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England and Wales High Court (Family Division) Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Family Division) Decisions >> W v X [2025] EWHC 1696 (Fam) (23 June 2025) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Fam/2025/1696.html Cite as: [2025] EWHC 1696 (Fam) |
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Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge
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| W |
Applicant |
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| - and - |
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| X |
Respondent |
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Mr Nicholas Wilkinson (instructed by Howes Percival) for the Respondent
Hearing dates: 3, 5 and 6 June 2025
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Crown Copyright ©
Mr Justin Warshaw KC:
Background
C's health issues
The proceedings
Section 8 and other proceedings
The final hearing
The length and quality of the parties' relationship
Conduct
Non-disclosure, forgeries and related topics
Interim Provision
M's resources
| Resource | £ |
| Bank accounts | 88,000 |
| Policies net | 448,000 |
| Smart car | 14,000 |
| Jewellery, watches, handbags | 1,000,000 |
| Subtotal | 1,550,000 |
| Company A loan | (64,000) |
| Company B loan | (87,000) |
| Nanny HMRC | (42,000) |
| Schedule 1 outstanding costs | (286,000) |
| Section 8 outstanding costs | (80,000) |
| Subtotal | (559,000) |
| Net Total | 991,000 |
The policies
The open offers
a. F to pay M maintenance of £290,000 per annum (£240,000 general plus £50,000 holiday fund) until conclusion of C's tertiary education + CPI;
b. F to pay rent on the family home (or equivalent property) until conclusion of C's tertiary education;
c. F to pay C's school fees, other educational costs and medical expenses;
d. F to pay £5,000 per annum direct to organisers of C's birthday party;
e. Security of £1 million;
f. F to pay £35,000 per annum into a fund for C;
g. F to transfer the G-Wagon to M;
h. F to pay to M £197,567 to fund her outstanding legal fees; and
i. F to indemnify M in respect of her involvement in various entities;
a. F offered maintenance of £194,000 per annum with CPI (vs. M's £290,000);
b. F offered to pay £40,000 per annum for C's birthday party direct to suppliers but not to pay £35,000 per annum to C (vs. M's £5,000 for party and £35,000 as investment for C); and
c. F offered nothing for security and nothing towards M's costs.
a. F to pay M maintenance of £138,000 per annum + CPI until completion of C's tertiary education (a reduction of £56,000);
b. F to pay rent on the family home at £178,200 per annum until 28 April 2027 and thereafter on another property up to a maximum of £108,000 per annum until completion of C's tertiary education;
c. F to pay school fees and extras;
d. F to pay £84,882 per annum in specified payments direct to third parties (these had previously been offered outside of the maintenance offer but in unspecified amounts);
e. M to return the G-Wagon and F to purchase a replacement up to a value of £50,000;
f. No provision was offered for M's indebtedness;
g. The only indemnities offered were in respect of the housekeeper's employment prior to 2 October 2023; and
h. No order for costs.
I note that this offer was significantly less advantageous than F's October 2024 offer.
a. F to pay rent on the family home (or equivalent property) until conclusion of C's tertiary education;
b. F to pay M maintenance of £741,000 per annum (£441,000 general maintenance and £300,000 for holidays) until conclusion of C's tertiary education;
c. F to pay C's school fees, other educational costs and medical expenses;
d. F to pay security in the sum of £3 million;
e. F to pay M £660,233 to pay off her debts and prospective legal fees;
f. F to transfer the G-Wagon to M, £145,000 to trade it in for another and then the equivalent every 4 to 5 years;
g. F to transfer the Tracey Emin picture to M;
h. F to indemnify M in respect of her involvement in various entities and for the tax relating to the housekeeper; and
i. She also sought £5,000 to be paid directly by F for C's birthday and £35,000 to be paid directly to him.
The law
35. I have been referred to a number of authorities. From these I draw the following principles:
i) The main orders which Schedule 1 entitles me to make are:
a. Settlement of property, which invariably will be on a trust, licence or lease arrangement such that the payer retains ownership thereof, and the payee is entitled to occupy with the children during their minority, or until conclusion of tertiary education; Re A [2015] 2 FLR 625 and UD v DN [2021] EWCA Civ 1947.
b. Lump sum or sums for the likes of furniture, car, and clearing debts.
c. Child maintenance (secured or unsecured).
ii) Each such order, by the wording of the statute must be "for the benefit of the child", or made direct to the child (which will be very rare).
iii) The court shall have regard to the matters set out at para 4 of Schedule 1 in the exercise of its discretion.
iv) Although para 4 does not expressly refer to the welfare of the child, in the generality of cases welfare will be a constant influence on the discretionary outcome; Re P [2003] EWCA Civ 837 at para 44.
v) Nor does para 4 refer expressly to standard of living, although in my judgment that is likely to be a highly material factor in many cases, particularly those which fall into the so-called "big money" category.
vi) In Al Maktoum (supra) at para 91, Moor J suggested that "…the children should be able to have a lifestyle that is not entirely out of kilter with that enjoyed by them in Dubai and that enjoyed by [the father] and his family". In Collardeau-Fuchs v Fuchs [2022] EWFC 135 at para 119, Mostyn J observed that standard of living before breakdown of the relationship "…should not however be allowed to dominate the picture as there will be many children, particularly children dealt with under Sch 1, who will not have experienced a standard of living within a functioning relationship either because the liaison between the parents was very brief, or because the child was born after the relationship had come to an end". In my judgment the relevance of the standard of living during the relationship, and the standard of living of each party after the end of the relationship, will vary from case to case, and, as was said at para 21 of Re A (supra), will have to be seen in context.
vii) The court will ordinarily determine the claims in sequence as to (a) property, (b) lump sum or sums, and (c) child maintenance; Re P (supra) at para 45.
viii) The court deals with property first because, as stated at para 22 of Re A (supra), "The nature of the child's home environment provides the obvious base line from which to consider commensurate levels of maintenance and is as good as any other".
ix) Child maintenance can be interpreted sufficiently broadly to include elements referable to the claimant in his/her capacity as the child's carer; Re P (supra) at paras 48-49. For many years this proposition, or concept, was known as the carer's allowance. More recently, at para 129 of Fuchs (supra) Mostyn J has suggested referring to it as a Household Expenditure Child Support Award [HECSA]. Whatever terminology is applied, the principle is clear, although its application is highly discretionary. It is not always easy to draw a bright line between budgetary items to which the claimant has no entitlement as being exclusively personal to him/her, and personal items which may reasonably be claimed as being necessary to discharge the carer's duties, including items which help sustain the carer's physical/emotional welfare; Re P (supra) at para 81. The court "… has to guard against unreasonable claims made on the child's behalf but with the disguised element of providing for the mother's benefit rather than for the child"; J v C (supra) at 159H.
x) The court should "not generally attach weight to the risk that the father may reduce or withdraw his support when the child comes of age (or ceases education or training) thereby obliging the child to adapt to a lower lifestyle at that time"; Re P (supra) at para 77(iii).
xi) In general (and particularly in the bigger money cases), the court is entitled to paint with a broad brush and will not ordinarily need to descend into a line-by-line budgetary analysis; Re P (supra) at para 77(i) and Fuchs (supra) at para 129(f).
xii) Ultimately, "the overall result… should be fair, just and reasonable taking into account all of the circumstances"; Re P (supra) at para 76(viii)
C's needs
Housing need
Income need
Lump sum provision
Security
Car
Other matters
Costs
a. M filed her Form E1 very late on the night before the first appointment;
b. M failed to disclose the value of her chattels in Form E1;
c. M's statement was too long and full of inappropriate attacks on F;
d. M falsely claimed to have been cut off financially by F;
e. M pursued an unsuccessful claim for MPS and LSPO and then appealed unsuccessfully;
f. M forged the EasyJet ticket;
g. M failed to disclose her Revolut account;
h. M changed to her third firm of solicitors in March 2025;
i. M made an unreasonable open offer which was not in the same ballpark as her earlier open proposal;
j. M attempted to reduce the value of her chattels by adducing an expert report without leave;
k. M failed to comply with various directions made for this hearing; and
l. M pursued a plethora of irrelevant issues including in respect of F's criminal record, expenditure during the relationship, signing of documents and access to accounts.