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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> Attorney General v Barker [2000] EWHC 453 (Admin) (16 February 2000) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2000/453.html Cite as: [2000] EWHC 453 (Admin), [2000] 1 FLR 759, [2000] 2 FCR 1, [2000] Fam Law 400 |
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QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
CROWN OFFICE LIST
DIVISIONAL COURT
The Strand London |
||
B e f o r e :
(Lord Bingham of Cornhill)
and
MR JUSTICE KLEVAN
B E T W E E N:
____________________
HER MAJESTY'S ATTORNEY GENERAL | ||
| Applicant | ||
- v - |
||
PAUL EVAN JOHN BARKER | ||
| Respondent |
____________________
Smith Bernal, 180 Fleet Street, London EC4
Telephone No: 071-421 4040
(Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
THE RESPONDENT appeared in person
____________________
VERSION
OF JUDGMENT
Crown Copyright ©
Attorney
General
seeks a civil proceedings order under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 against Mr Paul
Barker.
It is unnecessary for present purposes to recite the familiar terms of section 42(1)(a) and (b), save to point out that before the court can make an order under the section it must be satisfied that the statutory precondition of an order is fulfilled, namely that the person against whom the order is sought has habitually and persistently and without any reasonable ground instituted
vexatious
civil proceedings or made
vexatious
applications whether in the High Court or any inferior court and whether against the same person or against different persons.
Barker,
lived from 1988 until August 1993 with a partner, Miss Jane Boyce. They had two children, a girl, "F", who was born on 4 April 1990 and who will soon be 10, and a boy, "T", who was born on 27 February 1992 and who will even sooner be 8.
Barker
and his partner and the children were set out at
very
considerable length by His Honour Judge Ansell in a judgment delivered on 3 November 1997. It is unnecessary and undesirable for present purposes to give more than the briefest summary.
Barker
with the children. By that stage their relationship had to a large extent broken down. Following the separation there were difficulties over contact and at the end of 1993 the children went to live with Mr
Barker.
There were continuing difficulties over contact and the mother felt that in all the circumstances it was better if she stopped seeing the children, although her own mother continued to do so. There was evidence that Mr
Barker
behaved in an aggressive, disruptive and abusive way and he found himself involved in altercations with the staff, the governors and some parents at the first school which the two children attended. He had a quarrel with the headmistress. He was banned from the school. He broke the ban and was warned by the police. In October 1996, following a further altercation, the children were withdrawn from that school and did not attend school again until the end of January 1997. At the new school further difficulties arose and there were real anxieties about
various
aspects of Mr
Barker's
upbringing of the children.
Barker
was suffering from mental illness, and that may explain much of what took place.
Barker
issued eight writs. Seven of those related directly or indirectly to the family proceedings; one concerned a negligence claim which had been made by Mr
Barker
against solicitors and which had been settled on terms which Mr
Barker
had come to regard as disadvantageous. The writs were issued against the chairman of the governors of the children's first school, against the solicitor who had advised Mr
Barker
in the family proceedings, against an officer of the Hertfordshire County Council Social Services Department, against the solicitor who had acted for Mr
Barker
in the successful negligence claim, against another officer of the Hertfordshire County Council Social Services Department, against the head teacher of the children's second school, against a third officer of the Hertfordshire County Council Social Services Department, and against yet a fourth officer of that department.
"Tampering with Evidence
The letters of Steve Taylor of 11 December 1996 that a 'disclosure of papers order' shall reveal protecting Mrs Hallahan rather than putting the welfare of my children first
Telling his secretary to remove them from my bundle and then stating in an investigation that Andrea is 'conscientious, dedicated and most efficient member of staff. I do not doubt her honesty or integrity'."
"I refer to Barbara Barret's statement used in evidence in court (comprehensive assessment) Watford County Court, case No 97CC027 and Meg Carter's investigation into complaints, see writ of summons B1949 to be used in evidence in the Royal Courts of Justice and at my appeal of His Honour Judge Ansell's orders Watford County Court made on 29th October - November 3 1997.
Obviously I expect a documented report into the reasons for his absence from work following his statement to the Watford County Court to be used as evidence as all correspondence from him to me to be checked against access to records."
Barker
issued eight more writs. The defendants in this case were the headmistress of the children's first school, His Honour Judge Ansell, the solicitor who had advised Mr
Barker
on his prospects of an action against the solicitor who had handled the negligence claim, the solicitor who had advised Mr
Barker
on the merits of a defamation claim against the headmistress of the children's first school, the solicitor who represented Mr
Barker
in the family proceedings, the Hertfordshire County Council County Secretary's Department, the Hertfordshire County Council Social Services Department, and the solicitor who had represented the children at the family hearing. Again a sample of the nature of these proceedings may be given. The endorsement of the writ against Judge Ansell was headed "Negligence/Damages" and read:
"Perverting the [course] of justice at the Watford County Court, His Honour Judge Ansell, the last of 5 judges to have sat through this case, ordered Barbara Barret of Social Services to bring in her notes of an interview with myself as a matter of great urgency, notes taken on 20th March 1997 following a contact session with my children on 17 March 1997 that was supervised by Diane Hanlon, selective note taker.
Coincidentally this happened to be the last note taking session due to the fact I mentioned to my daughter the matters regarding Mrs K R Hallahan, Barbara Barret tried to palm me off with some note regarding the orange book assessment that I had asked for much earlier. She had refused to give them to me. His Honour Judge Ansell was blind to this. Further after I complained the notes that I asked for were brought into court the next day. These notes of 20 March were photocopies and forged. He knew this."
Barker
served documents purporting to be statements of claim in most of these actions, and some defences were served. In one instance an error on the part of the court led to the entry of a judgment in default in favour of Mr
Barker,
which was set aside by the Senior Master when the true facts came to light.
Barker
issued summonses in the St Albans County Court against the Senior Queen's Bench Master and the head clerk of the action department of the Queen's Bench central office, complaining of the setting aside and of the default judgment. These summonses were transferred to the High Court. On 20 February 1998 the Treasury Solicitor issued a summons to strike out the claim against Judge Ansell. On 23 February 1998 Mr
Barker
issued summonses in the St Albans County Court against the solicitor representing the
various
solicitors whom he had sued. This summons also was transferred to the High Court and
very
shortly thereafter a summons was issued to strike it out.
very
unusual course which matters had followed and he cited the well-known terms of Order 18, rule 19 of the Rules of the Supreme Court. He was in no doubt that all 19 actions should be struck out.
Barker
who on 18 March 1998 issued a summons in the St Albans County Court against the child psychiatrist who had given expert evidence at the family hearing. That was struck out on 1 May 1998.
General
authorised this application and a notice of motion was issued in November. Mr
Barker
sought leave to appeal against the decision of Judge Ansell, but that was refused by the Court of Appeal. He also sought leave to appeal against the order of Alliott J, and that too was refused.
Attorney
General
Mr Robin Tam, in the course of
very
clear and well prepared submissions, contends that the conditions specified in section 42(1)(a) of the Supreme Court Act are met and that it is appropriate for the court to exercise its discretion to make an order. He submits that the actions referred to do not disclose any reasonable cause of action and each pleading has been wholly defective. He submits that most of these actions have represented attempts to re-litigate decisions adverse to Mr
Barker
and that he has refused to accept judicial decisions as evidenced by his attempts to sue Judge Ansell and the Senior Queen's Bench Master. He points out that the remedies sought by Mr
Barker
in his
various
actions are frequently not such as the court could award, and draws attention to the fact that Mr
Barker
has issued a large number of separate actions against individual defendants when he could either have sued their employer or have joined them in a single action, drawing attention to this aspect as an indication of the
vexatious
character of the litigation. Mr Tam also points out that Mr
Barker
is on income support and as a result is in no position to pay the costs awarded against him and is furthermore excused from paying the ordinary fees exacted on issue of proceedings. He reminds us that on one occasion Mr
Barker
was heard to indicate that no one would get a penny out of him, and Mr Tam also suggests that Mr
Barker
has shown an intention to continue in his course of litigious conduct, particular attention being drawn to an occasion on 27 February 1998 when Mr
Barker
was heard to threaten action for defamation. It is said that in the course of the hearing before Alliott J he said that if the judge decided against him he would sue that judge as well as Judge Ansell.
Barker
today has appeared before us in person and told us, which I readily accept, that he was
very
deeply upset at losing his children under the order of the court. He further tells us, and again I would for my part accept, that he was at the time seriously ill. He points out, however, that his resort to litigation was
very
short- lived and was now two years ago. The burden of all these actions, he says, had a
very
severe effect on his mental health and resulted in his spending three months in
various
hospitals. He is now restored to health. He is seeing his children on a regular basis and looking forward to increased contact. He wants to put the past behind him and says that he has no intention of further resort to litigation. He has indeed offered his word to the court that he will not seek to repeat his conduct of two years ago in issuing writs broadcast.
Barker
has instituted
vexatious
civil proceedings. "
Vexatious"
is a familiar term in legal parlance. The hallmark of a
vexatious
proceeding is in my judgment that it has little or no basis in law (or at least no discernible basis); that whatever the intention of the proceeding may be, its effect is to subject the defendant to inconvenience, harassment and expense out of all proportion to any gain likely to accrue to the claimant; and that it involves an abuse of the process of the court, meaning by that a use of the court process for a purpose or in a way which is significantly different from the ordinary and proper use of the court process. Those conditions are in my
view
met in this case. Many of the proceedings show no justiciable complaint and, as has been pointed out, several writs have been issued against individual officers in the same department when one writ would have served against them all.
vexatious
civil proceedings have been instituted without any reasonable ground. All the proceedings have been struck out; none has gone to trial; none has been settled. Leave to appeal against Alliott J's striking-out order in relation to the 19 actions was refused. In truth, none of these actions could have succeeded.
variations,
after it has been ruled upon, thereby imposing on defendants the burden of resisting claim after claim; that the claimant relies on essentially the same cause of action, perhaps with minor
variations,
after it has been ruled upon, in actions against successive parties who if they were to be sued at all should have been joined in the same action; that the claimant automatically challenges every adverse decision on appeal; and that the claimant refuses to take any notice of or give any effect to orders of the court. The essential
vice
of habitual and persistent litigation is keeping on and on litigating when earlier litigation has been unsuccessful and when on any rational and objective assessment the time has come to stop.
Barker.
I do not consider that an order is necessary to prevent further abuse by him of the court process. Mr
Barker
appreciates that repetition of his previous resort to litigation would damage his mental health and disrupt his contact with his children, which is what he cares most about. He also fully appreciates that if he were to repeat his former conduct he would have no defence at all to an application by the
Attorney
General.
Barker
will not repeat his previous conduct in the months ahead. I further think that it is better that he should not have the matter hanging over him as a possible source of anxiety. He has told us that he wants to forget about the unhappy events of November 1997 to March 1998, and it is much better that he should do so. He has offered his word to the court that he will not repeat his previous conduct and I for my part would accept him as meaning what he says. I would therefore decline to make any order on this application.
Barker
is not represented -- is costs that might arise. If we had succeeded your Lordships know that, as a matter of tradition if nothing else, no order for costs is sought by the
Attorney
General.
I do not know whether Mr
Barker
makes any application against us, but I mention that out of completeness.
Barker,
Mr Tam is asking whether you are asking for an order for costs against the
Attorney
General?
Barker,
you understand the effect of that judgment, do you? We are not making the order that the
Attorney
General
is asking us to make. We are accepting your word.
very
much. We did say in the judgment that if you did, the
Attorney
General
would come back and he would be almost certain to obtain an order. Thank you
very much.