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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Family Division) Decisions >> A (A Child : Surrogacy: S.54 Criteria) [2020] EWHC 1426 (Fam) (18 June 2020) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2020/1426.html Cite as: [2020] EWHC 1426 (Fam), [2021] 2 All ER 204, [2021] 1 FLR 357 |
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FAMILY DIVISION
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
____________________
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1st Applicant |
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- and - |
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F |
2nd Applicant |
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-and- |
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SM |
1st ![]() | |
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A (By his Children's Guardian) |
2nd ![]() |
____________________
MS M-L SAVAGE & MR S LUE (instructed by Freemans Solicitors) for the 2nd Applicant
MR T HARRILL (instructed by Mills & Reeve
LLP) for the 1st
Respondent
MR M KINGERLEY QC (instructed by Mander Cruickshank Solicitors) for the 2nd
Respondent
Hearing date: 7th May
____________________
Crown Copyright ©
Covid-19 Protocol: This judgment was handed down remotely
by circulation to the parties'
representatives
by email and
release
to BAILII. The date and time for hand-down is deemed to be at 10.30am on Monday 22nd June 2020.
The Hon. Mr Justice Keehan :
Introduction
Background
The Law
"On an application made by two people ("the applicants"), the court may make an order providing for a child to be treated in law as the child of the applicants if—
(a)the child has been carried by a woman who is not one of the applicants, as aresult
of the placing in her of an embryo or sperm and eggs or her artificial insemination,
(b)the gametes of at least one of the applicants were used to bring about the creation of the embryo, and
(c)the conditions in subsections (2) to [F2(8A)] are satisfied.
(2) The applicants must be—
(a)husband and wife,
(b)civil partners of each other, or
(c)two persons who are living as partners in an enduring familyrelationship
and are not within prohibited degrees of
relationship
in
relation
to each other.
(3) Except in a case falling within subsection (11), the applicants must apply for the order during the period of 6 months beginning with the day on which the child is born.
(4) At the time of the application and the making of the order—
(a)the child's home must be with the applicants, and
(b)either or both of the applicants must be domiciled in the United Kingdom or in the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man.
(5) At the time of the making of the order both the applicants must have attained the age of 18.
(6) The court must be satisfied that both—
(a)the woman who carried the child, and
(b)any other person who is a parent of the child but is not one of the applicants (including any man who is the father by virtue of section 35 or 36 or any woman who is a parent by virtue of section 42 or 43),
have freely, and with full understanding of what is involved, agreed unconditionally to the making of the order.
(7) Subsection (6) does notrequire
the agreement of a person who cannot be found or is incapable of giving agreement; and the agreement of the woman who carried the child is ineffective for the purpose of that subsection if given by her less than six weeks after the child's birth.
(8) The court must be satisfied that no money or other benefit (other than for expensesreasonably
incurred) has been given or
received
by either of the applicants for or in consideration of—
(a)the making of the order,
(b)any agreementrequired
by subsection (6),
(c)the handing over of the child to the applicants, or
(d)the making of arrangements with a view to the making of the order,
unless authorised by the court.
(8A) An orderrelating
to the child must not previously have been made under this section or section 54A, unless the order has been quashed or an appeal against the order has been allowed.
(9) For the purposes of an application under this section—
(a)inrelation
to England and Wales
(i)"the court" means the High Court or the family court, and
(ii) proceedings on the application are to be "family proceedings" for the purposes of the Children Act 1989,
(b)inrelation
to Scotland, "the court" means the Court of Session or the sheriff court of the sheriffdom within which the child is, and
(c)inrelation
to Northern Ireland, "the court" means the High Court or any county court F5....
(10) Subsection (1)(a) applies whether the woman was in the United Kingdom or elsewhere at the time of the placing in her of the embryo or the sperm and eggs or her artificial insemination.
(11) An application which—
(a)relates
to a child born before the coming into force of this section, and
(b)is made by two persons who, throughout the period applicable under subsection (2) of section 30 of the 1990 Act, were not eligible to apply for an order under that section inrelation
to the child as husband and wife,
may be made within the period of six months beginning with the day on which this section comes into force"
i) the application was made outside of the 6-month time limit (s.54(3));
ii) the child's home at the time of the application and upon the making of any parental order will not be the same home as both parents because they are separated (s.54(4)(a)); and
iii) whether, at the time of the application, the mother and the father could be found to be "two persons who are living as partners in an enduring family relationship"
(s.54(2)(c))?
"Thereal
question in all these cases is this: A thing has been ordered by the legislature to be done. What is the consequence if it is not done? In the case of statutes that are said to be imperative, the Courts have decided that if it is not done the whole thing fails, and the proceedings that follow upon it are all void. On the other hand, when the Courts hold a provision to be mandatory or directory, they say that, although such provision may not have been complied with, the subsequent proceedings do not fail. Still, whatever the language, the idea is a perfectly distinct one. There may be many provisions in Acts of Parliament which, although they are not strictly obeyed, yet do not appear to the Court to be of that material importance to the subject-matter to which they
refer,
as that the legislature could have intended that the non-observance of them should be followed by a total failure of the whole proceedings. On the other hand, there are some provisions in
respect
of which the Court would take an opposite view, and would feel that they are matters which must be strictly obeyed, otherwise the whole proceedings that subsequently follow must come to an end. Now the question is, to which category does the provision in question in this case belong? … I believe, as far as any rule is concerned, you cannot safely go further than that in each case you must look to the subject-matter; consider the importance of the provision that has been disregarded, and the
relation
of that provision to the general object intended to be secured by the Act; and upon a
review
of the case in that aspect decide whether the matter is what is called imperative or only directory."
"The modern approach towards breach of a statutory proceduralrequirement
is to consider the underlying purpose of the
requirement
and whether it follows from consideration of that legislative purpose that any departure from the precise letter of the statute, however minor, should amount to the document being
regarded
as a nullity"
"In all cases, one must first construe the statutory …requirement
in question. It may
require
strict compliance with a
requirement
as a condition of its validity … Against that, on its true construction a statutory
requirement
may be satisfied by what is
referred
to as adequate compliance. Finally, it may be that even non-compliance with a
requirement
is not fatal. In all such cases, it is necessary to consider the words of the statute …, in the light of its subject matter, the background, the purpose of the
requirement,
if that is known or determined, and the actual or possible effect of non-compliance on the parties. We assume that Parliament in the case of legislation … would have intended a sensible …
result."
"[Khakh] was a case where therelevant
provisions of the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006 provided that the judge in the Crown Court "must inform the person at the time he is convicted" that his name would be included on the statutory barring lists. The judge failed to do so. Explaining why Parliament cannot fairly have intended that the consequence of the judge's failure should be that the appellant's inclusion on these lists was a nullity, Elias LJ gave as one of his
reasons
(para 10) that:
"the scheme is designed to protect children and vulnerable adults, and I cannot believe that Parliament can have intended that a failure by the judge should undermine that vital public objective.""
"Interpretation of legislation
(1) So far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation must beread
and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights.
(2) This section–
(a) applies to primary legislation and subordinate legislation whenever enacted;
(b) does not affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of any incompatible primary legislation; and
(c) does not affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of any incompatible subordinate legislation if (disregarding any possibility ofrevocation)
primary legislation prevents
removal
of the incompatibility"
"From this the conclusion which seems inescapable is that the mere fact the language under consideration is inconsistent with a Convention-compliant meaning does not of itself make a Convention-compliant interpretation under section 3 impossible. Section 3 enables language to be interpretedrestrictively
or expansively. But section 3 goes further than this. It is also apt to
require
a court to
read
in words which change the meaning of the enacted legislation, so as to make it Convention-compliant. In other words, the intention of Parliament in enacting section 3 was that, to an extent bounded only by what is 'possible', a court can modify the meaning, and hence the effect, of primary and secondary legislation."
"Nowhere in our legal system is a literalistic approach more inappropriate than when considering whether a breach of a Convention right may beremoved
by interpretation under section 3. Section 3
requires
a broad approach concentrating, amongst other things, in a purposive way on the importance of the fundamental right involved"
"The starting point is clear andremains
essentially unchanged from that identified by Lord Penzance in Howard v Bodington (1877) 2 PD 203 and most
recently
![]()
re-stated
by Sir Stanley Burnton in Newbold and others v Coal Authority [2013] EWCA Civ 584, [2014] 1 WLR 1288. I must consider section 54(3) having
regard
to and in the light of the statutory subject matter, the background, the purpose of the
requirement
(if known), its importance, its
relation
to the general object intended to be secured by the Act, and the actual or possible impact of non-compliance on the parties."
"24. The primary aim of s 54 is to allow an order to be made which has a transformative effect on the legalrelationship
between the child and the applicants. The effect of the order is that the child is treated as though born to the applicants. It has clear implications as
regard
the right to
respect
for family life under Article 8. Family life exists in this case as the child has lived with both Mr and Mrs A. The child is biologically
related
to Mr A and perhaps Mrs A. The effect of not making an order will be an interference with that family life in that the factual
relationship
will not be
recognized
by law. The court's
responsibility
to 'guarantee not rights that are theoretical and illusory but rights that are practical and effective' Marckx v Belgium (ibid) para 31
25. A furtherrelevant
consideration is that family life is not only a matter of fact and degree but also the significance of legal
relationships.
In this case if an order is not made there is no legal connection between the child and his deceased biological father. Protection of the right to family life pre-supposes the factual existence of family life (Pini v Romania [2005] 2 FLR 596 at para 143). Once that is established (and it is in this case) the State must facilitate and protect that right.
26. The consequences of not making an order in this case are as follows:
(i) There is no legalrelationship
between the child and his biological father who is also the commissioning father
(ii) The child is denied the social and emotional benefits ofrecognition
of that
relationship
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(iii) The child may be financially disadvantaged if he is notrecognised
legally as the child of his father (in terms of inheritance)
(iv) The child does not have a legalreality
which matches the day to day
reality
![]()
(v) The child is further disadvantaged by the death of his biological father
27. Article 8 of the United Nations Convention of the Rights of the Child ('UNCRC')requires
the State to protect the child's right to identity, it provides as follows
'1. States Parties undertake torespect
the right of the child to preserve his or her identity, including nationality, name and family
relations
as
recognised
by law without lawful interference. 2. Where a child is illegally deprived of some or all of the elements of his or her identity, States Parties shall provide appropriate assistance and protections, with a view to
re-establishing
speedily his or her identity."
"In their powerful and cogent submissions Ms Gamble and Ms Cabezarealistically
accept the limits on the court's power to
read
statutory provision through the s 3 HRA lens, even in a case with such compelling facts as these. When that limit is
reached
there is the alternative
remedy;
the power to make a declaration of incompatibility under s 4 HRA, which affords Parliament the opportunity to amend the
relevant
provision.
Which side of the s3 dividing line a particular case falls on was clarified by Lord Nicolls in Ghaidan when he identified that any meaning imported by s 3 'must be compatible with the underlying thrust of the legislation being construed' or in the words of Lord Rodger the words implied must 'go with the grain of the legislation'. Lord Roger went on in paragraph 115 to state
"In any given case, however, there may come a point where, standing back, the only proper conclusion is that the scale of what is proposed would go beyond any implication that could possibly be derived fromreading
the existing legislation in a way that was compatible with the Convention right in question. In that event, the boundary line will have been crossed and only Parliament can effect the necessary change.""
"Can Parliament have intended that in circumstances such as this where the intended father dies after the embryo transfer but before the child's birth that, adopting the words of Munby P inRe
X paragraph 55, the 'gate should be barred forever.'. I cannot think so for a number of
reasons:
![]()
(1) As inRe
X, Parliament has not explained its thinking why such a situation is excluded, when but for Mr Y's death prior to the birth all the
requirements
under s 54 would have been met following X's birth. There is no
reason
to believe Parliament either foresaw or intended the potential injustice which would
result
in this case if a parental order cannot be made in the circumstances in this case.
(2) Other provisions in the HFEA 2008 (ss 35 – 37) provide clarity about the status of the father of the child born as aresult
of assisted conception at the time when the embryo is transferred, or artificial insemination takes place, provided certain safeguards are in place, in particular consent. Consent is not an issue in this case, any consent
required
by s 54 is present and secure.
(3) The provisions set out in ss 39 and 49 HFEA provide clarity as to the status of the father in the circumstances of sub-paragraph (2) where they take place after his death, again with safeguards in placerelating
to consent.
(4) Parliament hasrecently,
when considering the declaration of incompatibility made by the court in
Re
Z (No 2), signaled that it seeks to ensure that the law does not discriminate against different categories of applicants for parental orders on the grounds of
relationship
status.
(5) A parental order is the only route by which X can have her statusregarding
Mr and Mrs Y
recognised
in a way that was intended by the surrogacy arrangement, which a parental order was specifically created for.
That conclusion is equally justified havingregard
to the Convention rights involved for the following
reasons:
![]()
(1) Both Articles 8 and 14 are engaged.
(2) Munby P foreshadowed at paragraph 61 inRe
X a situation such as this, when he highlighted the part of Article 8 that protects 'private life'; as he stated there may be cases where it may be more difficult to establish 'family life'. Here X did not have the opportunity to establish 'family life' due to the premature death of Mr Y, but X certainly has an established 'private life' right for her own identity to be protected by legal
recognition
of her
relationship
with Mr Y. The court's
responsibility
is to 'guarantee not rights that are theoretical and illusory but rights that are practical and effective' (Marckx v Belgium (1979 – 80) 2 EHRR 330 at paragraph 31). As Russell J observed in
Re
A and B [2015] EWHC 911 at paragraphs 62 – 63:
"62. It is undeniably a basic and fundamental part of these children's identity as human beings that the Applicant/father is their biological father, and that the Applicant/mother played a full part in the process of their conception having selected an egg donor, as she has herself explained to them and as they have grown up believing. The Applicants were their planned and intended parents from before conception and since the day on which they were born. All of these facts, fundamental to these children's very existence and identity are far from those present in adoption. Again I quote from the President's judgment inRe
X; "Adoption is not an attractive solution given the commissioning father's existing biological
relationship
with X. As X's guardian puts it, a parental order presents the optimum legal and psychological solution for X and is preferable to an adoption order because it confirms the important legal, practical and psychological
reality
of X's identity; the commissioning father is his biological father and all parties intended from the outset that the commissioning parents should be his legal parents."
63. To make adoption orders would effectively deny adequaterecognition
of the Applicants' and children's identity and their right to family life under Article 8 ECHR, particularly their established identity, their biological and social ties. There is no doubt in this case that as far as these children are concerned their identity has already been formed as the biological children of their father and the commissioning of their conception and birth involving their mother."
(3) Although I have concluded that Parliament cannot have intended that a child in X's position would be excluded from suchrecognition,
without the '
reading
down'
required
by s 3 the provisions s 54 (1), (2) (a) (4) (a) and (5) could prevent a parental order being made.
(4) From the extensivereview
set out above it is clear such a
reading
down does not go against the 'grain of the legislation', on the contrary it seeks to provide the order that it is accepted best meets a child born as a
result
of this type of arrangement. The parental order was specifically created for a child born as a
result
of a surrogacy arrangement, such as in this case.
(5) No alternative order that can properly and accurately toreflect
X's identity, including her
relationship
with Mr Y. A child arrangement or special guardianship order in favour of Mrs Y would mean Mrs Y secures parental
responsibility
limited to X's minority, but such an order would not negate X's legal
relationship
with Mr and Mrs Z, and would
result
in her biological father
remaining
a legal stranger to X. Mrs Y could apply for an adoption order, but only as a single applicant, which may give her the status of a legal parent but it will not accurately
reflect
X's identity in
relation
to either Mr or Mrs Y. This route would create something of a legal fiction, as s 67 ACA states that the effect of an adoption order is the adopted person is to be treated in law as if born as a child of the adopter, which does not
reflect
the
reality
of the surrogacy arrangement entered into. In addition, such a course could have a distorting effect as Mrs A would be an adoptive parent, the
register
would be marked that way and the tracing of the child's natural parents is still done in the same way as for any other adopted child.
(6) For X her connection with her biological father would be safeguarded in any other birth circumstances naturally or by way of assisted conception, consequently it is discriminatory for the circumstances of her birth to prevent this. A failure of the law torecognise
her connection with her biological father as the
result
of her birth through a surrogacy arrangement amounts to a breach of her Article 14 right to enjoy her Article 8 rights without discrimination on the grounds of birth.
(7) Mrs Y's article 14 rights are also engaged. She is discriminated against based on herrelationship
status as a widow, rather than being married. In
Re
Z (No 2) Munby P stated at paragraph 17
"Sections 54(1) and (2) of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 are incompatible with the rights of the Applicant and the SecondRespondent
under Article 14 ECHR taken in conjunction with Article 8 insofar as they prevent the Applicant from obtaining a parental order on the sole ground of his status as a single person as opposed to being part of a couple."
(8) The consequences of not making a parental order in this case is that there is no legalrelationship
between X and her biological father; X is denied the social and emotional benefits of
recognition
of that
relationship;
X may be financially disadvantaged if there is not legal
recognition
as the child of her biological father; X does not have a legal
reality
that matches the day-to-day
reality;
X is further disadvantaged by the death of her biological father.
(9) The only order that will confer joint and equal parenthood on Mr and Mrs Y is a parental order. Only that order will ensure X's security and identity in a lifelong wayrespecting
both her Article 8 and 14 rights.
It is clear thatreading
down the provisions in s 54 (1), (2) (a), (4) (a) and (5) in this case to permit the parental order to be made would not be incompatible with the 'underlying thrust of the legislation being construed' and the words sought to be implied 'go with the grain of the legislation'. The HFEA sought to provide a comprehensive legal framework for those undertaking assisted conception, with the aim of securing the rights of any child born as a
result.
That policy and legislative aim
remains
intact if the order sought in this case is made."
The Submissions
"Section 54 goes to the most fundamental aspects of status and, transcending even status, to the very identity of the child as a human being: who he is and who his parents are. It is central to his being, whether as an individual or as a member of his family. As Ms Isaacs correctly puts it, this case is fundamentally about Xs identity and hisrelationship
with the commissioning parents. Fundamental as these matters must be to commissioning parents they are, if anything, even more fundamental to the child. A parental order has, to adopt Theis J's powerful expression, a transformative effect, not just in its effect on the child's legal
relationships
with the surrogate and commissioning parents but also, to adopt the guardian's words in the present case, in
relation
to the practical and psychological
realities
of X's identity. A parental order, like an adoption order, has an effect extending far beyond the merely legal. It has the most profound personal, emotional, psychological, social and, it may be in some cases, cultural and
religious,
consequences……..X was born in December 2011, so his expectation of life must extend well beyond the next 75 years. Parliament has therefore
required
the judge considering an application for a parental order to look into a distant future.
Where in the light of all this does the six-month period specified in section 54(3) stand? Can Parliamentreally
have intended that the gate should be barred forever if the application for a parental order is lodged even one day late? I cannot think so. Parliament has not explained its thinking, but given the transcendental importance of a parental order, with its consequences stretching many, many decades into the future, can it sensibly be thought that Parliament intended the difference between six months and six months and one day to be determinative and one day's delay to be fatal? I assume that Parliament intended a sensible
result.
Given the subject matter, given the consequences for the commissioning parents, never mind those for the child, to construe section 54(3) as barring forever an application made just one day late is not, in my judgment, sensible. It is the very antithesis of sensible; it is almost nonsensical. …….
I conclude, therefore, that section 54(3) does not have the effect of preventing the court making an order merely because the application is made after the expiration of the six month period. That is a conclusion which I come to, withoutreference
to the Convention and on a straightforward application of the principle in Howard v Bodington (1877) 2 PD 203.
If for somereason
that is wrong, if to go that far is in truth to take a step too far, the same conclusion is, in my judgment, amply justified having
regard
to the Convention"
"65. I intend to lay down no principle beyond that which appears from the authorities. Every case will, to a greater or lesser degree, be fact specific. In the circumstances of this case the application should be allowed to proceed. No one – not the surrogate parents, not the commissioning parents, not the child – will suffer any prejudice if the application is allowed to proceed. On the other hand, the commissioning parents and the child stand to suffer immense and irremediable prejudice if the application is halted in its tracks"
"i. The statutory subject matter;
ii. The background;
iii. The purpose of therequirement
(if known);
iv. Its importance;
v. Itsrelation
to the general object intended to be secured by the Act;
vi. The actual or possible impact of non-compliance on the parties;
vii. Can Parliament have fairly been taken to have intended total invalidity?
viii. Is any departure from the precise letter of the statue, however minor, fatal?"
"Where the existence of a family tie with a child has been established, the State must act in manner calculated to enable that tie to be developed and legal safeguards must be established thatrender
possible as from the moment of birth or as soon as practicable thereafter the child's integration in his family"
and that
"In the Court's opinion, "respect"
for "family life"
requires
that biological and social
reality
prevail over legal presumption"
"It is also clear that "family life" is not confined torelationships
based on marriage or blood, nor indeed is family life confined to formal
relationships
![]()
recognised
in law. Thus family life is not confined to married couples. A de facto
relationship
outside marriage can give rise to family life (Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v United Kingdom at para [63]), even if the parties do not live together (Kroon v The Netherlands 19 EHRR 263 at para [30]), and even if the couple consists of a woman and a female-to-male transsexual (X, Y and Z v United Kingdom (1997) 24 EHRR 143 at para [37]). So there can be family life between father and child even where the parents are not married: Keegan v Ireland (1994) 18 EHRR 342 at para [44]. Likewise there can be family life between a parent and a child even where there is no biological
relationship:
X, Y and Z v United Kingdom at para [37] (family life existed as between the female-to-male transsexual partner of a woman and the child she had conceived by artificial insemination by an anonymous donor). A formal adoption creates family life between the adoptive parents and the child: X v Belgium and the Netherlands (1975) 7 D&R 75, X v France (1982) 31 D&R 241, Pini v Roumania (unreported – 22 June 2004). Family life can exist between foster-parent and foster-child: Gaskin v United Kingdom (1989) 12 EHRR 36"
"But such is the diversity of forms that the family takes in contemporary society that it is impossible to define, or even to describe at anything less than almost encyclopaedic length, what is meant by "family life" for the purposes of Article 8. The Strasbourg court, as I have said, has never sought to define what is meant by family life. More importantly for present purposes, and this is a point thatrequires
emphasis, the Strasbourg court has never sought to identify any minimum
requirements
that must be shown if family life is to be held to exist. That is because there are none. In my judgment there is no single factor whose existence is crucial to the existence of family life, either in the abstract or even in the context of any particular type of family
relationship"
"Following the positive obligation identified by Marck v Belgium the court should seek to ensure that the child is in an equivalentrelationship
with each parent. The court is therefore seeking to protect the rights to
respect
to family life of the unit as well as each of the individual members. The rights of the child and his interests have
'…primacy of importance…This is not, it is agreed, a factor of limitless importance in the sense that it will prevail over all other considerations. It is a factor, however, that must rank higher than any other. Where the best interest of the child clearly favour a certain course, that course should be followed unless countervailingreasons
of considerable force displace them.' (ZH (Tanzania) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (ibid) per Lord Kerr SCJ para 46).
Only a parental order would have the effect of transforming the legal status of the child such that both commissioning parents arerecognised
as being the legal parents of the child."
"If de facto family life is established, which it is submitted it is on the facts of this case, then there is a positive obligation to construe statutes in a way as to enable them to comply with the Convention [The European Convention on Human Rights]."
"In KB & RJ v RT [2016] EWHC 760 (Fam) Pauffley J concluded that the child lived with her parents, despite being stranded in India because of the level of contact she had with them, and their role in her day to day care. As she aptly described at [45]: "The concept of home must and should be construed flexibly".
In this case the evidence establishes that the children had their home with the applicants in the sense that the children's living arrangements are entirely arranged by and provided for by the applicants. When they are not in Iran, they are in Skype contact two or three times a day. The evidence points to them bothremaining
utterly committed to the children. They have arranged to be there for virtually all the time, and though there are other circumstances that have driven them to be apart, either B's health or A's need to be able to
return
to work, the Children's Guardian commends them for the arrangements that they have made to ensure the children's stability of care. They have had to
remain
based here since December 2018 to ensure the evidence is available to ensure this hearing is effective.
I am quite satisfied taking a broad and purposeful interpretation of the term "home with", thisrequirement
is satisfied. In any event s.3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 makes clear that primary legislation should be
read
in a way that is compatible with Convention rights. The children and the applicants' Art.8 rights are clearly engaged in their case, their Art.8 rights point towards the court seeking to be in a position to secure the children's legal position with the applicants, so that they may be able to enjoy family life together."
"Clearly the crucial words are "living as partners in an enduring familyrelationship."
These words are no doubt chosen so as not to
require
the
residence
of both in the same property. That is not surprising as historically many a parent has had to work abroad whilst the family
remained
at home without in anyway imperilling an enduring family
relationship.
Nor is that unusual today with people having to move jobs often at short notice. What is
required
is: first, an unambiguous intention to create and maintain family life, and secondly, a factual matrix consistent with that intention. That is clearly a question of fact and degree in each case"
"the principle that the family division of the High Court, with its experience, is the best place to test whether arelationship
is an enduring one. That decision is better made by the courts than by Parliament seeking to put in arbitrary time periods or definitions, however, well-meaning we may want to be. The ultimate test when issuing a parental order is what is best for the child."
"Unlike other provisions in s 54, s 54 (2) is silent as to the need for therequirement
to be linked to any particular time. In those circumstances the court should be alert not to
read
in any
requirement
that is not there in the primary legislation"
"The aim of s 54 is to allow an order to be made which has a transformative effect on the legalrelationship
between the child and the applicants. The article 8 rights of the applicants and the child are engaged. N has lived with the applicants all her life and is biologically
related
to K. The effect of not making an order will be an interference with that family life in that their factual
relationship
will not be
recognised
by law, there will be no legal
relationship
between N and the applicants, she would be denied the social and emotional benefits of
recognition
of that
relationship
and would not have the legal
reality
that matches the day to day
reality."
"The transformative legal effect of a parental order cannot be overstated. The only alternatives are:
i)An adoption order, but, on the facts, it would be inappropriate for the biological mother to become in law the adoptive mother of her own child in order to gain the status of being the child's legal parent; or
ii) Making the child a ward of court, granting and control of the child to the applicant and making such ancillary orders as to minimise the number of occasions the applicant would have to apply to the court: seeRe
Z (A Child) (No. 2) above and the judgment of the President at paragraph 7. But these collections of orders do not make the applicant the legal parent of the child."
Analysis
i) when interpreting legislative provisions, the court must have regard
to the underlying purpose of the
requirement
and ensure the interpretation does not 'go against the grain' of the intentions of Parliament;
ii) s.3 of the HRA requires
the court, where possible, to give a Convention compliant interpretation of statutory provisions;
iii) a failure to adhere to the six-month time limit to make an application for a parental order is not fatal to the making of the order;
iv) the questions whether the applicants are in an enduring family relationship
and whether the child has his home with the applicants are matters of fact for the court to determine;
v) where the court finds that the Article 8 and/or Article 14 rights of the child are engaged, the biological and social reality
of the child's life must prevail over legal presumption;
vi) the existence of family life is not defined nor is its existence constrained by legal, societal or religious
conventions;
vii) there are no minimum requirements
that must be shown if family life is to be held to exist;
viii) what is required
is an unambiguous intention to create and maintain family life, and secondly, a factual matrix consistent with that intention which is clearly a question of fact and degree;
ix) the mere fact that the parents are now separated is not fatal to the application for a parental order;
x) similarly, the mere fact that the parents live in separate homes is not fatal to the application;
xi) if a parental order is not made, the child is likely to be denied the social and emotional benefits of recognition
of his
relationship
with his parents and would not have the legal
reality
that matches his day to day
reality;
xii) the transformative effect of a parental order cannot be overstated; and
xiii) the ultimate test for the making of a parental order is the welfare best interests of the child.
i) prior to the surrogacy arrangement the mother and father were in an enduring relationship;
ii) they wished to have a family and desperately wanted a child of their own;
iii) they agreed to pursue a surrogacy arrangement and each provided their gametes to produce embryos for transplantation into the surrogate mother;
iv) A has spent his entire life in the care of the mother;
v) at the time of the joint application in December 2019, both the mother and the father were committed to play key roles in A's life and both were committed to his care and well-being;
vi) at the time of the application both the mother and the father had and/or wished to have a close and loving relationship
with A;
vii) they were and are committed to work together to promote the welfare best interests of A throughout his minority and beyond; and
viii) the mother and the father wished to have their biological status as A's parents to be recognised
in law.
Conclusion