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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division) Decisions >> EMI Group Ltd v O & H Q1 Ltd [2016] EWHC 529 (Ch) (16 March 2016) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2016/529.html Cite as: [2016] L &TR 14, [2016] Ch 586, [2016] EWHC 529 (Ch), [2016] WLR(D) 150, [2016] 3 WLR 269 |
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OF
JUSTICE
CHANCERY DIVISION
of JusticeRolls Building, Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1NL |
||
B e f
o
r e :
____________________
EMI GROUP LIMITED |
Claimant |
|
- and – |
||
O &H Q1 LIMITED |
Defendant |
____________________
Mr K Reynolds QC (instructed by Clarke Willmott LLP) for the Defendant
Hearing date: 1 December 2015
____________________
VERSION
OF
JUDGMENT
Crown Copyright ©
Miss Amanda Tipples QC:
Introduction
over
20 years ago
on
1 January 1996. The long title to the Act explains that it is:
"to make provision for persons bound by covenantsof
a tenancy to be released from such covenants
on
the assignment
of
the tenancy, and to make
other
provision with respect to rights and liabilities arising under such covenants …".
of
Contract and Estate (1988) (Law Com No. 174) and represented a major change in the law.
of
well known decisions: Wallis Fashion
Group
Ltd
v
CGU Life Assurance 81 P&CR 393, Neuberger J at [3]-[5], [21]; London Diocesan Fund
v
Phitwa (Avonridge Property Co
Ltd,
Part 20 defendant) [2005] 1 WLR 3956, HL at [10]-[11] per Lord Nicholls
of
Birkenhead, and at [37]-[39] per Baroness Hale
of
Richmond; Good Harvest Partnership LLP
v
Centaur Services
Ltd
[2010] Ch 426, Newey J at [11]-[13]; and K/S
Victoria
Street
v
House
of
Fraser (Stores Management)
Ltd
[2012] Ch 497, CA (Lord Neuberger
of
Abbotsbury MR, Thomas, Etherton LJJ) at [14] to [16].
original
tenant to its existing guarantor. This gives rise to the two issues I have to decide, namely:
(1) whether the Act precludes the guarantor
of
an assignor from becoming the assignor's assignee (
or,
using the terminology used in some
of
the cases, whether the guarantor (G1)
of
the tenant (T1) is precluded from becoming the assignee
of
the tenancy (T2)); and
(2) if this arrangement is precluded by the Act, to what extent are the agreements which purport to give effect to it avoided by section 25(1)
of
the Act.
of
the
original
tenant. It maintains that the lease has been assigned to it by the
original
tenant, so that it is now the tenant. However, the Claimant's case is that, although the legal interest in the tenancy is now
vested
in it as the assignee
of
the lease, the tenant's covenants in the lease are
void
by reason
of
sections 24(2) and 25(1)
of
the Act. The Defendant is the landlord. It maintains that this arrangement between the tenant and its guarantor is not precluded by the Act but, if it is, the consequence is that the assignment
of
the tenancy by the
original
tenant to its guarantor is rendered
void
by the Act. Before me the guarantor was represented by Mr Jonathan Seitler QC and the landlord was represented by Mr Kirk Reynolds QC.
void
by reason
of
section 25(1) as it frustrates the purpose
of
the Act. This means that,
on
an assignment by T1, G1 cannot become T2.
out
below. However, I first
of
all need to say something about the facts
of
this particular case (which are not controversial) and then explain the relevant provisions
of
the Act, together with the few but important cases in which these provisions have been considered.
Relevant facts
Group
Ltd
(company number 2356570) as landlord granted to HMV UK
Ltd
("the tenant") a tenancy for a term, starting
on
24 June 1996 and expiring
on
3 February 2021,
of
retail premises known as 88/89 High Street and Unit 31, Chapel Walk, Crowngate Centre, Worcester. The Lease is a standard form lease
of
retail premises and it is not suggested that there is anything unusual
or
remarkable about the terms
of
it. The Lease, as mentioned above, is a "new tenancy" to which the Act applies.
On
the same date a Deed
of
Guarantee ("the Guarantee") was entered into between
EMI
Group
Plc (which is the Claimant, now known as
EMI
Group
Ltd)
as guarantor. By Clause 2.1
of
the Guarantee the guarantor, in consideration
of
the landlord granting the Lease to the tenant, unconditionally and irrevocably covenanted with and guaranteed to the landlord:
"that until the Tenant is released from liability by section 5of
the Landlord and Tenant (Covenants) Act 1995 the Tenant will pay and discharge the Secured
Obligations
[defined to mean the
obligation
to pay all sums from time to time due
or
expressed to be due to the Landlord from the Tenant under the Lease and to perform all
other
![]()
obligations
which from time to time are
or
are expressed to be
obligations
![]()
of
the Tenant under the Lease] when the same fall due
or
are expressed to fall due under the Lease for payment and discharge."
of
the Guarantee provided that:
"The guarantee and covenant contained in clause 2.1 shall impose upon the Guarantor the same liability as if the Guarantor were itself the principal debtor in respectof
the Secured
Obligations
and such liability shall continue notwithstanding (and shall not be discharged in whole
or
in part
or
![]()
otherwise
affected by): (a) any forbearance by the Landlord to enforce against the Tenant its covenants in the Lease; (b) the giving
of
time
or
![]()
other
concessions
or
the taking
or
holding
of
![]()
or
![]()
varying
realising releasing
or
not enforcing any
other
security for the liabilities
of
the Tenant; … and for the purposes
of
this clause 2 the Tenant shall be deemed to be liable to continue to pay and discharge the Secured
Obligations
notwithstanding any
of
the above matters and any money expressed to be payable by the Tenant which may not be recoverable from the Tenant for any such reason shall be recoverable by the Landlord from the Guarantor as principal debtor."
Group
Ltd
assigned its interest in the Lease to the Defendant,
O
& H Q1
Ltd
(company number 05277211).
On
15 January 2013 the tenant, by then known as Record Shop 1
Ltd,
went into administration.
On
28 November 2014 a Licence to Assign was entered into, by which licence was given by the Defendant to the tenant to assign the Lease to the Claimant (referred to in the Licence to Assign as "the Assignee"). The Defendant's unchallenged evidence, set
out
at para 4.3
of
Bonnie Martin's witness statement is that:
"it was the Claimant itself (which was then bound as Guarantor under the Deedof
Guarantee) which suggested to the Defendant that there should be an assignment
of
the Lease to the Claimant with the expressed intent that the
obligations
![]()
of
the Claimant as Guarantor should, by
virtue
![]()
of
the assignment itself, be replaced by the tenant
obligations
under the Lease, at the same time as the
Original
Tenant was released from the tenant
obligations
by
operation
![]()
of
the Act."
I mention this piece
of
evidence because at
one
point the Claimant submitted that the Defendant landlord "brought the present situation all
on
itself" as it could have refused consent to the assignment
on
the basis that the assignment would be to a party, the Claimant, who would not be bound by the tenant covenants. This contention seems somewhat unfair in the light
of
Ms Martin's evidence and, to the extent it is
of
any relevance, I do not accept it.
of
the Licence to Assign the Claimant, as Assignee, covenanted with the Landlord:
"at all times after the completionof
the Assignment throughout the residue
of
the Term
or
until it is released from its covenants pursuant to the 1995 Act to pay the rents and all
other
sums payable under the Lease and to
observe
and perform all the covenants and conditions
on
the lessee's part contained in the Lease."
On
the same day by a Deed
of
Assignment made by the tenant, the Claimant and the tenant's administrators, the Lease was assigned to the Claimant. Also
on
28 November 2014 an Underlease was granted by the Claimant to a new company, HMV Retail
Ltd,
for a term starting
on
the date
of
grant and expiring
on
31 January 2017. The rent is £226,450 per annum, the same amount as that passing under the Lease.
On
18 December 2014 the Claimant's solicitors wrote to the Defendant's solicitors stating that that, although the assignment
of
the Lease and the grant
of
the Underlease were
valid,
the tenant's covenants in the Lease could not be enforced against the Claimant. They relied
on
para [37]
of
the Court
of
Appeal's decision in K/S
Victoria
Street in support
of
this proposition.
On
4 March 2015, the Defendant's solicitors responded to this letter setting
out
their reasons why this argument was wrong.
On
11 March 2015 the Claimant issued this claim seeking a declaration that the Lease has "as a matter
of
law
vested
in the Claimant by assignment and by
operation
of
law, the tenant covenants thereunder are
void
and cannot be enforced against the Claimant."
On
7 May 2015 the Defendant issued an application seeking permission to bring a counterclaim for alternative declarations, together with a declaration based
on
mistake in the event a declaration is made in terms set
out
in the claim form.
order
sealed
on
2 June 2015 Master Clark directed the trial
of
the following preliminary issue, namely "Whether the court should declare that, for the purposes
of
[the Act]:
(1) (as sought by the Claimant) the Lease has as a matter
of
law
vested
in the Claimant by assignment, and by
operation
of
law the tenant covenants therein are
void
and cannot be enforced against the Claimant;
or
(2) (as sought by the Defendant) notwithstanding that the Lease has been
vested
in the Claimant, the tenant covenants therein are
valid
and can be enforced against the Claimant;
or
(3) (as sought by the Defendant in the alternative) the purported assignment
of
the Lease to the Claimant is
void
and
of
no effect, with the result that the Lease remains
vested
in the
Original
Tenant, and that the Claimant remains bound as Guarantor
of
the
Original
Tenant's
obligations
under the Lease by
virtue
of
[the Guarantee] and has not been released from its
obligations
under the Deed
of
Guarantee by the
operation
of
[the Act]."
On
6 July 2015 the tenant's Administrators filed notice to move from administration to dissolution and the tenant was duly dissolved
on
14
October
2015. The Lease is now
vested
in the Crown as bona
vacantia.
In relation to the alternative declaration sought by the Defendant, it is also relevant to mention that in 2015 the Defendant gave written notice to the Claimant pursuant to clause 3.1
of
the Guarantee that the Defendant, as landlord, required the Claimant, as Guarantor, to take a new Lease
of
the Premises.
The Act
(a) Section 5
"5. Tenant released from covenantson
assignment
of
tenancy.
(1) This section applies where a tenant assigns premises demised to him under a tenancy.
(2) If the tenant assigns the wholeof
the premises demised to him, he –
(1) is released from the tenant covenantsof
the tenancy, and
(2) ceases to be entitled to the benefitof
the landlord covenants
of
the tenancy,
as from the assignment."
of
premises demised by the tenancy and "covenant" includes term, condition and
obligation,
and references to a covenant (
or
any description
of
covenant)
of
a tenancy include a covenant (
or
covenant
of
that description) contained in a collateral agreement.
only
applies to "new tenancies", being tenancies granted
on
or
after 1 January 1996, the date the Act came into force: sections 1(1) and 1(3).
of
Richmond (who was a member
of
the Law Commission at the time
of
the report) explained that (para [39]):
"The mischief at which the [Law] Commission's recommendations were aimed was the continuationof
a liability long after the parties had parted with the interests in the property to which it related."
Victoria
Street Lord Neuberger
of
Abbotsbury MR (giving the judgment
of
the court) said that "this aim is centrally achieved through section 5, subsection (2)(a)" (para [16]). In London Diocesan Fund Lord Nicholls described sections 5 to 8
of
the Act as "relieving provisions" and in relation to these provisions:
"16. They are intended to benefit tenants,or
landlords, as the case may be. That is their purpose. That is how they are meant to
operate.
These sections introduce a means, which cannot be
ousted,
whereby in certain circumstances, without the agreement
of
the
other
party, a tenant
or
landlord can be released from a liability he has assumed. The
object
![]()
of
legislation was that
on
lawful assignment
of
a tenancy
or
reversion, irrespective
of
the terms
of
the tenancy, the tenant
or
landlord should have an exit route from his future liabilities. This route should be available in accordance with the statutory provisions.
17. Thus the mischief at which the statute was aimed was the absence in practiceof
any such exit route…"
of
covenant
or
by
operation
of
law then section 5 does not have any effect in relation to that assignment: section 11(2)(a).
only
exception to the
operation
of
section 5 (and also section 24(2), set
out
below) is an authorised guarantee agreement
or
AGA under section 16 under which the existing tenant whose covenants would be released under section 5 agrees to guarantee the performance
of
those covenants by the assignee
only
until any subsequent assignment
of
the lease: section 25(3). However, the issues in this case do not concern AGAs.
(b) Section 24(2)
of
any party,
other
than a tenant, who is bound by any
of
the tenant's covenants in a tenancy (see K/S
Victoria
Street at para [17]). This sub-section provides:
"(2) Where –
(a) byvirtue
![]()
of
this Act a tenant is released from a tenant covenant
of
a tenancy, and
(b) immediately before the release another person is bound by a covenantof
the tenancy imposing any liability
or
penalty in the event
of
a failure to comply with that tenant covenant,
then, as from the releaseof
the tenant, that
other
person is released from the covenant mentioned in paragraph (b) to the same extent as the tenant is released from that tenant covenant."
of
K/S
Victoria
Street the Court
of
Appeal explained that:
"the whole thrustof
section 24(2), indeed
of
the 1995 Act itself, is that a person should not remain liable under a tenancy after the tenant with whose liability he is associated has been released from his liability."
Victoria
Street at para [37] (p. 511D). It is therefore a "relieving provision" and, applying by analogy what was said by Lord Nicholls in London Diocesan Fund, the guarantor "should have an exit route from his future liabilities" which "cannot be
ousted".
of
the Law Commission's report:
"Guarantors
4.53 The positionof
those who enter into leases as guarantors must be considered. The liability
of
a true guarantor is dependent upon the liability
of
the principal debtor. When the latter ceases to be liable, there is no
obligation
for the former to guarantee. Accordingly, if the result
of
![]()
our
proposals would be to release a party to a lease, be he landlord
or
tenant, that would automatically end the responsibility
of
that party's guarantor.
4.54 Mostof
the people now named in leases as guarantors for the tenant actually assume liabilities which make them principal debtors, with
obligations
independent
of
those
of
the party whose covenants they are said to guarantee. They have rights
of
reimbursement against their principals, but they will not, as a matter
of
law, be released from their
obligations
merely because the principal is released. To permit such guarantors,
or
more strictly indemnifiers, to remain liable when the tenant has been wholly released under
our
proposals, would undermine the thrust and purpose
of
those recommendations. We therefore go further. Whenever the liability
of
a tenant would be wholly cancelled under
our
recommendations, we recommend that liabilities which had been undertaken in parallel and are essentially to the same effect would also be terminated.
4.55 When a tenant is partially released from hisobligations
under
our
proposals, we recommend that a third party who has entered into a parallel
obligation
supporting the tenant's liability be released to the same extent. This effect will be automatic, without the third party having to take any action." (emphasis added)
of
the
obligations
under the Lease: see clause 2.4
of
the Guarantee set
out
at paragraph 10 above.
(c) Section 25
"25. Agreementvoid
if it restricts
operation
![]()
of
the Act.
(1) Any agreement relating to a tenancy, isvoid
to the extent that –
(1) it would apart from this section have effect to exclude, modifyor
![]()
otherwise
frustrate the
operation
![]()
of
any provision
of
this Act,
or
(2) it provides for –
(i) the terminationor
surrender
of
the tenancy,
or
(ii) the impositionon
the tenant
of
any penalty, disability
or
liability,
in the eventof
the
operation
![]()
of
any provision
of
this Act,
or
(3) it provides for anyof
the matters referred to in paragraph (b)(i)
or
(ii) and does so (whether expressly
or
![]()
otherwise)
in connection with,
or
in consequence
of,
the
operation
![]()
of
any provision
of
this Act.
…
(3) In accordance with section 16(1) nothing in this section applies to any agreement to the extent that it is an authorised guarantee agreement; but (without prejudice to the generalityof
subsection (1) above) an agreement is
void
to the extent that it is
one
falling within section 16(4)(a)
or
(b).
(4) This section applies to an agreement relating to a tenancy whetheror
not the agreement is –
(a) contained in the instrument creating the tenancy;or
(b) made before the creationof
the tenancy."
of
course to be interpreted generously, so as to ensure the
operation
of
the Act is not frustrated, either directly
or
indirectly" (paras [14] and [18]).
of
Appeal in K/S
Victoria
Street. In that case the claimant, referred to in the judgment as "
Victoria",
had agreed to purchase the freehold
of
a large department store from the then freehold
owner,
House
of
Fraser (Stores Management)
Ltd,
referred to in the judgment as "Management", which was a subsidiary
of
House
of
Fraser plc, referred to in the judgment as "HoF". The agreement provided that, immediately upon completion
of
the purchase,
Victoria
would grant, and Management would accept the lease, with HoF acting as guarantor
of
Management's liabilities.
Victoria
did not regard Management as a satisfactory tenant and the parties agreed that the lease would be assigned to another company within the HoF
group
(with the default position being that the lease should be assigned to a company referred to in the judgment as "Stores") and, in relation to that assignment, HoF would enter into a deed
of
guarantee
of
that assignee's liabilities as surety. The
obligation
of
HoF to enter into a further guarantee was recorded in clause 3.5(iii)
of
the agreement. The lease was not assigned and remained
vested
in Management. The claimant,
Victoria,
contended that it should be assigned to Stores, with HoF renewing its guarantee "pursuant to its apparent
obligation
to do so under clause 3.5(iii)". Management and HoF contended that clause 3.5(iii) was unenforceable and refused to effect the assignment to Stores.
Victoria
then brought proceedings, seeking an
order
that the lease be assigned to Stores with HoF as guarantor
of
Stores' liability. The defendants' contention was that clause 3.5(iii) was rendered
void
by section 25(1)(a), as it would "frustrate the
operation"
of
section 24(2)(b). The defendants' argument is recorded at para [20]
of
the judgment
of
the Court
of
Appeal:
"The argument proceeds as follows.On
the assignment
of
the lease by Management to Stores in accordance with clause 3.5(ii), Management will be released from all further liability under the lease, by
virtue
![]()
of
section 5(1), so section 24(2)(a) is satisfied; and, as HoF is "another person" who is "bound by [the] covenant[s]
of
the [lease]", section 24(2)(b) also applies. Accordingly, it is the effect and intention
of
section 24(2)(b) that, as from the release
of
[Management]", ie
on
the assignment to Stores, HoF should be released from its liabilities as guarantor under the lease. Any provision such as clause 3.5(iii), which stipulates in advance that HoF must re-assume precisely that liability as a term
of
the assignment, would therefore "frustrate" the
operation
![]()
of
section 24(2)(b), and its therefore rendered
void
by section 25(1)(a)."
of
Appeal held that this argument was correct (para [21]), and the reasons for doing so are set
out
at paras [21] to [29]
of
the judgment
of
the court. Lord Neuberger explained:
"21. … If a landlord could (a) when granting a tenancy, impose anobligation
![]()
on
the tenant's guarantor to guarantee the liability
of
the assignee in the event
of
an assignment, and (b)
on
an assignment by a tenant, enforce that
obligation,
it would, as a matter
of
![]()
ordinary
language, "frustrate" the
operation
![]()
of
section 24(2). If it were
otherwise,
it would mean, for instance, that a landlord, when granting a tenancy, could require a guarantor
of
the tenant's liabilities,
on
every assignment
of
the tenancy, to guarantee the liability
of
each successive assignee. Such an
obligation
("a renewal
obligation")
would plainly be wholly contrary to the purpose
of
section 24(2), as it would enable a well-advised landlord to ensure that any guarantor was in precisely the position in which it would have been before the 1995 Act came into force."
of
para [21], and the present situation. This is because the Claimant is the tenant's guarantor falling within (a) and, in relation to (b), the Claimant guarantor having become the tenant, will be liable as the assignee, and the landlord can enforce that
obligation,
which is the
very
same
obligation
it had as guarantor before the assignment. Further, he submitted it does not make any difference whether the landlord's requirement that the tenant's guarantor provide the guarantee has been agreed in advance,
or
whether the request for such a requirement had been made "spontaneously" (by which I think he meant "freely
offered"
by the assignor and guarantor), as this point had been resolved in K/S
Victoria
Street. He therefore submitted, in this case, there was a "renewal", but not a "renewal
obligation"
as such.
Victoria
Street, Lord Neuberger continued:
"22. If a renewalobligation
were enforceable, in many cases, for instance where the prospective
occupier
![]()
of
commercial property was a member
of
a
group
![]()
of
companies, a landlord could also effectively avoid the effect
of
section 5(2) by requiring a subsidiary company in the
group
to take the tenancy, with the parent company acting as guarantor
on
terms which included a renewal
obligation.
Indeed, it could go further than this: as a matter
of
logic, if such a liability could lawfully be imposed
on
and enforced against a guarantor
of
the
original
tenant, it is hard to see why it could not be imposed
on
the
original
tenant itself.
23. Given the plain purposeof
the 1995 Act, and the widely expressed terms
of
section 25(1)(a) and 25(4), any contractual arrangement contained in the tenancy (
or
in a prior agreement), which imposes an
obligation,
![]()
on
an existing
or
prospective guarantor
of
the tenant's liabilities, to guarantee the liabilities
of
a future assignee should be
void.
That conclusion is supported by what was said in the Avonridge case [2005] 1 WLR 2956, paras 14 and 18, by Lord Nicholls
of
Birkenhead. He described section 25 as a "comprehensive anti-avoidance provision", which was "to be interpreted generously, so as to ensure the
operation
![]()
of
the Act is not frustrated, either directly
or
indirectly".
24. For the avoidanceof
doubt, this conclusion would also apply to a contractual arrangement contained in a later document, for instance a renewal
obligation
imposed
on
a guarantor
of
an assignee's liabilities in an assignment
or
a licence to assign. Subsection (4) makes it clear that section 25 applies to agreements "whether
or
not" they are made in,
or
prior to, a tenancy. Accordingly, if, as we consider, a renewal
obligation
imposed
on
a guarantor
of
the
original
tenant is
void,
it must follow that the imposition
of
a renewal
obligation
![]()
on
the guarantor
of
an assignee would also be
void."
![]()
Victoria,
ran two arguments against this conclusion. The first argument, recorded at para [26]
of
the judgment, was that the purpose
of
section 24(2) was "solely to ensure that the release
of
a tenant under section 5(2) was effective", so that the tenant's guarantor is unable to "to seek through subrogation an indemnity from the tenant as the principal creditor, even though the tenant had been released from primary liability" and
on
that basis "a provision such as clause 3.5(iii),
or
indeed a renewal
obligation,
does not "frustrate" the purpose
of
section 24(2)". This argument was rejected by the Court
of
Appeal
on
the following basis:
"27. … we do not accept that section 24(2) has the limited purpose for which [counsel forVictoria]
contended. Its language does not suggest such a limited purpose, and the whole thrust
of
section 24(2), indeed
of
the 1995 Act itself, is that a person should not remain liable under a tenancy after the tenant with whose liability he is associated has been released from his liability. Further, paras 4.53 and 4.54
of
the Law Commission report (Law Com No 174), which were relied
on
by [counsel for
Victoria],
do not support the notion that the section has such a limited purpose. The former paragraph states that when the lessee's liability ceases "that would automatically end the responsibility
of
[his] guarantor". Para 4.54 says that if a guarantor remains liable after the lessee is released, it "would undermine the thrust and purpose
of
[the Commission's] recommendations"."
Victoria's
second argument was that,
on
the unusual facts
of
the case, section 25(1)(a) should not apply. In particular,
Victoria's
counsel pointed to the fact that the parties did not have any intention
of
evading the provisions
of
the Act (para [28]). The Court
of
Appeal expressed "considerable sympathy" with this second argument. However, it was also rejected. This was explained by Lord Neuberger at para [29]:
"… it seems to us that it would be wrong to accede to the argument, both as a matterof
principle and as a matter
of
practice. It would be wrong in principle because section 25(1)(a) applies to any provision which would "have effect to … frustrate the
operation
![]()
of",
inter alia, section 24(2). In
other
words, it is the
objective
effect
of
a particular provision, and not the subjective reasons for its existence, which determine its
validity
for the purpose
of
section 25(1). It would be wrong in practice to adopt the approach inherent in the submission, because it would introduce an element
of
uncertainty, and the
opportunity
for disputes
of
fact, into an area where it is important to have predictability".
of
Appeal then said that the discussion, which I have set
out
above, was "enough to dispose
of
Victoria's
appeal". However, it then went
on
to consider the reasoning and decision
of
Newey J in Good Harvest because, amongst
other
things, the decision in Good Harvest seemed to have led to some controversy and uncertainty in the field
of
landlord and tenant.
"For the reasons already discussed, an agreement which requires a guarantor to provide a further guarantee in the future falls foulof
section 25(1), because it involves a guarantor, at a time that he is,
or
is agreeing to become, the tenant's guarantor, committing himself to re-assume his liabilities
on
a future assignment, when the plain purpose
of
section 24(2) is to ensure that he is released from his liabilities with affect from the assignment." (emphasis added)
of
section 25(1) goes". He then turned to two interpretations
of
section 25(1) which he referred to as "interpretation (i)" and "interpretation (ii)". Interpretation (i) was the interpretation given by Newey J to section 25(1) in Good Harvest "which meant that [section 25(1)] invalidated any agreement which involves a guarantor
of
the assignor guaranteeing that assignor's assignee". The alternative interpretation, interpretation (ii), is that "section 25(1)
only
invalidates such an agreement if it was entered into at the insistence
of
the landlord". The Court
of
Appeal began by considering this issue without regard to AGAs.
"36. Where a lease contains a tenant's covenant against assignment in the normal form, namely that it requires the landlord's consent, which is not to be unreasonably withheld, the landlord mayoften
reasonably refuse consent to a particular assignment unless a suitable guarantor
of
the assignee is provided. If interpretation (i) is correct, the assignor could not
offer
his
own
guarantor, because a guarantor
of
the present tenant is, in effect, absolutely precluded from providing a subsequent guarantee
of
that tenant's assignee. Interpretation (i) would thus appear to give the 1995 Act an unattractively limiting and commercially unrealistic effect.
37. As Newey J accepted, interpretation (i) would mean that, even where it suited the assignor, the assignee and the guarantor that the assignee should have the same guarantor as the assignor (because, for instance, the assignor and the assignee had the same parent company,or
shared a common bank, which was the guarantor), they could not
offer
that guarantor. It would also appear to mean that the lease could not be assigned to the guarantor, even where both tenant and guarantor wanted it. Lord Nicholls said in the Avonridge case [2005] 1 WLR 3956, para 16, that section 5 was "intended to benefit tenants …That is [its] purpose. That is how [it is] meant to
operate".
So, too, section 24(2) is meant to benefit guarantors. It can therefore be argued that, where the assignor and the guarantor who want the guarantor to guarantee an assignee,
or
who want the lease to be assigned to the guarantor, such a renewal,
or
such an assignment, would not "frustrate the
operation
![]()
of
any provision
of
[the 1995 Act]".
38. All this provides some support for the contention that a guaranteeof
the assignee by the assignor's guarantor may not fall foul
of
section 25(1) if it is freely
offered
by the assignor and guarantor.
On
the
other
hand, there is much to be said for interpretation (i). It leads to a clear and simple position. It avoids argument, after, possibly long after, the subsequent guarantee has been given, as to whether it really had been insisted
on
by the landlord
or
freely
offered
by the assignor. Such problems could be particularly acute where the landlord's interest had been assigned after the subsequent guarantee had been
obtained,
and the current landlord therefore may have no knowledge
of
the circumstances in which it had been
obtained."
of
interpretation (i) having been identified, Lord Neuberger then turned to interpretation (ii):
"39. Interpretation (ii) is, in many ways, more attractive in termsof
commercial sense, as it is consistent with the idea that section 25 is to be treated as an anti-avoidance provision which (in a case involving an assignment
of
the tenancy rather than the reversion) protects the assignor and its guarantor, but does not work to their disadvantage…
41. However, as already mentioned above [para 29], section 25(1) appears to be concerned with "the effect"of
a particular agreement, which suggests that what it aims to invalidate is the
objective
effect
of
an agreement, rather than its subjective purpose. It does appear that interpretation (ii) runs rather counter to that approach, as it looks to the subjective reason for the guarantor guaranteeing the assignee, rather than its
objective
effect."
of
Appeal had to choose between interpretations (i) and (ii). The court chose interpretation (i), but subject to a
very
important qualification, which relates to AGAs under section 16, and "removes most
of
the unsatisfactory commercial consequences to which interpretation (i) appears
otherwise
to give rise" (para [44]). Interpretation (i) was chosen because it leads to "a clear and simple position" and "avoids argument … as to whether [the guarantee] had really been insisted
on
by the landlord
or
freely
offered
by the assignor" (para [38]). That was even though interpretation (i) gives the Act "an unattractively limiting and commercially unrealistic effect" (para [36]). The decision
of
Newey J in Good Harvest was therefore correct.
Ltd
v
Topland Neptune
Ltd
[2015] EWHC 53 (Ch) Morgan J summarised the
other
propositions established by K/S
Victoria
Street as a result
of
interpretation (i) as follows (para [15]):
"(5) there was no distinction between a guarantee freelyoffered
by the guarantor and a guarantee insisted upon by the landlord: [40] – [43];
(6) there was no distinction as to the effectof
the 1995 Act
on
an agreement to give the guarantee and a guarantee actually given: [43];
(7) the [very
important qualification, which relates to AGAs under section 16], was that if the assignor gave an AGA in relation to the assignee, the guarantor
of
the assignor (whilst it was the tenant) could also give a guarantee in relation to the assignor's liability under that AGA: [46] – [48].
(8) if a tenant assigns and the tenant and the tenant's guarantor are thereupon released, there is nothing to stop that guarantor becoming a guarantor againon
a subsequent assignment: [51];
(9) the proposition in (8) above applies notonly
where the subsequent assignee is a new party but also where the subsequent assignee is an earlier tenant whose liabilities were guaranteed by that guarantor; [51]."
of
section 25(1) as the correct approach,
one
of
the consequences
of
that interpretation was identified as follows (per Lord Neuberger at para [37]):
"It would also appear to mean that the lease could not be assigned to the guarantor, even where both tenant and guarantor wanted it."
of
the argument before me has been whether,
on
the correct interpretation
of
the Act, this statement is actually correct. This point was raised, but not decided, in UK Leasing Brighton
Ltd
at paras [28] to [30] and [41]. It is,
of
course, important to consider the statement in the context in which it was made and, for that reason, I have set
out
in some detail above the relevant passages from the judgment
of
K/S
Victoria
Street.
of
UK Leasing Brighton
Ltd,
I need to set
out
the provisions
of
section 3
of
the Act.
(d) Section 3
"3. Transmissionof
benefit and burden covenants.
(1) The benefit and burdenof
all landlord and tenant covenants
of
a tenancy –
(a) shall be annexed and incident to the whole, and to each and every part,of
the premises demised by the tenancy and
of
the reversion in them, and
(b) shall in accordance with this section passon
an assignment
of
the whole
or
any part
of
those premises
or
![]()
of
the reversion in them.
(2) Where the assignment is by the tenant under the tenancy, then as from the assignment the assignee –
(a) becomes bound by the tenant covenantsof
the tenancy except to the extent that –
(i) immediately before the assignment they did not bind the assignor,or
(ii) they fall to be complied with in relation to any demised premises not comprised in the assignment; and
(b) becomes entitled to the benefitof
the landlord covenants
of
the tenancy except to the extent that they fall to be complied with in relation to any such premises.
…
(3) In determining for the purposesof
subsection (2)
or
(3) whether any covenant bound the assignor immediately before the assignment; any waiver
or
release
of
the covenant which (in whatever terms) is expressed to be personal to the assignor shall be disregarded."
out
at para 2.20 (p. 8):
"B. Privityof
Estate
(i) Covenants enforceable by landlord and tenant and their successors
2.20. Covenants in leases may be divided into twogroups:
(a) those which "touch and concern the land"or
have "reference to the subject matter
of
the lease", term which have the same meaning; and
(b) those which impose personalor
collateral
obligations.
Most leases probably imposeobligations
![]()
of
both types. The
original
parties remain bound by all the covenants in the lease by
virtue
![]()
of
privity
of
contract. In respect
of
the first
group
![]()
of
covenants
only,
there is also liability, by way
of
privity
of
estate, between the persons, who for the time being, stand in the shoes
of
the
original
landlord and the
original
tenant.
2.21. Thus, when theoriginal
tenant assigns his lease, the assignee (and any subsequent assignee) automatically becomes directly liable to the landlord, with whom he has privity
of
estate, in respect
of
those covenants which "touch and concern" the land. Examples
of
such covenants are covenants to pay the rent; to repair buildings; to insure them against fire ..."
out
at Part IV
of
the report. At para 4.1 (p. 19) the Law Commission explains that their proposals for reform recognise the importance
of
two principles:
"First, a landlordor
tenant
or
property should not continue to enjoy rights nor be under any
obligation
arising from a lease
once
he has parted with all interest in the property.
Secondly, all the termsof
the lease should be regarded as a single bargain for letting the property. When the interest
of
![]()
one
![]()
of
the parties change hands the successor should fully take his predecessor's place as landlord
or
tenant, without distinguishing between different categories
of
covenant."
of
the report (p. 27). The first part
of
this section deals with the "distinction between covenants" and explains:
"4.46 Although to accord withour
first principle it may be necessary to differentiate between covenants which apply to different parts
of
property let by a lease,
our
second principle suggests that covenants should not be put into different categories for
other
reasons. We accordingly recommend that there should be no distinction between lease covenants which touch and concern the land and
other
covenants. Abolishing this distinction will
of
itself simplify the law, because the current parties to leases will be able to be sure that they are bound by and benefit from all the
obligations
set
out
in the lease."
on
p. 33
of
the report was that "the distinction between lease covenants which touch and concern the land and those which do not should be abolished". Mr Seitler relied
on
these passages from the Law Commission report and submitted that the purpose
of
section 3 is to enable the Act to provide a "complete and self-contained framework" so that the Act applies to all landlord and tenant covenants. Section 3 is not, he submitted, directed at the main thrust
of
the Act, which is that a tenant
or
any
other
person who is associated with the tenant's liability should not remain liable under a tenancy after the tenant has been released from his liability.
or
in the decision
of
the court, in K/S
Victoria
Street. This is perhaps not surprising given that the issue in that case was about imposition
of
a renewal
obligation
on
the tenant's guarantor, and not about the consequences
of
an assignment
on
the assignee
of
the lease. In the course
of
his submissions Mr Reynolds accepted that section 3 was part
of
the "tidying up", which took place as part
of
the reforms recommended by the Law Commission in its report.
Ltd
a lease, to which the Act applied, was granted to a tenant (T1). T1's
obligations
under the lease were guaranteed by a guarantor, G. In breach
of
covenant T1 assigned the lease to a new tenant, T2. The assignment was therefore an "excluded assignment" and T1 and G were not released from their liabilities in relation to the tenant covenants in the lease. The parties wished to resolve the situation, but were concerned about the impact
of
the Act in relation to the solutions proposed. The landlords suggested that T2 could re-assign the lease to T1, with G giving a fresh guarantee
of
the
obligations
under the lease. This solution was considered by Morgan J at paras [20] to [33]
of
his judgment and, in relation to these steps, he said this:
"21. I consider that the way in which the 1995 Act wouldoperate
in relation to these steps is, prima facie, as follows:
(1) T2 will be released from the tenant covenants: section 5(2)(a);
(2) T1 will be released from the tenant covenants entered into at the time the lease was granted to T1: section 11(2)(b);
(3) G will be released from the earlier guarantee which it gave: section 24(2);
(4)On
the re-assignment to T1, T1 again becomes bound by the tenant covenants: section 3(2)(a).
22. If this is right so far, the problem would then be: if G is released under section 24(2) from the earlier guarantee which it gave, can it effectively be bound by a fresh guarantee entered intoon
the re-assignment to T1? The concern is that the decision in
Victoria
Street would produce the result that the re-imposition
of
such a liability
on
G would frustrate the
operation
![]()
of
a provision
of
the 1995 Act (ie section 24(2)) and would therefore be invalid."
of
the Act. His first point was based
on
the interpretation
of
section 11(2)(b) which the judge described as a "radical argument", and rejected. Counsel for the landlords' second point was that:
"28. … it was not possible under the 1995 Act to assign the termof
the lease back to T1 because to re-impose liability
on
T1 would be contrary to a release
of
T1 under section 11(2)(b). This somewhat improbable argument was said to be supported by a statement in
Victoria
Street as to the position
of
a guarantor. In that case, Lord Neuberger said at [37]: "It would also appear to mean that the lease could not assigned to the guarantor, even where both the tenant and the guarantor wanted it."
observation
about Lord Neuberger's statement at para [37]
of
K/S
Victoria
Street:
"29. What Lord Neuberger was referring to in this statement was the possible conflict between a releaseof
a guarantor under section 24 and the re-imposition
of
liability
on
the former guarantor as assignee. The statement is
obiter
and somewhat tentative. For present purposes, I do not need to consider whether I should follow that statement in a case to which it applies. In the present case, there is no suggestion
of
an assignment to G so the statement is not directly applicable. I am not prepared to extrapolate from that statement about a guarantor so as to reach the result that it is not possible in the present case for T2 to reassign to T1. As explained in paragraph 21 above [set
out
at para 57 above], the position
of
T1 is governed by two provisions, first section 11(2)(b) and, secondly, section 3(2)(a). I am not prepared to hold that the release under section 11(2)(b) means that section 3(2)(a) cannot take effect. I consider that both provisions take effect. Accordingly I will adopt the analysis set
out
in paragraph 21 above [set
out
at para 57 above]. "
open
to the parties to proceed with a direct assignment by T2 to T1 with T1's
obligations
being guaranteed by G (para [33]). Finally, Morgan J commented
on
a "third way" which he had identified, but the parties had not themselves put forward, and said this:
"41. Theother
possibility is an assignment by T2 to G followed by an assignment by G to T1, guaranteed by a fresh guarantee from G, but without any commitment prior to the assignment to G that the assignment to T1 (and the fresh guarantee by G) would be entered into. Would these steps be effective under the 1995 Act? I do not think that a problem would arise in relation to the fresh guarantee given by G
on
the assignment by G to T1. The fresh guarantee could be an AGA within section 16, which would therefore be effective under the 1995 Act. However, a problem could arise in relation to the earlier assignment,
or
purported assignment, from T2 to G in
view
![]()
of
the statement at [37] in
Victoria
Street, which I have quoted at paragraph 28 above. This statement is
obiter
and somewhat tentative. A question was raised in the course
of
argument as to whether this statement was really correct. However, I was not asked to rule
on
that point. If I had been asked to hold that the statement was incorrect, I would have required further argument before being persuaded not to follow this dictum
of
the Court
of
Appeal. In the circumstances, it would not be right for me to consider the matter further in this judgment."
of
K/S
Victoria
had given rise to considerable debate in the property sector. I was therefore curious to know whether there had been any academic writing
on
this topic. Counsel checked this, and were unable to find any articles which were directly relevant. I then became aware
of
talk delivered by Morgan J to the Property Bar Association
on
4 November 2015 entitled "The Landlord and Tenant (Covenants) Act 1995: 20 years
on".
I drew this talk to the attention
of
Counsel and invited them to provide me with written submissions, if they wished to comment
on
it. I received written submissions from both Counsel in respect
of
the talk
on
28 January 2016.
Ltd
and said this:
"71. In my judgment, I leftopen
the question
of
whether Lord Neuberger had been right to suggest that where the lease was
vested
in T and T's
obligations
were guaranteed by G, then the lease could not be assigned to G even where T and G wanted that to happen. Let me now consider that proposition. The argument is that the Act is intended to produce the result that G is released under section 24(2)
on
an assignment by T1. If G becomes the assignee, it will be bound by the tenant covenants and so will not be released. Therefore, the assignment to G has effect to frustrate the
operation
![]()
of
the Act.
72. What this argument misses is that the reason the assignment to G makes G liableon
the tenant covenants is that section 3(2)(a) so provides. So the Act
operates
in two different ways.
On
the assignment, section 24(2)
operates
to release G from its earlier guarantee and section 3(2)(a)
operates
to impose the burden
of
the tenant covenants
on
G as assignee. So the Act
operates
in two consecutive ways. Why should it not
operate
to the full in both
of
these ways? The
operation
![]()
on
![]()
one
way does not frustrate the
operation
![]()
of
the Act in the
other
way. The release under section 24(2) does not frustrate the
operation
![]()
of
section 3(2)(a). The imposition
of
the burden
of
the covenants under section 3(2)(a) does not frustrate the release under section 24(2).
73. This reasoning was essentially the reasoning that appealed to me when I decided what the position would be when the term was assigned by T2 to T1. Although I did not need to say so in the case I decided, in truth, the same logicought
to dispose
of
Lord Neuberger's tentative suggestion also. There is no conceivable policy reason not to give effect to this logic."
observations
were made by Morgan J in the context
of
a talk (rather than as a result
of
legal argument), and they should not be given more weight than "the words
of
any reputable author": see Cordell
v
Second Clanfield Properties
Ltd
[1969] 2 Ch 9, per Megarry J at 16F-17B. In any event, Mr Reynolds adopted everything said by Morgan J at paras [72] and [73]
of
his talk, whereas Mr Seitler disagreed with the judge's analysis.
(e) The effect
of
section 25
Ltd
v
Adda Hotels (an unlimited company) [2014] EWCA Civ 1215. In Tindall Cobham 1
Ltd
the tenant assigned the lease to an associated company without the landlord's consent, and then sought to justify this by reference to section 25 as interpreted in K/S
Victoria
Street. The alienation provision in the relevant leases provided that:
"3.14.6 The Tenant shall not assign this Lease to any Associated Companyof
the Tenant without the prior consent
of
the Landlord Provided Always that for the purposes
of
Section 19(1A)
of
the Landlord and Tenant Covenants Act [1927], the Landlord shall be entitled to impose any
or
all
of
the following conditions set
out
in sub clauses (a) and (b) below:
(a) that the Tenant shall provide the Landlord with noticeof
any such assignment within 10 Working Days
of
completion
of
the same;
(b) thaton
any such assignment, the Tenant shall procure that the Guarantor and any
other
guarantor
of
the Tenant shall covenant by deed with the Landlord in the terms set
out
in the Sixth Schedule at the Tenant's sole cost
and subject to the Tenant's compliance with such conditions the Landlord's consent shall be given."
of
Appeal concerned a point
on
the construction
of
this clause in the lease. The Court
of
Appeal then moved
on
to consider the effect
of
section 25
on
clause 3.14.6. The arguments raised "the more fundamental question which applies to all the agreements about the effect
of
s.25 which is how far the section should be regarded as avoiding the contractual provisions in this case". This issue was dealt with by Patten LJ in relation to the facts
of
that case as follows:
"45. The argumentson
s.25 which I have already
outlined,
the landlords' argument that s.25(1) avoids the entirety
of
the proviso to clause 3.14.6 (which the judge accepted) and the further argument advanced by Mr Reynolds [counsel for the landlord] that it should be taken to avoid not
only
the proviso but the whole
of
clause 3.14.6 all turn
on
the words "to the extent that" in s.25(1). It is clear that s.25 was intended to provide a comprehensive anti-avoidance provision which, as Lord Nicholls said in London Diocesan Fund
v
Phithwa [2005] 1 WLR 3956,
ought
to be interpreted generously to ensure that the
operation
![]()
of
the 1995 Act is not frustrated either directly
or
indirectly. Mr McGhee [counsel for the tenants] made the point that that legislation which
operates
to avoid the whole
or
a part
of
a contract may produce consequences in terms
of
the legal position which the parties are left with that may be both capricious and uncommercial. I accept that. Any alteration
of
the contract will necessarily change the parties' legal relationship from what they intended it to be and the actual impact upon them in terms
of
the remaining balance
of
liabilities and
obligations
may be fortuitous. But that should not be regarded as an invitation to assume that such will necessarily be the case, still less to attribute to Parliament an intention that the legislation should be interpreted and applied in that way when
other
alternatives are available.
46. Although the words "void
to the extent that" indicate that Parliament did not intend to invalidate more
of
the relevant agreement than was necessary to safeguard the
objectives
![]()
of
the Act in the context
of
the particular assignment under consideration, those words do not in my
view
preclude the Court from taking a balanced approach to invalidation which, while neutralising the
offending
parts
of
the contract, does not leave it emasculated and unworkable.…
47. … We are not concerned with whether the Court is able to sever an illegal contracton
these common law principles because s.25 makes it clear in terms that it
operates
![]()
only
to invalidate limited parts
of
the relevant agreement. The rules
of
severance are not therefore
of
much assistance even by analogy to a determination
of
how much
of
the contract by the Court is required to treat as invalid
or
unenforceable for the purpose
of
s.25. But in carrying
out
that exercise I can see nothing in s.25(1) which prevents the court from looking at the structure
of
the agreement in an
objective
and common sense way.
48. The difficulty I have with Mr McGhee's argument that it is necessaryonly
to remove sub-clause (b)
of
the proviso is that this would treat conditions (a) and (b) as independent and self-sufficient rather than as parts
of
a composite, interdependent proviso under which the landlords must consent to the assignment if the conditions are fulfilled. The removal from the proviso
of
the most important condition from the landlords' point
of
![]()
view
seems to me to call both logically and as a matter
of
drafting for the removal as well
of
the concluding two lines
of
the proviso which apply
only
if "such conditions" are complied with. Mr McGhee accepts that those words have to be changed but submits that his clients should remain entitled to the benefit
of
the requirement
on
the landlords to give consent. That is to create an imbalance in the contractual provisions which in my
view
the legislation was not intended to create unless unavoidable. The far more
obvious
solution which both respects the structure
of
the contract and gives effect to the provisions
of
s.25(1) is to regard, as the judge did, the whole
of
the proviso as being avoided by legislation. This realistically treats the proviso as a complete term
of
the contract (which is what it is) and leaves clause 3.14.6 as a qualified covenant against assignment which can be
operated
according to its terms.
49. For the same reasons, I regard Mr Reynolds'other
argument that the whole
of
clause 3.14.6 should be regarded as invalidated as excessive and I reject it." (emphasis added)
of
Appeal therefore concluded that the whole
of
the proviso to clause 3.14.6 was avoided by section 25(1). Ryder LJ and Longmore LJ agreed with the reasons
of
Patten LJ (paras [51] and [52]).
The parties' submissions
(a) The Claimant's submissions
of
an assigning tenant cannot be made to guarantee the liabilities
of
an assignee. He says, the whole thrust
of
the Act, from the time
of
the Law Commission's report, is to draw no distinction between the liabilities as tenant and the liabilities as guarantor. This means that, if a guarantor cannot guarantee the liabilities
of
assignor's assignee, then it cannot assume them itself either. So,
on
the release
of
the
original
tenant, the
original
tenant's guarantor must be released from the tenant's covenants to the same extent. Mr Seitler maintains that the guarantor must be released – that is the central policy
of
the Act – and not re-instated as tenant. That is why, he says, in K/S
Victoria
Street, the Court
of
Appeal held that it would not be legitimate for the term to be assigned to the guarantor, but that the guarantor can lawfully guarantee a second assignment (para [51]).
of
Appeal has said, albeit
obiter,
at para [37]
of
K/S
Victoria
Street; (ii) section 3(2)(a) is not what the thrust
of
the Act is directed to (see paras 51 to 55 above) and, in any event, section 3(2)(a) is subject to sections 5, 24 and 25
of
the Act; (iii) if liability can be re-imposed
on
G1 when it becomes T2, this would "drive a coach and horses through the Act", as landlords could easily devise schemes to disable the Act (e.g. he said that a landlord could provide in a lease that the
original
tenant, T1, could
only
assign to a joint tenancy T1 and T2 and, if this was permitted, then there would be no release for T1 at all, and that would frustrate the purpose
of
the Act); (iv) the point was not decided in UK Leasing Brighton
Ltd;
and (
v)
Morgan J's extra-judicial
views,
set
out
in his recent talk to the Property Bar Association, about the effect
of
section 3(2)(a) are wrong.
of
section 25(1)(a) in the present circumstances. First, clause 4.1
of
the Licence to Assign (being an agreement relating to a tenancy) is rendered
void.
Second, the tenant covenants in the Lease are
void
as against the Claimant, but the Lease itself still exists and is
vested
in the Claimant. In relation to this second consequence, Mr Seitler says this is possible as a matter
of
law. In support
of
this submission he referred to Woodfall's Law
of
Landlord and Tenant (
Vol
1) para 1.003 and City
of
London Corporation
v
Fell [1994] 1 AC 458, HL at 465D-E, where Lord Templeman approved what Nourse LJ had said in the Court
of
Appeal:
"The contractualobligations
which touch and concern the land having become imprinted
on
the estate, the tenancy is capable
of
existence as a species
of
property independently
of
the contract."
on
assignment,
void
as against the Claimant because:
(1) The Lease contains a standard form forfeiture clause providing that the landlord can re-enter if the tenant does not comply with the tenant covenants and that forfeiture clause still exists and is binding
on
the Claimant (
or
G1). This is because the forfeiture clause is not a landlord
or
tenant covenant and, in support
of
this proposition, he pointed to section 4
of
the Act. The consequence
of
this, he argued, is that the tenant covenants are "in suspense" against the Claimant (
or
G1). However, notwithstanding this, he accepted that the landlord is quite entitled to forfeit the lease if the tenant covenants are not complied with. Therefore,
on
this analysis (i) the Lease is
vested
in the Claimant, (ii) the Claimant is not under any
obligation
to pay the rent, as the tenant covenant is
void,
but (iii) if the Claimant does not pay any rent, the Defendant can forfeit the Lease.
(2) If the point at (1) above is wrong then, in
order
to take a "balanced approach" (per Patten LJ in Tindall Cobham 1
Ltd),
if the landlord cannot enforce the tenant covenants, then the tenant cannot enforce the landlord covenants either.
(b) The Defendant's submissions
of
Appeal in K/S
Victoria
Street was right to decide that interpretation (i)
of
section 25(1) was correct (a proposition accepted by the Defendant for the purposes
of
this hearing). He accepted that the statement at para [37]
of
K/S
Victoria
Street that it appears a lease cannot be assigned to the guarantor was "
obviously
carefully considered by the court". However, he submitted that this statement made by Lord Neuberger should not be applied in the way contended for by the Claimant. He identified three principal reasons in support
of
this submission.
void
a guarantee which has been given,
or
an
obligation
to give such a guarantee, in relation to an assignment the efficacy
of
which is not dependent upon the giving
of
the guarantee.
of
the Act, and the Defendant adopts everything said by Morgan J extra-judicially in relation to the effect
of
section 3(2)(a) after section 24(2) has
operated
(see paras [72] and [73]
of
the talk set
out
at paragraph 62 above). Indeed, the Claimant's interpretation
of
the Act contravenes section 25(1) because it frustrates the
operation
of
section 3
of
the Act.
of
section 25(1) in the present circumstances
offends
against all the principles
of
landlord and tenant, and it creates a tenancy which is not
one
that we would
ordinarily
recognise as a tenancy. Indeed, as Mr Reynolds colourfully put it, it is a "Frankenstein's monster"
of
a tenancy and the Claimant's argument in this regard is absurd.
vested
in the tenant until its recent dissolution and is now
vested
in the Crown as bona
vacantia.
The consequence
of
this is that the Claimant as guarantor remains liable by
virtue
of
the Guarantee (and its
obligation
to take a new lease pursuant to clause 3.1 thereof).
of
their written arguments and
oral
submissions.
Conclusion
of
a tenant would be wholly cancelled by their recommendations, then liabilities which had been undertaken "in parallel and are essentially to the same effect" should also be terminated.
of
the Act" is that there should be no re-assumption
or
renewal
of
liabilities, whether
on
the tenant
or
the guarantor. That is the effect
of
5(2)(a) in the case
of
tenants and section 24(2)(a) in the case
of
a guarantor (
or
"
other
person" bound by the tenant covenants). This means that, if a tenant and the tenant's guarantor are each liable for the same
or
essentially the same liabilities as a result
of
the tenant's covenants
of
the tenancy, the guarantor cannot as a result
of
assignment by the tenant to it
of
the tenancy re-assume those
very
same,
or
essentially the same, liabilities as the tenant.
Or,
using the terminology used in some
of
the cases, G1 cannot
on
an assignment by T1, become T2.
on
the assignment by T1 to G1:
(1) T1 is released from the tenant covenants
of
the tenancy, as from the assignment: section 5(2)(a).
(2) G1 is released from the tenant covenants
of
the tenancy, as from the release
of
T1: section 24(2).
(3) It is the effect and intention
of
section 24(2) that "as from the release
of
[T1]", ie
on
the assignment to T2 (formerly G1), G1 should be released from its liabilities as guarantor under the lease.
(4) However, as from the assignment to T2 (formerly G1), T2 becomes bound by the tenant covenants: section 3(2)(a).
The assignment therefore releases G1 from the tenant covenants
of
the tenancy but, at the
very
same moment in time, binds G1 (but now as T2) with the tenant covenants
of
the tenancy. In practical terms therefore, there is no release at all for G1 in respect
of
its liabilities under tenant covenants. This is because the liabilities under the tenant covenants are simply re-assumed by the guarantor, but this time as an assignee (and not as a guarantor). Further, the liability re-assumed by G1 as T2 is the
very
same in a case such as the present, where the guarantor is also primarily liable in respect
of
the tenant covenants. The
objective
effect
of
the assignment is that G1 re-assumes precisely the same liability in respect
of
the tenant covenants as a result
of
becoming T2 pursuant to the assignment. It is that consequence which "frustrates" the
operation
of
section 24(2)(b) and the assignment is rendered
void
by section 25(1)(a), an anti-avoidance provision which is to be interpreted generously. The guarantor is therefore absolutely precluded from becoming the assignee,
on
an assignment by the tenant whose tenant covenants he is guaranteeing.
Victoria
Street when he says "it would appear to mean that the lease could not be assigned to the guarantor, even where both tenant and guarantor wanted it" (para [37]). Further, it also seems to me, that there is additional support for this conclusion when
one
looks at the main part
of
the judgment in K/S
Victoria
Street at para [27]. Here the Court
of
Appeal gave its reasons for rejecting
Victoria's
argument based
on
section 24(2) and said "the whole thrust
of
section 24(2), indeed
of
the 1995 Act itself, is that a person should not remain liable under a tenancy after the tenant with whose liability he is associated has been released from his liability" (emphasis added).
Ltd
Morgan J explained that what Lord Neuberger was referring to in this statement was the possible conflict between a release
of
a guarantor under section 24(2) and the re-imposition
of
liability
on
the former guarantor as an assignee under section 3(2)(a) (para [29]). I have given this point a considerable amount
of
thought, particularly in the light
of
the
observations
contained in Morgan J's recent talk to the Property Bar Association. However, I am not sure that I agree with this. This is because, what I think Lord Neuberger is referring to is the consequence
of
interpretation (i) and the policy
of
the Act that a tenant
or
guarantor cannot, as the result
of
an assignment, re-assume the
very
same,
or
essentially the same, liabilities in respect
of
the tenancy.
of
the Act is not mentioned in terms in the judgment
of
the Court
of
Appeal in K/S
Victoria
Street. However, in the light
of
what was said by Lord Neuberger at para [37], it would appear that the Court
of
Appeal did have section 3 in mind (and this is what Morgan J thought in UK Leasing Brighton
Ltd
(para [29])). It is therefore necessary to consider whether section 3 alters the conclusion that,
on
an assignment
of
the tenancy, the guarantor cannot re-assume its liabilities by becoming the assignee.
of
the Act, namely that a person should not remain liable under a tenancy after the tenant with whose liability he is associated has been released from his liability. It is, as Mr Reynolds pointed
out,
part
of
the "tidying up" that took place as a result
of
the reforms recommended in the Law Commission's report.
of
the same transaction) is that, first, the guarantor is released from liability under section 24(2) then, as a second step,
or
sequentially, the same liability is imposed
on
the
very
same person, but this time as assignee, under section 3(2)(a). This he submits is how the Act
operates,
and the
operation
of
the Act in this way is not contrary to section 25(1)(a). In support
of
this contention he pointed to UK Leasing Brighton
Ltd
and submitted that the facts
of
that case are not that dissimilar from facts
of
the present case.
of
the guarantor from his liabilities under the tenant covenants, and the re-assumption
of
those
very
same liabilities
on
him as the assignee. Rather, sections 5(2), 3(2) and 24(2) provide that these events should all happen at the
very
same moment in time, which is "as from" the assignment. There is therefore no moment in time when a person who is the guarantor, and then becomes the assignee, is actually released from,
or
otherwise
freed from, his liabilities in respect
of
the tenant covenants. This means that, whether as guarantor
or
as assignee, the liabilities in respect
of
the tenant covenants have continued unchanged. Indeed, the need for an actual period
of
release is clear from K/S
Victoria
Street at para [51] when Lord Neuberger explained:
"51. ... [If] theoriginal
tenant and the
original
guarantor are released from liability under the tenancy
on
the first assignment, and the fact that they choose subsequently, namely
on
a further assignment, to reassume liability under the lease cannot be said to "frustrate" their release
on
the first assignment."
view,
there is nothing in section 3(2)(a) which alters the conclusion expressed above that the guarantor is absolutely precluded from becoming the assignee,
on
an assignment by the tenant whose tenant covenants he is guaranteeing. As is clear from K/S
Victoria
Street, the fact such a conclusion is unattractively limiting and commercially unrealistic is neither here nor there.
of
the Lease was executed
on
28 November 2014. The next question is to what extent is the assignment,
or
the Licence to Assign, avoided by section 25(1). It is quite clear from Tindall Cobham 1
Ltd
that the court is required to take "a balanced approach to invalidation which, whilst neutralising the
offending
parts
of
the contract, does not leave it emasculated and unworkable", and the court is entitled to look at "the structure
of
the agreement in an
objective
and common sense way".
on
an assignment to the Claimant do not make any sense at all. I do not see how,
on
the
one
hand, the tenant covenants are rendered
void
or
kept in "suspense" and,
on
the
other,
the landlord is entitled to exercise his rights
of
re-entry if they are not complied with (which,
on
any footing, would be enforcing by the "back door" covenants rendered
void
by the Act). This cannot work as a matter
of
law. Take, for example, the
obligation
to pay rent. If Mr Seitler is right and the
obligation
to pay rent is
void,
then it must follow that the landlord cannot re-enter if he is not paid any rent by the assignee, in this case the Claimant. This is because no rent will be due from the assignee to the Defendant landlord as that
obligation
will be
void
by reason
of
section 25(1) and, if that
obligation
is
void,
then a right
of
re-entry cannot arise in respect
of
it under the Lease. The position must be the same in respect
of
all the
other
tenant covenants under the Lease which,
on
Mr Seitler's argument, have been rendered
void
by section 25(1). This Mr Seitler says is a "shell"
of
a lease. However, as Mr Reynolds contends, it is not a tenancy as we would
ordinarily
know it, but an arrangement which is unbalanced as well as "emasculated and unworkable" (per Patten LJ in Tindall Cobham 1
Ltd).
obvious
consequence
of
section 25(1)(a) in the present circumstances is that the assignment is
void.
The assignment, an "agreement relating to a tenancy", purports to make the Claimant, as the assignee, liable in respect
of
the
very
same covenants from which it had just been released as the guarantor. This has the effect
of
frustrating section 24(2) and, in
order
to safeguard the
objectives
of
the Act, the assignment itself must be
void,
and the consequence
of
this is that the assignment will not take effect to
vest
the Lease in the Claimant, as an assignee.
one
which is certain. This conclusion is re-inforced by the actual statement
of
Lord Neuberger in K/S
Victoria
Street that "the lease could not be assigned to the guarantor, even where both the tenant and guarantor wanted it" (emphasis added). It is not a question
of
picking and choosing which aspects
of
the lease will survive the assignment from the
original
tenant to the guarantor. Rather, as Lord Neuberger said, such an assignment is a transaction which cannot be done and the assignment will be struck down as
void
in the event that the tenant seeks to assign the lease to its guarantor.
of
the Lease to the Claimant is
void
and
of
no effect, with the result that the Lease remains
vested
in the
Original
Tenant, and that the Claimant remains bound as Guarantor
of
the
Original
Tenant's
obligations
under the Lease by
virtue
of
the Guarantee and has not been released from its
obligations
under the Guarantee by the
operation
of the Act.