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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Family Court Decisions (other Judges) >> B v C & Anor [2026] EWFC 66 (B) (28 January 2026) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWFC/OJ/2026/66.html Cite as: [2026] EWFC 66 (B) |
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IMPORTANT NOTICE This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this |
Neutral
citation
number: [
2026]
EWFC
66
(
B)
Case No: AF22P00020
IN THE FAMILY
COURT
AT WATFORD
Shire Hall, 10 King Street
Watford
WD18 0BW
Date: 28th January
2026
Before
style='letter-spacing: -.15pt'>:
HIS HONOUR JUDGE STOTT
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Applicant |
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(1)
(2) THE (Through her |
Respondents |
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Digital Transcription
by
Marten Walsh
Cherer
Ltd.,
2nd Floor, Quality House, 6-9 Quality
Court,
Chancery
Lane, London WC2A 1HP.
Telephone No: 020 7067 2900. DX 410 LDE
Email: info@martenwalshcherer.com
Web: www.martenwalshcherer.com
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
THE APPLICANT appeared In Person
THE FIRST RESPONDENT did not attend and was not represented
MS SARA SANDERSON (of Hepburn Delaney Limited) for the Guardian
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Judgment Approved
HIS HONOUR JUDGE STOTT :
1. This is my extempore judgment in respect of an application to enforce a
child
arrangements order. The applicant father is [redacted] and he appeared as a litigant in person. I pause there to give a note to any transcribers that
Child
in this judgment should
be
referred to as "E", the mother referred to as "
C"
and the father referred to as "
B".
2. The respondent mother is
C,
formerly [Redacted]. She did not attend the hearing and I am satisfied that she was aware of the hearing. The
court
received an email from her sent to the solicitor for the
child
at 8.04am on 28 January this year. E is a party to proceedings. She is represented
by
Ms Sanderson, solicitor. The rule 16.4 guardian who has
been
appointed
by
CAFCASS.
The mother, it appears, has never attended
court
and she has not engaged in these proceedings. Her failure to properly engage is inexcusable.
BACKGROUND
AND
CHRONOLOGY
3. It is with regret that I need to set out the procedural
background
in some length to give
context
to this judgment. The parents
commenced
a relationship in 2008. E was
born
on 23 November 2010. The relationship
between
the parents ended at the end of 2011 or the start of 2012. A final
child
arrangements order was made
by
consent
on 1 December 2012. The order provided for the father to see E on Tuesday afternoons and alternate Saturdays.
4. The family were known to Hertfordshire in 2020 and 2021 with
concerns
predominantly relating to the mother's new husband, referred to as "D". In November 2021
contact
between
E and her father
ceased.
The relationship with D appears to have
been
domestically abusive. Mother and D have two
children
together. For the avoidance of any doubt, this is not
B
and nor has he
been
involved in
concerns
by
the local authority as to any domestic abuse.
5. On 4 March 2022 the father applied for an order to enforce the
child
arrangements order from 2012. A safeguarding letter was produced on 15 July 2022 and whilst not wanting to go too far
back
into the history, that safeguarding letter sets out that the father applied for a
child
arrangements order when E was 18 months of age and that he had played a significant role in her life prior to separation with the mother. No safeguarding
concerns
were identified and I note there is some reference to the paternal grandfather sending abusive letters to the mother's solicitors and also to the parents arguing.
6. At that hearing
various
directions were made, including for a statement from the mother and an update from E's school. On 10 February 2023
CAFCASS
provided an updating safeguarding letter and a FHDRA was listed on 16 February 2023. The order of 16 February 2023 provided for a section 7 report and suspended the order made on 1 December 2012. On 28 June 2023 the
court
directed an ICFA (improving
child
and family arrangements) service. The mother attended the hearing and agreed to the ICFA along with indirect
contact.
7. Proceedings were transferred to
Cambridge
at the request of the mother. On 22 November 2023 a hearing was listed at the Family
Court
sitting at
Cambridge.
The mother did not attend. The order records the mother refused to travel for the ICFA. It appeared that indirect
contact
had
commenced.
The
case
was reallocated to district judge level. A penal notice was attached for the mother to attend the next hearing along with a direction for personal service.
8. On 19 March 2024 a further hearing took place. The mother attended
via
video
link. It is recorded that the mother stated that E refused to attend the first ICFA session. A further ICFA was directed and a penal notice attached to secure the mother's attendance at the DRA listed on 22 October 2024 along with a direction for an addendum section 7 report. Again, the mother and E did not engage in the ICFA.
9. On 22 October 2024 a further hearing took place. The mother did not attend. The
court
fined her £250 for
breach
of the penal notice attached for her to attend the hearing. A further penal notice was attached to secure her attendance at the next hearing. It does not appear that there was a direction for personal or substituted service of that order on the mother.
10. A further hearing took place on 7 January 2025 and again the mother failed to attend. On 7 March 2025 a hearing took place in
Cambridge
again. The mother did not attend. A warrant for arrest was made for the mother to
be
brought
to
court
to account for her failure to attend the hearing and to
consider
possible
contempt
of
court.
An adjourned hearing was listed on 30 April 2025 with the mother to attend in person, again with a penal notice attached. My reading of that order, I
can
see no reference to personal service or otherwise of the penal notice. On 30 April 2025 the mother failed again to attend the hearing
but
had
been
in
contact
with the
court
indicating she had not received the notice of hearing. E was made a party to proceedings and a rule 16.4 guardian appointed to act on her
behalf.
11. There was a hearing on 16 June 2025. The mother did not attend. A direction was made for her to provide recent school reports, a
copy
of the EHCP, if it existed, and any medical reports. A statement was sent
by
the mother to the solicitor for the
child
as well as a
video
statement. A direction was made for E to
be
taken to
CAFCASS
offices to meet with the guardian. Personal service was directed and yet a further hearing directed to take place on 15 July 2025. A warrant of arrest was attached to secure the mother's attendance. I noted that the mother's position was set out in that order. Her position was E wished to have no
contact
with her father
but
recorded that
contact
did take place
between
the two of them from 2012 until 2021.
12. On 15 July 2025 the mother failed to attend the hearing
before
HHJ
Choudhry.
A DWP order was made. The matter was transferred to the Family
Court
sitting at Watford as it was
believed
that E now resided in Hertfordshire. The order also sets out that a section 16A risk assessment was undertaken
by
CAFCASS.
A section 37 report was directed to
be
undertaken
by
Hertfordshire
County
Council.
Personal service was directed on the mother and permission given for her to attend remotely at the next hearing.
13. On 16 September 2025 the
case
came
before
HHJ Richard
Clarke.
The mother did not attend. An addendum section 37 report was directed and a further hearing listed on 19 November 2025. On 19 November 2025 the matter returned
before
HHJ
Clarke.
The mother did not attend the hearing despite having notice. Directions were made for the filing of statements and the matter listed for a final hearing with a time estimate of one day. In addition, the
court
refused a further section 37 report or a
change
of primary residence. The
court
recorded that the mother had repeatedly failed to attend or to participate in proceedings. Due to social work and guardian availability, this matter has
been
listed
before
me today, 28 January
2026.
On my maths, there have
been
at least 13 hearings on the enforcement application, twice
before
lay justices and
before
eight different judges.
14. I turn to the evidence. I have read the father's statements. They are
balanced.
They set out his reasons for wanting to have a relationship with his daughter and the efforts to try and secure the same. He is
clearly
saddened at the mother's total lack of engagement in proceedings and the undue influence
by
the mother with impunity has
caused
him great sadness and frustration. I sympathise with his position. I have seen five short statements from the mother and purportedly from E. I have read these in light of the matters
contained
in the section 7 and section 37 reports.
15. Put simply, the mother does not accept she has exaggerated or fabricated events as reported
by
CAFCASS.
She does not accept she has encouraged E to have a negative
view
of her father or failed to promote him positively to E. Her latest statements, which do not
contain
a statement of truth
but
are said to
be
written
by
both
the mother and E,
contain
abusive, threatening and
condescending
tones, threats to make reports to the police and others, including getting her ex-husband, D, to take matters into his own hands.
16. The tone of the statements sets out a
clear
position that E does not want to see her father and suffers from poor mental health. As I have said, they are also abusive towards
CAFCASS,
the father and the local authority. She has made threats to go to the press. They are accusatory in nature and do not in any way show any understanding of the importance of proceedings and the likely damage
caused
to E
by
the mother's own entrenched
views
and lack of engagement.
17. Her final statement makes allegations that the paternal grandfather is a paedophile, that the paternal family are unstable and
verbally
and emotionally abusive. The mother suggests that the decision to stop
contact
was down to E
but
I note the long period of
contact
between
2012 and 2021 that took place
before
contact
stopped. The mother's final statement
concludes
with the following:
"This family should never
be
allowed access to
children
and this should of never got this far in the
court
system given that E
voiced
her wants, wishes and needs repeatedly from the
very
start. She's done a
video
statement. She's wrote statements. She spoke to my previous solicitor. She spoke to a
children's
services worker. She wrote letters to
both
family members. She spoke to
CAFCASS,
though they lied to her and twisted her words. She has done everything she possibly
can
to get her message across and you have still ignored her. E DOES NOT want
contact
visits,
pictures, phone
calls,
smoke signals,
carrier
pigeon or any other form of
communication/visitation.
If these happen they will
be
reported to the police
continuously
and I will then file for a non-molestation order."
As I say, I have read a transcript of a
video
allegedly made
by
E when she was 14.
18. I turn to the evidence of social services and
CAFCASS.
The section 7 report dated 6 June 2023 records that the mother made allegations of domestic abuse, notwithstanding the lack of
contact
between
her and the father and the time spent
between
E and her father for nearly ten years. The mother
believes
that E is autistic
but
there is no diagnosis of this. In the report, E explains that the family are in a refuge away from D who allegedly is the perpetrator of domestic abuse. The
CAFCASS
officer records that there has not
been
any
contact
between
E and her father since November 2021 and that the father refuted any allegations of domestic abuse.
19. There was
concern
highlighted that the mother was placing a responsibility on E far
beyond
her age and that the mother had over shared information. It was noted that the language used was similar
between
E and her mother. The
CAFCASS
officer did not
believe
there was sufficient reason or justification for E to
be
rejecting her father and little thought had
been
given
by
the mother to
consider
E's need to have a relationship with him. The report
concluded
with the recommendation of an ICFA as well as indirect
contact
by
way of letters.
20. Hertfordshire
County
Council
have undertaken two section 37 reports. The first is dated 2 September 2025 and the second dated 23 October 2025. The first section 37 report records that the social worker spoke with the mother who told her that she would not
be
permitting the social worker to speak to E and was suggesting that the author had fabricated information in the proceedings. That section 37 report sets out the
background
of the father's relationships and some of the successful
contact
and activities that they engaged in together. The report fully
considers
the welfare
checklist
and the range of orders open to the
court
and
concludes
that E should spend time with her father and have indirect
contact.
21. It
became
apparent that E had
been
withdrawn from her school in February 2025 and home-schooled. The addendum section 37 report
considered
information from E's former school and therapeutic sessions which she engaged in. The report records that E was registered as a young
carer.
The elective home education team
confirmed
that they had not seen E during their
visits
and have no rights of access without
consent.
This in turn means there is little independent information as to E's welfare and wellbeing or the education that she is
currently
actually receiving. The report again reflects the
concerns
that E is
being
socially isolated which in turn is
causing
harm
by
way of lack of meaningful relationships with her family, friends and therefore peer
validation.
Additional
concerns
for E are that she is
being
"alienated" from her father.
22. The outcome of the report was to arrange a strategy discussion to
consider
whether the threshold is met for the provision of protective services. That took place
but
the report
concluded
that threshold was not found to instigate public law proceedings. I also note that E's half siblings were withdrawn from school in October 2025 and are
both
being
home-schooled as well. As I have said, E is registered as a young
carer.
23. The strategy meeting was
convened
on 7 November 2025 and the initial
child
protection
conference
(ICPC) took place on 12 November 2025. The threshold for a
child
protection plan was not found to have
been
met and it was thought then that little would
be
gained
by
a
child
in need plan as that required the
voluntary
agreement to work with social services from the mother and therefore the
case
was
closed
with no further action.
24. On 11 November 2025 the police were asked to undertake a welfare
check
by
the local authority. They did so. There were no
concerns
documented as to the home
conditions
or E's presentation,
but
I remind myself that a police welfare
check
is likely to
be
very
different in nature to a welfare
check
undertaken
by
a social worker or, indeed, a joint welfare
check
with the police and social services.
25. The rule 16.4 guardian filed his report on 14 November 2025. Due to E's age and the total lack of engagement
by
the mother and E in the process, the report recommends that proceedings
conclude
without any orders. Other options such as a transfer of primary
care
would not
be
in E's
best
interests, and I will
come
on to this a little
bit
more,
because
in his report the guardian highlights his
concerns
about E's emotional wellbeing in the
care
of her mother, the quality of education she may
be
receiving and that her immediate welfare is
being
harmed
by
not having any form of
communication
or relationship with her father. The guardian has
balanced
this against taking steps to re-establish E spending time with her father and determines that E's welfare would
be
greatly or more harmed
by
taking steps to try to re-establish that relationship.
26. The guardian reminds me that these proceedings have now
been
going on for nearly 200 weeks. He has made many attempts to
contact
the mother without response. He has
been
unable to meet with E notwithstanding his role as her rule 16.4 guardian. None the less, having
considered
the written evidence, the guardian's opinion is that E is a
very
vulnerable
child
who has and
continues
to experience high levels of adversity. He is particularly
concerned
about the mother's non-engagement with professionals and the isolation of E through her home education. He says there is evidence that she is
being
emotionally harmed and requires professional support which is no longer in place.
27. The guardian in his report sets out the Family Justice
Council
2024 definition of alienating
behaviours
which are defined as:
"Psychologically manipulative
behaviours,
intended or otherwise,
by
a parent towards a
child
which have resulted in the
child's
reluctance, resistance, or refusal to spend time with the other parent."
He goes on to explore this further and, in particular, the way in which
children
can
develop distorted
belief
systems that impact on their internal working models of self and others. There is
very
limited information available about E's needs and she is not receiving support from professional services having previously
been
assessed as necessary. The ability of E's mother to
be
able to make decisions that are in E's
best
interests remains questionable. However, this has to
be
seen in the
context
that the local authority does not
consider
the threshold met to
convene
a further
child
protection
conference.
28. The guardian opines that it is extremely unlikely that the mother will work in partnership with the local authority under any framework where her
consent
is required. The guardian
concludes
that, with sadness and regret, there is no workable way for E to re-establish a relationship with her father within these proceedings. No
criticism
is levied at the father at all and the guardian recognises the feelings of frustration and disappointment with proceedings needing to end without any form of relationship
being
re-established
between
E and her father.
29. The guardian also has had regard to the amount of time that E has not seen her father, her reportedly stating that she does not want to see him regardless of any undue influence from the mother, her emotional difficulties and her ability to
vote
with her feet all mean that any
change
of residence would
be
an extreme measure to take and likely to have a
very
significant impact on her welfare without any guarantee of success and he sets out it may go further than this and lead to a significant detrimental impact on E's emotional wellbeing and her relationship with her father.
30. When undertaking this
balance,
including the ingrained strong sense of loyalty E has to her mother and the relationship with her half siblings, the guardian is unable to support a
change
of residence or, indeed, to support the making of an order for E to spend time with her father. His recommendation is therefore proceedings to
conclude
with no order. The guardian totally sympathises with the father's predicament and the impact of that recommendation.
31. The guardian recommends E should have access to therapeutic supports, including life story work, for E to have her father's
contact
details, for the father to
create
a memory
box
for E for the future and for him to
be
updated as much as possible
by
professionals, including those providing updates as to her education and involved with E
because,
of
course,
he
continues
to share parental responsibility for her.
ORAL EVIDENCE
32. I heard short oral evidence from the father, the social worker and the guardian. The social worker
confirmed
that the home education team had not met E
but
that the father is entitled to receive information from them about E's academic progress. She did say that E has
been
seeing her friends from her previous school which his positive.
33. The social worker agreed that there should
be
a re-referral for a further strategy meeting to
consider
whether or not to
convene
an ICPC. E is not accessing support for young
carers
and is not accessing the therapeutic intervention previously deemed necessary due to her emotional
vulnerability.
I remind myself that there were suggestions of autistic traits
but
there has
been,
of
course,
no formal diagnosis for E.
34. The father in his evidence
confirmed
that he has only ever wanted to resume his relationship with E and will do anything to support her in doing so. He also showed me some photographs of himself and E together which were lovely.
35. The guardian was
clear
that the local authority should reconsider
convening
an ICPC and that his
concerns
as to E's emotional and educational wellbeing had not abated from his report.
THE LAW
36. I set out the law
briefly.
Section 1 of the
Children
Act provides when a
court
determines any question with respect to the upbringing of a
child,
the
child's
welfare shall
be
the
court's
paramount
consideration.
Section 1(3) of the
Children
Act 1989 sets out the welfare
checklist.
Section 1(5) provides that the
court
should not make any order with regard to a
child
unless it is satisfied that it is
better
to make an order for the
child
than to make no order at all.
37. I have to
consider
the rights in respect of the family and private life under Article 8 of the European
Convention
on Human Rights and if there is an interference with the right to private and family life, that I should only interfere to the extent that it is necessary and proportionate to do so and if the rights of a
child
conflict
with those of the parents, the rights of the
child
prevail.
38. I deal
briefly
with section 11J in respect of enforcement of orders. Subsection (2) provides that if the
court
is satisfied
beyond
reasonable doubt that a person has failed to
comply
with a provision of the
child
arrangements order, it may make an order (an "enforcement order") imposing on the person an unpaid work requirement. The
court,
subsection (3) provides, the
court
may not make an enforcement order if it is satisfied that the person had a reasonable excuse for failing to
comply
with the provision. (4) the
burden
of proof as to the matter mentioned in subsection (3) lies on the person
claiming
to have had a reasonable excuse, and the standard for that is the
balance
of probabilities.
DECISION
39. This is a
case
where there has
been
total disengagement
by
the mother with the
court
process other than sending emails, as I have referred to earlier, and one actual statement. I have the section 37 reports which set out the threshold for
commencing
public law proceedings is not met. I have a full welfare analysis. I have a welfare
check
undertaken
by
the police which raises no
concerns
and there is an entrenched
view
of a 15 year old who will
be
16 later this year who has
constantly
and
consistently
said, rightly or wrongly, that she does not want to see her father. There is no pathway for her to move on from these
views
however they have
come
about.
40. On the evidence
before
me, the impact of trying to force E to have
contact
in one way is not easily achieved and if I made an order for the same, it would go directly against the ascertainable wishes and feelings of E in light of her age and understanding notwithstanding how she has
come
to this
view.
The guardian has
carefully
analysed the impact and
balance
of harm and the father's suggested strategy perhaps of a
change
of primary
carer
or making an interim
care
order is not in any way likely to succeed, in my judgment,
because
very
sadly there is nothing to
be
gained and likely to only
create
further rejection and anger and hostility towards the father and paternal family and in
coming
to this decision, I have reminded myself of the Article 8 rights I have referred to earlier.
41. So I have to decide what steps, if any, I should take on the father's application to enforce a
child
arrangements order. I have to
consider
what is necessary and proportionate having had regards to E's welfare needs. E has a highly negative mindset towards her father. The evidence of this is overwhelming in the "joint letters" sent to the father and to the
court.
The lack of engagement in the section 37 reporting process and the
court
process is patently obvious
but
a
change
in primary residence for a
child
of this age when I
consider
the other welfare matters identified
by
the guardian is simply not justifiable.
42. So it is with deep frustration that the father's application and the work undertaken
by
the local authority
by
way of their assessments and the appointment and reports of a rule 16.4 guardian, have all
come
to nothing. I am sure the father will think what a waste of time and that the last 46 months has achieved simply nothing. He is no further forward with his relationship with his daughter than when he started this entire process and whilst I sympathise with that position, I have of
course
to make welfare determinations having regard to section 1 and 1(3) of the
Children
Act 1989.
43. I find that the father genuinely wants a relationship with his daughter which he says has
been
totally frustrated
by
the mother and that the
court
process has
been
unable to achieve that for him and, indeed, E.
44. The responsibility of making E available to spend time with her father rests with the mother. She is
clearly
a substantial part of the problem
by
not
complying
with
court
orders or engaging in proceedings or assessments and that is her responsibility to
bear.
However, the options are limited. I have had to
consider
the family dynamics. I have
considered
whether there is a real possibility that any order is practical and workable and whether in the event of non-
compliance
there is a realistic possibility of it
being
successfully enforced,
bearing
in mind the length of these proceedings and E's age.
45.
Very
sadly, what has now
become
clear
to me is that E will not
benefit
from
continuing
attempts for her to make a relationship
between
her and her father. There are limits to the attempts that
can
be
made to re-establish that
contact
and especially with an unwilling
child
of E's age and presentation. The guardian is
clear
that it is
contrary
to her welfare interests to try and re‑establish direct
contact
within these proceedings or for there to
be
a
change
of primary
care.
Having undertaken my own welfare analysis, I accept this opinion. I am satisfied that all avenues have
been
explored appropriately and that
continued
efforts within these proceedings should
be
no longer pursued, save that the local authority should make a fresh referral for
consideration
of a strategy meeting and for
consideration
for an ICPC to
be
convened.
46. I do not know the extent that E has
been
influenced
by
her mother's hostility towards the father
but
I think it highly likely. I do not know the extent of emotional harm that E has suffered as a result of this. I have to
be
realistic in
concluding
whether or not any further attempt to enforce
contact
is
bound
to fail and would
be
harmful to E and I remind myself of the no order principle and
by
making no order, I am saddened to say, is the lesser of two evils. As I have said, the welfare ramifications for forcing E to either live with her father or spend time with her father outweigh the potential
benefits
because
all decisions must
be
linked to her welfare. I
come
full
circle
to section 1 that the paramount
consideration
by
the
court
is E's welfare.
47. If E reads this judgment one day, she will need to understand that her mother's
behaviour
has
been
lamentable. Her mother has entirely frustrated the
court
process and therefore, in effect, prohibited any relationship
between
E and her father for nearly the last five years. That is the mother's responsibility to
bear
and E needs to know that. I have no doubt that the father loves E and has done absolutely everything to reignite that relationship that they once had and only has her
best
welfare interests in this application.
48. So, in
conclusion,
I make the following orders. I find
beyond
reasonable doubt that the mother has
breached
the
child
arrangements order dated 1 December 2012 and there is no reasonable excuse for doing so. I make no separate order as to any unpaid work in the
circumstances
of this
case.
I make no order on the father's application for a
child
arrangements order. A
copy
of my judgment will
be
transcribed and a
copy
provided to the local authority. I invite the local authority to make a referral for a further strategy meeting, an ICPC and for the father to
be
provided with information about E's education notwithstanding she is home-schooled.
49. That
concludes my judgment.
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