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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Commercial Court) Decisions >> Trafigura Maritime Logistics PTE Ltd v Clearlake Shipping PTE Ltd [2022] EWHC 2234 (Comm) (03 October 2022) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Comm/2022/2234.html Cite as: [2022] EWHC 2234 (Comm) |
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BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES
COMMERCIAL COURT (KBD)
Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1NL |
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B e f o r e :
SITTING AS A JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
____________________
TRAFIGURA MARITIME LOGISTICS PTE LTD |
Claimant |
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| - and - |
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| CLEARLAKE SHIPPING PTE LTD |
Defendant |
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And Between: |
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| (1) CLEARLAKE CHARTERING USA INC (2) CLEARLAKE SHIPPING PTE LTD |
Claimants |
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| - and - |
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| PETROLEO BRASILEIRO SA |
Defendant |
____________________
ROBERT THOMAS KC and BEN GARDNER (instructed by Kennedys Law LLP) for the Defendant in the 159 Claim and the Claimants in the 171 Claim
HENRY BYAM-COOK KC (instructed by White & Case LLP) for the Defendant in the 171 Claim
Hearing dates: 4,5,6, 7 and 11 July 2022
____________________
Crown Copyright ©
HH Judge Pelling KC:
Introduction
Trafigura")
made under a maritime indemnity given by the defendant in the 159 Claim ("CSPL") by reference to a voyage charter by
Trafigura
to the first claimant in the 171 Claim ("CUSA") of the MT Miracle Hope ("Vessel") in order to secure the discharge of the Vessel's cargo without presentation of the original Bills of Lading. It is also the trial of a claim under a maritime indemnity given by the defendant in the 171 Claim ("PBSA") to CUSA in respect of a sub charter of the Vessel by CUSA to PBSA for the same purpose.
Trafigura
arising out of the same facts as these claims) to recover what is due. It is also relevant to note that a requirement that an owner discharge without the benefit of an indemnity and without sight of the original bills of lading would require the owner to take the risk of a claim for mis-delivery that could be avoided by the simple expedient of refusing to deliver without sight of the original bills of lading and claiming demurrage for any resulting delay in discharge. That is not a risk that a ship owner or disponent owner could reasonably be expected to take.
Trafigura
was the time charterer of the Vessel from the head owners. It let the Vessel under a voyage charter to CUSA. CUSA then chartered the Vessel to PBSA. Both the voyage charter to CUSA and the sub charter by CUSA were fixed on 21 August 2019 on amended Shellvoy 6 forms in materially similar terms.
Trafigura,
although as I have explained it was CUSA not CSPL that had chartered the Vessel from
Trafigura.
Trafigura,
the 159 Claim by
Trafigura
against CSPL under the indemnity allegedly provided by it to
Trafigura,
and the 171 Claim by CUSA and CSPL against PBSA under the indemnity allegedly provided to CUSA by PBSA. PBSA maintains that even if CSPL is liable to
Trafigura,
it is not liable to either CUSA or CSPL because CUSA has no liability to
Trafigura
under any indemnity and PBSA has no contract with CSPL. I refer to this issue below as the "Contractual Lacuna Issue".
The Facts
Trafigura
chartered the Vessel to CUSA to carry a cargo of crude oil from up to 2 ports on a defined part of the Brazilian Seaboard to up to 3 ports in the Far East (the "
Trafigura
Charter"). On the same date CUSA sub-chartered the Vessel to PBSA. Both the voyage charter to CUSA and the sub charter by CUSA incorporated an amended version of the Shellvoy 6 voyage charterparty form provided by or on behalf of PBSA. The relevant provision within each is clause 33(6), which had been amended in materially identical terms. The drafting of the amendments was defective in a number of respects. I turn to the issues that arise in more detail after completing a description of the relevant background.
Trafigura:
"Please may we have a copy of Owners templates for LOI wording for discharge of cargo without presentation of Original Bills of Lading and Owners combined wording for discharge without Bills of Lading and change of destination"
As I explain below, the terms of the voyage and sub charters had called for the supply of the wording prior to each becoming unconditionally binding, but that wording had not been sought by or supplied either to CUSA by
Trafigura,
or by CUSA to PBSA, prior to the voyage and sub charters becoming unconditional. In response to the 14 October request,
Trafigura
provided on the same day (see the email from Mr Sangwan to Clearlake "Operations" at 06.13) a copy of the International Group of P&I Clubs Group C wording in the following terms:
"STANDARD FORM LETTER OF INDEMNITY TO BE GIVEN IN RETURN FOR DELIVERING CARGO AT A PORT OTHER THAN THAT STATED IN THE BILL OF LADING AND WITHOUT PRODUCTION OF THE ORIGINAL BILL OF LADING
To: [insert name of Owners] [Insert date]
The Owners of the [insert name of ship]
[insert address]
Dear Sirs
Ship: [insert name of ship]
Voyage: [insert load and discharge ports as stated in the bill of lading]
Cargo: [insert description of cargo]
Bill of lading: [insert identification number, date and place of issue]
The above cargo was shipped on the above vessel by [insert name of shipper] and consigned to [insert name of consignee or party to whose order the bills of lading are made out, as appropriate] for delivery at the port of [insert name of discharge port stated in the bills of lading] but we, [insert name of party requesting substituted delivery], hereby request you to order the vessel to proceed to and deliver the said cargo at [insert name of substitute Port or Place of delivery] to ["X [name of the specific party] or to such party as you believe to be or to represent X or to be acting on behalf of X"] without production of the original bill of lading.
In consideration of your complying with our above request, we hereby agree as follows :-
1. To indemnify you, your servants and agents and to hold all of you harmless in respect of any liability, loss, damage or expense of whatsoever nature which you may sustain by reason of the ship proceeding and giving delivery of the cargo in accordance with our request.
2. In the event of any proceedings being commenced against you or any of your servants or agents in connection with the ship proceeding and giving delivery of the cargo as aforesaid, to provide you or them on demand with sufficient funds to defend the same.
3. If, in connection with the delivery of the cargo as aforesaid, the ship, or any other ship or property in the same or associated ownership, management or control, should be arrested or detained or should the arrest or detention thereof be threatened, or should there be any interference in the use or trading of the vessel (whether by virtue of a caveat being entered on the ship's registry or otherwise howsoever), to provide on demand such bail or other security as may be required to prevent such arrest or detention or to secure the release of such ship or property or to remove such interference and to indemnify you in respect of any liability, loss, damage or expense caused by such arrest or detention or threatened arrest or detention or such interference, whether or not such arrest or detention or threatened arrest or detention or such interference may be justified.
..."
Mr Thomas KC, who appears on behalf of CSPL and CUSA, told me in the course of his submissions and it does not appear to be in dispute that the 13 biggest P&I Clubs in the world, which together cover 90% of the world's merchant vessels, are members of the International Group and adopt standard wording promulgated by that group. The wording referred to above was such standard wording. Mr Thomas also told me, and again it does not appear to be in dispute, that the International Group standard wording for an LOI only in respect of delivery without presentation of original bills of lading is in materially identical terms to the wording set out in paragraphs 1-3 of the Group C wording set out above.
" 1. LOI INVOCATION: Charterer's, Petrobras, hereby request Owners to discharge their cargo as per this Voyage Orders without presentation of Bill of Lading. In lieu of an LOI Charterer's hereby invoke Part II, clause 33 (6) of the Charter Party dated 21.08.2019. ..."
The commercially absurd suggestion that the cargo be discharged without either presentation of the bills of lading or the provision of an indemnity was not made, nor was it suggested that such was the effect of the sub charter between PBSA and CUSA. Those instructions were forwarded up the charter chain and to the Master of the Vessel, who confirmed receipt and that the Vessel would "
perform accordingly". PBSA maintain, passing on an argument made by Natixis in the Singapore proceedings, that the instruction to discharge the cargo was not an instruction to deliver the cargo to anyone, and in particular not Hontop, but only to discharge the cargo from the Vessel. No attempt had been made to explain in the discharge instructions how a cargo of over 1 million barrels of crude oil was to be discharged without it being delivered, or who was to meet the costs of that operation, assuming it was physically possible. Leaving to one side PBSA's point that no indemnity contract was concluded, or concluded on the terms relied on by
Trafigura,
there is nothing within the terms of the indemnity wording that suggest it was contemplated that there would be a discharge but not a delivery, nor that the LOI wording would apply only to discharge but not delivery. To the contrary the LOI wording expressly refers to delivery. If the intention had been that owners were to retain possession of the cargo after discharge, it is unclear what the purpose of invoking clause 33(6) was thought to be, or who was to meet the costs of this exercise.
"WE REFER TO A CARGO OF 981,616.383 NET BARRELS OF LULA CRUDE OIL DISCHARGED AT ONE OR MORE SAFE PORT(S), CHINA BY THE VESSEL MIRACLE HOPE ON DATED 31.10.2019, IN ACCORDANCE TO OUR SALES CONTRACT REF.792340 DATED 02.09.2019 (HEREINAFTER THE 'CONTRACT').
ALTHOUGH WE HAVE SOLD AND TRANSFERRED TITLE TO THE ABOVE-NAMED CARGO TO YOU, WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO PROVIDE TO YOU THE FULL SET OF 3/3 ORIGINAL CLEAN ON BOARD BILLS OF LADING AND OTHER SHIPPING DOCUMENTS REQUIRED UNDER THE CONTRACT (THE "DOCUMENTS").
IN CONSIDERATION OF YOUR MAKING PROVISIONAL PAYMENT OF U.S. DOLLARS 63,760,892.16 FOR THE AFOREMENTIONED CARGO, WE HEREBY EXPRESSLY REPRESENT AND WARRANT THAT IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THE TRANSFER OF THE ABOVE MENTIONED CARGO TO YOU, WE HAD MARKETABLE TITLE TO SUCH CARGO FREE AND CLEAR OF ANY LIEN OR ENCUMBRANCE AND WE HAD THE FULL RIGHT AND AUTHORITY TO TRANSFER AND EFFECT DELIVERY OF SUCH CARGO TO YOU.
WE FURTHER AGREE TO MAKE ALL REASONABLE EFFORTS TO OBTAIN AND SURRENDER THE DOCUMENTS TO YOU AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND TO INDEMNIFY AND HOLD YOU HARMLESS FROM AND AGAINST ANY AND ALL CLAIMS, DAMAGES, COSTS, AND EXPENSES INCLUDING REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES, WHICH YOU MAY SUFFER BY OUR FAILURE TO PRESENT THE DOCUMENTS TO YOU OR BREACH OF THE WARRANTIES GIVEN ABOVE, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO CLAIMS WHICH MAY BE MADE BY THE CARRIER, VESSEL OWNER, CONSIGNOR, CONSIGNEE OR ANY HOLDER OR TRANSFEREE OF THE DOCUMENTS OR BY ANY OTHER PARTY CLAIMING AN INTEREST IN OR LIEN ON THE CARGO OR PROCEEDS THEREOF, PROVIDED THAT (1) THE TOTAL AMOUNT FOR WHICH WE WILL BE LIABLE UNDER THIS LETTER OF INDEMNITY SHALL NOT EXCEED THE LESSER OF (A) THE TOTAL AMOUNT STATED IN THE FINAL COMMERCIAL INVOICE PROVIDED TO YOU UNDER THE CONTRACT, AND (B) THE TOTAL AMOUNT PAID TO AND RECEIVED BY US UNDER THE CONTRACT, AND (2) UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES SHALL WE BE LIABLE FOR ANY COST AND DAMAGES WHETHER INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, PUNITIVE, EXEMPLARY OR CONSEQUENTIAL. "
There then followed two weeks of delay at the discharge port, apparently due to port congestion. Ultimately, the Vessel docked on 13 November and discharge and delivery to Hontop was completed on 16 November without presentation of the original bills of lading. The Vessel departed the discharge port on the evening of 16 November. No objection was taken at the time to the fact that the cargo had been delivered to Hontop.
Trafigura,
CUSA and CSPL that the
Trafigura
Charter for the Vessel (which it will be recalled had been entered into between CUSA and
Trafigura)
would be "amended" (but in reality, as I explain below, novated) so that the Charterer became CSPL. This arrangement is evidenced by an email of that date from Mr MacLeod of Clearlake to Mr Mandius of
Trafigura
in these terms:
"TO :TRAFIGURA
![]()
ATTN : LUDVIG
FROM : GUNVOR / NICHOLAS
**ADDENDUM NO.l **
REF: RE : MIRACLE HOPE/ CLEARLAKE - CP DATED 21/08/2019 ------------------------------------------------
FURTHER TO TELCONS OF TODAY IT HAS BEEN MUTUALLY AGREED TO AMEND THE ABOVE CP AS FOLLOWS:
CHARTERERS TO READ:
CLEARLAKE SHIPPING PTE LTD
12 MARINA BOULEVARD
35-02 MARINA FINANCIAL TOWER 3,
SINGAPORE 018982
ALL OTHER TERMS, CONDITIONS AND DETAILS TO REMAIN UNALTERED AND IN FULL FORCE AND EFFECT.
END"
Trafigura
Charter and that in consequence CSPL became liable for all past and future obligations and liabilities accrued by the charterer under the
Trafigura
Charter. However, CUSA remained the disponent owner to PBSA. It is this that enables PBSA to submit that it has no liability to CUSA because it, CUSA, no longer has any liability to
Trafigura,
and PBSA has and never has had any liability to (indeed any contract with) CSPL. It is alleged by CPSL that there was an internal implied indemnity in place under which CUSA agreed to indemnify CSPL in respect of any liabilities arising under indemnities given by CSPL in respect of vessels it chartered to CUSA. A Booking Note was drawn up on 15 April 2020 that purported to evidence an internal charter of the Vessel by CSPL to CUSA. In so far as is material it was in these terms:
"MIRACLE HOPE / CCUSA : CP 21/08/19 BOOKING NOTE
C/P DATED: 21 AUGUST 2019
CHARTERER: CLEARLAKE CHARTERING USA INC.
600 TRAVIS STREET, SUITE 6500
HOUSTON, TX, USA 77002
+1-281-214-3107
SHIPPINGOPS@CLEARLAKESHIPPING.COM
OWNER: CLEARLAKE SHIPPING PTE LTD OF SINGAPORE."
As I explain further below, this document was prepared over a month after the Vessel had been arrested in Singapore, after these proceedings had been commenced by
Trafigura,
and just short of a month before the Vessel was released from arrest. There is no written evidence that contains or directly evidences the existence of the implied deemed indemnity relied on by CSPL.
Trafigura
to a third party were completed subject to various conditions. This is described as being an agreement on subjects. Although not obvious, this means that the agreement was conditional, and so not in fact an agreement at all unless and until the conditions were satisfied or waived a process the parties describe as "lifting the subjects". This charter (known in these proceedings and referred to below as the "P66 Fixture") was for a voyage from a load port in West Africa to a discharge port on the west coast of the United States of America. It was considered one that provided a significant commercial advantage because it provided the possibility of an onward charter at a high charter hire rate with limited non-revenue earning movements. On 13 March 2020, the subjects to which the P66 Fixture had been subject were lifted and it became a binding charter. It provided for a Laycan (i.e. the date by which the Vessel was required to arrive at the load port in West Africa) of 4/5 April 2020.
Trafigura,
and Clearlake asserted down the charter chain that they were entitled to be indemnified by each charterer. No indemnity was forthcoming and on 18 March the P66 Fixture was cancelled because the Vessel was no longer able to make the Laycan by reason of its arrest.
Trafigura
on 23 March 2020 and mandatory injunctions were sought by and granted to
Trafigura
against CSPL and to Clearlake against PBSA. The effect was to require respectively CSPL and PBSA to provide security to Natixis so as to secure the release of the Vessel, and to provide funds to enable the proceedings commenced by Natixis to be defended. A claim by the head owners for similar relief was commenced against
Trafigura
by arbitration. What then followed was significant delay in Singapore, caused by Natixis raising difficulties concerning the terms on which security was being offered. Ultimately orders were made in these proceedings requiring CSPL and PBSA to pay, or procure the payment of, the sum required to secure the release of the Vessel into court in Singapore by 11 May 2020. In the result PBSA paid the required sum into court in Singapore and the Vessel was released from arrest on 11 May 2020. Prior to that CSPL had borrowed the sum necessary for it to comply with the order made against it. In the end the sums borrowed were not required because the necessary security was provided by PBSA. CSPL claims the cost of borrowing from PBSA under the indemnity between CUSA and PBSA.
Trafigura
entered into a substitute voyage and storage charter with an associated company. This charter is known in these proceedings and referred to below as the "Traf CP". It commenced on 28 May for a voyage between Basrah in the Gulf and Asia. The agreed freight rate was "5 days average TD3 BITR pricing 6-13 May 2020 minus WS3". The charter provided for a storage period of up to 135 days at a rate of "5 days average of TD3C pricing 22-26 June 2020" for the first 45 days, and a fixed rate of US$33,000 per day for the remaining storage period. The Vessel arrived at the discharge port pursuant to the Traf CP on 22 July and, apart from a short round trip for fuel replenishment between 10 and 13 September, was waiting to discharge until 27 October, when it commenced discharge. That was completed and the vessel left the discharge port on 1 November 2020.
Trafigura
claims under the CSPL indemnity the loss of gross profit from the P66 Fixture, the gross profit it is alleged would have been made by the charter that it alleges would have followed ("the Follow On Fixture") and the expenses it incurred as result of the Vessel's arrest, less the profit made by it under the Traf CP. This claim is disputed by PBSA and CSPL for the detailed reasons I consider later in this judgment.
The Charterparties
Trafigura
to CUSA and the sub-charter by CUSA to PBSA was in these terms:
"Notwithstanding any other provision of this Charter, Owners shall be obliged to comply with any orders from Charterers to discharge all or part of the cargo provided that they have received from Charterers written confirmation of such orders.
If Charterers by telex, facsimile or other form of written communications that specifically refers to this clause request Owners to discharge a quantity of cargo either:
(a) without bills of lading and/or
(b) at a discharge place other than that named in a bill of lading and/or
(c) that is different from the bill of lading quantity
then Owners shall discharge such cargo in accordance with Charterers' instructions in consideration of receivingthean LOI as per Owners' P&I Club wording to be submitted to Charterers before lifting the "subs". Following indemnit [sic] deemed to be given by Charterers on each and every such occasionand which is limited in value to 200 per cent of the C.I.F value of the cargo on board
(i ) Charterers shall indemnify Owners, and Owners' servants and agents in respect of any liability loss or damage of whatsoever nature (including legal costs as between attorney or solicitor and client and associated expenses) which Owners may sustain by reason of delivery such cargo in accordance with Charterers' request.
(ii) If any proceedings is commenced against Owners or any of Owners' servants or agents in connection with the vessel having delivered cargo in accordance with such request, Charterers shall provide Owners or any of Owners' servants or agents from time to time on demand with sufficient funds to defend the said proceedings.
(iii) If the vessel or any other vessel or property belonging to Owners should be arrested or detained, or if the arrest or detention thereof should be threatened, by reason of discharge in accordance with Charterers' instructions as aforesaid, Charterers shall provide on demand such bail or other security as may be required to prevent such arrest or detention or to secure the release of such vessel or property and Charterers shall indemnify Owners in respect of any loss, damage or expenses caused by such arrest or detention whether or not the same may be justified.
(iv) Charterers shall, if called upon to do so at any time while such cargo is in Charterers' possession, custody or control, redeliver the same to Owners.
v) As soon as all original bills of lading for the above cargo which name as discharge port the place where delivery actually occurred shall have arrived and/or come into Charterers' possession, Charterers shall produce and deliver the same to Owners, whereupon Charterers' liability hereunder shall cease. Provided however, if Charterers shave not received all such original bill by 24.00 hours on the day3613 (thirteen) calendar months after the date of discharge, then this indemnity shall terminate at that time unless before that time Charterers have received from Owners written notice that:
(a) some person is making a claim in connection with Owners delivering cargo pursuant to Charterers' request or
(b) legal proceedings have been commenced against Owners and/or carriers and/Charterers and/or any of their respective servants or agents and/or the vessel for the same reason.
When Charterers have received such a notice, then this indemnity shall continue in force until such claim or legal proceedings are settled. Termination of this indemnity shall not prejudice any legal rights a party may have outside this indemnity.
(vi) Owners shall promptly notify Charterers if any person (other than a person to whom Charterers ordered cargo to be delivered) claims to be entitled to such cargo and/or if the vessel or any other property belonging to Owners is arrested by reason of any such discharge of cargo.
(vii) This indemnity shall be governed and construed in accordance with the English law and each and any dispute arising out of or in connection with this indemnity shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the High Court of Justice of England..."
The bold italicised words had been inserted into the draft and did not form part of the original form. As will be apparent from what is reproduced above, the form used contemplated (before it was amended) that where discharge without Bills of Lading was requested, then the owner or disponent owner would discharge in accordance with that request on the basis of a deemed indemnity by the charterers in the terms set out in clause 33(6) (c) (i) to (iii) as qualified by (iv) to (vii). The amendment struck out sub clauses (c) (i) to (iv) however. The amendment contemplated that the disponent owners' P&I Club wording would be submitted to the charterers before "lifting the subs" i.e. before the voyage or sub-charters became binding between the parties thereto. It is common ground, as I have explained, that this did not occur and that the wording relied on by
Trafigura
was only sent to the charterers on 14 October 2019, after the "subs" had been lifted i.e. after the voyage and sub charterparties had become binding between the parties thereto. This is something that PBSA relies on as suggesting there is no binding obligation to indemnify as between CSPL and
Trafigura.
The Indemnity wording that
Trafigura
maintains is binding between it and CSPL is that set out in paragraph 14 above.
The Issues
Trafigura
and CSPL are:
i) What is the meaning and effect of clause 33(6) in the voyage and sub-charters?
ii) What was the meaning of the Discharge Orders?
iii) Was the Indemnity not given for some reason?
iv) Was it a condition precedent to the giving of the Indemnity that "Owners' P&I Club wording" had to be provided before lifting subjects?
v) Was the Indemnity not given because no freestanding signed letter of indemnity ("LOI") was issued by CSPL?
vi) What is the correct quantification of
Trafigura's
trading losses for the purposes of identifying what such losses, if any, can be recovered by
Trafigura
pursuant to the Indemnity?
As between the Clearlake parties and PBSA, there are two broad additional issues, being first, the Contractual Lacuna Issue and secondly the Clearlake parties' claim to recover their own losses, as well as an indemnity in respect of their liabilities to
Trafigura.
Applicable Construction Principles
i) The court construes the relevant words of a contract in its documentary, factual and commercial context, assessed in the light of (a) the natural and ordinary meaning of the provision being construed, (b) any other relevant provisions of the contract being construed, (c) the overall purpose of the provision being construed and the contract in which it is contained, (d) the facts and circumstances known or assumed by the parties at the time that the document was executed, and (e) commercial common sense, but (f) disregarding subjective evidence of any party's intentions see Arnold v Britton [2015] UKSC 36 [2015] AC 1619 per Lord Neuberger PSC at paragraph 15 and the earlier cases he refers to in that paragraph;
ii) A court can only consider facts or circumstances known or reasonably available to both parties that existed at the time that the contract or order was made - see Arnold v Britton (ibid.) per Lord Neuberger PSC at paragraph 21;
iii) In arriving at the true meaning and effect of a contract, the departure point in most cases will be the language used by the parties because (a) the parties have control over the language they use in a contract; and (b) the parties must have been specifically focussing on the issue covered by the disputed clause or clauses when agreeing the wording of that provision see Arnold v Britton (ibid.) per Lord Neuberger PSC at paragraph 17;
iv) Where the parties have used unambiguous language, the court must apply it see Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank [2011] UKSC 50 [2011] 1 WLR 2900 per Lord Clarke JSC at paragraph 23;
v) Where the language used by the parties is unclear the court can properly depart from its natural meaning where the context suggests that an alternative meaning more accurately reflects what a reasonable person with the parties' actual and presumed knowledge would conclude the parties had meant by the language they used but that does not justify the court searching for drafting infelicities in order to facilitate a departure from the natural meaning of the language used see Arnold v Britton (ibid.) per Lord Neuberger PSC at paragraph 18;
vi) If there are two possible constructions, the court is entitled to prefer the construction which is consistent with business common sense and to reject the other see Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank (ibid.) per Lord Clarke JSC at paragraph 21 - but commercial common sense is relevant only to the extent of how matters would have been perceived by reasonable people in the position of the parties, as at the date that the contract was made see Arnold v Britton (ibid.) per Lord Neuberger PSC at paragraph 19;
vii) In striking a balance between the indications given by the language and those arising contextually, the court must consider the quality of drafting of the clause and the agreement in which it appears see Wood v Capita Insurance Services Limited [2017] UKSC 24 per Lord Hodge JSC at paragraph 11. Sophisticated, complex agreements drafted by skilled professionals are likely to be interpreted principally by textual analysis unless a provision lacks clarity or is apparently illogical or incoherent see Wood v Capita Insurance Services Limited (ibid.) per Lord Hodge JSC at paragraph 13 and National Bank of Kazakhstan v Bank of New York Mellon [2018] EWCA Civ 1390 per Hamblen LJ at paragraphs 39-40; and
viii) A court should not reject the natural meaning of a provision as incorrect simply because it appears to be a very imprudent term for one of the parties to have agreed, even ignoring the benefit of wisdom of hindsight, because it is not the function of a court when interpreting an agreement to relieve a party from a bad bargain - see Arnold v Britton (ibid.) per Lord Neuberger PSC at paragraph 20 and Wood v Capita Insurance Services Limited (ibid.) per Lord Hodge JSC at paragraph 11. As Lord Leggatt JSC held at paragraph 108 of his judgment in Triple Point Technology Inc v PTT Public Co Ltd [2021] UKSC 29; [2021] AC 1148 the " modern view is to recognise that commercial parties are free to make their own bargains and allocate risks as they think fit, and that the task of the court is to interpret the words used fairly applying the ordinary methods of contractual interpretation".
For reasons that I have explained already and which are essentially common ground, none of the parties pretends that either charterparty is a competently drawn document, much less one that can fairly be described or approached for construction purposes on the basis that they were drafted by skilled professionals. In those circumstances, it is likely that contextual issues will play a much more significant role in any construction issues that matter than would otherwise be the case and business common sense as understood in the way described above is likely to play a significant part in arriving at a true construction of the document. Some reliance was placed by both
Trafigura
and the Clearlake parties on the construction of the charters by the judges who determined the interlocutory applications for mandatory orders enforcing the indemnity relied on by the claimant see the Miracle Hope (No.1) [2020] EWHC 726 (Comm); [2021] 1 Lloyds Rep 533 (Henshaw J) and the Miracle Hope (No.2) [2020] EWHC 805 (Comm); [2021] 1 Lloyds Rep 543 (Jacobs J). This is forensically unsurprising given that those parties were successful in those applications. No one suggests however that these conclusions are binding on me or constitute a precedent which is only not binding on me because they are judgments of judges of coordinate jurisdiction. In any event, it would be inappropriate to adopt the reasoning used in the interlocutory judgments to resolve issues where the relevant evidence has been tested at trial in a manner that by definition was impossible at the hearing of the interlocutory applications. In those circumstances, I consider it safer to arrive at my own conclusions on the issues that arise free from what has gone before.
The Liability Issues other than the Contractual Lacuna Issue
Trafigura
to CUSA is in materially similar terms to that between CUSA and PBSA. For that reason, CSPL adopts each of the arguments advanced by PBSA for the purpose of ensuring that it does not end the trial with a liability to
Trafigura
that it is unable to recover from PBSA. No attempt was made by Mr Thomas KC to do anything other than adopt the arguments advanced by Mr Byam-Cook KC on behalf of PBSA. In reality therefore, on the issues I am now considering the debate was carried on between
Trafigura
on the one hand and PBSA as a proxy for CSPL on the other.
Trafigura
was obliged to discharge without sight of the original Bills of Lading if asked to do so without any right or entitlement to an indemnity in respect of any losses that may flow from complying with such a direction. He submits that this conclusion is not altered by retention of "
Following indemnit [sic] deemed to be given by Charterers on each and every such occasion
" because those words were intended to apply to the provisions that follow and those no longer contain any indemnity because sub clauses (c)(i) to (iii) have been struck out. Textually I agree that those words were originally intended to apply to the indemnity contained in sub clauses (c)(i) to (iii). I also agree that there is no indemnity in the sub clauses that follow and have not been struck out. It follows from this that it cannot have been the intention of the parties to refer to sub clauses (c)(i) to (iii) since it had been agreed they did not form part of the agreements between the parties. It follows that the parties must have intended that however linguistically inapposite, the words would apply to something that mattered.
Trafigura
in combination with sub clauses (v) to (vii) within clause 33(6) make sense because they cover different ground. I reject the submission that this conclusion is contrary to that of the Court of Appeal in The Songa Winds [2018] EWCA Civ 1901; [2018] 2 Lloyds Rep 374. That case was concerned with whether some qualifications within a charter party were impliedly incorporated into a letter of indemnity that did not expressly contain them. The Court of Appeal held that they could not on the basis that the letter of indemnity was a separate and free standing agreement. That says nothing about a deemed indemnity arising from the invocation of a deemed indemnity provided for by a clause within a charterparty that contains the relevant qualifications and where the wording of the deemed indemnity was contained in another document incorporated into that clause by reference. Nonetheless that focuses attention once again on the words "
wording to be submitted to Charterers before lifting the "subs"".
Trafigura,
once that occurred the wording referring to the production of the wording ceased to have any meaning or effect.
Trafigura.
"As per CP clause 33 we need to issue and sign a LOI to vessel discharge cargo at a port that is different from Bill of Lading.
So, please ask Owners to revert with their comments and a wording for the LOI."
Trafigura
sent to Clearlake Operations as agent for CUSA a copy of an LOI wording. It was not what had been requested in that what had been requested was "
a copy of Owners templates for LOI wording for discharge of cargo without presentation of Original Bills of Lading and Owners combined wording for discharge without Bills of Lading and change of destination", and what was supplied was only wording applicable to either delivery to a port other than that specified in the bills of lading or to a party without bills of lading. What was provided was the International Group of P&I Clubs Group C wording. It does not appear to be in dispute however that the operative part of the wording provided (paragraphs 1, 2 and 3) are materially identical to what appears in the International Group of P&I Clubs Group A wording, which is the wording appropriate for discharge otherwise than on presentation of the original bills of lading. No point was taken by Clearlake Operations that what had been provided did not satisfy what had been requested, no doubt because that was so, and well understood by all parties to be so. On the same day this was forwarded to PBSA. The query from PBSA concerning a part delivery at another port did not develop further.
Trafigura
appointed SPI Marine as its agent in respect of the discharge of the cargo. An entity known as LZH had been nominated originally by PBSA as agent for receivers, and in the result was appointed as SPI Marine's sub-agent in respect of the Bill of Lading 01 parcel. By an email sent to the Master of the Vessel on 25 October SPI informed the Master that it awaited delivery orders without production of the original bills of lading. At that stage, the Vessel was not expected to arrive at the discharge port before 11 November.
Trafigura.
Those instructions (which originated from PBSA) defined the receiver as Hontop and, under the heading "Remarks to Owners", at paragraph 1, under the sub heading "LOI INVOCATION", it is recorded that
"Charterer's, Petrobras, hereby request Owners to discharge their cargo as per this Voyage Orders without presentation of Bill of Lading. In lieu of an LOI Charterer's hereby invoke Part II, clause 33 (6) of the Charter Party dated 21.08.2019."
The reference to "Part II" is to a heading that appears above clause 30 in the Shellvoy 6 wording. The "INVOCATION" reflects PBSA's understanding to be that it was entitled to request discharge (without, for the moment, considering whether that meant delivery) without presentation of bills of lading under clause 33(6). It also reflects its understanding that it could make such a request without also offering a formal letter of indemnity but that a deemed indemnity would result from clause 33(6) being invoked (hence the use of the phrase "
(i)n lieu of an LOI"). Had it been thought there was an obligation to discharge without presentation of the original bills of lading and without an indemnity then the words "
(i)n lieu of an LOI" would not have been included. There would simply have been an assertion that discharge was to take place without an indemnity as had been agreed. The discharge orders were passed on by Clearlake Operations to the Master with copy to
Trafigura
in materially similar terms and with the same effect.
Trafigura
was in material similar terms to that sent by PBSA to Clearlake.
Trafigura
on 14 October are in materially similar terms to the form (International Group Form A) that applies to delivery without presentation of original bills of lading. That this was so was accepted by Henshaw J in the Miracle Hope (No.1) at [14] and was not challenged during this trial. The use of the International Group of forms can have come as no surprise to either Clearlake or PBSA since, as noted already, in the
Trafigura
Charter
Trafigura
had warranted that it was entered in a P&I Club within the International Group of P&I Clubs. A similar warranty was given by CUSA in the sub-charter. Given that fact, and that the International Group's forms are as widely used as Mr Thomas implied or ubiquitous as Mr Ashcroft KC put it in his oral submissions see T5/130/10-11 - it is inconceivable that any of these parties was not fully aware of that fact. Each of the parties to this dispute are very substantial and experienced ship owners and operators and (in PBSA's case) oil traders, who each operate on a global scale. For those reasons, I accept the submission that it is inconceivable that a party such as either Clearlake or PBSA would or could reasonably have thought that
Trafigura
would be relying on anything other than the International Group forms by no later than when the 14 October communication had been received and passed along the charter chain. In my judgment it was because that was so that PBSA expressed the invocation within the discharge orders in the terms that it did.
Trafigura
was relying on the wording in the International Group forms; (iii) both
Trafigura
and CUSA had warranted that they were respectively entered with P&I Clubs in the International Group and (iv) the language of the International Group's Form A was in materially similar terms to that supplied by
Trafigura
on 14 October. In my judgment that is why PBSA was content to invoke clause 33(6) in the way it did on 30 October 2019.
Trafigura
on 14 October together with and subject to sub clauses (v) to (vii) within clause 33(6) and that Clearlake had a similar intention up the charter chain to
Trafigura.
It was open to PBSA and Clearlake to invoke clause 33(6) because that is what it permitted and when it was invoked there was deemed to be an indemnity on
Trafigura's
P & I Club terms because that is the effect of the clause as I have construed it. In reality PBSA and CUSA knew full well what the effect of so doing was. It knew the wording relied on and it knew that invoking clause 33(6) would deem an indemnity to be provided because that is what was meant by the use of the phrase "
(i)n lieu of
". To decide otherwise would be commercially absurd. Indeed, I would go further. It is inconceivable that discharge instructions would have been accepted other than on this basis. It was only months following discharge that the points I am now considering (which do not include the Contractual Lacuna Issue to which I turn below) were taken by PBSA. To accede to such submissions in those circumstances would be obviously unfair and would defeat the reasonable expectations of the parties see First Energy UK Limited v Hungarian International Bank Limited [1993] 2 Lloyds Rep 194 per Steyn LJ at [196]. If and to the extent that it was necessary to do so, I accept the submissions of Clearlake and
Trafigura
that any requirement for a formal letter of indemnity, as opposed to an agreement in correspondence and by conduct, was waived or PBSA is estopped from relying on such a requirement in the circumstances.
Trafigura
in the terms set out in clauses (1) to (3) of the International Group Form C wording but subject to the qualifications in sub clauses (v) to (vii) in clause 33(6) of the charterparties. The liability issue that remains and to which I now turn is whether PBSA has no liability to CUSA because CUSA has no liability to CSPL.
The Contractual Lacuna Issue
i) The Clearlake parties intended to be bound by an internal indemnity up and down the charterparty chain where an LOI or deemed indemnity had been invoked against one Clearlake entity (CUSA) and invoked by another Clearlake entity (CSPL) up the charterparty chain ("Ground 1(a)");
ii) The Clearlake parties agreed to an internal charter on the Asbatankvoy COA terms, which gave rise to a deemed indemnity on "Owner's P&I club wording" when an LOI or deemed indemnity had been invoked against one Clearlake entity and invoked by another Clearlake entity up the charterparty chain ("Ground 1(b)");
iii) A contract is to be implied from the Clearlake parties' conduct in CSPL offering an indemnity to
Trafigura
after CUSA had received a deemed indemnity from PBSA and had come under an obligation to PBSA to procure delivery in accordance with PBSA's instructions ("Ground 1(c)");
iv) PBSA is liable to CSPL under the PBSA Indemnity because CSPL is an agent of CUSA and entitled to enforce that contract under the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 ("Ground 2"); or
v) To the extent
Trafigura
is successful in its arguments, CUSA is liable to
Trafigura
under the
Trafigura
Indemnity and so can recover its own liability under the PBSA deemed Indemnity to which it is a party ("Ground 3").
There is a potential difficulty about the Ground 1 analysis, which is that at the time CSPL provided its indemnity to
Trafigura,
CUSA not CSPL was the charterer of the Vessel from
Trafigura.
That only apparently changed after discharge of the Vessel, although before any claims were made for mis-delivery. It is only Ground 1(c) that most clearly avoids that point.
Trafigura
that the voyage charter from
Trafigura
to CUSA would be "amended" so as to substitute CSPL for CUSA as charterer. I use the word "amended" because that is the word that Mr Thomas uses. However, it is an imprecise word capable of covering either a variation or a novation, each of which has different legal consequences or is capable of doing so. Mr Thomas submits that PBSA has not explained how this ""amendment"
broke the chain of indemnities".
Trafigura
was CUSA, in fact the indemnity was provided to
Trafigura
by CSPL. I am willing to accept that it had been intended that CSPL would charter in the Vessel from
Trafigura
and that CUSA would charter the Vessel out to PBSA. Had that happened it would be relatively straightforward to infer an obligation by CUSA to indemnify CSPL in these circumstances. However, that is not what happened. CSPL was not under any obligation to provide
Trafigura
with an indemnity at the time when in fact it provided it. However, that is what it did. I explain why that was so below. This lacuna in the charter chain was only apparently rectified by the agreement between CSPL, CUSA and
Trafigura
in December 2019, which the Clearlake parties characterise in their closing submissions as being "
in order to facilitate payment of freight
".
Trafigura
by which it was agreed that the voyage charter of the Vessel by
Trafigura
to CUSA would be "amended" so that the charterer became CSPL in place of CUSA with all other terms remaining the same. Plainly the intention was that all past and future charterers' liabilities under the
Trafigura
charter would become the responsibility of CSPL in substitution for CUSA.
Trafigura
would be assumed by CSPL under a new contract with
Trafigura.
This requires both the consent of all parties (CUSA, CSPL and
Trafigura)
and consideration for both the discharge of the existing agreement and the new agreement. It is not suggested that any of the three parties concerned did not consent to the new arrangement, nor was it suggested by anyone that there was insufficient consideration to support such a novation, which in any event is usually found from the agreement to discharge and assume rights and liabilities and accept performance by the new party. A novation will generally have the effect of extinguishing the original contract (in this case between
Trafigura
and CUSA) and replacing it with another (in this case between
Trafigura
and CSPL) so as to transfer both the rights and obligations under the charter from CUSA to CSPL. If what happened was a novation, then its effect was to extinguish all liabilities by CUSA to
Trafigura
and render CSPL liable to
Trafigura
under the voyage charter in respect of liabilities accruing before as well as after the novation. Whilst a variation so as to add a party to an existing contract is possible, that is not what is suggested by any of the parties to have happened here. This is unsurprising since the 2 December email is consistent only with a substitution not a variation to add a party. CSPL appears to accept that the addendum brought about a valid novation since it accepts that it became liable for all past and future liabilities and obligations under the voyage charter.
Trafigura
from the date of the novation (2 December 2019). However, that of itself says nothing about what liabilities CUSA might have to CSPL by reason of its internal arrangements to the extent those give rise to legally enforceable obligations, or whether CUSA would be entitled to an indemnity in respect of any such obligations from PBSA under PBSA's deemed indemnity to CUSA. It is against that background that each of the arguments on which CSPL relies for the proposition that CUSA is liable to indemnify CSPL (and, therefore PBSA is liable to indemnify CUSA) has to be considered.
Trafigura,
CUSA, not CSPL, was the charterer from
Trafigura.
That only became so when the charter between CUSA and
Trafigura
was novated. I return to this point below.
Trafigura
at the time) or alternatively on 2 December 2019, when the novation took place. It was also on that date that the Clearlake parties assert that an internal charter was entered into between CUSA and CSPL on the Asbatankvoy terms.
" (a) agreement on essentials of sufficient certainty to be enforceable, (b) an intention to create legal relations and (c) consideration'. At paragraph 102, Mance LJ continued by explaining the distinction between express and implied contracts: '[w]here there is an express agreement on essentials of sufficient certainty to be enforceable, an intention to create legal relations may commonly be assumed ... It is otherwise when the case is that a contract should be implied from the parties' conduct ... It is then for the party asserting a contract to show the necessity for implying it'"
Trafigura
on 30 October 2019 stating "We, Clearlake Shipping Pte Ltd, hereby invoke Clause 33 of relevant CP to discharge as per below orders from Charterers w/o prod of OBL", CPSL thereby became bound to indemnify
Trafigura
on the terms of the indemnity referred to earlier. In writing as he did, Mr Chee erroneously proceeded on the basis that CSPL had chartered the Vessel in and CUSA had chartered it out in accordance with established Clearlake practice. Mr Ong's evidence was that Mr Chee had made an error and that he had explained that to Mr Chee see T2/57/7-9. Mr Ong was cross examined by reference to internal documentation passing thereafter that suggested Mr Chee at that later stage thought the chain was
Trafigura-CUSA-PBSA.
I am not satisfied that negatives his evidence on the point I am now considering or shows that Mr Chee was not proceeding on the basis of a mistaken belief that the chain had been corrected on 30 October. I reach that conclusion because Mr Chee's actions only make sense on the basis that he was then operating under the mistaken impression that the chain was PBSA CUSA CSPL
Trafigura.
I accept Mr Ong's evidence on this point therefore and find that an error had been made as he alleges. No other commercially rational reason has been suggested as to why Mr Chee would have adopted the course he did other than on the basis that he was mistaken as to the true chain. It was this error that was corrected by the novation of the charter from
Trafigura.
By that date all the operational parts of the charter had been performed and as I have said the only purpose of the novation could have been to place CSPL in the shoes of CUSA for all purposes including any liabilities that had already arisen. That is consistent with an error having been made, that error being that CSPL not CUSA should have been the charterer from
Trafigura,
and that error being intended to be corrected by the novation. It is not obvious what other purpose there could be in the novation at that stage.
Trafigura
without seeking to put in place any internal indemnity between CUSA and CSPL, when as I have said he mistakenly assumed the chain was PBSA-CUSA-CSPL-
Trafigura.
I accept Mr Thomas's submission that this appears to have reflected the practice adopted within the Clearlake group down to that date at least where CSPL chartered in and CUSA chartered out. Mr Thomas submits and I accept that the evidence available supports the conclusion that in acting as he did Mr Chee:
" was doing what Clearlake had done many times before: receiving an LOI on behalf of CUSA and giving an LOI on behalf of CSPL. This was done no fewer than thirteen times in the two months prior to the MIRACLE HOPE fixture. That is unsurprising, given how often LOIs are relied upon in the oil trade in the absence of bills of lading..." [Emphasis supplied]
On none of these occasions was an express indemnity issued between CUSA and CSPL. It shows that it was not the practice within Clearlake to issue such indemnities. This was Mr Ong's evidence see paragraphs 12-13 of his first statement. I accept this evidence as consistent with the practice on the prior transactions relied on by Mr Thomas. On this evidence, I accept that it was not the practice within the Clearlake group to issue internal indemnities where the charter chain was between CSPL as disponent owner and CUSA as charterer.
Trafigura
charter, no attempt was made to generate an internal LOI. This is consistent with the position being as reflected in the 29 August email, whereas I have said there is no mention of the need for an express internal LOI. Fifthly, I have referred to the thirteen times in the two months prior to the fixture of the Vessel where indemnities have been given by CSPL having been received by CUSA. On none of those occasions was an express internal LOI entered into. Given the exposure implications that reveals, I regard it as strongly supportive of the intention being as Mr Thomas contends.
"13. The Clearlake operations person would not send her-or himself an email invoking the LOI, but it was understood by the operations team that where an LOI has been invoked against one Clearlake entity, and a different Clearlake entity is bound by an LOI against owners up the chain, there would be an internal LOI between the two different Clearlake entities without the need for any written LOI invocation as between the Clearlake entities to ensure an unbroken indemnity chain. There is a need to have the indemnity chain complete as CCUSA and CSPL are separate entities who would need to be able to pass LOI claims up and down the charterparty chain. However, Clearlake does not have any practice of issuing internal LOI documents to evidence this internal indemnity agreement when CCUSA charters from CSPL and CCUSA's charterer invokes an LOI."
"(1) In certain circumstances a court may be entitled to draw adverse inferences from the absence or silence of a witness who might be expected to have material evidence to give on an issue in an action.
(2 If a court is willing to draw such inferences, they may go to strengthen the evidence adduced on that issue by the other party or to weaken the evidence, if any, adduced by the party who might reasonably have been expected to call the witness.
(3) There must, however, have been some evidence, however weak, adduced by the former on the matter in question before the court is entitled to draw the desired inference: in other words, there must be a case to answer on that issue.
(4) If the reason for the witness's absence or silence satis?es the court, then no such adverse inference may be drawn. If, on the other hand, there is some credible explanation given, even if it is not wholly satisfactory, the potentially detrimental effect of his/her absence or silence may be reduced or nulli?ed."
This statement was considered by the Supreme Court in Royal Mail Group v Efobi [2021] UKSC 33 by Lord Leggatt at paragraph 41. The Supreme Court specifically did not disapprove the statements set out above, which it described as "sensible" whilst emphasising that whether:
" any positive significance should be attached to the fact that a person has not given evidence depends entirely on the context and particular circumstances. Relevant considerations will naturally include such matters as whether the witness was available to give evidence, what relevant evidence it is reasonable to expect that the witness would have been able to give, what other relevant evidence there was bearing on the point(s) on which the witness could potentially have given relevant evidence, and the significance of those points in the context of the case as a whole".
Trafigura
at a time when it was not the charterer in is not the point since it was in consideration of that indemnity being given that
Trafigura
acted on PBSA's Discharge Orders. In relation to necessity, that would be relevant only if I had concluded that the Clearlake parties did not turn their minds to the question of an internal indemnity contract. I have rejected that for the reasons set out above. However, if that is wrong, I would have inferred an intention to effect legal relations in the circumstances of this case. The necessity test identified in the authorities is plainly satisfied on the facts of this case. It is inconceivable and commercially irrational to suppose that CUSA and CSPL intended to bring about a situation in which CSPL bore the losses resulting from complying with instructions from an entity below CUSA in the charter chain to discharge without presentation of original bills of lading. It is that which leads to the conclusion that the necessity requirement is satisfied in the circumstances of this case.
Trafigura,
no issue can arise because there is no requirement that an indemnity cannot be effective if offered by someone other than the charterer concerned, as long as what is offered is supported by consideration. As I have said already, the consideration for the CSPL indemnity was the agreement of
Trafigura
to discharge in accordance with PBSA's discharge instructions. An indemnity contract is a separate agreement from any charterparty to which it relates see The Songa Winds (ibid.). For that reason the novation of the
Trafigura
charter has no impact on this. CSPL was liable to
Trafigura
under its indemnity agreement whether or not the
Trafigura
charterparty had been novated. In any event, once the novation took effect, CSPL became liable to
Trafigura
for all liabilities that CUSA had or would have had in the future to the extent that is material.
The Quantum Issues
Trafigura's
pleaded primary case on the sums that it is entitled to recover under the indemnity is:
i) US$8,452,068 loss and damage by way of the revenue
Trafigura
says it was prevented from earning consisting of:
a) US$3,850,389, being the estimated earnings thatTrafigura
would have received under the P66 Fixture;
b) US$2,157,451, being the earnings it is estimated thatTrafigura
would have received from a charter following completion of the P66 fixture ("Follow On Fixture") on the basis that it would probably have obtained a fixture to load in Brazil and discharge in China in mid August 2020; and
c) Expenses in respect of time charter hire, port charges and bunkers incurred during the arrest period
less the sums that were earned from the Traf CP (after expenses) over the period that the Vessel would otherwise have been engaged on the P66 Fixture and the Follow On Fixture; and
ii) US$7,350 being costs incurred in defending the head owner's arbitration up to the date of its original pleading.
In the alternative, it claims loss and damage in the amount of what it would have earned under the P66 Fixture plus expenses in respect of time charter hire, port charges and bunkers incurred during the arrest period, less the sums that were earned under the Traf CP (after expenses) over the period from the end of the arrest to the probable end of the P66 Fixture.
Trafigura.
Trafigura
should be permitted to recover damages by reference to the Follow On Fixture or whether its claim should be confined to either the profits that would have been earned from the P66 Fixture during the period of arrest (the period of 60 days ending on 11 May 2022), alternatively the end of the P66 Fixture on 1 June 2020. In addition, the Clearlake parties and PBSA maintain that the net income derived from the Traf CP (the TCE calculation) should be calculated taking account of all the arrest period expenses. Whilst it will be necessary to consider these points in more detail below, two points are obvious firstly, to limit recovery in respect of the P66 Fixture to the period when the Vessel was under arrest is unreal because that fixture was for a period that was longer than the period of arrest and the whole of that fixture was lost as a result of the arrest, and secondly to require the arrest period expenses to be deducted from the income derived from the Traf CP would have the effect of requiring
Trafigura
to bear those (or some of those) expenses, which as a matter of first impression is wrong in principle having regard to the terms of the indemnities by which CSPL and PBSA are respectively bound.
Trafigura
should be carried out applying the same principles that would apply to the assessment of damages, whereas
Trafigura
maintains that different principles apply because the claim is under an express indemnity that entitles it to recover all loss resulting from the indemnified cause irrespective of whether it was in the reasonable contemplation of the parties. The defendants maintain that the rationale that underlies the approach adopted in damages claims either applies or should be applied to indemnity claims. There is a large measure of agreement as to the financial consequences that should follow on either basis. I turn to that and to the financial issues in dispute to the extent that is necessary having resolved the issues of principle between the parties.
Trafigura
must show that the losses they respectively seek to recover have been caused by the arrest. This is so because clause 1 of the indemnity responds "
in respect of any liability, loss, damage or expense of whatsoever nature which you may sustain by reason of the ship proceeding and giving delivery of the cargo in accordance with our request
" and because clause 3 responds "
in respect of any liability, loss, damage or expense caused by such arrest or detention
". Contrary to what was submitted on behalf of PBSA, that is not in dispute see paragraph 88 of Mr Ashcroft's opening submissions, where he accepts at least implicitly that to be recoverable the loss concerned must be the result of the Vessel giving delivery in accordance with the discharge instructions and/or caused by the arrest. To the extent that it was suggested by Mr Ashcroft that once that threshold requirement is satisfied, the indemnity permits the recovery of loss whether or not it is within the reasonable contemplation of the parties, I reject that proposition as contrary to Court of Appeal authority see The Eurus [1998] 1 Lloyds Rep 351 per Staughton LJ at 357 361. Whilst I accept that the issue is ultimately one that will turn on the true construction of the contract concerned (a point emphasised by Staughton LJ) there is nothing in the wording of clauses 1 or 3 in
Trafigura's
tendered wording that suggests the parties intended the indemnities thereby conferred to extend to losses that were not within the reasonable contemplation of the parties and, to that extent, the approach to be adopted is the same as that which would be adopted when assessing damages for breach of contract.
"But one problem that almost invariably arises, and does in this case, is that the substitute voyage lasts for longer than the voyage under the original charter-party. The solution commonly adopted is to take a proportion of the profits on the substitute voyage to set off against the profits lost on the original voyage; otherwise one would be involved in calculations to the end of the ship's working life."
Mr Byam-Cook's main point of principle concerned the Follow On Fixture. He submitted that in light of what Staughton LJ said in the Noel Bay (ibid.) quoted above, it would be wrong in principle to assess damages by reference to what hypothetically might have been earned under the Follow On Fixture. He submitted that this point was supported also by the formulation of Males J (as he then was) in The MTM Hong Kong [2015] EWHC 2505; [2016] 1 Lloyds Rep 197 at [2]:
" the starting point in ascertaining the shipowner's loss was "the amount of freight which the ship would have earned if the charterparty had been performed" and that from this amount there should be deducted "the expenses which would have been incurred in earning it" together with "what the ship earned (if anything) during the period which would have been occupied in performing the voyage."
Applied by analogy to the facts of this case, it was submitted this meant that it was necessary first to ascertain what
Trafigura
would have earned from the P66 Fixture, from which is to be deducted the costs that would have been incurred in earning that sum, and what the Vessel in fact earned during the period it would have been occupied in performing the P66 Fixture. I agree this is the effect of applying Males J's reasoning to the facts of this case, subject only to three points (i) this would obviously involve prorating what was earned under the Traf CP and deducting only the sum that would have been earned under it in the period between the start of the Traf CP and the date when the P66 Fixture would have ended, (ii) what was earned under the Traf CP in this context means freight less the expenses incurred in earning that freight; and (iii) on the facts of this case the costs incurred by the Vessel while it was detained would have to be added to the net sum recoverable unless Mr Byam-Cook's submission as to how those expenses should be accounted for is accepted.
"If proof of such losses requires complex hypothetical calculations about the future employment of a vessel, the tribunal of fact is likely to conclude that they are too speculative to be recovered. The more complex the calculation, the less likely the claim is to succeed."
Trafigura
maintains that the cut off date should be 13 August 2020, when it contends the Follow On Fixture would have come to an end. As I have said already the Traf CP did not end until 1 November thereby engaging the problem that there was no time convergence between the Traf CP and either the P66 Fixture or that fixture and the Follow On Fixture, contrary to the position in The MTM Hong Kong (ibid.). This is the problem identified by Staughton LJ in the Noel Bay (ibid.).
Trafigura's
approach "
is artificial, unprincipled and serves to considerably overstate their losses. ..." As Mr Byam-Cook submits, there is no convergence at that date between end of the Follow On Fixture and the end of the Traf CP. He submits that this means that it is necessary to explore what trading the Vessel might have undertaken between 13 August and 1 November and shows how Ms Richards, the expert whose evidence was adduced by
Trafigura,
then seeks to address that by hypothesising about a further fixture between 13 August and 1 November, which involves adopting various market rates. He submits that this exercise is flawed because there is evidence that other fixtures, in the event obtained by other vessels, were available that Ms Richards has not taken into account. This is in my view exactly the sort of complexity that Males J deprecated at paragraph 62 of his judgment in The MTM Hong Kong (ibid.).
Trafigura
is entitled to recover under its indemnity from CSPL is to be calculated applying the prima facie rule identified by Males J in that case and by Staughton LJ in The Noel Bay (ibid.). To do otherwise involves precisely the complex hypothetical calculations that necessarily involves the sort of speculation that Males J held should be avoided. Indeed, it starts with a proposition concerning the availability of an onward charter after the end of the P66 Fixture, which whatever the confidence expressed by
Trafigura
cannot be characterised as anything other than the loss of a chance, albeit on
Trafigura's
case a strong chance, and continues with a debate as to the rate that might have been obtained had such a charter been available. Inevitably everything that follows must be approached in a similar way but with increasing levels of speculation. That is entirely inappropriate.
Trafigura
to be entitled to recover the cost it incurred as a result of the arrest of the Vessel.
Trafigura
the burden of meeting some or all of the arrest costs when those costs have been caused by the events the subject of clauses (1) and (3) of the indemnity. That is so because Mr Byam-Cook maintains that the resulting rate for the Traf CP should be applied from the start date of the arrest. If this is right, then the sum recovered by
Trafigura
will be the profits lost as a result of losing the P66 Fixture less the per diem profit attributable to the Traf CP running from the date of arrest, which will be artificially low because it is being run from the date of arrest not the date of the start of the Traf CP, and is arrived at after deducting arrest expenses. That results in
Trafigura
not recovering the expenses it incurred during the arrest period, but only an artificial sum notionally attributable to the Traf CP. There is no principled basis for such an approach. Thirdly, since Mr Byam-Cook maintains that such costs should include the whole of the arrest period, this inappropriate approach would have an even more adverse effect where, as I have concluded, the damages claim duration ends on 1 June when the P66 Fixture would have ended. This led Mr Byam-Cook to accept (see T5/81/5-13) implicitly at least that if the 1 June cut off was adopted then the approach concerning arrest expenses could not sensibly be adopted. I do not accept that as a principled approach either. In my judgment the point is wrong as a matter of principle for the first and second reasons I have given and I decline to adopt it for those reasons. Its impact where damages are limited to the loss of profit from the P66 Fixture simply illustrates in an extreme way why the point is wrong in principle.
Trafigura
is entitled to recover what
Trafigura
would have earned from the P66 Fixture, from which is to be deducted (i) the costs that would have been incurred in earning that sum and (ii) what the Vessel in fact earned from the Traf CP during the period it would have been occupied in performing the P66 Fixture, less the expenses incurred in earning that sum and (iii) the expenses that were incurred as a result of the Vessel being detained for the period of detention. The time and expenses of the Arrest Period should be excluded in the TCE calculation for the Traf CP, and
Trafigura
should be entitled to recover the Arrest Period Expenses as a separate loss.
Trafigura)
for storage than in fact was payable under the Traf CP. In the result, PBSA contend that credit should be given based on a storage charter at a rate of between US$55,000-60,000 per day, whereas
Trafigura
maintains that credit should be given at the rate fixed by the Traf CP. At the heart of PBSA's case on this point is that
Trafigura
would not have fixed with an external charterer at the rates it fixed at internally, and that spot charters with no storage element were readily available in mid May 2020. All this was put to Mr Carrithers,
Trafigura's
official responsible for fixing the Traf CP and was accepted by him as so.
Trafigura
acted unreasonably. In my judgment it has not discharged that burden. My reasons for reaching that conclusion are as follows.
"Q: The lack of an up-to-date SIRE report seriously limited the options and the possibilities that were available in relation to this vessel in May 2020?
A. Yes. I will agree with that totally. Yes. At any time for any ship that was in that position would be hindered. ."
Finally, Mr Eveleigh accepted Mr Carrithers' statement that no external market participants were keen to charter the Vessel, which he said did not surprise him see T3/133/9 24. This led him also to accept:
"Q: if there were no external market participants willing to charter the vessel on reasonable terms,Trafigura
had little option other than to do an internal charter, would you agree?
A. Yes. I think I have to agree with that and in many ways they were fortunate to have one where the SIRE report wasn't necessary
Q: You certainly haven't identified any six month period fixture available and concluded in May 2020 that you say thatTrafigura
should have fixed at that time rather than concluding the Traf charterparty with TPTE correct?
A. Correct. ..."
Trafigura
had little option other than to do an internal charter
" In principle I accept that the terms agreed were ones that an independent ship owner would be reluctant to accept all other things being equal. However, that was not the position once it is accepted that the Vessel was blighted in the ways acknowledged by Mr Carrithers. This ended with this exchange:
"Q: And you simply do not know whether there may have been the possibility of fixing externally in May 2020 on terms that would have provided a better return toTrafigura
than the Traf charterparty with TPTE. Agreed?
A. Yes. I agree with that and neither do I know what marketingTrafigura
attempted to do with the vessel while -- at that period of time. ..."
The qualification does not assist given the concessions made in the earlier answers.
Trafigura
acted unreasonably.
"BUNKERS CONSUMED WHILE ON STORAGE TO BE AT COST BASIS SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS ON A FIRST IN FIRST OUT BASIS ..."
The effect of this provision is that the charterer was required to pay for the fuel used but the responsibility for ensuring there was fuel to use was that of the disponent owner, who in consequence retained title to the fuel not used. Thus the costs and incidental expenses of providing fuel are the responsibility of the disponent owner that is
Trafigura.
Trafigura
and the defendants concerns declarations in respect of costs and other expenses to be incurred or assessed principally in the Singapore proceedings and the arbitration between
Trafigura
and the head owners. The issue here is that
Trafigura
seeks various declarations concerning the obligation to indemnify in respect of those costs whereas Mr Byam-Cook maintains that to grant such declarations at this stage would be premature.
Trafigura's
costs in the Singapore proceedings and the arbitration to costs which were reasonably incurred and are reasonable in amount) whilst making provision for a further hearing if agreement cannot be reached concerning the amounts recoverable. This is likely to be an issue that can more appropriately be addressed when settling the order that should follow the handing down of the judgment. Given the cost implications of a further hearing, it may be possible to direct that any future claims arising under the indemnities can be addressed in the first instance on paper. However, I intend that a significant NDR provision should be included in any such order since these issues in practice ought not to require resolution by a court given the quality and experience of the parties' legal representation. I postpone further consideration of this issue until after hand down of this judgment.
Trafigura's
costs or Clearlake's own costs in seeking to resist the order sought at the on notice hearing see paragraph 54. The reasons for this conclusion are set out at paragraph 51 of the judgment in these terms:
"However, whenTrafigura
sought additional relief on 15 April 2020 it would appear that Clearlake chose to resist the additional relief for its own reasons. It adduced considerable evidence and made its own submissions as to why the additional relief should not be granted. It did not merely say that it passed on up the line the case of Petrobras. It advanced its own case. Had it adopted the passive role of "piggy in the middle" and merely passed on arguments up and down the line its costs would have been much less than they were."
Trafigura
and CSPL. Mr Thomas chose not to expand upon this submission see T4/120/7-13. The issue was not one that was addressed by Mr Byam-Cook orally. This being so, my provisional conclusion is that the costs disallowed by Teare J should not be recovered under the indemnity. He did not disallow them on the basis they were disproportionate. Had that been the case different considerations would apply. He disallowed them on the basis that they had been unreasonably incurred. However, given the unsatisfactory basis on which this issue has been addressed, I will hear the parties further on this issue at the hand down of this judgment.
"As I confirmed in my email of earlier today, Petrobras intends to fully comply with the Order of Mr Justice Jacobs dated 1 April 2020.
To this end, Petrobras has instructed counsel in Singapore Mr John Sze of JTJB who is copied on this email together with his colleague Ms Jolene Tan.
John has already written to Natixis' lawyers Rajah & Tann to discuss the security required for the release of the vessel. Additionally, I understand that Petrobras has established direct contact with Natixis' commercial team to discuss such security."
The point made by Mr Thomas in his oral submissions was that PBSA did not at that stage comply notwithstanding its expressed intention to do so. On the contrary there was an argument with Natixis about the wording of the security that led ultimately to a hearing before Teare J on 6 May some 5 weeks after the email on which PBSA relies. This leads Mr Thomas to submit that in these circumstances it was entirely reasonable that his client should seek to place itself in a position whereby it could comply with the injunction if PBSA did not by the deadline set. I agree with this submission the alternative would have been to run the risk of being held in contempt. The order made by Jacobs J did not discharge the order made by Henshaw J against CSPL.
Trafigura against CSPL and by CUSA against PBSA succeed to the extent set out above. I leave it to the parties to work out by agreement the effect of these conclusions. If there is any dispute as to the carrying into effect of these conclusions then they can be resolved at the hearing at which this judgment is handed down.