Singh v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ 766 (22 June 2026)

This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 22 June 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.

Lord Justice Stuart-Smith:

Introduction

Each of the appellants in these two appeals wishes to bring Judicial Review proceedings challenging decisions by the SSHD refusing them leave to remain as graduate students. In each case the SSHD's decision was upheld after administrative review. Permission to bring proceedings has been refused by the Upper Tribunal.

The appeals concern the Appendix Graduate of the Immigration Rules, which forms part of the points-based system within the Immigration Rules themselves. To qualify for leave to remain as graduate students, applicants must meet the "Successful Completion Requirement" and, specifically, the provisions of paragraphs GR 4.2 and GR 4.3, which state:

"GR 4.2. The applicant must have successfully completed the course of study which was undertaken during their last grant of permission to study on the Student route (where the applicant was allowed to change their course of study without applying for further permission as a Student, this requirement only applies to the course to which they changed).

GR 4.3. The student sponsor must have notified the Home Office, by the date of application, that the applicant has successfully completed the course of study in GR 4.2."

I return to GR 4.2 and 4.3 at [17] below, after setting out the essential factual background for each appeal.

The Factual Background - Singh

Mr Singh is a national of India. On 21 October 2022 he arrived in the UK as a student with leave that was valid until 27February 2024.

On 14 December 2023, Mr Singh applied for leave to remain as a Graduate Student. On 8 January 2024, in response to a request from Mr Singh, his university and sponsor, BPP University ("BPP"), sent him an email annexing a "Record of Academic Achievement" transcript which stated that his course was awarded on 28 November 2023. In their email, BPP told Mr Singh that he did not need any documents from BPP to apply for leave by the Graduate route as BPP would notify the SSHD about his course completion directly.

Unfortunately, BPP had not notified the SSHD of Mr Singh's course completion either before or since 14 December 2023, the date of his application. On 3January 2024, the SSHD contacted BPP to confirm Mr Singh's course completion. They asked:

"In order for someone to be eligible for the Graduate route, we must have received a notification from the sponsor that the Student has successfully completed an eligible course of study. However, according to our records, we have not received a notification from your institution. Therefore, could you please confirm:

· Has the above-named customer successfully completed their course of study with your institution, as stated on their Student/Tier 4 Cas? If the above named student has not yet completed their course, please provide an expected date of when the student will complete their course and receive their results.

..."

In response, BPP told the SSHD on 11 January 2024:

"We have checked with the relevant departments and can confirm that this student is on financial hold. No reporting has been carried out on SMS."

It has since been confirmed that Mr Singh owed BPP £12 in outstanding fees and an additional £150 for an exam he had to re-take.

On 1 February 2024 the Respondent refused Mr Singh's Leave to Remain application under paragraphs GR 4.2 and 4.3 of the Immigration Rules, on the basis that Mr Singh had not completed his course of study and his sponsor had not notified the Home Office that he had completed his course of study. On 8 February 2024 Mr Singh applied for administrative review. By 20 February 2024 the SSHD was contacted by BPP to confirm Mr Singh had cleared the outstanding fees. On 5 April 2024 the Respondent informed Mr Singh that his application for administrative review had been unsuccessful, upholding her original decision. The SSHD explained that, under the rules, Mr Singh was required to demonstrate that he had successfully completed his course of study and the Home Office must have received notification from his sponsor that he had successfully completed the course prior to his application. His application was rejected because when he applied on 14 December 2023 BPP had not notified the Home Office that he had successfully completed the course. The original decision maker had contacted his sponsor to request confirmation that he had successfully completed the course; but his sponsor had advised that it was unable to provide notification of Mr Singh's award due to a financial hold. BPP's confirmation that Mr Singh had cleared his fees was received on or by 20 February 2024 - after the initial decision. This meant that that Mr Singh was unable to satisfy paragraph GR 4.3. It was concluded that no case working errors had been made as it was open to the decision-maker to conclude that paragraphs GR4.2 and GR 4.3 were not met.

Mr Singh issued these Judicial Review proceedings in the Upper Tribunal on 1 July 2024. UTJ Kamara refused permission on the papers. On 18 October UTJ Loughran refused permission after an oral renewal hearing. Permission to appeal was granted by the Court of Appeal on 16 May 2025. It was ordered that Mr Singh's appeal be heard together with that of Mr and Mrs Barai.

The Factual Background - Barai

Mr and Mrs Barai are nationals of India. On 5 October 2022, Mrs Barai was granted leave to enter as a student, with Mr Barai as her dependent. Her leave was valid until 17 March 2024. They arrived in the UK on 17 October 2022, and Mrs Barai commenced her studies at BPP University.

On 6 March 2024 Mrs Barai submitted an in-time fee waiver application. By 10 April 2024 Mrs Barai had finished her course at BPP but was awaiting board approval. BPP confirmed in an email to Mrs Barai that she had completed and passed her course on 12 April 2024 but said that her results would be ratified at the next Academic Council meeting on 25 April 2024. On 22 April 2024 Mrs Barai varied her fee waiver application into a Graduate application, with Mr Barai applying as her dependent. The next day, 23 April 2024, the BPP board approved the completion of her course. On 29 May 2024 BPP informed the SSHD that the course had been completed on 23April 2023.

On 30 May 2024, Mrs Barai's application for a graduate visa was refused with a right to administrative review. The SSHD referred to GR 4.3 and stated that Mrs Barai's sponsor did not notify the SSHD of her successful completion. When the Home Office contacted BPP on 29 May 2024 to check whether the course had been completed, BPP had informed the SSHD that:

"Our Exams Team have confirmed that the student successfully completed and passed their course on 23/04/2024. However, as the student passed their course after their visa expiry date 17/03/2024, no reporting has been done on the SMS."

The SSHD continued:

"Therefore, as your Student sponsor did not notify the Home Office, your application is refused under Immigration Rules Appendix Graduate GR 4.3."

An administrative review application was filed on 31 May 2024, but a negative decision was issued by the SSHD on 20 August 2024. In addition to maintaining their decision, the SSHD provided the following reasoning:

"It is noted that you had made an in-time fee waiver application, which was then varied into a subsequent application for the Graduate route on 22 April 2024. However, at this time notification had not been received from your sponsor confirming that you had successfully completed the course. The original decision maker contacted your sponsor who confirmed that you successfully completed the course on 23 April 2024.

Unfortunately, you therefore did not successfully complete your course before the date of your application. As you have failed to successfully complete the course prior to your application I am satisfied that the decision to refuse your application was not misconceived or erroneous. It should be noted that the purpose of an administrative review is limited to an assessment of the original decision to ensure that no case working errors have occurred. In the circumstances of your case, I am satisfied that no such errors have occurred as notification was not received that you had successfully completed the course before the date of application as required by paragraph GR 4.3."

On 22 August 2024 a pre-action letter was sent by SAJ Legal on behalf of Mr and Mrs Barai. Mrs Barai also made a second application for leave as a graduate and dependent on 27 August 2024. On 6 September 2024 there was a negative pre-action reply and on 13 September 2024 the Judicial Review claim was issued. The SSHD refused the second application on 8 October 2024.

On 13 November 2024 UTJ Kamara refused permission on the papers and ordered costs against Mr and Mrs Barai of £1,220. UTJ Kamara emphasised that completing a course is not the same as having graduated and noted that the immigration route concerned is specifically for graduates. It was deemed that the SSHD had complied with her Graduate Route guidance and both paragraphs 4.2 and 4.3 of the Appendix Graduate Route to the Immigration Rules.

The application for permission was renewed on 21 November 2024. On 7 January 2025 UTJ Meah refused permission after a hearing and refused to grant permission to the Court of Appeal. UTJ Meah held that it was factually correct that the sponsor had not informed the Home Office that the applicant had completed her course of study by the time of her application. He further noted that it was not disputed that Mrs Barai successfully completed her course on 23 April 2024, but that this was after her application for a fee waiver had been varied on 22 April 2024. UTJ Meah concluded that the decision to refuse Mrs Barai's application under Rule GR 4.3 was both lawful and rational given she had failed to satisfy this aspect of the requirements of the relevant Immigration Rules. The decision of UTJ Kamara awarding the SSHD costs of £1220 was affirmed.

On 7 May 2025 the Court of Appeal granted permission to appeal on one ground of the three advanced, permission to appeal being refused on the other two.

The legal framework

The Immigration Rules

The Immigration Rules are made pursuant to the exhaustive power and duty contained in section 3(2) of the Immigration Act 1971 ("the 1971 Act"). Appendix Graduate of the Immigration Rules is part of the points-based system within the Immigration Rules. The relevant requirement for present purposes is established by GR 3.1 which states that an applicant following the Graduate Route must be awarded 70 points for "successful course completion."

The key provisions for the purposes of these appeals are GR 4.2 and GR 4.3. As already set out, they provide, under the heading "Successful completion requirement":

"GR 4.2. The applicant must have successfully completed the course of study which was undertaken during their last grant of permission to study on the Student route (where the applicant was allowed to change their course of study without applying for further permission as a Student, this requirement only applies to the course to which they changed).

GR 4.3. The student sponsor must have notified the Home Office, by the date of application, that the applicant has successfully completed the course of study in GR 4.2." (Emphasis added)

Paragraph 6.2 of Part 6 of the Immigration Rules defines "successfully completed":

"Successfully completed" means the Student or Child Student has completed their course and been assessed by their sponsor, and has been or will be awarded, a qualification that is (a) for the course of study for which their Confirmation of Acceptance for Studies was assigned; or ... ."

The guidance

The Home Office has published guidance for staff on how to consider applications from people who wish to remain in the UK to work, or look for work, under the Graduate Route of the points-based system. The applicable version is the version published on 5 November 2021. Under the heading "Eligibility for permission to stay" the guidance states that "the requirements for granting permission to stay can be found in ... the eligibility requirements for the Graduate route, contained in Appendix Graduate GR 3.1 to 6.1." Under the heading "Sponsor notification" the guidance states at page 8:

"The Student Sponsor must have notified the Home Office, by the date of application, that the applicant has successfully completed the course of study. Sponsors will normally do this by way of bulk upload. If sponsors are unable to make the notification via bulk upload, they must use the agreed exceptions process.

If a notification has not been received from the Student Sponsor, but the CAS shows that the applicant had been studying a qualifying qualification, the caseworker must not refuse the application if it would otherwise be granted. Instead, the caseworker must contact the Sponsor asking for confirmation that the student has successfully completed the course of study." (Emphasis added)

It will immediately be noticed that the first sentence of this passage of the guidance is identical to the first sentence of GR 4.3.

Later, at page 29, the guidance tells caseworkers when, and how, to request more information or supporting documents related to Graduate applications:

"Applicants should provide all the evidence on which they rely to support their application at the outset of the process. However, it is recognised that if an applicant makes an error or omission with the supporting evidence they provide, it may be appropriate for the caseworker to contact the applicant and invite them to provide additional evidence. Guidance for this can be found in the Evidential Flexibility guidance."

The Evidential Flexibility guidance to which this refers is set out in Version 11.0, which was published for Home Office staff of 15 January 2021. At page 5 it states:

"When you are considering the application, if it appears that the applicant has made an error with, or omitted, supporting evidence, or further information or verification of evidence is needed to make a decision, you should normally provide an opportunity for the additional information to be provided. For example, you should consider contacting the applicant:

• if evidence is missing that you believe the applicant has, or could obtain

• if evidence is inadequate but could be further clarified - for example, if an employer's letter has been provided but it is missing relevant information, for example, it does not confirm the applicant's gross annual salary

You may decide to ask for further information from the applicant, the sponsor, or the awarding body or other organisation to which the information relates. You may also decide to make verification checks of the evidence provided if you think that would help you assess whether the applicant meets the requirements of the route under which they are applying. If you are not sure whether the additional information or verification checks would help, please discuss this with your senior case worker or an appropriate manager."

Administrative reviews

The legal framework for administrative reviews is provided by Appendix Administrative Review in the Immigration Rules. The most relevant provisions for present purposes are:

"AR 3.1. The decision maker conducting the administrative review ("the reviewer") will decide whether the eligible decision is incorrect because:

(a) the decision maker of the eligible decision failed to apply, or incorrectly applied, the relevant Immigration Rules; or

(b) the decision maker of the eligible decision failed to apply, or incorrectly applied, published guidance.

...

AR 3.3. Where evidence which was not before the original decision maker is submitted with the application for administrative review, the reviewer will only consider that evidence where the eligible decision was:

(a) ...

(b) ...

(d) ...

(e) a failure to follow the evidential flexibility policy published on gov.uk.

AR 3.4. Where evidence would be admissible under AR 3.3, the reviewer may contact the applicant to request further information and specify a reasonable timeframe for receipt of that information.

AR 3.5. Where the requested information is not provided within the timeframe specified, the reviewer may consider the administrative review on the available information."

The Respondent's application documents

During the hearing, the Court enquired whether the Graduate Route permitted applicants to upload supporting documents. Following an exchange of correspondence since the hearing, it has become clear that the online application process specifies the documents that an applicant needs in order to apply and that the specified documents do not include any document evidencing successful completion the applicant's course. That is entirely consistent with the structure of the Graduate Route, which places the burden of informing the SSHD of successful completion on the sponsor. The fact that it is or may be possible to upload documents other than those specified as needing to be supplied is of no consequence: Mr Singh is not to be criticised for not having uploaded documents evidencing his successful completion. For him, the provision of such documents was, in a literal sense, surplus to requirements. He was not required to upload such documents as part of his application; to have done so would have been de trop.

Page 29 of the Graduate Route guidance (as set out at [21] above) does not create a free-standing obligation to supply any or all evidence of successful completion: that would subvert the whole point of GR 4.3, which is that the SSHD accepts notification from the sponsor in lieu of any other evidence of successful completion. The applicant is only required to provide all the evidence upon which they rely: they do not need to rely on or provide any evidence of successful completion as that is to be provided by the sponsor. It follows that for an applicant not to provide evidence of successful completion is not to be regarded as an "error or omission" within the meaning of page 29 of the Graduate Route guidance (or, for that matter, page 5 of the Evidential Flexibility guidance: see [22] above).

The Grounds of Appeal

Mr Singh pursues four grounds of appeal, submitting that:

i) The UT erred in law by failing to conclude that the Respondent's decision is arguably unlawful as it was procedurally unfair to refuse the Appellant's application without providing him with any opportunity to address the Respondent's concerns prior to making her decision: Ground 1;

ii) The UT erred in law by failing to conclude that the Respondent's decision is arguably unlawful for misconstruing Appendix GR 4.2 of the Graduate Route: Ground 2;

iii) The UT's decision is unlawful for failing to conclude that the Respondent's decision is arguably inconsistent with her own policy guidance: Ground 3;

iv) The UT's decision is unlawful for failing to conclude that it is arguable that the Respondent's decision was irrational and/or unlawful for failing to consider the Applicant's evidence with administrative review grounds: Ground 4.

The Ground upon which Mrs and Mr Barai rely was expressed by Zacaroli LJ when giving permission as being that there is an arguable tension between para GR 4.3 of the Immigration Rules and the SSHD's guidance as a result of which the SSHD should have accepted the Barais' application. GR 4.3 imposes a requirement that the sponsor must have notified the SSHD by the date of the application that the applicant had completed their course of study. The guidance provides that if this has not happened, the case worker should not refuse the application if it would otherwise be granted but should contact the sponsor to ask for confirmation that the applicant has completed their course of study. The arguable tension is said to arise because there is no requirement for the sponsor to confirm that the course of study was completed before the date of the application. I understand this to be a slight variant of Mr Singh's Ground 3.

There is a degree of overlap between the various grounds and arguments advanced. For convenience I shall follow the order of the Singh Grounds, while remembering at all times that neither the grounds nor the arguments should be regarded as hermetically sealed silos.

Singh Ground 1: procedural fairness

It is axiomatic that the requirements of procedural fairness depend upon the facts and the context in which a decision is taken, including the nature of the legal and administrative system within which the decision is taken: see R (Topadar) v SSHD [2020] EWCA Civ 1525, [2021] 1 WLR 2307 at [52].

There may be circumstances in which procedural fairness may require a person who may be adversely affected by a decision to be given an opportunity to make representations on his own behalf before the decision is taken: see R v SSHD, ex p Doody [1994] AC 531, 560 per Lord Mustill. It would therefore be wrong to assert that procedural fairness could never require that a person be afforded an opportunity to make representations where they may be adversely affected by a decision being made under the points-based system. Conversely, however, as a general rule the fact that a potential decision may adversely affect a person is not of itself a sufficient basis on which to assert that the person must be given an opportunity to make representations before the decision is made.

The context for the present decision is the operation of the points-based system for determining applications for leave to remain.

"That is recognised as a system which is intended to simplify the procedure the procedure for applying for leave to enter and remain in the cases of students and certain classes of economic migrants. The system is intended to enable high volumes of applications to be processed in a fair and efficient manner. The system operates by specifying what evidence must be submitted by applicants. The requirements of procedural fairness are to be understood in that context": see Topadar at [53], per Lewis LJ, with whom Males and Floyd LJJ agreed.

Another feature of the points-based system, expressly recognised in EK (Ivory Coast) v SSHD [2014] EWCA Civ 1517 at [28]-[29], is that the system is intended to enable the Secretary of State to process those high volumes of applications according to clear objective criteria. This is in the interests of all applicants. It also assists applicants to know what evidence they have to submit in support of an application. It is therefore an inherent feature of the points-based system that it puts a premium on predictability and certainty at the expense of discretion.

"This context informs the way in which the general public law duty of fairness operates in relation to the PBS. The duty supplements the PBS regime, but ought not to be applied in such a manner as to undermine its intended mode of operation in a substantial way. Application of the duty of fairness should not result in the public benefits associated with having such a clear and predictable scheme operating according to objective criteria being placed in serious jeopardy.": EK at [31].

Here, as explained in relation to Grounds 2 and 3, GR 4.2 and 4.3 laid down two criteria, each of which was entirely clear and each of which was expressed as a mandatory criterion by the use of the same word "must". GR 4.3 made entirely clear that the student sponsor (a) must have notified the Home Office that the applicant had successfully completed the course of study in GR 4.2 and that the sponsor (b) must have so notified the Home Office by the date of application. Nothing in this criterion required the applicant to do anything. Rather, it relied solely on action by the sponsor. The reason for relying on the sponsor rather than the applicant is not stated but is not far to find: the sponsor is the primary source of knowledge about whether the applicant had successfully completed their study and is not subject to any temptation to mislead the Home Office. The sponsor should also have in place systems for the bulk uploading of notification, as contemplated on page 8 of the Guidance. Furthermore, the Guidance caters for what should happen if notification has not been received from the Student Sponsor and the application would otherwise be granted. The caseworker must (again a mandatory requirement) contact the sponsor to asking for confirmation that the student has successfully completed the course of study. Once again, the applicant was not required to do anything. Reliance was placed on the sponsor, satisfying the requirement of clear objective criteria.

If the matter were entirely free of authority, I would hold that procedural fairness did not justify a requirement that the applicant be contacted in the event of (a) a sponsor's failure to notify in accordance with GR 4.3 and/or (b) the Home Office contacting the sponsor. The criteria to be satisfied were clear and objective and (reasonably) placed the onus on the sponsor rather than on the applicant. That left open the possibility that a sponsor might not discharge its obligations, to the applicant's detriment. But the balance between the advantages of administrative efficiency and the clogging effect of personal involvement was one that was clear, objective and justifiable in the interests of enabling high volumes of applications to be processed in a fair and efficient manner.

As it happens, the matter is not free from authority, much of which is closely analogous even if not addressing the precise provisions and point with which we are now concerned.

In Pathan v SSHD [2020] 1 WLR 4506, the applicant was already employed by the sponsor and applied to renew his leave to remain on the basis of an apparently valid certificate of sponsorship. Unbeknownst to the applicant, the Secretary of State revoked the sponsor's licence and, as a consequence, the certificate was no longer valid and the application was bound to fail. Three months passed before the decision was made. Pathan may be seen as a case where the Secretary of State's direct intervention in rendering an apparently valid certificate invalid gave rise to the demand of procedural fairness that the applicant should have been informed. That is not this case. Here, notification by the sponsor in accordance with GR 4.3 was the criterion that enabled the Secretary of State to determine that the Successful Completion Requirement was satisfied. Where the sponsor did not do so, there was no outstanding issue that procedural fairness required to be put to the applicants.

In EK it was held by the Court of Appeal that there was no duty to notify an applicant seeking leave to remain as a student who had applied in time of the fact that, unknown to them, their sponsor had withdrawn their sponsorship. The decision was founded in large part on the impact that the existence of such a duty would have had in undermining the purpose and functioning of the points-based system: see [32], [35]. The court reached its conclusion despite recognising (at [24]) that the position in which the applicant found herself could, in a general sense, be said to be unfair to her.

In a statement of general application that is relevant to the exercise that needs to be undertaken in the present case, Sales LJ said at [38]:

"The authorities in which the general public law duty of fairness has been found to impose additional obligations on the Secretary of State in the context of the PBS have been materially different from the present case. It has been held that where the Secretary of State has withdrawn authorisation from a college to issue CAS letters, fairness requires that she should give foreign students enrolled at the college a reasonable opportunity to find a substitute college before removing them: ... . But that requirement was found to arise where there had been a change of position of which the Secretary of State was aware, and indeed which she had brought about, in circumstances in which the students were not themselves at fault in any way, but had been caught out by action taken by the Secretary of State in relation to which they had had no opportunity to protect themselves. In the present case, by contrast, the Secretary had no means of knowing why the Appellant's CAS letter had been withdrawn and was not responsible for its withdrawal, and the fair balance between the public interest in the due operation of the PBS regime and the individual interest of the Appellant was in favour of simple operation of the regime without further ado." (Emphasis added).

In a concurring judgment, Briggs LJ drew the distinction (which I would respectfully endorse) in rather different terms at [54]:

" In my judgment the necessary starting point is that a clear distinction must be made between the unfairness in outcome, viewed from the standpoint of the applicant, to which a particular set of circumstances may give rise, and the separate question whether the Secretary of State's participation in those circumstances involved a breach of her common law duty to act fairly."

In Topadar the applicant was seeking leave as a tier 2 general migrant under a points-based system. It was held by the Court of Appeal that there was no duty to notify the applicant of the facts that the SSHD had requested the sponsor of the application to provide information but that the sponsor had failed to respond to the request, with the result that the application failed. At [61] Lewis LJ, having reviewed Doody, EK, Pathan and other authorities said:

"Here, there was a decision-making process where, in accordance with the relevant rules, the sponsor was required to provide evidence of certain matters to enable the Secretary of State to assess whether a job vacancy was a genuine vacancy. The rules provided that, if the information was not provided, the application for leave to remain might be refused. The sponsor was asked to provide the information. It did not do so. The Secretary of State could not therefore be satisfied that the sponsor did require an accounts manager paid £21,000 a year. There was nothing unfair in that process. This was not a case where the Secretary of State was making adverse findings, still less adverse findings on matters within the knowledge of the claimant. It was for the sponsor to provide the information to enable an assessment of whether the vacancy was genuine. It did not provide the information. In those circumstances, there was no allegation or issue that need in fairness to be put to the claimant for comment before the application for leave was refused."

The analogy with the facts of the present case is close and persuasive. During submissions on behalf of Mr Singh, it was submitted that the refusal of his application implied imputations of dishonesty on his part. It is sufficient to say that it did no such thing. It is therefore not necessary to examine the authorities to which we were referred in support of Mr Singh's case on that issue.

Finally, for present purposes, in R (Taj) v SSHD [2021] EWCA Civ 19, [2021] 1 WLR 1850, where the applicant applied for leave to remain as a Tier 1 (Entrepreneur) Migrant under a points-based system, the Court of Appeal held that there was no duty upon the SSHD to communicate concerns to the applicant before making the decision. In the course of giving his reasons at [52]-[62], Green LJ (with whom Males and Peter Jackson LJJ agreed) referred to the points-based system being open and transparent and specifically designed to reduce administrative discretion and, in this way, the risk of arbitrary or inconsistent decisions being minimised.

In my judgment, the authorities to which I have referred reinforce the view I expressed at [34] above. There is nothing in the Rules and, specifically, nothing in GR 4.2 and 4.3 that gave rise to a duty to provide Mr Singh with an opportunity to address the Respondent's concerns before making her decision. By parity of reasoning, there is also nothing in the guidance that gives rise an equivalent duty.

I would dismiss the appeal on Ground 1: it is unarguable.

Singh Grounds 2 and 3: interpretation of GR 4.2 and inconsistency with policy

Mr Singh submits that the effect of GR 4.2 and 4.3 together with the policy guidance unequivocally requires the Respondent to limit her inquiry to a single unambiguous question: "Has the applicant successfully completed the course?" It is submitted that this question only permits of an unambiguous binary response: yes or no. Any response deviating from that binary format fails to meet the explicit requirements set out in the rules. Accordingly, BPP's answer to the Home Office's enquiry (set out at [6] above) was unrelated to the question asked and was inadmissible and the Home Office erred in placing any weight on it and in proceeding without having obtained a clear answer to the question posed.

This is described in Mr Singh's supplemental skeleton argument as "the central point" where it is summarised as:

"This is not a case in which the Appellant failed to provide evidence that the application process required him to provide. It is a case in which (i) the Appellant did what the Respondent's own application process required of him; (ii) the Respondent's own policy required sponsor verification rather than immediate refusal; (iii) the sponsor failed to answer the material question asked; (iv) the Respondent chose not to notify that Appellant and made no follow -up enquiry; and (v) the application was refused on a factual premise which the Respondent now effectively accepts was wrong."

As explained in the supplemental skeleton argument, Mr Singh submits that GR 4.3 is "ancillary to" and "supportive of" GR 4.2 and that the Respondent's approach, which is that the two paragraphs identify different and discrete criteria so that GR 4.3 is a "freestanding and rigid" basis of refusal, is wrong. Taking into account the Respondent's policy guidance, it is submitted that the policy (by which I understand him to mean or include the overarching policy of the provisions and the guidance) makes coherent sense only if the operative issue remains whether the applicant has successfully completed the course and sponsor notification is merely the "ordinary mechanism for verifying that matter."

The principles to be applied when interpreting the Immigration Rules are not in dispute and do not need to be set out in detail here: see R (Wang) v SSHD [2023] UKSC 21, [2023] 1 WLR 2031 at [29]-[32] for a concise summary. Applying those principles to the provisions in the present case, I consider that Grounds 2 and 3 are unarguable.

I start with GR 4.2 and GR 4.3. On any fair reading they establish two discrete prerequisite criteria for a successful Graduate Route application, each of which has to be satisfied in every case. The use of the same word "must" in each clause cannot be ignored. GR 4.2 requires that the applicant must have successfully completed their qualifying course of study. Clause 4.3 requires that the sponsor must have notified the Home Office that the applicant has successfully completed the course of study in GR 4.2; it also requires that the sponsor must have given that notification "by the date of the application". There is nothing in GR 4.2 or 4.3 or the wider context of the Immigration Rules that either contradicts the clear wording of the two provisions or justifies any other interpretation.

It follows by necessary implication from GR 4.3 that, as the sponsor must notify the Home Office "by the date of application" that the applicant has successfully completed the relevant course of study, the applicant must have completed it before the date of the application. That follows because the sponsor cannot notify the Home Office until such time as the applicant has successfully completed the course, which must therefore happen before the date of the application to enable notification in accordance with GR 4.3 "by the date of application".

The only softening of the "bright line" requirement established by GR 4.3 is provided by the guidance at page 8, which I have set out at [20] above. It is a significant softening and it was followed in Mr Singh's case. The caseworker contacted BPP as mandated by the guidance and asked what Mr Singh submits is the right question; but in response they did not receive confirmation that Mr Singh had successfully completed the course of study: see [6] above. I would reject the submission that BPP were only able to give (and the Respondent was only able to receive) a binary "yes/no" answer. What BPP gave and the Respondent received was an answer that, at its lowest, did not confirm that Mr Singh had successfully completed (as defined) his course. In my judgment, a reasonable interpretation of the answer that BPP gave was that he had not successfully completed his course because he was on financial hold. The SSHD was entitled to rely upon that answer and to determine Mr Singh's application accordingly.

In his written and oral submissions Mr Singh referred to page 29 of the guidance and to the Respondent's Evidential Flexibility guidance, from which I have cited at [24]-[25] above. In my judgment Mr Singh's reliance on the Evidential Flexibility guidance is misplaced. That policy applies where it appears that the applicant has made an error with, or has omitted, supporting evidence. However, as outlined above at [24] there is no valid criticism to be made of Mr Singh's completion of his application form. The problem he has encountered arises because of GR 4.3 and the failure of BPP to supply the information which it was their function under the points-based system to provide. The Evidential Flexibility policy therefore had no application and there was no failure to follow it within the meaning of AR 3.3(e). Neither the Evidential Flexibility policy nor the Graduate Route guidance supports the existence of an obligation on the part of the Secretary of State to make further enquiries of Mr Singh.

In my judgment, it is not arguable that the UT erred in its interpretation of GR 4.2, 4.3 or the respondent's policy guidance either in relation to the Graduate Route guidance or the Evidential Flexibility policy; nor is it arguable that the policy guidance or Evidential Flexibility policy is inconsistent with GR 4.2 or 4.3. Accordingly, I would dismiss Mr Singh's appeal on grounds 2 and 3.

Singh Ground 4 - administrative review

I have set out the legal framework for administrative reviews at [23] above.

Mr Singh's submissions on this ground are founded on what is alleged to be a failure to follow the evidential flexibility policy. Since that policy does not apply to the facts of Mr Singh's case, there was no failure to follow it. Ground 4 is unarguable and must fail.

Singh appeal resolution

For the reasons set out above, there was no obligation upon the Respondent to seek additional information from Mr Singh. Instead the Home Office adopted the route provided by page 8 of the guidance in a case where the sponsor had not notified it by the date of application that the applicant had successfully completed his course of study in GR 4.2. Having asked the right question of BPP the Respondent received an answer which, in the context of the enquiry to which it was a reply, was reasonably to be understood as meaning that Mr Singh had not successfully completed his course. At its lowest, the answer did not confirm that he had. In those circumstances, the Respondent was entitled to refuse his application pursuant to GR 4.3, as she did.

Barai appeal

I have summarised the factual background at [9]-[16] and Mrs Barai's permitted ground of appeal at [27] above.

For the reasons I have given above, GR 4.2 and 4.3 establish two discrete criteria, each of which has to be satisfied to enable a Graduate route applicant to succeed in their application.

Bearing in mind the hierarchy under section 3 of the 1971 Act of legislation, rules and regulations and then guidance, I am unable to detect any material tension between GR 4.3 and page 8 of the guidance. In the case of Mrs Barai we are concerned with an applicant who did not successfully complete her course until the day after her application had become an application relying on the Graduate route. On the clear meaning of GR 4.3, it was impossible for the student sponsor to notify Home Office of her successful completion by the date of her application.

What then of page 8 of the guidance? The first thing to note is that the relevant passage starts by reiterating the GR 4.3 requirement that the sponsor must have notified the Home Office, by the date of the application, of the applicant's successful completion. This is not an encouraging start for the proposition that the guidance entitles an applicant to succeed in their Graduate route application where they only successfully completed their course of study after the date of the application. The guidance does not say so; nor is it necessarily to be implied when the provisions of the Rules and the guidance are read together. On the contrary, an interpretation of the guidance that led to the conclusion that notification could be given whenever the course had been successfully completed would directly contradict the clear meaning of the time limitation of GR 4.3 imposed by the rule and is impermissible.

In my judgment the meaning of GR 4.3 read together with page 8 of the guidance is that the guidance gives the sponsor another chance to demonstrate that the course was successfully completed by the date of the application. The mere fact that the guidance does not expressly spell that out in so many words does not mean that there is tension between the rule and the guidance.

I therefore consider that Mrs Barai's permitted ground to be unarguable. In these circumstances it is not necessary to address the issue raised by the SSHD's Respondent's Notice and I do not do so.

I would dismiss Mrs Barai's appeal.

Lord Justice Baker

I agree.

Lord Justice Coulson

I also agree.

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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Singh v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ 766 (22 June 2026) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2026/766.html Cite as: [2026] EWCA Civ 766

England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions