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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions >> Cromwell, R. v [2025] EWCA Crim 1315 (25 September 2025) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2025/1315.html Cite as: [2025] EWCA Crim 1315

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		Neutral Citation Number: [2025] EWCA Crim 1315
		Case No 2025/03146/A4

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
ON APPEAL FROM THE CROWN COURT AT PRESTON
(HIS HONOUR JUDGE KNOWLES KC) [04ZL1093624]

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand, London WC2A 2LL
		25 September 2025

LORD JUSTICE JEREMY BAKER: I shall ask Mr Justice Cavanagh to give the judgment of the court.

MR JUSTICE CAVANAGH:

1. This application for leave to appeal against sentence has been referred to the full court by the Registrar. We grant leave and so will deal with this as the hearing of the full appeal.
2. The appellant has been represented by Mr Sachdev of counsel, and the respondent by Miss Bond of counsel. We are grateful to them both for their clear and helpful submissions.
3. On 15 August 2025, in the Crown Court at Preston, the appellant was sentenced by His Honour Judge Knowles KC to concurrent terms of 12 months' imprisonment on each of two counts of assault occasioning actual bodily harm, contrary to section 47 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861. Restraining orders were also made preventing her from contacting the two victims for a period of five years. The appellant had pleaded guilty to these offences at the Crown Court on 2 April 2025 and was given 25 per cent credit for her plea.
4. The grounds of appeal do not challenge the length of the appellant's sentence; rather it is submitted that the sentence should have been suspended. This is mainly, though not entirely, because of the caring responsibilities undertaken by the appellant. She is currently aged 52 and she has ten children and 13 grandchildren. Her four youngest children live with her, two of whom have diagnosed additional needs.
5. The grounds of appeal also contend that the restraining orders should be amended in one respect.
6. The facts, briefly, are these. The first victim was the appellant's estranged husband, Ryan Cromwell. In November 2023 he left the appellant and, so far as she was concerned, disappeared. She made enquiries and discovered that Mr Cromwell was in a relationship with another woman, Chloe Legg (the second victim). The appellant also found out that Mr Cromwell was staying with Miss Legg in the Morecambe area.
7. On 13 November 2023, in the middle of the night, the appellant bombarded Miss Legg with phone calls. She also sent her a text message saying: "I know where you live, number 7. I'm coming, believe me".
8. The following morning the appellant travelled from her home in South Yorkshire to the vicinity of Miss Legg's home. She travelled with two of her children, Morgan Crookes (aged 18) and Casey Crookes (aged 20), and with another young man, James Greenfield, who was the partner of one of her daughters. The appellant went there (as the judge put it) with a view to giving Mr Cromwell and Miss Legg a "battering".
9. At 1 pm the appellant and the others arrived at Miss Legg's house. The appellant, accompanied by her two children, banged on the door. When Mr Cromwell opened it, she wedged her foot through the door and urged the others to enter the property. She said to Mr Cromwell: "I told you I would find you". Mr Cromwell told Miss Legg to hide in the bathroom and call the police. Mr Greenfield entered the bathroom via the window and went out and confronted Mr Cromwell. Mr Greenfield began to assault Mr Cromwell, and Morgan and Casey Crookes joined in.
10. The appellant went to the bedroom where Miss Legg was hiding. She pushed open the door, dragged Miss Legg by her hair, jumped on her, scratched her face, and half punched, half slapped her. Miss Legg passed out. The appellant attempted to collect her husband's belongings and shouted: "You're a home wrecker. You're a dirty little slag".
11. Miss Legg had managed to call the police. When they heard the police sirens, the four offenders made their escape. When the police arrived, Miss Legg was on the bedroom floor and appeared to be having some form of seizure. She was initially unresponsive. Both she and Mr Cromwell were taken to hospital. Fortunately, their injuries were not serious.
12. Mr Cromwell complained of pain to his left chest, a head injury, and pain to his pelvis and left arm. There were abrasions to his left posterior chest and left posterior medial aspect of his forearm. When he made his witness statement on the day after the assault, he said that he felt like he had been hit by a train; that he was very sore; that he ached all over his body; and that he had bruises everywhere. He was in shock at what had happened.
13. Miss Legg was found to have minor swelling to the bridge of her nose.
14. The incident had a terrifying effect on the two victims.
15. The appellant was originally charged with conspiracy to kidnap, alongside assault occasioning actual bodily harm, but this offence was left to lie on the file.
16. At the sentencing hearing the judge placed the appellant's offending in category A1 of the sentencing guidelines for assault occasioning actual bodily harm, which denoted high culpability and the highest level of harm. Sensibly, no objection is made to this categorisation by Mr Sachdev, who has made helpful submissions on behalf of the appellant. Similarly, no objection is taken to the 25 per cent credit for the appellant's guilty plea, which was entered at the plea and trial preparation hearing in the Crown Court.
17. The starting point for category A1 offending is two years and six months' custody, with a range from four years' custody to one year and six months' custody.
18. The appellant entered her guilty pleas on a full facts basis. The judge sentenced her on the basis that she was the ringleader and that she had been responsible for persuading two of her children, who had no previous convictions, to accompany her. She also persuaded Mr Greenfield to join her, even though he had previously been convicted of a serious offence of violence and so could expect to be dealt with severely if he was involved in offending such as this. The appellant was also sentenced on the basis that her offending had been planned and premeditated.
19. The appellant was 51 years of age when the offence was committed. She had no previous convictions, save for a driving conviction which the judge considered to be irrelevant. She had shown some remorse.
20. The judge was provided with a detailed pre-sentence report. He considered whether he should suspend the sentence imposed upon the appellant. He took account of the guidance given in R v Petherick [2012] EWCA Crim 2214, and in other cases where a defendant has caring responsibilities. He said that if the appellant was sent to prison, Mr Greenfield's partner (the appellant's eldest daughter) would step in, in the short term. The judge said that no doubt other family members would rally around, and that the local authority's Children and Social Care Team was aware of the position and would continue to be involved, as they already were. Although the council property in which the family lived was in the appellant's name, the judge considered that it was likely that the house would be kept available for the family, and at least some benefits would continue to be available to the family.
21. The judge further decided that the present case was not on the cusp of custody or not. Rather it was a case which cried out for a significant period of custody. Therefore, he had no alternative but to impose a custodial term, although he would heavily reduce the length of the sentence in the interests of the appellant's two children who have particular needs. The judge imposed a sentence of 12 months' imprisonment, although he noted that in reality the appellant would be released after 21 weeks or less.
22. We have been provided with some further materials which were not available to the sentencing judge, but which have been provided to this court. They are: first, a prison report dated 16 September 2025; second, a report by a probation officer, Miss Hannah Jackson, into the impact of sentence on family and caring responsibilities; and third, an email from the appellant's solicitors, dated 22 September 2025, which contains some information from her GP about her health.

Discussion

23. We approach this appeal by reminding ourselves that it is not for us simply to substitute our view as to whether the sentence should have been suspended for the view of the sentencing judge. Rather, as Mr Sachdev acknowledged, the question for this court is whether the judge's decision not to suspend the sentence was outside the range of answers to which he could properly have come: see R v Clayton Atkinson [2023] EWCA Crim 991 at [16] and [17].
24. Apart from the consideration of the caring responsibilities of the appellant, we have no doubt that the judge would have been entitled – and indeed would have been right – to impose an immediate custodial sentence. This was a planned attack by a group on two victims in which the appellant was the driving force. In these circumstances, even though the appellant had effective good character, and even bearing in mind that the appellant did not re-offend or give any cause for concern between arrest and sentence, and even bearing in mind the prospects of rehabilitation, an immediate custodial sentence was plainly appropriate.
25. The focus of this appeal in the main has been upon whether the sentence should have been suspended because of the appellant's caring responsibilities and the effect of the custodial sentence on the appellant's younger children.
26. In considering this issue, we take account not only of the material that was before the sentencing judge – and in particular the pre-sentence report – but also the further pre-appeal report by the probation officer, Miss Jackson, into the impact of sentence on family and caring responsibilities. This report, as we have said, was prepared just over a week ago, on 16 September 2025. For obvious reasons, therefore, this report was not before the judge. The pre-sentence report stated that the appellant was unemployed and was claiming benefits. She was the full-time primary carer for two of her children. She received carer's allowance and personal independence payment. She lived in council accommodation and was behind with the rent. Four of the appellant's children live with her. Her youngest child has autism and the loss of chromosome 10. Another child has ADHD. There was at the time of sentencing no current evidence of direct harm, neglect or abusive behaviour within the home. But Children's Social Services have been involved with the family intermittently between 2005 and 2024, with common themes of concern related to criminality and neglectful care. The author of the report said that there is a need for ongoing oversight and support to ensure appropriate care for the children.
27. The most recent pre-appeal report, dated 16 September 2025, states that, since her sentence, the appellant's children have been cared for by an adult sibling. The author of the report says that the appellant plays a vital and irreplaceable role in the care and wellbeing of her children, particularly those with complex needs. The report says that the immediate custodial sentence is likely to have had a profound and disruptive impact on her children in that it has resulted in the absence of their primary carer. The younger children, at least one of whom suffered emotional distress when Mr Cromwell left the family home, may face further psychological strain due to the loss of their mother's presence and support. The emotional and logistical upheaval may lead to increased school absences, reduced academic engagement and deterioration in behaviour or mental health; and there is an increased risk of family fragmentation and a negative impact upon the wider family network.
28. A prison report, also dated 16 September 2025, says that the appellant's behaviour had been of the standard expected, with no adjudications or negative behavioural comments recorded. The appellant told the prison offender manager that she has a large and supportive family and that she has accommodation in Sheffield available to her upon her release.
29. We have considered the guidance given by this court in cases in which an offender has caring responsibilities such as Petherick and R v Carla Foster [2023] EWCA Crim 1196. It is not necessary to repeat that guidance in detail. The court must give full weight to the impact of a prison sentence upon those who are cared for by the offender. This is required by the common law, but has been reinforced by the right to family life that is recognised in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The sentencing judge must ask three questions:

(1) Is there an interference with family life?

(2) Is it in accordance with the law and in pursuance of a legitimate aim within Article 8(2)?

(3) Is the interference proportionate, given the balance between the various factors?

30. As with almost all criminal cases, the answers to questions 1 and 2 is "yes". As for factor 3, the court in Petherick said that, especially where the case is on the cusp of custody, the balance is likely to be a fine one. In that kind of case, the interference with the family life of one or more entirely innocent children can sometimes tip the scales and mean that a custodial sentence that is otherwise proportionate may become disproportionate.
31. We have carefully considered the submissions made on the appellant's behalf in relation to the decision not to suspend the sentence that was imposed upon her. We are unable to accept them. The judge's decision not to suspend the sentence was well within the range of answers to which he could properly have come upon the question whether or not the sentence should be suspended. There are two reasons for this. First, as the judge found, this case was not on the cusp of a non-custodial sentence. The nature of the appellant's offending was so serious that the judge was entitled to conclude that only an immediate custodial sentence could be passed. She acted as the ringleader and prime mover in a group attack on two people in their own home. She persuaded her young adult children and another relatively young man to become involved. There was a substantial degree of planning. She located Miss Legg's home and arranged for an expedition from Sheffield to Morecambe with a view to carrying out the assault. The impact upon the victims was substantial and the assault was terrifying for them. The judge was entitled to conclude that the nature of the offending was such that only an immediate custodial sentence could be imposed.
32. Second, as is so often the case, the custodial sentence which resulted from the appellant's offending has had adverse effects on vulnerable family members. However, on the basis of the information available to the judge – and the further information that is available to this court – the consequences are not so drastic as to mean that the only reasonable decision open to a court would be to suspend the sentence. Although the appellant was the sole carer for her younger children, an older daughter has taken over their care, supported by the wider family. There is no suggestion that the younger children or other family members have been left homeless or destitute by the appellant's prison sentence, although the appellant's carer's allowance has been stopped. The pre-appeal report, dated 16 September 2025, does not refer to any specific adverse consequences that have been suffered by the appellant's children. The potential consequences referred to in the report are, with respect, somewhat generic and speculative.
33. The sentencing judge did not ignore the impact of the appellant's imprisonment on her dependents. He heavily reduced the duration of the appellant's sentence for the sake of her children. The sentence of 12 months' imprisonment was considerably less than half of the starting point of two and a half years.
34. The email from the appellant's GP, dated 22 September 2025, forwarded to the court by the appellant's solicitors, did not deal with her caring responsibilities, but described health problems from which she is suffering. The email said that the appellant is being treated for high blood pressure and is on cholesterol reducing treatment. She is awaiting a cardiology opinion following an echocardiogram which showed a suspicion of a hole in the lining of her heart. She is on a waiting list for surgery to assist on her right eye. She had a blood test in August '24 to check for any underlying cause for restless leg syndrome; and she was diagnosed with mild anxiety and depressive disorder in 2024, for which she is undergoing treatment.
35. Although we have sympathy for the appellant because of her health difficulties, they are not of such seriousness as to mean that the court should take the exceptional step of ordering her release to deal with them. Happily, she does not suffer from a terminal illness. There is no reason to think that her various conditions cannot be properly treated while she is in prison. In fact, even if the appeal is unsuccessful, the appellant will be released from prison into home detention curfew in a few weeks' time.
36. The second aspect of the appellant's appeal is a challenge to one feature of the restraining orders. The restraining orders are in force for five years. The court ordered that the appellant be prohibited from approaching, contacting, or trying to contact either Mr Cromwell or Miss Legg by any means either herself or through anyone else. No objection is taken to this part of the orders.
37. The orders also prohibited the appellant from going within 100 metres of any address where, as she knows or suspects, Mr Cromwell or Miss Legg is living. Mr Sachdev has submitted that a radius restriction which prevents the appellant from going within 100 metres of any address at which she knew the victims to be living is not practical because it is not practicable for the appellant or the police to measure that distance. He submitted that sufficient protection would be provide by a term that prevented the appellant from attending any address at which she knew or reasonably believed the victims to be living.
38. We do not accept this submission. It is commonplace for restraining orders to impose a restriction which prevents an offender from going within a particular distance of a location. There is a good reason for this. This means that the offender is prevented from harassing or intimidating the victims by hanging around in the vicinity of their home, even if they do not actually attend at the property. The term proposed by Mr Sachdev would not provide sufficient protection. The reference to 100 metres does not mean that the restriction is unclear or impractical. It is entirely reasonable to expect an offender – and the police – to have a sufficient understanding of how far away a perimeter of 100 metres is from a property to enable the restriction to be complied with and enforced. Maps are not required. If this were the only ground of appeal, we would not have given leave.
39. For these reasons, and notwithstanding Mr Sachdev's impressive submissions, the appeal against sentence is dismissed.