![]() |
[Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback] [DONATE] | |
England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions |
||
|
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> City of Bradford Metropolitan District Council v Booth [2000] EWHC Admin 444 (10 May 2000) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2000/444.html Cite as: [2000] COD 338, (2000) 164 JP 485, (2001) 3 LGLR 8, [2001] LLR 151, [2000] EWHC Admin 444, [2000] EWHC 444 (Admin) |
||
[New search]
[Context
]
[View without highlighting]
[Printable RTF version]
[Help]
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
CROWN OFFICE LIST
DIVISIONAL COURT
The Strand London |
||
B e f o r e :
(Lord Bingham of Cornhill)
and
MR JUSTICE SILBER
B E T W E E N:
____________________
CITY OF BRADFORD METROPOLITAN DISTRICT COUNCIL |
||
| Appellant | ||
- v - |
||
ERIC WILSON BOOTH | ||
| Respondent |
____________________
Smith Bernal, 180 Fleet Street, London EC4
Telephone No: 071-421 4040
(Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
Bradford
Metropolitan District Council) appeared on behalf of
THE APPELLANT
THE RESPONDENT was not represented and did not appear
____________________
VERSION
OF JUDGMENT
Crown Copyright ©
vehicle
licensing decision of the local authority when the local authority had not, in making the decision appealed against, acted unreasonably or in bad faith.
Bradford
Metropolitan District Council. The respondent to the appeal (who does not appear) is Mr Eric
Booth
who operates a private car hire business.
Booth
a private hire operator's licence. That licence was
valid
from 7 October 1997 for one year and its effect was to license Mr
Booth
to operate private hire
vehicles
in the City of
Bradford.
The licence was subject to a condition that no more than one private hire
vehicle
should be run from an address in Haworth where Mr
Booth
lived.
view
that Mr
Booth
had broken the condition of his licence and at the expiry of the year refused to renew it. The court is not concerned with the detailed grounds for the local authority's
view,
although it is plain that it was thought that Mr
Booth
was operating more than a single private hire
vehicle
from his home address.
Booth
was aggrieved by the decision of the local authority not to renew his licence and on 23 November 1998 preferred a complaint against the local authority. The effect of this complaint was to appeal against the decision not to renew his licence under section 62(3) of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 against the decision not to renew his licence under section 62(1)(b) of the Act. By section 77 of that Act, sections 300 - 302 of the Public Health Act 1936 are incorporated. Section 300 of the Public Health Act affords a right of appeal to the magistrates' court by way of complaint. In this way Mr
Booth's
complaint came before West Yorkshire Justices sitting in
Bradford.
The justices concluded that Mr
Booth
had not breached the condition of his licence, nor relevant planning legislation. Accordingly the justices upheld Mr
Booth's
appeal and renewed his private operator's licence on the same terms and conditions as had obtained previously.
Booth
by his representative then applied for costs against the local authority under section 64 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 which so far as relevant provides in subsection (1):
"On the hearing of a complaint, a magistrates' court shall have power in its discretion to make such order as to costs --
(a) on making the order for which the complaint is made, to be paid by the defendant to the complainant;
(b) on dismissing the complaint, to be paid by the complainant to the defendant,
as it thinks just and reasonable;...."
Booth
it was argued before the justices that in this situation, as in other litigious situations, the principle that costs follow the event should apply. It was contended that R
v
Merthyr Tydfil Crown Court, ex parte Chief Constable of Dyfed Powys Police (unreported, 9 November 1998, CO/3484/98), to which I will come in a moment, should be distinguished. It was further contended that although the local authority were exercising an administrative function in the licensing of private hire operators, if they made a mistake or failed to consider matters properly they should not escape the consequences of paying an appropriate sum in costs. It was, however, conceded on behalf of Mr
Booth
that the local authority had not acted unreasonably or in bad faith.
Booth
were strongly contested in counter-submissions made by the local authority, on whose behalf it was argued that the local authority was carrying out a public function which it was required to perform by law and that in those circumstances costs should not follow the event but should be awarded only if the local authority had acted unreasonably or in bad faith. It was argued that the principle in the Merthyr Tydfil case should be followed. It was further argued that a conflict might arise between the local authority's overriding duty to protect the public, as set out in Department of Transport guidance, and the authority's concern to protect its position on costs. Such a dilemma, it was said, would be even more acute if costs automatically followed the event.
Booth
should recover £750 plus
VAT
against the local authority. The questions posed for the opinion of the court are two- fold:
"a) Were we correct in law in finding that the principle that 'costs follow the event' apply against Local Authorities who make decisions on licensing functions which they are required to perform?
b) Were we correct in law in finding that there was no requirement that we be satisfied that the Local Authority had acted unreasonably or in bad faith, before we could order costs against the Local Authority?"
vehicle
licensing are probably the largest and most exacting. He submits that the local authority works inevitably through sub-committees who seek to act in a quasi-judicial manner, making decisions in the public interest, and he urges that it would be gravely detrimental to the protection of the public if local authorities were to be deterred from making whatever decisions they thought were right by the fear that if those decisions were challenged, and if the challenge were successful, they would be mulcted in costs. As a matter of practical reality, he submits, a local authority in a case of this kind has no choice but to appear in the magistrates' court. The argument then may be about the facts upon which the local authority relied in making its decision, for example as to whether a condition had been breached, or might be as to whether a licensee had shown himself unfit to hold a licence, in which case the magistrates, while accepting the local authority's
view,
might nonetheless decide to give the licensee another chance. In either situation, Mr Blair-Gould urges, the financial consequences of the hearing to the successful complainant are irrelevant or
virtually
so. He submits that the costs of a hearing such as this should be regarded by a complainant as an ordinary business expense. If the complainant cannot afford legal representation, then he should go without. He submits, roundly, that it can never be just and reasonable to order a local authority to pay costs in the absence of bad faith or unreasonable behaviour. Thus, he submits that the justices erred in this case. He fortifies his submissions by urging that the present issue is one of
very
considerable import to a large number of local authorities who have expressed interest in the outcome and sought guidance.
v
Merthyr Tydfil Crown Court, ex parte Chief Constable Dyfed Powys Police (9 November 1998), in which the Chief Constable objected to the transfer of a justices' on-licence to a Mrs W. It was an important feature of the case that he had good grounds for doing so. The transfer was refused by licensing justices. Mrs W appealed and the Chief Constable, having objected to the transfer, became a respondent. On the appeal Mrs W contended that, since the conduct of which the police complained, she had undergone training and addressed the deficiencies in her performance as a licensee. She furthermore was able to adduce the support of a major brewer. The Crown Court allowed Mrs W's appeal and granted the transfer of the justices' licence to her, although it is noteworthy that in doing so the judge commented that the court had accepted that the objections placed before it by the police were well-founded and related to serious breaches of the licensing laws. The question of costs then arose. The Crown Court ordered that the police should pay Mrs W's costs of the appeal. It was that order that was challenged before Lightman J. In the course of giving judgment Lightman J quoted a passage from the judgment of Roch J in R
v
Totnes Licensing Justices, ex p Chief Constable of Devon and Cornwall (1990) 156 JP 587, The) Times, 28 May 1990, where Roch J had said:
"In my judgment it was wrong for the justices to treat this matter as civil proceedings between two private litigants and to ignore the factor urged upon them by the solicitor appearing for the police authority, namely, that the police have a function which they are required to perform. They are required to supervise the proper conduct of the licensed premises and to object in those cases where there are good grounds for objecting to the renewal of the licence. That that is the police's function is clearly demonstrated by the provisions in the Licensing Act which give the police power to enter licensed premises whether at the invitation of the licensee or not.
In addition, in myview,
the police authority must also bring to the attention of the licensing justices matters of which the police know and which can fairly and properly be said to amount to misconduct by the licensee or those for whom he is responsible ...."
view,
the position is quite clear: the same principle applies before the Crown Court as before the licensing justices. The language of the relevant rules is for all practical purposes identical. This is reinforced by the consideration that the proceedings before the Crown Court take place by way of rehearing. In the same way as the justices need the assistance of the police in respect of the provision of any information which may assist them in deciding whether or not the Applicant is a fit person to hold a licence, the Crown Court requires that assistance. It seems to me that no order can properly be made against the police simply on the basis that costs follow the event. The Crown Court can only make such an order if it can be shown that the police's position has been totally unreasonable or prompted by some improper motive."
v
Goodman and Newton (DC, unreported, 2 April 1998). The facts in that case were that firearms licences were granted to the two respondents, Mr Goodman and Mr Newton, by the Chief Constable, and in due course revoked by the Chief Constable. They appealed to the Crown Court against that revocation and their appeal was allowed. The judge, however, ordered the Chief Constable to pay the costs of the two respondents, and he appealed against that order. It was the correctness of that order which was the issue on the appeal. In the course of giving judgment May LJ said at page 5D of the transcript:
view,
this is a borderline case so far as costs are concerned. I can certainly see some force in [counsel's] submissions, but exercising afresh, as in my
view
we are entitled to do, the discretion which Judge Morrison exercised, I consider on balance that this is not a case where costs ought to have been ordered against the Chief Constable. He acted, as the judge held, in complete good faith and, in those circumstances, the costs order ought not to have been made against him."
view
that the reference in section 64 to the order being just and reasonable applied to quantum only. On the other hand, in my judgment the submissions made by Mr Blair-Gould on behalf of the local authority go too far the other way since to give effect to the principle for which he contends would deprive the justices of any discretion to
view
the case in the round which is in my judgment what section 64 intends.
Booth, to whom his costs have already been paid. In that situation I would make no further order.