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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> The Lord Chancellor v Detention Action [2015] EWCA Civ 840 (29 July 2015) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2015/840.html Cite as: [2015] EWCA Civ 840, [2016] 3 All ER 626, [2015] WLR 5341, [2015] 1 WLR 5341, [2016] INLR 79, [2015] Imm AR 1349, [2015] WLR(D) 352 |
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2015] EWCA Civ 840 | ||
2015/2134 |
CIVIL
DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE,
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Mr Justice Nichol,
CO5882015
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
||
2015 |
B e f o
r
e :
ROLLS
LORD
JUSTICE BRIGGS
and
LORD JUSTICE BEAN
____________________
| THE LORD CHANCELLOR |
Appellant |
|
| - and - |
||
DETENTION ACTION | Respondent |
____________________
(Transcript of the Handed Down Judgment of
WordWave International Limited
Trading as DTI
165 Fleet Street, London EC4A 2DY
Tel No: 020 7404 1400, Fax No: 020 7831 8838
Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
Nathalie Lieven QC and Charlotte Kilroy (instructed by the Migrant's Law Project) for the
Respondent
Hearing dates : 17 July
2015
____________________
VERSION
OF JUDGMENT
Crown Copyright ©
Master of the
Rolls:
Rules
2014 ("FTR") which govern appeals to the
First-tier
Tribunal
(
Immigration
and
Asylum
Chamber)
("the FTT") against
refusals
by the Secretary of State for the Home Department ("SSHD") of
asylum
applications. By a decision made on 12 June
2015,
Nicol J held that the FTR were ultra
vires
section 22 of the
Tribunals,
Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 ("the 2007 Act") and he made an order quashing them. In particular, he found that the appellate stage of the system introduced by the FTR was structurally unfair and put appellants seeking to challenge
asylum
decisions of the SSHD at a serious procedural disadvantage. The Lord Chancellor is named as a defendant because he approved the FTR as the enabling legislation
requires.
The legislative framework
"(1) There are to berules,
to be called '
Tribunal
Procedure
Rules'
governing –
(a) the practice and procedure to be followed in theFirst-tier
![]()
Tribunal,
and
(b) the practice and procedure to be followed in the UpperTribunal.
![]()
(2)Tribunal
Procedure
Rules
are to be made by the
Tribunal
Procedure Committee.
…..
(4) Power to makeTribunal
Procedure
Rules
is to be exercised with a
view
to securing -
(a) that in proceedings before theFirst-tier
![]()
Tribunal
and Upper
Tribunal,
justice is done,
(b) that thetribunal
system is accessible and fair,
(c) that proceedings before theFirst-tier
![]()
Tribunal
or Upper
Tribunal
are handled quickly and efficiently,
(d) that therules
are both simple and simply expressed, and
(e) that therules
where appropriate confer on members of the
First-tier
![]()
Tribunal,
or Upper
Tribunal,
![]()
responsibility
for ensuring that proceedings before the
tribunal
are handled quickly and efficiently."
Immigration
and
Asylum
Chamber
of the FTT is governed by The
Tribunal
Procedure (
First-tier
Tribunal)
(
Immigration
and
Asylum
Chamber)
Rules
2014, SI No 2604. Two different
regimes
are created by these
Rules.
Rules
1 to 46 establish the ordinary procedure. They are
referred
to in the Schedule itself as "the Principal
Rules".
The Schedule contains the FTR.
rule
2(1) provides:
"The Fast TrackRules
apply to an appeal to the
Tribunal
or an application for permission to appeal to the Upper
Tribunal
where the appellant -
(a) was detained under theImmigration
Acts at a place specified in paragraph (3) when provided with notice of the appealable decision against which the appellant is appealing; and
(b) has been continuously detained under theImmigration
Acts at a place or places specified in paragraph (3) since that notice was served on the appellant."
rule
2(3) are Colnbrook House and Harmondsworth
Immigration
Removal
Centres, both of which accommodate men, and Yarl's Wood
Immigration
Removal
Centre, which accommodates women.
Rule
5(1) provides that the notice of appeal must be given not later than 2 working days after the day on which notice of the
refusal
decision is given. Paragraph (2) provides that where a notice of appeal is provided outside the time limit in paragraph (1), the
tribunal
must not extend the time for appealing unless it considers that it is in the interests of justice to do so.
Rule
7 provides that the
respondent
must, not later than 2 working days after the day on which the
tribunal
provides the
respondent
with the notice of appeal, provide
various
documents to the
tribunal.
Rule
8 provides that the
tribunal
must fix a date for the hearing of the appeal which is (a) not later than 3 working days after the day on which the
respondent
provides the documents under
rule
7 or (b) if the
tribunal
is unable to arrange a hearing within that time, as soon as practicable.
Rule
9(1) provides that the
tribunal
must conclude the hearing of the appeal on the date fixed under the FTR. Paragraph (2) provides inter alia that, where the
tribunal
postpones or adjourns the hearing under
rule
12 or 14(2)(a), the
requirement
referred
to in paragraph (1) ceases.
Rule
12 provides:
"Adjournment
Unless theTribunal
makes an order under
rule
14, the
Tribunal
may postpone or adjourn the hearing of the appeal only where the
Tribunal
is satisfied that—
(a) the appeal could not justly be decided if the hearing were to be concluded on the date fixed under the Fast TrackRules;
and
(b) there is an identifiable future date, not more than 10 working days after the date so fixed, upon which theTribunal
can conclude the hearing and justly decide the appeal within the timescales provided for in the Fast Track
Rules."
Rule
14 provides:
"Transfer out of fast track
(1) Where the Fast TrackRules
apply to an appeal or application, the
Tribunal
must order that the Fast Track
Rules
shall cease to apply—
(a) if all the parties consent; or
(b) if theTribunal
is satisfied that the case cannot justly be decided within the timescales provided for in the Fast Track
Rules.
(2) When making an order under paragraph (1), theTribunal
may, notwithstanding
rule
1(5) or (6) of the Fast Track
Rules
or the application of the Principal
Rules—
(a) postpone or adjourn any hearing of the appeal or application; and
(b) give directions inrelation
to the conduct of the proceedings."
Rules
including those differences between the Fast Track and ordinary provisions of the
Tribunal
Procedure (Upper
Tribunal)
Rules
2008 can be tabulated as follows:
| Stage | Fast-track Rules |
Principal Rules |
| Notice of Appeal | Two working days from notice of decision (Schedule, Rule 5) |
14 days from notice of decision (2014 Rules, Rule 19) |
Service of Respondent's Bundle on FTT |
Two working days from service of notice of appeal (Schedule, Rule 7) |
28 days from receipt of notice of appeal(2014 Rules, Rule 24) |
| Hearing of appeal by FTT | Three working days after service of Respondent's Bundle on FTT(Schedule, Rule 8) |
No fixed time limits |
| Adjournments | Maximum of 10 working days permitted (Schedule, Rule 12) |
No fixed time limits (2014 Rules, Rule 4(3)(h)) |
| Service of Determination by FTT | Two working days after hearing (Schedule, Rule 10) |
No fixed time limits (2014 Rules, Rule 29) |
| Application to FTT for Permission to appeal to UT | Three working days from service of determination (Schedule, Rule 11) |
14 days after service of the determination (2014 Rules, Rule 33) |
Renewed application to UT for PTA |
Four working days after FTT sends notice of refusal of leave(UT Rules, Rule 21(3)(a)(ii)) |
14 days after FTT sends notice of refusal of leave(UT Rules, Rule 21(3)(a)(i)) |
Hearing of appeal by Upper Tribunal | Two working days after permission granted if decision granting permission sent electronically or delivered personally, otherwise five working days. (UT Rules 36A) |
No time limits. |
| Notice of appeal | One day's notice of hearing date. (UT Rules, Rule 36(2)(aa)) |
At least 14 days notice of hearing date required.(UT Rules, Rule 36(2)) |
The grounds of appeal
role
in allocating cases to the FTR created an unacceptable
risk
of unfairness or made an otherwise fair process unfair; (ii) holding that (a) any unfairness was sufficiently serious to be characterised as "structural" and (b) the FTR provisions allowing for adjournments and
requiring
transfer out of the FTR were not capable of ensuring fairness or sufficiently
reducing
any
risk
of unfairness; (iii) failing to consider whether the FTR provisions allowing for adjournments and
requiring
transfer out of the FTR sufficiently mitigated any perceived disadvantage or unfairness arising out of the SSHD's
role
in allocating cases to the FTR; and (iv) departing from the decision of Ouseley J in
R
(
Detention
Action
)
v
SSHD [2014] EWHC 2245 (Admin) ("DA 1").
reasons
which I set out in more detail below that the judge was wrong to conclude that the FTR are "structurally unfair" as a
result
of the "serious procedural disadvantage which comes from the abbreviated timetable and curtailed case management powers together with the imposition of this disadvantage on the appellant by the [SHHD]" (para 60 of the judgment). This is a distillation of the first three grounds of appeal. Mr Eadie did not pursue the fourth ground of appeal.
Background
asylum
claims. Individuals are kept in
detention
pending the determination by the SSHD of their claims and the determination by the FTT or the UT of appeals. It is well established that the prompt and effective determination of
asylum
claims is in the public interest and to a legitimate government policy objective: see
R
(L)
v
SSHD [2003]
EWCA
Civ
25, [2003] 1 WLR 1230 at paras 48 to 53 and
R
(
Refugee
Legal Centre)
v
SSHD [2004]
EWCA
Civ
1481, [2005] 1 WLR 2219 at paras 6 to 8 and 20 to 25.
detention
regime.
In his judgment in DA1, Ouseley J accepted that the manner in which the DFT was being operated created an unacceptable
risk
of unfair determinations for
vulnerable
or potentially
vulnerable
applicants who did not have access to lawyers sufficiently early in the process. But he did not accept the broad attack that was made by the claimant on the FTR appeals process. At para 184 of his judgment, he said that he did not consider that the appeals process was ultra
vires
or that the FTR, in their 2005 form created an unacceptable
risk
of unfairness.
view,
the outcome of the appeal before this court depends on the specific submissions that were addressed to us on the FTR themselves. I propose to say no more about the earlier challenges.
The judgment of Nicol J
reasoning
is to be found in the following paragraphs of his judgment :
"57. In my judgment the FTR do incorporate structural unfairness. They put the Appellant at a serious procedural disadvantage…..
…….
60. What seems to me to make the FTR structurally unfair is the serious procedural disadvantage which comes from the abbreviated timetable and curtailed case management powers together with the imposition of this disadvantage on the appellant by therespondent
to the appeal."
Some introductory points
asylum
appeal involves a full adversarial hearing in which the FTT can and does hear oral evidence from the SSHD and the appellant on all issues before it. It can consider evidence that was not put before the decision-maker, including evidence about matters arising after the decision is taken and it makes fresh findings of fact. As Ms Lieven points out, many
refusals
of
asylum
turn on the SSHD making adverse findings on the appellant's credibility. In practice, it is likely that the only way to displace such findings on appeal is for the appellant to produce some corroborative evidence to support his account, whether it is specific to the individual or
relating
to the country of origin to which he will be
returned
if his appeal fails. The combination of a highly expedited timetable and the fact that the appellant is in
detention
makes this task
very
difficult.
representative
must perform in connection with an appeal. The judge assumed that appellants would be legally
represented,
although there was some doubt as to the extent to which this would be the case. I shall make the same assumption. The tasks include:
(i) Checking whether the generaldetention
criteria have been properly applied. These are the sole justification for
detention
post-decision and pending an appeal.
(ii) Makingrepresentations,
where appropriate, that the appellant is unlawfully detained.
(iii) Applying for bail if therepresentations
are
rejected.
These involve identifying sureties, taking instructions from them, and checking their availability for any bail hearing and finding a bail address.
(iv) Taking instructions from the appellant on therefusal
letter.
(v)
Preparing the appellant's statement, checking it with the appellant and having it signed. The statement will include the appellant's
response
to the
refusal
letter which any expert will need to take into account.
(vi)
Arranging for the translation of any documents produced by the appellant which an expert needs to consider.
(vii)
Arranging for any expert evidence, including identifying an appropriate expert, applying for an extension to the controlled legal
representation
certificate to fund this or any other additional expense, further
representations
to the legal aid authorities (if necessary in the event of initial
refusal),
arranging for the expert to attend the appeal hearing.
viii)
Making an application where appropriate for the appeal to be transferred out of the Fast Track appeal procedure. Considering the
response
to such an application from the SSHD.
detention
and will therefore have limited access to their legal
representatives
is explained in the witness statement of Mr Blakely, a solicitor who has extensive experience of dealing with
asylum
cases. He says at para 103 of his statement:
"We usually instruct counsel torepresent
our clients. Therefore whether counsel can attend at the
Detention
Centre prior to the day of the hearing will depend on his or her availability and the need to give notice to the
Detention
Centre in order to book the
rooms.
Where it is necessary for counsel to see the client on the day of the hearing, the position is that there is no privacy in taking instructions, which must be done through a glass in a
room
in which other
representatives
and clients are present. In addition, clients are brought to court only about 45 minutes before the hearing, meaning there is not always enough time to complete the conference before the hearing begins."
The court's approach to the
vires
of the FTR
reference
to section 22(4) of the 2007 Act and whether the power to make the
rules
has been exercised "with a
view
to securing" the five objectives set out in subsection (4)(a) to (e). There might appear to be a tension between (a) and (b) on the one hand and (c) and (e) on the other. But in my
view,
the tension is more apparent than
real:
the
rules
must secure that the proceedings are handled quickly and efficiently, but in a way which ensures that justice is done in the particular proceedings and that the system is accessible and fair. Speed and efficiency do not trump justice and fairness. Justice and fairness are paramount. This
reflects
what Sedley LJ said in
Refugee
Legal Centre at para 8:
"The choice of an acceptable system is in the first instance a matter for the executive, and in making its choice it is entitled to take into account the perceived political and other imperatives for a speedy turn-round
of
asylum
applications. But it is not entitled to sacrifice fairness on the altar of speed and convenience, much less of expediency; and whether it has done so is a question of law for the courts. Without
reproducing
the
valuable
discussion of the development of this branch of the law in Craig Administrative Law (5th ed.), ch.13, we adopt Professor Craig's summary of the three factors which the court will weigh: the individual interest at issue, the benefits to be derived from added procedural safeguards, and the costs to the administration of compliance. But it is necessary to
recognise
that these are not factors of equal weight. As Bingham LJ said in Thirukumar [1989] Imm AR 402,414,
asylum
decisions are of such moment that only the highest standards of fairness will suffice; and as Lord Woolf CJ stressed in
R
![]()
v
Home Secretary, ex parte Fayed [1998] 1 WLR 763, 777, administrative convenience cannot justify unfairness. In other words, there has to be in
asylum
procedures, as in many other procedures, an irreducible minimum of due process."
v
SSHD [2007]
EWCA
Civ
13, [2007] INLR 224 at para 58.
requirements
of fairness and justice include that the appeal process in the DFT provides a fair opportunity for appellants to present their cases properly. The claimant says that the time limits are so tight that many
asylum
seekers are denied the opportunity to present their appeals effectively and the
various
safeguards on which the SSHD and the Lord Chancellor
rely
are insufficient to secure justice by means of a fair appeal process. The claimant also says that the unfairness is aggravated by the fact that the SSHD is the other party to the appeal, so that she is able to gain a major litigation advantage by being able to decide that the appeal is suitable to be placed in the FTR. The SSHD and the Lord Chancellor say that the safeguards contained in the FTR are sufficient to
render
the system fair and just.
RLC
and
R
(Tabbakh)
v
Staffordshire and West Midlands Probation Trust [2014]
EWCA
Civ
827, [2014] 1 WLR 4620 indicate the general approach that the court should adopt when assessing whether a system for challenging adverse findings is unfair so as to be unlawful. In
RLC
the issue was whether the administrative decision-making stage of the detained fast track system which the SSHD had introduced was inherently unfair so as to be unlawful. The court said that the question was whether the system "considered in the
round"
carried "an unacceptable
risk
of unfairness to
asylum
seekers" (para 20).
relies
on para 49 of the judgment of
Richards
LJ in support of his submission that there must be a high
risk
of unlawful decisions inherent in the system before a court will declare a system to be unlawful:
"That the court will be slow to find that a system is inherently unfair and therefore unlawful is illustrated byRefugee
Legal Centre itself, where the court had evident concerns about potential
rigidity
in the system but concluded that so long as it operated flexibly it could operate without an unacceptable
risk
of unfairness."
run
of cases that go through the system; (ii) a successful challenge to a system on grounds of unfairness must show more than the possibility of aberrant decisions and unfairness in individual cases; (iii) a system will only be unlawful on grounds of unfairness if the unfairness is inherent in the system itself; (iv) the threshold of showing unfairness is a high one; (
v)
the core question is whether the system has the capacity to
react
appropriately to ensure fairness (in particular where the challenge is directed to the tightness of time limits, whether there is sufficient flexibility in the system to avoid unfairness); and (
vi)
whether the irreducible minimum of fairness is
respected
by the system and therefore lawful is ultimately a matter for the courts. I would enter a note of caution in
relation
to (iv). I accept that in most contexts the threshold of showing inherent unfairness is a high one. But this should not be taken to dilute the importance of the principle that only the highest standards of fairness will suffice in the context of
asylum
appeals.
RLC
and Tabbakh involved challenges to policies of the executive. He submits that the court should be more circumspect about
reaching
conclusions as to the fairness of a scheme which has been the subject of wide consultation (including of the judiciary) and is the product of the deliberations of a
Rule
Committee and is contained in legislation (in our case subject to the negative
resolution
procedure). That is why he submits that the judge was
right
to say at para 56(
viii):
"the TPC is given
responsibility
for drawing up the
Tribunal
Procedural
Rules
by Parliament and I must give its judgment
respect".
regard
to and
respect
the
views
of the TPC as to the appropriate procedural
rules.
But this should not be taken too far. The material that we have been shown indicates that during the consultation process the TPC itself and most of the consultees expressed great concern about the potential unfairness of the proposed FTR. It should also be noted that the TPC decided to support the proposed
rules
after correspondence from the then Lord Chancellor in which he
raised
the possibility of his overruling the TPC's initial
view
and supporting the position of the SSHD. For this
reason
alone, the court should exercise caution about giving too much weight to the judgment of the TPC. In any event, the question is whether the FTR satisfy the
requirements
of justice and fairness stated in section 22(4) of the 2007 Act. The answer to this question does not call for expertise which the court does not possess. The court is well equipped to decide whether an appeal process is fair and just. I accept that the concepts of fairness and justice are not susceptible to hard-edged definition. That is why a margin of discretion should be accorded to the TPC, but it should be modest.
R
v
SSHD ex p Saleem [2001] 1 WLR 443 and FP (Iran) as being examples of the kind of case where the court does not allow a margin of discretion to a
rule-making
body. In Saleem, the issue was whether
rule
42(1)(a) of the
Asylum
Appeals (Procedure)
Rules
1996 on deemed service was ultra
vires
the enabling Act. It was held that it was ultra
vires
on the grounds that the
rule
involved a complete denial of access to the
Immigration
Appeal
Tribunal,
a fundamental
right
which could only be abrogated by an Act of Parliament either expressly or by necessary implication. FP (Iran) was an analogous case. These were striking and extreme cases. I do not consider that they shed light on the extent of the margin of discretion that should be allowed in a case such as the present. Ultimately, the question that arises in this case is whether there is systemic or structural unfairness inherent in the FTR such as to
render
them ultra
vires
section 22(4) of the 2007 Act. That is a question of law for the court to determine. It turns on whether the safeguards on which the SSHD and the Lord Chancellor
rely
render
the system fair and just.
The safeguards
relied
on by the SSHD and the Lord Chancellor
result
from the tight time limits.
immigration
and
asylum
appeals. They are acutely aware of the consequences of success or failure for individual appellants and their families. They are, therefore, best placed to assess the
requirements
of justice and fairness in the particular facts and circumstances of each case. We should
respect
and take account of their expertise: see AH (Sudan)
v
SSHD [2007] UKHL 49, [2008] AC 678 per Baroness Hale at para 30. In short, we should trust them to get it
right.
required
by
rule
2 of the Principal
Rules
to give effect to the "overriding objective" when they exercise any power under the
rules
including the FTR. The overriding objective is "to enable the
Tribunal
to deal with cases fairly and justly" and includes "ensuring, so far as practicable, that the parties are able to participate fully in the proceedings" (
rule
2(1)(c)) .
Rule
5(2) permits an extension of the time for appealing if the
tribunal
considers that it is in the interests of justice to do so.
Rule
14 is particularly important and (Mr Eadie submits) provides a complete answer to the complaint of unfairness. It obliges the
tribunal
to transfer an appeal out of the fast track if it is satisfied that the case "cannot justly be decided within the timescales provided for in the Fast Track
Rules".
represented
by lawyers.
Discussion
asylum
appeals are often factually complex and difficult. They sometimes
raise
difficult issues of law too. I am unpersuaded that the safeguards are sufficient to overcome the unfairness inherent in a system which
requires
asylum
seekers to prepare and present their appeals within 7 days of the decisions which they seek to challenge.
tribunal
judges who deal with the appeals. I accept that they are specialist judges who can usually be trusted to get the
right
answer on the basis of the material that is presented to them. I am also sure that they do their best to comply with the overriding objective of dealing with appeals justly. Nevertheless, in
view
of (i) the complex and difficult nature of the issues that are often
raised;
(ii) the problems faced by legal
representatives
of obtaining instructions from individuals who are in
detention;
and (iii) the considerable number of tasks that they have to perform (see para 20 above) the timetable for the conduct of these appeals is so tight that it is inevitable that a significant number of appellants will be denied a fair opportunity to present their cases under the FTR
regime.
rules
12 and 14.
Rule
12 gives the
Tribunal
the power to postpone or adjourn the hearing of the appeal for no more than 10 days if it cannot be justly decided on the date fixed under the FTR (i.e. within 7 days from the date of the decision under appeal). I agree with the judge that the power to adjourn "has a
very
limited
role
because of the stipulation that the adjourned hearing must take place within 10 days" (para 62). That is why the main focus of the argument before us was on
rule
14 which provides that, if the
tribunal
is satisfied that the case cannot justly be decided within the timescales provided for in the FTR, it must order the FTR to cease to apply. In that event, the Principal
Rules
apply. It is not in dispute that under the Principal
Rules
appellants have a fair opportunity to present their cases properly and have them decided justly. At first sight, the argument based on
rule
14 seems to be formidable. If an appeal cannot be decided justly within the FTR time limits, it must be transferred out. Why is this not a complete answer to the claimant's challenge?
Review
Hearing and no effective opportunity to deal with an application to transfer an appeal out of the fast track until the substantive hearing of the appeal itself. It follows that the appellant and his legal
representative
must always be
ready
to conduct the appeal in case the application to transfer is
rejected.
real
risk
that 7 working days will simply be too short to assemble such an argument (and, at the same time, prepare for the full appeal in case the
Tribunal
decides to proceed)". I doubt whether there is much force in the argument that an appellant's
representative
will not have the time to prepare both for an application to transfer out of the fast track and for the appeal itself in case the application to transfer is dismissed. It seems to me that it will inevitably become clear during the course of the preparation for the appeal whether the appellant has grounds for making an application to transfer out of the fast track. It is unlikely that significant additional time will be
required
to prepare for the making of the application.
rule
14 does not provide the complete answer to the claimant's case that at first sight it seems to offer. First, it may be difficult for the appellant to persuade the
tribunal
that the appeal cannot be justly determined in the limited time available. There may not have been sufficient time to complete inquiries into possible further evidence. An appeal is bound to seek to challenge the
reasons
given by the SSHD for
refusing
the
asylum
claim. As I have said, many
refusals
turn on adverse findings on the appellant's credibility. The focus of the preparation for an appeal will often, therefore, be on the search for evidence to corroborate the appellant's account in
rebuttal
of the adverse findings. The period of 7 days between the date of the
refusal
decision and the hearing of the appeal is bound to be insufficient in a significant number of cases. I have
referred
to the difficulties facing legal
representatives
who have to take instructions from clients who are in
detention.
It may not be possible for them to say whether the further inquiries that they wish to make are likely to be fruitful. In such a situation, it may be difficult to persuade the
tribunal
that there are cogent
reasons
to transfer a case out of the fast track.
required
to argue that the evidence that has already been submitted in support of the appeal is insufficient. The appellant is placed in a
very
difficult position. The stronger the case he seeks to advance for a transfer on the footing that there are material gaps in his evidence which he needs time to fill by obtaining further evidence, the more he damages his prospects of succeeding in his appeal if the
tribunal
refuses
to transfer the case out of the fast track. In short, in order to explain why the time scales are unjust, the appellant has to identify all the evidential gaps in his case. But if the application to transfer is
refused,
the appellant will then have to persuade the judge that the appeal should be allowed notwithstanding these gaps. I accept the submission of Ms Lieven that this puts the appellant in an invidious position and is unfair and unjust.
rule
12 power and the
rule
14 duty are mechanisms which are intended to ensure that the tight time limits imposed do not produce injustice in individual cases. But the expectation must be that the time limits will usually be applied. Otherwise the object of the FTR would be defeated. There is bound to be a
reluctance
to postpone or transfer an appeal on the day of the hearing when time has been allocated for the full hearing of the appeal and the parties and witnesses have come to give their evidence and advance their submissions. The
tribunal
would be likely to be more sympathetic to an application to postpone or transfer out if it were made at a case management hearing before the date of the hearing. But the timescales of the FTR do not permit this. We were told that typically the FTT hears two or three
asylum
appeals per day.
Rule
10
requires
the decision and the
reasons
for it (which may be extensive and detailed) to be given no later than 2 working days after the day of the hearing. I have little doubt that the judges of the FTT know that, if they were
regularly
to adjourn or transfer cases out of the fast track, this would be inconsistent with section 22(4)(e) of the 2007 Act which
requires
that the
rules,
where appropriate, confer on members of the FTT "
responsibility
for ensuring that proceedings before the
tribunal
are handled quickly and efficiently". As Ms Lieven puts it, by the time of the hearing, the SSHD and the FTT will have prepared for the appeal and there will be a momentum in favour of proceeding with the hearing which it will be difficult for an appellant to stop.
view
the time limits are so tight as to make it impossible for there to be a fair hearing of appeals in a significant number of cases. For the
reasons
that I have given, the safeguards on which the SSHD and the Lord Chancellor
rely
do not provide a sufficient answer. The system is therefore structurally unfair and unjust. The scheme does not adequately take account of the complexity and difficulty of many
asylum
appeals, the gravity of the issues that are
raised
by them and the measure of the task that faces legal
representatives
in taking instructions from their clients who are in
detention.
It seems to me that some
relaxation
of the time limits is necessary, but it is not for the court to prescribe what is
required
to
remedy
the problem. A lawful scheme must, however, properly take into account the factors to which I have
referred
whilst, I acknowledge, giving effect to the entirely proper aim of processing
asylum
appeals as quickly as possible consistently with fairness and justice.
The
relevance
of the
role
of the SSHD in the process
rules
themselves, there is also additional unfairness in the fact that the decision to place an appellant into the highly expedited FTR procedure is taken by the other party to the appeal, namely the SSHD (
rather
than the FTT itself): this amounts to a breach of natural justice. There is a fundamental unfairness in one party to litigation being able to impose a highly disadvantageous procedure on the other party in circumstances where the
tribunal
or court can only consider the matter at the hearing which is intended to be the full hearing.
view
of the conclusion that I have already
reached
on the unfairness of the procedural
rules
themselves, it is not necessary to deal with this additional argument. It seems to have found some favour with the judge as is apparent from his conclusion at para 60 of his judgment "the serious procedural disadvantage which comes from the abbreviated timetable and curtailed case management powers together with the imposition of this disadvantage on the appellant by the
respondent
to the appeal" (emphasis added).
view)
the
rules
themselves are procedurally fair and enable an appellant to present his appeal fairly and justice to be achieved, then I do not consider that the fact that an appellant is in the fast track system as a
result
of the decision of the SSHD is
relevant.
Ex hypothesi, the decision of the SSHD has not impeded the ability of the appellant to present his case fairly and the FTT to decide the appeal justly.
Conclusion
reasons
that I have given, the FTR are systemically unfair and unjust. The appeal must, therefore, be dismissed. The object of the SSHD in placing
asylum
appeals in the fast track is the entirely laudable one of dealing with them quickly. This is not because she considers that they are all hopeless cases. Far from it. Although many of the appeals are dismissed, many succeed. They are placed in the fast track so that they can be handled quickly and efficiently. But the consequences for an
asylum
seeker of mistakes in the process are potentially disastrous. That is why section 22(4) of the 2007 Act
recognises that justice and fairness should not be sacrificed on the altar of speed and efficiency. As I have explained, the FTR do not strike the correct balance between (i) speed and efficiency and (ii) fairness and justice. It is too heavily weighted in favour of the former and needs to be adjusted. Precisely how that is done is a matter for the TPC and Parliament.
Lord Justice Briggs:
Lord Justice Bean: