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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (King's Bench Division) Decisions >> London Borough of Richmond on Thames v Trotman [2023] EWHC 2461 (KB) (11 July 2023) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/KB/2023/2461.html Cite as: [2023] EWHC 2461 (KB) |
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QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
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| The London Borough of Richmond on Thames |
Claimant |
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| - and - |
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| Alistair Trotman |
Defendant |
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Francis
Hoar
(instructed by South London Legal Partnership) for the Claimant
The Defendant appeared in person
Hearing dates: 11 July 2023
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Crown Copyright ©
Mrs Justice Lambert DBE:
Hoar
and the Defendant is present representing himself.
The Facts
Hoar
in his skeleton argument. I do not set out the entire enforcement history but note that on 23 November 2020, the Defendant's appeal against the dismissal by magistrates of an appeal against an enforcement notice made by the Surrey Fire and Rescue Service was in turn dismissed. He sought unsuccessfully to challenge that dismissal by way of judicial review. KUPE has been unlawfully moored in Elmbridge, at Molesey Lock and at Queen's Promenade (Royal Borough of Kingston on Thames). On each occasion the relevant local authority has had to issue and pursue injunction proceedings forcing the Defendant to move the vessel. These various sets of proceedings have been subject to unsuccessful appeals or applications for permission to appeal. Most recently, the Defendant has unsuccessfully sought to judicially review the Royal Borough of Kingston on Thames enforcement of the injunction obtained on 29 April 2022 (HHJ Roberts). That application was not successful and the oral reconsideration of the application for judicial review was similarly unsuccessful.
The Parties' Submissions
Hoar
has drawn my attention to the Claimant's Byelaws Relating to Mooring which were made under section 235 Local Government Act 1972. Under paragraph 1, "moor" is defined to mean "the act of being physically attached to the land, physically touching the land or tied to objects in the land by way of ropes, gangplanks, stakes in the ground or other similar methods." Paragraph 4 of the Byelaws sets out at (a) that "except in cases of an emergency or other unavoidable cause, no person shall on any land designated by Schedule 1 ….moor any boat or permit any boat to be moored for longer than a maximum period of 1 hour in any period of 24 consecutive hours.. without the prior consent of the Council." The land designated by Schedule 1 includes the land adjacent to KUPE. The Byelaws continue: "If a boat continues to be moored after the expiry of 1 hour in breach of byelaw 4(a) further offences will be committed after the expiry of the first hour in every subsequent 24 hour period.." Mr
Hoar
submits that the lawfulness of the Byelaws is now well established, and relies upon the authority of Akerman v London Borough of Richmond [2017] EWHC 84 (Admin) an appeal by way of case stated concerning the lawfulness of the byelaws relevant to the Claimant's application. Although a public law challenge to the vires of the Byelaws, Beatson LJ observed at [28] that it was "legitimate for the respondent to regulate the way in which the appellant and others occupy the riverbank, land held for the benefit of the whole community, to the detriment of other uses of the land and riverbank."
Hoar
submits that KUPE is undoubtedly moored to the Claimant's land. He draws my attention to the adapted ladder obviously being used as a gangplank running from the vessel and resting in a thicket of sycamore roots and branches on the riverbank. This had been present on each occasion upon which Mr Almond had attended. The Byelaw is lawful and has been breached. The Defendant is therefore moored unlawfully and is trespassing on the Claimant's land. On this basis he submits the claim against the Defendant in trespass is well made out and undoubtedly raises a serious issue to be tried. He submits that the Defendant is entitled to exercise its powers to ensure that the Defendant's vessel is removed to prevent further trespassing upon the Claimant's land by making this application. He relies upon the Cambridge City Council v Traditional Cambridge Tours [2018] EWHC 1304 where at [54] Whipple J (as she then was) observed that "the Council's claim, which is for trespass on the Council's land which lies adjacent to the river. The Council is obviously entitled to take action to prevent a trespass on land belonging to it, whether or not that trespass happens to be connected with or a prelude to unlawful activity on the River Cam which falls under the jurisdiction of another authority." He submits that damages would not be a sufficient remedy. Unlawful mooring of vessels deprives short stay boaters of the opportunity to moor and causes congestion. The Defendant's trespassing has already caused damage to local flora (trees and plants) and this damage will continue. In any event the Defendant is now a declared bankrupt and would be unable to pay any award of damages. He submits that the balance of convenience clearly satisfies the grant of an interim injunction.
Decision
Hoar whether the preferable course in this case would have been to have asked the court to list the application for a final injunction rather than an interim injunction. However I accept that a court date for a two hour hearing such as has been conducted today would have been available rather more quickly than for a final and substantive hearing with evidence. Having found a serious issue to be tried in trespass, there is no reason to allow it to continue. The Defendant is a serial trespasser. For these reasons I am satisfied that it is just and convenient to exercise my discretion under s. 37 Senior Courts Act 1981 to grant such an injunction. There will be a penal notice attached. Any breach of that injunction will amount to a contempt of Court which is punishable with imprisonment of a fine.