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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Family Division) Decisions >> J, G And H (Children: Supervision Orders) [2021] EWHC 884 (Fam) (29 March 2021) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2021/884.html Cite as: [2021] EWHC 884 (Fam) |
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IN THE MATTER OF THE CHILDREN ACT 1989
B e f o r e :
____________________
Re J, G and H (Children: Supervision Orders) |
____________________
Ann May (instructed by Arani Solicitors) for the First Respondent Mother
Ummar Farooq Ahmad (instructed by AL Law) for the Second Respondent Father
Jo Brown (instructed by Freemans Solicitors) for the Third Respondent, J
Deborah Piccos, of, TV Edwards LLP for the Fourth Respondent, G
Victoria Roberts (instructed by Miles and Partners) for the Fifth Respondent, H, by her Children's Guardian, Ms Rush
Hearing dates: 2 – 12 and 29 March 2021
____________________
Crown Copyright ©
Mr Justice Poole:
Introduction
i. Whether the attack by the father on the mother in 2013 was pre-meditated: the father denies that it was.
ii. The mother's intentions when she travelled with the children to England in 2019. The Local Authority says that the mother came here to reunite the family, the mother says that she only intended to stay temporarily and visited for the purpose of securing therapy for H. She and the children would have returned to Y but for the intervention of the Local Authority.
iii. The risk of future harm to the children from their father.
iv. The ability of the mother to protect them from harm from the father.
v. The mother's ability to care for her children. The Parenting Assessment states that the mother is unable to provide "good enough" care for the three children, emotionally and practically. Although the Local Authority has not relied on this in its final threshold document, it is a matter that needs to be addressed in this judgment.
History of Events
"The agreed statement of facts … disclose a horrible vicious assault based on an unreasonably held belief in infidelity… I agree that there are overwhelming elements of misogyny in this; in other words, hatred of women. The victim, [the mother] did nothing, repeat nothing, to bring this upon her… [she] has shown courage in her rehabilitation which I find to be nothing short of heroic. She has taken herself from being paralysed to walking on her own with a cane…. The admitted facts speak for themselves. There are so many aggravating factors here. To list but a few, this is horrific abuse of a spouse. It is pre-meditated. To say that it has a significant impact on the health of the mother is an understatement. This was committed in front of young children…"
Allocated Social Worker
i. He has made numerous unannounced visits to the family home but has not found the father there, and the children have never indicated to him that the father has been in the home. Given the views of J and G about their father, I am sure that they would have told the allocated social worker had the father broken his agreement to stay away from the family home.
ii. He told the court that the mother had engaged with Children's Services and with him "since day one". The mother has not been in conflict with any services or agencies but "presents as a well-mannered, calm, considerate and a very thoughtful woman." He said that he had "nothing but the greatest admiration for her" and was impressed by her "love, affection, and commitment to her children."
iii. He articulated a significant concern in this case when he said that the mother caused the children to relocate away from their familiar environment to live in a different country where they did not want to live, with a man who they had last seen being taken away by police having inflicted the most heinous injuries on his wife. He considered that this showed a lack of insight by the mother into her children's feelings. As he said this, the mother became visibly upset and we had to take a break in proceedings.
iv. The allocated social worker was clearly concerned about the mother being under the influence of the father. He suggested that it was the father who was behind her expensive use of a "light/energy therapist" for herself and H, therapy that is not evidence-based. He expressed his view that the father had persuaded the mother to bring the family to England to reunite. He fears for the consequences should the father exercise similar influence in the future.
v. He accepted that the mother and children had had a more stable life since arriving in England, in particular since moving to their current home in mid 2020. He had noticed what he called "absolutely remarkable" progress by H since his first involvement with them in the summer of 2020. Their social interaction with him had completely changed from almost complete silence to free-flowing chatter.
Expert Evidence
"I am of the opinion that the children have suffered harm as a result of the assault, its immediate aftermath and the subsequent years of instability and inconsistent caregiving. While there are no diagnosable mental health difficulties at this time for J and G, the impact of frequently moving house and schools and being witness to conflict within the family cannot be underestimated. H is selectively mute and has significant learning needs, both of which may have been exacerbated by the instability of the past few years. School are currently applying for an EHCP. Nevertheless, the children all seem to have positive attachments to their mother and wish to remain in her care. They do not appear to have a significant attachment to their father. All three children expressed a wish to return to Y."
"support the inference that the mother's brain injury has had a major impact on her cognitive architecture … it would be safe to infer that the bilateral [encephalomalacia] and sucal effacement has resulted in an overall decrement in cognitive effectiveness but its greater involvement in left hemispheric inferior frontal structures has caused better differentiated impairments in memory and working memory in the auditory-verbal modality and in the executive function of abstracting ability."
"Her comportment during interview, her comprehension of explorative questions and the coherence of her account of events do not support the contention that she is incapable of understanding information given to her…. The information on offer about the mother's life experience in the last 7 years indicates that she has been completely deprived of support and subjected to intense levels of instability and stress. Despite these prolonged and severely debilitating circumstances she has coped and maintained the integrity of her personality and of her family. This is a considerable achievement, especially in an individual who has sustained a probably severe brain injury." [E312 paras. 3.2.4 to 3.2.8]
"I have not encountered any evidence to suggest that the mother is unable to prioritise her children's needs before her own, that she is not cognisant of safety and risk factors regarding her children, and that she is unaware of the harm that exposure to domestic violence or conflict may cause to the development of children." [E313 para. 3.2.9]
"In my opinion, [the father's] lack of understanding and empathy for the children poses a very significant, immediate and real risk of emotional harm. In my view, there is a very significant risk that [the father] will dismiss or minimise the children's concerns and would not take the children's views into account when decisions were made about his interaction with the family. I have not assessed the children and indeed, I am not qualified to do so but I must point out that in my view, [the father's] current views in relation to the children, pose a very significant risk of immediate emotional harm."
"The mother's cognitive needs make it difficult to manage these competing priorities and it is my view this is leading to less than 'good enough' care for all the children, both emotionally and practically."
The Mother
The Father
The Children
H
G
J
"I can confirm that J's attendance at school is exemplary - 98%. Their attendance in lessons on remote learning has also been exemplary - above 95%. They are attending a great deal of online tuition - often 3 hours a week outside school hours. They are doing exceptionally well at school."
Support Network
The Guardian
The Legal Framework
i. The burden of proof lies on the Local Authority that brings the proceedings and identifies the findings they invite the court to make.
ii. The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities, Re B (Care Proceedings: Standard of proof) [2008] UKHL 35. Baroness Hale said at [70] "I …..would announce loud and clear that that the standard of
proof in finding the facts necessary to establish the threshold at s31
(2) or the welfare considerations at s1 of the 1989 Act is the simple
balance of probabilities, neither more not less."
iii. Findings must be based on evidence not suspicion or speculation - Lord Justice Munby in Re A (A child) (Fact Finding Hearing: Speculation) [2011] EWCA Civ 12.
iv. The court must take into account all the evidence and consider each piece of evidence in the context of all the other evidence – see Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss, President observed in Re T [2004] EWCA Civ 558, [2004] 2 FLR 838.
v. The opinions of medical and other experts need to be considered in the context of all the other evidence. In A County Council v KD & L [2005] EWHC 144 Fam. at paragraphs 39 to 44, Mr Justice Charles observed:
"It is important to remember that (1) the roles of the court and the expert are distinct and (2) it is the court that is in the position to weigh up the expert evidence against its findings on the other evidence. The judge must always remember that he or she is the person who makes the final decision."
vi. The evidence of the parents and any other carers is of the utmost importance. They must have the fullest opportunity to take part in the hearing and the court must form a clear assessment of their credibility and reliability.
vii. It is not uncommon for witnesses in these cases to tell lies in the course of the investigation and the hearing. The court must be careful to bear in mind that a witness may lie for various reasons, such as shame, misplaced loyalty, panic, fear, distress and the fact that the witness has lied about some matters does not mean that he or she has lied about everything: see R v Lucas [1981] QB 720.
viii. Domestic abuse having occurred in this case I must follow the principles and guidance at PD 12J of the Family Procedure Rules 2010.
ix. Findings of fact will form the basis for consideration of whether the threshold has been met. By s. 31(2) Children Act 1989:
"A court may only make a care order or supervision order if it is satisfied (a) that the child concerned is suffering, or is likely to suffer, significant harm and (b) that the harm or likelihood of harm is attributable to (1) the care given to the child or likely to be given to him if the order were not made, not being what it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give to him or (2) the child being beyond parental control".
x. In Re J (Children) [2013] UKSC 9, at paragraph 47, Baroness Hale, said:
"The threshold comes in two limbs and each has two distinct components. In the first limb the court must be satisfied (a) that the child is suffering significant harm and (b) that that harm is attributable to the care being given to him, not being what it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give to him. The second limb the court must be satisfied that (a) the child is likely to suffer significant harm and (b) that that likelihood is attributable to the care likely to be given to him if the order is not made, not being what it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give to him".
xi. By s. 31(9), "harm" means "ill-treatment or the impairment of health or development including, for example, impairment suffered from seeing or hearing the ill-treatment of another" and "development" means "physical, intellectual, emotional, social or behavioural development."
xii. By s. 31(10), "Where the question of whether harm suffered by a child is significant turns on the child's health or development, his health or development shall be compared with that which could reasonably be expected of a similar child."
xiii. The relevant date with respect to which the Court must be satisfied is the date on which the local authority initiated the procedure for protection under the Act. In this case the date of the application for a care order is 11 December 2019. The parties have identified that as the relevant date and I proceed on that basis but arguably it was 29 October 2019 when social services secured the agreement of the father to leave the flat where the family was living. In this case it makes no difference which of those two dates is taken as the relevant date. I shall take it to be 11 December 2019 since that was agreed by the parties and the hearing was conducted on that basis.
xiv. The reference in s. 31(2) to a child being likely to suffer significant harm does not necessitate a finding that harm is probable. Lord Nicholls in Re H (Minors) (Sexual Abuse: Standard of Proof) [1996] AC 563, said, "In this context, Parliament cannot have been using likely in the sense of more likely than not …. The context shows that in s. 31(2) (a) likely is being used in the sense of a real possibility, a possibility that cannot sensibly be ignored having regard to the nature and gravity of the feared harm in the particular case."
xv. Because it is generally in the best interests of a child to be brought up with its natural family, "society must be willing to tolerate very diverse standards of parenting, including the eccentric, the barely adequate and the inconsistent …. [I]t is not the provenance of the state to spare children all the consequences of defective parenting …. Only exceptionally should the state intervene with compulsive powers and then only when a court is satisfied that the significant harm criteria in s.31 (2) [are] made out" (per Hedley J in Re L (Care: Threshold Criteria) [2007] 1 FLR 2050).
xvi. (7) However, "[t]he test under s.31 (2) is, and has to be, an objective one. If it were otherwise, and the 'care which it is reasonable to expect a parent to give' were to be judged by the standards of the parent with the characteristics of the particular parent in question, the protection afforded to children would be very limited indeed, if not entirely illusory. It would in effect then be limited to protection against the parent who was fully able to provide proper care but either chose not to do so or neglected through fault to do so. That is not the meaning of section 31(2). It is abundantly clear that a parent may unhappily fail to provide reasonable care even though he is doing his incompetent best" (per Hughes LJ in Re D [2010] EWCA Civ 1000).
xvii. If I find threshold proved, I must go on to consider section 1 of the Children Act 1989. The children's respective welfare during their minorities is my paramount consideration. I must consider the welfare checklist in section 1(3). In particular, I must have regard to
(a) The ascertainable wishes and feelings of the children concerned (considered in the light of their age and understanding);
(b) Their physical, emotional and educational needs;
(c) The likely effect on them of any change in their circumstances;
(d) Their age, sex, background and any characteristics which I consider relevant;
(e) Any harm which they have suffered or are at risk of suffering;
(f) How capable each of their parents, and any other person in relation to whom I consider the question to be relevant, is of meeting their needs; and
(g) The range of powers available to the court under the Act in the proceedings in question.
xviii. I must not make any order unless I consider that doing so would be better for the children than making no order at all.
xix. Delay is likely to prejudice the welfare of a child.
xx. I should consider the realistic options and conduct a
"global holistic analysis of each of the options available for the child's future upbringing before deciding which of those options best meets the duty to afford paramount consideration to the child's welfare"
Re G (Care Proceedings: Welfare Evaluation) [2013] EWCA Civ 965; [2014] 1FLR 670.
In Re F (A Child) (International Relocation Cases) [2015] EWCA Civ 882, para 50, McFarlane LJ makes it clear that:
"'a global holistic evaluation' is no more than shorthand for the overall, comprehensive analysis of a child's welfare seen as a whole, having regard in particular to the circumstances set out in the relevant checklist [CA 1989 s1(3) or ACA 2002 s1(4)]. Such analysis is required by CA 1989 s1(1) and/or ACA 2002 s1(2) when a court determines any question with respect to a child's upbringing ... the factors that must be given due consideration and appropriate weight on either side of the scales of the welfare balance may be such as to require an analysis of some sophistication and complexity. However, whatever the issue before the Court, the task is the same: the Court must weigh up all of the relevant factors, look at the case as a whole, and determine the course that best meets the need to afford paramount consideration to the child's welfare. That is what, and that is all, that I intended to convey by the short phrase 'global holistic evaluation'"
xxi. I should approach the applications on the basis that the best place for any child is within the family of origin unless there are clear welfare grounds to prefer an alternative. I must consider, in relation to each child, whether they could be cared for by a member or members of their family to a satisfactory standard within an appropriate timescale, not whether they might be better off being in foster care.
xxii. The children and parents' Article 8 rights under the European Convention on Human Rights are engaged and I must be satisfied that any orders I make are lawful, necessary, and proportionate to the aim of safeguarding and promoting the welfare of the children.
xxiii. I also have regard to Art. 6 of the ECHR and must ensure procedural fairness. The mother is a disabled person within the definition of the Equality Act 2010 and required the assistance of an intermediary fully to participate in this hearing. Frequent breaks were taken during the hearing, and the other parties submitted their questions for the mother in writing for consideration and comments by the intermediary.
Submissions
Discussion and Conclusions
(i) Was the attack by the father on the mother in 2013 pre-meditated?
(ii) The mother's intentions when she travelled with the children to England in 2019.
(iii) The risk of future harm to the children from their father.
(iv) The ability of the mother to protect the children from the risk of harm from their father.
i. The evidence suggests that the mother's experience of the father prior to the attack was positive. She saw him as someone she could rely upon and they appear to have had a warm relationship.
ii. There are strong cultural influences and expectations that she must not divorce him and that they should remain together.
iii. There was no hostility in the build up to the attack. It came out of nowhere from her point of view.
iv. She has no memory of the attack or of the immediate aftermath.
v. She has difficult relationships within her own family. She was beaten as a child and she has had a stormy time with her own mother and brother since 2013. By comparison, in ten years of marriage prior to the attack her husband had been a support to her, and, I accept, there is no evidence that he had hurt her.
vi. Her contact with the father since 2013, limited though it has been, appears to her to have been positive from her point of view.
vii. The mother's brain damage impairs her ability to process the events that occurred.
viii. The mother has felt dependent on the father, possibly due to the nature of their relationship in the past, and possibly also due to her impairments.
(v) The mother's care of her children
i. H is likely to be formally assessed as having special educational needs. They are far behind the educational milestones for reading, writing and arithmetic, that they should be attaining.
ii. The mother is unable, due to her own impairments, to assist H with reading and writing. The mother told me that she cannot read H's schoolwork, and she cannot read books to them.
iii. The mother's brain damage limits her ability to plan and organise her time, causing H to be repeatedly late for school before the Local Authority intervened with the provision of a taxi service.
iv. The mother's reliance on the light/energy therapist. It is not for me to comment on the light/energy therapist's qualifications or effectiveness, save to remark that a competent healthcare professional would be unlikely to offer to heal shoulder joints, eyesight, and learning difficulties with the use of energy, even, during the pandemic, by transmitting energy via a photograph of the "patient".
Threshold
Welfare
The Children's Wishes and Feelings
Physical, Emotional and Educational Needs
Effect of Change
Age, Sex and Background
Risk of Harm
Capability of Parents
The Range of Available Powers
Conclusions on Welfare
i. For J, a Supervision Order or no order other than a child arrangements order. I do not believe that a Care Order in their case would be practical, proportionate, or in their interests, given their age and character.
ii. For G and H, a Supervision Order or a Care Order.
"If the making of a care order is intended to be used as a vehicle for the provision of support and services, that is wrong. The means/route should be devised to provide these necessary support and services without the need to make a care order. Consideration should be given to the making of a supervision order which may be an appropriate order to support the reunification of the family.
The risks of significant harm to the child are either adjudged to be such that the child should be removed from the care of her parents/carers or some lesser legal order and regime is required.
It should be considered to be rare in the extreme that the risks of significant harm to the child are judged to be sufficient to merit the making of a care order but nevertheless, the risks can be managed with a care order being made in favour of the local authority with the child remaining in the care of the parents/carers."
Note 1 In this published version of the judgment, the identity of the children is protected by anonymising the names of every member of the family, countries of origin and residence (other than England), the distinctive implement used by the father to assault the mother, and whether the children are male or female - hence the use of the pronouns “their” and “them” throughout. [Back]