BAILII is celebrating 24 years of free online access to the law! Would you consider making a contribution?

No donation is too small. If every visitor before 31 December gives just £1, it will have a significant impact on BAILII's ability to continue providing free access to the law.
Thank you very much for your support!



BAILII [Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback]

England and Wales High Court (King's Bench Division) Decisions


You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (King's Bench Division) Decisions >> McCarthy, R (on the application of), R. v [1923] EWHC KB 1 (09 November 1923)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/KB/1923/1.html
Cite as: [1924] KB 256, [1923] EWHC KB 1, [1924] 1 KB 256

[New search] [View without highlighting] [Printable PDF version] [Buy ICLR report: [1924] KB 256] [Help]


ICLR_logo
[1924] 1 KB 256

[DIVISIONAL COURT]

THE KING v. SUSSEX JUSTICES.

Ex parte MCCARTHY.

1923 Nov. 9.   LORD HEWART C.J. , LUSH , and SANKEY JJ.
     LORD HEWART C.J. stated the grounds of the rule and continued: It is clear that the deputy clerk was a member of the firm of solicitors engaged in the conduct of proceedings for damages against the applicant in respect of the same collision as that which gave rise to the charge that the justices were considering. It is said, and, no doubt, truly, that when that gentleman retired in the usual way with the justices, taking with him the notes of the evidence in case the justices might desire to consult him, the justices came to a conclusion without consulting him, and that he scrupulously abstained from referring to the case in any way. But while that is so, a long line of cases shows that it is not merely of some importance but is of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done. The question therefore is not whether in this case the deputy clerk made any observation or offered any criticism which he might not properly have made or offered; the question is whether he was so related to the case in its civil aspect as to be unfit to act as clerk to the justices in the criminal matter. The answer to that question depends not upon what actually was done but upon what might appear to be done. Nothing is to be done which creates even a suspicion that there has been an improper interference with the course of justice. Speaking for myself, I accept the statements contained in the justices' affidavit, but they show very clearly that the deputy clerk was connected with the case in a capacity which made it right that he should scrupulously abstain from referring to the matter in any way, although he retired with the justices; in other words, his one position was such that he could not, if he had been required to do so, discharge the duties which his other position involved. His twofold position was a manifest contradiction. In those circumstances I am satisfied that this conviction must be quashed, unless it can be shown that the applicant or his solicitor was aware of the point that might be taken, refrained from taking it, and took his chance of an acquittal on the facts, and then, on a conviction being recorded, decided to take the point. On the facts I am satisfied that there has been no waiver of the irregularity, and, that being so, the rule must be made absolute and the conviction quashed.
     LUSH J. I agree. It must be clearly understood that if justices allow their clerk to be present at their consultation when either he or his firm is professionally engaged in those proceedings or in other proceedings involving the same subject matter, it is irrelevant to inquire whether the clerk did or did not give advice and influence the justices. What is objectionable is his presence at the consultation, when he is in a position which necessarily makes it impossible for him to give absolutely impartial advice. I have no doubt that these justices did not intend to do anything irregular or wrong, but they have placed themselves in an impossible position by allowing the clerk in those circumstances to retire with them into their consultation room. The result, there being no waiver, is that the conviction must be quashed.
     SANKEY J. I agree.

Rule absolute; conviction quashed.

Solicitor for applicant: W. C. Crocker.

Solicitors for justices: Pettitt & Ramsay, for Langham, Son & Douglas, Hastings.

Solicitors for police superintendent: Taylor, Willcocks & Co., for F. Lawson Lewis, Eastbourne.

J. S. H.



The permission for BAILII to publish the text of this judgment was granted by:
Incorporated Council of Law Reporting for England & Wales
 Their assistance is gratefully acknowledged.

ICLR_VOTE_BATCH_2


BAILII: Copyright Policy | Disclaimers | Privacy Policy | Feedback | Donate to BAILII
URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/KB/1923/1.html