provision is unlawful?
Reed
submitted that the importance of its relying on the principle of fiscal neutrality (as a sub-set of the principle of equal treatment) was that fiscal neutrality cannot be objectively justified. I agree with Arden LJ that it is not necessary to deal with the point, because it is accepted that
Reed
cannot succeed on it, having failed on equal treatment.
Third issue: does the EU principle of effectiveness mean that the 2005 amending provision is unlawful?
Reed's
submission under this head was that, when the unlawful 3-year cap was introduced on 4th December 1996,
Reed
had an accrued EU and domestic law right to recover all the output tax it had overpaid in respect of the period between 1973 and 1995 (the period in issue in this case), free of any unjust enrichment defence. The Finance Act 2008 provided that the 3-year cap did not apply to claims made before 1st April 2009 and in respect of accounting periods before 4th December 1996, but did not provide, as
Reed
says it should have done, that HMRC could not rely on any unjust enrichment defence in respect of the period prior to the cut off date (26th May 2005).
Reed
submits that, because of the chronology of unlawful enactments, it should be put back into the position it was in before the original enactment of the unlawful 3-year cap in 1996.
Reed,
because the circumstances I have described have made it impossible or excessively difficult for
Reed
to pursue its claims to repayment, that are conferred by EU law, free of the unjust enrichment defence.
Reed has no right to recover its overpaid tax without having to face a claim for unjust enrichment. It has no EU or other right to be unjustly enriched. In my judgment, the UT was right on this point as well.