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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Senior Courts Costs Office) Decisions >> King v Basildon & Thurrock University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust [2016] EWHC B32 (Costs) (30 November 2016) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Costs/2016/B32.html Cite as: [2016] EWHC B32 (Costs) |
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SENIOR COURTS COSTS OFFICE
Royal Courts of Justice London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
____________________
Catherine King | Claimant |
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| - and - |
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| Basildon & Thurrock University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust |
Defendant |
____________________
Michael Brown of Acumension for the Defendant
Hearing dates: 30 and 31 August 2016
____________________
VERSION
OF JUDGMENT APPROVED
Crown Copyright ©
Master Rowley:
Introduction
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that I did not think that I should follow the decision of Master Gordon-Saker in BNM
v
MGN Ltd [2016] EWHC B13 (Costs) in this case, I did not give reasons for my decision to the parties but indicated that they would follow in writing. This judgment sets out those reasons.
Submissions
VAT
and that was the figure on which Mr Brown concentrated.
v
Home Office [2002] EWCA Civ 365. Whilst the costs should still be looked at on a global basis (albeit now at the end rather than the beginning), they should now include the additional liabilities i.e. the success fee and After The Event premium, rather than, to all intents and purposes, excluding them as had previously been the case. Mr Brown's submissions
very
much relied upon paragraphs 25 to 32 of Master Gordon-Saker's decision in BNM which are as follows:
25. CPR 48.1(1), in force after 1st April 2013, provides:
The provisions of CPR Parts 43 to 48 relating to funding arrangements, and the attendant provisions of the Costs Practice Direction, will apply in relation to a pre-commencement funding arrangement as they were in force immediately before 1 April 2013, with such modifications (if any) as may be made by a practice direction on or after that date.
26. CPR 43.2(1)(a), as it was in force before 1st April 2013, defined "costs" as including "any additional liability incurred under a funding arrangement". CPR 44.1, in force after 1st April 2013, defines "costs" with no reference to additional liabilities.
27. A number of rules relating to funding arrangements in the CPR in force prior to 1st April 2013 are identified in paragraph 1.4 of Practice Direction 48, in force after 1st April 2013. They include CPR 43.2(1)(a) but do not include CPR 44.4(2) the old test of proportionality.
28. It seems to me that the intention was that the rules as to the recoverability of additional liabilities would be preserved in relation to those additional liabilities which remain recoverable after 1st April 2013. However the old test of proportionality was not preserved in relation to those additional liabilities. Had that been intended it could have been achieved quite easily by a further exception in CPR 44.3(7).
29. CPR 44.4(2), the test of proportionality in force before 1st April 2013, was not a provision "in relation to funding arrangements". CPR 43.2(1)(k), in force before 1st April 2013, defined funding arrangements as conditional fee agreements, after the event insurance premiums and arrangements with membership organisations for the purposes of s.30 Access to Justice Act 1999. CPR 44.4(2) does not therefore survive beyond 1st April 2013 byvirtue
of CPR 48.1(1), as in force after that date. It survives only in the circumstances set out in CPR 44.3(7).
30. The old test of proportionality applied to additional liabilities but rarely had an impact on assessment. If the base costs were reasonable and necessary the reasonable success fee would also be necessary. An after the event insurance premium, if reasonable, would rarely not be necessary; although greater enthusiasm developed for disallowing disproportionate or unreasonable premiums: Redwing Construction Ltdv
Wishart [2011] EWHC 19 (TCC) (Akenhead J); Kelly
v
Black Horse Limited [2013] EWHC B17 (Costs) (Master Hurst); and my decision in Banks
v
London Borough of Hillingdon (unrep., 3rd November 2014).
31. A consequence of the reduction of the base costs to a proportionate figure will be that the success fee, a percentage of those base costs, also reduces. It would be absurd and unworkable to apply the new test of proportionality to the base costs, but the old test of proportionality to the success fee.
32. Ring fencing and excluding additional liabilities from the new test of proportionality would be a significant hindrance on the court's ability to comply with its obligation under CPR 44.3(2)(a) to allow only those costs which are proportionate.
VAT)
when comparing the costs claimed here with the sum in issue. This is the first of the 5 factors described by rule 44.3(5) which says:
(5) Costs incurred are proportionate if they bear a reasonable relationship to
(a) the sums in issue in the proceedings;
(b) thevalue
of any non-monetary relief in issue in the proceedings;
(c) the complexity of the litigation;
(d) any additional work generated by the conduct of the paying party; and
(e) any wider factors involved in the proceedings, such as reputation or public importance.
view
that costs of six times more than the damages could not be proportionate. If the case was worth more than the £35,000 awarded, it could not be any more than £50,000 and which would mean that the costs were still more than four times the potential damages. That could not be a reasonable relationship between costs and damages.
v
Wavell Group [2016] EWHC B16 (Costs) where the claim settled for £25,000 in damages and was limited to £35,000 plus
VAT
for costs on the ground of proportionality. In this case proceedings had reached trial (unlike May) and consequently the defendant said the proportionate figure would be £70,000 i.e. twice the
value
of the claim plus the sums allowed for Parts 1 and 2 which made a total of £82,323.60.
view
were not reasons to distinguish it as such but merely, on Mr Jones' argument, ones which suggest that I should not be bound by it. Those reasons were that another costs judge's decision can only be persuasive and not binding and in any event the case of BNM is under appeal.
VAT
amounted to £88,337.58. That compared favourably, in Mr Jones' submission, with the budget of £91,901.69 allowed by Master Cook when making the CMO.
vindication
of the ultimate result. He did not accept Mr Brown's categorisation of the complexity of the case or the additional work caused as a result of the defendant's conduct. In Mr Jones's submission, this was not just a defended claim. The treating surgeon had been subjected to judicial criticism by Jay J following the giving of his evidence in court. According to the attendance note of the claimant's solicitors, the judge had described the consultant's evidence as "a disgrace." An extra witness statement had been served by the treating consultant in an attempt, according to Mr Jones, to influence the discussions of the experts retained by the parties. The case went into a third day as a result of the treating consultant's attempts to protect his reputation. As such the case was not defended on an economic basis. Nevertheless, the claimant's ability to keep within the budget set by Master Cook was a weighty consideration in favour of proportionality.
view
that it was difficult to import its rationale into this case. In May there had only been two phases reached before settlement had occurred. Here all 11 phases had been reached. There was also complexity and work created by the paying party's conduct here which were not factors in May. As such, Mr Jones argued that the costs already allowed were both reasonable and proportionate.
Decision
view,
the base costs figure of £88,337.58 is almost always going to be proportionate for a clinical negligence case which reaches a three-day trial. It would only be the case that a
very
modest amount of damages might render such a level of costs to be disproportionate and I do not accept that £35,000 is a
very
modest amount of damages. Therefore, having decided that I should only consider the base costs figure when considering proportionality, it seemed clear to me that the costs obviously bore a reasonable relationship to the damages. That
view
was only strengthened by the complexity involved in fighting a breach of duty defence, particularly in circumstances where the treating surgeon was clearly concerned about protecting his reputation and additional costs were incurred as a result.
VAT
for simple comparison.) I am not at all convinced that I would have allowed the latter figure as being proportionate if I had come to a different conclusion regarding the relevance of the additional liabilities.
view,
the reforms arising from the reports of Sir Rupert Jackson, enshrined in LASPO 2012 and the recasting of the CPR as of 1 April 2013, sought to produce a completely new regime from that date. No longer would success fees and ATE premiums be recoverable from the opponent save for
very
limited cases such as in BNM itself. Costs incurred by the parties would be subject to the more stringent proportionality test and, elsewhere in the rules, cases would be subject to prospective costs control through budgeting. Part 48 sought to preserve, as if in aspic, the pre-April 2013 regime for cases which had begun before that date until such cases concluded.
Various
Claimants
v
MGN [2016] EWHC 1894 (Ch) at paragraphs 19 and 20, that is the likely effect of otherwise recoverable additional liabilities being included within the sum allowed as being proportionate for base costs.
view,
treating the word "costs" as only referring to base costs fits in with the provisions of Part 3 in relation to costs budgeting which were also brought into the CPR in April 2013. For example, in rule 3.15 the court "may manage costs to be incurred by any party in any proceedings" and in doing so will make a costs management order. Such an order will record the extent to which budgets are agreed between the parties and, to the extent they are not agreed, will record the court's approval after making appropriate revisions. "The court will thereafter control the parties' budgets in respect of recoverable costs." Precedent H, which sets out the costs to be managed, expressly excludes any additional liabilities that may still be recoverable between the parties. Consequently, the only interpretation of the recoverable costs which the costs management order is controlling, is that they are the base costs of a CFA as set out in the Precedent H. The court is required to set a budget which is specifically described as allowing reasonable and proportionate costs notwithstanding that it excludes additional liabilities.
view,
if the base costs have been allowed at a proportionate figure, a success fee at a percentage agreed by the parties or allowed by the court would also be proportionate. Indeed proportionality, in a general sense, is often talked about in percentage terms.
v Merthyr Tydfil County Borough Council [2006] EWCA Civ 1134 determined that such premiums were necessary under the old regime. I can see no reason in principle why the approach in Rogers cannot still apply to ATE policies taken out prior to April 2013 (or otherwise considered to be "pre-commencement") simply because proceedings were not commenced until after 1 April 2013. In any event, I agree with Master Gordon-Saker's comment that courts have become more willing to consider the reasonableness of the figure claimed and reduce it where appropriate.
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