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England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> Campbell v Crown Prosecution Service  EWHC 3868 (Admin) (18 November 2020)
Cite as:  EWHC 3868 (Admin)
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QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
B e f o r e :
MR JUSTICE WILLIAM DAVIS
| TONIQUE CAMPBELL
|- and -
|CROWN PROSECUTION SERVICE
Official Court Reporters and Audio Transcribers
5 New Street Square, London, EC4A 3BF Tel: 020 7831 5627 Fax: 020 7831 7737
MR L. MABLY QC (instructed by the CPS) appeared on behalf of the Respondent.
Crown Copyright ©
LORD JUSTICE POPPLEWELL:
(1) The appellant had been both drunk and disorderly in Wardour Street. There was clear evidence that she was swaying and propping herself up against the cars. At one point she fell over. She also swore at the officers and continued to do so despite being told to go home.
(2) The appellant had been arrested during the events which unfolded in Wardour Street.
(3) The appellant had assaulted PC Regan, an emergency worker acting in this capacity, causing an injury to her arm during the struggle which ensued when PC Regan tried to handcuff her.
(4) The appellant had assaulted PC Young, an emergency worker acting in this capacity, by kicking him when walking up a ramp at the police station.
(5) The appellant assaulted PC Regan, an emergency worker acting in this capacity by kicking her whilst being led away from the sink area.
(6) At all times PC Regan and PC Young were each exercising the functions of an emergency worker.
(7) The appellant's actions were intentional throughout.
The Case Stated
1. Were we right to conclude that a defendant can be convicted of assaulting an emergency worker contrary to section 1 of the [2018 Act] even where the officer may not have been acting in the execution of his duty?
2. Were we right to conclude, on the facts of this case, that even if PC Regan was acting unlawfully when she took hold of Ms Campbell to handcuff her, this would not prevent us finding her guilty of the subsequent assaults at the police station?
3. Were we right to conclude that the case law pertaining to assault police officer in execution of his duty contrary to section 89 of the Police Act 1996 did not apply to offences brought under section 1 of [the 2018 Act]?
"In my judgment it matters not whether the push was lawful or unlawful in determining the answer to the question whether the appellant was wilfully obstructing P.C. Upshon in the execution of his duty. The push clearly had no bearing on the question whether the appellant's conduct before that time amounted to wilful obstruction. On the findings of the magistrates it did. I am unable to see how an unlawful push could retrospectively render conduct lawful, which was otherwise criminal. But equally, if the push were unlawful it does not follow that P.C. Upshon was any the less acting in the course of the execution of his duty thereafter in dealing with the arrested man in the car. Even on that hypothesis, a person who has been assaulted by a police officer is not liberated from the application of the criminal law prohibiting wilful obstruction of a constable (including that constable) in the execution of his duty. The assault itself could not be characterised as being part of the execution of the officer's duty. That is why Fraser Wood was entitled to resist when he was restrained . . ."
". . . an assault on any individual or citizen in our society is a terrible thing, but an assault on an emergency worker is an assault on us all. These people are our constituted representatives. They protect society and deliver services on our behalf, therefore, an attack on them is an attack on us and on the state, and it should be punished more severely than an attack simply on an individual victim."
It is, therefore, the status of being an emergency worker which attracts the added protection provided the worker is acting in that role, not whether some duty is being performed at the time. So, for example, a consultant surgeon carrying out an operation is intended to have the benefit of the protection whether or not there may be some defect in the procedure which he has undertaken in obtaining the consent of the patient. So, too, a paramedic who attends an accident should attract the protection of the section without any question as to the niceties of a judgment as to whether consent is or is not being given to physical handling.
MR JUSTICE WILLIAM DAVIS: I agree.