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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Hamer v Levy [2026] EWCA Civ 662 (22 May 2026) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2026/662.html Cite as: [2026] EWCA Civ 662

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT TORQUAY AND NEWTON ABBOT
HH Judge Mitchell
L00TQ265

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
		22 May 2026

B e f o r e :

LORD JUSTICE BAKER
and
LORD JUSTICE LEWIS
____________________

Between:

	LINDA HAMER	Appellant
	- and -
	HESTHER LEVY	Respondent

____________________

The Appellant appeared in person
Suffian Hussain (instructed by Scott Richards) for the Respondent

Hearing date: 19 March 2026
____________________

HTML VERSION OF APPROVED JUDGMENT (SUBJECT TO EDITORIAL CORRECTION)
____________________

Crown Copyright ©

This judgment was handed down remotely at 2pm on 22 May 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.

LORD JUSTICE BAKER :

1. By a notice of appeal dated 15 December 2025, Mrs Linda Hamer ("the appellant") applied for permission to appeal against an order made in the Torquay and Newton Abbot County Court by HH Judge Mitchell on 15 November 2024 in which he struck out her appeal against a possession order made by District Judge Priddis on 5 August 2024.
2. On 18 December 2025, Snowden LJ ordered that the application for permission to appeal should be listed for an oral hearing with the substantive appeal to follow if permission was granted. He directed that "both parties should attend and be prepared to argue the full appeal." He further ordered that the possession order be stayed until the determination of the appeal.
3. In accordance with that direction, the matter was listed for a half-day hearing on 19 March 2026. At that hearing, the appellant appeared in person and the respondent landlord was represented by counsel. At the outset of the hearing, I explained to the parties that we would conduct a full hearing of the issues and then decide whether to grant permission to appeal and, if permission was granted, whether to allow the appeal. I explained that this meant that the parties had to put forward all the arguments they wanted the court to consider, both on whether permission should be granted and on whether the appeal should be allowed if we granted permission. The parties then presented their oral submissions, supplementing the arguments raised in their skeleton arguments. At the conclusion of the hearing, we reserved judgment.
4. Having considered the documents filed in connection with the appeal, and the parties' written and oral submissions, I have concluded that (1) the appellant should be granted permission to appeal but (2) the appeal should be dismissed.
5. This judgment sets out my reasons for reaching that conclusion.

Statutory provisions

6. Section 21 of the Housing Act 1988 (now repealed by the Renters Rights Act 2026) entitled the landlord of a property let under an assured shorthold tenancy ("AST") to serve a notice requiring the tenant to leave the property without asserting any fault on the part of the tenant.
7. Chapter 4 of Part 6 of the Housing Act 2004 ("the 2004 Act") is headed "Tenancy Deposit Schemes". Under the provisions in this Part of the Act, a landlord of a property let under an AST is required to protect the deposit with a government-approved tenancy deposit scheme. At the date on which the AST in this appeal was created (October 2019), section 212(2) of the 2004 Act provided that a tenancy deposit scheme was a scheme "(a) for the purpose of safeguarding tenancy deposits paid in connection with shorthold tenancies and facilitating the resolution of disputes arising in connection with such deposits and (b) complied with the requirements of Schedule 10 [of the Act]".
8. Section 213 provided, so far as relevant:

"(1) Any tenancy deposit paid to a person in connection with a shorthold tenancy must, as from the time when it is received, be dealt with in accordance with an authorised scheme.

(2) No person may require the payment of a tenancy deposit in connection with a shorthold tenancy which is not to be subject to the requirement in subsection (1).

(3) Where a landlord receives a tenancy deposit in connection with a shorthold tenancy, the initial requirements of an authorised scheme must be complied with by the landlord in relation to the deposit within the period of 30 days beginning with the date on which it is received.

(4) For the purposes of this section "the initial requirements" of an authorised scheme are such requirements imposed by the scheme as fall to be complied with by a landlord on receiving such a tenancy deposit.

(5) A landlord who has received such a tenancy deposit must give the tenant …. such information relating to

(a) the authorised scheme applying to the deposit.

(b) compliance by the landlord with the initial requirements of the scheme in relation to the deposit, and

(c) the operations of this Chapter in relation to the deposit

as may be prescribed.

(6) The information required by subsection (5) must be given to the tenant …

(a) in the prescribed form or in a form substantially to the same effect, and

(b) within the period of 30 days beginning with the date on which the deposit is received by the landlord."

Section 214 gives a tenant the right to apply to court where there has been a breach of the requirements in section 213.

9. Section 215 of the 2004 Act provided, so far as relevant:

"(2) Subject to subsection (2A), if section 213(6) is not complied with in relation to a deposit given in connection with a shorthold tenancy, no section 21 notice may be given in relation to the tenancy until such time as section 213(6)(a) is complied with.

(2A) Subsections (1), (1A) and (2) do not apply in a case where—

(a) the deposit has been returned to the tenant in full or with such deductions as are agreed between the landlord and tenant, or

(b) an application to the county court has been made under section 214(1) and has been determined by the court, withdrawn or settled by agreement between the parties."

10. Article 2(1) of the Housing (Tenancy Deposits) (Prescribed Information) Order 2007 ("the 2007 Order") defines prescribed information for the purposes of section 213(5):

"(1) The following is prescribed information for the purposes of section 213(5) of the Housing Act 2004 ("the Act") –

(a) the name, address, telephone number, e-mail address and any fax number of the scheme administrator of the authorised tenancy deposit scheme applying to the deposit;

(b) any information contained in a leaflet supplied by the scheme administrator to the landlord which explains the operation of the provisions contained in sections 212 to 215 of, and Schedule 10 to, the Act;

(c) the procedures that apply under the scheme by which an amount in respect of a deposit may be paid or repaid to the tenant at the end of the shorthold tenancy ("the tenancy");

(d) the procedures that apply under the scheme where either the landlord or the tenant is not contactable at the end of the tenancy;

(e) the procedures that apply under the scheme where the landlord and the tenant dispute the amount to be paid or repaid to the tenant in respect of the deposit;

(f) the facilities available under the scheme for enabling a dispute relating to the deposit to be resolved without recourse to litigation; and

(g) the following information in connection with the tenancy in respect of which the deposit has been paid—

(i) the amount of the deposit paid;

(ii) the address of the property to which the tenancy relates;

(iii) the name, address, telephone number, and any e-mail address or fax number of the landlord;

(iv) the name, address, telephone number, and any e-mail address or fax number of the tenant, including such details that should be used by the landlord or scheme administrator for the purpose of contacting the tenant at the end of the tenancy;

(v) the name, address, telephone number and any e-mail address or fax number of any relevant person;

(vi) the circumstances when all or part of the deposit may be retained by the landlord, by reference to the terms of the tenancy; and

(vii) confirmation (in the form of a certificate signed by the landlord) that—

(aa) the information he provides under this sub-paragraph is accurate to the best of his knowledge and belief; and

(bb) he has given the tenant the opportunity to sign any document containing the information provided by the landlord under this article by way of confirmation that the information is accurate to the best of his knowledge and belief."

11. The 2004 Act and regulations made thereunder also contain provisions about gas safety and energy performance certificates which were raised in the course of the proceedings but are not relevant to this appeal

Background

12. These proceedings have taken a particularly tortuous course. Both parties have filed chronologies covering part, but not all, of the history.
13. On 11 October 2019, Ms Heather Levy ("the respondent") granted the appellant an AST of 4 Belle Vue Road, Kingsbridge, Devon ("the property").
14. The AST agreement was in a standard form and included the following provisions relevant to this appeal.

(1) Under clause 1.1.1, the respondent's contact address was stated to be Scobie House, Scobie, South Pool TQ7 2RU ("Scobie House"). This was the respondent's former family home used by her as a forwarding address. The clause also provided a telephone number and email address for the respondent. The email address was correct, but one digit of the telephone number was wrong.

(2) Clause 1.7.1 provided that "the deposit of £775.00 will be paid by the Tenant."

(3) Clause 1.7.7 provided that "the deposit will be protected by Tenancy Deposit Scheme …"

(4) Under clause 2, Scobie House was named as the landlord's address for service of notices under the Landlord and Tenant Act 1987.

(5) Clause 6 of the AST agreement was headed "Tenancy Deposit Protection Prescribed Information". Its terms were precisely in line with the information prescribed in Article 2(1) of the 2007 Order.

(6) Clause 6.1 named TDS Custodial as the authorised scheme.

(7) Clause 6.7 provided: "The deposit value is as per clause 1.8.1" [sic]

(8) Clause 6.9 provided: "The contact details of the Landlord are as per clause 1.1.1."

15. On 12 October 2019, the appellant paid a deposit in the sum of £775 to the respondent.
16. On 17 October 2019, the respondent transferred the deposit to TDS Custodial.
17. On 19 October 2019, the respondent sent an email to the appellant enclosing a deposit certificate issued by TDS Custodial, together with a document headed "Prescribed Information". The email read:

"Hi Linda.

How are you settling in? I hope everything is going well.

Please find attached some information regarding the deposit scheme that I've used to protect your deposit.

Please have a read through the 'Prescribed Information' and sign in acknowledgement when you have a minute.

Many thanks, Hesther"

The deposit certificate included the respondent's email address and correct phone number but not her contact address. In the Prescribed Information, the respondent's address was wrongly stated to be the address of the rented property. The telephone number given for the respondent was the same as on the deposit certificate. In both the deposit certificate and the Prescribed Information, the amount of deposit protected was said to be £775.00 and the date on which the deposit was received by the landlord was wrongly stated as 11 October 2019, not 12 October. At the bottom of the Prescribed Information was an unsigned certificate by the landlord that "the written information provided is correct to my knowledge and belief".

18. I understand it to be agreed between the parties that all communication between the parties took place via email.
19. At some point prior to April 2024, solicitors acting for the respondent served a section 21 notice on the appellant. No details of that notice have been included in the papers filed for this appeal. It seems from various comments made in the documents, however, that the notice was invalid in some way and there was apparently no attempt to recover possession of the property on that basis.
20. On 12 April 2024, a new firm of solicitors acting for the respondent wrote to the appellant stating that the respondent had instructed them to seek possession of the property. The letter continued:

"We therefore enclose the following documents by way of service upon you.

1. Copy tenancy agreement dated 11 October 2019.

2. Deposit Protection Certificate dated 17 October 2019 and Advisory Leaflet. Please note the required prescribed information is contained within your tenancy agreement referred at point 1, at section 6 of the agreement.

3. Gas Safety Certificate dated 14 May 2019 and 08 August 2023.

4. Energy Performance Certificate dated 10 May 2019.

5. How to Rent Booklet as provided by the Government dated May 2019 and October 2023.

A revised section 21 notice will follow shortly providing you with a new date to vacate the property."

21. On 17 April 2024, the respondent's solicitors served a section 21 notice on the appellant by first class post. The appellant did not vacate the property within the two-month period. On 27 June 2024, a claim for possession was issued in the Torquay and Newton Abbot County Court, which was deemed served on 2 July 2024.
22. On 14 July 2024, the appellant filed a defence. She raised a number of arguments against the claim, including that the contact address and telephone number give for the respondent in the Prescribed Information sent on 19 October 2019 did not match those given in the AST agreement.
23. On 17 July, not having received a copy of the defence, the respondent's solicitors filed an application for possession and costs. On the same date, District Judge Murray listed the claim for a 30-minute hearing on 5 August 2024, giving the following reasons:

"The Defendant has raised technical compliance issues with the validity of the notice under section 21, specifically:

1. She argues that an error in telephone number invalidates the prescribed information in relation to the deposit.

2. She argues that the claimant was not entitled to serve a section 21 notice until a previous notice under section 21 had expired.

3. She argues that the claimant was not entitled to let the premises to her because at the time of letting they were classified "F" on an energy performance certificate (albeit that they are now E).

4. She raises issues with service of the gas documents.

5. She alleges she did not get a 'how to rent' at the beginning of the tenancy but accepts receiving one before service of the notice under section 21."

24. The hearing on 5 August 2024 took place before District Judge Priddis. A transcript of the hearing has been provided to us. At the conclusion of the hearing, the district judge made an order that, upon the court hearing from the parties and being satisfied of the validity of the section 21 notice, and having read the written evidence, (1) the appellant should give possession of the property on or before 19 August 2024, and (2) the appellant pay the respondent's costs of £460.50 on or before that date.
25. On 25 August 2024, the appellant filed a notice of appeal against the possession order.
26. On 13 September 2024, HH Judge Walsh gave directions and stayed the possession order pending determination the appeal. On 24 September, after receiving a letter from the respondent's solicitor, he listed the matter for a hearing on 8 October 2024. At that hearing, HH Judge Mitchell, having heard submissions from the appellant acting in person and from the respondent's solicitors, made an order that the respondent's solicitors' letter be treated as an application to strike out the appeal on the grounds that it had no real prospect of success. He further directed that

"3. The court … in fairness to the appellant extends the opportunity for the appellant to send to the court and the respondent's solicitors by 4pm on 15 October 2024 written two points on the following two points made on behalf of the respondent: (1) irrespective of any initial failings on the part of the landlord in providing prescribed information relating to the deposit, any such failings were coped [sic] by Scott Richards letter of 12 April 2024 served prior to the section 21 notice; (2) the original prescribed information was in fact provided by email on 19 October 2019 and therefore after the deposit was paid on 12 October 2019 (and not before).

4. Thereafter the application to strike out will be further considered on paper."

In compliance with these directions, the appellant submitted further written representations.

27. On 6 November 2024, having considered the papers including the further representations, HH Judge Mitchell made an order (sealed on 15 November, but hereafter referred to as "the 6 November order") that "(1) pursuant to CPR 52.28 the appeal is struck out, having no real prospect of success; (2) the stay upon enforcement of the possession order of 5 August is accordingly lifted.". The order included the following "brief reasons":

"It is acknowledged that striking out an Appeal is somewhat unusual.

Usually unmeritorious Appeals will be dealt with by refusal of permission to Appeal. Here the Court previously directed a transcript of the subject judgment. That is still not to hand and may be delayed for some time. The Respondent has asked the Court to consider striking out the Appeal on the basis that it has no real prospect of success, to avoid ongoing and unnecessary delay. The Court has ultimately acceded to that request but only having given the Appellant an opportunity to further respond to the limited points arising (per Order 8th October 2024).

Those points are twofold.

First, the Appellant contends that the prescribed information relating to the deposit was provided before the deposit itself citing a first instance case of Siddeeq v Alaian 2024. However, in the instant case it is clear that whilst the deposit was paid a day after the tenancy agreement was entered into (12.10.19) the prescribed information was provided on 19.10.19 i.e. after the deposit and within the initial 30 day period.

Second, the Appellant contends that the Prescribed Information contained an incorrect address for the landlord and that the landlord's telephone number had 1 wrong digit.

The Respondent's Solicitors have pointed out that on 12.4.24 they wrote to the Appellant enclosing a further copy of the prescribed information and pointing out that such information was contained in Sections 1 and 6 of the Tenancy Agreement, thereby correcting any previous error.

The Section 21 Notice was not served until 17th April 2024.

Section 215(2) of the 2004 Act provides that if section 213(6) (i.e. the need to provide prescribed information) is not complied with, no Section 21 Notice may be given until such time as it is.

The communication on 12th April cured any previous error.

The Appeal therefore has no real, or any, prospects of success and it is appropriate to strike out the Appeal."

28. Following this order, an eviction notice was served to take effect on 10 December 2024. On 30 November, the appellant filed a further application in form N244 asking for a stay of execution of the warrant of possession on the grounds that she was seeking reconsideration of the order of 6 November. Appended to the application was a handwritten letter addressed to the court setting out in detail the appellant's arguments relating to the prescribed information and her assertion that there had been a failure to comply with the provisions of section 21. At a hearing on 5 December before District Judge Priddis attended by the appellant and the respondent's solicitor, the application was dismissed. According to the chronology prepared by the respondent's solicitor for the present appeal, the district judge told the appellant that any application needed to be by an appeal to a "higher court".
29. On 9 December 2024, the appellant filed a notice of appeal to the High Court against the order of 6 November. Later that day, her notice was considered by HH Judge Berkeley sitting in the Bristol County Court. He made an order containing recitals that he noted that the order of 6 November contained no notice pursuant to CPR 3.3(5); that the appellant "appears to have attempted to invoke CPR 3.3(5) and (6) and made an application (by letter) to set aside or vary the 6 November order because it had been made without a hearing"; and that the district judge on 5 December had "incorrectly identified that the proper course was to appeal the 6 November order and not pursue her application under CPR 3.3(5)". Having so noted, he stayed the execution of the warrant of possession until further order, directed that her application be referred urgently to HH Judge Mitchell "to consider listing as an application to vary or set aside the 6 November order at a hearing pursuant to CPR 3.3(5)", and stayed the appellant's appeal without being issued pending the outcome of any hearing before HHJ Mitchell. On the following day, 10 December, however, HHJ Berkeley amended his previous order "upon it becoming apparent" that the order of 6 November was not an order made without a hearing. He set aside the order referring the matter to HHJ Mitchell for reconsideration and lifted the stay on the appellant's appeal, but retained the stay of enforcement of the warrant of possession until further order.
30. Following a preliminary hearing before HHJ Blohm KC, the appeal was referred to Pepperall J. On 25 June 2025, he struck out the appeal and lifted the stay, on the grounds that the proposed appeal was a second appeal and therefore should be made to the Court of Appeal. As he was making this order without a hearing, he further ordered that any party affected by it could apply to have it varied or set aside. The appellant duly made such an application, and a hearing was listed before Pepperall J on 13 October 2025. In a reserved judgment handed down on 24 November 2025 (reported as Hamer v Levy [2025] EWHC 3101 (KB)), Pepperall J concluded that HHJ Mitchell's order of 6 November 2024 striking out the appeal against the district judge's order was a case management decision made on hearing the appeal and therefore caught by section 55(1) of the Access to Justice Act 1999 Act, article 6 of the Access to Justice Act 1999 (Destination of Appeals) Order 2016 and CPR rule 52.7(1) with the consequence that her appeal lay not to the High Court but only to the Court of Appeal. He therefore dismissed the appellant's application to set aside his earlier order and lifted the stay on the execution of the warrant of possession. By a further order on 28 November 2025, Pepperall J ordered the appellant to pay the costs of the application to set aside his order, refused her oral application for a further stay, and dismissed her application for permission to appeal.
31. On 15 December 2025, the appellant filed a notice of appeal to this Court against the orders of 5 August 2024, 6 November 2024 and 24 and 28 November 2025. She applied for a stay of execution of the warrant of possession and an extension of time for filing the notice. She put forward sixteen grounds of appeal.
32. On 18 December 2025, her applications were considered by Snowden LJ. He ordered that the application for permission to appeal should be listed for an oral hearing to follow if permission to appeal is granted, adding that "both parties should attend and be prepared to argue the full appeal." He further ordered that the order for possession be stayed until after the determination of the application for permission to appeal or appeal if permission was granted.

The appeal to this Court

33. An appeal against a judge's decision will only be allowed where the appeal court is satisfied that the decision was wrong or unjust because of a serious procedural or other irregularity. Under CPR rule 52.7(2), this court will not give permission to bring a second appeal unless it considers that (a) the appeal would (i) have a real prospect of success and (ii) raise an important point of principle or practice or (b) there is some other compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to hear it.
34. There is a preliminary issue as to whether the appellant should be given permission to appeal out of time. As noted by Snowden LJ, there is at least some strength in the argument that, due to the unusual order made by HHJ Mitchell, the pursuit of the application ultimately resolved by Pepperall J was not unreasonable and a good reason for the delay in applying to this Court. In those circumstances, I would extend the time for filing the appeal notice.
35. As observed by Snowden LJ when listing the application, the grounds of appeal advanced by the appellant fall into two categories. Grounds 1 to 6 allege procedural unfairness in the hearing before DJ Priddis on 5 August 2024. I set them out in full.

"(1) Not listed as a possession claim and on a different day to when court duty officer was available.

(2) I wanted the support of the Court duty officer – hearing still went ahead.

(3) A court duty officer would have given legal support. I had arrived 50 minutes earlier to discuss my case.

(4) It affected my ability to understand the proceedings, respond to submissions and present my case.

(5) Swayed by solicitor – claimant present but although she lives in Zambia, has only been present at two hearings as she has a solicitor and barrister in High Court.

(6) Normally hearings last an hour for possessions, this was booked for 30 minutes.

As further observed by Snowden LJ, grounds 7 to 15 all raise points going to the question of whether the respondent had fully or properly complied with the requirements of notification in relation to tenancy deposits before the service of the section 21 notice. It is said that the court erred in law

(7) by an incorrect acceptance of the deposit receipt date on the prescribed information – a misrepresentation to then use the information within the tenancy agreement;

(8) by accepting prescribed information that failed to state landlord's correct address instead duplicating tenancy address contrary to statutory requirements;

(9) in failing to properly consider that the deposit was paid after the tenancy agreement was signed and that the prescribed information did not accurately reflect this;

(10) in finding compliance with the law where the prescribed information was not signed by the landlord contrary to the Tenancy Deposit Act;

(11) in that the prescribed information was not served with the section 21 which placed instead reliance on the tenancy agreement which cannot substitute for statutory notice and therefore erred in finding it to be a valid section 2;

(12) in finding the section 21 notice valid when at the time of serving the section 21 the landlord had moved and failed to provide tenant with an address in UK – address seen for first time on possession claim;

(13) by [not] finding that as a result of non-compliance with the prescribed information that any section 21 notice was invalid as a matter of law;

(14) in that the issue of the prescribed information results in a tenancy breach and affects the return of the deposit with compensation;

(15) by failing to recognise that incorrect factual information within prescribed information invalidates it even when it appears compliant on its face.

Finally, under ground 16, the appellant contends that, pursuant to CPR rule 52.7, the appeal raises an important point of principle and a compelling reason for the appeal to be heard "as the decision permits substantial non-compliance with mandatory statutory requirements".

36. I shall consider first grounds 1 to 6, alleging procedural unfairness in the hearing before DJ Priddis on 5 August 2024.
37. It was not clear to Snowden LJ when listing this hearing whether the matters raised in grounds 1 to 6 were raised before HHJ Mitchell. He also expressed "very substantial doubt" that those grounds were arguable or raised any important point of principle or practice so as to pass the second appeal test.
38. Having had an opportunity to consider all of the documents filed by the parties, it is apparent that the appellant's grounds of appeal to the circuit judge included that she "had wanted to have the Court Officer as a representative in court" and that she believed that the judge's decision had been "swayed" by the respondent's solicitor. It follows, therefore, that the appellant was seeking to argue on appeal to the circuit judge that the procedure before the district judge was unfair because, whereas the respondent was legally represented, she did not have the benefit of the safeguards normally available to tenants attending court on applications for possession orders.
39. In her skeleton argument in support of her appeal to this Court, the appellant developed these points. By listing the matter on a day other than the day on which possession claims were listed, the court deprived the appellant of access to the court duty officer scheme. The appellant asserts that she suffered real and substantial prejudice and that the outcome would have been different. She says: "He would have prompted me and made me feel at ease, as well as giving guidance and his opinion." The appellant also contends that insufficient time was allocated to the hearing and that this prevented a proper and fair determination of the issues.
40. The Housing Possession Court Duty Scheme (now the Housing Loss Prevention Advice Service) is a civil legal aid service provided under section 9 of and Schedule 33 to the Legal Aid Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012. It has not been suggested to us that it is mandatory for hearings to be listed on days when the duty officer is present. But there is certainly an expectation that they will be so listed. Furthermore, it is clear from the transcript of the hearing that the appellant raised this issue and the district judge expressed concern that she was at a disadvantage. At one point the following exchange took place between the judge and the respondent's solicitor:

"Judge: Let's be fair to her [i.e. the appellant] – she was hoping that the court duty officer would be here today. I am really unclear why this has been listed in a non-PCOL [Possession Claim Online] day because, when one challenges a section 21, it usually goes into the PCOL list

Solicitor: I agree. And I think 30 minutes is – is a short period of time as well.

Judge: That – well so do I."

The district judge said she was "concerned [about] the disparity" adding that she had got to hold a fair hearing. The solicitor pointed out that his client, who had come over from Zambia for the hearing, was concerned that there was a real risk of repossession by the mortgage lender if the possession order was not granted.

41. At the solicitor's suggestion, the district judge went through the five technical compliance issues with the validity of the section 21 notice identified in the earlier order of 17 July 2024. The transcript demonstrates that the process adopted by the district judge was more of a conversation rather than hearing submissions. At the end, she concluded that she was satisfied that the section 21 notice was valid and made the possession order with costs.
42. For my part, reading the transcript, I do not think this was a wholly satisfactory way for the district judge to proceed. She evidently felt at the outset of the hearing that the appellant might be at a disadvantage. But having heard the issues ventilated in the way described above, she evidently concluded that the appellant had been able to present her case fairly and that the grounds for possession were made out. In particular, she concluded that the errors in the Prescribed Information sent to the appellant on 19 October 2019 did not invalidate the section 21 notice served on 17 April 2024.
43. I turn next to the order of HHJ Mitchell. Rather than determining the application for permission to appeal, he struck the appeal notice out. As he recognised, this course was "somewhat unusual". In my view, it was not the appropriate way to proceed.
44. CPR 52.18 provides:

"(1) The appeal court may

(a) strike out the whole or part of an appeal notice;

(b) set aside permission to appeal in whole or in part;

(c) impose or vary conditions upon which an appeal may be brought.

(2) The court will only exercise its powers under paragraph (1) where there is a compelling reason for doing so.

(3) Where a party was present at the hearing at which permission was given, that party may not subsequently apply for an order that the court exercise its powers under subparagraphs (1)(b) or (1)(c)."

45. In Turner v Haworth Associates [2001] EWCA Civ 370, a circuit judge struck out a notice of appeal from an order by a district judge discharging an earlier injunction made without notice restraining the defendant's use of premises in which the plaintiff claimed to have an interest. The plaintiff was, however, subject to a bankruptcy order so that any cause of action he had against the defendant vested in his trustee in bankruptcy. In giving reasons for his decision, the circuit judge stated: "the notice of appeal is frivolous and vexatious and is otherwise an abuse of process." On appeal to this Court, the circuit judge's decision to strike out the appeal notice was upheld. Chadwick LJ, with whom Hale LJ agreed, said (at paragraph 28):

"It seems to me that the practice which is now embodied in CPR 52.9 [now CPR 52.18] reflects the jurisdiction which a court must have in order to safeguard its own proceedings from abuse; and to deal with an appeal in a summary manner if it thinks that appropriate."

46. As noted by the editors of the White Book (at paragraph 52.18.3), however,

"the appeal against the district judge's order in Turner was commenced after 2 May 2000 and this was not subject to a permission requirement. If the appeal had been commenced after 2 May 2000, neither the district judge nor the circuit judge would have given permission to appeal and thus no question of striking out would have arisen."

47. In my view, where, before permission to appeal has been granted, the appellate judge concludes that the proposed appeal has no real prospects of success, he should dispose of it using the provisions in CPR 52.3 to 52.7 relating to permission to appeal. The powers under CPR 52.18(1)(a) should be confined to situations arising after permission has been granted, for example where the appellant has failed to comply with court orders – see Moses-Taiga v Oghenerume [2004] EWCA Civ 1399 and cases cited therein, and the recent decision in Kanabar v Kanabar [2026] EWCA Civ 582 in which this Court held that the fact that there was no legal personality able to pursue the appeal amounted to a compelling reason for the family court to strike out an appeal notice under FPR rule 30.10, which is in terms identical to CPR rule 52.18.
48. Where a judge concludes there is no merit in a proposed appeal, the appropriate course is simply to dismiss the application for permission to appeal and certify it to be totally without merit. Given the availability of this course, it cannot be said that there is any compelling reason for resorting to striking out the appeal notice. Furthermore, as observed by Pepperall J in his judgment in this case, a decision by a circuit judge to strike out an appeal notice is one against which the appellant may seek permission to appeal. In contrast, no application for permission to appeal may be brought against a circuit judge's decision to refuse permission to appeal.
49. For those reasons, I have concerns about the course adopted by both the district judge and the circuit judge. It does not follow, however, that this appeal must be allowed. At the hearing in this Court, which continued for over two hours, we heard extensive submissions from both parties on the substantive issues raised by the appellant about the validity of the section 21 notice. In my view, we are able to reach a conclusion on those issues in a way which enables us to resolve them without remitting the matter for a rehearing.
50. There is some overlap and repetition in the appellant's grounds 7 to 15. Her complaints, as amplified in her skeleton argument, can be summarised as follows.
51. First, there were a number of errors in the tenancy agreement and the Prescribed Information served by email on 19 October 2019. In the tenancy agreement, the respondent's telephone number contained one wrong digit. In the Prescribed Information served on 19 October 2019, the respondent's address was mistakenly stated to be the address of the rented property. Both documents incorrectly stated the date on which the deposit was paid (11 October instead of 12 October).
52. Secondly, the appellant submits that the statement in the solicitors' letter dated 12 April 2024 that the prescribed information contained in the tenancy agreement was insufficient to meet the respondent's obligations under the 2004 Act. Section 213(6)(b) required the prescribed information to be given within the period of 30 days beginning with the date on which the deposit was received by the landlord. In this case, the tenancy agreement containing the prescribed information to which the respondent's solicitors referred in their letter of 12 April 2024 was dated 11 October 2019, the day before the deposit was paid.
53. Thirdly, contrary to article 2(1)(g)(vii) of the 2007 Order, the Prescribed Information served on 19 October 2019 was not signed.
54. The appellant contends that prescribed information supplied by a landlord must comply strictly with the provisions of the 2004 Act and the 2007 Order. Merely substantial compliance is not enough. The information must be factually accurate and correctly reflect the circumstances in which the deposit was paid. She argues that if there is any failure to comply with the obligations under the Act or regulation, the landlord is prohibited from serving a section 21 notice.
55. The appellant further cites section 48 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1987, which requires a landlord of premises to which that Act applies to furnish the tenant by notice with an address in England and Wales at which notices (including notices in proceedings) may be served on him by the tenant. At all material times, the respondent lived in Zambia and, according to the appellant, failed to provide her with an address within this jurisdiction. The appellant argues that by reason of this failure the respondent is precluded from serving a notice under section 21 of the 1988 Act.
56. The appellant submits that, as the section 21 was served in breach of these statutory provisions, the possession order made by the district judge must be set aside.
57. In considering these arguments, I was assisted by two authorities cited by Mr Hussain on behalf of the respondent.
58. In Pease v Carter & Anor [2020] EWCA Civ 175, this Court considered the validity of notices of proceedings for possession under section 8 of the Housing Act 1988 which contained typographical errors. At paragraph 39, after reviewing the previous case law, Arnold LJ said:

"(i) A statutory notice is to be interpreted in accordance with Mannai v Eagle [1997] AC 749, that is to say, as it would be understood by a reasonable recipient reading it in context.

(ii) If a reasonable recipient would appreciate that the notice contained an error, for example as to date, and would appreciate what meaning the notice was intended to convey, then that is how the notice is to be interpreted.

(iii) It remains necessary to consider whether, so interpreted, the notice complies with the relevant statutory requirements. This involves considering the purpose of those requirements.

(iv) Even if a notice, properly interpreted, does not precisely comply with the statutory requirements, it may be possible to conclude that it is 'substantially to the same effect' as a prescribed form if it nevertheless fulfils the statutory purpose. This is so even if the error relates to information inserted into or omitted from the form, and not to wording used instead of the prescribed language."

59. In Lowe v Governors of Sutton's Hospital in Charterhouse [2025] EWCA Civ 857, intending to comply with the requirements of section 213 of the 2004 Act and article 2(1) of the 2007 Order, the landlord's agent sent the tenant a signed letter confirming that his deposit had been protected with an authorised tenancy deposit scheme and a certificate containing information relating to the deposit. The tenant applied to the county court under section 214 of the 2004 Act for payment of a sum of money on the grounds of a failure to comply with section 213(6) because the information required by section 213(5) had not been given to the tenant "in the prescribed form or in a form substantially to the same effect". In particular, the tenant asserted that the landlord had (1) failed to provide the information required by article 2(1)(g)(vi) of the 2007 Order as to the circumstances when the deposit might be retained by the landlord and (2) failed to certify the information as required by article 2(1)(g)(vii) because the certificate was unsigned. The claim was refused and an appeal to the High Court and second appeal to this Court were dismissed.
60. In her judgment in this Court, Asplin LJ, with whom Nicola Davies and Andrews LJJ agreed, cited Arnold LJ's summary of the law in paragraph 39 of Pease v Carter quoted above. At paragraph 52 of her judgment, she said:

"The principle in Mannai is available in this case and should be applied with Arnold LJ's conclusions at [39] in Pease v Carter in mind. The Prescribed Information can be interpreted as it would be understood by a reasonable recipient reading it in context, having taken account of the statutory requirements, including the purpose of those requirements. Furthermore, if properly interpreted, the Letter, Prescribed Information and Certificate do not comply with the statutory requirements, it may be possible to conclude that they are "substantially to the same effect" in circumstances in which section 213(6)(a) of the 2004 Act applies."

61. As to the statutory purpose, Asplin LJ said (at paragraph 54):

"There is no dispute about the statutory purpose of Chapter 6 of the 2004 Act, amplified by the requirements of the 2007 Order. It is both to safeguard deposits paid by tenants and to facilitate dispute resolution should an issue arise about the return or retention of the deposit at the end of the tenancy or any deduction from it. It requires information to be provided as to the circumstances in which a deposit may be retained by reference to the terms of the tenancy."

62. Asplin LJ concluded on the facts that a reasonable recipient of the information would have recognised the error in question. She contrasted the situation with that identified by Etherton LJ in Ayannuga v Swindells [2012] EWCA Civ 1789 where a tenant has to conduct his own research in order to discover the relevant information. She observed (paragraph 57):

"In this case, Mr Lowe was in possession of his tenancy agreement and Charterhouse were required to provide information as to the circumstances in which all or part of the deposit might be retained by the landlord "by reference to the tenancy". The Article itself looks outwards to the tenancy agreement."

63. As to the unsigned certificate, Asplin LJ took into account that it had been sent with a signed covering letter. At paragraph 65, she said:

"With the appropriate context in mind, it seems to me that the judge was correct to decide that the statutory purpose had, in substance, been achieved. As he put it at [48], taken together, the signed covering letter and the Prescribed Information were "substantially to the same effect" as a signed certificate because Charterhouse were effectively saying that it believed that it had done what was needed by providing the prescribed information and was happy to confirm that by way of a certificate. In other words, it believed that it had provided accurate information as to the prescribed matters. It was not necessary also to refer to expressly to its accuracy in order to satisfy sub-sub-article (aa)."

Discussion and conclusion

64. The substantive issue in this case is whether the service of the section 21 notice was invalidated by deficiencies in the prescribed information provided to the appellant by the respondent or on her behalf under the 2004 Act and the 2007 order. The argument raised by the appellant about section 48 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1987 has no relevance to this appeal. A failure by a landlord to provide the tenant with an address in this jurisdiction for the service of notices has consequences for the tenant's liability to pay rent and other charges (as provided in section 48) but does not preclude the landlord from serving a notice under section 21 of the 1988 Act.
65. I accept that information contained in the tenancy agreement was incorrect and that the process of giving information prescribed under section 213(6) of the 2004 Act and Article 2(1) of the 2007 Order was deficient in several respects.

(1) The tenancy agreement included the respondent's right address but her wrong telephone number (by one digit).

(2) The Prescribed Information sent by email to the appellant on 19 October 2019 included the right telephone number but the wrong address (the address of the rented property).

(3) In their letter dated 12 April 2024, the respondent's solicitors stated that "the prescribed information is contained in your tenancy agreement …at section 6 of the agreement." This had the effect of correcting the error about the address in the Prescribed Information sent on 19 October 2019 but reintroduced the error about the phone number.

(4) Furthermore, section 6.7 of the agreement wrongly stated that "the deposit value is as per clause 1.8.1" instead of "as per clause 1.7.1."

(5) The respondent never signed a certificate to confirm the accuracy of the information.

66. The question is whether the information given to the appellant was "substantially to the same effect" as the information required by the 2007 Order. I conclude that it was, for the following reasons.
67. Where there has been a failure to comply with the provisions of section 213(6), section 215(2) provides that a section 21 notice may nevertheless be valid if the landlord takes steps to comply with section 213(6)(a). It was therefore open to the respondent through her solicitors to seek to remedy the failure to comply by sending a letter as they did on 12 April 2024.
68. In sending the letter, the step taken by the respondent's solicitors to comply with section 213(6)(a) was to state that the prescribed information was contained in the tenancy agreement. The reference back to the agreement was sufficient to comply with the requirement in section 215(2) notwithstanding the fact that the agreement had been signed before the deposit was paid.
69. In listing this application for an oral hearing, Snowden LJ suggested that it was potentially arguable that, if the particulars of the tenancy agreement did not include the information needed to comply with the 2007 Order, merely referring back to the agreement in the letter did not satisfy the requirements of the Order. In my view, however, the errors in the tenancy agreement – the typographical error in clause 6.7 (referring to clause 1.8.1 instead of 1.7.1), the wrong digit in the telephone number, and the error as to the date on which the deposit was paid – were of no material consequence.
70. As to the first, a "reasonable recipient", having read the whole agreement, would appreciate that section 6, clause 6.7, identifying the amount of the deposit, contained an error and would understand that it intended to refer to clause 1.7.1. This caused no prejudice to the appellant. There has never been any dispute as to the amount of the deposit – the same figure was given in the tenancy agreement, the TDP Certificate and the Prescribed Information served on the appellant on 19 October 2019.
71. As to the single error in the phone number, it must be considered in the overall context of the contact details in the agreement. The statutory purpose of this requirement was to facilitate communication between the landlord and tenant. As the appellant invariably communicated with the respondent by email via the email address correctly given in the tenancy agreement and in the Prescribed Information served on 19 October 2019, the error in the telephone number was of no real consequence. Even though the prescribed information in the agreement did not precisely comply with the statutory requirements as to contact details, it was therefore 'substantially to the same effect'.
72. It is true that the tenancy agreement also contained an error as to the date on which the deposit was paid. But this is of no relevance as the date of payment is not information prescribed under the 2007 Order.
73. It is also true that the certificate at the bottom of the Prescribed Information served by email on 19 October 2019 was not signed. But in considering whether the respondent was entitled to serve the section 21 notice, the question is whether the requirements of section 216(2) have been satisfied. That provides that, if section 213(6)(a) is not complied with, no section 21 notice may be given in relation to the tenancy until such time as section 213(6)(a) is complied with. Section 213(6)(a) requires that the information required by section 213(5) must be given to the tenant "in the prescribed form or in a form substantially to the same effect". In my view, the information required by section 213(5) was provided by the letter dated 12 April 2024 in a form substantially to the same effect as the prescribed form, notwithstanding the absence of a signed certificate. By sending the letter referring back to the tenancy agreement, the solicitors were providing information relating to the prescribed matters. As Asplin LJ observed in Lowe v Governors of Sutton's Hospital in Charterhouse, the statutory purpose of the provisions in Part 6 Chapter 4 of the 2004 Act is "to safeguard deposits paid by tenants and to facilitate dispute resolution should an issue arise about the return or retention of the deposit at the end of the tenancy or any deduction from it". And in the present case, as in Lowe v Governors of Sutton's Hospital in Charterhouse, having regard to the overall context, the statutory purpose has, in substance, been achieved.
74. It follows that there is no merit in the appellant's defence to the claim for possession. For the reasons set out above, I have concerns about the course adopted by both the district judge and the circuit judge. But even if the hearing of the claim before the district judge had been listed, as it should have been, on a day when the duty officer was in attendance, and allowed the customary hearing time of one hour as opposed to thirty minutes, the order for possession would still have been made. If the circuit judge had considered the application for permission to appeal instead of striking out the appeal notice, he would in all probability have refused permission. Even if he had granted permission, the appeal would ultimately have been refused.
75. The issues raised on this proposed appeal, and the submissions put forward by the appellant, are of sufficient weight to persuade me that permission to appeal should be granted. Having considered all relevant information and submissions, however, I conclude that, whilst the judge's decision to strike out the appeal was procedurally flawed, the outcome of the appeal was neither wrong nor unjust.
76. In those circumstances, the appeal is dismissed.

LORD JUSTICE LEWIS

77. I agree.