![]() |
[Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback] [DONATE] | |
England and Wales High Court (Admiralty Division) Decisions |
||
|
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Admiralty Division) Decisions >> Unity Ship Group SA v Euroins Insurance JSC (Re the "Happy Aras") [2026] EWHC 7 (Admlty) (12 January 2026) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admlty/2026/7.html Cite as: [2026] EWHC 7 (Admlty) |
||
[New search]
[Context
]
[View without highlighting]
[Printable PDF version]
[Help]
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES
ADMIRALTY COURT
Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1NL |
||
B e f o r e :
____________________
UNITY SHIP GROUP S.A. |
Claimant |
|
| - and - |
||
| EUROINS INSURANCE JSC |
Defendant |
|
THE "HAPPY ARAS" |
____________________
Ms Lara Hicks (instructed by Scornik Gerstein LLP) for the Defendant
Hearing dates: 1 – 4 December 2025
____________________
Crown Copyright ©
Admiralty Registrar Davison:
Introduction
(i) it was not manned with a competent crew, more specifically a competent Master; and
(ii) there was no proper system in place for passage planning and/or there was a failure to exercise due diligence in passage planning, in contravention of IMO Resolution A.893(21) (Guidelines for Voyage Planning).
shipped
under a single "CONGENBILL 1994" bill of lading dated 13 March 2023, which incorporated the terms of the Charterparty and in any case provided for General Average to be adjusted and settled in London in accordance with the York/Antwerp Rules. The Average Guarantee was governed by English law and contained a jurisdiction clause in favour of the High Court in London.
The evidence at trial
The grounding
[Diagram or picture not reproduced in HTML version - see original .rtf file to view diagram or picture]/
"20.35 STOP M/E
20.36 FULL ASTERN
20.45 STOP M/E"
"I clocked in my shift on 20.03.2023 at 20.00. I returned to route 213 at 20.05. I sent Fuat Erdogan, who was my spotter during the cruise, downstairs to brew tea. I missed the route that I was supposed to steer at 20.35. I saw the island in front of me, at that moment I urgently stopped the machine and gave it a reverse position after 1 minute. However, I ran aground because theship
had speed."
The Passage Plan
The law
"Rights to contribution in general average shall not be affected, though the event which gave rise to the sacrifice or expenditure may have been due to the fault of one of the parties to the adventure; but this shall not prejudice any remedies or defences which may be open against or to that party in respect of such fault."
"Ashipowner
is not entitled to recover general average contributions from the owners of the cargo where the loss or expenditure was caused by its 'actionable fault' which includes any causative breach of the terms of the relevant contract of carriage"; judgment of Lord Hamblen in The CMA CGM Libra [2021] 2 Lloyd's Law Rep 613, [2021] UKSC 51 at paragraph 21.
"The carrier shall be bound, before and at the beginning of the voyage, to exercise due diligence to –
(a) make theship
seaworthy ……"
"1. Neither the carrier nor theship
shall be liable for loss or damage arising or resulting from unseaworthiness unless caused by want of due diligence on the part of the carrier to make the
ship
seaworthy…in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article III.
Whenever loss or damage has resulted from unseaworthiness, the burden of proving the exercise of due diligence shall be on the carrier or other person claiming exemption under this Article.
2. Neither the carrier nor theship
shall be responsible for loss or damage arising or resulting from:
(a) Act, neglect, or default of the master, mariner, pilot or the servants of the carrier in the navigation or in the management of theship."
ship
to sea; see The Cape Bonny [2018] 1 Lloyd's Reports 356 at paragraph 118 and Scrutton on Charterparties and Bills of Lading 23rd Ed. at paragraph 7-025.
ship
unseaworthy for the purposes of article III rule 1 of the Hague Rules' see The CMA CGM Libra above.
"(1) Incompetence or inefficiency may consist of a 'disabling want of skill' or a 'disabling want of knowledge':
'It is not disputed, I think, that aship
may be rendered unseaworthy by the inefficiency of the Master who commands her. Does not that principle apply where the Master's inefficiency consists, whatever his general efficiency may be, in his ignorance as to how his
ship
may, owing to the peculiarities of her structure, behave in circumstances likely to be met with on an ordinary ocean voyage? There cannot be any difference in principle, I think, between disabling want of skill and disabling want of knowledge. Each equally renders the Master unfit and unqualified to command, and therefore makes the
ship
he commands unseaworthy. And the owner who withholds from the Master the necessary information should, in all reason, be as responsible for the result of the Master's ignorance as if he deprived the latter of the general skill and efficiency he presumably possessed.' (Standard Oil v. The Clan Line Steamers [1924] AC 100 per Lord Atkinson at 120-121).
(2) Incompetence or inefficiency is a question of fact, which may be proved from one incident and need not be demonstrated by reference to a series of acts: The Star Sea [1997] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 360 at 373-374 (per Leggatt LJ). However, one mistake or even more than one mistake does not necessarily render a crew-member incompetent: The Star Sea [ibid] at 374:
'It is true that in The Makedonia Mr Justice Hewson found at p. 336 – "... a shocking history of sheer inefficiency, a succession of negligent acts ... amounting to a state of inefficiency far beyond casual negligence ..." but we can find nothing to support the proposition that a series of acts must always be necessary in order to establish incompetence or inefficiency. Indeed, at an earlier stage of the judgment, Mr Justice Hewson quoted the well-known passage from Lord Atkinson's speech in Standard Oil Co. of New York v. Clan Line Steamers Ltd. [1924] AC 100 referring to Lord Atkinson's view that "disabling want of skill and disabling lack of knowledge" equally renders the Master unfit and unqualified to command. It seems to us that it must be possible, in certain circumstances, to draw the inference from one incident that someone had a "disabling lack of knowledge". ...
We do entirely accept (as the Judge in his judgment recognized) that one mistake or even more than one mistake does not necessarily render a crew member incompetent. Anyone can make a mistake without the conclusion being drawn that he has either "a disabling want of skill" or a "disabling lack of knowledge".'
(3) Incompetence is to be distinguished from negligence and may derive from:-
(a) an inherent lack of ability.
(b) a lack of adequate training or instruction: e.g. lack of adequate fire- fighting training (The Star Sea [ibid]).
(c) a lack of knowledge about a particular vessel and/or its systems: Standard Oil (ibid); The Farrandoc [1967] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 276; The Star Sea [ibid] (operation of the CO˛ fire-fighting system).
(d) a disinclination to perform the job properly:
'In considering efficiency, the matters to be considered, in my view, are not limited to a disabling want of skill and a disabling want of knowledge. A man may be well qualified and hold the highest grade in certificates of competency and yet have a disabling lack of will and inclination to use his skill and knowledge so that they are well-nigh useless to him. Such a man may be unable efficiently to use the skill and knowledge which he has through drunken habits or through ill-health. Mr MacCrindle has submitted that a lack of application in the use of skill and knowledge is not within the ambit of "competence", though in certain cases he would be prepared to accede that drunkenness and physical unfitness might be.
This is a matter to which I have given considerable thought and I can see no real difference between those two, that is, drunkenness or physical unfitness on the one hand and a disabling lack of will to use the skill and knowledge on the other. The reason why I can see no distinction is that the result is the same, or may be.' (The Makedonia [1962] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 316 at 335 per Hewson J).
(e) physical or mental disability or incapacity (e.g. drunkenness, illness): Moore v. Lunn (1923) 15 Ll.L.Rep. 155; Rio Tinto v. SeedShipping
(1926) 24 Ll.L.Rep. 316.
(4) The test as to whether the incompetence or inefficiency of the Master and crew has rendered the vessel unseaworthy is as follows:- Would a reasonably prudent owner, knowing the relevant facts, have allowed this vessel to put to sea with this Master and crew, with their state of knowledge, training and instruction? (per Salmon J in Hong Kong FirShipping
v. Kawasaki [1962] 2 QB 26 at 34.)
(5) As to causation, unseaworthiness must be 'a cause or, if it is preferred, a real or effective or actual cause' and 'In truth, unseaworthiness ... can never be the sole cause of the loss. ... It must, I think, always be only one of several co-operating causes. ... I can draw no distinction between cases where the negligent conduct of the Master is a cause and cases in which any other cause, such as perils of the seas, or fire, is a co-operating cause. A negligent act is as much a co-operating cause, if it is a cause at all, as an act which is not negligent. The question is the same in either case, it is, would the disaster not have happened if theship
had fulfilled the obligation of seaworthiness, even though the disaster could not have happened if there had not also been the specific peril or action.' (per Lord Wright in Smith, Hogg & Co v. Black Sea and Baltic [1940] AC 997 at 1005)."
"132. If the vessel is found to have been unseaworthy due to the incompetence or inefficiency of the Master or crew, it is for the carrier to show that it has exercised proper care in relation to the following:
(1) the appointment of a generally competent Master/crew: The Makedonia [1962] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 316 (at 337-338 per Hewson J). That is to say, the owners / managers must have taken care to see that the Master / crew were 'suitable men for the post' (Moore v. Lunn (1922) 11 Ll.L.Rep. 86 at 93 (per Bailhache J). The owners / managers must take reasonable steps to satisfy themselves of this. They must satisfy themselves by inspection of the seaman's documents, interviews and inquiries from previous employers that he is reasonably fit to occupy the post to which he is appointed: The Makedonia [ibid]; Scrutton on Charterparties (20th ed.), p. 430.
(2) the specific competence of the Master in relation to the vessel and voyage in question. It will not necessarily be enough to rely on certificates of competence held by the seaman: The Farrandoc [ibid] (Can.Ex.Ct) (Scrutton on Charterparties (20th ed.), p. 430). The owners/managers must provide the Master / crew with reasonably necessary specific instruction and supervision, on an ongoing basis, in relation to the vessel and voyage(s).
'To my mind, a person taking reasonable care for his ownship
or cargo or seeking to discharge this obligation even when told that the person to be employed in a position involving responsibility held a qualifying certificate would scarcely fail to make further inquiries as to his ability and experience. Even after making such inquiries he would, in my opinion, inquire how far the man's experience fitted him for service in the particular
ship
and take steps to see that the man was adequately instructed with respect to any features of the particular
ship
with which it was necessary for him to be familiar to properly discharge the duties of his position and to avoid damage to the
ship
and her cargo.' (at 282)
(See also: Standard Oil (ibid); The Makedonia [ibid] at 338) Some forms of supervision by the carrier were considered by Lord Brandon in The Marion [1984] 1 AC 563 at 575:
'The forms of supervision used vary considerably, depending no doubt on the size of the companies concerned, the number and types ofships
which they operate, and the trades in which such
ships
are employed. The forms of supervision used, however, include, first, regular or random checks by marine superintendents or other qualified managerial staff when
ships
are visited by such persons in port; secondly, the complete overhaul, in the form of inspection and checking of chart rooms and their contents, at regular or irregular intervals; and, thirdly, the complete landing of the contents of chart rooms for inspection and checking, again at regular or irregular intervals.'
The submissions of the parties
Discussion and conclusions
Competence of the Master
ship's
radar. But the Master cannot have been monitoring the radar. Additionally, it appears that he had not inputted either cross-track limits or proximity warnings. Had he done so, either step would have generated an automatic warning from the radar.
Registrar: So, this went beyond just having a bad day, is that it?
Capt. Simpson: In my belief, yes, judge. As a consultant or as a surveyor, one of the things we always do when you're carrying out a survey on aship,
the sort of rule of thumb test is, would I want to sail on it? Would I be happy sailing on this
ship
to the next port? And I think that's the test: I really would use every excuse in the book not to, not to cancel my taxi to the airport. And I'm very sad to say that indeed.
ship
to sea.
"The Captain has been working with me for three years and was reassigned for Happy Aras upon positive performance evaluation results. Before being assigned to Happy Aras, he worked onships
of similar tonnage with similar number of personnel. All documentation is available and is at Oceangoing Master level. He had a Bridge Team Management certificate. There was no reason to doubt his performance. I got a positive reference from Tango
Shipping.
Tango is a big company with a good reputation in the industry."
Shipping
has not been disclosed. There is no evidence of or about supervision in any of the forms mentioned in The Marion. Lastly, I have obviously not been told the full story of the Master's departure from the employment of the claimant.
Passage planning
ship
could not be relied upon in relation to a causative breach of the carrier's obligation to exercise due diligence to make the
ship
seaworthy".
Quantum
ship, US$855,000; for the cargo, US$1,230,104 – a total of US$2,085,104. The difference between the claimed GA expenses and the total contributory values was US$1,054,936.97. Thus, in order for the defendant to reduce its contribution at all, it would have to "move the dial" (Mr Yusupoff's expression) by more than US$1,054,936.97. It would have to do this by showing that the expenses fell to be reduced or the vessel's contributory values (sound market value less cost of repairs) fell to be increased, or both. I have concluded that the defendant would never be able to discharge this burden. Without going into detail, which would be a disproportionate exercise in these circumstances, I will give three examples. The defendant disputed the sound market value of the vessel and (possibly) the cost of the repairs. But it had no contrary evidence. The defendant disputed the period of allowance. But this would make very little difference to the overall figure as the great majority of the expenses were still incurred within the defendant's proposed period. The defendant disputed the reasonableness of the hire charges for tug and lightering services. Although there was some force in the criticism, this was a suppliers' market and any reduction imposed would have to reflect this and would be modest.