A Mother v A Father (Fact-Finding: Abduction) [2025] EWFC 518 (B) (04 June 2025)

1. This is the judgment in case SD24P00271 delivered on 4 June 2025 at 11.57. In this case it is the welfare of C that is my paramount consideration. C is a young child. C's mother is M and his father is F. M, the applicant in these proceedings has been represented through solicitors and counsel Ms Logan. F has represented himself having dismissed his solicitors around 10 days ago prior to a pre-trial review heard by me, and C through his experienced Children's Guardian, Ms McGuinness, is represented by solicitors and Ms Troy of counsel.

2. I am delivering this ex tempore judgment having heard over the last two days evidence from M and F who I shall refer to as the "mother" and the "father" for ease and no disrespect is intended to either of them in doing so, and this morning have heard closing submissions on behalf of the mother, the father and C through his Guardian.

3. This fact-finding hearing is listed to consider one allegation, that made by the mother against the father that he retained C in second Hague Convention Country in 2021 unjustifiably and against C's welfare best interests. This fact-finding hearing has focused on events concerning this family from around mid-2021 onwards. On 15 November 2021 the father flew to second Hague Convention Country with C. That was a trip that the mother gave her permission in respect of on the basis that they were returning on 26 November, she having been provided with outgoing and return boarding passes by the father. The father's case in fact was and in fact it still is, that he flew out to second Hague Convention Country at a point when it was fully his intention to return on 26 November and that, in fact, even as late as 19 November of 2021 he still fully intended to return to this country as he had planned.

4. The mother's case is that she had suspicions, which were quickly realised, that the father always intended to take C to second Hague Convention Country and to stay there and that he is a manipulative and calculating individual who has engineered a number of incidents to create a false evidence base retrospectively to justify his planned and successful abduction of C.

5. Father's case, so far as it can be accurately ascertained, is that whilst he did intend to return C on 26 November, even as late as 19 November, it then became both neither his desire to return nor possible to do so even if he had wanted to, to return C until eventually C was returned on 26 February 2024.

6. In terms of the background, I can state it relatively briefly. The key facts are that the parents were together from about 2016, separated in the second half of 2021 and both say there were arguments between them, and they both accept the relationship was not working and had broken down by the point C was taken to second Hague Convention Country. C was then taken to second Hague Convention Country by the father on 15 November 2021, was due to return on 26 November 2021 and did not return until 26 February 2024. This fact-finding hearing has been necessary to ascertain so far as it is possible to do so on the evidence before me, whether the father's taking of C to second Hague Convention Country in November 2021 and his not returning him until February 2024 was a deliberate and pre- meditated attempt to unilaterally remove C from both this jurisdiction and the care of his mother and therefore deprive him of a relationship with his mother, that is the mother's case, or a combination of unfortunate and unforeseen circumstances combined with potentially an attempt to protect C from harm at the mother's hands, which is the father's case.

7. Overall within the proceedings, the welfare decision for me in due course will be whether (as father would like me to) I order that C should live in second Hague Convention Country with him. He also hopes that the mother may then move her whole life to second Hague Convention Country as well at the same time or whether as the mother would like me to ultimately order that C's welfare interests are best met in this country where he lived until he was taken to second Hague Convention Country and where he now lives.

8. In terms of the background to the proceedings, they are the key aspects. I have to look in more detail at the allegations surrounding what occurred in the immediate build up to and during, particularly the first weeks and months of C's time in second Hague Convention Country. Of course, on 14 November 2021 a non-molestation order was granted on an ex-parte basis against the mother on application from the father. The very next day the father travelled to second Hague Convention Country with C. This was agreed to by the mother on the basis, despite the reservations that she described to me, that there would be a return on 26 November. I make clear that there is nothing to suggest that the father's assertion that he went as a result of the sad passing of his father is anything other than accurate. The father had already prior to the application being made on 14 November for the non-molestation order, bought the tickets to go to second Hague Convention Country. That is evidenced by them being sent to the mother around the week before.

9. On 22 November the non-molestation order was granted on an ex-parte basis, no findings having been made and it seems to me without a hearing at all. On 26 November, the day C was due to be brought back to his home in England by his father who had taken him to second Hague Convention Country on his case for a holiday, the father sent an email to the mother indicating that he would be remaining in second Hague Convention Country for a further unspecified period. I have the benefit of having that email in the bundle and have considered it carefully.

10. On 6 December 2021 the mother filed her C66 and a C1A application seeking the return of C to this jurisdiction. Of course, that matter was heard in the High Court and on 13 December the High Court at a without notice hearing made a return order determining that C must return to the jurisdiction by 16 December of 2021.

11. On 15 December the mother quite understandably applied to the second Hague Convention Country Central Authority for C to be returned to this jurisdiction under the Hague Convention and a hearing was listed in that respect on 5 May. The second Hague Convention Country police were inevitably then involved and visited the father at his family property in second Hague Convention Country where C was.

12. The next day, 16 December 2021, the social services in second Hague Convention Country became involved and produced a report, and on 17 December there was a return hearing in the High Court where a further order was made that C must be returned to the jurisdiction by his father by 20 December. On 20 December a return hearing took place before a Deputy District Judge in the Family Court sitting at Brighton and the proceedings were purported to be transferred to the High Court because of the Deputy District Judge being aware of the ongoing return order proceedings. Of course, as a matter of law that was not open to the Deputy District Judge to do as has been remarked upon by Roberts J, but in any event the proceedings were on the face of it therefore to be dealt with in the High Court.

13. From 22 December or thereabouts, the second Hague Convention Country police opened up a criminal investigation into the father in respect of the alleged child abduction and he was interviewed on a number of occasions by them from March 2022 onwards.

14. On 5 May 2022 within the second Hague Convention Country proceedings the first hearing was listed in respect of the mother's application for the child to be returned under the Hague Convention and the father, importantly in my judgment, made an application to revoke the mother's parental responsibility in respect of C. Of course, the second Hague Convention Country proceedings have continued and ultimately resolved by way of the Court in second Hague Convention Country ordering that C be returned to this jurisdiction in line with the order of the High Court which I will come onto in due course. It is right that the father has subsequently appealed that decision and the Supreme Court in the second Hague Convention Country have referred the matter back to the second Hague Convention Country First Instance Court. For the avoidance of any doubt as I will discuss in due course, I am in no doubt at all that there is no conflict of jurisdictions here and that this Court retains jurisdiction, the High Court rightly made the orders they did for return and there is no suggestion that there is anything like a conflict of jurisdiction as is claimed potentially by the father.

15. By the middle of 2022, the mother submitted to the High Court an application for an urgent hearing and on 28 June 2022 at a hearing which the father attended remotely and participated in from the transcript I have read, a further return order was made. Two days later in the second Hague Convention Country proceedings there was a further hearing to consider the father's application to revoke the mother's parental responsibility, and a number of directions were made.

16. Somewhat surprisingly on 18 July 2022 despite the very clear orders from the High Court, the hearing in the Court in second Hague Convention Country in respect of the mother's application for the child to be returned to this jurisdiction was postponed until 1 February 2023. The criminal case against the father was formally closed on 9 August 2022 and towards the end of 2022 supervised contact began taking place between the mother and C in second Hague Convention Country.

17. A number of further assessments were ordered within the second Hague Convention Country proceedings for reasons which are not entirely clear, including psychiatric assessment of the mother by a psychiatrist. I have had the benefit within the bundle of all of the relevant information and some information which is not relevant from the second Hague Convention Country proceedings, and I have considered it all carefully.

18. On 9 January 2024 seemingly as a result of the information provided to them by the father, the second Hague Convention Country Public Prosecutor's Office effectively joined in his application for the mother's parental responsibility to be revoked and to effectively overrule the judgment of the High Court in this country that the child should be returned to the UK.

19. On 16 February 2024 the Court sitting in second Hague Convention Country clearly having analysed all of the actual evidence as opposed to assertions being made to them which were wholly unjustified, ordered the return of C to England and Wales and rightly in my judgment clearly found a lack of jurisdiction in respect of the Courts in second Hague Convention Country, that being in line of course with the return orders that were made in the High Court. On 26 February 2024 finally C was returned to this jurisdiction and was returned to the care of his mother.

20. Thereafter of course there have been further hearings in the High Court, particularly on 7 March 2024 when orders were made prohibiting the father from removing C from England and Wales without the express permission of the mother or of course an order of the Court and that the contact such as it was to take place with the father was to be agreed between the parties. The proceedings were then transferred to the Family Court and both the mother and the father on 3 and 2 May 2024 respectively issued applications to the Family Court sitting in England and a number of reports have therefore been prepared by Cafcass in terms of the safeguarding report, the County Council where C lives with his mother prepared a Section 7 report and a number of hearings have taken place.

21. The first of those within these proceedings was on 18 June at which the case was transferred to me as a Circuit Judge on the basis of its complexity and at the first hearing before me on 20 June 2024 I joined C to these proceedings and appointed a Children's Guardian, ordering at that point indirect contact twice a week and any future arrangements for contact to be agreed between the parties. I directed a number of reports to be filed before on 15 November directing that a fact-finding hearing was necessary to consider the mother's allegation that the father had taken C to second Hague Convention Country and unjustifiably retained him there against C's welfare best interests, determining at that point in time on 15 December that it was not necessary in order to make the welfare decisions I am asked for C to consider the allegations of domestic abuse such as they were raised between the parties in light of the overall circumstances of this family and ultimately the key issue from a welfare perspective being should C live in second Hague Convention Country with his father or in this jurisdiction with his mother and on any view the main reason that it was said by the mother that it should not happen being the allegation that C had previously been abducted and unjustifiably retained in second Hague Convention Country and that it was likely to happen again.

22. It has recently come to light that on 9 January 2025 the Supreme Court in second Hague Convention Country overturned the decision of the Court in second Hague Convention Country to order the return of C to this jurisdiction. It is not for me in a different jurisdiction to pass comment on the way in which the second Hague Convention Country legal system works or the decision that was made. I make that abundantly clear. But as I will go on to explain in due course, it is abundantly clear to me that the evidence base presented to the second Hague Convention Country Supreme Court by the father was wholly inaccurate and was undoubtedly an attempt in my judgment to mislead them into making decisions which they may otherwise not have, had they been presented with for example the fullness of the evidence which I have the benefit of.

23. I heard a pre-trial review hearing in this matter on 12 March 2025 and directed further evidence to be filed including a letter from the mother's GP particularly in respect of her mental health because of the significant emphasis that the father was placing and continues to place on what he says are significant concerns raised by the evidence of the mother's ability to meet C's needs because of her mental health difficulties. I also made directions in respect of evidence to be filed from the father's second Hague Convention Country lawyers because at that point the father's case was that he did not return C to this jurisdiction in large part due to positive advice from his second Hague Convention Country lawyers not to do so. I confirmed at that point F being represented that he was willing to and was waiving privilege in respect of the documentation in the hands of his second Hague Convention Country lawyers. He confirmed it was, and I made directions for it to be translated and served and filed. Subsequently, the second Hague Convention Country lawyers themselves drafted statements and claimed that the second Hague Convention Country Bar Association had told them they must not disclose any such evidence, despite the fact that their own client was consenting to it and it had been ordered by a Circuit Judge in this jurisdiction. Nonetheless, as a result of that the father withdrew his application to rely on any of that evidence. Also somewhat tellingly, having not been allowed to rely on that evidence it seems from the evidence he gave he now does not place any emphasis at all on any advice he got from second Hague Convention Country lawyers.

24. I listed the matter again on 22 May for a further directions hearing/pre-trial review granting the application the father made for permission to withdraw his application to rely on those second Hague Convention Country third party witnesses. I appointed a Qualified Legal Representative to represent the father because he had shortly beforehand chosen to dismiss his legal team, and I am extremely grateful to Ms Nugent who took up the Qualified Legal Representative appointment and did so with great skill. She had clearly prepared her cross-examination extremely well and had had considered the entirety of the bundle in anxious detail. I am extremely grateful to any lawyer who takes up the mantle of assisting parties and the Court to accepting a Qualified Legal Representative appointment, particularly when they demonstrate the competence and ability of Ms Nugent, so I am particularly grateful to her.

25. The fact-finding hearing then began before me on Monday of this week, 2 June, when I heard from the mother. I heard from the father yesterday on Tuesday 3 June and am giving judgment today, 4 June.

26. Turning to the law that I must apply, of course that is not in dispute, and I summarise it as follows. The burden of proving an allegation rests upon the mother because she is making it. The standard of proof, simply is it more likely than not to have occurred. Findings of fact must be based on evidence and not mere speculation or feeling. Fairly and safely drawn inferences can be drawn from the evidence if appropriate and I can take into account inherent probability or improbability if it is appropriate to do so. What I must do is survey the wide canvass of evidence in reaching any conclusions and must not artificially focus on any particular part of the evidence or elevate one witnesses' evidence to some special status simply because of external factors. I have to take a step back and consider all of the evidence which is what I have done. I must not artificially compartmentalise different bits or parts of evidence but consider each piece of evidence in the context of all of the evidence before me and I must consider the consistency or otherwise of evidence before me both internally and externally compared to other evidence I have.

27. The Family Court operates a binary system so even if an allegation is proved to the requisite standard by the party making it or it is not if it is proved the welfare decisions to be taken in due course for C are made on the basis of if an event occurred and if not proved then it did not occur for the purposes of the welfare decisions I am in due course to take. I remind myself of course that human memory is fallible. It does not operate like a CCTV system from which picture perfect memories can be retrieved at any point whenever an individual wants to and the fragility of the human memory is inevitable and inconsistency as a result does not necessary amount to the overall account of a witness being untrue or inaccurate, particularly if that memory is formed in times of stress or trauma.

28. Contemporaneous and written documents are important in determining where the truth lies in any particular case, particularly where the other evidence is limited to the accounts of those who were directly involved and reliant on their memories and importantly told from their own different points of view, perspectives and with their own agendas. I remind myself of course that people do lie for many reasons, many of which do not in any way denote guilt. Even if I conclude a witness has lied about a particular matter, I must not hold it against them unless it was in my judgment a deliberate lie told about a material issue with the intention of diverting the Court from the truth of the allegation faced. Whilst demeanour can potentially be important, an assessment of a witnesses' credibility in my judgment can never safely be based solely or indeed mainly on the way in which a witness gave their evidence. Giving evidence is a stressful process for any individual which ensures that their presentation in giving evidence is usually not an accurate indicator of whether they are telling the truth or not. In this case, I attach no weight to the demeanour of the witnesses both of whom were giving evidence in very stressful situations about their son and future plans for him and what has or has not happened in the past.

29. In terms of any legal principles that I apply I make clear that criminal law concepts and principles have no place in my deliberations. There is of course within the criminal law a definition of "child abduction". Within the Hague Convention there is a definition. They do not matter to me. All I am focused on is what in my judgment on the evidence before me has likely occurred and subsequently its impact on C and therefore I am not in any way considering any definitions of child abduction which may exist in other jurisdictions or within different parts of the jurisdiction of the Family Court and High Court.

30. Of course, I remind myself in respect of fact-finding hearings generally as per Re: K & K [2022] EWCA Civ 468 at paragraph 65, that:

"A fact-finding hearing is not free-standing litigation, it always takes place within proceedings to protect the child from abuse or regarding the child's future welfare. It is not to be allowed to become an opportunity for the parties to air their grievances nor is it a chance for the parents to seek the Court's validation of their perception of what went wrong in their relationship. If a fact-finding is to be justified in the first place or continued thereafter the Court must be able to identify how any alleged abusive behaviour is or may be relevant to the determination of the issues between the parties as to the future arrangements for the children."

31. As I have already indicated I have determined last year that this fact-finding hearing would purely focus, having applied that test, on the allegation of abduction and retention.

32. The allegations that are made and which I have heard some limited evidence about during these proceedings of domestic abuse between the parents, are not relevant for the reasons I gave previously to the decisions I must make. Inevitably during the course of the analysis of my evidence, I have to consider certain aspects of evidence which if proved would likely result in a finding of controlling or coercive behaviour. On any view were the allegation of unlawful, unjustified and in a way that was adverse to C's welfare best interests retention in second Hague Convention Country to be proved, that would be an abusive act within of itself if it were designed to deliberately and intentionally damage the relationship between C and his mother. In respect of alienating behaviours which are alleged to the extent that a unilateral removal of a child by a parent preventing a relationship with the other of course is, I must approach my analysis of those allegations and this allegation in exactly the same way as I would any other. There is no special test to be applied. I must consider the evidence before me in its entirety and make any findings of fact following the application of the relevant legal principles.

33. The father represented himself during this fact-finding hearing, having dismissed his solicitors shortly before the pre-trial review about 10 days ago and this made things more difficult for him. So far as it is necessary to do so I gave him every allowance in terms of representing himself and not being legally represented as the mother and C are. He has done so ably, and I am extremely grateful as I have indicated to Ms Nugent, the Qualified Legal Representative appointed by the Court to undertake the cross-examination of the mother on behalf of the father. She did so with great skill and gusto, and no one could have within the proper remit of cross-examination and the rules of this Court put the father's case through cross-examination any more forcefully or persuasively as she did.

34. I have carefully considered turning to the evidence all of the evidence in the bundle before me. Of course, I will not mention anything like all of the evidence I have read or indeed all that I have heard. That does not mean that I have ignored it, just that it is simply unnecessary to mention a great deal of it or anything close to every piece of evidence I have considered, in order to explain the findings I have made and my basis for doing so.

35. I heard first from the mother. I found the mother's evidence to be forthright, straightforward and honest. It is difficult to think of a more difficult situation for any parent to give evidence in than having agreed to their child going on a short trip to second Hague Convention Country then not seeing them for around two years and four months. Despite that and despite at points obviously being upset the mother's evidence was utterly compelling in my judgment. She was at points self- deprecating in terms of in her eyes things which she could have done differently in the past. She was clearly a witness and a mother who is still feeling very guilty about her decision to allow C to go in the first place. She says, and I accept fully, that she had her suspicions and ill feeling about the trip because of the situation such that it had been towards the end of their relationship, but nonetheless despite those reservations was persuaded by the father that he would come back as he promised on 26 November. It is difficult to think of a more difficult situation for a mother to give evidence in than having been put in that position.

36. I found her evidence to be very straightforward and unashamedly honest. She was at every point willing to answer in a direct and clear way any question asked of her. She was asked a number of questions about very difficult things such as her mental health problems which she had suffered from previously and which clearly in any view now manages extremely well. She was asked questions about her older daughter who she spends time with and who has come to this country previously to spend time with her, and it is clear that they were questions asked on the basis of the case advanced by the father properly by Ms Nugent but which were on any view upsetting for the mother. She answered them with poise and dignity, and it was clear that despite how hard she found giving evidence because of the subject matter she was asked about, she did everything she could to provide honest and straightforward answers to me. Even in respect of the police caution that she has, which I will come onto in due course, her account was very frank. She described how because during the course of the incident she had pushed the father away and she said that when she was interviewed by the police to accept a police caution. I will in due course explain why that must be viewed in a particular context and may in due course be a matter she asks the police to reconsider in light of the findings I make in this case. Nonetheless, even when it was evidence that did not on the face of it paint her in a positive light, I found her to be unashamedly honest and straightforward about it.

37. I make clear that at points the mother's evidence was some of the most moving I am sure many have heard, in particular her description of the morning of the trip to London for the return date on the return order hearing, how she described cleaning the car inside and out, putting her car seat in there for C because she truly believed that the father would comply with an order from the High Court of England and Wales and return her child to where he lived, only then to be so cruelly and bitterly disappointed and upset when it did not happen. That was extremely moving evidence, but I make clear that does not bolster or undermine her credibility in any way. I merely remark on how moving that was and how hard it must have been for the mother to give.

38. I then turn to the father who by contrast was one of the most dishonest, manipulative and frankly deceitful witnesses from whom I have heard in my courtroom. I found him to be evasive in the extreme in respect of his answers to questions. He avoided at any point reflecting on his own potential poor behaviour and the inconsistency which ran through his evidence on multiple occasions was frankly stark. He regularly tried within his evidence to force reference to the mother's previous mental health difficulties, to her attempts to take her life or to her older child not being in her care, giving answers in a gratuitous and wholly unnecessary way. He did so as I indicated I feared he was at the time he was doing it, I am entirely satisfied in no more than an attempt to cause the mother upset and distress. It was in my judgment abusive on his part and it was designed to be exactly so. Despite that, the mother has throughout these proceedings even when having to listen to unnecessary references to her previous mental health difficulties and her previous Court involvement regarding her older child in second Hague Convention Country, has maintained poise and dignity in the most difficult of circumstances.

39. The father's evidence was inconsistent almost in its entirety. Taking one example, when one looks at whether the father's account of looking from the witness box of not returning to this jurisdiction as he had intended to right up until at least 19 November because he wanted the mother to move out of the home and he did not know where she was going to go being the reason that he did not immediately come back. It is clearly inconsistent with the words that he himself used when he spoke to the police. For example, he said in evidence "I did not know if the mother had a property lined up to move to." He uses that as a reason that he could not move back to this jurisdiction with C "as I planned to because if the mother was still in the house which I intended to stay in longer term it would not have been safe for me or C." Then when I read the police report from 7 November 2021 he told the police on that occasion that he knew the mother was planning to move with C and where she planned to move to but he told them he did not agree with it happening and so that on 27 November 2021 one day after he was meant to return with C what the father told the police was that he knew the mother was intending to move with C and that he did not agree to it happening.

40. The father then said in his oral evidence:

"I don't remember when we gave notice to the landlord of our property, but we had to move out the same month we gave notice. I gave notice on the property whilst I was in second Hague Convention Country. It wasn't before Christmas. It was when I was put under criminal investigation in second Hague Convention Country. It was after Christmas of 2021."

41. I compare that to the police report of 27 October 2021 where the father tells the police, "We are both moving out in the next few weeks" and the police report from 24 October 2021 where the father specifically tells the officer the tenancy on the house they are in at the moment ends on 6 December 2021. The father in his evidence having been challenged about that said that when he referred on 27 October 2021 to moving out in the next few weeks that he did not mean that he was moving to second Hague Convention Country but the father has not provided any suggestion in his evidence, written or oral, as to what he did mean if he did not mean he was moving to second Hague Convention Country with C.

42. Of course, as I will explore within my analysis of the evidence more generally and in my explanation and my findings, that is by far not the only example of clear inconsistency and frankly dishonesty from the witness box on behalf of the father, but it is just one of many examples which it is worthy to note.

43. I have considered as part of my analysis a number of really importance pieces of evidence. I have not based it purely on which version from the witness box I preferred of the parents. I begin with a letter sent on 20 January of 2021, the importance of which cannot be overestimated, and that letter dated 20 January of 2021 is addressed to the General Practitioner at the Bridge Medical Centre in England under whom the mother was registered and it is from the perinatal community service in England because the parent had moved. That letter headed "Dear GP" starts:

"This is a letter to notify you that the mother has been discharged from the perinatal team as her son is now over the age of one year and she has moved out of the area. An onward referral has been made to Assessment Team, who have arranged an initial appointment with her on 9 February. This team will then make a decision on the most appropriate support for her moving forward."

44. It then goes on to in a straightforward way describe how the mother was referred to the perinatal team in England first in May 2019 when she was pregnant and how the referral was made by the midwives following the mother telling them she was suffering from low mood and anxiety and then goes into more detail about the mental health difficulties she had suffered. On the face of it that letter is relevant because the letter that has been provided by both the mother and indeed by way of a subject access request to the NHS Trust itself, goes on to state importantly, "At the time of discharge mental state is both subjectively and objectively stable." That is relevant because as part of the father's case throughout these proceedings he has chosen to put front and centre what he says are significant concerns about the mother's mental health and the effect on her ability to meet C's needs. This is a letter which made very clear at the time of discharge mental state is both subjectively and objectively stable before going on to specifically consider risk stating:

"Risk to self - intermittent thoughts of harm to self, which is passive, denies any current active suicidal ideation since the overdose in September. Perinatal specific - no concerns with bond or parenting. No child safeguarding concerns. To others - no risk of harm to others. No history of this. From others - no risk of harm from others reported."

Before setting out the details of the plan with which the mother agreed for ensuring that that no risk and stability objectively and subjectively continued.

45. During the course of these proceedings, the father chose to file what he purports to be the same letter. However, the father's version of that same letter which to all intents and purposes looks exactly the same, somehow omits two very important parts. At the end of the first paragraph on the second page of the letter there are three very important parts missing. The first is the line which says, "At the time of discharge mental state is both subjectively and objectively stable." The second is under "Risk perinatal specific" which states, "Concerns with bond or parenting and child safeguarding concerns." So the difference in the version of the letter submitted as evidence by the father and that of the mother that the father's version of the same letter does not include one sentence at the end of a paragraph which says that mother's mental health was subjectively and objectively stable and also omits the word "no" before the words "concerns with bond or parenting" and omits the word "no" before the words "child safeguarding concerns."

46. The mother's case is that the letter that she has submitted and the one provided directly from the NHS Trust under a subject access request is the accurate one and the father's one has been doctored, edited in order to make it appear that the mother has mental health difficulties which are ongoing and active which means she poses a risk to her child.

47. The father's case is that the letter he has submitted is the letter which he simply took from his computer or his phone having previously scanned it in and simply sent it via email, so he claims to be at a complete loss as to how those extremely important and highly relevant bits of evidence are not to be found in the version he submitted.

48. I have listened very carefully to the evidence I have heard from the witness box about it. The difference between the letters of course is clear as Ms Logan pointed out during the course of her forensic cross-examination there is an extra bit of spacing where the line contained at the end of that first paragraph on the second page, "At the time of discharge mental health is both subjectively and objectively stable" would be, and it is clear to me considering that alongside Ms Logan's other astute observation that under "Perinatal specific" where the word "no" has been removed the lower case c at the start of "concerns" remains whereas at the start of every other sentence after the semi-colon, it begins with a capital letter. It is obvious to me that the letter has been edited, that sentence has been removed and the word "no" has been removed twice under "Perinatal specific concerns about risk". That in and of itself of course does not mean that it was the father who did it or that it was the father who did it for a reason that is not innocent. I have to consider the evidence as a whole.

49. Father's case is that:

"The letter that I submitted as part of my evidence to both this Court and within the second Hague Convention Country proceedings is simply a scanned version of a letter that I obtained in an attempt to assist the mother in her therapy with a therapist in second Hague Convention Country which was taking place by Zoom who wanted to know the full picture. I scanned in the image and simply sent it on. I used an App on my phone, and I didn't in any way edit it."

50. I note that the father did describe to me how you can edit documents in that App and described how you can crop documents etc. He said he did not do that and has no idea how the letter that he relies on omits any part at all, let alone two parts which are so crucial to the case that he advances. I found the father's evidence in respect of that to be wholly incoherent frankly and whilst he alleges that it was nothing to do with him, he provides no possible explanation as to what may have happened to this letter. It is obviously a doctored letter. It is obviously not the original as was sent. Anyone in any context in the future looking at those letters will I am sure conclude that they have been frankly rather clumsily, unprofessionally and lazily edited so that anyone looking at those two letters would be well aware that there had been editing of an amateur nature which had taken place.

51. I have to consider whether there is anyone else who could have done it, whether it could have somehow happened by accident in the transfer of electronic documents and it is clear to me that it simply could not have. There is no way bearing in mind how specifically important that sentence and those two words are to the case advanced by the father it could have been done by accident nor indeed in my judgment by anyone else. The father has chosen throughout these proceedings and those before the Court in second Hague Convention Country to place great emphasis on what he says are ongoing concerns regarding the mother's mental health difficulties, the way in which he has throughout his oral evidence gratuitously and grievously attempted to make as much reference to mental health difficulties as he could, clearly indicates to me that he is still determined to make as much of this point as he possibly can.

52. The reason that this document which has been edited is edited in the father's version but is not edited in the mother's version nor that provided by the NHS Trust themselves, is that the father has deliberately edited this document in a deliberate attempt to mislead this Court and indeed it appears the second Hague Convention Country Court and authorities. Of course, the fact that the father has in my judgment on the evidence before me overwhelmingly deliberately manipulated evidence and placed it before the Court is not necessarily determinative of my view of his credibility, but it is obviously extremely important. There might be a situation in which someone might edit a document for purposes which do not denote guilt. One can easily see that. The removal of frankly the most important part of the letter which supports the mother's case but undermines the father's in these circumstances mean the only conclusion I can reach is that this was done by the father to mislead the Court in an attempt to pervert the course of justice and present entirely false evidence about the mother in order to try to manipulate the justice process so that the outcome in respect of decisions made about his son was wholly skewed.

53. I move on to consider what is headed "The Separation and Cohabitation Agreement" which I have within the bundle. This document, as anyone reading it in due course will see, is frankly shocking. I am not going to read it in its entirety, but it is headed "Cohabitation and Separation Agreement.". It says, "This cohabitation and separation agreement is dated on the " and then the date is not inserted, which is why I asked F in evidence whether this came from a proforma but it says, "of September 2021 prior verbal consent from both parties between" and then the details of both parents. Then in capitals, underlined and italics for extra effect, "The purpose of this agreement is to safeguard C to create and maintain a non-traumatising environment where the child can live and also to avoid misunderstandings between the parties, to set rules for a peaceful and friendly cohabitation." Then going onto the background and then says in terms of the agreement:

"Both parties agree

(1) C will reside with both parents.

(2) C will spend time with both parents on the day-to-day agreement due to different working patterns of the parties.

(4) M will spend more time with C due to F working on shift patterns. However, he will spend time with C when at home.

(5) F will try his best to work as much hours as possible to cover the living costs and to contribute more than M, however any overtime available will be only at F's employer's discretion.

(7) M will be more focussed on C's education and development due to her flexible job."

54. Some parts of it are highlighted in red which I am unclear as to why that is. Tellingly, there are a number of entries which are directly relevant to the situation in which both the mother and father and indeed C found themselves at the time:

"(12) The party that wished to spend time out without C is entitled to do it without the fear of getting judged. However, this must pay costs towards childcare/childminding in total if the other party is away for any reason. Car expenses need also to be paid in total by the party using the vehicle for own activities.

(14) Any money earned by the parties must be primarily used towards the costs of rent, bills, living expenses, food, C's needs and everything related to C.

(16) Each party agrees to do not have any legal obligation to each other from now on. Also any intimate relationship will not consider it as adultery however in case one party has had a secret relationship and/or a hidden initial talking stage with a new partner or a person who will then have an intimate relationship with one of the parties before the date of the stipulation of this contract, the other party is entitled to take legal action and to request to be reimbursed of any costs occurred in doing so."

55. I pause at that point because shortly before the father drafted this document, as he clearly did, he became aware that the mother was in his words at the "hidden initial talking stage with a new partner" because he had in going through the mother's emails uncovered that she had been speaking to a man, as she was fully entitled to to be perfectly clear, because she and the father had broken up, and had arranged to meet him and so certain aspects of this "agreement" are clearly directly applicable to how the father was feeling at the time about the actions of the mother.

56. The document goes on:

"Both parties agree that it is not allowed to

(1) Introduce C to any new partner or a person involved in sexual activity with one of the parties, bring C out with a new partner or a person involved in sexual activity with one of the parties to spend time with, bring C on holiday with a new partner or a person involved in sexual activity with one of the parties."

57. The father's obsession frankly with who the mother is involved in sexual activity with shines through in this document. Under the same heading, "Both parties agree that it is not allowed to:

"(2) Bring a new partner or person involved in sexual activity with one of the parties at home address.

(3) Have sex, a sexual relationship or even occasional encounters at home address.

(4) Also when C and the other party is away for any reason (nursery, school, work, holiday, training courses, ongoing disputes etc both parties agree they are not allowed to (6) have sex, a sexual relationship or even occasional encounters in the car shared by the parties, not allowed to take calls or video calls from a new partner or a person involved in a sexual activity with one of the parties whilst at home in the presence of the other one or C, not to invite friends, colleagues, family members or other relatives to the home without prior consent received from the other party.

Must not travel outside the UK with C without prior written consent received from the other party and this consent must indicate the reason, destination, details of other passengers, travel evidence such as train, ferry, flight tickets and car itinerary.

Both parties agree that it is strictly forbidden to behave in such a way to manipulate C with intent to influence his personal feelings about the parties' family members, relatives or friends and must not use C to humiliate, threat, undermine, control manipulate the other party in case of dispute or any other reason."

58. The document goes on:

"This document has been edited, corrected and reviewed by F on the date stated above and M agrees that this document has been read, reviewed and discussed with F before signing it."

59. The evidence I heard around that came primarily from the father of course, the mother not having for obvious reasons signed that document. The father's case is that he did draft that document in his words, but he says some of it he now cannot remember doing and in his evidence was very cagey about specific parts, namely those which paint him in a particularly poor light. Obviously having found that he has gone to the lengths of manipulating evidence in an attempt to pervert the course of justice and divert me away from the truth, I have a very dim view of his credibility, but it was not at that stage near mortally wounded.

60. However, having considered his evidence in respect of this agreement, I found him to be thoroughly dishonest and disingenuous about it. The evidence could not be clearer that he drafted this document. It is in the language that he uses. It is focused on the mother's speaking to the man who he recently discovered she was by snooping through her emails. It is on any view overwhelmingly the case that he drafted this document in an attempt in my judgment to try and control the mother and her behaviours, but also more importantly for the purposes of my judgment with the intention specifically of setting out a clear path for him to take C to second Hague Convention Country without objection from the mother. I remind myself that the document specifically states the sort of information that a party must provide to the other before they can take C outside the UK. Travel outside the UK with C without prior written consent received by the other party, the consent must indicate the reason, destination, details of other passengers, travel evidence such as train, ferry, flight tickets or car itinerary. Of course, the father went on to provide the mother with that evidence, thereby complying with his own agreement which he would have tried to enforce on the mother.

61. I have no doubt that this was just another part of the evidence before me which easily satisfies me that the father had set about creating an entirely false evidence base for his own benefit entirely in order to retrospectively try to claim falsely that he was justified in some way in retaining C out of the jurisdiction. He gave as Ms Troy pointed out during her submissions in closing at least four different answers to straightforward questions to whether he drafted this document, why he drafted it, whether he drafted certain bits of it, feigning in my judgment at points that he could not remember whether he drafted frankly the most obvious bits that he has drafted, because he realised that having accepted he has drafted that document there was no way out for him having realised how significantly detrimental to his case it was other than to feign a lack of memory as to whether he had drafted particular sentences or clauses, even at points attempting to suggest that the mother herself may have edited this document for her own benefit, which for the avoidance of doubt I reject entirely.

62. As I have stated, the father's credibility was already severely damaged by his actions in respect of the NHS letter. It was frankly almost mortally wounded by his wholly unbelievable oral evidence from the witness box on all other points. That puts into context of course the very significant evidence I heard regarding the father's discovering of the emails between the mother and another individual whom she had apparently arranged to meet up with. That went against the agreement of course that the father himself was so keen to impose and was clearly something which had annoyed him greatly.

63. I turn now to the caution that the mother has from the police following an incident on 29 September 2021. I remind myself that under the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 the father is therefore a victim of domestic abuse as the mother has received a caution accepting guilt, whether she was aware of that or not. Therefore, I must bear in mind that the father on the face of it is a victim of domestic abuse. That is not relevant for reasons I have already given to the fact-finding hearing before me because on the father's own account he is very clear, and could not be clearer, that even from 19 November 2021 he was determined to return to this jurisdiction with C so clearly the caution she received had not changed his mind in any way in that regard. He says, "I went to second Hague Convention Country with the intention of coming back and even as late as 19 November I was certain I was coming back." It cannot be said by him to be of any particular relevance but nonetheless he is on the face of it a victim.

64. I have considered very carefully the circumstances which are clear to me from the police disclosure I have, the account given to me by the mother and of course the context of my analysis of the evidence as a whole. I am clear that whether the mother was aware of the basis of accepting that caution or not, that her evidence was accurate. She did so on the basis that she did push the father, but her evidence to me was clear the basis for her doing so was an abusive and volatile situation in which there had been a discussion about alleged infidelity. It seems to me in the context of that police caution that whilst of course it was entirely a matter for the mother and indeed the police were there to be any application of this kind, that it may be a situation in which an application to review the appropriateness of that police caution would be a course open to the mother. I put it no higher than that but I give permission for any such application to include a transcript of this judgment setting out as it will that it certainly appears to me having had the benefit of hearing a huge amount of evidence that the mother has been the victim of not only a deliberate abduction of her child to second Hague Convention Country, but also in the build up to it a concerted plan by the father to fabricate as much evidence as he can including doctoring evidence from the NHS in order to support his entirely false narrative and so as a result it may be the case that the mother through her solicitors ask the police to review whether the caution is appropriate and whether it should stay on her record. I make no comment as to what action the police may take but I encourage them to read this judgment as a whole, my view of the mother, her utmost honesty and credibility and I view of the father as one of the most dishonest and manipulative witnesses from whom I have had the benefit of hearing.

65. I consider of course the father's email to the mother's solicitors more recently in which he enquired of them directly whether they were advising their client, the mother, to comply (in his words) with the second Hague Convention Country Court order seeking to obtain further information in respect of C's whereabouts and information about C which would of course not be in line with the orders I have previously made withholding such information from him. There is no order of the second Hague Convention Country Court which the mother could be advised to comply with. The father accepted that in his evidence and gave frankly a non-sensical explanation as to why he had suggested there was. This was just yet another attempt to manipulate and deceive, another egregious example of his intention and manipulative and deceptive behaviour.

66. I have considered, as the father has brought it up so often, whether there is any relevance to the previous proceedings in second Hague Convention Country regarding the mother's older child and I am easily satisfied that in fact it is as Ms Logan suggested it may be in her closing submissions a red herring. It is irrelevant to me and having considered the documentation it is only relevant to this extent. What happened with mother's older child is that, in the words of the second Hague Convention Country Court, two very young parents did not feel able at that point in time to better meet her needs and so they agreed that she should live with her paternal grandmother and she did so, had contact with both parents and gradually had more and more contact with her mother which resulted in it being unsupervised and even the child coming to this country to see her mother. That is what happened.

67. The only relevance of that is that the father has tried to manipulate it and has tried to portray, as he has said on multiple times in his written evidence, that the mother's parental rights were revoked in respect of her elder child. He has asserted that in these proceedings and those before the second Hague Convention Country Court. Put simply, that did not happen. It is yet another example of the father attempting to achieve in my judgment two things. Firstly, to create an entirely false impression as to the mother and any risk she might pose to C and secondly it is his attempt to cause upset and distress to the mother in an abusive manner in any way that he can. Both of those are wholly irrelevant to the decisions I have to make for C, save that they are highly relevant in the view that I take of the father and how manipulative and deceptive he is.

68. I now look at the without notice non-molestation order that was granted by a Deputy District Judge in this jurisdiction. It is clearly not a well drafted order. As Roberts J rightly observed (having considered the transcript of the hearing before a learned High Court Judge) this was an order made on the basis of no findings, no evidence being heard on an ex-parte basis and in fact it is clear to me having considered the order carefully that there was not even a hearing which took place at which it was granted. It was during the time of Covid when those cases were dealt with largely on the papers. It was made on the basis therefore of the father's own assertions and evidence in writing before the Court which in my judgment was wholly inaccurate and wholly one sided. It also missed out the key point, deliberately in my judgment, that he was going to second Hague Convention Country the very next day. The father has attempted to utilise that without notice, no findings, no hearing, non-molestation order in both these proceedings and before the High Court and indeed to some extent before me. Roberts J clearly and rightly dismissed the alleged significance of this ex-parte no findings, no hearing order.

69. Indeed, having heard the evidence I have and having considered the matter within the context of this fact-finding hearing, I must go further than those very clear and accurate descriptions of the order by the learned High Court Judge and I can properly and do find it likely that the order would not ever have been made by the Deputy District Judge, certainly not on an ex-parte basis, had the Deputy District Judge been provided with the full evidential picture by the father. The reason the Deputy District Judge was not, is the father chose, in my judgment to omit from his evidence the fact that he was going to second Hague Convention Country at any point, let alone as in fact I find it to be his plan to stay there. I am clear that the application for that non-molestation order and the use to which he has tried to put it since, is no more than a part of an attempt by him to add yet another piece of "evidence" to support his premeditated plan to take C to second Hague Convention Country and keep him there. This was simply another aspect of the father's deliberate, concerted effort to create through a caution being received by the mother, through a non-molestation order being granted, to the drafting of that agreement a completely false evidential base to ultimately justify what he knew he was going to do when he took C to second Hague Convention Country which was to keep him there.

70. The father's case overall in respect of his retention of C in second Hague Convention Country made frankly no sense. As I have already indicated the evidence from the police shows clearly that on two occasions he told them that the tenancy was soon to be coming to an end, even specifically telling them it was ending on 6 December. It is clear that he is now lying about not knowing when his tenancy came to an end and that it was in any part of his reason for keeping C in second Hague Convention Country. In reality, the father's whole case as to why he remained in second Hague Convention Country despite the numerous witness statements and numerous opportunities in the witness box to clarify it, remains wholly unclear. On the one hand he says:

"When I went to second Hague Convention Country having applied for the non-molestation order, having made my reports to the police, mother having received her caution, having known everything I know about the mother's mental health, I intended to return. I was there purely for my father's funeral and so that C could see some of his second Hague Convention Country family."

71. He was clear in his evidence that he was definitely still intending to return four days later on 19 November 2021 and that it was only on the last day or so of his proposed trip due to end on 26 November, that he decided not to return to the jurisdiction. He says or has said at points that is because he knew the non-molestation order was now in place and he was worried about coming back home for C's sake because it would be returning to the property that the mother would be at. Of course that in and of itself makes no sense because he made no mention of going to second Hague Convention Country when he made the application for a non-molestation order and had that actually been his concern he would have as Ms Troy in my judgment rightly submits in closing would have simply said, "I am going to second Hague Convention Country, I need the non-molestation order to regulate things when I come back." In fact, he doctored the non-molestation order that he wanted not because he intended to return and he thought he needed it to keep him and C safe, but because he always from the moment he made the application intended to remain in second Hague Convention Country with C and knew that he would seek to use that non-molestation order as retrospectively justification for doing so.

72. The father's clear intentions are made somehow even clearer by the fact that when in second Hague Convention Country with C he applied to revoke the mother's parental responsibility. It undermines entirely his evidence that he intended to return, he really wanted to return and I find that his evidence from the witness box when he described actively looking for flights to return but could not get one because of Covid to just be a lie made up on the spot because in the very next breath he described how he did not want to return and could not return because it would expose C to a risk of harm.

73. The application the father made in second Hague Convention Country to revoke the mother's parental responsibility and for C to live with him in second Hague Convention Country shows his true intention. In fairness to him, it is the intention really that he has now within these proceedings. He actually now goes even further. Not only does he want C to live in second Hague Convention Country, but he wants the mother to uproot her life and for her to live in second Hague Convention Country as well, because he would like to control where she lives as well as his son. That is truly what he wants to happen and what frankly in my judgment he has always wanted to happen. From the moment he began his campaign in my judgment of deliberately manipulating and creating evidence to support his entirely false narrative of the mother and what is best for C, and from whatever moment it was which only he surely knows he decided he was taking C to second Hague Convention Country and not returning him. He set about to do whatever he could to damage C's relationship with his mother and to ensure that he kept him in second Hague Convention Country in a way that would mean he would not see his mother.

74. A good example of the father's continuing attitude towards the mother in my judgment was his behaviour in taking C around 600 miles away during the month that the mother was in second Hague Convention Country, in order to ensure that the mother could not see C. The father knew precisely when the mother was going to be in second Hague Convention Country. It is set out within the schedule of appointments within the report from the second Hague Convention Country psychiatrist who prepared the report for the benefit of the second Hague Convention Country Court in second Hague Convention Country. Yet the father claims he was not aware and that it is just pure chance that on the very month that the mother was in second Hague Convention Country therefore having an opportunity to actually see her son that had been taken so cruelly from her, he was 600 miles away on his own account working from home remotely. On any view he could have worked from home where he was and the reason he took the child away as he did was because he was determined then as he always had been and as he is now in my judgment to do everything he could to damage the chances of C's relationship with his mother developing as it should do. His explanation as to why he needed to during that specific period of time take C 600 miles away so he could sit at a computer and work from home anyway was once again non-sensical and was no more than a continuation of the thoroughly dishonest and deceitful way in which he gave his evidence.

75. I considered of course that the mother's case will always be, in circumstances such as this, limited. Her case is that she agreed for C to go to second Hague Convention Country from 15 November to 26 November. She agreed because she was assured he would come back. There is in fact no dispute that the mother is telling the truth about that because the father's case is that he did tell the mother that because that is what he intended and so there is actually no aspect of the mother's case of relevance which is in dispute. The dispute is why the father did not return C. The father's case as I have indicated is that he was still definitely intending to come back to this country, even as late as 19 or 20 November when he was intending to come back on 26 November and that it was the receipt of the non-molestation order which of course he had already applied for before he left the country which changed his mind about coming back. That makes no sense because of course as Ms Troy points out on behalf of C, if the non-molestation order was so important then receiving it would actually fortify the father in his ability to return because it would provide him with the precise protection he had asked the Court to give him before he went to second Hague Convention Country in the first place.

76. It is important to give my particular thanks to the approach taken by Ms McGuinness, the Guardian, for playing an active role in this fact-finding hearing, remaining throughout and having considered all of the evidence. There are of course competing views as to the roles of Guardians at fact-finding hearings but my view is, and frankly always has been, that in cases where there is a clear and in this case in my judgment overwhelming set of evidence which makes clear where the truth lies, it is right and in fact essential for a Guardian representing the best interests of a child to ensure that the Court is assisted in every way they can be to approach that evidence properly and give appropriate weight to the relevant parts of it. I am really grateful for the approach taken by the Guardian in this case which is entirely proper.

77. In conclusion, the evidence before me is utterly overwhelming. The father took C to second Hague Convention Country with a plan to keep him there which he then acted out. He had prior to going set about deliberately manipulating evidence, creating a situation which he knew he could then use before the second Hague Convention Country Court and indeed the Court in this jurisdiction to try and justify his action. I make clear as I have indicated there is no conflict of jurisdictions in this case. C was born here, habitually resident here and was only in second Hague Convention Country because he was abducted there by his father. He was then rightly returned pursuant to orders from the High Court in this jurisdiction and had it not been for the father's wholly unjustifiable and un-child focussed behaviour, C would have remained in this jurisdiction where he is habitually resident and where he should be.

78. I find that the father deliberately failed to comply with the three High Court return orders simply because he did not want to bring C back. He did not intend to bring him back when he got on the flight to second Hague Convention Country and he never intended to until the Court in second Hague Convention Country with all credit to that Court, finally directed that he must do so. The impact of that sort of behaviour on C is clear to anyone with a shred of insight into what that is likely to have caused this young child. He was just two years of age and having been used to being with his mother every day he was taken from her then only to see her in supervised settings very infrequently until over two years later. I found striking the mother's evidence as to the impact on her on having C returned after such a long time. Her description of having taken C to bed that first night and still holding him like he was two years old was extremely moving and was in my judgment yet again evidence which supports entirely how attuned and aware the mother is of the significant emotional impact this has had on C, and which may in due course show itself even further.

79. I compare that to the evidence of the father who despite being given numerous opportunities particularly under cross-examination on behalf of C through Ms Troy to really think about the impact of his own behaviours in taking C to second Hague Convention Country as he did and keeping him there was unable to say really anything more than yes, it had an impact on him but the impact would be even worse if he now did not see me. The father throughout his evidence in a striking way in my judgment was unable to think about C above himself. In fact, he was unable to think about anyone above himself, repeatedly during his evidence answering questions from his own perspective when as I had to remind him at points it was not about him but about C. I also find it telling at numerous points the father did not refer to C by his first name albeit he did at points and when a question was asked about the impact on C, he referred to the impact on "the child."

80. It is abundantly clear to me that the father is not someone who is able to think about what is best for his son in any way, was not when he chose to take him to second Hague Convention Country, was not when he decided to keep him there despite orders of the High Court and still is not. There is likely in my judgment a huge emotional impact and real emotional harm likely to be caused both immediately and long term to C by the father's actions as a result of the damage to his bond with his mother and the false narrative which on any view must have been given to him about his mother whilst he was in the care of his father. The father cannot even now hide how much he wants to try to hurt the mother by referencing her mental health difficulties and the proceedings in respect of her previous child. I am in no doubt at all that was precisely what happened when C was in his care. Thankfully it appears from the helpful evidence I have from the mother and from the Guardian that C is doing very well, no doubt I am sure as a result of the really hard work that the mother is putting in to make sure that everything that can be done to minimise the impact of this traumatic experience on him can be done.

81. As a result the finding that I make have been set out during the course of this judgment and of course I now hear submissions in respect of any contact, the starting point of that is that it appears to me, subject to any submissions, that it would be wholly unsafe subject to any submissions I hear at this point in time for there to be any direct contact at all. The risks from the father of another attempt to abduct, the risks of manipulation of professionals and evidence is stark. The father has shown he is more than willing to doctor evidence and manipulate professionals and individuals and lie for his own benefit to achieve his own end with no regard for what is best for C. It appears to me at this point as an interim measure pending any further evidence and any further final decisions, that direct contact even professionally supervised exposes C to such a significant risk of significant emotional harm to a further attempt by the father to either manipulate C or to take him somewhere he should not, and it is difficult to see how there is any way to make that safe.

82. I will of course hear submissions before making a decision in respect of that but it seems to me that subject to any submissions indirect contact is potentially still appropriate and safe but having heard the evidence I have, it appears to me likely that it is inappropriate, having considered Practice Direction 12J, and likely to have such a detrimental impact on the mother's emotional wellbeing in light of how manipulative and dishonest the father is but her supervising is likely to be causing her harm and as a result is likely to be causing C harm or at least there being a risk of C suffering emotional harm because the mother understandably in light of what has happened and the father's manipulative behaviour, is likely unable to focus entirely on C's needs through no fault of her own and so as a starting point it may well be that indirect contact by video is reduced to make it perhaps once a week for one hour at most when convenient, supervised by a professional who is able to properly ensure that it is done in a safe way. I will hear submissions of course before making any decisions regarding contact.

83. Before I hear those submissions, I also indicate it appears to me there is absolutely no need for anyone other than the mother to hold C's passport or for her to be restricted in respect of any application she seeks to make. She poses no risk to C. I cannot be clearer of that. The father's assertion that because she lived in non-Hague Convention country until she was eight, she might abduct C there is no more than an attempt by him to deflect from his own appalling behaviour as he has throughout these proceedings attempting to weaponize anything he possibly can to upset the mother because of his feelings towards her.

End of Judgment.

	[Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback] [DONATE]
	England and Wales Family Court Decisions (other Judges)
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Family Court Decisions (other Judges) >> A Mother v A Father (Fact-Finding: Abduction) [2025] EWFC 518 (B) (04 June 2025) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWFC/OJ/2025/518.html Cite as: [2025] EWFC 518 (B)

England and Wales Family Court Decisions (other Judges)