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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Commercial Court) Decisions >> Maxamcorp International Sl v Eurotel LLC [2026] EWHC 666 (Comm) (13 March 2026) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Comm/2026/666.html Cite as: [2026] EWHC 666 (Comm) |
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 2026] EWHC 666 (Comm) | ||
| 2026-000102 |
BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALESCOMMERCIAL COURT (KBD)
IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION CLAIM
7 Rolls Buildings Fetter Lane London, EC4A 1NL |
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| 2026 |
B e f o r e :
____________________
| MAXAMCORP INTERNATIONAL SL (a company incorporated in the Kingdom of Spain) |
Claimant |
|
| - and - |
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| EUROTEL LLC (A company incorporated in the Russian Federation) |
Defendant |
____________________
The Defendant did not appear and was not represented
____________________
Crown Copyright ©
MR. JUSTICE BRYAN:
A. INTRODUCTION
2026 ("the 2 March Order) following a without notice application by the claimant ("Maxam"). The 2 March Order was largely directed at preventing the Defendant ("Eurotel") from pursuing foreign court proceedings in breach of agreements. The original application was supported by the first witness statement of James Hayton dated 2 March 2026 ("Hayton 1"). The continuance of the injunctions and the further relief sought at this hearing is supported by the second witness statement of James Hayton dated 9 March 2026 ("Hayton 2").
(a) permits Maxam to serve Eurotel out of the jurisdiction and by an alternative method, namely by emails on the lawyers who at the time of that application represented Eurotel in the proceedings which it has commenced against Maxam in the Voronezh Arbitrazh Court in Russia (Case No. A 14-17859/2024 ("the Russian Proceedings");
(b) restrains Eurotel were pursuing the Russian proceedings or any other proceedings otherwise than in accordance with the terms of certain arbitration agreements ("the Arbitration Agreements"). These arbitration agreements were contained in or incorporated into certain supply agreements ("the Supply Agreements"); and
(c) restrains Eurotel from enforcing any judgment rendered against Maxam in the Russian Proceedings.
2026 ("the 4 March 2026 Russian Judgment").
(1) First, to clarify that the interim anti-enforcement injunction applies specifically to the 4 March 2026 Russian Judgment.
(2) Secondly, to add to the interim injunction a further injunction to require Eurotel to take all necessary steps within its power not only to "adjourn or stay or otherwise defer until after further order in these proceedings any consideration of the merits of its claims in the Russian Proceedings", as per the 2 March Order but also to "set aside the 4 March 2026 Russian Judgment"; and
(3) Thirdly, to grant Maxam permission to serve any further documents required to be served in these proceedings on Eurotel's new lawyers in the Russian Proceedings ("the New Representatives").
2026, (i) in accordance with the method or alternative service permitted in paragraph 7 of the 2 March Order, and also (ii) by email to Eurotel's New Representatives. I have been addressed further in relation to that by Mr. Paul Key KC who appears before me this morning.
B. BACKGROUND
B.1. The Procedural Background
(1) First "Assignment Agreement no.77" dated 27th April 2024 by which UEE purported to assign both (i) the EuroChem Claims and also, (ii) its own claims to debts due under Supply Agreements No. 2-4 ("the UEE Claims") to VSI. The value of the EuroChem Claims was said to be USD 9,620,569 and the UEE Claims EUR 537,461.32.
(2) Secondly, "Assignment Agreements No. 78" dated 27 April 2024 by which EMS assigned its claims under Supply Agreement No. 1 ("the EMS Claims") to VSI. The value of the EMS Claim was said to be EUR 2,357,666.21 (although that value was subsequently purportedly amended on 5 June 2024 to EUR 2,435,379.41).
(1) Maxam has been the target of a corporate raid by Promsintez.
(2) Assignments Agreements Nos. 77 and 78 were purported signed on behalf of UEE by a Mr. Mikaelyan who was a financial director of another of Maxam's subsidiaries, Maxam Russia LLC, but Mr. Mikaelyan had, by the date of signature, requested to resign from his position and had in any event not been granted a power of attorney on behalf of either UEE or EMS entitling him to any such agreement on their behalf.
(3) Those Assignment Agreements were not authorised by the governing body of UEE or EMS.
(4) The transactions were detrimental to UEE's and EMS's interests and were therefore liable to be set aside under Russian law.
2026. The claim brought on behalf of UEE was dismissed on 24 June 2025. Maxam lost on appeal on 24 October 2025 and the cassation appeal is due to be heard on 12 May 2026.
2026.
commenced the Russian Proceedings against Maxam and also in the same proceedings, a claim against VSI on its guarantee pursuant to Assignment Agreement No. 80.
(1) The Assignments Nos. 77, 78 and 80 are intended to harm the interests of the Maxam Group of companies and Maxam in particular, and Eurotel's claim in the Russian Proceedings is a means to achieve that goal. The claims should therefore be dismissed on the basis they are 'a clear abuse of rights' (see Defence at paragraphs 1-8).
(2) Eurotel violates the terms of the Supply Agreement on applicable law and bases its claims solely on the 1980 UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, as well as on the norms of Russian legislation, although the UN Convention does not apply to three of the Supply Agreements (see Defence paragraphs 9-15).
(3) Eurotel and VSI violated the contractual prohibition on the assignment of claims without consent which the Defence says are contained in two of the Supply Agreements, with the result that the claims under those Supply Agreements "must be denied" (see Defence paragraphs 16-20).
(4) Eurotel unlawfully failed to take into account additional agreements on the extension of payment terms and the terms of validity of the Supply Agreements, with the result that for a number of the Supply Agreements, "the postponement of deadlines indicates that the plaintiff has incorrectly calculated the penalties, and for some, it indicates that the payment deadline has not yet arrived, which precludes the possibility of satisfying the claim" (see Defences paragraphs 21-26).
(5) Eurotel wrongly claims that terms in some of the Supply Agreements providing a maximum amount of penalties are invalid (see Defences paragraphs 27-39).
B.2 Developments Following the Hearing Before Andrew Baker J
2026 took place. At the hearing, Eurotel was represented by the new representatives who were not the persons whose email addresses were stated for service in the 2 March Order. During the hearing, the Court read out the details of the New Representatives power of attorney from Eurotel which the court said was dated 5 March 2026, and which was after service of the 2 March Order had been effected.
commencement of the session, Maxam's Russian counsel handed a copy of the 2 March Order to the new representatives accompanied by a notarised translation of it in Russian. Once the hearing began, the New Representatives asserted to the Russian Court that the injunction had no effect on the Russian Proceedings and could not restrict the judge from rendering a decision. The Court proceeded to reject an application by Maxam to adjourn the hearing. Maxam's Russian counsel then formally submitted the 2 March Order with a certified translation into the case file.
2026 but as the hearing was in camera the judgment is not expected to be filed in public.
(1) has breached paragraphs 3 and 4 of the 2 March Order by pursuing and obtaining its claims against Maxam in the Russian Proceedings at the 4 March 2026 hearing and;
(2) has breached paragraph 6 of the 2 March Order by failing to take all necessary steps within its power to adjourn or stay or otherwise defer until further order in these proceedings any consideration of the merits of its claims in the Russian Proceedings.
C. JURISDICTION
"(1) Subject to paragraph (2A), the court may give permission to serve an arbitration claim form out of the jurisdiction if – ...
(c) the claimant –
(i) seeks some other remedy or requires a question to be decided by the court affecting an arbitration (whether started or not), an arbitration agreement or an arbitration award; and
(ii) the seat of the arbitration is or will be within the jurisdiction or the conditions in section 2(4) of the 1996 Act are satisfied ....
2A) An arbitration claim form falling within (1)(a) to (c) above may be served out of the jurisdiction without permission if—
(a) the seat of the arbitration is or will be in England and Wales; and
(b) the respondent is party to the arbitration agreement in question."
"In any proceedings to which rule 6.32 or 6.33 does not apply, the claimant may serve a claim form out of the jurisdiction with the permission of the court if any of the grounds set out in paragraph 3.1 of Practice Direction 6B apply."
"(3) The court will not give permission unless satisfied that England and Wales is the proper place in which to bring the claim."
"[3.1] The claimant may serve a claim form out of the jurisdiction with the permission of the court under rule 6.36 where ....
(4A) A claim is made against the defendant which—
(a) was served on the defendant within the jurisdiction without the need for the defendant's agreement to accept such service;
(b) falls within CPR rule 6.33; or
(c) falls within one or more of paragraphs (1A), (2), (6) to (16A) or (19) to (23),and a further claim is made against the same defendant which arises out of the same or closely connected facts
....
(6) A claim is made in respect of a contract where the contract. .... (c) is governed by the law of England and Wales."
C.1 Claim relating to Supply Agreements 5-7
".... shall be finally settled under the Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration of the International Chamber of
"The place of the arbitration shall be fixed by the Court, unless agreed upon by the parties."
"Of course, the concerns expressed in the Altimo Holdings case [2012] 1 WLR 1804 about the width of the necessary and proper party gateway apply with equal force when a party seeks to build gateway upon gateway as in the present case. That is not, in my judgment, a sufficient reason for giving the words a strained construction. The appropriate stage at which to give effect to those concerns is at the stage of considering whether, under CPR r 6.37(3), England and Wales is the proper place in which to bring the claim."
"Service out of the jurisdiction should in principle be permitted unless, in the opinion of the court, the fact that the seat of the arbitration is or is likely to be outside England and Wales makes it inappropriate on the facts of the case to exercise the court's jurisdiction to grant relief aimed at enforcing the arbitration agreement or supporting the arbitral process. This test should be applied consistently with the principle discussed above: That a strong reason needs to be shown as to why in the particular circumstances the court ought not to exercise its jurisdiction to restrain a breach of the parties' contractual bargain."
common background to the claims and to the assignments, and given the emphasis put by Lord Leggatt on the court's jurisdiction to grant relief to enforce an arbitration agreement or support the arbitral process even when the seat of the arbitration is outside England and Wales, Maxam submits that the approach should be the same in this case.
D. THE LEGAL PRINCIPLES FOR QUASI-CONTRACTUAL ASI RELIEF
"There was no real dispute as to the applicable legal framework and principles when determining whether to grant an ASI:
(i) The Court has power to grant such an injunction to restrain proceedings brought in breach of an arbitration agreement under s.37 of the Senior Courts Act 1981, even if no arbitral proceedings are on foot or in prospect: Ust- Kamenogorsk Hydropower Plant JSC v AES Hydropower Plant LLP [2013] UKSC 35, [25].
(ii) The applicant must show a 'high probability of success' that the pursuit of the foreign proceedings involves a breach of the arbitration agreement (Aggeliki Charis Compania Maritima SA v Pagnan SpA (The Angelic Grace) [1995] 1 Lloyd's Rep 87 and Dell Emerging Markets (EMEA) Ltd v IB Maroc.com SA [2017]
(iii) If the applicant makes out such a case, it is for the respondent to show a 'strong reason' why relief should not be granted (Welex AG v Rosa Maritime Ltd (The Epsilon Rosa) [2003] 2 Lloyd's Rep 509, 518) ('the Strong Reason Issue').
(iv) Finally, it must be just and convenient for an ASI to be granted ('the Discretion Issue')."
Commercial and Investor State Arbitration at paragraphs 6-113 to 6-119, which in relevant parts states as follows:
"[6-114], The English courts are willing to grant anti-suit injunctions in these circumstances - which are variously referred to as para-contractual or quasi-contractual anti-suit injunctions. These injunctions have been rationalised by reference to a principle of 'benefit and burden' or the concept of 'conditioned rights', and the courts have categorised the right enforced by the anti-suit injunction as an equitable right not to be sued otherwise than in accordance with any forum agreement conditioning the claim asserted .... In Schiffahrtsgesellschaft Detlev von Appen v Voest Alpine Intertrading (The Jay Bola), a case in which cargo insurers brought their own claim against the charterer for damage to the goods, Hobhouse LJ (as he then was) stated: 'The rights which the insurance company has acquired are rights which are subject to the arbitration clause .... The insurance company is not entitled to assert its claims inconsistently with the terms of the contract .... The insurance company is not entitled to enforce its right without also recognizing the obligation to arbitrate.'
....
"[6.1160] In this 'derived' or 'conditioned' rights context it is now clear that the same test applies as in conventional contractual anti-suit injunction applications. At first instance, this has been held to be the case even when the anti-suit claimant denies it is party to the contract containing the arbitration agreement which it is being sued upon in the foreign jurisdiction, sometimes referred to as 'Non-Contractual Claimant' cases. It is suggested that this approach is correct in principle. As has been noted, in both contractual and non-contractual claimant cases 'the respondent is seeking to assert a contractual right without respecting an incident or condition of that right which requires the claim to be asserted in an English-seated arbitration'."
(Emphasis added)
EWHC 2462 (Comm) (per Foxton J at [20] and [44]. It is well established that the applicable principles are the same in respect of EJCs and arbitration clauses (see QBE Europe SA/NV and Another v Generali [2022] EWHC 2062 (Comm); [2022] 2 WLR 481 at [15] to [16], as also referred to in Croda Europe at [19] to [20].
E. APPLICATION OF THE RELEVANT PRINCIPLES TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE
E.1 Breach
"It is the law applicable to the contract containing the words of incorporation which is to be applied in determining the existence and extent of any effective incorporation .... That law will fall to be ascertained by applying Article 10 of the Rome I Regulation. The starting point, under Article 10(1), is to apply 'the law which would govern it under this Regulation if the contract or term were valid' (i.e. the putative applicable law), with Article 10(2) permitting a party to establish absence of consent by reference to the law of its habitual residence 'if it appears from the circumstances that it would not be reasonable to determine the effect of his conduct in accordance with the law specified in paragraph 1'."
EWHC 2530 (Comm) [2017] 1 WLR 280 [65] to [66], as a matter of English law, general words of incorporation (not specifically referring to the arbitration clause) are likely to be sufficient to incorporate an arbitration clause from standard terms (which is the view expressed by the editors of Mustill & Boyd at paragraph 3.46). I agree. I am accordingly satisfied that Maxam has a high probability of successfully establishing that Supply Agreements 6 and 7 incorporate the Arbitration Agreements providing for LCI arbitration in London which are found in the GTCs. I am also satisfied that the Russian Proceedings constitute a breach by Eurotel of the Arbitration Agreements in Supply Agreements 5 - 7. In this regard
(1) an arbitration agreement entails the negative promise that the parties agree not to seek relief in any other forum (see the AES Ust-Kamenogorsk Hydropower Plant LLP v Ust-Kamenogorsk Hydropower Plant JSC case supra at [1], [21] and [48] per Lord Mance.)
(2) Eurotel's Statement of Claim in the Russian Proceedings seeks payments of the debts to Supplier said to be due under the seven Supply Agreements on the basis that the rights to claim those debts have been transferred to Eurotel by Assignment Agreement Nos. 77, 78 and 80.
(3) Maxam has at least arguable defences to those claims and so far as those disputes relate to each of Supply Agreements 5 – 7, arise "out of or in connection with" that Supply Agreement and should be referred to arbitration in accordance with the relevant Arbitration Agreement.
(1) First, that Maxam does not have the necessary high probability of success on the question whether the LCI arbitration agreements are incorporated in Supply Agreement 6 and 7 in the context of what is a complex area of law. However, I am satisfied Maxam does have a high probability of success on this question.
(2) Secondly, it might have been argued that Maxam does not in fact have at least arguable defences to the claims made by it, and that Eurotel is therefore not in breach of the Arbitration Agreements in pursuing the Russian Proceedings. However, I am satisfied on the material before me that Maxam's Statement of Defence does disclose at least arguable defence to the claims.
(3) Thirdly, Eurotel might also have relied on the dismissal (including in one of the two claims, at the final Cassation stage) of Maxam's Assignment Challenge Proceedings to argue that Maxam's defence is not arguable because it is an attempt to reargue the same points. However, it appears that distinct issues are raised in the Assignment Challenge Proceedings and the Statement of Defence in the Russian Proceedings. While there is some overlap, the Assignment Challenge Proceedings will consider where issues of corporate authority and the like align, whereas the Statement of Defence raises their defence of abuse of rights.
(4) Eurotel might also have argued that the governing law of the Arbitration Agreement with Supply Agreement is Hong Kong law, and that there is no express choice of governing law for the Arbitration Agreements and Supply Agreements 1 - 3, and that Maxam therefore cannot make out a high probability of success on the question of whether the Russian Proceedings are a breach of those agreements because it has not adduced expert evidence of foreign law. However, having regard to the clear terms of those Arbitration Agreements, I am satisfied that there is the necessary high probability that Maxam will succeed at a final hearing in establishing breach.
E.2 Strong reason to refuse relief
(1) Such reasons generally relate to reasons for suing in a foreign court (see ADM Asia-Pacific Trading Pte Ltd v PT Budi Semesta Satria [2016] EWHC 1427 (Comm) at [34], per Phillips J, as cited by Cockerill J in Times Trading Corpn v National Bank of Fujairah (Dubai Branch) [2020] EWHC 1078 (Comm); [2020] Bus LR 1752 at [102]).
(2) Strong reasons can include the fragmentation of a single set of proceedings with a risk of inconsistent decisions in a multiparty multi-jurisdiction dispute if an anti-suit injunction is granted (see Donohue v Armco Inc [2001] UKHL 64, [2002] 1 Lloyd's Rep 425 at [27] per Lord Bingham).
(3) The existence of mandatory provision of foreign law applicable in the foreign court which overrides contractual choice of jurisdiction does not amount to a strong reason not to grant relief (see Mustill & Boyd at paragraph 6.109 citing cases including Shipowners' Mutual Protection & Indemnity Association (Luxembourg) v Containerships Denizcilik Nakliyat v Ticaret (The Yusuf Cepnioglu) [2016] EWCA Civ 386, [2016] 1 CLC 687 at [34]–[37]).
(1) Even if Eurotel disregards the ASI (or the 4 March Russian Judgment is not set aside on the application of Eurotel following the granting of the injunctive relief sought), the exercise of ASI relief from the English court would assist Maxam in resisting enforcement of such a judgment outside Russia. As explained by Mr. Hayton, Maxam is a substantial business which carries on operations internationally and ASI relief from the English court would therefore be of value in resisting enforcement outside Russia.
(2) Paragraph 2(1) of the draft order would restrict participation by Eurotel in an appeal of the Russian Proceedings.
(3) I am satisfied that paragraph 2(2) of the draft order is as applicable to Eurotel now as it was before 4 March 2026 Russian Judgment.
(4) It cannot be appropriate for a respondent to an interim anti-suit injunction to be able to procure its lifting in advance of a final hearing to determine whether should be granted and made final simply by ignoring it and obtaining a judgment or order in the enjoined proceedings. That would be inconsistent with the principle that a party should not be permitted to retain advantage derived from proceedings taken in breach of the parties' agreement as to jurisdiction (see Catlin Syndicate Ltd v Amec Foster Wheel Corp [2020] EWHC 2530 Comm; [2021] 2 CLC 15 at [69], still less in breach of an injunction).
EWHC 1343 (Comm); [2019] Bus LR 146 at [103] to [114] per Males J).
E.3 Just and convenient/just and equitable, including delay
E3.1 Delay
Commercial Injunctions (7th Ed) at paragraph 14-085). A justifiable delay, on the other hand, will not be given serious weight against the granting of an injunction (see Niagara Maritime SA v Tianjin Iron & Steel Group Co Ltd [2011] EWHC 3035 (Comm)).
EWHC 1276 (Comm); [2013] 2 Lloyd's Rep 196 at [33], Hamblen J found that a one-year delay between the commencement of Bangladeshi proceedings and the anti-suit application was explained by "good reasons" that the claimant "thought it might be able to deal with the Bangladeshi proceedings more quickly and efficiently in the Bangladeshi courts themselves" and no prejudice had been caused to the defendants.
EWHC 768 (Comm), Teare J found that the applicant had a reasonable explanation in the context of a delay of 13 months in issuing an anti-suit injunction application after notice of the relevant foreign proceedings, in circumstances where it was attempting to restructure a lending agreement giving rise to the litigation.
EWHC 3657 (Comm) [2021] 2CLC 47 per Calver J at [36]).
EWHC 1074 (Comm) at [56]). This will often although not always be the case in respect of anti-enforcement injunctions sought of a judgment on the merits have been given. Compare in this record Ecobank and Google LLC v NAO Tsargrad Media [2024] EWHC 2212 (Comm).
commencement of the Russian Proceedings and Maxam making the application to this Court. Maxam submits that, (i), the delay is justifiable (and for reasons recognised in the authorities); and, (ii), in any event the delay has not led to a substantial waste of costs or of the Russian courts' time and resources and in consequence a delay does not give rise to considerations of comity (that would weigh against injunctive relief).
(1) In parallel to the Russian Proceedings, Maxam has been challenging the validity of the assignments in the Assignment Challenge Proceedings. This set of proceedings, which started before the Russian Proceedings in respect of which Maxam claimed relief from this Court, is an unusual feature of this litigation when compared with many ASI cases and goes a long way towards explaining the delay. In this regard it appears that under Russian law the only means for Maxam to challenge the validity of the assignments themselves was to bring proceedings in Russia (see Hayton 1, paragraph 59(1)). Maxam has persisted with the Assignment Challenge Proceedings as a means of cutting off the Russian Proceedings in limine. It has done so throughout the entire period of the delay, filing an appeal as late as 28 December 2025 which remains outstanding. I consider that this approach bears some similarities to that which was considered reasonable by Hamblen J, as he then was, in Ecom Agroindustrial.
(2) Maxam filed its objection to jurisdiction in the Russian Proceedings (through a Jurisdiction Motion) promptly on 25th October 2024. While this is not a justification for any significant delay in applying for anti-suit injunctive relief it does preclude any intention that Eurotel or the Russian court were not on notice of the jurisdiction objection or were led to believe Maxam had submitted to jurisdiction in the Russian Proceedings. The Jurisdiction Motion was not dismissed until 27th August 2025.
(3) On the same day as the Jurisdiction Motion was dismissed, 27 August 2025, Maxam immediately applied to stay the Russian Proceedings pending the outcome of the Assignment Challenge Proceedings. This application was successful. The Russian Proceedings were therefore stayed from 27 August 2025 until the stay was lifted on appeal on 18 November 2025. I do not consider that any delay during this period should count against Maxam. For as long as the stay was in force there was no immediate need to apply for an ASI or an AEI.
(4) Accordingly I consider there is a reasonable explanation for much of the delay and, to the extent any of the delay remains unjustified, I do not consider any such delay has is resulted in such a progression of the case in terms of time, cost and resources as to render the granting of an injunction at this stage an unjustified interference with the foreign court. Were there to be any force in such matters they would have to be weighed against the importance of enforcing forum clauses (see Raphael, The Anti-Suit Injunction, (2nd Ed) at paragraph 8.21, as approved in Barclays Bank v VEB.RF at [56], it being noted that a defendant should not be obtaining a benefit from its breach of contract).
2026 hearing was itself scheduled to last only 20 minutes, albeit in the event, and as Maxam feared on a without notice application before Andrew Bacon J, it resulted in judgment being entered.
"One 30 minute hearing which set one firm preliminary hearing date and a further date, a failed attempt by VEB to accelerate the proceedings and the filing of a jurisdiction challenge by Barclays. The filing of submissions in response and a further five minute hearing lead to go an adjournment." (At [69(a)]).
".... of relatively minor concern where it is not suggested that the orders sought are ones which will be given effect to in Russia, including because of the improbability of the court giving effect to orders of that sort."
E3.2 Voluntary submission
(1) First, and as the expert Professor Yarkov explains, Russian law does not recognise the concept of submitting to jurisdiction by performing procedural actions such as filing a defence on the merits, but rather by refraining from challenging jurisdiction in a timely manner before that stage (see Professor Yarkov Expert Report at paragraph 67). In the present case Maxam did challenge jurisdiction before filing a defence on the merits.
(2) Secondly, Maxam is not entitled to appeal the dismissal of the Jurisdiction Motion unless and until a judgment is rendered on the merits (see Professor Yarkov Expert Report at paragraphs 40 to 41).
F. ANTI-ENFORCEMENT INJUNCTION
"In my judgment there is no distinct jurisdictional requirement that an anti-enforcement injunction will only be granted in an exceptional case. Such injunctions will only rarely be granted, but that is because it is only in a rare case that the conditions for the grant of an anti-suit injunction will be met and not because there is an additional requirement of exceptionality."
commenced in Russia in breach of jurisdiction and arbitration agreements:
(1) in the RusChem Alliance case interim anti-enforcement relief was granted on the basis of a motion to discontinue the Russian proceedings required the approval of the Russian court which, "might not be granted so that judgment may be entered regardless" (Longmore LJ, Court of Appeal [2024]. 1 AER (Comm) 1094 at [43], not challenged on appeal).
(2) In Airbus Canada Limited Partnership v JSC Ilyushin Finance Co [2024] EWHC 790 (Comm), HHJ Pelling KC granted final anti-enforcement relief on the basis of a real risk that the Russian Proceedings would continue to a judgment and that some Russian cases suggested that:
"The Russian courts will or may refuse to permit a party to withdraw proceedings pursuant to an order made by a foreign court." (At paragraph 24).
(3) In Barclays Bank plc v PJSC Sovcombank [2024] EWHC 1338 (Comm), Foxton J at [14] granted final anti-enforcement relief on the basis of a concern that an ASI would not be effective because it would not be complied with or a judgment might be entered into foreign proceedings in any event, finding that in those circumstances and provided relief sought at an early stage:
"It does seem to me that the requirements for obtaining an anti-enforcement judgment will readily be satisfied."
(4) In JPMorgan Securities plc v VTB Bank PJSC [2025] EWHC 1368 (Comm), Foxton J again granted anti-enforcement relief, saying that:
"It has become increasingly
commercial relationships. The evidence before me from Mr. Hayton in his witness statement is that he is instructed that Maxam has 40 subsidiaries in over 30 countries worldwide, trading in 60 countries (see Hayton 1 at paragraph 71).
G. ALTERNATIVE SERVICE APPLICATION
EWHC 360 (Comm) at [8(v)].
(1) First, there is good reason to order alternative service where it is necessary to achieve the required expedition in cases such as the present which have been begun on a without notice injunction application which it is to be served immediately or in short order on the respondent see Griffin Underwriting Limited v Varouxakis [2021] EWHC 226 (Comm) at [57]) in which Calver J stated:
".... because the court is making a number of coercive orders with the risk of
(2) Secondly, this ASI/AEI claim arises from Eurotel's commencement and pursuant of proceeding in breach of the Arbitration Agreements. Orders for alternative service are routinely made in the Commercial Court in claims for relief in under the Arbitration Act 1986, notwithstanding Article 10 reservations (see the cases cited in M v N, at [12]). Although this application is brought pursuant to section 37.1 of the Senior Courts Act, the principles which underpin the Court's willingness to order alternative service in support of "a speedy finality of arbitral proceedings" apply equally to applications seeking an ASI against proceedings brought in pursuance of arbitration agreements (see JPMorgan Securities, at [176]), reflecting the orders for alternative service in respect of both interim and final anti-suit relief protecting LCIA arbitrations agreements against a Russian defendant. In each case the courts are concerned to ensure the practical efficacy of English seated arbitration agreements and arbitrations. This will be defeated if proceedings brought in beach of arbitration agreements can continue and/or be concluded while service through Hague Convention channels is awaited.
"The final point I think which arises concerns whether, or not, permission to serve by an alternative means should be granted. So far as that is concerned, where service out of the jurisdiction is to be ordered, as it must be in the circumstances of this case, the question which arises is whether, or not, service by an alternative means should be permitted where the relevant parties are to be found in countries that are parties to the Hague Service Convention. So far as that is concerned there is now a very substantial body of first instance decisions of the
H. CONCLUSION