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	England and Wales High Court (Commercial Court) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Commercial Court) Decisions >> Chubb Bermuda Insurance Ltd v Fertitta Entertainment Inc & Ors [2026] EWHC 1392 (Comm) (09 June 2026) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Comm/2026/1392.html Cite as: [2026] EWHC 1392 (Comm)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES
COMMERCIAL COURT (KBD)

		Royal Courts of Justice, Rolls Building Fetter Lane, London, WC4A 1NL
		9 June 2026

B e f o r e :

MR JUSTICE BRIGHT
____________________

Between:

	CHUBB BERMUDA INSURANCE LTD	Claimant
	- and -
	(1) FERTITTA ENTERTAINMENT, INC (2) FERTITTA HOSPITALITY, LLC (3) 1600 WEST LOOP SOUTH, LLC (4) LANDRY'S SEAFOOD HOUSE-NEW ORLEANS, INC (5) LANDRY'S SEAFOOD HOUSE-JAX, INC (6) LANDRY'S, LLC (7) GOLDEN NUGGET LAKE CHARLES, LLC (8) RIVERBOAT CORPORATION OF MISSISSIPPI (9) GOLDEN NUGGET ATLANTIC CITY, LLC (10) GNLV, LLC (11) GNL, LLC (12) GOLDEN NUGGET, LLC (13) MORTON'S OF CHICAGO/ROSEMONT, INC (14) LANDRY'S SEAFOOD HOUSE-MISSOURI, INC (15) BILL'S BAR & BURGER R.C., LLC (16) RAINFOREST CAFÉ, INC (17) DEL FRISCO'S OF GEORGIA, LLC	Defendants

____________________

Andon Dudnikov KC (instructed by Clyde & Co LLP) for the Claimant
The Defendants did not appear

Hearing date: 3 June 2026
____________________

HTML VERSION OF APPROVED JUDGMENT
____________________

Crown Copyright ©

This judgment was handed down by release to The National Archives on 9 June 2026 at 11am.

Mr Justice Bright:

Introduction

1. This judgment is concerned with the final determination of the Claimant's claim, which is for anti-suit ("ASI") relief in support of an arbitration agreement, and also for damages for breach of the arbitration agreement.
2. I must also dispose of the Defendants' challenge to the jurisdiction of this Court, by their application notice of 13 August 2025.

The parties

3. The Claimant is a company incorporated in Bermuda, where it has its principal place of business.
4. The Defendants are associated corporations and companies, headed by the First Defendant, which is incorporated in Texas. The Defendants' businesses are primarily focussed on the hospitality sector, in Texas, Louisiana and other locations in the United States.

The Policy

5. The Claimant issued a Property Insurance Policy with the policy number FERTITTA01492P03 ("the Policy"), with an effective period of 31 May 2019 to 31 May 2020. The Named Insured was the First Defendant, but the definition of the Insured encompassed all the Defendants.
6. The Policy was recorded as having been issued at Hamilton, Bermuda. The Declarations section of the Policy further recorded the broker (i.e., the entity which acted on behalf of the Defendants in procuring the Policy, and to which it was issued by the Claimant) as Bowring Marsh (Bermuda) Ltd, of an address in Hamilton, Bermuda.
7. The Declarations summarised the layer details of the cover provided by the Claimant, and various other relevant details, as follows:

"Limit USD 200,000,000

Part of USD 500,000,000

Excess Of USD 250,000,000

Excess of underlying deductibles/SIR

Annual aggregates apply to Earthquake and Floor

Deductibles: Per Attached Policy

Ground up Per Attached Policy

Sublimits

Followed Policy: 2019 FE GN LA – POLICY FORM FOR ISSURANCE [sic] – CHUBB BDA received May 30, 2019

…

Exceptions to the

Followed Policy:

…

Change to the Policy Form:

…

ii. Section POLICY PROVISIONS clause 32. SUIT AGAINST THE COMPANY is hereby deleted in its entirety from the policy"

8. The Policy's General Provisions included the following:

"1. INSURING AGREEMENT

Chubb Bermuda Insurance Ltd., hereafter called "Chubb", agrees to provide insurance coverage to the Insured in accordance with the terms, conditions, exclusions and limitations of the Followed Policy, except as superseded limited or excluded herein, and subject to the applicable Retention Amount(s) of Liability as shown in the Declarations.

2. ARBITRATION

Any dispute arising out of or relating to this Policy, or the breach thereof, shall be fully and finally determined in London, England under the provisions of the Arbitration Act of 1996 (as amended or supplemented) by an Arbitration Board composed of three arbitrators. Each arbitrator shall be an active Queens Counsel or retired judge of the English High Court or Court of Appeal familiar with insurance and the Act. All matters relating to the existence of the agreement to arbitrate and the selection of arbitrators shall be determined under the laws of England and Wales. …

3. GOVERNING LAW AND INTERPRETATION

This Policy shall be construed and enforced in accordance with the laws of the State of New York in the United States, except and insofar as such laws:

(1) pertain to regulation under New York Insurance law, or regulations issued by the Insurance Department of New York pursuant thereto, applying to insurers doing business, or issuance, delivery or procurement of policies of insurance, within the State of New York r as respects risks or insureds situated in the State of New York;

(2) pertain to choice of law rules that result in the selection of a substantive state law other than New York;

(3) purport to limit, exempt, repeal or otherwise qualify in any way the exclusion of all physical loss or damage and of all other interests, expenses or sums arising from or relating to terrorism, including but not limited to fire-following terrorism; or

(4) are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Policy.

The terms, conditions, exclusions, and limitations of this Policy are to be construed in an even-handed fashion as between the Insured and Chubb. Without limitation, where the language of this Policy is deemed to be ambiguous or otherwise unclear, the issues shall be resolved in the manner most consistent with the relevant terms, conditions, exclusions and limitations (without regard to authorship of the language, without any presumption or arbitrary interpretation or construction in favor of either the Insured or Chubb and without reference to parol evidence.) In any circumstances where New York law does not apply, the law of England and Wales governs this contract."

9. The followed Policy Form, referred to in the Declarations, contained various policy provisions. Clause 32 – which was deleted by the exceptions noted in the Declarations, as set out in paragraph 5 above – was headed "Suit against the Company." If it had not been specifically deleted, Clause 32 would have provided for the Claimant to submit to the jurisdiction of any court of competent jurisdiction within the United States.

The 1st Louisiana Proceedings

10. On 17 June 2020, a notice of loss was given to the Defendants' excess insurers, including the Claimant, in respect of alleged losses sustained as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.
11. On 2 July 2020, the First, Second, Third, Sixth and Twelfth Defendants and MPBB Holdings I, LLC. (there the plaintiffs) issued proceedings against various of their insurers including the Claimant, in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana, Division "N" (the "1^st Louisiana Proceedings"). As plaintiffs in the 1^st Louisiana Proceedings, the relevant Defendants sought business interruption coverage, under insurance policies issued to them in the May 2019 – May 2020 policy period, for losses allegedly caused by the closure of their facilities under government orders related to COVID-19.
12. On 6 July 2020, several of the Defendants' insurers issued a reservation of rights in respect of the Notices of Loss. On 9 July 2020, the Claimant was dismissed, without prejudice, from the 1^st Louisiana Proceedings. On 16 July 2020, the remaining defendants in the 1^st Louisiana Proceedings were dismissed without prejudice.

The 2nd Louisiana Proceedings

13. On 27 July 2020, the First to Twelfth Defendants filed a complaint against various insurers in Division B of the 14^th Judicial District Court, Calcasieu Parish, Louisiana ("the Division B Petition" and "the Louisiana Court"). On 28 July 2020, the First to Seventeenth Defendants filed a similar complaint against various insurers in Division F of the Louisiana Court ("the Division F Petition"; together, "the 2^nd Louisiana Proceedings").
14. In both the Division B Petition and the Division F Petition, the relevant Defendants (as plaintiffs) alleged that they had suffered physical harm, damage and losses, and that the defendants to each Petition had denied coverage. They sought various declarations and damages. In the Division B Petition, they alleged that the Louisiana Court had sole and exclusive jurisdiction, for which they relied on a service of suit clause in the same terms as Clause 32 of the followed Policy Form – i.e., the provision which was expressly and specifically excluded from the Policy by which cover was provided by the Claimant.
15. The Claimant was not named as a defendant in either the Division B Petition or the Division F Petition.
16. However, on 8 January 2025 the Defendants filed documents in the 2^nd Louisiana Proceedings including a Motion for leave to file an Amended Petition, by which they sought to add the Claimant as a new defendant. The Defendants thereby sought similar relief to that previously sought against the other insurers, including declarations relating to the Policy and damages.

The Interim ASI

17. The Claimant commenced the instant proceedings on 30 January 2025 and applied without notice for an interim anti-suit injunction ("Interim ASI"). The application was heard on 31 January 2025 by Jacobs J, who granted the Interim ASI in wide terms. It prohibited the Defendants from pursuing or taking any further steps in the 2^nd Louisiana Proceedings (so far as they concern any claim arising out of or relating to the Policy) or the Motion filed with the Louisiana Court on 8 January 2025.
18. The return date was listed for 14 February 2025. In the event, no hearing was required because the Interim ASI was continued by agreement, as recorded by a Consent Order dated 14 February 2025. A further continuation was then agreed, as recorded by a further Consent Order dated 27 March 2025, to enable settlement discussions.
19. The effect of these agreements and Consent Orders was that the Interim ASI was to remain in place until (i) settlement, or (ii) (if there were no settlement) the final hearing in the instant proceedings. The corollary was that the Motion filed against the Claimant in the 2^nd Louisiana Proceedings would await the outcome of the settlement discussions, and then of the instant proceedings, with (accordingly) a postponed date for the service of the Claimant's response to that Motion.
20. The settlement discussions were not fruitful. The Claimant therefore applied for directions for a final hearing. The solicitors acting for the Defendants in England, Hausfeld & Co. LLP ("Hausfeld"), acknowledged the application but made no substantive comments on the directions suggested by the Claimants. An Order was made on 25 July 2025, giving dates for the sequential service of evidence leading up to a hearing on the first available date after 10 October 2025. In the event, the final hearing was listed by this Court for 26 January 2026.
21. On 13 August 2025, the Defendants issued an application challenging the jurisdiction of this Court and seeking to set aside the Interim ASI ("the Set Aside Application"). It was supported by a witness statement made by Mr Christopher P Ieyoub, a partner at the Defendants' principal attorneys in Louisiana.

Louisiana TRO and Preliminary Injunction

22. Despite the Defendants' agreement to await the outcome of the instant proceedings, as recorded in the Consent Orders of 14 February 2025 and 27 March 2025, and despite the Defendants' apparent willingness for this Court to determine its Set Aside Application, on 15 August 2025 (i.e., just two days after they had issue the Set Aside Application), the Defendants applied for an obtained, without notice, a temporary restraining order in the 2^nd Louisiana Proceedings ("the Louisiana TRO"). This restrained the Claimant from pursuing the instant action in this Court, and also from pursuing any arbitration arising from or related to the Policy.
23. On 16 August 2025, the Claimants' solicitors, Clyde & Co. LLP ("Clyde & Co."), wrote to Hausfeld, noting that the Defendants' actions in obtaining the Louisiana TRO constituted a breach of the Interim ASI. In response, the Defendants did not dispute this. Instead, they simply asserted that this Court had no jurisdiction:

"In summary, our clients maintain that there is no proper basis for the English court's jurisdiction in the parties' underlying dispute. The Defendants are all US companies, the Claimant is Bermudan, and the policies cover only US risks and losses, which have already been litigated in Louisiana. The only purported link to England—an arbitration clause—is void under Louisiana law (La. R.S. 22:868) and contrary to strong public policy designed to protect insureds' access to local courts. Any attempt to enforce that clause would undermine settled Louisiana litigation, risk inconsistent outcomes, and amount to impermissible forum shopping. England is not a suitable forum in any event, with all witnesses, evidence, and proceedings located in the US."

24. Being unwilling to breach the Louisiana TRO, the Claimant had temporarily to desist from pursuing any proceedings in this court and instead take steps in Louisiana to extricate itself from the 2^nd Louisiana Proceedings. This meant, among other things, that the hearing date of 26 January 2026, which had been fixed for the final hearing in the instant proceedings, had to be vacated, and the directions given by this Court's Order of 25 July 2025 had to be varied.
25. On 2 September 2025, the Defendants obtained a further Louisiana TRO. They then applied for, and on 30 September 2025 obtained, a preliminary injunction ("the Louisiana Preliminary Injunction"), which again restrained the Claimant from pursuing the instant action in this Court.
26. The Claimant had opposed the granting of the Louisiana Preliminary Injunction. It then appealed the decision of the Louisiana Court of 30 September 2025, granting the Louisiana Preliminary Injunction, to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ("the Fifth Circuit"). The appeal was resisted by the Defendants. A contested hearing took place on 2 December 2025. The appeal succeeded, for reasons given by the Fifth Circuit on 8 December 2025. The case against the Claimant was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.
27. The Defendants' application for a re-hearing was denied on 13 January 2026. The Fifth Circuit issued its mandate on 20 January 2026, with the consequence that the Louisiana Preliminary Injunction ceased to have effect.

The 3rd Louisiana Proceedings

28. On 11 February 2026, the Defendants commenced fresh proceedings against the Claimant in Louisiana ("the 3^rd Louisiana Proceedings") – notwithstanding the decision of the Fifth Circuit that the Louisiana Court had no jurisdiction over the Defendants' complaints against the Claimant under the Policy. In these fresh proceedings, the Defendants advanced the contentions that the arbitration agreement in the Policy is contrary to Louisiana law, and that the Claimant has waived its right to invoke the arbitration provisions in the Policy by instead choosing to litigate in a non-arbitral form (i.e., this Court). They sought declarations to this effect, as well as a declaration that the Louisiana Court has personal jurisdiction over the Claimant.
29. Clyde Co. wrote to Hausfeld objecting on the basis that this was further breach of the Interim ASI and enclosing letters to two individuals believed to be officers of the First Defendant. There was no response from Hausfeld. The only response received was from one of the relevant individuals – Mr Steven Scheinthal, whose email of 11 February 2026 did not contradict Clyde & Co.'s assertion that the Defendants were again in breach of the Interim ASI, but and appeared to confirm that he is the First Defendant's Executive Vice President and General Counsel, but stated that the other individual (Mr Tilman Fertitta) was neither an offer nor director of any relevant entity.
30. On 6 March 2026, the Defendants filed a motion in the 3^rd Louisiana Proceedings, for declaratory judgment and an injunction to restrain the Claimant from pursuing the instant proceedings before this Court. This was opposed by the Claimant.
31. On 15 April 2026, the Louisiana Court issued a judgment dismissed the Defendants' motion and granting the Claimant's motion to dismiss or stay the 3^rd Louisiana Proceedings, in light of the earlier decision of the Fifth Circuit.
32. On 14 May 2026, the Defendants filed a notice of appeal, seeking to appeal to the Fifth Circuit.

Further steps in the instant proceedings

33. Following the removal of the Louisiana Preliminary Injunction, the Claimant applied to this Court to amend the Claim Form so as to seek damages for the Defendant's breach of the arbitration agreement in clause 2 of the Policy, and for case management directions. That application was dealt with at a hearing on 24 April 2026. The Defendants were given notice but did not attend.
34. By the Court's Order of 24 April 2026, the Claimant was permitted to amend the Claim Form. The Court then gave directions, leading to this hearing. Those directions included provision for evidence from the Claimant in support of its claim for damages to be served by 6 May 2026, and for any responsive evidence from the Defendant to be served by 20 May 2026.
35. The Claimant served its evidence accordingly, in the Sixth Witness Statement of Ms Emma-Jayne Ager.
36. The Defendants did not serve any responsive evidence. However, Hausfeld sent a letter to Clyde & Co. dated 5 May 2026, which they asked to be put before the Court at this hearing and which I have, accordingly, take into account. It reads in full as follows:

"Dear Clyde & Co

Chubb Bermuda Insurance Ltd v Fertitta Entertainment, Inc & Ors

Claim No. CL-2025-000032 (the "Proceedings")

1. We continue to act on behalf of the Defendants in the above Proceedings and adopt the definitions from previous correspondence.

2. We write further to the Order of the Honourable Mr Justice Bright dated 24 April 2026, and in particular to paragraph 5 of the Order, pursuant to which the final hearing of the ASI (the Relisted Hearing as defined in the Order) has been listed for 3 June 2026.

3. Our clients' position on the ASI, including as to the jurisdiction of the English Court and the validity of service of the ASI and the Proceedings, is well known to your client and has been clearly and consistently set out in prior correspondence, including our clients' application dated 13 August 2025 to challenge jurisdiction in respect of the ASI and to set aside the ASI and service thereof (the "Application"). We refer, without limitation, to: (i) the first witness statement of Christopher P Ieyoub dated 13 August 2025 ("Ieyoub-1"); and (ii) our letter dated 19 August 2025.

4. As stated in paragraphs 41 and 42 of Ieyoub-1:

"The ASI, which is solely an English proceeding, is not enforceable in Louisiana, where the damage occurred. It is a foreign process that may prove to have little to no practical significance, while causing undue prejudice to the Defendants/insureds.

The Claimant's attempt to force the Defendants to arbitration in London by using the threat of civil fines and criminal charges is a breach of Louisiana public policy is unprofessional, unethical

and perhaps even criminal."

5. Our clients' position remains unchanged. They are particularly concerned that, in the proceedings before the US court, your client has significantly misrepresented our clients' actions in relation to the Proceedings. In your client's Memorandum of Law (1) In Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction And (2) In Support of its Cross-Motion to Dismiss to Stay this Action filed in Civil Action No: 25-cv-01175 before the United States District Court, Western District of Louisiana, Lake Charles Division, your client stated (emphasis added):

a) "Plaintiffs [our clients] have knowingly and willingly participated in the ASI proceedings from the get-go" (page 9) – this is untrue and misleading: our clients (i) did not submit to

the jurisdiction; (ii) always participated subject to a strict reservation of rights; (iii) and subsequently made the Application.

b) "Indeed, they [our clients] have done so for the past eight months without attempting to terminate the London High Court proceeding, instead agreeing via stipulation to litigate the London action first" (page 11) – this is untrue and misleading as the Application was, incontrovertibly, one to terminate the Proceedings.

6. Our clients' position is that it is wrong for them to be forced to spend time and money seeking to resist the ASI which lacks basis or jurisdiction, the more so given it is evident from the matters referenced in the preceding paragraph that steps taken by our clients even to resist the ASI risk being (wrongly) relied upon and/or misrepresented in any US proceedings as evidence of acceding to the ASI. Further, the Claimant impermissibly seeks a declaration of arbitrability by the London High Court which is even beyond the scope of the very policy provision upon which

the Claimant relies in seeking the ASI.

7. As a result, we are not instructed to file further evidence or submissions ahead of the final hearing of the ASI or to attend that hearing. We are instructed to send this letter to explain our clients' position to the Court and being mindful of judicial resource. Please draw the Court's attention to it.

8. As throughout, all our clients' rights regarding the Proceedings generally, and specifically as to jurisdiction, service and the ASI, are and remain strictly reserved.

Yours faithfully

Hausfeld & Co. LLP"

37. As foreshadowed by that letter, the Defendants did not attend the hearing which has taken place before me on 3 June 2026, despite evidently being aware that this date had been fixed.
38. I understand that the Defendants' appeal proceedings before the Fifth Circuit remain on foot. However, the Defendants do not appear to have sought to have them expedited, despite their awareness of the hearing before this Court fixed for 3 June 2026; nor do they appear to have sought any further injunctive relief in the United States to restrain the Claimant from advancing its case before this Court, in the course of the hearing. I take it from this that the Defendants are content that I should proceed to make my decision, in the light of the submissions and evidence that have been proffered by both parties. This includes the letter from Hausfeld, and the witness statement of Mr Ieyoub to which it refers; as well as, of course, the Claimant's submissions and evidence.

The arbitration agreement and its governing law

39. General Provision 2 of the Policy is an agreement to arbitrate.
40. Under General Provision 3, the governing law of the Policy itself is New York law, subject to the limit extent to which English law applies.
41. However, the arbitration agreement in General Provision 2 needs to be considered separately, applying the principles set out in Enka Insaat ve Sanayi AS v OOO Insurance Company Chubb [2020] UKSC 38, as explained in UniCredit Bank GmbH v RusChemAlliance LLC [2024] UKSC 30. In Unicredit, Lord Leggatt JSC said at [21]:

"… the arbitration agreement is governed by whichever system of law the parties have agreed will govern it or, in the absence of such an agreement, the system of law with which the arbitration agreement is most closely connected. Whether the parties have agreed on a choice of law to govern the arbitration agreement is ascertained by construing the arbitration agreement and the contract containing it, as a whole, applying the rules of contractual interpretation of English law as the law of the forum."

42. General Provision 2 expressly provides that all matters relating to the existence of the agreement to arbitrate shall be determined under the laws of England and Wales. It follows that this is a case where the parties have agreed on the governing law of the arbitration agreement: it is English law.

The Defendants' challenge to English jurisdiction

43. The basis on which the Defendants sought to challenge English jurisdiction was set out the witness statement of Mr Ieyoub, which supported the application of 13 August 2025. The letter from Hausfeld of 5 May 2026 adds nothing to this. There were essentially three points made:

(1) The arbitration agreement in General Provision 2 of the Policy is invalid under Louisiana law, by reason of Louisiana statutory provision: Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:868 ("La. R.S. 22:868").

(2) There is no connection to England and the Defendants have not submitted to the jurisdiction of the English Court.

(3) Louisiana is the most suitable forum.

44. If the arbitration agreement is valid, then points (2) and (3) do not matter. If the arbitration agreement is valid, then by agreeing to arbitrate in London, the parties have necessarily agreed to the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court, pursuant to the Arbitration Act 1996 and CPR 62. Furthermore, it is not necessary for the Claimant to establish any connection to England other than the arbitration agreement; and it is not open to the Defendants to contend that the Louisiana Court is a more suitable forum than arbitration in London.
45. It follows that the key question is whether the arbitration agreement is valid. As noted, the Defendants do not challenge the general validity of the Policy (on the contrary they rely on it) nor do they deny that they and the Claimants are parties to it or that it incorporates General Provision 2. Their sole point in relation to the validity of the arbitration agreement arises from the effect of La. R.S. 22:868.
46. This provision applies to any insurance policy "delivered or issued for delivery in [the state of Louisiana]". I understand that, in the various proceedings in the United States, including the appeal to the Fifth Circuit, there have been issues about whether the Policy falls within this definition (in circumstances where it was issued in Bermuda and delivered to a broker in Bermuda) and also about whether La. R.S. 22:868 applies to international insurance policies/arbitration agreements, or only to US policies/agreements, in the face of the New York Convention.
47. Before me, there is a logically anterior question: should this Court apply La. R.S. 22:868? As a Louisiana statute, it is not naturally applicable in England, by this Court. The only basis on which it might apply would be if the arbitration agreement were governed by the law of Louisiana. However, that is not the case, as I have already found.
48. General Provision 2 expressly states that all matters relating to the existence of the agreement to arbitrate shall be determined under the laws of England and Wales. The Defendants' case boils down to the contention that there is no valid agreement to arbitrate. Because the parties have expressly agreed that this falls to be determined under English law, Louisiana law is irrelevant, including La. R.S. 22:868.
49. It follows that the Defendants' challenge to English jurisdiction is based on a false premise, i.e. that the arbitration agreement is invalid by reason of La. R.S. 22:868.
50. It therefore must be dismissed.

The Claimants' application for final ASI relief

51. The Court has power to grant an ASI under s. 37(1) of the Senior Courts Act 1981. An ASI enforces the negative promise contained in an arbitration agreement not to bring court proceedings, which applies and is enforceable regardless of whether or not any arbitration proceedings are on foot or proposed: UniCredit, per Lord Leggatt JSC at [99].
52. On the facts set out above, I am satisfied that there is a valid arbitration agreement in existence, whose scope extends to all the matters that the Defendants seek to litigate in the Louisiana Court.
53. In these circumstances, the Court will ordinarily exercise its discretion to restrain the pursuit of proceedings brought in breach of a forum clause unless the defendant can show 'strong reasons' to refuse the relief: QBE Europe SA/NV v Generali España de Seguros y Reaseguros [2022] EWHC 2062 (Comm), per Foxton J at [10].
54. Here, no reasons are or have been advanced, except that the underlying disputes are more closely connected with Louisiana. This is not a reason (let alone a strong reason) not to restrain the Defendants' breach of the arbitration agreement, as explained by Foxton J in QBE at [11]:

"(i) It has been held that respect for comity is not a strong reason for the court not to give effect to a contractual choice of forum clause, and that comity requires that where there is an agreement for a sole forum for the resolution of disputes under a contract, that agreement is respected: Males LJ in AIG Europe, para 8. By way of parenthesis, in that context, comity is served by applying the same respect to choice of court or arbitration agreements in favour of other jurisdictions and arbitral seats.

(ii) It has been held that the existence of a mandatory provision of foreign law applicable in the foreign court which overrides the contractual choice of jurisdiction is not a strong reason to refuse an ASI: Shipowners' Mutual Protection and Indemnity Association (Luxembourg) v Containerships Denizcilik Nakliyat ve Ticaret AS (The Yusuf Cepnioglu) [2016] 1 Lloyd's Rep 641, paras 34 to 37 and 57 to 58 and Thomas Raphael QC, The Anti-Suit Injunction (2nd Edition) ( Raphael), paras 8.31 to 8.44.."

55. Arbitration and jurisdiction clauses are often agreed precisely because the chosen forum has nothing to do with the parties or their affairs, and to give overriding weight to forum conveniens would defeat the intention of the parties: Raphael (2^nd ed.), at para. 8.10.
56. The ASI relief sought by the Claimant includes a mandatory injunction requiring the Defendants to procure the dismissal of the claims brought by them against the Defendant in the 3^rd Louisiana Proceedings. This is appropriate, indeed it is the necessary corollary of the obligation not to pursue proceedings outside the agreed arbitral forum. The Claimant suggested in submissions that the Defendants should be allowed until 12 June 2026 to accomplish this. That seems likely to be inadequate. The Defendants should have until 19 June 2026. It of course is open to them to apply asking for more time, albeit they would have to explained why more time is needed, and how much more time should be allowed.

The Claimant's claim for damages

57. By the Amended Claim Form, the Claimant seeks damages in respect of the costs that it incurred in resisting the 2^nd Louisiana Proceedings. Ms Ager's Sixth Witness Statement explains that this element of the claim is limited to costs incurred by the Claimant's US lawyers in the period from 15 August 2025.
58. The invoices submitted in support have been redacted, Ms Ager says in order to preserve privilege and confidential information. The Defendants had the opportunity to challenge the Claimant's redactions, but have chosen not to do so.
59. The sums claimed total US$709,052.88. In the absence of any challenge either as matter of principle or in relation to quantum, I accept this figure and award this sum as damages.
60. The Claimant also seeks, and is entitled to, an indemnity in respect of future US legal costs, and various declarations.

Costs of this action

61. The Claimant further seeks and in principle must be entitled to its costs of this action. In all the circumstances, such costs should be awarded on the indemnity basis.
62. Mr Dudnikov KC, for the Claimant, asked for costs to be summarily assessed. Given the Defendants' failure to participate to date, I agree that there will be no utility in detailed assessment proceedings.
63. Having considered the Claimant's schedule, I summarily assess such costs in the sum of £444,516.16, which represents about 70% of the grant total of costs incurred.