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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> Hannigan v Nursing and Midwifery Council [2026] EWHC 62 (Admin) (29 January 2026) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2026/62.html Cite as: [2026] EWHC 62 (Admin) |
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AC-2025-CDF-000054 |
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
2 Park Street, Cardiff CF10 1ET |
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B e f o r e :
____________________
| MRS KARA LOUISE HANNIGAN |
Appellant |
|
| - and - |
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| THE NURSING AND MIDWIFERY COUNCIL |
Respondent |
____________________
Benjamin D'Alton (internal legal counsel) for the Respondent
Hearing date: 18th November 2025
____________________
Crown Copyright ©
Mr Justice Eyre:
Introduction.
case.
The Factual and Procedural Background.
The Proposed Charges.
"That you, a registered Band 7 nurse:
1. Between November 2014 to July 2019 on one or more occasions behaved inappropriately and/or undermined and/or interfered towards or with Samantha Sell, in that you:
a. Endeavoured to have a meeting with Samantha Sell, as requested by them, without prior notice to Samantha Sell;
b. Said to Samantha Sell "its something like prostitutes would wear" or words to that effect, when commenting on Samantha Sell's appearance.
2. Your actions at one or more of charges at 1(a) and 1(b) above amounted to bullying and/or harassment of Samantha Sell in that:
a. Your conduct was unwanted;
b. Your conduct had the purpose or effect of creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for Samantha Sell.
3. On or after 17 September 2015 you inappropriately placed Samantha Sell on an informal stage of the capability policy.
4. Your actions at charge 3 above amounted to bullying and/or harassment of Samantha Sell in that:
a. Your conduct had the purpose or effect of:
i. Violating Samantha Sell's dignity, or
ii. Creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for Colleague A.
5. Between November 2014 to July 2019 on one or more occasions:
a. Put a meeting in the daily diary between yourself and Danielle Saunders, for no reason;
b. Said to Samantha Sell, that Daniel Champion Smith had a "drink issue" or words to that effect.
c. Said to Danielle Saunders, "look at the way he's done his notes, that's disgusting, I need to have a word with him" or words to that effect, in regards to Daniel Champion Smith;
d. Disclosed information about Daniel Champion Smith/Kelly's redeployment;
6. Your actions at charge 5(a) had the purpose or effect of creating an intimidating and/or hostile environment for Danielle Saunders.
And in light of the above, your fitness to practise is impaired by reason of your misconduct".
The Approach to be taken by the Court.
"[42] Counsel's researches have not found any authority setting out the approach to be taken by the court once a panel's decision has been quashed and the court is deciding whether to substitute another decision for that of the Panel or to remit the matter for rehearing. They were, however, agreed on the applicable principles and I have substantially adopted their analysis.
[43] The court has a discretion. That discretion is necessarily a wide one because of the wide variety of differing circumstances in which it will have to be exercised. Those circumstances will differ both as to the form of the failing in the decision or procedure of the panel and as to the matters leading up the hearing before the panel. The discretion will have to be exercised having regard both to the purpose of the regulatory regime and to the interests of justice. The following considerations are potentially relevant in the currentcase.
[44] First, account must be taken of public interest in the proper regulation of health care professionals and in the maintenance of high standards in the healthcare professions. I have quoted above article 3(4) and (4A) with its identification of the protection of the public as the Respondent's over-arching objective and with the subsidiary objectives of the promotion of public confidence and the promotion and maintenance of proper professional standards and conduct as being aspects of the pursuit of that overarching objective. The public interest in those matters is an important one and Mr Micklewright was correct to identify it as a consideration underlying the conclusion of the Court of Appeal in Ruscillo v Council for the Regulation of Health Care Professionals [2004] EWCA Civ 1356 that a regulatory body could appeal against an unduly lenient decision by a panel dealing with such matters.
[45] In order to maintain high professional standards and to uphold the public interest in the proper regulation of healthcare professionals allegations against such professionals must be properly investigated and properly determined once investigated. Those complaining of misconduct have an important interest in their allegations being determined before a panel properly considering the material advanced. Those accused of misconduct also have an interest in such proper determination which not only provides for the upholding of allegations against those properly accused but also for the definitive dismissal of allegations against those wrongly accused.
[46] However, a further factor is the public interest in finality of proceedings and in the prompt determination of allegations against healthcare professionals. Delay and multiple hearings incases
of allegations of professional misconduct are both to be avoided where possible. Not only are they wasteful of public resources but they increase the stress which such proceedings cause both for the accused professional and for the person whose allegation is under consideration.
[47] Next, regard must be had to the requirements of fairness and of justice. To some extent these requirements are elements of the public interest to which I have just referred. However, they are more focussed on the circumstances of the particularcase
and of the particular healthcare professional. The consideration will necessarily be fact-specific but it will be appropriate to have regard to the circumstances of the proceedings in question; the nature of the allegation being made; the reason why the decision of the original panel has been quashed; the time since the events in question; and whether it will be possible to have a fair hearing if the matter is remitted for rehearing by a new panel (and potentially when such a hearing will be possible). The question of whether there is unfairness or injustice to the professional concerned in having to face again the same allegations will depend on the particular circumstances. However, in light of the public interest in the proper regulation of healthcare professionals and in the proper determination of allegations of misconduct the mere fact that a professional will have to undergo a further hearing is unlikely of itself to be a potent factor against remittal.
[48] Finally, it is necessary to consider the utility or otherwise of remittal for a hearing before a further panel. There will be no point in remitting a matter for a further hearing if on a proper consideration of the evidence the only proper conclusion would be the dismissal of the allegation. Thus in Soni v General Medical Council [2015] EWHC 364 (Admin) Holroyde J, as he then was, declined to remit the matter for a further hearing having concluded that the evidence of the witnesses even when accepted could not properly lead to the necessary finding of dishonesty (see at [69] and [70])."
case.
I agree but, as I noted in Hawkins at [43], regard must be had to the width of the court's discretion and to the variety of circumstances in which it will have to be exercised. The list of factors set out in Hawkins was expressly a list of the factors potentially relevant in the particular circumstances of that
case:
not all of those will be relevant in other
cases
and there will be factors not listed there which will, on occasion, be relevant. In addition, although some assistance can be derived from seeing how the court's discretion has been exercised in particular
cases
the ultimate decision is necessarily
case
and fact-specific.
"I am far from convinced that the public interest is truly served by a rehearing of the limited factual allegation that was made in thiscase,
turning on the precise language used 12 years ago. Having said that, however, protection of the public interest is primarily for the GMC and I do not consider it appropriate to remove the responsibility for making this decision from them."
case
it is to be noted that it is not the Respondent's position that a further hearing to determine whether the allegations are made out is necessarily required by the relevant public interest. Instead, its position is that if a further hearing is to be avoided through an agreed removal then there will need to be proper consideration of that course and a decision made in accord with the procedure laid down in the Registration and Appeal Rules.
case.
The Agreed Removal Process.
"(2B) Where matters have given rise to an allegation against the registrant under article 22 of the Order, and the Council's proceedings in relation to that allegation have not concluded—
(a) the Registrar shall before determining the application provide the maker of the allegation (if any) with a reasonable opportunity to comment on the application;
(b) the Registrar, in considering whether to remove the registrant's name from the register or, where paragraph (2A) applies, the Committee in considering its advice to the Registrar, shall amongst such other matters which the Registrar or, as thecase
may be, the Committee considers appropriate, have regard to—
(i) any comments received pursuant to sub-paragraph (a): such comments may also be considered by the Registrar or Committee in discharging any of their other functions;
(ii) the interests of the registrant; and
(iii) the public interest."
Case
Management says that "agreed removal can support our aim 'to reach the outcome that best protects the public at the earliest opportunity'". The Guidance also explains that when considering an application for agreed removal the Registrar will require information as to and will take account of the nurse's plans for the future and, in particular, whether there is an intention to return to nursing within the next five years.
Are the Allegations against the Appellant capable of being established as Matters of Fact?
case
that her concerns were genuine and that her action was appropriate and properly-motivated. However, they are not conclusive and the force of the email is weakened by Miss Sell's evidence that the Appellant's action on 17th September 2015 was a response to the concerns which Miss Sell had raised on 16th September 2015.
case.
It follows that this is not a
case
where the outcome of the further hearing can be predicted with any degree of confidence, rather it is one where there is a real prospect that the allegations will be rejected at a remitted hearing (as a number of others were by the Panel).
Are the Allegations capable of amounting to Misconduct?
case
of Samantha Sell the conduct alleged includes placing Miss Sell on the capability policy as a way of deflecting concern from the Appellant's actions. In the
case
of Miss Saunders it is said that the Appellant deliberately sought to create an intimidating work environment for this nurse and I note that the Panel found that the Appellant took pleasure in doing so.
Will a Finding of Impairment be available if the Matter is remitted?
Should the Matter be remitted?
Factors in favour of Remittal.
case
where the agreed removal route would appear on the current material to be a sensible way forward but the decision on that is for the Registrar. It is not a foregone conclusion that it will be right for the Registrar to accede to an application from the Appellant for agreed removal and the court should be wary of forestalling the procedure laid down in the Registration and Appeal Rules. There would be such forestalling if the appeal were to be allowed and the decision simply quashed with the consequence that the Appellant could leave the Register voluntarily. Moreover, although I am satisfied that the Appellant is genuine in saying that she does not intend to return to nursing and that she will seek to be removed from the Register, if the decision were simply quashed the Appellant would be free to change her mind and to seek to work as a nurse.
Factors against Remittal.
case.
cases
for August 2026. I accept the submission of Mrs Simpson that there is at the very least a real risk that the hearing would be later than that. This is because provision would have to be made of a hearing lasting several days and involving about ten witnesses. The original hearings lasted at total of 25 days. The number of allegations has now been reduced and it will not be necessary for the initial arguments about amendment and the admissibility of evidence to be refought. However, even at the most optimistic several days would be needed for the resumed hearing. It follows that if there is remittal it will be late 2026 (and potentially early 2027) when the witnesses will be giving evidence and the new panel making a decision about actions in 2014 – 2019 (and again with the most important findings being those about events in 2015).
case
of an isolated incident but it is of alleged misconduct in a specific context some time ago.
case.
She points out that the Respondent has not suggested that such a course is necessarily inappropriate (it has simply said that the process in the rules must be followed). In those circumstances the Appellant says that remittal will achieve nothing other than to require the time, expense, and strain of the agreed removal process to be incurred.
case
they would have to answer by reason of having been questioned at the original hearing. In my judgement this cannot affect the position. The fact that the witnesses will have the benefit of having undergone the original hearing and will have to bear the burden of giving evidence for a second time is an almost inevitable consequence of any order for remittal. It cannot be a factor against remittal just as the fact that the relevant professional will have to undergo a further hearing cannot be a factor of any weight against remittal (see Hawkins at [47]). Moreover, the position is not as one-sided as Mrs Simpson suggested. The Appellant will also be forearmed in respect of the likely lines of questioning and of argument to be advanced against her. Her lawyers will know which lines of questioning and argument were effective against the Respondent's witnesses and which were not. Further, the transcript of the earlier hearing will be available and so any witness who gives evidence which is radically different from that given at the earlier hearing will have to explain the discrepancy.
Conclusion.
case are best served by the matter being remitted for a further hearing. That hearing will not be necessary if an application for agreed removal is made and the Registrar concludes that course is appropriate.
Determination.