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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Commercial Court) Decisions >> FM Capital Partners Ltd v Marino & Ors [2018] EWHC 1768 (Comm) (11 July 2018) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Comm/2018/1768.html Cite as: [2018] EWHC 1768 (Comm) |
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Neutral Citation Number: [2018] EWHC 1768 (Comm)
Case No: CL-2014-000863
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS
OF ENGLAND AND WALES
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
COMMERCIAL COURT
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Date: 11/07/2018
Before :
THE HONOURABLE MRS JUSTICE COCKERILL
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Between :
|
FM CAPITAL PARTNERS LTD |
Claimant |
|
- and – |
|
|
(1) FRÉDÉRIC ![]() (2) AURÉLIEN BESSOT (3) YOSHIKI OHMURA (4) MARIT SJǾVAAG |
Defendants |
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Nathan Pillow QC & Anton Dudnikov (instructed by Hogan Lovells International LLP) for the Claimant
James Couser (instructed by Richard Slade and Company) for the First Defendant
Laurence Emmett & James Fox (instructed by Cooke Young and Keidan LLP) for the Third Defendant
Hearing dates: 12, 13, 14, 15, 19, 21, 22, 26, and 27 March 2018
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Judgment Approved
Mrs Justice Cockerill:
1.
In this action the Claimant ("FMCP”) brings a variety of claims
against the First Defendant ("Mr Marino")
and the Third Defendant ("Mr
Ohmura"). Claims against other defendants, principally the Second
Defendant ("Mr Bessot") have been settled before this trial. FMCP is
a UK company originally incorporated as a joint venture between Mr
Marino,
Mr
Bessot and Libya Africa Investment Portfolio ("LAP"), a Libyan
sovereign wealth fund, to manage LAP's assets. It is majority owned by LAP.
2.
At all material times FMCP's directors included Mr Marino,
who was also
its employee and Chief Executive Officer, and Mr Bessot, who was also its Chief
Investment Officer. At the same time Mr
Marino
and Mr Bessot were joint owners
of another company, Ironfly International Limited ("Ironfly"), and Mr
Marino
was the owner of a company called Leopard Technology Limited (“Leopard”).
6.
The payments made to Ironfly, Leopard and Conquest are said by FMCP to
be secret commissions. Consequently, as well as the claim in conspiracy, claims
are made against both Mr Marino
and Mr Ohmura on the basis of dishonest
assistance, knowing receipt and bribery; and claims are also made against Mr
Marino
for breach of his duties as a director. There are also proprietary
claims against each. The claims made against each of them by FMCP, and the
amounts of those claims, are summarised in the Appendix to this judgment. In
essence the total claims against both Defendants across the various trades
(FM/YO) are:
i) Conspiracy: US$16,231,426/ US$16,231,426;
ii) Dishonest assistance: US$14,789,984/ US$12,183,713;
iii) Bribery: US$14,789,984/US$7,875,313
iv) Breach of fiduciary duty: US$14,789,984/zero;
v) Knowing receipt: US$13,933,713/US$625,000.
7.
It is only the issues concerning these payments and giving rise to these
causes of action with which I am concerned in this Phase I trial. Pursuant to
a direction made by Andrew Baker J on 20 December 2016 there will at a later date
be a Phase II trial concerned with claims relating to what is said to be a loss
of c. US$46m caused by the forfeiture of capital protection on the GAIN notes,
and claims relating to the extraction of various fees, without LAP’s consent,
both for FMCP and for the benefit of entities owned or controlled by Messrs
Marino
and/or Bessot.
8. I set out below a guide to the structure of this judgment:
i) The structure of the trial: Paragraph 9
ii) Uncontroversial facts: Paragraph 15
a) The Parties
b)
LAP, its portfolio and initial contact with Mr Marino
c) The JB Notes and the IMAs
d) The Structured Product Trades
e) The Defendants’ companies and the amounts paid to the Defendants
f) Sums paid to Third Parties
g) The PwC and BDO investigations
h) The Charles Russell letter and the current proceedings
iii) The legal common ground and the legal issues in outline: Paragraph 63
a) The standard of proof for dishonesty
b) Breach of fiduciary duties and directors' duties
c) Dishonest assistance
d) Knowing receipt
e) Bribery
f) Conspiracy
iv) Conclusions on Factual Issues and on Principal Claims: Paragraph 96
a) The witnesses and the inferences contended for
b) The background to FMCP’s incorporation and the April Mandate
c) July - October 2009: GAIN I and II and the first payments
d) July - October 2009: The Vesper entities
e) January- July 2010: Mr Haggiagi
f) October 2009- September 2010: The Private Bank trades
g) May 2010: AMFC +
h) November 2010: TRAC
i) January 2011: Transfer of Custody to HSBC
j) Vesper: 2010-2011
k) January - June 2011: The Vesper Trades
l) October 2011: TRAC+
m) September 2012-July 2014: Payments to Mr Aversano and Mr Ay
v) Other Issues: Paragraph 409
a) The issue of loss
b) Knowing receipt
c) Bribery
d) Conspiracy
e) Limitation issues
vi) Choice of law and Swiss law: Paragraph 480
a) Choice of law
b) Swiss law: the substance
vii) Summary of conclusions: Paragraph 582
viii) Postscript: Remedies: Paragraph 583
a) Breach of Fiduciary Duty
b) Dishonest assistance
c) Knowing Receipt
d) Bribery
e) Conspiracy
The Structure of the Trial
9.
The trial before me was structured to be a three week trial, in which
each of the first three Defendants and Mr Eltriki for the Claimant would give
factual evidence; and in which there would be three experts in structured
products called (Mr Colas for the Claimant, Mr Beevers for Mr Marino
and Mr
Alpay for Mr Ohmura) as well as two experts in Swiss law: Professor Pieth for
FMCP and Dr Weibel for Mr Ohmura.
11.
More surprisingly on Day 2 of the trial, Mr Couser for Mr Marino
indicated that Mr
Marino
would not be called on his own behalf. A suggestion
was made that his statements would be tendered in his absence, though he was or
had been within the jurisdiction. However, following an indication that the
Claimant would then apply to cross examine him under CPR 32.7 it was indicated
that Mr
Marino
would not either put in or seek to rely upon his witness
statements.
13.
When it came to expert evidence the planned timetable also collapsed.
Firstly, the Claimant, having trailed Mr Colas' evidence fairly thoroughly in
opening, elected not to call him. Following a necessarily short
cross-examination of Mr Beevers by the Claimant, Mr Ohmura then also elected
not to call his own expert witness Mr Alpay. Thus, the structured products
evidence that was left before me was essentially the agreed parts of the Joint
Memorandum of the experts, although ultimately reliance was placed (both by
FMCP and Mr Ohmura) on parts of the evidence of Mr Alpay for Mr Ohmura as well
as parts of the evidence of Mr Beevers (for Mr Marino).
This was not an
entirely satisfactory position, as the Joint Memorandum largely proceeded by
reference to evidence which was never called. In the circumstances I have
considered carefully to what extent any of this evidence actually assists and
referred so far as possible only to truly agreed evidence, and then only to the
extent necessary.
Uncontroversial Facts
The Parties
15.
Mr Marino
was born in 1966. Since 2000 he has been involved in the derivatives
business, initially at Rabobank and later (having been headhunted after
developing a specialist fund derivatives business) at Merrill Lynch, Bear
Stearns and following the Bear Stearns merger with JP Morgan, JP Morgan.
17.
Mr Marino
was successful in his role. At Merrill Lynch he was earning a
seven figure bonus; and his joining bonus at Bear Stearns was commensurate with
that. It appears however that he was not happy at JP Morgan following the
merger and was by early 2009 looking to set up his own business.
18.
In his first job at Rabobank Mr Marino
worked in the same team though at
a senior level to Mr Bessot, who was an equity derivatives trader initially
concerned with “vanilla” products which he priced and hedged, but later
dealing with “exotics” (more complex derivative products). The two
became friendly and kept in touch after Mr
Marino
moved on from Rabobank. In
early 2009, shortly after Mr Bessot moved from Rabobank to Bank of America,
that bank merged with Merrill Lynch and Mr Bessot accepted voluntary
redundancy.
19.
FMCP is an English company incorporated on 3 July 2009 as the vehicle
for a joint venture between, on the one hand, Messrs Marino
and Bessot; and, on
the other, LAP. LAP was at all material times FMCP’s sole client. Prior to
January 2014 (when Mr Bessot left), FMCP was owned by LAP as to 55%; by Mr
Marino
(through his company, Addison Participation Limited: “Addison”) as to
33%; and by Mr Bessot (through his company, Mangusta Capital Limited: “Mangusta”)
as to 12%. The circumstances surrounding the creation of FMCP are in issue and
are dealt with below.
20.
Mr Ohmura has been a business associate of Mr Marino
since around 2004.
Between 2004 and August 2009, Mr Ohmura was the Global Head of the structured
investments group at JB. He was the founder and General Director of one of its
subsidiaries, GAM, which was incorporated in Guernsey. It was later (post July
2009) called Baer Alternative Solutions Limited (“BASL”). His expertise was in
the design and technical structuring side of the structured products business.
21.
As a result of their business encounters Mr Marino
and Mr Ohmura
developed a social as well as a professional relationship, with Mr Ohmura
visiting Mr
Marino
at home on occasion.
22.
Mr Ohmura had always been looking to start his own business in due
course. By 2009 it became apparent that the provisional plans he had discussed
with the management of JB were unlikely to eventuate following a change in
management which was less focussed on promoting entrepreneurial businesses. He
set up an email account for a company called Conquest in early 2009 and
registered the domain for the company in February 2009. He discussed with Mr
Marino
the possibility of setting up a business in March 2009; that business
would later become Vesper. It is unclear whether it was initially contemplated
to be a joint business, or Mr Ohmura’s own project.
23.
He resigned from the JB group in July 2009 with his last working day
being 31 July 2009; he remained under contract to them however (effectively for
the purposes of bonus accruals) until the end of August 2009. Following his departure,
he set up Vesper, initially with Mr Marino.
He also established, and at all
material times owned and controlled, Conquest Cayman and Conquest.
LAP, its portfolio and initial contact with Mr Marino
25.
During 2008 and early 2009, in the course of his employment with JP
Morgan, Mr Marino
met (and apparently got along well with) Messrs Haggiagi and
Sharif. Mr Haggiagi was not an officer of LAP but became Head of Investment at
some point in spring 2009. Mr Sharif was Deputy Chairman of LAP until 15 March
2009 when he was replaced by Dr Kagigi.
26.
Mr Marino
(then at JP Morgan) was asked to conduct a review of LAP’s
investments. A draft of his report ("the JP Morgan Report") was
produced on 25 February 2009. It was a lengthy document which ultimately made
conclusions and recommended various steps. It described a portfolio of US$1.6
billion which was held via mandates with a number of banks: UBP [already
defined], Crédit Agricole, Deutsche Bank, LODH, JB, Man, Platinum, Stanford and
Palladyne. The portfolio was spread across cash, bonds, equities, alternative,
other, derivatives and commodities. Each mandate was analysed and then
conclusions were drawn at a more general portfolio level.
29.
Also reviewed in the report were the portfolios at UBP and Stanford. Of
the former Mr Marino
concluded that the portfolio, invested in a variety of
cash and alternatives, was performing in line with benchmarks but that the
funds had been gated and were therefore illiquid. As for Stanford, although it
had performed better than its rivals in substantially preserving capital
throughout the 2008 crisis there was a question mark over future liquidity
because of a pending investigation by the SEC into fraud.
The JB Notes and the IMAs
i) The first tranche of GAIN ("GAIN I") was in respect of US$125m of LAP funds in the JB account, previously managed by GAM, and was issued on 8 July 2009 (with a maturity date of 14 July 2016).
ii) The second tranche ("GAIN II") was for US$48.5m of LAP funds, which were formerly held in the account at UBP, and were invested on 13 October 2009.
31. In relation to GAIN FMCP entered into two agreements with JB:
i)
A Note Advisory Agreement (“NAA”) dated 6 July 2009, signed by Messrs
Marino
and Bessot for FMCP; and by Mr Ohmura and another director on behalf of
GAM. It provided (in Clause 4) for FMCP to advise GAM regarding the initial
structure and parameters of the products, including composition, level of
protection, risk parameters and product fees. FMCP was also to provide
assistance to GAM in communication with the investors and to advise on ongoing
maintenance and reporting. FMCP was paid a Note Advisory fee. On its face this
was 0.2% per annum, but in fact the whole fee was paid up-front. Thus, FMCP was
paid Note Advisory Fees totalling US$2,410,910 for the two tranches of GAIN.
ii)
A Sub-Advisory Agreement ("the FMCP SAA") also dated 6 July
2009 was signed by Messrs Marino
and Bessot for FMCP and by Mr Ohmura and
another director on behalf of GAM. The FMCP SAA provided for FMCP (as
Sub-Advisor) to provide to GAM (as Investment Manager) various services
relating to the management of the fund of hedge funds to which the performance
of GAIN was linked. FMCP’s duties included (Clause 4) assisting in
co-ordinating the overall investment strategy, evaluating investments and
advising on price movements, undertaking continuous analysis, and providing
advice concerning “all actions the USD Selection Segregated Portfolio should
take in order to carry into effect… its investment objective and policy… and,
as may be appropriate, subject to the terms of this Agreement, take such
actions”. FMCP’s remuneration under the Sub-Advisory Agreement was 1% p.a.
of the Net Asset Value of the Portfolio: and a total of US$9,331,738 was
received by FMCP in Sub-Advisory Fees.
32. The subsequent iterations of the JB Notes were:
i) AMFC+: US$70 million in May 2010 (separate to GAIN);
ii) TRAC: US$243.2 million in November 2010 (rolled up proceeds from GAIN and AMFC+);
iii) TRAC+: the proceeds of TRAC in October 2011.
Unlike GAIN, none of these products involved capital protection (in the sense that the invested capital was safe).
i) by Clause 1.1, appointed FMCP to manage “all of the assets of the Accounts”;
ii) by Clause 2.1, conferred upon FMCP “full discretion and authority, without obtaining [LAP’s] prior approval, to manage the Accounts on a day to day basis by investing, divesting and supervising [LAP’s] assets in a manner consistent with the investment objectives and guidelines set forth in Clause 4”;
iii) by Clause 8.1 and Appendix IV, entitled FMCP to receive a management fee of 1.5% p.a. of the aggregate value of the assets of the accounts; and a performance fee of 15% of the net performance of the assets; and
iv) Clause 8.2, dealt with commissions/fees as follows:
“Within the context of its asset management and trading activities, the Manager [FMCP] may receive compensation for services performed for third parties (e.g. for the products’ sponsors or issuers), that are not contemplated in this Agreement. Such compensation is totally independent from the remuneration provided in Clause 8.1 above and the Client [LAP] acknowledges that it has and will have no right to assert any proprietary claim or otherwise in this respect.”
35.
On 29 January 2010, a “Third Party Management Authorization Agreement” (“TPMAA”)
was signed by Messrs Marino
and Bessot on behalf of FMCP, by Mr Haggiagi and Mr
Naas for LAP and Mr Gonet for JB. This gave FMCP formal authority over the
assets in LAP’s account at JB and express authority to give trading
instructions. The account in question held the JB Notes.
“[e]ffecting option transactions in securitized form (warrants) traded on- and off-exchange, unsecuritized options… on stocks, bonds, precious metals, commodities etc. or on reference rates such as currencies, interest rates, indices, etc.”
…
“[e]ffecting further transactions in derivative instruments, such as combinations of option and forward transactions, swap transactions of all types, so-called certificates on one or more underlying security or asset, structured products and other derivative instruments of all types.”
The Structured Product Trades
44. There were two types of Structured Products trades:
i)
The first were six trades using LAP assets held in private bank accounts
then controlled by FMCP through discretionary investment mandates (the “Private
Bank Trades”). Here, it is alleged that Messrs Marino
and Bessot caused FMCP
to enter the trades with LAP’s money which they were managing under the Coutts,
Crédit Agricole and HSBC IMAs whilst allowing Mr Ohmura to interpose Conquest
into the transaction, entirely unnecessarily. The counterparty banks paid
Conquest fees described as ‘distribution’ fees on each trade. Mr Ohmura
transferred 90% of such fees to Messrs
Marino
and Bessot via Ironfly, keeping
10% for himself. These trades resulted in payments to Conquest/Ironfly of
around US$1.5m and hence are also known as “Ironfly Trades 1-6”.
ii)
The second type of Structured Product Trade employed the LAP assets
invested in the JB Notes, which had in turn been invested in certain funds
managed by Mr Ohmura (“the Vesper Funds") – and hence are known as
"the Vesper Trades". These funds were used to enter into further
structured trades with counterparty banks. Again, commissions were paid via
Conquest. These amounted to more than US$6m, of which about US$2.7m was passed
to Mr Marino's
company Leopard; and around US$1.7m to Ironfly. These trades are
also known as “Ironfly Trades 7-9 and “Leopard Trades 1-5”.
The Defendants’ companies and the amounts paid to the Defendants
45.
Mr Marino
therefore received payments through two companies, Ironfly and
Leopard. Ironfly, which he co-owned with Mr Bessot, was incorporated in the
Seychelles on 9 April 2009. Leopard was also incorporated in the Seychelles and
was owned by Mr
Marino
alone.
46. Conquest was owned by Mr Ohmura. It was incorporated in Switzerland on 21 August 2009.
47. The following key payments were made to the Defendants via their companies:
i) 12 August 2009: US$3,125,000 from JB to Ironfly (GAIN I)
ii) 13 October 2009: US$1,183,400 from JB to Ironfly (GAIN II)
iii) 16 October 2009: US$625,000 from Ironfly to Conquest Cayman (GAIN I/II)
iv) 1 October 2009: €90,000 from Rabobank to Conquest (Ironfly Trade 1)
v) 19 October 2009: €81,000 from Conquest to Ironfly (Ironfly Trade 1)
vi) 28 October 2009: US$150,000 from Rabobank to Conquest (Ironfly Trade 2)
vii) 10 November 2009: US$135,000 Conquest to Ironfly (Ironfly Trade 2)
viii) 12 January 2010: US$75,000 Rabobank to Conquest (Ironfly Trade 3)
ix) 25 January 2010: US$67,500 Conquest to Ironfly (Ironfly Trade 3)
x) 17 May 2010: US$50,000 Rabobank to Conquest (Ironfly Trade 4)
xi) 25 May 2010: US$45,000 Conquest to Ironfly (Ironfly Trade 4)
xii) 31 May 2010: US$1,750,000 from JB to Ironfly (AMFC+)
xiii) 8 September 2010: US$400,000 Rabobank to Conquest (Ironfly Trade 5)
xiv) 14 September 2010: US$360,000 Conquest to Ironfly (Ironfly Trade 5)
xv) 21 October 2010: €660,000 Deutsche Bank to Conquest (Ironfly Trade 6)
xvi) 25 October 2010: €594,000 Conquest to Ironfly (Ironfly Trade 6)
xvii) 24 November 2010: US$2,400,000 JB to Conquest (TRAC)
xviii) 9 December 2010: US$2,000,000 Conquest to Leopard (TRAC)
xix) 14 February 2011: US$900,000 Deutsche Bank to Conquest (Ironfly Trade 7)
xx) 22 February 2011: US$810,000 Conquest to Ironfly (Ironfly Trade 7)
xxi) 24 May 2011: US$1,000,000 to Conquest (Leopard Trade 1)
xxii) 26 May 2011: US$675,000 Conquest to Leopard (Leopard Trade 1)
xxiii) 9 March 2011: US$1,000,000 to Conquest (Leopard Trade 2)
xxiv) 26 April 2011: US$675,000 Conquest to Leopard (Leopard Trade 2)
xxv) 23 May 2011: US$990,000 to Conquest (Leopard Trade 3)
xxvi) 29 June 2011: US$675,000 Conquest to Leopard (Leopard Trade 3)
xxvii) 10 March 2011: €612,500 to Conquest (Ironfly Trade 8)
xxviii) 8 June 2011: €551,250 Conquest to Ironfly (Ironfly Trade 8)
xxix) 9 March 2011: US$312,400 to Conquest (Leopard Trade 5)
xxx) 28 March 2011: US$942,500 to Conquest (Leopard Trade 4)
xxxi) 26 July 2011: US$675,000 Conquest to Leopard (Leopard Trade 4)
xxxii) 30 June 2011: US$250,000 to Conquest (Ironfly Trade 9)
xxxiii) 7 December 2011: US$225,000 Conquest to Ironfly (Ironfly Trade 9)
Sums paid to Third Parties
48.
There are two sets of payments which were made to third parties. The
first is a set of payments made to Mr Haggiagi of LAP (and FMCP) by Mr Marino,
which FMCP says were bribes.
49. Those payments were as follows:
i)
On 7 January 2010, Mr Marino
transferred US$21,070 from his personal
account in Monaco to Mr Asem Haggiagi, on the instructions of Mr Haggiagi.
ii)
On 11 January 2010, Mr Marino
transferred US$235,201 from his personal
account (having transferred it immediately beforehand from Leopard’s account)
to Mr Ikramul Haq Mian, again on Mr Haggiagi’s instructions.
iii)
Subsequently, Mr Marino
and Mr Haggiagi procured the incorporation in
Dubai of a company called Blue Tiger Limited (“Blue Tiger”), which then made
the following payments:
a)
On 13 July 2010, Mr Marino
transferred US$700,298 from Leopard to Blue
Tiger.
b) On 15 July 2010, he caused Blue Tiger to transfer US$600,000 to another (unidentified) Dubai company owned and controlled by Mr Haggiagi.
50.
The second set of payments were to Mr Aversano and Mr Ay of GAM (later
BASL). Between September 2012 and July 2014, Mr Marino
met in person with
Messrs Aversano and Ay in Monaco. At those meetings he handed over cash
payments totalling probably between €600,000 and €800,000.
The PwC and BDO investigations
54.
On 29 August 2014, LAP sent a letter to FMCP complaining about performance,
the fees charged, failures to properly manage conflicts of interest, failures
to seek the express, informed consent of LAP and failures generally to have
regard to LAP’s best interests. It concluded “we have lost all confidence in
Mr Marino’s
ability to properly manage the LAP assets and safeguard LAP’s
interests” and called on FMCP to investigate LAP’s concerns. By 1 September
2014, Mr
Marino
had been suspended and the forensic accountants BDO LLP ("BDO")
were engaged by FMCP’s solicitors to investigate LAP’s complaints.
55.
On 8 October 2014, the day before Mr Marino
was due to be interviewed by
BDO, he transferred £2.5m of the payments he had received via the transactions
outlined above to his ex-wife’s bank account in Norway.
56.
BDO interviewed Mr Marino
on 9 October 2014. Mr
Marino
was asked to give
an explanation of the arrangements concerning Ironfly; after taking legal
advice he terminated the interview.
The Charles Russell letter and the current proceedings
57.
On 16 October 2014, Charles Russell Speechlys, LLP (then Charles Russell
LLP) acting for Mr Marino,
sent a ‘whistleblowing’ letter to the Financial
Conduct Authority (and also to the National Crime Agency): "the Charles
Russell letter". It appears that Mr Ohmura knew nothing of this letter at
the time.
58.
That letter contained a detailed statement that wrongdoing had been
committed by inter alia Mr Marino,
Mr Bessot and Mr Ohmura by the taking
of payments in relation to the transactions which are the subject of this
action. Mr
Marino’s
case at trial has been that the Charles Russell letter set
out an incorrect version of events. FMCP has relied on the letter as being a
substantially true and accurate account.
59.
In considering the Charles Russell letter I bear in mind that it speaks
of Mr Marino
as being unwell and in hospital in Norway. Certainly, I am told
that that would have been the thrust of Mr
Marino's
evidence if called. However,
his physical and mental state - including his ability to give proper
instructions to the professionals he had plainly retained - was not vouched for
by any proper medical evidence, and would doubtless have been the subject of
cross-examination if he had been called. Accordingly, I am not prepared to
discount the letter as a source of evidence. However, I have wherever possible
had regard rather to the contemporaneous documents, looking to the letter only
by way of comparison.
60.
Mr Marino’s
disciplinary hearing was held on 30 October 2014 in his
absence. He was found to have received secret profits, charged fees to LAP
without obtaining its consent and breached his fiduciary duties by placing
himself in a position of conflict of interest (which he failed to disclose). It
was also found that he had improperly charged his personal expenses to FMCP’s
corporate account and used FMCP’s funds to pay a related third party. On 3
November 2014, Mr
Marino
was dismissed with immediate effect for gross
misconduct.
61.
These proceedings were issued on 23 December 2014 and served on 19
February 2015. A freezing order was obtained against Mr Marino
on 12 November
2015.
62.
On 31 January 2017 Mr Marino
was declared bankrupt. He was discharged
from his bankruptcy on 31 January 2018. His financial difficulties led to a
situation where Mr Couser was instructed to represent Mr
Marino
only shortly
before the hearing. I would like to record that, despite the obvious
difficulties which faced him, he discharged his role with admirable
thoroughness and care.
The Legal Common Ground and the Legal Issues in Outline
The Standard of Proof for dishonesty
63. In this case many of the claims made involve elements of dishonesty. There is an issue between the parties as to the standard of proof which I should use in this regard. Mr Emmett, for Mr Ohmura, drew my attention to the dictum of Lord Nicholls in Re H (Minors) [1996] AC 563 at page 586:
“The balance of probability standard means that a court is satisfied an event occurred if the court considers that, on the evidence, the occurrence of the event was more likely than not. When assessing the probabilities, the court will have in mind as a factor, to whatever extent is appropriate in the particular case, that the more serious the allegation the less likely it is that the event occurred and, hence, the stronger should be the evidence before the court concludes that the allegation is established on the balance of probability. Fraud is usually less likely than negligence. Deliberate physical injury is usually less likely than accidental physical injury.”
65. FMCP says that I should indeed have regard to subsequent authority, in particular Re S-B [2009] UKSC 17; [2010] 1 AC 678 and Re J [2013] UKSC 9; [2013] 1 AC 680 as well as the summary of the relevant authorities by Eder J in Otkritie International Investment Management Ltd v Urumov [2014] EWHC 191 (Comm) at paragraphs [85]- [89].
66. In Re S-B Lady Hale said this:
“If an event is inherently improbable, it may take better evidence to persuade the judge that it has happened than would be required if the event were a commonplace. This was what Lord Nicholls was discussing in re H (Minors) [1996] AC 563, 586. Yet, despite the care that Lord Nicholls had taken to explain that having regard to the inherent probabilities did not mean that the standard of proof was higher, others had referred to a “heightened standard of proof” where the allegations were serious.”
67. This mirrors what was said by Eder J in Otkritie at [88-9]:
“… it has been firmly established that:
i) First, there is only one civil standard of proof and that is proof that the fact in issue more probably occurred than not: Re B at para 13 per Lord Hoffmann.
ii) Second, the proposition that “the more serious the allegation, the more cogent the evidence needed to prove it” is wrong in law and must be rejected: Re S-B at §13 per Baroness Hale; Re J [2013] 1 AC 680 at para 35 per Baroness Hale.
iii) Third, while inherent probabilities are relevant in considering whether it was more likely than not that an event had taken place, there is no necessary connection between seriousness and inherent probability: Re S-B at para 12 …
89. …. it may well be true to say that it is inherently improbable that a particular defendant will commit a fraud. But it all depends on a wide range of factors. For example, if the court is satisfied (or it has been admitted) that a defendant has acted fraudulently or reprehensibly on one occasion, it cannot necessarily be considered inherently improbable that such defendant would have done so on another; or if, for example, the court is satisfied (or it has been admitted) that a defendant has created or deployed sham or false documents, the court cannot assume that it is inherently unlikely that such defendant did so on other occasions. For the avoidance of doubt, I should make absolutely plain that this is not to say that inherent probability is irrelevant. On the contrary, as submitted by Mr Casella, I accept, of course, that the court should take into account the inherent probability of an event taking place (or not taking place) as is made abundantly plain by Baroness Hale in the passage from Re S-B quoted above. However, as it seems to me, the court must in each case consider carefully what is – and is not – inherently probable having regard to the particular circumstances – but the standard of proof in civil cases always remains the same i.e. balance of probability.”
Breach of Fiduciary / Directors’ duties
69.
It is common ground that Messrs Marino
and Bessot owed the directors’
duties set out in ss. 171-177 of the Companies Act 2006 (“CA 2006”). The
relevant duties on which reliance is placed by FMCP are:
i) S. 172: to act in a way that was considered by them (in good faith) to be most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole, including having regard to the likely consequences of any decision in the long term, the need to foster the company’s business relationships with suppliers, customers and others and the need to act fairly as between members of the company;
ii) S. 175: not to place themselves in a position where their (direct or indirect) interests conflicted or might conflict with their duties to, or the interests of, the company;
iii) S. 176: not to accept benefits (whether directly or indirectly) from third parties conferred by reason of their being or doing (or not doing) anything as directors; and
iv) S. 177: to disclose to the other directors of the company prior to the company entering into any proposed transaction any direct or indirect interest in that arrangement or transaction with the company.
70. Specifically, the following propositions were in essence common ground.
(1) The no-conflict rule (S.175 CA 2006)
71. A fiduciary’s distinguishing obligation is that of loyalty - see Bristol & West Building Society v Mothew [1998] Ch 1, 18 per Millett LJ:
“A fiduciary is someone who has undertaken to act for or on behalf of another in a particular matter in circumstances which give rise to a relationship of trust and confidence. The distinguishing obligation of a fiduciary is the obligation of loyalty. The principal is entitled to the single-minded loyalty of his fiduciary. This core liability has several facets. A fiduciary must act in good faith; he must not make a profit out of his trust; he must not place himself in a position where his duty and his interest may conflict; he may not act for his own benefit or the benefit of a third person without the informed consent of his principal. This is not intended to be an exhaustive list, but it is sufficient to indicate the nature of fiduciary obligations …”
72. No fiduciary is permitted to enter into engagements in which they have, or can have, a personal interest conflicting, or which may possibly conflict, with the interests of those whom they are bound to protect: Bray v Ford [1896] AC 44, 51; Snell’s Equity (33rd ed.) at [7-018]. This is because by having a conflicting personal interest in a transaction, the fiduciary “puts himself in such a position that he has a temptation not faithfully to perform his duty to his employer”: Boston Deep Sea Fishing & Ice Co v Ansell (1888) 39 Ch D 339, 357.
73. This rule operates even if:
i) The conduct has been to the benefit of the fiduciary’s principal: Boardman v Phipps [1967] 2 AC 46.
ii) The fiduciary acts honestly: Aberdeen Railway Co, v Blaikie Bros (1854) 1 Macq 461, 475.
iii) The transaction is fair; it is established that fairness is not a relevant consideration and “no inquiry on that subject is permitted”: Aberdeen Railway Co. 461, 471-472.
iv) The principal himself had some kind of beneficial interest in the opportunity: Bhullar v Bhullar [2003] BCC 711 at [28].
v) The principal could have obtained the profit for itself: Boston Deep Sea Fishing, 355, 367; IDC v Cooley [1972] 1 WLR 443, 453G.
74. Regardless of any of these factors, a director is under a positive duty to make a business opportunity available to the company if it is in the company’s line of business where the information is received by the director in his private capacity: IDC v Cooley, 451F; Bhullar v Bhullar [2003] BCC 711 at [41].
(2) The no-profit rule (s.176 CA 2006)
76. Again, the rule operates even if:
i) There is no fraud or bad faith. The relevant element is the fact of the profit being made: John Taylors v Masons [2001] EWCA Civ 2106 at [46], Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver [1967] 2 AC 134, 137, 144-145, 153, 154.
ii) The principal could have obtained the profit for itself (Boardman v Phipps, 109) or was unwilling to take up the opportunity (IDC v Cooley, 453G).
iii) The fiduciary’s conduct has caused no loss to the principal: Regal (Hastings) Ltd, 154.
(3) Duty of loyalty including to disclose own misconduct (S.172 CA 2006)
77. Because a director’s duty of loyalty requires him to act in what he in good faith considers to be the best interests of his company (see s.172 CA 2006), he is required to disclose his own misconduct: Item Software (UK) Limited v Fassihi [2004] BCC 994 at [41], [63-68].
(4) Authorisation: fully-informed consent
79. Where the company is a victim of fraud or wrongdoing by its directors, or of which its directors had knowledge, their acts or knowledge cannot be attributed to the company as a defence in an action against them: Bilta (UK) v Nazir (No. 2) [2016] AC 1 (SC) at [7], [89], [206]. This ‘breach of duty’ exception to the principle of attribution is not limited to fraud, but includes knowledge of a breach that falls short of dishonesty: Bilta at [71].
i) Company directors can seek authorisation to act with a conflict between duty and interest from the other (non-interested) directors: s.175(4) -(6) CA 2006. By contrast, breaches of s.176 (the no-profit rule) or the other directors’ duties cannot be authorised by (non-interested) directors.
ii) Breaches of directors’ duties can be ratified by a resolution of its members in general meeting, as set out in s.239 CA 2006. Such a resolution is only effective if passed without counting votes in favour of the resolution by the defaulting directors and any members connected with them: s.239(3) -(4). However, such a resolution is still not effective if it amounts to fraud or oppression of the minority of shareholders: Cook v Deeks [1916] 1 AC 554, 564; Menier v Hooper’s Telegraph Works (1873-74) LR 9 Ch App 350, 353-354.
iii) The only other method is by the application of the Duomatic principle, which requires the unanimous informed consent of the shareholders: Re Duomatic [1969] 2 Ch 365, 373. This is summarised in EIC Services Ltd v Phipps [2003] 1 WLR 2360 at [122]:
“The essence of the Duomatic principle, as I see it, is that, where the articles of a company require a course to be approved by a group of shareholders at a general meeting, that requirement can be avoided if all members of the group, being aware of the relevant facts, either give their approval to that course, or so conduct themselves as to make it inequitable for them to deny that they have given their approval. Whether the approval is given in advance or after the event, whether it is characterised as agreement, ratification, waiver, or estoppel, and whether members of the group give their consent in different ways at different times, does not matter.”
(see also: Madoff Securities International Limited (In Liquidation) v Raven [2013] EWHC 3147 (Comm) [2014] Lloyd's Rep. F.C. 95 at [267]).
iv) However:
a) The principle does not permit shareholders to do informally what they could not have done formally: Re New Cedos Engineering Co Ltd [1994] 1 BCLC 797, 814g-h.
b) The shareholders must have acted in good faith and honestly in assenting to a course of action: Bowthorpe Holdings Ltd v Hills [2003] 1 BCLC 226 at [50].
c) There must be an unqualified agreement, objectively established, between the shareholders; and a shareholder’s mere internal decision, unaccompanied by any outward manifestation or acquiescence, will not suffice: Re D’Jan of London [1993] BCC 646, 648.
d) Unanimous shareholder consent cannot be used to authorise an act or omission that would be unlawful, for an improper purpose, in fraud of the company or dishonest: Mortimore, Company Directors (3rd ed.) at [10.51].
Dishonest Assistance
i) There must be a trust or fiduciary obligation owed by the trustee/fiduciary to the claimant. It suffices if the trust in question is a constructive or resulting trust: McGrath, Commercial Fraud in Civil Practice (2nd ed.) at [9.34].
ii) Because dishonest assistance is a type of accessory liability, there must be a breach by the trustee/fiduciary: Royal Brunei Airlines v Tan [1995] 2 AC 378, 382, Novoship (UK) Ltd v Mikhaylyuk [2014] EWCA Civ 908; [2015] QB 499. That is common ground for the purposes of my decision. However, I should note that Mr Ohmura reserves the right to argue, if this matter were to go to a higher court, that liability for dishonest assistance would not arise in relation to a breach of the kind that is alleged in this case.
iii) The breach by the trustee/fiduciary need not be dishonest: because liability of the third party is fault-based, what matters is the nature of their fault, not that of the trustee/fiduciary: Royal Brunei Airlines, 384-5, 392, Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] UKHL 12; [2002] 2 AC 164 at [109].
iv) The third party must have assisted in, induced or procured the breach. It is necessary to show that the relevant assistance played more than a minimal role in the breach being carried out, but there is no requirement to show that the assistance provided would inevitably have resulted in the beneficiary suffering a loss: Baden v Société General pour Favoriser le Development du Commerce et de l’Industrie en France SA [1993] 1 WLR 509 at [246].
v) The third party must have acted dishonestly in providing the assistance. The test in its modern incarnation derives from Royal Brunei Airlines at 386-7 and is now set out in Ivey v Genting Casinos (UK) t/a Crockfords [2017] UKSC 67 at [74]:
“When dishonesty is in question the fact-finding tribunal must first ascertain (subjectively) the actual state of the individual’s knowledge or belief as to the facts. The reasonableness or otherwise of his belief is a matter of evidence (often in practice determinative) going to whether he held the belief, but it is not an additional requirement that his belief must be reasonable; the question is whether it is genuinely held. When once his actual state of mind as to knowledge or belief as to facts is established, the question whether his conduct was honest or dishonest is to be determined by the fact-finder by applying the (objective) standards of ordinary decent people. There is no requirement that the defendant must appreciate that what he has done is, by those standards, dishonest.”
vi) However, the standards in question are those of an ordinary honest person in the circumstances of the defendant. Thus, in applying the test of dishonesty, the Court must have regard to all the circumstances known to the defendant at the time, and have regard to the defendant's personal attributes, such as their experience and the reason why they acted as they did: Royal Brunei Airlines v Tan at 391.
i) There is no need to prove that the defendant was aware of the details of the underlying fraud, that there existed a trust, and/or they knew the facts which give rise to the trust: McGrath at [9.133]. It suffices if they simply know that they are assisting the fiduciary to do something he or she is not entitled to do: Ultraframe (UK) Ltd v Fielding [2005] EWHC 1638 (Ch) at [1505], Twinsectra v Yardley at [24] per Lord Hoffmann.
ii) The defendant has the requisite dishonest state of mind if they deliberately close their eyes and ears, or deliberately refrain from asking questions, lest they learn something they would rather not know, and then proceed regardless: Royal Brunei Airlines, 389. Or as it was put by Lord Scott in Manifest Shipping Co v Uni-Polaris Insurance Co [2003] 1 AC 469:
“In summary, blind-eye knowledge requires, in my opinion, a suspicion that the relevant facts do exist and a deliberate decision to avoid confirming that they exist. But a warning should be sounded. Suspicion is a word that can be used to describe a state-of-mind that may, at one extreme, be no more than a vague feeling of unease and, at the other extreme, reflect a firm belief in the existence of the relevant facts. In my opinion, in order for there to be blind-eye knowledge, the suspicion must be firmly grounded and targeted on specific facts. The deliberate decision must be a decision to avoid obtaining confirmation of facts in whose existence the individual has good reason to believe. To allow blind-eye knowledge to be constituted by a decision not to enquire into an untargeted or speculative suspicion would be to allow negligence, albeit gross, to be the basis of a finding of privity.”
iii) However, a defendant does not have the requisite dishonest state of mind if he merely suspects what is going on: Heinl v Jyske Bank (Gibraltar) Ltd [1999] Lloyd’s Rep Bank 511 where (in the context of a case with a distinct factual parallel to this one) Colman J put the matter with characteristic clarity and good sense:
“it is not enough that on the whole of the information available to [the defendant] he ought as a reasonable man to have inferred that there was a substantial probability that the funds originated from the Bank. It must be established that he did indeed draw that inference…. If third parties are to be held accountable on the basis of accessory liability for breaches of trust committed by others the standard of proof of dishonesty, although not as high as the criminal standard, should involve a high level of probability.”
“Honest people do not intentionally deceive others to their detriment. Honest people do not knowingly take others' property. Unless there is a very good and compelling reason, an honest person does not participate in a transaction if he knows it involves a misapplication of trust assets to the detriment of the beneficiaries.”
87. He also relied on the dictum of Lord Hoffmann in Twinsectra at [24]:
“I do not suggest that one cannot be dishonest without a full appreciation of the legal analysis of the transaction. A person may dishonestly assist in the commission of a breach of trust without any idea of what a trust means. The necessary dishonest state of mind may be found to exist simply on the fact that he knew perfectly well that he was helping to pay away money to which the recipient was not entitled.”
Knowing Receipt
89. So far as knowing receipt goes, the ingredients of the tort are again not in issue:
i) A claim for knowing receipt requires a claimant to show:
“First, a disposal of his assets in breach of fiduciary duty; secondly, the beneficial receipt by the defendant of assets which are traceable as representing the assets of the plaintiff; and thirdly, knowledge on the part of the defendant that the assets he received are traceable to a breach of fiduciary duty.”
(See El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings plc [1994] 2 All ER 685, 700; BCCI v Akindele [2001] Ch 437, 448.)
ii) Unlike dishonest assistance, dishonesty, even in the objective sense need not be shown. The critical question is whether the defendant had such knowledge as to render it unconscionable for him to retain the benefit of the receipt: BCCI v Akindele, 450, 455; see also Snell’s Equity at [30-072].
iii) The defendant’s liability is restitutionary. Thus:
“it is fixed at the value of the property when he first received it. He remains liable even if the defendant dissipated the original property, or if it can no longer be specifically identified in the defendant’s remaining assets. This is an important practical distinction between it and the proprietary claim founded on following or tracing”: Snell’s Equity at [30-071].
Bribery
“a bribe consists in a commission or other inducement which is given by the third party to an agent as such, and which is secret from the principal.”
i) The test for whether a payment or other benefit or a promise of the same amounts to a bribe depends upon whether it puts the agent in a position in which their duties to the principal and their interests might conflict: Fiona Trust v Privalov [2010] EWHC 3199 (Comm) at [73] (per Andrew Smith J).
ii) Where there is an actual or potential conflict of interest, the requirement that a payment or promise must be made to the agent ‘as such’ does not provide any defence to liability for bribery even if the payment was made to the agent in a different role or capacity or in respect of valuable work done on his or her own account or for another principal: “…the law does not excuse an actual or potential conflict of interest because it arises from a payment made to the fiduciary in some other capacity and not because he was an agent or other fiduciary: it still regards the payment as a bribe, unless there has been full disclosure”: Fiona Trust at [1391-1392] (and see [73](iii)); Otkritie v Urumov [2014] EWHC 191 (Comm) at [69].
iii) It is unnecessary to show that the bribe was given in connection with a particular transaction or series of transactions. The possibility of a conflict between duty and interest may be created by a bribe paid to an agent in order to influence them in favour of the person paying it generally and not directed to any particular matter or intended to influence them in relation to a particular transaction: Fiona Trust at [73]; Otkritie v Urumov at [70].
Conspiracy
“A conspiracy to injure by unlawful means is actionable where the claimant proves that he has suffered loss or damage as a result of unlawful action taken pursuant to a combination or agreement between the defendant and another person or persons to injure him by unlawful means, whether or not it is the predominant purpose of the defendant to do so.”
To similar effect is the dictum of Lord Neuberger in HMRC v Total Network [2008] UKHL 19; [2008] 1 AC 1174 at paragraph [213].
94. The elements of the cause of action are as follows:
i) A combination, arrangement or understanding between two or more people. It is not necessary for the conspirators all to join the conspiracy at the same time, but the parties to it must be sufficiently aware of the surrounding circumstances and share the same object for it properly to be said that they were acting in concert at the time of the acts complained of: Kuwait Oil Tanker at [111].
ii) An intention to injure another individual or separate legal entity, albeit with no need for that to be the sole or predominant intention: Kuwait Oil Tanker at [108]. Moreover:
a) The necessary intent can be inferred, and often will need to be inferred, from the primary facts – see Kuwait Oil Tanker at [120-121], citing Bourgoin SA v Minister of Agriculture [1986] 1 QB: “[i]f an act is done deliberately and with knowledge of the consequences, I do not think that the actor can say that he did not ‘intend’ the consequences or that the act was not ‘aimed’ at the person who, it is known, will suffer them”.
b) Where conspirators intentionally injure the claimant and use unlawful means to do so, it is no defence for them to show that their primary purpose was to further or protect their own interests: Lonrho Plc v Fayed [1992] 1 AC 448, 465-466; see also OBG v Allan [2008] 1 AC 1 at [164-165].
c) Foresight that his unlawful conduct may or will probably damage the claimant cannot be equated with intention: OBG at [166].
iii) In some cases, there may be no specific intent but intention to injure results from the inevitability of loss: see Lord Nicholls at [167] in OBG v Allan, referring to cases where:
“The defendant’s gain and the claimant's loss are, to the defendant's knowledge, inseparably linked. The defendant cannot obtain the one without bringing about the other. If the defendant goes ahead in such a case in order to obtain the gain he seeks, his state of mind will satisfy the mental ingredient of the unlawful interference tort.”
iv) Concerted action (in the sense of active participation) consequent upon the combination or understanding: McGrath at [7.57].
v) Use of unlawful means as part of the concerted action. There is no requirement that the unlawful means themselves are independently actionable: Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Total Network [2008] 1 AC 1174 at [104].
vi) Loss being caused to the target of the conspiracy.
95. However, a person is not liable in conspiracy if the causative act is something which the party doing it believes he has a lawful right to do: Meretz Investments NV v ACP Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 1303; [2008] Ch 244, per Arden LJ (paragraphs [126]- [127]) and Toulson LJ (paragraph [174]); Digicel v Cable & Wireless [2010] EWHC 774 (Ch) at Annex I, paragraphs [117]-[118] (Morgan J).
Conclusions on Factual Issues and Principal Claims
The witnesses and the inferences contended for
96. Before turning to the factual issues, I should indicate briefly my conclusions on the witnesses and the issues which arose in relation to them.
97.
Both factual witnesses were heavily criticised by the other side, both
for the content of their evidence and the way in which they gave it. As will be
apparent I certainly do not accept the full extent of this criticism of either
witness. In particular both witnesses were subject to criticism in relation to
evidence which they gave faute de mieux, because of the absence of other
better qualified witnesses. In the case of Mr Ohmura this was the result of the
vicissitudes of this case, which meant that neither Mr Marino
nor Mr Bessot
gave evidence. In the case of Mr Eltriki, it was because no better qualified
witness from LAP was made available (a point to which I shall return below).
101. One key piece of his evidence was the answer he gave on Day 1:
"Q. Are [the current executive management of LAP] a different group of people from those who acted as the executive management of LAP in January 2010?
A. (Interpreted): 90% changed, they changed 90%. But the old team stayed in LAP as employees now. They are still working as employees. So, there was a change in positions, if you like, but the employees themselves are still working at LAP."
105.
I did conclude that Mr Ohmura was an impressive witness in many ways; he
is plainly very intelligent, and he dealt well with the ordeal of being the
sole witness for the defence and being subjected to searching cross-examination
for a lengthy period – longer than can have been anticipated, because the
absence of Mr Marino
meant that certain points which would have been put to Mr
Marino
were instead put to him.
109.
It was suggested on behalf of Mr Ohmura and Mr Marino
that I should draw
negative inferences against FMCP because of the way in which the proceedings
have been handled and specifically because of the other witnesses who might
have been tendered and who were not.
110.
In relation to the first part of this submission, Mr Couser for Mr
Marino
pointed to the fact that LAP is in effect the eminence grise
behind this litigation, since it has the controlling interest in FMCP,
appointed all of its current directors, chose its solicitors (who were LAP's
own solicitors) and is the party for whose benefit the claim is effectively
brought. It was submitted that LAP's proceeding in this way (not formally a
party but in fact in control) has had profound implications for the litigation,
particularly in terms of disclosure; but also, because the "change of
guard" in the control of LAP means that those in control are now
inimical to those with whom Mr
Marino
initially dealt and on whose authority,
he relies. So far as the Defendants are concerned there has been no sensible
way of joining LAP as a party; therefore, there has been no way of accessing
disclosure from LAP or putting LAP under real pressure to call witnesses thought
to be particularly relevant.
111.
It was submitted therefore that I should draw negative inferences
against FMCP in relation to the absence of the documentary record, in relation
to the case on LAP's knowledge and approval of payments to Mr Marino
and in
relation to the failure to call any of the principal officers of LAP at the
relevant times.
112. The principles relied on derive from the case of Wiszniewski -v- Central Manchester Health Authority [1998] PIQR P324. That case concerned a refusal to return to give evidence on the part of one of two medical professionals involved in a birth which resulted in the baby suffering irreversible brain damage in the minutes before delivery. The principles set out in the judgment were not in issue. They are:
i) In certain circumstances a court may be entitled to draw adverse inferences from the absence or silence of a witness who might be expected to have material evidence to give on an issue in an action.
ii) If a court is willing to draw such inferences, they may go to strengthen the evidence adduced on that issue by the other party or to weaken the evidence, if any, adduced by the party who might reasonably have been expected to call the witness.
iii) There must, however, have been some evidence, however weak, adduced by the former on the matter in question before the court is entitled to draw the desired inference: in other words, there must be a case to answer on that issue.
iv) If the reason for the witness's absence or silence satisfies the court, then no such adverse inference may be drawn. If, on the other hand, there is some credible explanation given, even if it is not wholly satisfactory, the potentially detrimental effect of his/her absence or silence may be reduced or nullified.
113.
Mr Marino
submits that this is such a case. In particular he invited me
to infer from the absence of any of the relevant LAP witnesses (Dr Kagigi, Mr
Haggiagi, Mr Siala, Mr Naas and the late Mr Kashadah) that they were not
prepared to give evidence that supports FMCP's case and that if they were to
give a truthful account of events at FMCP between 2009-2011, they would reveal
that Mr
Marino
made full and frank disclosure to them and they (as directors of
FMCP and representatives of LAP) gave their fully informed consent to the
payments to him.
116.
So far as concerns Mr Marino,
he falls down at the first hurdle. It is
not possible for him to say that there is a case to answer on authority when he
has not given evidence (and so put his statements in) and consequently the only
document in evidence which purports to give his story, the Charles Russell letter,
specifically says he did not disclose the payments.
119.
Here there is a problem in that the question of the issues to which the
evidence went was not identified, to enable the examination of whether a case
had been put forward by Mr Ohmura on that issue for FMCP to answer; it might be
said that these witnesses were more relevant to the case against Mr Marino
than
that against Mr Ohmura. Thus, in relation to authority, these witnesses might
well be relevant, but the case of authority was one for Mr
Marino
rather than
Mr Ohmura to make. I would not be minded to draw adverse inferences without the
exercise of identifying the issue in question and the case advanced being
thoroughly and carefully performed, which it has not been. I would therefore
not be prepared to draw any adverse inferences for Mr Ohmura's benefit from the
absence of Mr Haggiagi and Mr Bessot.
The background to FMCP's incorporation and the April Mandate
122.
The first suite of controversial facts concerns the knowledge of Mr
Ohmura regarding FMCP, the intention as regards whether the JB Notes should be
managed by FMCP or whether they (or at least the initial iteration) should be
regarded as introduced by Mr Marino
as part of a separate work stream to that
of FMCP and what is to be drawn from a document relied on by Mr
Marino
and
known as "the April Mandate".
123.
Mr Marino’s
recommendation in the JP Morgan report was that the
portfolios across the various banks, including JB, should be monitored and
managed in the aggregate rather than only at the mandate level and that there
be appointed “an advisor to partner with LAP”, who would be able to take
an overview of LAP’s investments and implement guidelines at the aggregate
portfolio level (which was not then happening). It also recommended the “wrapping”
of the portfolio in a “principal guarantee”.
124.
The idea of a corporate entity called “FM Capital Partners” had
crystallised by March 2009 at the latest. A presentation of that date can be
seen to envisage the launch of FMCP in July 2009, as in fact occurred. The
intention was to have an FSA-regulated, independent financial advisory
partnership (involving inter alios Mr Marino
and Mr Bessot) covering
three distinct areas: (a) portfolio construction and risk management; (b)
trading; and (c) structuring, product research and development. It also
envisaged training LAP’s own staff to improve their skills in the area.
125.
It was submitted that the pitch made by Messrs Marino
and Bessot was for
FMCP to have both advisory and management mandates, and for structured products
to be squarely within FMCP’s purview. This was implicitly in issue for Mr
Ohmura whose case was that he understood FMCP did not undertake structured
products work. While this is not determinative of Mr Ohmura’s understanding I
do find that the way FMCP was planned was that Mr
Marino
and Mr Bessot might
arrange structured product trades. They said to LAP in terms in the May
document: “We will also sometimes suggest investment in traditional asset
classes via Structured Products. LIA can rely on our superior experience in
that field to find the best products and track hidden costs/undesirable
features.”
126.
Another point referenced that Messrs Marino
and Bessot would aim to
reduce the multiple layers of fees and move away from the present position
where “investment decisions are not necessarily taken in LIA’s interests…”,
achieving an efficient cost structure.
128.
Mr Ohmura was not (as were certain other associates of Messrs Marino
and
Bessot) identified as a likely director or employee of FMCP. However, it is
striking that he was taking steps to start his own business at exactly the same
time as were Messrs
Marino
and Bessot and that there was plainly some
discussion of their future plans in the Vesper discussion.
129.
Mr Marino’s
pleaded case rests heavily on the April Mandate. He says
that by this document he was engaged to broker an agreement for structured products
between LAP and a bank. He says that he was instructed by LAP to create a capital
guarantee in a personal capacity, completely separately from the FMCP project.
He also says that he agreed a commission payment for work done pursuant to this
mandate with Mr Sharif and Mr Haggiagi and that the various transactions later entered
into in relation to the JB assets were covered by this mandate and this commission
arrangement. He contends that since the committee appointed by LAP to negotiate
with Mr
Marino
consisted of Mr Sharif and Mr Haggiagi as well as Dr Kagigi, Mr
Siala and Mr Naas they must all have known and approved this agreement.
130.
The April Mandate is a single page document apparently drafted by Mr
Bessot and signed by Mr Sharif and Mr Marino.
It is dated 2 April 2009. It
states:
This letter hereby confirms that Libya Africa Investment
Portfolio, a Sovereign Fund registered in Libya …. (The Investor) is giving
Frederic
Marino
the mandate to advise the Investor on the structuring of a
portfolio comprising the following Funds:
· UBP
· Palladyne
· Platinum
· Stanford International Bank (SIB) CDs
The total Notional of the portfolio is around USD650Mios
The Investor gives Frederic
Marino
the mandate to
· Select the banks to be involved in the structuring of the product
· Start structuring the product with them”
131.
The effect of this document was hotly contested. Mr Marino
and Mr Ohmura
placed it squarely at the heart of their defences. They said that it evidenced
an important qualification to the Business Plan which hived off a group of
assets and placed them under the management of Mr
Marino,
which were separate
to the assets which were to be under the management of the joint venture
company, (the future FMCP). It reflected, they said Mr Sharif's wish not to
have “all the eggs in one basket”. They also relied on the way in which
matters were discussed between the parties at a meeting in early June
(discussed further below).
132.
FMCP formally challenged the April Mandate's authenticity. They
therefore submitted firstly that, Mr Marino
having failed to give evidence and
verify its authenticity, the document was not in evidence and could prove
nothing to aid Mr
Marino
or Mr Ohmura. Secondly, they submitted that it was
plainly inapt and incapable of supporting Mr
Marino’s
case.
134.
FMCP also submitted that the April Mandate is expressly limited in
another sense: in that it purports only to authorise Mr Marino
to “select
the banks to be involved in the structuring of the product” and “start
structuring the product with them.” It notes that Mr
Marino’s
own expert Mr
Beevers accepted that it is “not of the level of detail I would expect to
see in a mandate letter between European or US counterparties. It is silent on
many key issues.” He describes it as a “soft commitment letter”,
noting that “[l]etters of this sort are often used as a statement of intent,
intended to be used to procure the interest and initial works of a counterparty
financial institution”. Accordingly, FMCP submitted that the April Mandate
is not a document of any contractual force or effect.
135.
FMCP also says that even if this document could provide some basis for
commissions being paid to Mr Marino,
the instruction must relate solely to GAIN
(or possibly GAIN II) (the only structured products that could be described as
a capital guarantee) and not to any of the other JB Notes or the Structured
Product Trades.
138.
It also submitted that there is insufficient evidence of knowledge and
consent by LAP qua LAP and that Mr Marino
comes nowhere near to
discharging the burden – which they submit he as a fiduciary bears - of proving
that his principal (FMCP) gave its fully-informed consent to the promise and
receipt of huge personal commissions. They also submit that payments which were
later made to Mr Haggiagi suggest strongly that not only was there no consent,
but that Mr
Marino
well knew that there was no such consent.
139.
FMCP also submits that the April Mandate would be expected to deal with
remuneration if such a deal were in existence, and it points to the IMAs as
providing an example of the sort of specific provision that one might expect to
see had LAP intended the April Mandate to give Mr Marino
consent to take
personal fees in connection with transactions with LAP assets.
140.
Finally, FMCP says that as to the key issue – remuneration – there is
simply no evidence of this agreement at all since Mr Marino's
evidence in his
statement as to the existence of an oral agreement cannot be relied on by him.
141.
Shortly after the April Mandate, on 23 April 2009, LAP executed a
personal power of attorney in relation to the RBS Coutts portfolio. That
document granted management authority to Mr Marino
personally in respect of
LAP’s account at RBS Coutts (held in the name of another subsidiary of the LIA,
the Libyan Foreign Investment Company ("LFICO")). This contained an
express consent by LAP to the receipt by Mr
Marino
of “payments from
commissions and brokerage fees” (Clause 5). It was expressly revoked
shortly after FMCP was incorporated and granted its own power of attorney on 30
July 2009. No payments said to be made under this agreement are in issue.
145.
At the LAP board meeting on 18 May 2009 the LAP board considered the JP
Morgan report prepared by Mr Marino
and the thrust of his recommendation, viz.
that “our portfolios are in urgent need of restructuring, as well as
effective and direct management, in order to confront the current and future
challenges, recover from the current drop in its assets, and, consequently,
improve performance and realize a satisfactory return” and indicated that
it was “comfortable” with the proposal submitted by Mr
Marino
for a “partnership”
with LAP, which would consist of an independent FSA-regulated company that
would have “the primary objective of developing international management in
the field of asset and risk management as well as research. It would manage our
portfolios as well as third party portfolios in a professional and scientific
manner in order to achieve the best return possible… this partnership would
provide [LAP] with a distinguished international presence". FMCP also
draws attention to the fact that there is no sign that the April Mandate - or
any agreement to pay commissions - was discussed.
146.
The Board appointed a sub-committee, chaired by Dr Kagigi and comprising
Messrs Siala, Haggiagi and Naas, to negotiate with Mr Marino
and make any
amendments to the terms of engagement they deemed appropriate in order to
protect LAP’s interests in the joint venture.
147.
In parallel with this, steps were being taken in relation to the first
of the JB Notes, GAIN. Initially it seems that Mr Marino
did not identify LAP
as the potential client, though somewhat later he did show Mr Ohmura, and
probably others at JB, the April Mandate.
148.
It appears that Mr Marino
had, at least in principle, persuaded LAP to
purchase GAIN by early June 2009, in that a Product Proposal for GAIN dated 3 June
2009 was signed by Dr Kagigi on 4 June. This appears to have occurred at or
after a series of meetings held between Mr
Marino
and Dr Kagigi and Mr Haggiagi
between 1 and 4 June 2009.
149.
Mr Marino
relied heavily on the minutes of these meetings, submitting
they are consistent only with his case that Mr
Marino
had a personal mandate
generally and specifically in relation to the JB Notes, noting the following:
i) The “Capital Guaranteed products on the Julius Baer mandate” section is separate and distinct from the “FM Capital Partners” section.
ii) The “Capital Guaranteed products on the Julius Baer mandate” section is referring to the JB Notes. There is no suggestion there that the JB Notes are to be brought into the FMCP fold later on.
iii)
The minutes record that Dr Kagigi, Mr Haggiagi and Mr Marino
“discussed
the details of the product, the mechanism and the benefits.” This is said
to justify an inference that what was discussed included all the details of the
products, including the commissions.
iv)
The decision to give Mr Marino
the mandate to execute the JB Notes is
immediate and is not dependent upon FMCP's incorporation. Dr Kagigi and Mr
Haggiagi had already signed the GAIN product proposal in the meeting.
v)
The “FM Capital Partners” minutes do not record a binding agreement to
incorporate FMCP, merely an agreed set of steps starting with a letter of
intent signed by LAP to be sent to Mr Marino.
vi)
The minutes include another separate section entitled “RBS Coutts
Portfolio” referring to “the RBS portfolio managed by himself [Mr Marino]
and [Mr Haggiagi]”. There is here no contemplation that the RBS Coutts
portfolio would be transferred to FMCP once formed.
152.
By late June the intention to enter into GAIN was clear. On 22 June
2009, LAP sent a Letter of Intent to Mr Marino
confirming that: “[LAP]…intends
to invest in a financial advisory new company to be established by [Mr
Marino]
as set out in the presentation “FM Capital Partners – Financial Advisory” dated
May 2009 …”. On 24 June 2009, Mr Haggiagi and Mr Naas signed trading
instructions, on behalf of LAP, addressed to Mr Gonet of JB, to exchange all
cash and securities held in the LAP account at JB for the GAIN notes as and
when they were issued in due course. This was of course before FMCP was
incorporated.
April Mandate - conclusions
157.
I have no hesitation in concluding that the April Mandate does not
contain or evidence an agreement that Mr Marino
(and Mr Bessot) should be
entitled to an introducer fee in their personal capacities.
159.
The evidence which would be needed to transform this document into (a) a
contractual document with the effect of enabling Mr Marino
to control the
assets and (b) a document with reference to an entirely separate portfolio are
entirely lacking.
161.
Nor does the document deal with remuneration. This is consistent with
the conclusion reached as to its non-contractual status; if Mr Marino
were
being retained to do work, a remuneration provision would be expected – as in
the IMAs. This conclusion is yet further bolstered by the fact that the April
Mandate could provide no basis for any payments to Mr Bessot.
162.
In my judgment there is nothing in the June meeting minutes (to the
extent they are even admissible in aid of construction of the April Mandate) which
compels a different conclusion. While those minutes are plainly capable of
being read the way in which they are read by Mr Marino,
that is not the only
reading open on the document, particularly when it is placed in its context of the
ongoing work to deal with the LAP Portfolio and to bring FMCP into existence.
July 2009- October 2009: GAIN I and II and the first payments
165. On 3 July 2009, FMCP was incorporated.
“THIS AGREEMENT… replaces that made the 6th July 2009 between GAM Structured Investments Ltd. and FM Capital Partners…”
167.
It includes signature blocks for Messrs Marino
and Bessot, each supposedly
as “attorney” for Ironfly. In fact, neither of them in fact held any formal
power of attorney for Ironfly, which generally executed documents by its
Seychellois nominee directors.
“Members of the Julius Baer Group have various and multiple roles and responsibilities related to the issue, performance, management and administration of the Notes. Members of the Julius Baer Group and their directors, officers, employees and agents may also be involved in other financial investment or professional activities which may cause conflicts of interest with the issue and ongoing management and administration of the Notes.”
No reference was made to any other actual or potential conflicts of interest.
176.
The amount of the Amortization Fee replicates the sums paid by GAM to
Ironfly. It is common ground that the fact that sums were paid to Ironfly was
not disclosed per se, though Mr Marino
and Mr Ohmura explained that it
was entirely normal and would be expected for an introduction fee to be payable
and for it to be paid in this way. It is also common ground that the Amortization
Fee was not paid by GAM out of its own fees, but that the cost of the Amortization
Fee (in relation to this and the later JB Notes) came out of the LAP assets.
The experts agreed that this structuring of the payment of an introducer's fee
was not unusual.
177. The other fees relating to GAIN were:
i) A “Risk Monitoring Fee” payable to GAM of 1.30% p.a. of the Denomination according to the Term Sheet and Prospectus, but 1.40% according to the Product Proposal. This was the fee for creating the product (including design and structuring), managing it, and guaranteeing capital protection.
ii) There was also a “Note Advisory Fee”, payable to FMCP, of “0.20% per annum of the Denomination, during the lifetime of the Notes”. Two features should be mentioned:
a) In fact, and (it was agreed) unusually 1.4% (7 years x 0.2%) was agreed to be paid upfront as a lump sum within ten business days of the Issue Date. The result was that FMCP was immediately paid Note Advisory Fees totalling US$2,410,910 for the two tranches of GAIN. FMCP argued that this was unusual and inconsistent with the wording of the main term, indicating a degree of bad faith while Mr Ohmura contended that the “during the lifetime” wording effectively denoted an intention for a lump sum payment.
b) The Note Advisory Fee also diminished the assets of LAP, and the value of the Notes. Again, the expert evidence was that it is commonplace for such fees to be taken out of the investor’s assets.
178.
The position as to the payment of the Amortization Fee at least is
nonetheless said to be key in relation to the case on GAIN against Mr Marino,
given that it was his case that while LAP did expect him to get paid for his
work on GAIN, it expected him to be paid by the bank, and not by LAP. This is
one point on which Mr
Marino’s
intended evidence was clear. In his first
statement he stated that Mr Sharif expected Mr
Marino
to get paid by the Bank “and
not by LAP” and that Mr Haggiagi “did not expect LAP to pay” Mr
Marino.
In his second statement he said that LAP agreed to himself and Mr
Bessot being paid by JB “from its profits (and not from LAP assets),
because, otherwise, it would have had to pay us itself, which it did not want
to do.”
179.
Also, key to FMCP's case against both Mr Marino
and Mr Ohmura was the
contemplated role of FMCP, as evidenced by the two agreements into which it
entered in connection with GAIN, which it says gives the lie to the suggestion
that any further fees (for example to Mr
Marino
directly) were intended. FMCP
submits that the duties of FMCP as Note Advisor were wide-ranging. Under Clause
4.1(a), one aspect of its role was to advise GAM (as Calculation Agent)
regarding:
“…initial structure and parameters of designated Products as per Schedule I [i.e. GAIN] including but not limited to (i) composition of initial portfolio and weighting of portfolio components, (ii) choice of basic Products parameters such as currency, denomination and tenor, (iii) level of principal protection and/or leverage, (iv) choice of Products risk parameters such as maximum exposure and the allocation table, and (v) determination of product fees.”
180.
This, FMCP says, reflects an agreement that FMCP be paid for the self-same
tasks that Mr Marino
argues that he performed in his ‘personal’ capacity. A
similar point applies to the role of a ‘distributor’, which Mr Ohmura says was
genuinely the role performed by Ironfly; FMCP says that this was expressly
within the scope of FMCP’s remit pursuant to the NAA: in particular when one
looks at Clause 4.1(c), which required FMCP to provide “assistance to [GAM]
in communication with the investors in the Products [i.e. LAP]”.
182. FMCP’s role under the NAA also included (Clause 4.1(b)) advising on:
“… matters of ongoing maintenance and reporting of Products as per Schedule I [i.e. GAIN], including but not limited to (i) monitoring of Products performance, (ii) reporting of Products performance and key Products parameters in light of investor needs, and potentially (iii) any modification of Products terms as may be conducted by the Calculation Agent and/or the issuer of the Products according to the Terms of the Products.”
“… at its reasonable discretion… with a view to reasonably safeguard the legitimate interests of [LAP], provided however always in accordance with (i) the Terms of the Products and (ii) the Terms of this Agreement.”
184.
FMCP points to these clauses and says that in the light of them Mr
Marino’s
evidence that the work that he and Mr Bessot had done for LAP was “completely
separate and different in quality from the work which FMCP would do for LAP and
the work which we would do for FMCP” is demonstrably false – even as
regards these earliest transactions.
185.
Mr Marino
submits that given the timeline on these agreements: the April
Mandate (2 April 2009), JB's proposal for the structured products (4 June 2009)
and LAP’s sign-off on the proposal and the transfer of funds (24 June 2009) which
all pre-dated the incorporation of FMCP (3 July 2009), there could be no breach
of any obligation by Mr
Marino.
He says that he was under no obligation to
bring a pre-existing contract between him and a third party into FMCP when it
was incorporated. He says that there was no shared intention that the contract
between himself and LAP would be migrated into FMCP once FMCP had been
incorporated.
i) On 12 August 2009 – US$3,125,000, being 2.5% of the notional subscription in the first tranche of GAIN (US$125m); and
ii) On 13 October 2009 – US$1,183,400, being 2.5% of the notional subscription in the second tranche of GAIN (US$47.3m).
187.
These commissions were then shared out by Messrs Marino
and Bessot
amongst themselves (through onward transfers to Leopard and Mr Bessot's company
Regent 121) and to the extent of US$625,000, with Mr Ohmura.
188.
Mr Marino’s
case is that these were effectively payments made pursuant
to the April Mandate. He says that there was no breach of duty because the
payments came to him via this earlier agreement. He therefore says that he was
under “no duty to disclose the receipt of this fee, or indeed payments I
made following receipt”; and that there was not “any need or occasion to
disclose the introducer fees at FMCP board meetings”. This case, that he
did not disclose the payments, is consistent with his later admissions to the
FCA in the Charles Russell letter.
193. FMCP says that these factors drive the conclusion that the Ironfly SAA is a sham.
GAIN: conclusions on Mr Marino
Breach of Directors’ duties
195.
As I have indicated above, I do not find the case advanced by Mr Marino
(and adopted by Mr Ohmura) in relation to the April Mandate credible.
196.
In a sense this disposes of Mr Marino's
case on breach of fiduciary
duty, because it, and the timeline argument, are predicated on the supposition
that there was a valid agreement to pay an introducer fee pursuant to that
April Mandate. At least one of the breaches alleged (s. 175 – no conflict) is
necessarily breached as soon as one concludes that there was no agreement as alleged
by Mr
Marino
in the April Mandate. That is sufficient for liability on the part
of Mr
Marino,
subject to the defences he raises.
198.
This is reflected in the documentation later agreed; in particular I
consider that the NAA plainly contemplated FMCP (presumably via Mr Marino
and
possibly Mr Bessot) performing duties before its incorporation and that those
duties were or included effectively those which one might expect an introducer
to perform. That is harmonious also with the finding which I have made as to
the inapplicability of the April Mandate.
199.
That being the case, I conclude that it is quite plain on the evidence
that by arranging for and receiving the sums paid to Ironfly, Messrs Marino
and
Bessot breached their employment duties and the directors’ duties discussed
above and specifically the no-conflict rule (s. 175 CA 2006), the no-profit
rule (s. 176 CA 2006), and the duty of loyalty (s. 172 CA 2006). They also
failed to disclose their actions and thereby breached the duty to disclose
their own misconduct.
200.
To the extent that Mr Marino
prays in aid the fact that the duties are
prospective not retrospective, and claims that any profit was made before he
came under director’s duties, this cannot assist him. Although the introduction
was performed before the incorporation of FMCP I have found that the payment
was not made pursuant to the April Mandate. There is no other agreement even
suggested by Mr
Marino.
Further it seems likely, given that an Introducer Agreement
was concluded that the sums paid were paid pursuant to that Introducer
Agreement. The conclusion of the Introducer Agreement was not until after the
incorporation of FMCP, and hence a breach arose when it was concluded.
201.
But in any event, it is clear that the payment of the sums to Ironfly
came significantly after the incorporation of FMCP. In simple terms, even had
Mr Marino
reached a formal agreement for the payment of an introduction fee
prior to the incorporation of FMCP he would upon its incorporation have come
under a duty to declare an interest under s. 177, and a duty not to accept a
benefit under the agreement which was paid in part by reason of his (as a
director) committing FMCP’s client to the new products. He would also, it seems
to me, even at that stage be in breach of his duty under s. 172.
Defences to the breach of statutory duty case
202.
Mr Marino
has attempted to discharge the burden of showing that he
obtained the fully informed consent of FMCP to his actions, or that his and/or
Mr Bessot’s breaches were authorised or ratified.
203.
However, I conclude that he fails to do so. Crucially of course Mr
Marino
was himself the key witness on this point; and yet he failed to attend
to give evidence and expressly elected not to rely on his witness statements.
The evidence that he therefore would have given on this point is not before the
court. In closing Mr Couser for Mr
Marino
correctly conceded that he “cannot
point to any document that shows LAP/FMCP consented to every individual trade/transaction
of which complaint is made.” The only documentary evidence to which he has
been able to point is the April Mandate and the 1-4 June minutes, with which I
have already dealt and which I have found do not sustain the case that there
was agreement.
205.
Further there are issues with the mechanism of authority. Unless the
authority stems from the June meetings (as I have found it does not) the
authority on which Mr Marino
relies comes only from non-directors of LAP (Mr
Sharif and Mr Haggiagi) and in the case of the latter interested rather than
non-interested parties. There has been no suggestion of ratification of any
breaches by the shareholders in a general meeting. In any event authorisation
would be required for breach of the no-profit rule and authorisation short of
full shareholders' meeting or the Duomatic principle would not as a
matter of law suffice.
206.
To get around these difficulties it was suggested for Mr Marino
that he
could bring himself within the principle in Re Duomatic. It was argued
that the knowledge of the LAP representatives who were directors of FMCP is to
be attributed to FMCP for that purpose as per Moore-Bick LJ in Jafari-Fini
-v- Skillglass Limited [2007] EWCA Civ 261. It was Mr
Marino’s
case that
all of the directors were fully aware of the arrangements and consented to them
but, he submitted that he need only show that one of them had the requisite
knowledge and that that could be done via the knowledge of Dr Kagigi from the
documents, in particular the June meeting minutes which he says show that the
investment of the LAP funds was carried out on the instructions of Dr Kagigi.
207.
Mr Marino
then submits that those directors, having the authority of
LAP, were able to and did bind LAP to consent to the arrangements in its
capacity of shareholder of FMCP. Mr
Marino,
Mr Bessot and LAP at all times
represented 100% of the issued share capital of FMCP and could therefore pass
informal resolutions under the Duomatic
principle.
208.
However, I consider that this reliance is misplaced. In the first place,
it is a bootstraps argument. The principle in Duomatic requires
unqualified agreement that has been, or is capable of being, objectively
established. There is no such evidence here. On the evidence there was no fully
informed consent of the majority shareholder, LAP (and in fact, it is clear on
the evidence that there has been no such consent). The April Mandate was, as I
have concluded, not apt to permit payment of an introductory fee in relation to
GAIN. The June meeting minutes do not evidence such agreement or consent. Mr
Marino's
case as to consent by Mr Sharif and Mr Haggiagi rested on his own evidence,
which he declined to call. Mr Sharif had no relevant authority. As to Mr
Haggiagi, I have concluded (see below) that he was corrupt and even had he had
authority his knowledge is not to be attributed either to FMCP or to LAP.
210.
Mr Marino
argues that even if, as I have found, he was in breach of his
fiduciary duties to FMCP, he ought to be forgiven those breaches pursuant to
section 1157 of the Companies Act.
“1157 Power of court to grant relief in certain cases
(1) If in proceedings for negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust against–
(a) an officer of a company, or …
it appears to the court hearing the case that the officer or person is or may be liable but that he acted honestly and reasonably, and that having regard to all the circumstances of the case (including those connected with his appointment) he ought fairly to be excused, the court may relieve him, either wholly or in part, from his liability on such terms as it thinks fit.”
213.
This case is very different from D’Jan. Mr Pillow described it as
being “not in the same ballpark”. That phrase is overused in litigation,
but here is, in my judgment, entirely fair. This is a case where Mr Marino’s
breaches were (setting aside dishonesty) both multiple and gross and where
interests other than his own and Mr Bessot’s were plainly affected by his
failure. There can be no excusing of the breaches under section 1157.
Dishonest assistance
214.
The second main head of liability alleged against Mr Marino
in relation
to GAIN I and GAIN II is dishonest assistance. Given the conclusions which I
have reached above, it follows that there was a breach of directors’ duty also
by Mr Bessot, Mr
Marino’s
co-director. Since Mr
Marino
and Mr Bessot were
acting together, they must logically have been assisting each other, and the
contrary was not argued. Those ingredients of dishonest assistance are not
controversial. The issue here is as to dishonesty.
215.
Mr Couser for Mr Marino
has made a number of criticisms of the way in
which the particulars of the case on dishonesty are pleaded. I do not however
consider that these need to be unpicked at any length, given the fact that dishonesty
is plainly pleaded and that being the case what really matters is the
application of the test in Ivey v Genting Casinos.
216.
The first step is to ascertain (subjectively) the actual state of Mr
Marino’s
knowledge or belief as to the facts. On this I conclude that Mr
Marino
did not subjectively consider that what he was doing was honest. The bottom
line is that he agreed a fee for himself in a transaction made by a company of
which he was a director. The ethical difficulties involved in this must have
been obvious to him. The very nature of the argument deployed to answer this
evidences that there is no real answer to the case, unless the April Mandate
argument were accepted and GAIN/the JB Notes were not to be part of the FMCP
business. Given the fees also being paid to FMCP he must have been aware that
there was an element of double payment going on; and he knew that fees were an
issue which was important to LAP. The reality is that if he had thought that
the arrangement which he put into place was acceptable to FMCP it is more
likely than not that he would have told them exactly what the arrangement was. He
did not do so.
218.
Yet Mr Marino,
knowing this, knew full well that the Ironfly payments
were so structured that they in fact were paid from the LAP funds. This
evidence alone would be incompatible with honesty; and tellingly, no attempt
was made to deal with it.
219.
That his conscience was subjectively affected is also evidenced by the
payments made to Mr Haggiagi. Whether or not those are properly characterised
as bribes, payments were made to Mr Haggiagi, who did no work, simply because
(according to Mr Marino)
he knew of the payments to Ironfly and wanted to keep
him onside. The innocent explanation for this is hard even to hypothesise.
220.
For similar reasons even if Mr Marino
were not subjectively dishonest, I
would conclude that the only possible answer to the question of whether his
conduct was honest or dishonest by reference to the (objective) standards of
ordinary decent people is that his conduct was dishonest. The payment of an
introducer fee may be – and the evidence suggests it is - perfectly normal and
acceptable in the banking world. That is not the point. This was not a simple
payment of an introducer fee. This was the payment of an undisclosed introducer
fee, to be taken from the client’s own funds, in circumstances where the terms
of the product made a separate payment for the same work to Mr
Marino’s
and the
client’s joint venture company. This was not objectively honest behaviour.
GAIN: conclusions on Mr Ohmura
222.
The case against him must be very carefully considered. I accept the
submission advanced by Mr Emmett for Mr Ohmura that there has been a tendency
in FMCP’s approach to the case to elide the position of Mr Ohmura with that of
Mr Marino
and Mr Bessot, and that that elision assumes more than can be
justified. In particular I bear well in mind that:
i) Mr Ohmura was not a principal in the dealings with LAP;
ii) He was not a director or even an employee of FMCP;
iii) He was not, it appears, a person whose job involved the contractual side of the business in any detail. While he was General Director at GAM, his business was making sure that the structuring/risk side of the transaction worked as it should;
iv) He could very properly, it appears to be common ground on the expert evidence, have regarded the payment of an introduction fee to the introducer of this business as entirely normal and unremarkable;
v) Whatever may be argued about some of the other transactions, it is clear that the GAIN transaction was a perfectly valid transaction for LAP to enter into and the evidence suggests that Mr Ohmura did some very real work on the structuring side of it.
223.
The starting point in evaluating the evidence is that Mr Ohmura was certainly
closely involved with GAIN: it was conceived, structured and issued while he
was in charge of JB’s Alternative Risk Group and was the General Director of
GAM itself. Further he was Mr Marino’s
contact at GAM, having been his
long-standing business associate. His close involvement is reflected in the
fact that the NAA and FMCP SAA were signed by Mr Ohmura for GAM. Mr Ohmura
accepted that he for GAM had discussed the fees to be paid to Mr
Marino
and Mr
Bessot before a meeting which took place on 9 June 2009. It would not be
surprising if he had signed the Introducer Agreement, though he said he had no
recollection of doing so.
225.
In relation to these agreements and the Ironfly SAA, the BPA and the
Rabobank and Deutsche Bank agreements, Mr Ohmura was questioned closely about
their meanings and sometimes as regards his understanding of their regulatory
implications. Exception has been taken to this cross-examination by those
acting for Mr Marino
and Mr Ohmura, who say that such evidence was
inadmissible, and that the line of questioning was unfair. I accept these
complaints, but only in part. Although some of the cross-examination directed
to the meaning of these and other agreements seemed to stray too far into his subjective
opinion of meanings of provisions which were not germane to the issues and
would not be admissible in relation to construction of those documents, it was
valid in the context of reaching a conclusion as to his honesty to examine Mr
Ohmura’s understanding of the key provisions of agreements which he signed (and
in some cases drafted).
226.
Here (in relation to the NAA and the FMCP SAA) Mr Ohmura can be taken to
have read the main contractual documents which he signed on behalf of his
employer, committing JB to contractual relationships which had financial
implications for the firm. His evidence was that the agreements were drafted by
the legal department based on terms negotiated by him with Mr Marino
and Mr
Bessot and approved by the bank. The key provisions of these agreements are
clear. He must therefore be taken to know from these agreements, which he
signed for GAM, that FMCP was being paid fees for the product, that those fees
were on their face apt to cover the introducer aspect of the deal and that (assuming
FMCP did indeed come into existence) FMCP was to take over the management of
the portfolio. Mr Ohmura’s dismissal of the terms of the agreement as regards FMCP
being responsible for introduction as being inconsistent with the chronology
was not satisfactory, given the context and what he knew of Mr
Marino’s
involvement with FMCP.
228.
This knowledge of the terms of the NAA creates a tension with the
position which Mr Ohmura adopted as to Mr Marino’s
personal entitlement to be
paid as an introducer.
229.
On this, Mr Ohmura’s position was that he saw nothing wrong with Messrs
Marino
and Bessot in the person of Ironfly receiving an introducer fee (which
was standard market practice) in relation to an introduction which pre-dated
the formation of FMCP, particularly as he said that it was his understanding
that FMCP was not involved in structured products business and that Mr
Marino
intended to have a separate business alongside FMCP to perform such business.
230.
He said that he considered this to be not just normal but also a
reflection of the April Mandate, which he said that Mr Marino
had showed him. His
evidence on the April Mandate was somewhat contradictory. He said that in one
sense he regarded the April Mandate as “not that relevant” because work
was often done with introducers without seeing their agreements; if a
distributor with a good history with JB had come along, he would have
structured a product without the comfort of the mandate. However, he also said
that he did read the April Mandate, and indeed filed it – an answer which is
consistent with his case before me that he took comfort from the document.
231.
The problem with this evidence is that it is actually hard to see how
the April Mandate (if read with any degree of thoroughness) could have created
any comfort as to Mr Marino’s
and Mr Bessot’s entitlement to receive a private
payment as introducers for this product. This is because, as noted above, it
simply was not on its plain words apt to cover an introducer fee for the JB Notes
– and still less one which included a payment to Mr Bessot.
232.
Mr Ohmura’s evidence on this point is therefore highly unsatisfactory
(and not, as was suggested by Mr Marino,
“highly cogent”). The reality
is that if he had read the April Mandate it would not have provided him with
comfort, but rather the reverse. It is of course possible that Mr Ohmura did
not read the April Mandate carefully enough to note this point – and one
possibility which I have considered, given Mr Ohmura’s evidence on the various
agreements, was that he is habitually careless about reading contractual
documents. However, this was not what he said; his evidence was that he did
read it – and the April Mandate is (unlike some of the other documents) short
and straightforward. If read it would be understood by a man of Mr Ohmura’s
intelligence.
236.
FMCP also asks me to conclude that in addition Mr Ohmura knew things
about Ironfly and Messrs Marino
and Bessot which are incompatible with his
acting honestly. In particular it is said that he knew at all material times
that Ironfly was a shell company incorporated in an opaque jurisdiction, with
no business premises or employees and no other business. It manifested only in
connection with payments; there is no evidence of any work being done by it or
communication between JB/GAM and Ironfly. No emails were sent from Ironfly
email addresses; Mr
Marino
and Mr Bessot either used FMCP emails or their
personal emails when dealing with Ironfly business. Its invoices were “homemade”.
It is also suggested that Mr Bessot’s habit of sending Ironfly emails without
appending his name indicated a secrecy which was incompatible with an innocent
explanation.
237.
I am not prepared to draw any conclusions as to Mr Ohmura’s honesty in
relation to the GAIN transactions from these facts. The fact that Mr Marino
chose to take payment through a company in a tax efficient location would in my
view be neither here nor there in the context of the banking world, where tax
efficiency may well be viewed as a question of competence rather than moral
laxness. Nor at this early stage do I see that Mr Ohmura (if acting honestly) would
have been alerted to any wrongdoing by less than smooth use of emails and less
than professional invoices. The parties in question were moving from employment
in big banks to a more independent existence; start-ups take time and documentation
may not proceed smoothly.
238.
The position is however different as regards the related assertion that
Mr Ohmura knew that Messrs Marino
and Bessot were not employees of Ironfly and
were directors of FMCP dealing with GAM in relation to GAIN as directors of
FMCP – including at the time they signed the Introducer Agreement.
239.
Whether or not Mr Ohmura knew their precise employment status I conclude
that Mr Ohmura must have known that Mr Marino
and Mr Bessot, whose idea FMCP
was and who acted for FMCP, were directors of FMCP. I conclude that he must
have known this from early in June 2009 when Mr
Marino
handed the signed
Product Proposal to Mr Ohmura in a meeting and that he certainly knew it by the
time that the inferential Introducer Agreement was signed, even if he did not
do so when he first discussed the fee to be paid to Mr
Marino.
Nor do I
consider that Mr Ohmura’s evidence that the agreement for the commission was
made earlier can assist, given that it was not until 6 July 2009 and after the
incorporation of FMCP that any Introducer Agreement was signed. I would add
that I regarded his evidence regarding the absence of disclosure by Messrs
Marino
and Bessot (“to be honest, that’s not part of the judgment we have to
make from the structuring side”) taken in conjunction with his not very
satisfactory evidence as to the fee disclosure in the final document being
adequate as indicating a defensive response most easily consistent with an
understanding that such disclosure should have been made and hence with, at
least, “blind eye knowledge”.
243.
I also note that the Ironfly SAA does not appear to have been considered
a document of significance by Mr Marino,
who never mentioned it.
246.
That the payment may not have been for work as such is supported by Mr
Marino's
account which was that the payment represents him sharing his own
fees for GAIN with Mr Ohmura in order to help him set up Conquest and pay for
office equipment, incorporation costs and costs of personnel. That is to some
extent supported by a Bloomberg chat of 12 October which shows him asking for
the payment to be sent so that he can pay some bills urgently. While Mr Ohmura
says that the payment was for genuine work it is hard to see what it was,
unless it related to GAIN I and represented a form of bonus over and above the
salary he was paid for it.
247.
In the light of these various points I conclude that the US$625,000
payment was not, as Mr Ohmura contends, for structuring work in relation to
GAIN II but was rather a payment made with reference to GAIN I. Since Mr Ohmura
was employed by GAM at the time, there would be no need to pay him for his
structuring work. This and Mr Ohmura’s unwillingness to accept the link to GAIN
I suggests that the payment was for something else and most probably for
assisting Mr Marino
and Mr Bessot’s plans to take a personal commission.
248.
All in all I do reach the conclusion that in the light of what Mr Ohmura
can be shown to have known, the circumstances surrounding the US$625,000
payment and the unsatisfactory nature of his evidence in certain key regards, the
correct inference to draw - even bearing in mind the caution appropriate to
drawing inferences from circumstantial evidence - is that he was either aware
that Mr Marino
and Mr Bessot were acting in breach of duty or he was wilfully
blind to that fact. The evidence in my judgment goes beyond his suspecting the
truth.
249.
It was asserted on behalf of Mr Ohmura that this question fell to be
considered by reference to the fact that Mr Ohmura was at all times operating
in Switzerland and under Swiss law directors are prohibited from profiting from
their positions at the expense of the company and not otherwise. I do not
consider that even if this were the case as a matter of Swiss law, this would
impact on my conclusion. The first reason is that it is very specifically not
said, in Mr Ohmura’s pleading or in his oral evidence, or in the submissions
advanced on his behalf that he believed that the actions of Mr Marino
and
Bessot were unobjectionable because this was his understanding of this point of
Swiss law at the time. Indeed, his pleaded case and oral evidence both
suggested that he did think that disclosure was necessary. His pleaded case was
that he assumed disclosure had been made. His oral evidence, as I have noted
above, was that it was not for him to make a judgment about disclosure. That
being the case it is hard to see what relevance Mr Ohmura’s presence in
Switzerland and this point of law could have.
250.
Further the obvious other candidate for the introducer fee was FMCP
itself. Mr Ohmura agreed that the introducer fee to FMCP could have been
increased if Mr Marino
and Mr Bessot had not been being paid. As he said, to
GAM “the economics would have been the same”. There must therefore have
been at least a question as to whether Mr
Marino
and Mr Bessot aside from being
in conflict of interest, were profiting at the expense of FMCP.
251.
Thus, I conclude that like Mr Marino,
Mr Ohmura was subjectively
dishonest in relation to GAIN. This is a case where in the words of Lord
Hoffmann in Twinsectra: “he knew perfectly well that he was helping to pay
away money to which the recipient was not entitled”. This is very different
to the findings in Heinl where Colman J found:
“Given what he knew of Metcalf’s operations, it would not be obvious to him that any funds under Metcalf’s control probably originated with the Bank. Nor would it be obvious that because the funds were going into the accounts of companies under the control of Metcalf …. that meant that those funds were probably fraudulently procured.”
252.
I would in any event have found that even if he were not subjectively
dishonest, he was objectively so. I bear in mind in this connection the fact
that the experts were agreed on the fact that Messrs Marino
and Bessot were in
conflict of interest and the degree of hesitancy which they expressed as to the
documentation surrounding this transaction.
July – October 2009: The Vesper entities
256.
In early 2009, alongside the plans made by Messrs Marino
and Ohmura to leave
their respective employers and set up their own respective companies, they also
agreed to set up a business which appears at least initially to have been intended
to be a joint business. That business was called Vesper.
257.
The umbrella company was called Vesper Capital Management Limited
("VCM"), a Cayman entity incorporated on 24 July 2009. In the second
half of 2009, Messrs Ohmura and Marino
established three Vesper funds in the
Cayman Islands: (a) Vesper DTF; (b) VCM Liquid Alpha Fund SPC (“Vesper Liquid
Alpha”); and (c) VCM Systematic Alternative Beta Replication Fund (“Vesper
Beta”): collectively, the “Vesper Funds”.
258.
The Vesper Funds were managed by VCM which was entitled to receive fees,
including management and incentive fees, pursuant to IMAs signed by Messrs
Marino
and Ohmura with each of the Vesper Funds. In fact, it appears that VCM
received only the management fees.
259.
On 22 October 2009, Messrs Marino
and Ohmura also founded Vesper
Investment Management AG (“Vesper AG") in Switzerland. By agreements
signed by Mr Ohmura and on occasion by Mr
Marino,
Vesper AG was appointed fund
advisor to Vesper DTF and Vesper Liquid Alpha; and Mr Ohmura's company Conquest
was appointed fund advisor in relation to Vesper Beta. Investment advisory fees
were paid by VCM to Vesper AG and/or Conquest.
260.
Messrs Marino
and Ohmura were the joint beneficial owners (as to 50%
each) of both entities; and the only directors of VCM. Similarly, Messrs
Marino
and Ohmura initially also jointly owned, through Vesper AG, all of the shares
in Conquest Cayman, which Mr Ohmura had transferred to Vesper AG in December
2009.
261.
There was an issue as to the period of that co-ownership. Mr Ohmura
tended to dispute that there had been any real co-ownership in that he had
funded Mr Marino's
original share purchase and he said that from an early stage
it was intended that Mr
Marino
should not actually be a co-owner. He said that
pressure of business only stopped the co-ownership from being unwound earlier.
262.
However, the facts are that Mr Marino
was originally a part owner of
Vesper, and that the paperwork to bring that situation to an end was not done
until October 2010. To the extent that it is relevant I find that Mr
Marino
was
a co-owner of Vesper and Conquest Cayman until that date.
263.
On about 31 August 2009, Mr Marino
caused FMCP to transfer US$10m of
LAP’s assets from the RBS Coutts account managed by FMCP under the IMA, into
the Vesper DTF.
264.
FMCP at around this time made a Global Portfolio Management Report to LAP
in respect of the RBS Coutts portfolio. It reported this transfer and attached
a document, entitled “Fund Analysis – VCM Diversified Trading Fund”
which gave the reasons for it. It spoke highly of the virtues of the fund; and
described VCM as “independent and unbiased”. It did not indicate that Mr
Marino
held a personal beneficial interest in Vesper.
265.
Since, as I have found, Mr Marino
had an interest in Vesper at the time,
it follows that his actions were ones which were afflicted by a serious
conflict of interest, which could only be dealt with by full disclosure; which,
it is common ground, did not take place.
266.
Mr Marino
then (again in conflict of interest) supported the Vesper Funds
in his Global Portfolio Management Report to LAP for December 2009. This noted,
in relation to alternative investments (e.g., investments in hedge funds) that
the alternative portfolio is “essentially made of positions we want to get rid
of”, but that:
“…[t]he only position that corresponds to our long term plan for the alternative allocation is [Vesper DTF] … The performance is not on par with our expectations, but the Manager has recently reshuffled the portfolio between the three strategies and this should help building sustainable returns. More importantly, this fund should perform well in volatile market conditions, and therefore can be seen as a hedge in case market conditions deteriorated.”
January- July 2010: Mr Haggiagi
267.
It appears that in late 2009 Mr Haggiagi had approached Mr Marino
and
sought a payment for his own benefit. Mr
Marino's
witness statement (the only
account of how the payment came about) said that Mr Haggiagi was aware that Mr
Marino
had received an introducer’s fee and asked for money. Because he felt
harassed by Mr Haggiagi and wanted to keep him onside Mr
Marino
agreed to make
a payment to him.
268.
From the commissions received by Ironfly, Mr Marino
made the series of
payments outlined above from January 2010. FMCP says that these payments were
bribes and makes claims for the sums paid accordingly in bribery, breach of
fiduciary duty and dishonest assistance (allowing for recoveries already made
from Mr Haggiagi).
269.
But also, FMCP submits these payments mean that Mr Haggiagi was at all
material times a corrupt agent whose knowledge could not be attributed to his
principals (whether at FMCP or LAP). Thus, it says Mr Marino’s
explanation in
his witness statement that he thought that the payments were disclosed and authorised
cannot succeed (even if disclosure were found on the facts).
270.
Mr Haggiagi, in a statement tendered under the CEA which denied ever
authorising any personal payment to Mr Marino,
did not deal with the funds he
received, or the amounts he has subsequently repaid at all.
271.
I accept FMCP's submissions. Given their respective positions in respect
of the allegations, and the fact that neither was called, the evidence of Mr
Marino
and any hypothetical substantive explanation by Mr Haggiagi would only
have been capable of being accepted if supported by other, preferably
documentary, evidence. Mr Couser for Mr
Marino
was unable to point me to any
such evidence. I have already concluded that there was no disclosure in
relation to the GAIN breaches of duty; I can see no evidence to support a
conclusion that these payments were disclosed.
272.
It appears that Mr Haggiagi sought a sum for his silence and that Mr
Marino
paid it. That is consistent with the uncontroversial facts. It is also
consistent with Mr
Marino’s
account to the FCA in the Charles Russell letter which
stated, so far as relevant:
“18. Mr Marino
understands that Mr Ramadan Haggiagi, a
director of FMCP, became aware of the First Undeclared Payment shortly after it
was made. During the second half of 2009 Mr Haggiagi solicited a payment in
respect of the First Undeclared Payment from Mr
Marino.”
…
20. Mr Haggiagi instructed Mr Marino
to establish a company
in Dubai for the purpose of making these payments. That entity was called Blue
Tiger. Mr
Marino
paid the approximate total sum of USD $600,000 from Leopard
Technology to Blue Tiger, and from there made payment to an entity as
identified by Mr Haggiagi (the “Second Undeclared Payment”).
21. Mr Marino
did not disclose the Second Undeclared Payment
to either FMCP or LAP or any other individual related to either of those
entities, save that his recollection is that he disclosed it to Mr Bessot. To
the best of Mr
Marino’s
knowledge, Mr Haggiagi did not make any disclosure to
FMCP or LAP and nor did Mr Bessot."
273.
I therefore conclude that these payments were bribes paid by Mr Marino
to Mr Haggiagi. I also conclude that Mr
Marino
cannot have thought that the
payments were honest. It follows that Mr
Marino
was in breach of his directors'
duties also and that as Mr Haggiagi was also a non-executive director of FMCP
he dishonestly assisted Mr Haggiagi in his breaches of his duty to FMCP.
274.
Further since Mr Haggiagi was bribed, his knowledge, so far as relied on
from the relevant dates, as authorising Mr Marino’s
actions cannot in law be
relied on.
October 2009- September 2010: The Private Bank Trades
275.
After the completion of GAIN, but largely before the next of the JB
Notes (AMFC+) was purchased in May 2010, Messrs Marino
and Bessot carried out a
series of structured trades using LAP’s assets under FMCP’s mandates.
Commissions on these trades were initially paid to Mr Ohmura’s company, Conquest,
although 90% of the sums paid were then transmitted by him to Ironfly.
276.
These trades did not loom large in the pleaded case, and therefore were
not dealt with extensively in the witness statements of Messrs Marino,
Bessot and
Ohmura. However, by the time the hearing arrived, there was considerable focus
on the detail of these transactions.
279.
Clause 7 of the power of attorney also revoked any existing limited
power of attorney. It follows, as FMCP submitted, that this included the
temporary one given to Mr Marino
prior to FMCP’s incorporation on 23 April
2009. It also contained an express acknowledgment and agreement by LAP that
FMCP may receive “payments from commissions and brokerage fees accruing at
the Bank”.
282.
The note was issued by Rabobank. This was a bank where both Mr Bessot
and Mr Marino
had worked for many years in the past. It is apparent that they
still had contacts there. Mr Bessot originated and then arranged the
transaction directly with a former Rabobank colleague, as can be clearly seen
in records of Bloomberg chats which were before the court. There was no mention
of Ironfly or Conquest in the exchanges with Rabobank.
286.
On 19 October 2009, Conquest received €90,000 in ‘distribution’
commissions from Rabobank. €81,000 of this was passed on to Ironfly at the
direction of Mr Ohmura. FMCP submits that the interposition of Mr Ohmura was
for the sole, dishonest purpose of using him as a conduit, and cover, for the
transfer of 90% of the up-front commissions to Ironfly, for the benefit of
Messrs Marino
and Bessot.
287.
In terms of Mr Ohmura’s/Conquest’s role on 24 September 2009, Mr Ohmura
created a Conquest invoice addressed to Rabobank for €90,000 in respect of
services to Rabobank. The services he described as “Structuring” with
the fee being denoted as “Advisory Fee”. Similarly, there is an invoice
dated 1 October 2009 from Ironfly to Conquest for €81,000 (i.e., Messrs Marino
and Bessot’s 90% share). This references “Advisory fees”.
i) Despite its title, the only obligations it purports to impose are on Conquest to negotiate on behalf of Ironfly (and not on behalf of the underlying investor, i.e., LAP) terms and conditions for the issuance of “various structured products”; provide a regular flow of investment reports linked to existing product and new investment ideas; and render a range of other services. There was no credible evidence that Conquest performed this role in relation to the Ironfly Trades, or indeed any of the other Private Bank Trades, where Mr Bessot was effectively the prime mover.
ii) Despite placing no obligation on Ironfly, Ironfly was supposedly entitled to “90% of the Gross Margin generated in the dealing of Structured Solutions” and Conquest was supposed to execute deals in the “best interests” of Ironfly. This apparently creates a tension with the interests of the underlying investor, since such commissions diminished the value of the assets invested dollar-for-dollar.
iii) Mr Ohmura’s evidence suggested the BPA was not a final agreement. He said:
“The [BPA] reflected the intention that in so far as Mr
Marino
and Mr Bessot acted as introducers to Conquest Financial Partners in
relation to future transactions, they would be paid as such (through Ironfly)
in accordance with standard market practice. In the event, the arrangement set
out in the [BPA] was subject to further negotiations and discussions.”
Ironfly 1-6: Conclusions on Mr
Marino
296.
FMCP’s case against Mr Marino
(and Mr Bessot to the extent relevant for
Mr
Marino’s
liability) is that in carrying out the structured trades, they
acted in flagrant breach of their fiduciary duties.
297.
Most simply it is said that the conclusion follows from the mere fact
that Messrs Marino
and Bessot were using funds entrusted to FMCP (which it was
their responsibility to manage as directors of FMCP) for their and Mr Ohmura’s
personal gain.
298.
It is also said that they were actively using their status as directors
to bring the trades about, in that the Private Bank Trades could only be
carried out by Messrs Marino
and Bessot in their capacity as directors, and on
behalf, of FMCP. This was the only entity with power and authority to deal with
the LAP funds and the only entity that could have been entitled to receive any
commissions on trades carried out using LAP moneys in the private bank accounts
in question is LAP’s asset manager.
299.
I conclude that the case against Mr Marino
in relation to breach of
fiduciary duty is plainly made out. The evidence seems quite clear that the
funds used for these trades were indeed funds which FMCP had under management
and that Mr
Marino,
the CEO of FMCP, utilised these funds in a way which
involved a financial gain to himself. That is enough. It would also involve a
financial loss to FMCP who would probably otherwise have received any introducer
commissions.
300.
This situation could only be excusable if there were disclosure by him
and consent by FMCP. But Mr Marino
did not suggest that the commissions paid
and received in relation to the Ironfly Trades were disclosed to FMCP or to
LAP. There was no means by which this disclosure could even have been argued to
have been made, in that none of the documents sent or available to LAP
contained any reference to the commissions payable in relation to these trades
or the identity of those receiving them. There was no reason why FMCP (who were
employing Messrs
Marino
and Bessot and for whose benefit they should have been
acting) could not have conducted these trades directly with the counterparty
banks, and thereby received any commission.
302.
Adding to the picture of a dishonest transaction on the part of Mr
Marino
is the invoice from Ironfly for advice: no case was advanced as to what advice
Ironfly was giving to Conquest in respect of this transaction, which had been
initiated by FMCP and used LAP funds under its management.
303.
The only other issue on which Mr Marino
raised a case was as to whether
Mr
Marino
caused the trades to be made. In circumstances where he effectively
had control over the relevant funds and could make the Ironfly Trades happen by
the sweep of a pen, it seems that the contrary is not really arguable.
304.
While there is a case against Mr Marino
in dishonest assistance (by
assisting in Mr Bessot’s breach of fiduciary duty) in relation to the same
amounts, it adds nothing to the breach of fiduciary duty case.
305.
To the extent that it is necessary to do so I would find the case in
dishonest assistance to be made out for similar reasons to those which I have
given above in relation to GAIN. But here of course there is no argument open
to Mr Marino
about the time period or the date at which his fiduciary duties
became live. At all material points he was in a fiduciary position vis à vis
FMCP.
307.
Secondly, there is the interposition of Mr Ohmura. As I have found, his
role was little more than that of post box; he performed no substantive role.
Nor was he needed to perform any structuring, as he did with GAIN I - the types
of trades in question here were Mr Bessot's area of expertise; and he duly took
the lead on their arrangement. There is therefore a major question mark as to
why Mr Ohmura was involved. The answer which appears most compelling is that Mr
Ohmura (wittingly or otherwise) provided Mr Marino
and Mr Bessot with a
"front" so that their private companies were not directly involved. There
appears to be no honest reason why this would be done by Mr
Marino
and Mr
Bessot.
308.
Finally, three aspects of the evidence as to the emails sent by Mr
Bessot are strongly suggestive that he and hence Mr Marino
knew that what they
were doing was wrong. Firstly, it became apparent that Mr Bessot took pains not
to sign emails to Mr Ohmura from his Ironfly account - he left the sign - off
blank. Secondly when reporting on Ironfly Trade 6 to his in-house compliance
officer at FMCP Mr Bessot edited the text of an email setting out the terms to
remove the reference to a 2% up - front commission. Thirdly in passing on
material from Mr Ohmura to the same compliance officer Mr Bessot edited Mr Ohmura's
details out, with the effect that he actively concealed Mr Ohmura's involvement
from his compliance officer.
Ironfly Trades 1-6: Conclusions on Mr Ohmura
310.
The case against Mr Ohmura is that he knew that in entering into the Private
Bank Trades Messrs Marino
and Bessot were using funds entrusted to FMCP (which
it was their responsibility to manage as directors of FMCP) for their and Mr
Ohmura’s personal gain, and that he actively facilitated their scheme by
interposing Conquest as a receptacle for commissions, which he then distributed.
311.
The key submission from which the inference of dishonesty is said to
flow is the allegation that Mr Ohmura knew very well that the Coutts account
was managed by FMCP on behalf of LAP. Mr Ohmura however denied this. He
contended that “the beneficial owners of the products… remained anonymous as
far as Conquest was concerned”. He also suggested that he thought that
Messrs Marino
and Bessot were acting on behalf of an Ironfly client.
315.
One point on which FMCP rested heavily as regards knowledge was the fact
that Mr Ohmura knew the number of the account at Coutts from which funds
predominantly came for these trades. He knew this because the account
information was on the documents for the transfer of funds into the Vesper DTF.
It is said that he therefore knew the funds were LAP's because the money came
from the same account as was used at the end of August 2009. The trade confirmation
went via fax to Messrs Marino
and Bessot at FMCP.
“Q: You knew, at least now, Mr Ohmura, on 30 September... that FMCP was the manager of the LAP account at HSBC from which this trade had been—was to be executed?
Yes… I would have gathered that from this information.”
319.
In relation to this obvious oddity, Mr Ohmura contended that he believed
that FMCP did not engage in structured products, and hence Ironfly were doing
that which FMCP could not or would not do. Essentially, he sought to portray
his understanding as having been that Ironfly was the structured products arm
of Mr Marino's
business. I do not find this evidence credible. It is in tension
with the case in relation to the BPA, that Ironfly was the distributor of the business.
It also appears to contradict the evidence which he gave orally that he knew of
the marketing material which FMCP had produced for LAP indicating that they
would engage in structured products. It also makes no practical sense in the
context of Mr
Marino
and Bessot both being very experienced in different
aspects of structured products. I therefore conclude that Mr Ohmura's evidence
in relation to this aspect did not reflect his knowledge and belief at the
time.
320.
It is also absolutely clear, inter alia from the fact that he
drafted the relevant documentation and organised the transfer of funds to them,
that Mr Ohmura knew that Mr Marino
and Mr Bessot were receiving commissions,
not qua FMCP, but qua Ironfly (i.e. personally). It follows that
he knew (at least to a Nelsonian standard) that Mr
Marino
and Mr Bessot were
breaching their fiduciary duties. Again, he did not know or ascertain the
position on disclosure.
330.
Mr Ohmura provided more than minimal assistance in the sense that even
if he did not perform a substantive role, he was of manifest use in concealing
the involvement of Messrs Marino
and Bessot from sight and in arranging
payment. It follows that he is liable in dishonest assistance in relation to
the Ironfly Trades. As with Mr
Marino
I will return later to the alternative claims.
May 2010: AMFC+
335. AMFC+ involved 12.5% of fees, including:
i) A Certificate Management Fee of 0.35% p.a. payable to BASL;
ii) An Investment Advisory Fee of 1% p.a. payable to FMCP;
iii) An Amortization Fee of 0.09% per month (an increase from the figure in GAIN) which included:
a) Ironfly’s commission;
b) A Note Advisory Fee of 0.28% p.a. as provided in updated Note Advisory Agreements dated 20 April 2010 and 15 March 2010 between BASL and FMCP; and
iv) A further fee of 1.50% for JB/BASL.
336.
The means by which AMFC+ was actioned was first by a “Trading
Instruction & Note Amendment” which was signed by Messrs Marino
and
Bessot (acting for FMCP) by a letter of 18 May 2010, on FMCP paper and
addressed to Mr Gonet of JB. One of the instructions was to change certain
terms of GAIN. The other was to book into “our portfolio” the necessary
equivalent combination of AMFC+ and cash necessary to match the US dollar value
of the Avatar Funds due to be received by JB free of payment.
337.
On 31 May 2010, Ironfly received what was described as an “introducer
fee” of US$1,750,000 from BASL in respect of AMFC+. Messrs Marino
and
Bessot then made onward transfers to their respective vehicles, Leopard and
Regent 121.
i) They had themselves in their capacity as directors of FMCP signed the instructions which caused the product to be purchased;
ii) Only FMCP was contractually entitled, vis-à-vis LAP, to charge any fees in respect of AMFC+;
iii)
LAP had expressly ruled out remunerating Mr Marino
personally (as
opposed to the bank doing so); and
iv) There was no need for any introduction (still less any ‘distribution’), because LAP was already an established customer of JB and GAM via GAIN and there was no question of selecting a product from an array offered by different banks or conducting due diligence over a new trading partner.
341.
However, the case in relation to Mr Marino
as regards breach of
fiduciary duty appears to be made out. The position is essentially similar to
that which pertained for GAIN, but without any question as to the existence of
duties at the relevant period and with Mr
Marino's
role in committing LAP to
the transaction being even more clear. If any fee could have been justified it
should plainly have gone to FMCP.
342.
As to the April Mandate, some attempt was made to pray this in aid, with
it being submitted that while there is no direct evidence that the later iterations
of the JB Notes were carried out on LAP’s instructions, the Court should
nonetheless conclude that Mr Marino
continued to be authorised by the April Mandate
and is entitled to infer that LAP was fully aware of the changes and gave its
consent and instructions to it.
343.
This argument even as expressed however slightly shoots past the real
target. The question is not whether LAP was aware of the restructurings, but
whether LAP was aware that on each restructuring Mr Marino
and Mr Bessot were
taking another "introducer's commission" out of the LAP funds.
There is nothing in the April Mandate which would tell them this. There is
nothing in the documentation for the transaction which would tell them this; on
the contrary the documentation only suggested the possibility of a payment to
FMCP. In any event as I have concluded there was never any such agreement in
the April Mandate this argument cannot assist.
344.
I also consider that the fact that (as Mr Alpay indicated) the level of
the fee charged was high for a product of this nature, in circumstances where
Mr Marino’s
evidence was that LAP did not want to pay fees out of their funds,
provides further confirmatory evidence that this was not a valid authorised
fee, but a fee taken dishonestly and in breach of duty.
345.
As to the other claims I conclude that the claim in dishonest assistance
is also made out. Absent some argument based on an agreement to the
commissions, which never really emerged, it is plain that there was a breach of
directors’ duties by both Mr Marino
and Mr Bessot, and that for the reasons I
have already given Mr
Marino
was subjectively as well as objectively dishonest.
346. Again, I will revert to the other claims at the end of this judgment.
November 2010: TRAC
347.
TRAC was the third iteration of the JB Notes. On 19 November 2010, GAIN
(a seven-year product which was at this time just over one year old) and AMFC+
(a five-year product which was nine months old) were both redeemed and replaced
with the five-year TRAC certificates. This was a rather different product to
the previous iterations. The Term Sheet and Prospectus stated that TRAC’s
purpose was to seed funds established by FMCP, Clear Alpha Ltd (“Clear Alpha”)
and VCM. Clear Alpha was a newly-established company which was part-owned by Mr
Marino.
348.
Pursuant to the TPMAA, Messrs Marino
and Bessot again gave the Trading
Instruction for TRAC on FMCP paper on 16 November 2010, instructing JB to
replace the two existing investments (GAIN and AMFC+) in “our account”
with TRAC. The instructions for this transaction were signed by Mr
Marino
and
Mr Bessot at FMCP's office on 16 November 2010, in the presence of Mr Ohmura,
who was paying a visit to the office on that day and whose evidence was that he
brought the relevant documents, which he had been given by Mr Aversano or Mr
Ay.
349.
Messrs Marino
and Bessot also signed the Subscription Form, identifying
themselves as representatives of FMCP and identifying FMCP as the Investor. The
Subscription Form disclosed the fact that the funds comprising the “Fund
Universe” under TRAC were “newly established and hence have either none
or very short Track Record” and to seek confirmation that “[t]he
investor is aware of the inherent risks connected with such investments”.
351.
US$240m of LAP’s assets were invested in TRAC. The redemption of GAIN
meant that its capital guarantee was lost. Mr Marino
says that he, Mr Bessot
and Mr Ohmura all nonetheless thought it was in LAP’s interests to redeem GAIN
and put all of its assets into hedge funds.
353. For TRAC, JB itself was the Issuer, Lead Manager and Calculation Agent.
355. Again, FMCP takes issue with the fees levied on TRAC, which were:
i) A Certificate Management Fee of 0.25% p.a. payable to JB; and
ii) Amortization Fees of “0.876% per month of the Denomination for the first four months and 0.032% thereafter for the lifetime of the Certificates”. This comprised:
a) Conquest: 1% (US$2.4m);
b) JB: 0.6% (US$1.44m); and
c) The remaining, as-yet unamortized fees accrued on GAIN and AMFC+.
367.
FMCP also relies on issues as regards Mr Ohmura’s account of the
transfer of US$2m to Mr Marino
(via Leopard). Mr Ohmura's case is that the
payment was made pursuant to the BPA. The issues FMCP identifies are that:
i) Leopard is not even a party to the BPA.
ii) Leopard’s purported invoice makes no reference to ‘distribution’ fees nor to the BPA.
iii) The percentage of Conquest’s fee transferred to Leopard (83%) is not what was provided in the BPA (90%).
iv) There is in any case no evidence that Leopard carried out any ‘distribution’ or ‘introduction’. LAP and FMCP had a long-standing relationship with JB and needed no introduction; and the assets in TRAC had all along been held in JB and invested in JB Notes, as Mr Ohmura knew.
368.
It was submitted that I should conclude that the true reason why, on
this occasion, Messrs Ohmura and Marino
selected Leopard (not Ironfly) as the
receptacle for Mr
Marino’s
share of the secret commission was to conceal it
(and/or its quantum) from Mr Bessot. Mr
Marino
was the sole beneficial owner of
Leopard. If they had intended to share the spoils with Mr Bessot, who was a
co-owner of Ironfly, they would have caused the payment to be made to Ironfly,
as they had done previously. This is consistent with the reference in the
Charles Russell letter which indicates that Mr Bessot “discovered” the
payment subsequently.
TRAC: Mr
Marino
369.
As regards Mr Marino,
the position is again quite straightforward. As
with the AMFC+ commissions, the money was paid in relation to a transaction
where he plainly acted as a director of FMCP. There was a manifest conflict of
interest. There has been no attempt to suggest that this commission was disclosed
to FMCP. Indeed, it appeared that Mr
Marino
was planning, even in relation to
transactions this far down the line, to rely on the April Mandate and say that
he was under no duty to disclose the payment to FMCP. Even had the April
Mandate authority argument been compelling at an earlier stage (which I have
found it was not) it could not have extended to cover payments under an
agreement as far distant in time and events as TRAC.
370.
It follows that, as with the earlier transactions, Mr Marino
was in
breach of his fiduciary duties. A liability for dishonest assistance, in the
absence of a payment to Mr Bessot, would it seems to me depend upon a
conclusion that (i) TRAC was not in LAP’s best interests and (ii) that Mr
Marino
and Mr Bessot knew or should have known this. As the issue of TRAC’s
justification was not an issue before me and in the absence of Mr Bessot it is
not possible for me to reach this conclusion on the evidence before me.
TRAC: Mr Ohmura
371.
In relation to TRAC, it seems to me that the conclusion is near to
inescapable that Mr Ohmura was aware that Mr Marino
was acting in breach of
trust. Mr Ohmura was aware that Mr
Marino
was receiving another personal
payment in connection with a reinvestment of LAP assets which were (i) under
the control of FMCP, of which he was a director, and which was the investor’s
subsidiary, financial advisor and asset manager and (ii) investments in respect
of which Mr
Marino
had already taken introducer fees in respect of earlier
products. The position was one which must have rung warning bells at an early
stage with Mr Ohmura, if he had been acting honestly.
January 2011: Transfer of Custody to HSBC
379.
The custody of TRAC was transferred from JB to HSBC in January 2011.
This was effected pursuant to LAP’s instruction on 23 December 2010. That
instruction had been drafted by Mr Marino
and then sent in soft copy from his
FMCP account to LAP with a request to the LAP representatives to sign it. The
signed version was then sent by him to JB.
Vesper: 2010-2011
381.
There are no claims in relation to Vesper per se, but it forms part of
the background to the later stages of the claim that Mr Marino
caused FMCP to
retain the holding in Vesper DTF whilst the other alternative investments were
being unwound in 2009 and 2010.
382.
It is suggested that this was surprising if Mr Marino
were at all acting
in the interests of FMCP/LAP when he had misgivings about Vesper DTF's poor
returns which were reflected in third party analysis. In particular the Chief
Fund Accountant of Alphametrix noted its poor performance; and FMCP’s own head
of global market research (Mr Vojetta), suggested redeeming the position as
early as June 2010, because:
“...
· It does not bring anything to the portfolio
· in May, it performed worse than other, not exactly state of the art, alternative investment positions within the Global Portfolio – see below.
· in our attempt to transfer only cash and futures, it may be a good idea to get rid of it to simplify everything."
383.
Subsequently, Messrs Marino
and Bessot (in their capacity as directors
of FMCP) caused further LAP assets from the JB Notes to be invested into the
Vesper Funds. Mr Ohmura assisted with this; he drafted the email which Mr
Marino
sent regarding investments of US$50 million in December 2010 and accepted
that it was possible that he drafted another of US$25 million on 24 February
2011.
386.
The second suggestion is that this evidence does to an extent go into
the scale against Mr Ohmura because FMCP argues that the irresistible inference
is that the Vesper DTF position was created and then maintained against LAP’s
interests, because Mr Marino
had a secret personal interest in it. That being
the case, they say it creates an inference that Mr
Marino
did this because Mr
Ohmura had done something for which a considerable reward was appropriate.
387.
As to this argument, while I understand why the point is made, I do not
consider that the evidence justifies a fairly extended inference, not least in
circumstances where the evidence both of LAP and Messrs Marino
and Bessot as to
the surrounding circumstances was lacking.
January – June 2011: The Vesper Trades
389.
The original investment of LAP’s funds was carried out by Messrs Marino
and/or Bessot exercising the authority granted to FMCP pursuant to the TPMAA
and, after the transfer of custody, the HSBC IMA. The execution of the trades
was effected by Mr Ohmura in conjunction with the banks who sold the relevant
products: Deutsche Bank, Natixis and Nomura, apparently having discussed the
trades or at least the “implementation of the strategy” with Mr
Marino.
397.
Nothing has been said as to what Leopard did. Again, neither Conquest’s invoices
nor Leopard’s nor Ironfly’s match the purported agreements pursuant to which
the transfers are now claimed to be made. I consider that the evidence does
justify the inference that the Leopard Trades represent instances of Mr Marino
and Mr Ohmura cutting Mr Bessot out of the business with Mr Ohmura retaining a
greater share in the payment for accommodating Mr
Marino.
Conclusion: Vesper Trades
399.
It follows that Mr Marino
was in breach of his fiduciary duties and that
his receipt of the sums paid in relation to these trades was dishonest. As FMCP
submits, Mr
Marino’s
breaches of duty at this point appear to have been
egregious: he was in breach of his duties in taking any private commission in
relation to dealings with assets in the management of FMCP, he was still more
so in taking more commissions in relation to dealings with assets within TRAC
on which he had privately taken (in breach of duty) substantial payments
shortly before, and he was aware of and complicit in Mr Ohmura’s own conflict
of interest.
400.
I likewise conclude that Mr Ohmura dishonestly assisted Mr Marino
in his
breaches of duty. Even if one were to accept (as I am not minded to do) that Mr
Ohmura thought that the agreements he had reached with the banks were not
deceptive (and his own expert accepted that Conquest could not realistically be
acting as a distributor in this context), I would conclude that Mr Ohmura,
acting in conflict of interest himself, and against the background of the
previous business, cannot have thought the actions he was taking were honest;
certainly no ordinary honest person would do so. His role here was plainly
central to both the execution of the trades and to the administration of the
commissions paid.
401.
FMCP asks me to note and draw inferences from the fact that the timing
of these transactions in late February 2011 and the very large (hitherto
unprecedented) size of the commissions generated by Messrs Marino
and Ohmura coincides
with the beginning of the Libyan Revolution. In that revolution premises in
Libya were apparently bombed and computers were stolen. FMCP’s board was unable
to meet effectively and many did not come to the office for some time. Email
contact was intermittent or absent. I note the point, but given the thin nature
of the evidence surrounding these trades and the absence of evidence concerning
the prevailing market conditions, I am not prepared to draw any inferences.
October 2011: TRAC+
404. There were however differences in the fees payable from those payable under TRAC:
i) The Certificate Management Fee was raised from 0.25% to 0.60% p.a., payable to JB;
ii) The Amortization Fees were raised from the 0.32% payable from the fifth month of TRAC to 0.04333% per month for the first 36 months; and
iii) A Product Advisory Agreement was concluded by JB and FMCP, mirroring the provisions of the Note Advisory Agreement for GAIN and AMFC+ and entitling FMCP to receive a fee of 0.30% of the Denomination, paid quarterly. FMCP thus received product advisory fees totalling US$1.56m.
September 2012-July 2014: Payments to Mr Aversano and Mr Ay
406.
Between September 2012 and July 2014, Mr Marino
met Messrs Aversano and
Ay of JB/GAM, apparently in Monaco. During the course of those meetings he
handed over cash payments totalling several hundred thousand Euros. Mr
Marino
gave as the reason for this that: “[t]hey knew about the commission I was
receiving under the Capital Guarantee so they clearly wanted a part of it”.
That reference to the Capital Guarantee is presumably a reference to TRAC,
which had been placed shortly before.
408.
As will be apparent, I do not consider that such evidence is needed as
regards the main heads of claim against Mr Marino
which I have already
considered. As regards Mr Ohmura they are neither here nor there, as they add
nothing to the picture as regards his actions or his intentions.
Other Issues
The issue of loss
409.
One matter which has been much debated in the course of the hearing is
that of loss. Mr Marino
and Mr Ohmura argued as one of their main arguments that
FMCP had suffered no loss. Though sometimes this appeared to be deployed as an
argument which offered a substantive defence to all the claims, in reality it
is not. However, as it does impinge on the claim in conspiracy (which is
dependent on loss) and on some of the relief sought in the alternative in relating
to bribery and dishonest assistance I will deal with it separately here.
411. What is said is that FMCP’s case on loss (and hence damages) is fundamentally flawed.
412.
FMCP's primary case is that FMCP would have been paid the sums in
question. It says that JB/GAM/BASL (in the case of the JB Notes) and the
various counterparty banks (in the case of the structured trades) were clearly
willing to make the payments. They could, and would, have paid the same fees to
FMCP. There would be no reason for LAP not to agree this, given its agreement
to fees being payable to FMCP in various of the management agreements and still
more so given the joint venture nature of FMCP. Thus, Mr Marino
and Mr Ohmura
could and should have caused them to do so. Insofar as the relevant payments
were bribes, FMCP says loss in this amount is irrebuttably presumed in any
event.
414.
On this argument Mr Marino
says it is extraordinary that FMCP is asking
the Court to find that loss of something over US$16 million is “proved” by way
of a presumption or inference with no primary facts being pleaded to ground the
inference and no direct evidence led to justify the establishment of such a
presumption.
418. Fleshing this out, FMCP says that it stood in a fiduciary relationship vis-à-vis LAP who had a legitimate expectation, which equity recognises, that the fiduciary would not utilise his or her position in such a way which is adverse to the interests of the principal: Arklow Investments Ltd v Maclean [2000] 1 WLR 594, 598, Finn, Fiduciary Obligations (2016) at [803], Diamantides v JP Morgan Chase Bank [2005] EWCA Civ 1612 at [27].
Loss - conclusions
422.
So far as the primary case advanced by FMCP is concerned, I conclude
that the evidence adduced does not justify the full ambit of the proposition
advanced. FMCP did not call anyone from LAP who was in a position to say
whether the full extent of such fees would have been agreeable to LAP. There is
therefore no clear evidence for the proposition. The evidence which was adduced
seems to me to justify a far more limited proposition: namely that FMCP
probably suffered some loss by reason of the commissions being paid to Messrs
Marino
and Bessot and Mr Ohmura.
424.
What seems to me far less clear is that LAP would - if all had been
explained to them – have acceded to commissions which involved paying twice for
the same services. I note this, given that it was FMCP’s own case in relation
to, for example, the GAIN fees that there was an element of double paying, with
FMCP being paid as introducer via the NAA, and Mr Marino
also being paid as an
introducer through his separate agreement. This is the more so given the
evidence of Mr
Marino,
on which FMCP relied against him, that LAP were
reluctant to agree fees which came out of their assets, and the evidence of the
early encounters with Mr
Marino
before the incorporation of FMCP which show
that LAP were keen to keep the fees for managing the portfolio down.
427.
As for the alternative argument, to the extent that it is relevant, I
would find that FMCP owed a liability to LAP. Standing back from the facts of
this case it would seem startling if it did not; FMCP had (by virtue of the
fact that Mr Marino
and Mr Bessot were effectively rogue directors) allowed or
failed to stop its client’s assets being plundered. That the route to such
liability is not lacking can be seen from some of the authorities cited by
FMCP:
i) Financial advisers can (and in practice often do) occupy a fiduciary position vis-à-vis their clients: Snell’s Equity at [7-006]; Daly v Sydney Stock Exchange Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 371, 377; and Aequitas v AEFC [2001] NSWSC 14 at [307];
ii) Diamantides v JP Morgan Chase Bank [2005] EWCA Civ 1612 at [27]
“… it would be unusual for an investment manager acquiring and managing a portfolio of investments under a formal management agreement not to owe duties of care and duties of a fiduciary nature to the other party to the agreement…”
Knowing receipt
431.
So far as knowing receipt is concerned, plainly the elements of this
claim would not, on the basis of the findings above, be seriously in issue if
the payments were ones made to Mr Marino
and Mr Ohmura personally.
432.
However, an issue arises because of the fact that the payments in
question were made to Ironfly, Leopard and Conquest. Mr Marino
and Mr Ohmura
argue that these are separate legal entities. FMCP says that there are three
ways round this. First it says that the moneys can be traced into because they
were received by or for the benefit of the defendants and so the “separate
legal entity” issue is an illusion.
433. Secondly it says that “the corporate veil of Conquest Cayman is to be pierced on the basis of the evasion principle”. This is a principle identified by Lord Sumption JSC in Petrodel Resources Ltd v Prest [2013] UKSC 34; [2013] 2 AC 415 at paragraph [28], to the effect that:
“the court may disregard the corporate veil if there is a legal right against the person in control of it which exists independently of the company's involvement, and a company is interposed so that the separate legal personality of the company will defeat the right or frustrate its enforcement.”
435.
It is submitted for Mr Marino
and Mr Ohmura that none of these arguments
gains traction. I accept those submissions.
437.
As regards the second argument it seems to me, as Mr Couser for Mr
Marino
submitted, that Prest really is pointed at a rather different
situation where a claim is made against a company but it becomes necessary to
trace through the company to its controller. Here the relevant companies are not
parties to the litigation. In any event it seems correct to say (as did Mr
Emmett for Mr Ohmura) that the principle relied on is not apposite in this
case, because it is not said that Messrs
Marino
and Ohmura have used the
relevant companies to evade a legal liability that they would otherwise have
had. Thus, for example, if Conquest had not received the payment, Mr Ohmura
would have had no liability.
439.
In the circumstances I have formed the view that I need not reach a conclusion
in this judgment on the further submissions made on this point (which are also
relevant to the proprietary claims against Mr Marino).
However, I record that
were it to arise there seems to me to be some force in the submissions that
there is no satisfactory explanation of why FMCP rather than LAP should have a
proprietary interest in the sums received by the various companies and that
tracing into Ironfly would in any event present difficulties, because Mr
Marino
was on any analysis not the full owner of it.
Bribery
440.
There were essentially three points which were in issue on the bribery
claims (principally on behalf of Mr Ohmura, though also for Mr Marino):
i) The issue of whether payment was made to an “agent as such”;
ii) The liability of a person who did not make a payment (here, Mr Ohmura);
iii) The nature of the remedy and whether it is necessary for FMCP to prove loss.
“For the purposes of the civil law a bribe means the payment of a secret commission, which only means (i) that the person making the payment makes it to the agent of the other person with whom he is dealing; (ii) that he makes it to that person knowing that that person is acting as the agent of the other person with whom he is dealing; and (iii) that he fails to disclose to the other person with whom he is dealing that he has made that payment to the person whom he knows to be the other person's agent. Those three are the only elements necessary to constitute the payment of a secret commission or bribe for civil purposes.”
445.
The de minimis issue is plainly not relevant here. I will analyse
the arguments by reference to Mr Ohmura, but the same points apply as regards
Mr Marino;
there is no difference of principle between them.
446.
Mr Marino
was the agent of FMCP and had the management of their funds; payments
to him would on their face run the risk of compromising his loyalty to FMCP. The
question is whether Mr Ohmura was dealing with FMCP. On one level – that of
simple contract - he was not, and nor was Conquest, who actually made the
payments. But if Mr Ohmura was not dealing with FMCP with whom was he dealing?
Mr Ohmura suggests that he was really dealing with LAP, in that the gains were
at the expense of LAP. That however seems an artificial analysis.
447.
Although there was no actual contractual nexus between Mr
Ohmura/Conquest, and FMCP, I conclude that the payments were made to Mr Marino
as agent “as such”. FMCP was the key actor for the purposes of the payments. It
was FMCP as asset manager for LAP which made the decision to purchase
structured products or to enter into TRAC. On TRAC Mr Ohmura, though no longer
employed by GAM brought the key documents to FMCP’s offices; and on his own
case he was doing the structuring which FMCP was supposed to be doing. On the
Private Bank Structured Product Trades, it is clear that Mr Ohmura was
assisting Mr
Marino
acting for FMCP in the small roles he performed. In the
Vesper Structured Product Trades he likewise assisted Mr
Marino
acting for
FMCP, but with a greater role.
448.
Mr Ohmura urges caution in relation to this issue on the basis that the
strictness of liability for bribery under English law is a reason not to allow
liability to expand. He says that it would be wrong in principle to create a
situation where both FMCP and LAP were able to bring claims in bribery in
respect of the same payment. I note this caution, but consider that it does not
apply here. The conclusion which I reach above is not, in my judgment, any
expansion of the relevant principles in that I have concluded that there was
relevant dealing. Nor does it seem to me that LAP would necessarily have a
claim in bribery also, because Mr Marino
was not its agent.
451.
I therefore conclude that the case on bribery is made out against Mr
Ohmura and Mr Marino.
Conspiracy
453.
However, the financial analysis of the claims produced as part of FMCP’s
submissions demonstrates that it adds something, albeit a relatively small
amount. The largest claims otherwise against Mr Marino
and Mr Ohmura are
US$14,789,984 and US$12,183,713, respectively, but the claim in conspiracy
rises to US$16,231,426. The difference is represented by the moneys which Mr
Ohmura received in relation to the Structured Products Trades, namely
US$1,897,713. This sum is conceded not to be recoverable from Mr
Marino
in
breach of fiduciary duty or from either Mr
Marino
or Mr Ohmura in dishonest
assistance. The attack based on redundancy therefore fails.
455.
Turning then to the substance of the claim, FMCP says that in the
present case both the combination, arrangement or understanding between Mr
Marino
and Mr Ohmura and the intention to injure FMCP are readily inferred from
the findings already made. So far as concerns unlawful means, FMCP points to
the various wrongs already considered, namely: bribery, breaches of fiduciary duty,
dishonest assistance and knowing receipt.
458.
As I have noted above, FMCP says that the loss caused to FMCP actually
does equal the total sum of amounts paid to Mr Marino
and Mr Ohmura in
connection with the JB Notes and on the Structured Product Trades, on two
alternative bases.
Conclusion: conspiracy
461. As a backdrop I bear in mind the guidance of the House of Lords in OBG v Allan [2007] UKHL 21; [2008] 1 A.C.1 as regards the requirement of intent. At [164-6] Lord Nicholls said the following:
“164. I turn … to the other key ingredient of this tort: the defendant's intention to harm the claimant. A defendant may intend to harm the claimant's business either as an end in itself or as a means to an end. A defendant may intend to harm the claimant as an end in itself where, for instance, he has a grudge against the claimant. More usually a defendant intentionally inflicts harm on a claimant's business as a means to an end. He inflicts damage as the means whereby to protect or promote his own economic interests.
“165. Intentional harm inflicted against a claimant in either of these circumstances satisfies the mental ingredient of this tort. This is so even if the defendant does not wish to harm the claimant, in the sense that he would prefer that the claimant were not standing in his way.
“166. Lesser states of mind do not suffice. A high degree of blameworthiness is called for, because intention serves as the factor which justifies imposing liability on the defendant for loss caused by a wrong otherwise not actionable by the claimant against the defendant. The defendant's conduct in relation to the loss must be deliberate. In particular, a defendant's foresight that his unlawful conduct may or will probably damage the claimant cannot be equated with intention for this purpose. The defendant must intend to injure the claimant. This intent must be a cause of the defendant's conduct, in the words of Cooke J in Van Camp Chocolates Ltd v Aulsebrooks Ltd [1984] 1 NZLR 354, 360. ….””
462. This passage (and the judgments of Lords Hope and Mance for example at [44] and [120]) provides a strong indication that the intent hurdle is intended to be a high one. That is reflected in the similarly high hurdle seen for the "obverse side of the coin" intent arguments referred to at [167] of Lord Nicholls’ judgment and seen in such cases as Tarleton v M’Gawley (1794) Peak 270, WH Newsom Holdings Ltd [2014] Bus LR 156 and Emerald Supplies v British Airways plc (Nos 1 and 2) [2016] Bus LR 145.
463.
If one starts by asking what the intention of Mr Marino
and Mr Ohmura in
the hypothetical conspiracy is said to be, the natural answer is the one which
FMCP chose to place front and centre of their opening: to cause loss to LAP. This
is not a promising start for FMCP, as regards their primary case.
464.
Looking further at that primary case it seems clear on the evidence that
in the context of conspiracy there are real issues. As I have indicated above,
the question of paying introducer/distributor commissions is not, on the
evidence I have seen, one which can only have one answer (that commissions
would be paid). I have concluded that in relation to the JB Notes, given the
fees that FMCP were already being paid for essentially distribution work, a
commensurate increase might well have been objectionable, though some increase
might well have been agreed. Then too, there is the question of whether any
fees taken out of LAP assets, as the commissions were, would have been
acceptable at all. Thus, while I would conclude that it was foreseeable by both
Mr Marino
and Mr Ohmura that some loss would probably be caused to FMCP, that
is insufficient as a matter of law for a claim in conspiracy, as Lord Nicholls
makes clear. So far as concerns the question of actual intent, the evidence by
no means meets the hurdle of showing that Mr
Marino
and Mr Ohmura intended that
loss to FMCP to be caused.
466.
If, on FMCP’s secondary case, the loss was primarily a loss to LAP and
could only be a loss to FMCP by the route of liability to LAP, matters become
even more difficult when intention is considered. Was it foreseeable that such
a loss would occur? Was it intended that such a loss would occur? As regards
the first question the answer might well be yes as regards Mr Marino;
I do not
see how it could be as regards Mr Ohmura, who was not privy to the details of
LAP’s relationship with FMCP.
469.
Secondly, I would have been minded to find concerted action on the part
of Mr Marino,
Mr Bessot and Mr Ohmura, but only as regards the individual
claims. To the extent that the claim was advanced on the basis that there was
an overarching conspiracy to injure reached in around May 2009, my firm view
was that there was insufficient evidence to make out any such concerted plan or
action involving Mr Ohmura. I have concluded that Mr Ohmura was dishonest as
early as GAIN, but I see nothing which indicates that he was part of some
overarching conspiracy to injure FMCP; he appears to me to have been the wrong
side of the line on GAIN (quite possibly on the basis of Nelsonian knowledge) and
increasingly implicated in dishonesty as time progresses, but simply as regards
the individual transactions.
470.
The position would be different as regards a wider combination between
Mr Marino
and Mr Bessot. The evidence was that they were closer colleagues.
They had worked together in the past and they started FMCP together and worked
closely while there. They both benefitted financially from FMCP as well as
their private ventures. The evidence I heard indicated that Mr Ohmura was a
more marginal figure. He appears to have sought Mr
Marino’s
patronage and
attended at Mr
Marino’s
convenience, waiting for him while Mr
Marino
did other
business. Mr Bessot did not always speak respectfully of him behind his back in
Bloomberg chats.
471.
It seems to me quite possible that Mr Marino
and Mr Bessot did combine together
with the intent of enriching themselves via the LAP portfolio. However, this specific
combination was not the subject of detailed argument and I make no findings on
it, as there may be interesting issues which involve the impact of not just the
private commissions but also the fee structures. These, although generally arguably
within market tolerances involved not just the fees to “external” introducers
(alias Ironfly/Leopard) but considerable fees to FMCP – from whom of course Mr
Marino
and Mr Bessot both benefitted, albeit not as wholly as they did from
Ironfly and Leopard. In relation to the later products the experts became
increasingly hesitant as to the justifiability of the fee levels. However,
there must be a question as to the relevance of such issues to a claim in
conspiracy to injure FMCP.
472.
Finally, for the reasons which I have given earlier I would not consider
(as was submitted on behalf of Mr Marino)
that the existence of the April
Mandate informed the question of conspiracy at all.
Limitation Issues
“(1) … where in the case of any action for which a period of limitation is prescribed by this Act, either—
(a) the action is based upon the fraud of the defendant; or
(b) any fact relevant to the plaintiff’s right of action has been deliberately concealed from him by the defendant; or
(c) the action is for relief from the consequences of a mistake;
the period of limitation shall not begin to run until the plaintiff has discovered the fraud, concealment or mistake (as the case may be) or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) above, deliberate commission of a breach of duty in circumstances in which it is unlikely to be discovered for some time amounts to deliberate concealment of the facts involved in that breach of duty.”
476.
It says that because of Mr Ohmura’s (and Mr Marino’s)
fraud and
concealment, the commencement of the limitation period was postponed by s.32(1)
of the Limitation Act 1980. It says that it had not discovered Mr Ohmura’s
involvement in the fraud, nor could with reasonable diligence have discovered
it, until receipt of the Charles Russell letter on 16 September 2015.
477. Mr Ohmura points out that the burden of proof is on FMCP to show that it could not have discovered the fraud or deliberate concealment without taking exceptional measures which it could not reasonably have been expected to take: Paragon Finance v DB Thakerar [1999] 1 All ER 400, 418.
Choice of law and Swiss law
480. The question of Swiss law arises only in relation to the claim against Mr Ohmura. Mr Ohmura says that since he was not a director or fiduciary of FMCP (an English company), the claims as against him are governed by Swiss law, and that the position under Swiss law is materially different to that under English law. Thus, even if he would be liable under English law, he would not be so liable under Swiss law.
Choice of law
“1. Unless otherwise provided for in this Regulation, the law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising out of a tort/delict shall be the law of the country in which the damage occurs irrespective of the country in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred and irrespective of the country or countries in which the indirect consequences of that event occur.
…
3. Where it is clear from all the circumstances of the case that the tort/delict is manifestly more closely connected with a country other than that indicated in [paragraph] 1 … the law of that other country shall apply. A manifestly closer connection with another country might be based in particular on a pre-existing relationship between the parties, such as a contract, that is closely connected with the tort/delict in question.”
“For the purposes of this Regulation, damage shall cover any consequence arising out of tort/delict, unjust enrichment, negotiorum gestio or culpa in contrahendo.”
486. To similar effect was the judgment of Gloster LJ in Erste Group Bank AG v JSC ‘VMZ Red October’ [2015] 1 CLC 706 at [90-1] where she said that the provision "ought to be interpreted in a manner which is broadly in harmony with the jurisprudence and interpretation of similar provisions" in Brussels and that of Flaux J as he then was in Fortress Value Recovery Fund I LLC and others v Blue Skye Special Opportunities Fund LP and others [2013] EWHC 14 (Comm) at [44].
487. Mr Ohmura says applying the test correctly in relation to dishonest assistance (as well as the other heads of claim on which FMCP relies), the place of damage for the purposes of Article 4(1) is the place where the accessory’s assistance caused direct damage to the claimant. This will not necessarily be the same place where the trustee caused direct damage to the claimant and will depend upon the form which the assistance took. He points me to the case of London Helicopters Ltd v Heliportugal LDA-INAC [2006] 1 All ER (Comm) 595, [2006] EWHC 108 (QB) at [20(iii)] where Simon J (as he then was) stated that:
“The place where the damage occurred …. is not the place where a claimant simply suffers financial loss. It is necessary to see where the event giving rise to the damage produced its “initial”, “direct”, “immediate” or “physical” harmful effect.”
(see also Dicey at [35-026])
490. Before me the parties addressed the bulk of their submissions in closing to the case of Dolphin Maritime & Aviation Services Ltd v Sveriges Angfartygs Assurans Forening [2009] EWHC 716 (Comm); [2010] 1 All ER (Comm) 473. In that case, an English company (“Dolphin”) was engaged by Turkish cargo underwriters to recover compensation from shipowners whose vessel had grounded off Gibraltar. The owners’ interests were represented by the defendant Swedish P&I Club. Dolphin entered into an agreement with the underwriters whereby only Dolphin was entitled to conduct negotiations with the Club and the full amount of any recoveries would be paid into Dolphin’s English bank account, from which Dolphin would deduct its commission. The Club provided a Letter of Undertaking addressed to the underwriters securing the shipowners' liability, which provided for payment of any settlement monies to Dolphin or solicitors appointed by Dolphin. However, in breach of contract the underwriters concluded a settlement directly with the Club, and the Club paid the settlement monies directly to the underwriters’ bank accounts in Turkey. Dolphin sued the Club for, among other things, inducing a breach of the contract between Dolphin and the underwriters, and conspiracy to injure by unlawful means.
"30. In some cases the place where the damage occurred may not be difficult to discern. If a claimant's person or property is injured that place is likely to be the place where his person or property was at the time of the injury. In the case of economic loss, however, the issue is not so clear cut. In one sense a corporation's economic loss is suffered in the place where its accounts are prepared because it is in them and there that its monetary loss is calculated and felt.
31. However, as the jurisprudence of the ECJ makes clear, the fact that a corporation's loss is felt where its books are made up does not mean that that is the place where the damage occurred for the purpose of Article 5.3. If that were so a corporation would in most economic loss cases be able to sue in the courts of its own domicile.
32. The present case introduces an added complication in that, whilst the claimant complains of things that were done, e.g. the fact that the underwriters negotiated directly with the Club, it also complains, most particularly, about what was not done, namely to procure that the recovery was paid to Dolphin itself. …
56. …there is, as it seems to me, a well arguable case that, under the terms and conditions, the underwriters were bound to procure that the sums recovered directly from the Club were paid in the first instance to Dolphin. ….
57. In those circumstances, the arguments on behalf of Dolphin are, in my judgment, to be preferred. Dolphin's essential complaint is that it suffered harm because it did not receive the $8.5 million into its bank account which it should have done because, despite knowledge that this would involve a breach of the underwriters' contract with Dolphin, the Club paid it to their accounts in Turkey. …. the contract (which is governed and must be interpreted by English law) calls in terms for 'Recoveries and quasi-Recoveries (i.e. sums which would otherwise comprise 'Recoveries') to be received direct by Dolphin and that the complaint in tort is that the Club wrongfully brought about a breach of that obligation.
58. When, in those circumstances, I ask myself 'where the damage to the direct victim occurred' (Dumez: Advocate General para. 52) or 'where the event giving rise to the damage, and entailing tortious liability, directly produced its harmful effects upon the person who is the immediate victim of that event' (Dumez (ECJ) para. 20) or 'where the event giving rise to the damage caused injury' (Reunion), the answer appears to me that it is in this country, where Dolphin did not receive the money which, if the contract had been performed, it should have received.
59. Further, if I ask myself what would have been the position if the tort complained of had not taken place, the answer is that payment would have been made to Dolphin in England: and the essence of Dolphin's complaint is that that did not occur. ….. In some cases, e.g. in cases of damage to goods or persons, the question may have no great utility. But in others where the claimant has failed to obtain some property or money which he would otherwise have received the answer to the question may be a guide to identifying where the harm in the particular case occurred.
60. I do not ignore the danger of conflating the place where the damage occurred with the place where the loss was suffered. There is, however, a difference between a case in which the claimant complains that he has lost his money or goods … and a case in which the claimant complains that he has not received a sum which he should have received. In the former case the harm may be regarded as occurring in the place where the goods were lost …or the place from or to which the moneys were paid …, although the loss may be said to have been suffered in the claimant's domicile. In the latter case the harm lies in the non-receipt of the money at the place where it ought to have been received, and the damage to him is likely to have occurred in the place where he should have received it. That place may well be the place of his domicile and, therefore, also the place where he has suffered loss.”
494. I note that subsequent cases, in dealing with the Dolphin Maritime case, seem to regard it as encapsulating a general principle. Thus, in Pan Oceanic Chartering Inc v UNIPEC UK Co. Limited, UIPEC Asia Co. Limited [2016] EWHC 2774 (Comm) at [200], Carr J applied the Dolphin Maritime analysis in a case concerning Article 4(1) of Rome II. Similarly in the Brussels cases of Actial Farmaceutica LDA v Professor Claudio De Sione, Mendes SRL, MS Florence Pryen [2016] EWCA Civ 1311 at [34] – [37] and the judgments of both the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court in AMT Futures Ltd v Marzillier, Dr Meier & Dr Guntner Rechtsanwaltsgesellschaft mbH: [2014] EWCA Civ 143, [2015] QB 699 at [37], [50] and [53] and [2017] UKSC 13; [2017] 2 WLR 853 at [26] the principle was applied in the way one would a general principle.
500.
I prefer the latter argument. It is indubitably the case that (despite
some somewhat loose wording in some of the submissions) FMCP’s primary argument
has been that (so far as compensatory remedies are concerned) the commissions
paid to Messrs Marino,
Bessot and Ohmura could and should have been paid
instead to FMCP, and (so far as the alternative remedy in dishonest assistance
is concerned) that Mr Ohmura is liable to account to FMCP in England. This is not
a case about misappropriation of FMCP’s own money.
503.
But I cannot accept the submission that the loss suffered by FMCP is the
receipt of fees by the various defendants. Receipt by Messrs Marino
and Bessot
and Mr Ohmura is not damage or harm to FMCP. The test under Article 4 (unlike
that under Article 10 dealing with unjust enrichment, which as I have noted,
was not relied on) does not focus our attention on gain, but on harm caused to
the claimant. Furthermore, such a test would (as FMCP submitted) produce
arbitrary results when one looks at economic loss because of the possibilities
of multiple jurisdictions. Here it would make claims against Mr Ohmura subject
to Swiss law and Monegasque law (Monaco being where Ironfly and Leopard
banked.)
" …the case-law from the Brussels I Regulation offers guidance which, with one significant reservation, it will be proper to follow. The one note of caution is that the case-law dealing with special jurisdiction under what is now Article 7(2) of the recast Brussels I Regulation has proceeded on the basis that if a proposed interpretation of the place where the damage occurred would tend to point to the home country of the claimant it will not be favoured, as the jurisdictional principle of forum actoris conflicts with the general principle of the Brussels I Regulation that defendants should enjoy the advantage of defending in their own courts. It is hard to see that this concern corresponds to any aspect of the proper interpretation of Article 4(1) of the Rome II Regulation, under which the law applicable to the claim may be that of the claimant’s home country, even though it would not be generally appropriate that this be the court with special jurisdiction over a defendant domiciled in another Member State."
507. I also have in mind the point noted by Gloster LJ at [91] of the Erste case:
"But there is, we think, this important difference between Article 4 of Rome II and Article 5.3 of the Judgments Regulation. The latter contemplates that a claimant in tort may choose between the courts of the place where the harmful event occurred and the place where the damage was sustained. But the purpose of Rome II is to identify a single applicable law rather than a choice: see Recitals (6) and (14). It is for that reason that Article 4.1 excludes the place where ‘the event giving rise to the damage occurred’, if different from the place where the damage itself occurred."
509. In this case the factors which tend to pull against this simple conclusion in some of the authorities do not exist. This is not a Brussels case, and there is no need to regard this rule as a derogation, to be construed restrictively. This is not a case (as in AMT, the eDate case [2012] QB 654, or Degussa [2015] QB 906) where there is a second place of damage. If one focuses on harm and damage in this case there is only one answer: FMCP suffered damage in England. Anything else elides the wrong and the damage, which is expressly contrary to the wording of the relevant Article.
512. The points which he prays in aid are:
i) The claims relate to a matrix of documents which he says are governed by Swiss law. He points in this regard to the transaction documentation for the JB Notes themselves, the NAA, the FMCP SAA, the Ironfly SAA and also to the BPA.
ii) The underlying transactions, namely the JB Notes, were carried out in Switzerland and related to assets located in Switzerland.
iii) The actions on the part of Mr Ohmura which are said to be wrongful were all done in Switzerland.
iv) Mr Ohmura was domiciled in Switzerland and could have been sued in Switzerland pursuant to the Lugano Convention.
513.
FMCP submits for its part that the hurdle of "manifestly more
closely connected" cannot be met by Mr Ohmura when the case is looked
at in the round. Further it says that the various wrongs are manifestly more
closely connected with England. It argues that the conspiracy with Messrs
Marino
and Bessot, and the individual unlawful acts underlying it, were focused
squarely on and directed towards FMCP in England, that FMCP is incorporated and
run there, that the wrongs principally involved interference in English law
duties owed by UK-based directors of an English company; and the transmission
of secret payments either for the benefit of those UK-based company directors
(who controlled the relevant bank accounts from England); or to others at their
instruction. It also highlights the facts that FMCP has its bank account at
the London branch of the British Arab Commercial Bank, into which the fees
under the various agreements were paid, and where the other sums would they say
have been paid and that the (unsigned) 2010 “Introducer Agreement” is in
fact expressed to be governed by English law.
516. On this point I conclude that Mr Ohmura's argument is not well founded.
517. The starting point with any Article 4(3) argument is that it represents an "exceptional" route: (See Recital 18 of Rome II and p.12 of the Commission’s Proposal for Rome II (“Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (“Rome II”), 2003/0168 (COD)”). To avail itself of this route a party seeking to invoke it must overcome a "high hurdle": Pan Oceanic at [206] and Committeri v Club Méditerranée [2016] EWHC 1510 at [36] and [57]. The conclusion has to be reached against all the circumstances, which can include the event or events which give rise to damage, whether direct or indirect, factors relating to the parties, and possibly also factors relating to the consequences of the event: or events Dicey, Morris & Collins [35-032]).
518.
I do not consider that that hurdle is met – by some distance. Although
it can be said that all that Mr Ohmura did was done in Switzerland, that
reflects just a small part of what is alleged in relation to this course of
wrongdoing. In particular the main head of claim against Mr Ohmura is a claim
in dishonest assistance which is legally speaking parasitic on Messrs Marino
and Bessot's breach of fiduciary duties and where his actions are a small part
(in some cases, as in relation to the Private Bank Trades, a very small part)
of a much bigger factual whole. Further that main claim is one in relation to a
UK company, the duties it is owed by its directors are unquestionably governed
by English law, their actions are almost entirely ones in London and it would
suffer financial loss (through a failure to account, for example) in a bank
account in England. A similar point could be made in relation to others of the
heads of claim against him such as knowing receipt, conspiracy and bribery.
Swiss law – the substance
Breach of duty by a director
Dishonest Assistance
“Any person who unlawfully causes loss or damage to another, whether wilfully or negligently, is obliged to provide compensation.”
“(A138)1. Any person who for his own or another’s unlawful gain appropriates moveable property belonging to another but entrusted to him,
any person who makes unlawful use of financial assets entrusted to him for his own or another’s benefit,
is liable to a custodial sentence not exceeding five years or to a monetary penalty. …
(A158)1. Any person who by law, an official order, a legal transaction or authorisation granted to him, has been entrusted with the management of the property of another or the supervision of such management, and in the course of and in breach of his duties causes or permits that other person to sustain financial loss is liable to a custodial sentence not exceeding three years or to a monetary penalty.
Any person who acts in the same manner in his capacity as the manager of the business but without specific instructions is liable to the same penalty.
If the offender acts with a view to securing an unlawful gain for himself or another, a custodial sentence of from one to five years may be imposed.”
539.
The question therefore becomes whether there is a liability under
Article 158 on the part of Messrs Marino
and Bessot and if so whether Mr
Ohmura’s participation would result in liability under Swiss law. As to the
first question, the experts agree that:
i) Directors must give priority to the company’s interests over their own interests and that they must not make a profit from their position at the expense of the company.
ii) Where a director receives a commission payment or retrocession from a third party while acting in his capacity as director, that money belongs in principle to the company.
iii) A director must declare to the company any monies so received, and indeed must surrender such monies to the company unless the latter has given its informed consent to the director keeping the money.
iv)
If a director acts in deliberate breach of his duties to the company by
receiving such a commission, failing to disclose it to the company and thereby
causing loss to the company, he will be liable under Article 158. On this basis
the liability of Messrs Marino
and Bessot would seem to follow.
i) Article 7 provides for liability if the offence is also liable to prosecution at the place of commission and the person in question is in Switzerland but is not being extradited to the place of commission in relation to the offence;
ii) Article 8(1) provides that “[a] felony or misdemeanour is considered to be committed at the place where the person concerned commits it or unlawfully omits to act, and at the place where the offence has taken place”.
Knowing receipt
548. No separate case on Swiss law is advanced in relation to this head of claim.
Bribery
549. In relation to bribery Mr Ohmura denies that he would be liable in bribery under Swiss law.
“(1) Shall be deemed to have committed an act of unfair competition, anyone who:
(a) in the private sector, offers, promises or concedes to a third party’s employee, partner, agent or other auxiliary person an improper advantage in his or a third party’s favour in return for an unlawful or discretionary act or nonfeasance in connection with his official or professional tasks;
(b) in the private sector, as a third party’s employee, partner, agent or other auxiliary person demands, is promised or accepts an improper advantage for himself or a third party in return for an unlawful or discretionary act or nonfeasance in connection with his official or professional task.
(2) Advantages contractually accepted by the third party as well as insignificant, socially common advantages are not deemed to be improper.”
i) The bribed person has a personal relationship of trust with the principal;
ii) The bribed person has an actual and determining influence on the principal’s business decisions;
iii) An undue advantage is offered, promised or granted to the bribed person, or the bribed person demands, is promised, or accepts an undue advantage for its own benefit or the benefit of a third party;
iv) Such act is committed in view of an act or omission of the bribed person in connection with its business or commercial activity that is in breach of duty or discretionary powers;
v) The perpetrator acts with intent, i.e., deliberately; and
vi) There exists what has been described as "a competition nexus".
552. There are three issues: intent, competition nexus and effect.
Remedies
“Any person who conducts the business of another without authorisation is obliged to do so in accordance with his best interests and presumed intention”.
568. Article 423 then provides that:
“(1) Where agency activities were not carried out with the best interests of the principal in mind, he is nonetheless entitled to appropriate any resulting benefits.
(2) The principal is obliged to compensate the agent and release him from obligations assumed only to the extent the principal is enriched.”
579.
I have considered whether it is possible that an alternative route of
utilising this concept could be to characterise Mr Marino/Ironfly
as the agent
without authority with Mr Ohmura being jointly and severally liable with him. However,
this is not the way the point was pleaded, put to the experts or argued in
closing, and it would not be appropriate to make a finding on it on that basis.
Limitation
Summary of conclusions
582. For the reasons given at length above, I accordingly conclude that:
i) As a matter of English law:
a)
Mr Marino
is liable in breach of fiduciary duty, dishonest assistance,
and bribery in respect of all of the heads advanced against him;
b) Mr Ohmura is liable in dishonest assistance and bribery in respect of all of the heads advanced against him;
ii) The proper law of the claims is English law;
iii) As a matter of Swiss law (if it applied):
a)
Mr Ohmura would be liable as an accessory to the liability for criminal
mismanagement of Messrs Marino
and Bessot under Article 158;
b) He would not be liable in bribery;
c) The remedies available via the concept of "agency without authority" would not be available against him.
Postscript: Remedies
583. The question of remedies was touched on relatively briefly at the hearing and will require to be the subject of some further submissions in the light of the findings above. For the present I confine myself to setting out the issues as issues they appear to be from the parties’ submissions to date and noting the implications of the decisions made above for those various submissions.
Breach of Fiduciary Duty
585. FMCP therefore seeks declarations accordingly in respect of:
i)
Mr Marino’s
shares in FMCP, which it is said that he purchased using
funds from the JB Secret Commissions, and the dividends deriving from them (and
their respective fruits and/or traceable proceeds);
ii)
the £2.5m transferred by Mr Marino
to his ex-wife, for no consideration,
on 8 October 2014, and any traceable proceeds of those funds (to the extent not
already recovered from Mrs
Marino);
and
iii)
the credit balances in the bank accounts of Mr Marino
and his vehicles
which received the traceable proceeds of the JB Secret Commissions.
586.
To the extent that Mr Marino
has disposed of these (proprietary) assets
and FMCP has been unable to trace, secure and/or recover them or their
traceable proceeds, FMCP seeks an order that Mr
Marino
is personally liable to
compensate FMCP for the shortfall.
Dishonest assistance
587.
FMCP claims an account of profits (and/or of its losses) and equitable
compensation from both Mr Marino
and Mr Ohmura.
590. As to this FMCP maintains that it has suffered loss. But also, as regards the account it submits that an account of profits is available in English law even where no loss is provable or even alleged. In support of this proposition I was referred to Novoship v Mikhahyluk [2014] EWCA (Civ) 908 [2015] QB 499 at [71-93] where the Court of Appeal noted the body of first instance and academic authority which supported the proposition that the court has the power to order an account of profits against a dishonest assistant, even where no corresponding loss has been suffered by the beneficiary, and having carefully considered the authorities, accepted that proposition.
Knowing receipt
Bribery
592. FMCP submits that if liability is established, there is a comprehensive choice of remedies available to the principal – see Daraydan Holdings Ltd v Solland International Ltd [2005] Ch 119 at [54]:
“The agent and the third party are jointly and severally liable to account for the bribe, and each may also be liable in damages to the principal for fraud or deceit or conspiracy to injure by unlawful means. Consequently, the agent and the maker of the payment are jointly and severally liable to the principal (1) to account for the amount of the bribe as money had and received and (2) for damages for any actual loss. But the principal must now elect between the two remedies prior to final judgment being entered… The third party may also be liable on the basis of accessory liability in respect of breach of fiduciary duty: Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency, para 8-221. The principal is also able to rescind the contract with the payer of the bribe.”
594. Further, FMCP submit that it is entitled to a proprietary remedy because a bribe or secret commission accepted by an agent is held on trust for his principal (FHR European Ventures [2014] UKSC 45; [2015] AC 250 at [46]). It is not necessary for the benefit to be derived from the property of the principal for the benefit to be held on trust.
595.
So far as the extent of the claims made, the claim against Mr Marino
in
bribery is the JB Notes commissions (US$4,308,400, US$1,750,000, US$2,000,000),
the Haggiagi bribes (US$856,271) and the Structured Product Trades commissions
(US$5,875,313); that is a total of US$14,789,984 (subject to recoveries made
from Mr Haggiagi).
596.
That against Mr Ohmura may require clarification. In opening it was said
that the bribes which he caused, procured or directed to be paid, for which he was
jointly and severally liable with Mr Marino,
were as follows:
i)
US$4,337,500 to Mr Marino
and Mr Bessot (via Ironfly) in connection with
GAIN.
ii)
US$2,000,000 to Mr Marino
(via Leopard) in connection with TRAC.
iii)
US$4,342,500 and €1,226,250 to Mr Marino
and Mr Bessot (via Ironfly) in
connection with the Structured Product Trades.
iv)
US$2,700,000 to Mr Marino
(via Leopard) in connection with the
Structured Product Trades.
However, in closing the case in bribery against Mr Ohmura was limited to the US$2,000,000 in respect of TRAC and the US$5,875,313 in relation to the Structured Product Trades commissions. As I have said, this may require clarification, but I shall note here that this latter formulation seems more accurately to reflect the payment structure in relation to the various products.
Conspiracy
Proprietary claims
599.
FMCP asserts a proprietary claim arising out of the breaches of
fiduciary duty, namely that all of the secret commissions received by or on
behalf of Mr Marino
(through Ironfly and Leopard) and their traceable proceeds
were, and are, held by him on trust for FMCP: Lewin on Trusts [7-018]; Williams
v Central Bank [2014] AC 1189 at [9]; Burnden Holdings (UK) Ltd v
Fielding [2018] UKSC 14 at [11], [19].
600.
FMCP also pursues a proprietary remedy in relation to bribery, the
relevance of which appears questionable in the light of the above. So far as
that is concerned FMCP say that the bribes received by, or for the benefit of,
Mr Marino
(and their traceable proceeds) are held by him on trust for FMCP.
601.
As for Mr Ohmura, FMCP advances a proprietary claim in respect of the
US$625,000 payment as the traceable proceeds of a bribe or of moneys received
by Messrs Marino
and Bessot in breach of their fiduciary duties. This operates
essentially as an alternative to the knowing receipt claim. There was an
interesting discussion on the different ways in which the concept of a bona
fide purchaser might impact on each claim (as a defence to the former, the
burden of which is on the defendant to prove; and the obverse (unconscionability)
as a constituent of knowing receipt with the burden on the claimant). The point
does not seem to require to be decided in this judgment in the light of my
conclusions as to the recoverability of the US$625,000 payment via other claims
which have already succeeded.
__________________________________
APPENDIX
__________________________________
|
GAIN Ironfly Commissions |
GAIN Ohmura Payment |
Haggiagi bribes |
AMFC+ |
TRAC |
TRAC Ohmura |
SP Trades
|
SP Trades Ohmura |
TOTAL |
|
|
$4,308,400 |
$625,000 |
$856,271 |
$1,750,000 |
$2,000,000 |
$400,000 |
$5,875,313 |
$1,897,713 |
|
|
Bribery |
FM |
Yes |
|
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
|
Yes |
|
$14,789,984 |
YO |
|
Yes |
|
Yes |
|
$7,875,313 |
||||
Breach of fiduciary duty |
FM |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
|
Yes |
|
$14,789,984 |
YO |
|
N/A |
||||||||
Dishonest assistance |
FM |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
|
Yes |
|
$14,789,984 |
YO |
Yes |
Yes |
|
Yes |
|
Yes |
|
$12,183,713 |
||
Conspiracy |
FM |
Yes |
Yes |
|
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
$16,231,426 |
YO |
Yes |
Yes |
|
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
$16,231,426 |
|
Knowing receipt |
FM |
Yes |
|
Yes |
Yes |
|
Yes |
|
$13,933,713 |
|
YO |
|
Yes |
|
$625,000 |
||||||
Proprietary claims |
FM |
Yes |
|
Yes |
Yes |
|
Yes |
|
N/A |
|
YO |
|
Yes |
|
N/A |