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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> D (A Child) [2017] EWCA Civ 196 (29 March 2017) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2017/196.html Cite as: [2017] EWCA Civ 196 |
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2017] EWCA Civ 196 | ||
CIVIL
DIVISION)
ON
APPEAL FROM Coventry
District
Registry
His
Honour Judge Cleary sitting as a S 9 Judge of the High Court
CV16C00513
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
||
2017 |
B e f o r e :
LADY JUSTICE KING
and
MR JUSTICE MOYLAN
____________________
D (A Child) |
Appellant |
|
| - and - |
____________________
John Vater QC and Elizabeth Walker (instructed by Brendan Fleming Solicitors) for the Second
Respondent
Hearing
date:
Wednesday 15 February
2017
____________________
Crown Copyright ©
Lady Justice King :
dismissal
on 20 October 2016 by His Honour Judge Cleary sitting as a high court judge, of its application for a care order in
respect
of a little girl, ML, who was born 7
December
2015.
determine
the cause of ML's injuries and, heard over eleven
days
commencing 28 October 2016, properly weighed and evaluated all the medical evidence put before him prior to concluding that he "could not hold" that ML's father (or indeed mother) were
responsible
for the injuries suffered by ML.
Background
daughter
of ID ("the mother") and ML ("the father"). Both parents are Lithuanian. The parents began to live together a few weeks prior to ML's birth. They set up home in a multi-occupation property in which they had their own room with a shower, together with the shared use of a kitchen on a
different
floor of the building. The judge was of the view that "the true nature of the
relationship
has
remained
something of a mystery".
day
largely with her mother. In the afternoon, sometime between 15.30 and 16.00, ML was taken from the shared kitchen up to the parents' room by the father. Although ML was seen briefly on several occasions by the mother when she went up to the bedroom, ML was thereafter in the care of the father. In broad terms the father's case was that he had attempted to settle ML, who began to cry, he had picked her up, and she had "spat out" her
dummy,
"given a cough" and fallen unconscious. An ambulance was called and the father carried out CPR until the paramedics attended at the house at 17.45. ML was admitted to hospital, where she
remained
until
discharged
into foster care on 3 May 2016. Fortunately, given the seriousness of the brain injury she was found to have sustained, she appears to have made an excellent
recovery,
revealed
in the hospital notes was one of ML having suffered an acute collapse
requiring
subsequent
resuscitation
including an episode of encephalopathy (abnormal brain function) and having extensive bilateral
retinal
haemorrhaging and subdural bleeds of
different
ages.
read
and
referred
to their statements, which can be summarised as follows:
i)Dr
Ann Callaghan, Consultant Paediatrician,
referred
to subdural haemorrhages of
different
ages and concluded that ML had sustained a "violent assault" immediately prior to becoming unwell.
Dr
Callaghan concluded that it was most likely that ML had been "violently shaken" on more than one occasion.
ii)
Dr
Khaled Sherlala, Consultant Neuroradiologist,
reported
subdural collections of
different
ages (i.e. chronic and acute). He was of the view that what he observed was "highly suspicious of non-accidental injury".
iii) Ms
Dean,
Ophthalmologist, found there to be acute
retinal
haemorrhages consistent with those found in abusive head trauma.
Dr
Callaghan, led to the involvement of social services and the institution of care proceedings in
respect
of ML.
i)Dr
Neill Stoodley: Consultant Paediatric Neuroradiologist
ii)
Dr
Patrick Cartlidge: Consultant Paediatrician
iii) Mr Peter Richards: Consultant Paediatric Neurosurgeon
iv) Mr William Newman: Consultant Paediatric Ophthalmologist
v)
Dr
Russell Keehan: Consultant Paediatric Haematologist
reports
and all but
Dr
Keehan gave oral evidence. (
Dr
Keehan's evidence was accepted and he expressed no opinion as to causation). Both
Dr
Stoodley and Mr Richards focused on the CT scan and the MRI scans carried out upon ML's admission to hospital. Whilst the two
doctors
had a
difference
of opinion as to the precise locations of the bleeding, they were nevertheless in complete agreement with each other (and indeed with
Dr
Cartlidge and Mr Newman) that the likely cause of the injuries to ML's brain was a shaking/shaking impact injury sustained immediately prior to her collapse.
Dr
Cartlidge for his part prepared a paediatric overview, going through numerous
differential
diagnoses
and hypothetical scenarios before setting out from a paediatric perspective why, on the facts of the case, he was of the view that what was seen was an acute injury rather than a pre-existing chronic subdural collection. Whilst accepting in evidence that "the uncommon is going to happen uncommonly" at the conclusion of his cross-examination on behalf of the parents
Dr
Cartlidge
remained
steadfast in his view that, when considering the injuries both taken altogether and individually, he was satisfied that they were
recent
and likely to have been caused by trauma.
reporting
on the injuries to ML's eyes originally observed by Ms
Dean
on ML's admission to hospital, identified in both eyes multiple
retinal
haemorrhages which were multi-layer in all four quadrants and which he said were likely to have been caused within 17
days
prior to their last identification (namely since 5 April 2016, over four months after ML's birth). Mr Newman, at considerable length and in painstaking
detail,
examined possible causes for the
retinal
haemorrhages. He ruled out birth-
related
retinal
haemorrhages and said that normal, (or even rough) handling, minor trauma, low level fall, an attempt to rouse an unconscious or sleeping child, CPR, seizures or raised inter-cranial pressure would not cause, or would be very unlikely to have caused, the
retinal
haemorrhages he saw in ML's eyes.
During
the course of his oral evidence Mr Newman confirmed that nothing which had been put to him, or which arose
during
the course of his oral evidence, had caused him to change his opinion as to either the causation or timing of the
retinal
haemorrhages. He properly accepted that the presence of
retinal
haemorrhages should not be
regarded
as a "trump card".
"In the absence of an episode of major accidental trauma, or an underlying medical condition, and in the knowledge that not everything in medicine has a clear explanation, then the intraocular haemorrhagesremain
unexplained and in my opinion are most consistent with a shaking or a shaking with impact injury."
doctors
who had expressed a view as to causation (the 3 clinicians and 4 of the experts), all specialists in their varying
disciplines,
were of the opinion that it was most likely that the injuries sustained by ML were caused as a consequence of her having been shaken shortly before she collapsed on 16 April 2016 whilst in her father's care.
The approach of the parents
reject
the evidence of the experts but that in
doing
so he must give
reasons
for having
reached
that conclusion.
representation
by Mr Vater QC and Mr Storey QC, both counsel with considerable experience in
representing
parents in cases where there is an allegation that a child has, or may have been, shaken. Mr Vater in his submissions to us frankly acknowledged that given the strength of the medical evidence, he had, when embarking upon the case, an "uphill task" if he was to undermine the seemingly overwhelming medical evidence to such an extent that the judge could not be satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the injuries had been sustained by ML on 16 April 2016 as a consequence of inflicted injury or an undisclosed accident. To this end, whilst not putting forward a positive case that ML's collapse had been as a
result
of subdural haemorrhages sustained by her at birth at the hearing before HHJ Cleary, both counsel for the parents explored this possibility in considerable
detail
and properly exploited areas where, in particular,
Dr
Stoodley and Mr Richards had not been in complete accord in their evidence.
The Medical Evidence
relation
to the
retinal
haemorrhages. In order to understand the importance of the evidence in
respect
of the
retinal
haemorrhages it is necessary to consider in basic terms the state of the medical evidence overall.
reading
a scan which
reveals
subdural haemorrhaging, the ageing of those findings is estimated by
reference
to their appearance on the scan; acute blood shows as 'bright' or 'white' and older bleeds as '
darker'
or 'grey'. A clinician
reading
the scan may identify bright blood as
recent/acute
and
darker
blood as old/chronic.
relatively
minor (or indeed no) incident of a benign nature can cause a so-called
re-bleed
within the existing subdural effusion. Where there has been a
re-bleed,
both old and fresh blood can be seen in the same area within the brain with the acute blood being visible within the old bleed. If however acute blood is seen in a geographically
different
area of the brain from the
darker
blood, then that is
regarded
as indicative of there having been two or more separate episodes of trauma having led to the haemorrhages, of
different
ages, there being no source of 'old' blood to generate a '
re-bleed'.
Each of the treating clinicians were of the view that they were seeing both old and new haemorrhages of
different
ages indicating separate traumatic incidents rather than a '
re-bleed'.
darker
fluid seen in head injury cases. When the arachnoid membrane is
damaged
at the time of a head injury,
dark
cerebral spinal fluid (CSF) can leak from the subarachnoid space into the subdural space and either collect there or
dilute
acute blood that is present. It can therefore be the case that what is observed on a scan is not a chronic subdural haemorrhage at all but a mixture of blood and CSF which has a similar grey,
dark
appearance as is seen in a chronic subdural haemorrhage. This phenomenon is known as acute traumatic effusion, and is part of an acute or
recent
injury.
recent,
traumatic event. As chronic subdural haemorrhages
resolve,
membranes form within them as part of the healing process. If these membranes can be seen on a scan, then that is good supportive evidence that what is seen is a chronic subdural haemorrhage and not an acute traumatic effusion. However, the absence of membranes is not
diagnostic
of acute traumatic effusion; the experts must
draw
on other aspects of their findings and indeed their experience and expertise in order to
reach
a conclusion as to whether what is seen is, or is not, a chronic collection.
Research
is limited but seems to suggest that any such subdural haemorrhages have largely cleared by four weeks and have completely
resolved
by three months.
D
was four months old.
Dr
Stoodley gave his evidence by
reference
to four weeks and
Dr
Cartlidge and Mr Richards to three months.
Regardless
of the
date
by which they would have expected any birth subdural haemorrhages to be
resolved,
both
Dr
Stoodley and Mr Richards were of the view that what they saw on the scans were not chronic subdural haemorrhages, (whether
dating
back to birth or otherwise) but acute traumatic effusions and therefore indicative of
recent
trauma. Further, each was clear that,
regardless
of whether the
darker
density
in fact
revealed
chronic subdural haemorrhage or acute traumatic effusion, an explanation would still be
required
to account for the presence of the acute bilateral
retinal
haemorrhages which were found by Mr Newman to be no more than 17
days
old and which, it was accepted by common consent, were unconnected with the subdural haemorrhaging.
referred
to "chronic subdural haemorrhages of various ages" and where there were no membranes visible on the scars, there was ample material for cross-examination on behalf of the parents. If what was seen were chronic subdural haemorrhages, rather than acute traumatic effusions, that opened up a line of cross-examination as to whether these may have been birth injuries. Further, if Mr Richard's rather that
Dr
Stoodley's observations as to the precise location of blood were accepted then all the acute blood identified on the scans could be attributed to '
re-bleed'
into an old subdural haemorrhage, notwithstanding the clinicians'
reference
to more than one incidence of trauma.
relation
to ML's head circumference and the significance of seizures, which it is not necessary to examine for the purposes of this appeal. A number of possible alternative explanations for the head injuries were put to each of the experts (including birth subdural haemorrhage). Mr Vater
described
these, admittedly
remote,
possibilities as outliers (an expression which when used in statistics means, (per the OED), "an observation whose value lies outside the set of values considered likely according to some hypothesis, usually one based on other observations). Each of the possible outliers put to the experts was
rejected
by them, they used in
response
expressions such as 'never say never' and 'I can't exclude it but it is highly unlikely' or 'improbable'.
described
their evidence as follows:-
"[20]…..The evidence of each of these clinicians, in their writtenreports
appeared to me to be well
researched,
soundly based, and well expressed. Each of them, at the stand, was
refreshingly
open and honest. They each acknowledged the presence of
research
in their
respective
fields, and the existence of cases of which they were aware or in which they appeared, when
differences
between them and their colleagues (in those cases) were exposed or when evidence at the hearing was established to provoke a change of opinion."
recorded
[11] that 'None of the experts changed their overall opinions'. Accordingly, at the conclusion of their evidence:
i) Each of Mr Richards,
Dr
Stoodley and
Dr
Cartlidge was of the view that the imaging was more likely to
represent
fresh blood and acute traumatic effusion rather than fresh blood and a chronic collection
ii) Mr Newman's opinion in
relation
to the
retinal
haemorrhages was that:
"In the absence of an identifiable medical condition or history of significant trauma, theretinal
haemorrhages identified in ML
remain
unexplained but in my opinion would be most consistent with those found following a shaking or shaking with impact injury"
iii) It was common ground and was, and is, accepted by Mr Vater that a chronic injury could not account for the
retinal
haemorrhages.
iv) All of the experts
remained
of the view that there was nothing in the parents' accounts that explained ML's collapse, the encephalopathy, and the injuries subsequently found.
v) The court appointed experts were of the view that the combined effect of: ML's presentation, the injuries themselves and the absence of a plausible explanation, meant that it was most likely that ML had been injured by a shaking/shaking impact injury in a manner that one or more of her carers had chosen to conceal.
The Judgment
recorded
that the standard of proof is the balance of probabilities and the burden of proof
rests
upon the local authority. He further
reminded
himself that:
"Thirdly, there is no room for a conclusion which consists of only a possibility or suspicion. The test is binary. Either the local authority succeeds in the task it sets itself or itdoes
not. The court is not permitted to shroud its judgment in uncertainties, and thus it must either
declare
that it is satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, at the occurrence of an event or that it is not. And if it is not, then the assertion is
rejected.
There is no room for 'maybe' or 'possibly'."
recorded
that none had any
doubt
as to their conclusions and that each was satisfied as to the outcome and to the cause of ML's injuries, namely that ML had sustained a
recent
traumatic injury. The judge said that:
"[23] It is necessary therefore to establish where each of them were challenged, and on what basis, and to conclude whether or not the skilful interrogation by counsel for therespondents
produced
doubt
or uncertainty into their
respective
conclusions."
doubts".
To approach the case by
reference
to "
doubts"
meant, Mr Geekie submitted, that if the local authority were to prove its case it was necessary to exclude all other possibilities or uncertainties but:
i) such an approach imports the criminal standard of proof, namely "satisfied so that you are sure"ii) is a scientific impossibility in any event given that, as Mr Richards puts it in evidence,
doctors
"never say never"
detail
the evidence of each of the experts. He
dealt
with the evidence of
Dr
Stoodley and Mr Richards identifying the
difference
between them as to the location of all the blood seen on the scans. The judge set out the evidence of
Dr
Cartlidge noting his important observation that even if what was seen were chronic subdural haemorrhages
dating
back to birth (which he
did
not accept) an explanation would still be
required
for the unconnected
retinal
haemorrhages.
referring
to his
report
as having been "hugely informative,
detailed
and comprehensive" and his evidence as "candid and helpful". The judge briefly set out in one paragraph of the judgment the "unknowns" in
relation
to
retinal
haemorrhages but
did
not thereafter
record
Mr Newman's specific evidence that, notwithstanding the "unknowns", his opinion was that the likely cause of the
retinal
haemorrhages was a
recent
shaking or shaking/impact injury. The judge said in
relation
to the evidence of Mr Newman:
"[61] It appears to me to be uncontroversial to conclude thatretinal
haemorrhages by themselves prove nothing – they are part of the wider canvas. As Mr Newman volunteered, their existence is not a trump card and it has to be taken in the context of paediatric and radiological evidence. But I ask myself, if we look at the local authority's hand, where are the trump cards? Which cards are of low or high value, and if taken together, and there are
discrepancies,
should the value of one be
reduced
by the undervalue of another?"
recollection
of the evidence is at fault there; the transcript
reveals
that the
reference
to a "trump card"
did
not come from Mr Newman but was put to Mr Newman by Mr Vater:
"Q… And you would be the first, I think, to accept that the presence ofretinal
haemorrhages should not be
regarded,
as it were, as the trump card.
Do
you understand what I mean by that? "
A… That is correct."
did
not therefore assess the impact of Mr Newman's evidence on the other evidence. Had he
done
so, Mr Geekie submitted, he would have appreciated that Mr Newman's evidence
rendered
it significantly more unlikely that the subdural haemorrhages were from a chronic injury as such a cause could not account for the acute
retinal
haemorrhages.
relation
to the medical evidence, speculated as to whether or not a "leak or bleed from an asymptomatic collection onto the surface of the brain would cause irritation. That, he suggested, could lead to a seizure". He went on:
"[68] I am not convinced one way or the other. Equally, however, I am troubled by some of the uncertainty presented by the clinicians whose evidence I found to be candid and open. And Iremind
myself that I am not exercising criminal jurisdiction and I
do
not have to be satisfied so that I am sure of the picture which they present, a picture which is unanimous in its conclusion, namely that ML suffered a shaking injury. Nonetheless, I am left with
doubts.
. . ."
draft
this paragraph concluded at this point. Having
read
the
draft,
Mr Vater
drafted
and proposed the inclusion of the following passage identifying the nature of those
doubts:
" First, whether all of the subdural collections wererecent
in origin or whether they
represented
acute
re-bleeding
into chronic collections of uncertain origins; secondly whether ML's collapse was as a consequence of acute injury or alternatively a seizure caused by pre-existing subdural collection; and thirdly whether the causes of any or all of these things might simply be unknown. Notwithstanding the unanimous conclusions
reached
by the clinical experts, and given that Mr Newman acknowledges that
retinal
haemorrhages
do
not
represent
a trump card (and thus their existence
does
not assist me in
resolving
this uncertainty), I have then to turn to the lay evidence to complete the jigsaw which I am endeavouring to put together in my overall analysis of the case. "
during
subsequent argument as to the appropriateness or otherwise of the inclusion of Mr Vater's addition that the paragraph as
drafted
by Mr Vater in fact
reflected
his own views. Mr Geekie in those circumstances
did
not pursue a separate ground of appeal in
respect
of this addition to the judgment.
"[106] The candour and assistance which all the experts have provided to this court has left me with thedoubts
which I have no
doubt
clumsily attempted to set out in this judgment. None of the experts, by themselves or collectively, persuade me that these
doubts
![]()
do
not exist. They are not
removed
by the lay evidence and indeed they are
reinforced."
relation
to the events of that late afternoon, the judge posed and answered a number of questions [99] before concluding:
"[100] It will be observed that none of these questions have been answered by me in a way which points towards the father'sresponsibility
for the calamity which befell his
daughter.
My answers
reveal
that I am in
doubt.
. . . ."
"[108] Consequently, given the binary test to which I nodoubt
inelegantly
referred
at the outset of this judgment, I conclude that I cannot hold the father
responsible
for the injuries suffered by his
daughter.
. . ".
The judge accordingly
declined
to make the findings sought against the father. This was a single issue case, there being no other basis for intervention by the local authority; therefore absent the judge making findings of non-accidental head injury the threshold criteria were not established and the care proceedings were
dismissed.
The local authority indicated to the court in submissions that it no longer pursued findings against the mother and accordingly, shortly after the judgment, ML
returned
to her care where she
remains.
The Appeal
"The learned judge's conclusion that he could "not hold [the father]responsible
for the injuries suffered by his
daughter"
was wrong in that:
(i) He wronglydirected
himself in law that he could not find the local authority case to be proved if he had "
doubts"
about the case or if "uncertainties"
remain.
(ii) He failed sufficiently to explain why he wasdeparting
from the unanimous opinion of four independently instructed experts who advised that, on the balance of probabilities, the injuries were non-accidental or inflicted.
(iii) He failed sufficiently or at all to consider the effect of the ophthalmological evidence.
(iv) He failed sufficiently or at all to analyse the weight of the medical evidence when viewed as a whole."
i) The judge having heard the lay evidence was entitled toreject
the medical evidence. To interfere with his conclusions at the end of a long finding of fact hearing would go
dangerously
close to saying that where medical evidence was unanimous it was also conclusive.
ii) The judge had not in any event
rejected
the medical evidence but had concluded, as he was entitled to, that the local authority had not
discharged
the burden of proof.
referred
the court to well-known passages in the authorities which properly emphasise the
difficulty
an appellant will have in
dislodging
a finding of fact made by a judge after a substantial hearing where he has heard and seen the witnesses give evidence. For
recent
iterations on the point see
Re
F (Children) [2016]
EWCA
Civ
546 and T-B-N (Children) [2016]
EWCA
Civ
1098.
representing
the mother to
deliver
a judgment overnight as ML was in foster care and the anticipated exoneration of the mother would enable her to be
returned
forthwith to her care. In any event, Mr Vater told the court the judge was
driven
to give judgment on the Friday (submissions having been made on the Thursday) as he was
due
to start another 10
day
case the following Monday. In this context Mr Vater submitted that the second 'limb' of the
doctrine
found in Piglowska v Piglowski [1999] 1 WLR 1360; [1999] 2 FLR 763; [1999] 3 All ER 632, HL is particularly apposite:
"The second point follows from the first. The exigencies ofdaily
courtroom life are such that
reasons
for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. This is particularly true of an unreserved judgment such as the judge gave in this case but also of a
reserved
judgment based upon notes, such as was given by the
district
judge. These
reasons
should be
read
on the assumption that, unless he has
demonstrated
the contrary, the judge knew how he should perform his functions and which matters he should take into account. This is particularly true when the matters in question are so well known as those specified in s 25(2). An appellate court should
resist
the temptation to subvert the principle that they should not substitute their own
discretion
for that of the judge by a narrow textual analysis which enables them to claim that he misdirected himself." [p784]
desire
to give a judgment overnight so as to allow ML to be
reunited
with her mother as quickly as possible shows him to be the humane and compassionate judge he undoubtedly is.
do
not go to the judge's assessment of the credibility of the witnesses as such, nor
do
they
rely
on some unrealistic counsel of perfection in
relation
to the
drafting
of the judgment, (grounds of appeal which, I should say, are
regarded
with considerable scepticism by an appeal court conscious of the time pressure under which circuit judges work and of their particular skill in assessing the credibility of witnesses). In the present case the grounds of appeal are that the judge failed adequately to set out his
reasons
for failing to accept the unanimous medical evidence. More particularly it is said that the judge was wrong in having failed to take into account Mr Newman's evidence in
relation
to the
retinal
haemorrhages when considering the possibility of birth injury or outliers as having provided a sufficiently plausible alternative explanation for the head injuries such that, notwithstanding the preponderance of the medical evidence, the local authority had failed to
discharge
the burden of proof.
doubts'
may, but
does
not necessarily, translate into a finding that the local authority failed to establish on the balance of probabilities that ML had suffered an inflicted head injury. As Mr Geekie correctly submits, in assessing evidential sufficiency it is not necessary to
dispel
all
doubts
or uncertainty (see for example
Re
B(Non-Accidental Injury) [2002]
EWCA
Civ
752;[2002] 2 FLR 1133 at [25])
doubts
as to the cause of the brain injuries as expressed by him in his judgment having heard the cross-examination of the experts to that effect, entitled the judge, Mr Vater says, to conclude that the local authority had not
discharged
the burden of proof to show on the balance of probabilities that ML had sustained an inflicted injury shortly before her collapse.
doctors
by Mr Vater and Mr Storey, nor took into account the constellation of medical co-incidence which their case
demanded,
(that is to say the presence of chronic subdural haemorrhages together with the wholly unconnected acute
retinal
haemorrhages). What, however, in my judgment is fatal to the judge's judgment is his treatment of the evidence of Mr Newman in
respect
of the
retinal
haemorrhages.
recent,
wholly unconnected, bilateral
retinal
haemorrhages consistent with a shaking injury.
respect
to the judge, he seems to have been led
down
the wrong path by Mr Vater's cross-examination
during
which Mr Newman,
readily
and properly, accepted that the presence of
recent
retinal
haemorrhages are not a 'trump card'. No one has or could suggest that the presence of
retinal
haemorrhages is pathogenic of a shaking injury. It would be quite wrong to
do
so. Their presence might however have been
regarded
as having been capable of providing strong support for the expert evidence of
Dr
Stoodley,
Dr
Cartlidge and Mr Richards that what was seen were acute traumatic effusions indicative of a trauma immediately prior to ML's collapse. The judge, having said that "
retinal
haemorrhages by themselves prove nothing - they are part of the wider canvas", in my judgment thereafter wrongly left the evidence in
relation
to them entirely out of the equation, failing to take the presence of the
retinal
haemorrhages into account as 'part of the wider canvas' or at all. Instead he concluded at [68] that:
"Notwithstanding the unanimous conclusionsreached
by the clinical experts, and given that Mr Newman acknowledges that the
retinal
haemorrhages
do
not
represent
a trump card (and thus their existence
does
not assist me in
resolving
this uncertainty), I have then to turn to the lay evidence to complete the jigsaw which I am endeavouring to put together in my overall analysis of the case."
retinal
haemorrhages should not be allowed to undermine his fundamental finding that he was not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that ML had suffered a traumatic head injury shortly before the ambulance was called. Even having accorded the judge every allowance for the situation in which he found himself, I cannot agree. In my judgment the judge needed to explain why his '
doubts'
led to him being unable to find, notwithstanding the medical evidence, that on the balance of probabilities ML had been shaken; such an explanation could only be provided by analysing the totality of the medical evidence which he failed to
do
having set aside the evidence in
respect
of the
retinal
haemorrhages
respect
of the
retinal
haemorrhages when considering whether his '
doubts'
could be
resolved
one way or the other and whether, notwithstanding those '
doubts',
he was nevertheless satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the local authority had proved their case.
reject
expert medical evidence, a court in
doing
so should have well in mind the case of
Re
M-W (Care Proceedings: Expert Evidence) [2010]
EWCA
Civ
12; [2010] 2 FLR 46, where Wall LJ (as he then was) emphasised the importance of providing
reasons
and analysis if medical evidence is to be
rejected.
He said:
"[39] Iregard
the following as trite propositions of law:
(1) Expertsdo
not
decide
cases. Judges
do.
The expert's function is to advise the judge;
(2) The judge is fully entitled to accept orreject
expert opinion;
(3) If the judgedecides
to
reject
an expert's advice, he or she:
a. Must have a sound basis upon which todo
so; and
b. Must explain why the advice is beingrejected;
(4) Similar considerations arise when a judge prefers one expert's evidence to that of another. Judges must explain why they prefer the evidence of A to that of B"
rejects,
even seemingly convincing, expert evidence. However, he submits, when assessing the lay evidence against the expert evidence it is first necessary for the expert evidence to have been analysed correctly and that, he says, the judge failed to
do.
review
of the medical evidence. In my judgment, in setting aside the evidence in
respect
of the
retinal
haemorrhages, the judge fell into the trap of addressing the head and eye injuries separately and in
doing
so, failed to consider if they were inter-
related
or to take into consideration that the court was being presented with a unifying medical hypothesis to explain the constellation of symptoms exhibited by ML upon his admission to hospital. Only by having carried out such an overall analysis of the medical evidence could the judge have then properly moved on to balance his conclusions in
relation
to the expert evidence against the lay evidence and, in particular, the accepted contradictions within the father's evidence as to the events leading up to the collapse of ML whilst in his sole care.
Conclusion
remitted
for
re-hearing.
In the first instance the case should be listed before the Family
Division
Liaison Judge for
directions
and allocation. I should note in conclusion that there were a number of issues which were considered at length at trial and touched upon in this appeal but which it has not been necessary for this court to consider in any
detail
in order to
decide
the appeal. These various issues will, no
doubt,
feature in a
re-trial
and will necessarily form part of the trial judge's evaluation of the medical evidence. This is not a case where it would be appropriate for this court to substitute its own findings and fairness therefore
requires
that the matter is
remitted
for
rehearing.