![]() |
[Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback] [DONATE] | |
England and Wales High Court (King's Bench Division) Decisions |
||
|
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (King's Bench Division) Decisions >> Chanel Ltd v Skeens [2025] EWHC 619 (KB) (14 March 2025) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/KB/2025/619.html Cite as: [2025] EWHC 619 (KB) |
||
[New search]
[Context
]
[View without highlighting]
[Printable PDF version]
[Help]
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
||
B e f o r e :
____________________
| Chanel Limited | Claimant/Applicant | |
| - and - | ||
Charlotte Skeens | Defendant/Respondent |
____________________
____________________
HTML VERSION OF JUDGMENT
Crown Copyright ©
Mr Justice Sweeting:
Charlotte
Skeens
(Ms
Skeens).
The application arises from concerns that she has breached undertakings given to the Court in a Consent Order dated 5 March 2025, as well as the terms of a "New Settlement Agreement" of the same date.
Skeen's
undertakings. This application clearly falls within that exception, and I am satisfied that the stay should be lifted to allow this application to proceed.
Skeens
and she attended and appeared in person. I am satisfied that she has not been prejudiced by the shorter notice period. She gave a courteous and articulate explanation of her position in court, and I was provided with her witness statements and a skeleton argument.
Skeens
was formerly employed by Chanel in its Global Reward team. Her employment ended following a First Settlement Agreement dated 29 March 2022, which contained obligations of confidentiality and her agreement not to make derogatory statements about Chanel.
Skeens
was posting on TikTok about Chanel, its group companies, and the "Chanel" brand under the alias "@Lottie.Liu", allegedly containing confidential and/or derogatory statements. This led to Chanel issuing proceedings and obtaining interim relief in August 2024, which was continued until judgment after trial.
Skeens
gave undertakings to the Court, including not to disclose Confidential Information (as defined in the order) and not to make derogatory statements concerning Chanel, subject to certain exceptions including protected disclosures under section 43A of the Employment Rights Act 1996.The Consent Order also contained a penal notice.
Skeens
posted a TikTok video (the "March TikTok"). Chanel contends that this post breaches the undertakings in the Consent Order by disclosing Confidential Information and making disparaging comments. Ms
Skeens
has suggested that she lacked capacity when the settlement terms were agreed, and that the information disclosed in the March TikTok constitutes a protected disclosure under the Employment Rights Act 1996.
Skeens
to take down the March TikTok and refrain from further publication of its contents or other confidential information concerning Chanel, as well as limited orders protecting confidential information within these proceedings.
Skeens
has breached her obligations to the Court and to Chanel. Ms
Skeens's
arguments regarding lack of capacity (if pursued) and protected disclosure will need to be fully examined at trial.
Skeens
if the injunction were granted and she subsequently succeeds at trial. Chanel argues that the continued publication of confidential information and derogatory statements will cause irremediable harm to its reputation and brand, which would be very difficult, if not impossible, to quantify in damages. Chanel highlights the potential damage in key markets.
Skeens's
financial circumstances are unclear, but there is an indication that she may find it difficult to pay a substantial award of damages. Conversely, Chanel has offered a cross-undertaking in damages which it is plainly able to meet if required to do so. The restrictions sought by Chanel are primarily focused on the specific content alleged to be in breach of the Consent Order and the New Settlement Agreement. They would not prevent Ms
Skeens
from earning a living or posting on social media generally.
Skeens's
freedom of expression in this specific area, this must be balanced against her prior agreement to the Consent Order and the need to uphold undertakings given to the Court. The penal notice attached to the Consent Order, indicates the seriousness with which breaches of its terms are viewed.
Skeens
has suggested that the Consent Order was not valid for the following reasons:
a. She claims she was still experiencing a miscarriage when she signed it.
b. She also cited "a few other reasons" for believing it was not valid, although these are not specified in detail.
c. She stated she was suffering from severe physical and emotional distress at the time.
d. She felt she was not in a fit state to properly understand, assess, or consent to the terms of the agreement due to the miscarriage and distress.
e. In a later communication, she explicitly stated she lacked capacity to make a rational decision due to her severe physical and emotional distress, which she claimed her doctor or Approved Mental Health Professional would confirm.
Skeens
has raised these points now, the Good Law Project, were representing Ms.
Skeens
at the time. While the Good Law Project informed Mishcon de Reya about Ms.
Skeens'
recent miscarriage, they also expressly confirmed that she was of sound mind. Furthermore, at no point did the Good Law Project suggest that Ms.
Skeens
lacked mental capacity or that anything prevented them from obtaining proper instructions regarding the Consent Order and the New Settlement Agreement. I asked at the hearing whether the new agreement had been signed by Miss
Skeens
so that there was no issue that she consented to it.
Skeens
has a right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Human Rights Act.
Skeens'
contractual obligations under the First Settlement Agreement and the New Settlement Agreement, as well as her obligations to the Court through the undertakings in the Consent Order.
Skeens
is threatening to post about or otherwise publicise.
Skeens's
freedom of expression in the specific area of the March TikTok and related confidential information, this must be balanced against her prior agreement to the Consent Order and the need to uphold undertakings given to the Court.
Decision on Protected Disclosure
Skeens
has said that the March TikTok contains protected disclosures. She has referred to paragraph 4.a of the Tomlin Order (which she does not accept as valid), stating that it permits her to make a protected disclosure without specifying the channel.
Skeens
must reasonably believe that the information disclosed and any allegation contained in it are substantially true, she must not make the disclosure for personal gain, one of the gateway conditions in section 43G(2) must be met, and it must be reasonable in all the circumstances to make the disclosure.
Skeens
made a complaint about her manager's conduct internally, the broad and systemic allegations made in the March TikTok Video appear to be a significant extrapolation from her earlier complaints. The hearsay evidence of other alleged witnesses coming forward, without further verification, does not at this stage satisfy me that she had a reasonable basis to believe the widespread allegations were substantially true.
Skeens
appears to rely on having previously raised the issue internally. However, the internal complaint related to specific comments by her manager, not the systemic issues alleged in the TikTok video. While Ms
Skeens
claims a fear of a cover-up, an independent investigation was conducted into her initial complaint. Furthermore, the existence of the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) as a prescribed person under section 43F of the ERA provided an alternative avenue for disclosure. Ms
Skeens
told me that she had attempted to use this avenue and had been rebuffed but there was no evidence of this apart from her assertion.
Decision on Interim Injunctive Relief
Skeens
has breached her undertakings in the Consent Order. The March TikTok Video prima facie contains derogatory statements about Chanel and discloses information relating to alleged discreditable conduct and treatment of employees, which falls within the definition of Confidential Information in the Consent Order.
Skeens
entered into these undertakings with the benefit of legal representation from Good Law Project.
Skeens's
right to freedom of expression under Article 10 with Chanel's right to protect its reputation and confidential information, and the need to uphold court orders, I am of the view that the potential harm to Chanel's reputation and business from the continued publication of the March TikTok Video is significant. This includes potential damage to relationships with customers, employees, and other stakeholders. Quantifying this damage would be very difficult.
Decision on Mandatory Injunction
Skeens
to take down the March TikTok Video is appropriate at this stage. Given the number of views the video has already received (over 17,300 within a week and now in the order of 146,000 in the last few days) and the potentially damaging nature of its content, leaving it online until a return date hearing would exacerbate the harm to Chanel. The fact that it is her own TikTok account which has received this accelerating number of views suggests that there would be a purpose in the order sought and that it would not be, as she argued, futile at this stage. Taking down the post is not a permanent step, and Ms
Skeens
can re-upload it if she is successful at a later hearing. On balance, the risk of injustice to Chanel if the video remains public outweighs the potential risk to Ms
Skeens
from its temporary removal. I therefore have a sufficiently high degree of assurance that Chanel will establish its right to this relief at trial to justify a mandatory order at this interim stage.
Decision on Confidentiality of Hearing Papers
Skeens's
promoter and the transcript of the March TikTok Video, be redacted in the open bundle and witness statements. The unredacted documents have been provided to me for the purposes of this application. Given the nature of the information and the risk that its public disclosure could undermine the very purpose of this application (the protection of confidential information and prevention of derogatory statements), I consider these limited derogations from the principle of open justice to be justified and proportionate in the circumstances.
Service
a. MsSkeens,
in her email of 10 March 2025 to Chanel's solicitors, Mishcon de Reya LLP, stated that "Email correspondence is fine as I will be going to the Middle East soon for business/ Eid. Therefore, I do not presently require any future service in person". This indicates a clear acceptance of email as a sufficient method of communication and service.
b. As noted by Ms Tan in her witness statement, MsSkeens
is about to travel abroad, although the precise dates are unknown. Permitting email service would therefore avoid the practical difficulties and potential delays associated with attempting personal service on Ms
Skeens,
especially given her imminent departure from the jurisdiction.
c. In light of MsSkeens's
stated preference for email communication and her impending travel, which would likely complicate personal service, I am satisfied that permitting service of the Application Notice and supporting evidence by email to the address provided by Miss
Skeens
is appropriate and constitutes good service in these specific circumstances.
d. This permission extends to the service of any order made pursuant to this application, unless the Court directs otherwise in respect of any mandatory injunctions requiring personal action by MsSkeens, a matter which can be revisited if necessary.
Conclusion
END