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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> A (A CHILD) (supervised contact) (s91(14) Children Act 1989 orders) [2021] EWCA Civ 1749 (23 November 2021) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2021/1749.html Cite as: [2022] 4 WLR 25, [2022] 4 WLR 26, [2021] WLR(D) 598, [2022] 1 FLR 1019, [2022] 1 FCR 337, [2021] EWCA Civ 1749 |
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Neutral Citation Number: [
2021]
EWCA
Civ
1749
Case No: B4/
2021/1398
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (
CIVIL
DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM CHELMSFORD COUNTY COURT AND FAMILY COURT
Her Honour Judge Dawson
CM18P02988
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Date: 23/11/
2021
Before:
LADY JUSTICE KING
LORD JUSTICE NEWEY
and
LORD JUSTICE ARNOLD
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Between:
Re
A (A
CHILD)
(
supervised
contact)
(s91(14)
Children
Act 1989
orders)
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Maria Scotland (instructed by The Family Law Company) for the Appellant
1st
Respondent
appeared in person
Andrew Bagchi QC and Matthew Fletcher (instructed by David Wilson Solicitors) for the 2nd
Respondent,
the
Children’s
Guardian
Hearing date: 12 October
2021
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Approved Judgment
Covid-19 Protocol: This judgment was handed down
remotely
by circulation to the parties'
representatives
by email. The date and time for hand-down is deemed to be at 11:00am on 23 November
2021.
Lady Justice King:
orders
made by HHJ Dawson in private law proceedings in
relation
to her daughter, A, who is rising 7 years of age. The
orders
now challenged were made on 20 May
2021
and:
i) Provided that A should live with her father by the final confirmation of an existing interim
order
made in August 2019;
ii) Provided for ongoing
contact
by A to her mother on a professionally
supervised
basis every fortnight for up to 6 hours;
iii) Prohibited any further application under the
Children
Act 1989 being made in
relation
to A for a period of 2 years without the permission of the court pursuant to section 91(14) of the
Children
Act 1989 (‘s91(14)’).
2021,
the mother applied for permission to appeal against each of the
orders
made including the
refusal
to grant an adjournment. Because the application was made from
orders
made by a Tier 2 Circuit Judge in private law proceedings, the avenue of appeal was to a judge of the High Court under Part 30(8) of the Family Procedure Rules 2000 (‘FPR’).
2021,
Cohen J granted limited permission to appeal,
restricting
the appeal to the question of
contact
and the making of the s91(14)
order.
He
refused
permission to appeal against the
order
confirming that A should live with the father or the
refusal
by the court of the mother’s application for an adjournment. Pursuant to FPR r 30.13(1)(a), the appeal was transferred to the Court of Appeal, Cohen J having considered that the appeal raised an important point of principle or practice.
renew
her application for permission to appeal based on the
rejected
grounds at an oral hearing. The hearing took place on 5 October
2021
at which Cohen J
refused
the application.
i) wrong to make a
supervised
contact
order
without specific provision for that
contact
to progress to unsupervised
contact
and if not;
ii) whether, in any event, the making of an
order
under s91(14) coupled with a
supervised
contact
order
placed an impermissible fetter on movement towards unsupervised
contact
and to the development of a more natural
relationship
between mother and
child.
Background
children
from earlier
relationships.
relationship
in 2013 and A was born in 2015. In April 2017, the mother
returned
to Hungary leaving the four
children
in the care of the father. Six months later, she
returned
to this country and announced her intention to
relocate
to Hungary taking all of the
children
with her. The father immediately applied for a prohibited steps
order
to prevent this but it would appear that the parties
reconciled
before an
order
was made.
children
remained
in England with the father. A was not
returned
in accordance with the agreement. In August 2018 the mother told the father that their
relationship
was over and in October 2018, A not having been
returned
to this country, the father issued
child
abduction proceedings for the
return
of A to this jurisdiction. In fact, unbeknownst to the father, the mother had already
returned
to this country and in October 2018 she made an application for a
child
arrangements
order
and offered the father one hour’s
contact
each week to be
supervised
by her. The mother’s unsettled lifestyle continued, she moved to Hastings without informing the father and then in June 2019, she moved to Northern Ireland. The father first became aware of the mother’s
relocation
when a Northern Irish
contact
centre
contacted
him to inform him that
contact
would now take place in their premises in Northern Ireland. The mother subsequently failed to comply with a court
order
to
return
A to England and to surrender A’s passport.
Children’s
Guardian was appointed to
represent
A’s interests in what was to prove to be long running and destructive private law,
child
arrangements proceedings. Eventually, sufficiently worried about A’s welfare in the care of her mother, the
Children’s
Guardian took the most unusual step of making an urgent application for the
residence
of A to be forthwith transferred to the father. The application was granted by the judge on 21 August 2019 and subsequently appealed by the mother. The mother’s appeal against the transfer was dismissed by Cohen J and A has lived with her father ever since.
relationship
with A by taking planned and covert steps to
relocate
some distance from the father.
contact
was
ordered
to take place with A twice a week. In January 2020, the
Children’s
Guardian was once again driven to make an urgent application to the court, this time to suspend the telephone
contact
following an incident during the mother’s allocated phone call when A was questioned by a police officer from Northern Ireland about the mother’s (wholly unfounded) allegations of sexual abuse of A by the father.
Supervised
contact
took place thereafter, but no telephone
contact
was allowed. By March 2020, the mother was expressing further concerns and making allegations about A’s physical and mental health and her development to her GP and Social Services. The mother’s focus was, and
remains,
that A is not putting on enough weight in the care of her father and that she is living in a sexually inappropriate environment. By way of example, the mother vehemently disagreed with a diagnosis of thrush made by A’s GP, attributing it to her having been exposed to inappropriate sexual conduct whilst in the father’s care. The mother’s persistent complaints finally led to the GP
referring
A to a paediatrician, Dr Filby, who carried out a physical examination of A. At that examination, Dr Fliby found nothing untoward, either physically or developmentally. The court nevertheless agreed to appoint a further paediatrician, Dr Chawla an expert chosen by the mother, who in due course filed a
report
in the ongoing proceedings.
representing
the
child
and the
Child’s
Guardian themselves. Informal complaints were also made towards counsel
representing
the
child.
By the time the matter came on for trial, the papers in what should have been a straightforward
child
arrangements dispute, ran to six lever arch files.
restrictive
Covid-19 environment, but this did not present any difficulties given that A had only
recently
been seen by Dr Filby. Dr Chawla had had access to all the medical
records
and the benefit of Dr Filby’s
recent
report.
Dr Chawla was cross examined at length and her evidence, which was accepted by the judge, was that there was no concern with
regard
to A’s weight, that her progress is now steady and it is in her genetic make up to be small. Dr Chawla had no other concerns and noted that when Dr Filby examined her, A had presented as ‘articulate, active and imaginative’. The judge, having heard the evidence of Dr Chawla, accepted that although A’s weight had plateaued in the summer of 2019, it was not attributable to the father’s care and noted that her weight now continues to grow in congruence with her height.
children,
she said, attend A & E with thrush and exhibiting symptoms of itching and scratching. She added that: ‘we do not
refer
a
child
for a sexual examination if there is no cause. It will traumatise the
child’.
The judge was equally clear and having set out the mother’s allegations of either the sexual abuse or sexual exploitation of A by the father, concluded in robust terms that there was not a ‘shred of evidence’ that the father is a sexual risk to A.
rehearse
them here. Dr McCartan concluded that the personality disturbance of the mother which she had identified in her
report,
meant that she had been exposing her
children
to ‘maltreatment without being aware of the impact of her behaviours and presentation on her
children’.
The
children,
Dr McCartan said, had a ‘lack of stability. Suffered a lack of
respect
for their education process, were exposed to conflict and did not have their needs consistently met, including their needs to have a
relationship
with their
respective
fathers.’ Dr McCartan considered that the mother was ‘highly unlikely to engage in therapeutic intervention aimed at helping her to address her personality issues’. It was Dr McCartan’s view that the mother
regarded
therapy as a sign of weakness and did not perceive that there was a problem.
contact
needed to be
supervised
until DBT was completed ‘which in itself would provide motivation for the mother to engage in the work’. Assuming the mother engaged in and made progress in the therapy,
contact
could be increased, and
supervision
reduced.
Children’s
Guardian gave evidence and was also subjected to detailed and vigorous cross examination on behalf of the mother; she too was absolutely clear that any
contact
had to be
supervised
and said that direct unsupervised
contact
would be much more damaging than not having any face to face
contact.
supervised
contact
with the mother for 6 hours every other weekend. The judge made an
order
under s91(14) prohibiting either party from making an application to the court without leave for a period of two years.
contact
order
and the making of an
order
under s91(14), it is necessary for this court to also consider the judge’s findings as to the impact of the mother’s campaign against the father and therefore upon A. In evidence, the father
referred
to
receiving
80 emails in an 8 week period from the mother, each complaining about his care of A. Complaints were also made by the mother to the police and social services, one example being an untrue allegation made by the mother to the police that the father had committed a sexual assault on the mother’s older daughter, an allegation which was inevitably investigated by the police. The father spoke of the huge impact which the various formal complaints made by the mother had on his home life and on A, involving as it did a number of police officers and social workers coming to make enquiries and carry out risk assessments in
order
to determine A’s safety in her father’s care.
represented
at various points up to and including the fact-finding hearing, has been unrepresented since then and has had to cope as best he can. Fortunately, as the judge noted, since the mother has had solicitors, these damaging and unjustified complaints have stopped. Having heard the mother give evidence, however, the judge formed the impression that once the spotlight of the proceedings was
removed
and the ‘steadying influence’ of her legal advisors came to an end, the mother would
revert
to her peripatetic lifestyle and endless criticisms of the father.
contact
and that his proposed
restrictions
around
contact
were designed for A’s protection, not as a form of
revenge
against the mother.
child
is perfectly healthy and developing normally. At the conclusion of the appeal hearing during which her counsel made sensible and proportionate submissions, the mother stood up and tried to address the court in
relation
to her concerns about A’s weight. The day after the appeal had concluded, the mother sent a lengthy, unsolicited document to the court making allegations across a range of issues which have already been determined by the court including, once again, in
relation
to A’s weight and general health and also making serious allegations that Dr McCartan had ‘falsified’ her
report.
This mother, who is herself a doctor, must of all people be aware of just how serious it is to make such a complaint, and the disinhibited way in which she made it serves only to confirm the judge’s fears as to the future conduct of the mother.
Discussion
contact
were unsupervised:
i) The risk of abduction would be high;
ii) It is likely that the mother would denigrate the father to A given her unshakeable belief that the father is a serious risk to A;
iii) That the mother would use unsupervised
contact
as an opportunity medically to examine A or have her examined in an attempt to prove that A is abused, unwell or badly cared for by the father.
relationship
with her mother is important and best achieved by direct
contact,
the risk of the mother acting in a way that would be detrimental to A’s well-being if it were unsupervised is high. The judge went on:
“Unless and until the mother is able to accept appropriate therapy to modify her emotions and her presentation, she is likely to influence [A] with all her concerns or prejudices. I consider that
supervision
is a protective measure for [A]; it will stop her being conflicted emotionally and will prevent her from fearing that her home with her father is likely to be disrupted by the mother”.
ordered
the mother to pay the cost of professional
supervision
which the mother says she can ill afford as a locum doctor. The Guardian expressed the view that if the planned 6 hours a fortnight of
contact
was unaffordable, the duration of the
contact
visits should be
reduced
rather than the frequency.
respect
of which the mother has no permission to appeal, she cannot
realistically
challenge the judge’s conclusion that
contact
should, at present, be
supervised.
Ms Scotland emphasised to the court that whilst on the facts as found by the judge she had no alternative but to accept that the judge was entitled to conclude that
contact
has to be
supervised,
the mother does not accept that outcome or that
supervision
is either necessary or appropriate.
order
that
contact
is to be
supervised
when coupled with the making of a s91(14)
order,
does not allow for progression to unsupervised
contact
unless the mother undertakes the therapy
recommended
by Dr McCartan. Ms Scotland drew the attention of the court to a number of authorities which emphasise that in the ordinary course of events,
supervision
of
contact
should be
regarded
as a stepping stone to unsupervised
contact.
That may be so, but as I said in
Re
S (a
Child)
[2015]
EWCA
Civ
689, at para.[23], that does not mean that in an appropriate case ‘such a route should not be deployed as a means of allowing a
child
to continue to have a
relationship
with her absent parent’.
Children’s
Guardian, that this is one of those unhappy cases where the inability of the mother to
regulate
her behaviour in the interests of her
child
means that the choice was not between
supervised
and unsupervised
contact,
but between no direct
contact
or
supervised
contact.
The judge rightly considered the importance of
contact
between A and her mother on the one hand, and the need to protect her on the other. I am satisfied that Ms Scotland’s concession was well made and that the judge had no alternative but to
order
contact
to be professionally
supervised.
reinforced
by the intemperate and wild allegations made by the mother to the court in writing immediately after the hearing, allegations which when put together with her
resistance
to the highly specialised therapy she needs (as opposed to her stated willingness to have some therapy in the form of counselling/CBT from her GP) make it likely that A’s welfare will
require
contact
to be
supervised
for some time to come.
Order
under s91(14)
Children
Act 1989
order
were set out by Butler-Sloss LJ in the form of guidelines in
Re
P (Section 91(14)(Guidelines)(
residence)
and
Religious
Heritage) sub nom: In
Re
P (A Minor)(
Residence
Order:
Child’s
Welfare) [2000] Fam 15; [1999] 2 FLR 573 at p19. The guidelines are as follows:
“Guidelines
(1) Section 91(14) of the Act of 1989 should be
read
in conjunction with section 1(1), which makes the welfare of the
child
the paramount consideration.
(2) The power to
restrict
applications to the court is discretionary and in the exercise of its discretion the court must weigh in the balance all the
relevant
circumstances.
(3) An important consideration is that to impose a
restriction
is a statutory intrusion into the right of a party to bring proceedings before the court and to be heard in matters affecting his/her
child.
(4) The power is therefore to be used with great care and sparingly, the exception and not the rule.
(5) It is generally to be seen as a useful weapon of last
resort
in cases of
repeated
and unreasonable applications.
(6) In suitable circumstances (and on clear evidence), a court may impose the leave
restriction
in cases where the welfare of the
child
requires
it, although there is no past history of making unreasonable applications.
(7) In cases under paragraph 6 above, the court will need to be satisfied first that the facts go beyond the commonly encountered need for a time to settle to a
regime
ordered
by the court and the all too common situation where there is animosity between the adults in dispute or between the local authority and the family and secondly that there is a serious risk that, without the imposition of the
restriction,
the
child
or the primary carers will be subject to unacceptable strain.
(8) A court may impose the
restriction
on making applications in the absence of a
request
from any of the parties, subject, of course, to the rules of natural justice such as an opportunity for the parties to be heard on the point.
(9) A
restriction
may be imposed with or without limitation of time.
(10) The degree of
restriction
should be proportionate to the harm it is intended to avoid. Therefore the court imposing the
restriction
should carefully consider the extent of the
restriction
to be imposed and specify, where appropriate, the type of application to be
restrained
and the duration of the
order.”
Re
P guidelines into a modern context and also considering how the provision in section 67 of the Domestic Abuse Act
2021
may impact upon the guidelines when the time comes for that section to be brought into force.
received
the endorsement of this court on a number of occasions in the intervening period, the fact
remains
that they were set out in April 1999, some 22 years ago. In the intervening period the forensic landscape has changed out of all
recognition.
Amongst the many advances is the advent of the smart phone and of social media in all its forms. Of particular
relevance
in this context is the almost universal use of email as a means of instant communication. Another development of
relevance
is that as a
result
of the withdrawal of legal aid in the majority of private law cases, a large proportion of parents are unrepresented and therefore do not have, as the judge described it in the present case, the ‘steadying influence’ of legal advisors.
representing
him or herself. Such behaviour may be the
result
of anxiety but in other cases, as in this case, it is part of a campaign of behaviour by one parent against the other which amounts to a deeply disturbing form of oppressive behaviour on their part.
Regardless
of the motivation, behaviour of this type, as exhibited by the mother in this case by way of an example, is deeply distressing to the parent who is the subject of such abuse and litigation at this level and is highly debilitating to each of the parties and to their
children.
All too often such communications are ill-considered and ill-judged with the consequence that every minor dispute or misunderstanding is met with an application to the judge. More importantly, the distress and anxiety caused to the other parent and to the
children
at the centre of such a raging dispute cannot be overestimated, nor can the damaging consequences where the focus of the litigation veers away from what, on any objective view, would and should be
regarded
as the
real
issues going to the welfare of the
children
concerned.
referred
to similar problems in a
civil
context in Agarwala v Agarwala [2016]
EWCA
Civ
1252 (Agarwala) where I said at [72] that:
“Whilst every judge is sympathetic to the challenges faced by litigants in person, justice simply cannot be done through a torrent of informal, unfocussed emails, often sent directly to the judge and not to the other parties. Neither the judge nor the court staff can, or should, be expected to field communications of this type. In my view judges must be entitled, as part of their general case management powers, to put in place, where they feel it to be appropriate, strict directions
regulating
communications with the court and litigants should understand that failure to comply with such directions will mean that communications that they choose to send, notwithstanding those directions, will be neither
responded
to nor acted upon.”
referred
in Agarwala, often even strict directions designed to limit the torrent of emails have no effect. The easy accessibility to the court and the other parties as a
result
of emails means that Guideline 5 in
Re
P which says that s91(14)
orders
are: ‘generally to be seen as a useful weapon of last
resort
in cases of
repeated
and unreasonable applications’, has even more
resonance
now than it did in 1999. It seems, however, that the phrase ‘weapon of last
resort’,
when put together with Guideline (4) which says that: ‘The power is therefore to be used with great care and sparingly, the exception and not the rule’, has led to an understandable, but perhaps misplaced,
reluctance
for judges to make
orders
under s91(14), save for the most egregious cases of which, on the facts as found by the judge, this is one.
order
made under s91(14) limits a party’s ability to make an application to the court, the court’s jurisdiction to make such an
order
is not limited to those cases where a party has made excessive applications, although that will frequently be the case. It may be that there is one substantive live application but that a person’s conduct overall is such that an
order
made under s91(14) is merited. This situation is anticipated by Guideline 6 of
Re
P: ‘In suitable circumstances (and on clear evidence), a court may impose the leave
restriction
in cases where the welfare of the
child
requires
it, although there is no past history of making unreasonable applications.’ In my judgment the sort of harassment of the father seen in this case, in the form of vindictive complaints to the police and social services, is an example of circumstances where it would be appropriate to make an
order
under s91(14), even if the proceedings were not dogged by numerous applications being made to the judge.
order
should only be made in exceptional circumstances, rather Guideline 4 says such an
order
should be the ‘exception and not the rule’. That is of course right, there is no place in our
child
focused family justice system for any sort of ‘two strikes and you are out’ approach, but it seems to me that in the changed landscape described in paragraph 30 above there is considerable scope for the greater use of this protective filter in the interests of
children.
Those interests are served by the making of an
order
under s91(14) in an appropriate case not only to protect an individual
child
from the effects of endless unproductive applications and/or a campaign of harassment by the absent parent, but tangentially also to benefit all those other
children
whose cases are delayed as court lists are clogged up by the sort of applications made in this case, applications which should never have come before a judge.
reluctance
than has been the case hitherto, before stepping in to provide by the making of an
order
under s91(14), protection for a parent from what is in effect, a form of coercive control on their former partner’s part.
Re
P should now be applied with the above matters in mind and in my judgment the prolific use of social media and emails in the modern world may well mean that
orders
made under s91(14) need to be used more often in those cases where the litigation in question is causing either directly or indirectly,
real
harm.
2021
the Domestic Abuse Act
2021
received
Royal Assent. Section 67 of the Domestic Abuse Act
2021
which
relates
to
orders
under s91(14) will come into force in accordance with provisions yet to be made by the Secretary of State. (Commencement Note 403).
relevant,
as follows:
“91A Section 91(14)
orders:
further provision
(1) This section makes further provision about
orders
under section 91(14) (
referred
to in this section as ‘section 91(14)
orders’).
(2) The circumstances in which the court may make a section 91(14)
order
include, among others, where the court is satisfied that the making of an application for an
order
under this Act of a specified kind by any person who is to be named in the section 91(14)
order
would put—
(a)the
child
concerned, or
(b)another individual (‘the
relevant
individual’),
at risk of harm.
(3) In the case of a
child
or other individual who has
reached
the age of eighteen, the
reference
in subsection (2) to ‘harm’ is to be
read
as a
reference
to ill-treatment or the impairment of physical or mental health.
(4) Where a person who is named in a section 91(14)
order
applies for leave to make an application of a specified kind, the court must, in determining whether to grant leave, consider whether there has been a material change of circumstances since the
order
was made.”
respect
of which statutory guidance has yet to be published. It is worth however noting that the proposed new section 91A dovetails with the modern approach which I suggest should be taken to the making of s91(14)
orders.
In particular the provision at section 91A(2), if brought into effect, gives statutory effect to Guideline 6 of
Re
P (see para 39 above) by permitting a s91(14)
order
to be made where the making of an application under the
Children
Act 1989 would put the parent or
child
at risk of physical or emotional harm.
order
under s91(14) is one which is to be used sparingly but as she had set out in the body of her judgment there had, in the present case, been numerous applications. Further, the judge emphasised that either parent would still be able to apply to the court for enforcement of the
contact
order
she intended to make. Somewhat unusually, the bar on applications without leave for a period of two years was
ordered
to apply to both parents and not only to the mother. This was an approach on the part of the judge which, in my view, demonstrates her even handed and welfare focused approach to this intractable case.
order
under s91(14) it was accepted on behalf of the mother by Ms Scotland that the judge had not fallen into the trap of either using the
order
to provide ‘breathing space’ whilst
contact
settles down:
Re
G (
Residence:
Restriction
on Further Applications) [2008]
EWCA
Civ
1468; [2009] 1 FLR 894, or of making future leave conditional (for example upon the mother having treatment):
Re
S (Permission to Seek
Relief)
[2006]
EWCA
Civ
1190; [2007] 1 FLR 482. Ms Scotland accepted that whilst the expert evidence was that therapy provided the best route to enable the mother to have unsupervised
contact
in the future, the judge had not made therapy a condition for the granting of leave to make an application when she made the
order
under s91(14).
order
together with an
order
that
contact
should be
supervised,
which was wrong in law, as such a combination would for a period of two years prohibit progress towards a more natural unsupervised
relationship
between mother and
child.
order
under s91(14) is the need to have in mind that it is only a filter. If a time comes within the next two years that credible evidence becomes available to support an application by either the father or the mother which would have the potential substantially to change the extent or form of
contact,
then permission to make the application will be given. In the meantime, A will have the protection from further litigation and as Butler-Sloss LJ said at p38 of
Re
P:
“…On an application for leave, the applicant must persuade the judge that he has an arguable case with some chance of success. That is not a formidable hurdle to surmount. If the application is hopeless and
refused
the other parties and the
child
will have been protected from unnecessary involvement in the proposed proceedings and unwarranted investigations into the present circumstances of the
child.”
order
as follows:
“[139] Whilst it is important that either parent is able to apply to the court for enforcement if
orders
are not complied with, the court cannot continue to micro-manage every aspect of [A]’s life...The parents must learn to negotiate difference of opinion and be able to co-parent their daughter without the court’s intervention. [A] must have a period of time when she is settled and is able to learn, grow and develop like any other six-year-old. I consider that her welfare demands that she is given a period of
respite,
and that a section 91.14
order
is warranted in this case.”
contact
to be
supervised
but for an
order
under s91(14) to be made.
Conclusion
order
in addition to an
order
for
supervised
contact
is wrong in principle, is without merit. It goes without saying that in the same way that leave to make an application following the making of a s91(14)
order
cannot be conditional, equally s91(14) cannot be used as some sort of fetter designed to prevent
supervised
contact
progressing to unsupervised
contact
for the duration of the
order.
supervision
order
and an
order
under s91(14) in any individual case, each has to be considered separately on their merits; that is not however to say that, as here, the same facts and features of a case may not lead a judge to
order
both
supervision
of
contact
and a s91(14)
order.
orders
made by this judge far from acting as a fetter on the establishment of a more natural
relationship,
facilitate
contact
in circumstances where absent
supervision,
A’s welfare would have necessitated indirect
contact
only. Quite separately, the s91(14)
order
was essential in
order
to give A and her father much needed
respite from the mother’s unremitting campaign of harassment.
Lord Justice Newey:
Lord Justice Arnold: