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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division) Decisions >> Freedman v Freedman & Ors [2015] EWHC 1457 (Ch) (21 May 2015) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2015/1457.html Cite as: [2015] EWHC 1457 (Ch) |
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2015] EWHC 1457 ( Ch) | ||
CHANCERY
DIVISION
IN THE MATTER OF THE SETTLEMENT
KNOWN AS THE MELANIE
FREEDMAN
SETTLOR INTERESTED SETTLEMENT
DATED 4 FEBRUARY 2013
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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2015 |
B e f o r e :
____________________
MELANIE DAWN FREEDMAN | Claimant |
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| - and - |
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(1) MICHAEL FREEDMAN(2) DORIAN GRANT NINEBERG(trustees of the above named settlement) (3) BRADLEY FREEDMAN (A Child by Ruth Freedman his litigation friend)(4) ROSALIND NINEBERG (5) THE COMMISSIONERS FOR HER MAJESTY'S REVENUE AND CUSTOMS |
Defendants |
____________________
Judith Bryant (instructed by OGR Stock Denton LLP) for the Third Defendant
Jonathan Davey (instructed by OGR Stock Denton LLP) for the Fourth Defendant
Matthew Slater (instructed by the Solicitor and General Counsel to HM Revenue and Customs) for the Fifth Defendant
The First and Second Defendants were not represented and did not appear
Hearing dates: 07 and 08/05/
2015
____________________
VERSION
OF JUDGMENT
Crown Copyright ©
Mrs Justice Proudman :
Various
representation orders have been made by Deputy Master Jefferis on 27 October 2014 in respect of all the beneficiaries with the exception of future discretionary beneficiaries under clause 1.4 (d) ("such other persons or
Charities
as are added under clause 3").
Freedman,
(whom I shall call "Melanie" without intending any disrespect) entered into the settlement in 2013 on the advice of her father,
Charles
Freedman
(who died on 27 June 2013), and Mr Peter David Fraser, a solicitor with OGR Stock Denton LLP. Melanie is now aged 53.
children
of Melanie's parents of whom there are three and their issue and such other persons or
charities
as are added under the provisions of the settlement (clause 1.4) and subject thereto the capital and income is held upon trust for the third defendant (clause 5.3). The third defendant is Melanie's minor son by a relationship which she had with a Mr Anthony Bakir who was at the time of the birth in about 1999/2000 married (with
children)
to someone else.
charge
on St Leonard's Close. In about 2004-5, when her relationship with Mr Bakir had ended, her father agreed to forgo the loan and the
charge
was removed. Then in about April 2010 Melanie left St Leonard's Close to be nearer the third defendant's then school where she worked as a dinner lady. She let St Leonard's Close and moved into rented accommodation. She found Gibbs Green but had difficulty selling St Leonard's Close. The unchallenged evidence is that Melanie has
very
little money and
very
little earning power. By contrast, her father was a rich man as his inheritance tax account shows. Melanie again approached her father who agreed to lend her the purchase price (£525,000) for Gibbs Green and the acquisition costs of £5,000.
"He was somewhat reluctant to do this [lend me the money] as he did not want me to own two houses. Therefore he wasvery
clear that this was to be a loan which was to be repaid at least in part from the proceeds of sale of [St Leonard's Close], with any balance to be left outstanding for the foreseeable future. I agreed to this. My Father always wanted to act fairly to his
children
and he felt that giving me the monies for the two houses outright would have been unfair to my siblings. The purchase of [Gibbs Green] was completed in September 2012.
10. After I had bought [Gibbs Green] I still could not sell [St Leonard's Close]. In or about November 2012 my Father raised the idea with me of placing the two Properties into a trust. My Father told me that he thought such a trust would protect them. As I have said his concern was to protect my assets I held in my sole name from my former boyfriend or indeed any other man I might become involved with… As this was his idea I agreed to it as I knew he only had my best interests at heart. My trust in him was such that I was not particularly concerned about the precise details of what was involved and I did not consider that such a step might have taxation consequences or other disadvantages for me. I relied on my Father and Messrs OGR Stock Denton being the solicitors he engaged to protect my interests. I knew from my discussions with my Father that he had raised the idea of creating a trust with his solicitors before discussing it with me."
i. that the purpose of the settlement was to protect Melanie from Mr Bakir and others perceived by Melanie's family to be predatory males: see [3] and [4] of Dorian Nineberg's statement, [4] of Lynton Stock's statement and [3] of RuthFreedman's
statement,
ii. that Melanie should not be able to retain both St Leonard's Close and Gibbs Green for her own benefit: see [6] of Dorian Nineberg's statement, [4] of Lynton Stock's statement, [9] and [12] of Mr Fraser's statement and the inference from [3] of RuthFreedman's
statement,
iii. that the settlement was entered into subject to an agreement between Melanie and her father to repay the loan out of the proceeds of sale of St Leonard's Close: see [6] of Dorian Nineberg's statement, [3] of Lynton Stock's statement, [15] of Mr Fraser's statement and [2], [3] and [4] of RuthFreedman's
statement,
iv. that the loan would be enforced: see [6] of Dorian Nineberg's statement, [3] of Lynton Stock's statement and [5] of RuthFreedman's
statement, and
v.
that one of the reasons why the loan was to be repaid was because Melanie's father wished to maintain equality between his
children:
see [7] of Dorian Nineberg's statement, [22] of Mr Fraser's statement and [3] of Ruth
Freedman's
statement.
charged
on entering into the settlement, some £156,000 (plus interest), will not.
v.
Daniel [1993] 1 WLR 1453), which it is, HMRC must be taken to have accepted it.
value
of the settled property remained part of Melanie's estate. He admits (at [16] of his witness statement) that he failed to realise and thus explain that the transfer of assets into the trust would be a lifetime
chargeable
transfer for inheritance tax purposes and (to the extent that the net
value
exceeded the nil rate band) there would be an immediate entry
charge
of 20%. He also admits that he failed to realise or explain that there would be a 10-yearly
charge
and (counter to the intention that the proceeds of St Leonard's Close would be appointed to Melanie to pay off the loan from her father) exit
charges.
changed
their mind. Melanie trusted her trustees and has been proved right to do so in the circumstances: see also [20] of Mr Fraser's statement. The settlement was set up for the benefit of Melanie and the third defendant so that it was understood by the trustees that the other beneficiaries would only benefit in the unlikely event of their premature deaths.
very
close family. Melanie's mother Ruth
Freedman
is the litigation friend of the third defendant and Melanie's parents had three
children
who are Melanie, the first defendant and the fourth defendant, who is married to the second defendant. Melanie was
very
close to her father to the extent that if he recommended a course of action to her she would follow it without question. He was evidently
very
concerned about her relationship with Mr Bakir who still had contact with Melanie. She says (at [5]),
"…my whole family, including my Father, were concerned that our relationship might restart and that he might persuade me to transfer my assets to him or sell my house and give him money."
And later (at [20]),
"This was not a trust which was created for tax reasons or to avoid tax but purely for family reasons. I did not intend to create a taxcharge
by the creation of the Settlement or prejudice my ability to pay my debt. As the only purpose behind the creation of the Settlement was to reassure my family that the Properties were safe clearly I would not have wanted to create such a Settlement if I had appreciated that it (i) would have such serious taxation consequences and (ii) would prevent me from repaying my Father his loan as agreed from the proceeds of sale of [St Leonard's Close]."
The claim
v.
Holt, Futter
v.
Futter [2013] UKSC 26; [2013] 2 AC 108. In Kennedy
v.
Kennedy [2014]
EWHC
4129 (
Ch)
Etherton C said (at [36]),
"The principles applicable to rescission of a non-contractualvoluntary
disposition for mistake were comprehensively set out in the judgment of Lord Walker in Pitt
v.
Holt…, with which the other members of the Supreme Court agreed. They may be summarised as follows:
(1) There must be a distinct mistake as distinguished from mere ignorance or inadvertence or what unjust enrichment scholars call a "misprediction" relating to some possible future event. On the other hand, forgetfulness, inadvertence or ignorance can lead to a false belief or assumption which the court will recognise as a legally relevant mistake. Accordingly, although mere ignorance, even if causative, is insufficient to found the cause of action, the court, in carrying out its task of finding the facts, should not shrink from drawing the inference of conscious belief or tacit assumption when there is evidence to support such an inference.
(2) A mistake may still be a relevant mistake even if it was due to carelessness on the part of the person making thevoluntary
disposition, unless the circumstances are such as to show that he or she deliberately ran the risk, or must be taken to have run the risk, of being wrong.
(3) The causative mistake must be sufficiently grave as to make it unconscionable on the part of the donee to retain the property. That test will normally be satisfied only when there is a mistake either as to the legalcharacter
or nature of a transaction or as to some matter of fact or law which is basic to the transaction. The gravity of the mistake must be assessed by a close examination of the facts, including the circumstances of the mistake and its consequences for the person who made the
vitiated
disposition.
(4) The injustice (or unfairness or unconscionableness) of leaving a mistaken disposition uncorrected must be evaluated objectively but with an intense focus on the facts of the particular case. The court must consider in the round the existence of a distinct mistake, its degree of centrality to the transaction in question and the seriousness of its consequences, and make an evaluative judgment whether it would be unconscionable, or unjust, to leave the mistake uncorrected."
Chancellor
added (at [39]),
"Lord Walker observed in Pittv.
Holt at paragraph [135] that in some cases of artificial tax avoidance the court might think it right to refuse relief, either on the ground that such claimants, acting on supposedly expert advice, must be taken to have accepted the risk that the scheme would prove ineffective or on the ground that discretionary relief should be refused on grounds of public policy."
In the passage referred to in Pitt
v.
Holt Lord Walker said,
"Had mistake been raised in Futterv.
Futter there would have been an issue of some importance as to whether the court should assist in extricating claimants from a tax-avoidance scheme which had gone wrong."
As Lord Walker (when Sir Robert Walker) said (at p. 235) in an article in Private Client Business (2002) 4 PCB 226-40 called The Limits of the Principle in Re Hastings–Bass [1975]
Ch
25,
"One's instinctive reaction…is to ask why theChancery
Division, rather than the parties' professional indemnity insurers, should have to pick up the pieces…"
charge
on entry into the settlement and because of the exit
charge
on any appointment to her. It is also said that the mistake is sufficiently grave and unconscionable to give rise to the remedy and thirdly it is said that the beneficiaries such as the third defendant are
volunteers
who have not
changed
their position as a result of the mistake and it is plainly unconscionable for them to take advantage of Melanie's mistake.
HMRC's submissions
challenged
all these submissions. He made the general point that it would be strange if, while restricting the test in Hastings-Bass, the Supreme Court in Pitt
v.
Holt intended to allow tax mistakes (similar to those which were previously relieved by Hastings-Bass) to be corrected through a simple application of the law of equitable mistake. Thus, he submitted, the test for equitable mistake was intended to be more stringent than Miss Stanley QC, Miss Bryant and Mr Davey contended. However, those counsel said that the test for equitable mistake was simply different from that in Hastings-Bass, not more or less stringent, so that the rule in Hastings-Bass did not impinge on equitable mistake in any way. They were two completely different strands in the law which developed in a different way but happened to come together in Pitt
v.
Holt. As Lord Walker said at [12], "similar issues arise…and in practice they sometimes overlap".
v.
Holt at [102] and following) that Hastings-Bass depended on trustees' breach of the duty to act properly for the benefit of the beneficiaries, so that if the trustees had taken proper advice they were not in breach of duty and had to look for their remedy against their advisers. Whereas, said Miss Bryant, rescission on the ground of mistake derives from the much older case of Ogilvie
v.
Littleboy (1897) 13 TLR 399 which does not depend on breach of duty but is much more general in its scope. The passage cited by Lloyd LJ in the Court of Appeal (at [167]) and Lord Walker in the Supreme Court (at [101]) in Pitt
v.
Holt is of Lindley LJ giving the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Ogilvie
v.
Littleboy (approved by the House of Lords) at 400,
"In the absence of all circumstances of suspicion a donor can only obtain back property which he has given away by showing that he was under some mistake of so serious acharacter
as to render it unjust on the part of the donee to retain the property given to him."
Distinct mistake
"I broadly understood the letter [which means the letter of 6 November 2012; see her second witness statement dated 30 April2015]
to mean that the Settlement would not have any tax consequences I needed to worry about."
More accurately (he submits), she says in the following passage,
"It did not occur to me at all that creating a Settlement could affect my ability to repay my father as we had agreed."
And (at [13] and [17]),
"Its taxation consequences and the effect those taxation consequences would have on my ability to repay my Father was not discussed at all…
What I did not understand because it was not mentioned to me either by my father or the solicitors was that there would be serious inheritance tax disadvantages to the creation of the Settlement and that my ability to repay the loan to my Father as we had agreed would be affected…"
v.
Holt at [127]) "a lively personal interest" in establishing that there was a causative mistake. He submitted that this is to be contrasted with Kennedy, where the evidence was clear that Mr Kennedy, who was the driving force behind the transaction, believed that the appointment complied with his instructions.
v.
Holt the Supreme Court disapproved the distinction between the effect (in the sense of legal effect, the legal
character
or nature: see [119]) and the consequences of a transaction, replacing it (see [122]) with the test of causative mistake of sufficient gravity. The Court also considered the distinction between on the one hand mere causative ignorance and on the other a mistaken conscious belief or a mistaken tacit assumption. Lord Walker said at [108],
"I would hold that mere ignorance, even if causative, is insufficient, but that the court, in carrying out its task of finding the facts, should not shrink from drawing the inference of conscious belief or tacit assumption when there is evidence to support such an inference."
v.
Holt at [129]-[132] that a mistake as to the tax consequences of a transaction may, in an appropriate case, be sufficiently serious to warrant rescission and Mr Slater did not seek to argue to the contrary. There is no justification for a different approach to mistakes about tax and other types of mistake. However, Mr Slater submitted that there is in this case no evidence to support any inference of conscious belief or tacit assumption.
EWHC
118 (
Ch).
In that case Mr Griffiths had taken advice about tax planning which recommended potentially exempt transfers with seven-year term insurance. Mr Griffiths settled shares without the term insurance but was diagnosed with lung cancer and died only about a year after the settlement. Had he done nothing, the shares would have formed part of his residuary estate in which his wife took a life interest and no inheritance tax would have been payable on his death. Lewison J set aside the settlement for mistake, a mistake about Mr Griffiths' state of health. Lord Walker said (at [113]),
"…it seems close to the residual category of mere causative ignorance. Had the judge not made his hair's breadth finding about the presence of cancer in February 2004 it would have been a case of misprediction, not essentially different from a failure to predict a fatal road accident. Lloyd LJ observed (para 198) [and Lord Walker plainly had sympathy with the observation] that it was strongly arguable that, having declined to follow the financial consultants' recommendation of term insurance, Mr Griffiths was taking the risk of deterioration of his health and failure to survive the statutory period."
Relevance and gravity of the mistake
voluntary
settlement) the fact that it is a unilateral mistake may be a good reason for the court to apply a more stringent test as to the seriousness of the mistake before granting relief and avoiding the settlement: see Pitt
v.
Holt at [114].
v.
Holt where Lord Walker said that,
"In general a mistake as to the essential nature of a transaction is likely to be more serious than a mistake as to its consequences."
And [122] where he said,
"I would provisionally conclude that the true requirement is simply for there to be a causative mistake of sufficient gravity; and, as additional guidance to judges in finding and evaluating the facts of any particular case, that the test will normally be satisfied only when there is a mistake either as to the legalcharacter
or nature of a transaction, or as to some matter of fact or law which is basic to the transaction."
v.
Holt itself was about a case where neither the settlor nor her advisers had considered the issue of compliance with inheritance tax legislation upon the transfer of the assets into a discretionary trust or the trust's subsequent operation, with the result that large inheritance tax liabilities arose.
v.
Holt on three grounds. First he said that as a matter of practicality the facts of Pitt
v.
Holt were such that the Court would necessarily consider that relief ought to be given since the merits were so strong.
v.
Holt for tax to have been avoided by the simple expedient of executing a settlement which complied with the requirements of s. 89 IHTA. In the present case there was no such possibility since the
choice
was between fulfilling the requirements of the purpose of the settlement and having no settlement at all. And thirdly (overlapping with the second reason) Melanie's mistake was not causative in any relevant sense, neither did it go to the heart of the transaction.
character
or nature of the transaction" or "a matter of fact or law basic to the transaction". This was to be contrasted with Lady Hood of Avalon
v.
Mackinnon [1909] 1
Ch
476 in which Eve J set aside an appointment under a settlement on the basis that Lady Hood had forgotten the existence of a pre-existing appointment in favour of one of her daughters. Lady Hood's mistake related to a point which lay at the heart of the transaction: see Lord Walker at [121]. This was because the "predominating idea" and "sole origin" of the transaction (using Eve J's words at p. 479 and p. 481 respectively) was to achieve equality between Lady Hood's two daughters.
charge
to CGT. And in Wright
v.
National Westminster Bank PLC [2014]
EWHC
3158 (
Ch),
Mr Wright's declared aim in setting up a discretionary trust was to provide for his family in a tax-efficient manner. The effect of the trust was that Mrs Wright would not during Mr Wright's lifetime or even after his death be able to receive income and there was a large amount of contemporaneous evidence (which Norris J accepted: see [19] of his judgment) that he believed that the income from the settlement would be available to Mrs Wright so that they would not lose the income from the settled assets on which they currently relied to maintain their standard of living.
very
cases that the Court was likely to refuse relief in its discretion and HMRC was likely to press for such refusal. He said that relief was indeed available in tax avoidance cases where the mistake was a tax mistake, because the mistake would have the requisite "degree of centrality to the transaction", but that this would be limited to cases of unexceptionable tax avoidance, such as in Pitt
v.
Holt where the statute itself provided a means of avoiding tax by
virtue
of s. 89 IHTA or in Kennedy (at [39]): "a perfectly legitimate way of conferring benefit…in a tax efficient manner that was contemplated by express provisions in FA 2006."
v.
Littleboy and Pitt
v.
Holt. When describing the mistake Lord Walker merely says that it has to be "serious", "of sufficient gravity", and it is not helpful to restate it using some other epithet, despite the fact that Lloyd LJ used the word "fundamental" in the Court of Appeal (at [206]) quoted by Lord Walker at [121]. Indeed, Lord Walker disapproved the use of this concept at [115].
v.
Holt at [132]) if the consequence were only that inheritance tax were payable, I would have more sympathy with Mr Slater's submissions. However, the fact that the tax
charge
means that the loan cannot be repaid makes all the difference. The settlement was so affected by the tax consequences that its effect was entirely different from that which Melanie believed it to be. It seems to me that this element fulfils Lord Walker's analysis at [126],
"The gravity of the mistake must be assessed by a close examination of the facts, whether or not they are tested by cross-examination, including the circumstances of the mistake and its consequences for the person who made thevitiated
disposition. Other findings of fact may also have to be made in relation to
change
of position or other matters relevant to the exercise of the court's discretion."
Would it be unconscionable for the donees to insist on their rights under the settlement?
v.
Holt at [125]. It must (see [128]),
"…consider in the round the existence of a distinct mistake (as compared with total ignorance or disappointed expectations), its degree of centrality to the transaction in question and the seriousness of its consequences, and make an evaluative judgment whether it would be unconscionable, or unjust, to leave the mistake uncorrected. The court may and must form a judgment about the justice of the case."
Again (at [126]),
"The injustice (or unfairness or unconscionableness) of leaving a mistaken disposition uncorrected must bevalued
objectively, but with an intense focus…on the facts of the particular case…"
charge,
namely asset protection and the provision of a home for Melanie and the third defendant. If on the other hand the application succeeded, the third defendant's remainder interest (as well as his interest as an object of the power of appointment) would be removed and the risks which led to the creation of the settlement would revive.
charge
is likely to prevent this, bearing Melanie's asset and earning position in mind and the fact that the loan will be enforced.
Freedman
has no present intention of waiving the loan as this would be inconsistent with her aim of treating all her
children
equally, and the case has to be decided on the evidence at trial. Indeed, as Miss Stanley pointed out, speculation as to what may happen in the future is futile. As a matter of speculation, Melanie could fall out with her mother which would make her mother even more determined to enforce the loan.
charge
and forgave the loan. She has now sold St Leonard's Close and the proceeds will go to Melanie's father's estate in accordance with their agreement.
volunteer
and Miss Bryant, who acts for him and other beneficiaries in the same position, says that neither he nor they have
changed their position in any way which might affect unconscionability. Indeed unravelling the settlement will be for the third defendant's benefit since if the settlement remains he will inevitably, on the evidence, lose his home. As I have said, Miss Bryant supports Melanie's claim.
Conclusion