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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (King's Bench Division) Decisions >> Guildford Borough Council v Cupids Green Ltd & Ors [2026] EWHC 270 (KB) (13 February 2026) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/KB/2026/270.html Cite as: [2026] EWHC 270 (KB) |
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KING'S BENCH DIVISION
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
(sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge)
____________________
GUILDFORD BOROUGH COUNCIL | Claimant |
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| (1) CUPIDS GREEN LIMITED (2) ALFIE SAM DALY (3) JACK MIKOL JACK BRAZIL JOSEPH BRAZIL ALBERT CHAPMAN CELIA GREEN BILLY CHAPMAN FRANK EDWARD GREEN (10) WILLIAM KEAT (11) NICK CHAPMAN (12) JADWIGA AGATA SZCZECINEK (13) JAMIE ALAN WOTTON (14) SHOW SITE SERVICES LIMITED (15) NOAH GREEN (16) MARTIN CHATFIELD (17) RUSSELL JOHN EDE (18) DEAN JOHN EARLY (19) ADAM ZACKARY BAHOU (20) JOSEPH FAAM (21) JAMES OLIVER EDE (23) ASAF HOSEIN (24) HALEEMA HOSEIN (25) LIXIANG GUO (26) OLGA EUGENIA USTINOVA (27) MOHAMMAD FAAM (28) JUNBO DING (29) CAILI ZHU (30) BRIDGET CASH (31) JOSEPH STANLEY MITCHELL (32) ANGELICA CECCARELLI (33) SEAN NICHOLAS RIDGWELL (36) HOGS BACK FARM LIMITED (37) PERSONS UNKNOWN I.E. ANY PERSON OTHER THAN HE NAMED DEFENDANTS WHO HAS ALREADY MOVED ONTO THE LAND (38) PERSONS UNKNOWN I.E. ANY PERSON OTHER THAN THE NAMED DEFENDANTS WHO HAVE NOT ALREADY MOVED ONTO THE LAND (39) THOMAS CHAPMAN (40) KAREN ANN DENYER (41) SIMON WILLIAM BLANCHFLOWER (42) JACQUELINE VALERIE BLANCHFLOWER (43) VIRDZHINIYA PANCHEVA ILIEVA (44) BARRY WILLIAM DOYLE (45) SHELIA DOYLE (46) CATHERINE RACHEL AIKIN-SNEATH (47) RUBY BOYCE (48) JORDAN NEWELL |
Defendants |
____________________
Guildford
Borough
Council)
for the Claimant
Stephen Cottle (instructed by Community Law Partnership) for the Defendant no.8
Defendants nos.2, 4, 5, 9, 13, 17, 18, 21 and 44 attended unrepresented
The other defendants were not represented and did not attend
Hearing dates: 21-22 January 2026
____________________
Crown Copyright ©
DUNCAN ATKINSON KC :
INTRODUCTION
Guildford
(hereafter referred to as "the Land"). The Land in question is an agricultural field within a designated Area of Great Landscape Value and the setting of the Surrey Hills National Landscape. It is also within 400m-5km Zone of Influence for the Thames Basin Heaths Special Protection Area. The Land has been split into many parcels of land which are registered at HM Land Registry under various title numbers. There are 8 plots recorded at the Land Registry, plots A-G, and plot A has been sub-divided into 15 sub-plots, each of which has its own Land Registry title.
Guildford
Borough
Council
("the
Council")
is the local planning authority, and as such is empowered under the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 ("the Act") to restrain actual or apprehended breaches of planning control. The
Council
considers that there has been widespread unauthorised development on, and unauthorised use of, the Land, including its residential occupation. There has been a material change of use and operational development without planning permission. The
Council
also considers that there is likely to be further breaches of planning control on the Land which will include further unauthorised residential occupation.
Council
therefore seeks injunctive relief under section 187B of the Act in relation to such actual and apprehended breaches of planning control at the Land. The injunction is sought not only (a) to restrain apprehended breaches of planning control in the future ("the Restraining Elements"), but also (b) in respect of the remediation and cessation of the actual breaches of planning control which have occurred on the Land ("the Mandatory Elements").
The context of this application
Council
has already taken. The
Council
has served 20 enforcement notices in relation to the land. Some have been satisfied; some have not; and some are subject to appeal.
Planning (General Permitted Development) Order 2015, by the
Council
on 27 July 2018 in respect of the Land to restrict the operation of permitted development rights which might otherwise allow enclosures on the Land and temporary uses of the Land. In particular, this applied to the erection of any gate, fence, wall or other means of enclosure, and required that planning permission be sought for any such.
Council
are addressed in the witness statements of Darren Gregory, Senior Planning Enforcement Officer, and Joanna Searle, Planning Enforcement Team Leader for the
Council,
which were served in support, first, of the application for interim relief made on 31 July 2025, and now in support of the application for a final injunction, the hearing of which took place on 21-22 January 2026.
Council.
In brief summary:
(a) Enforcement notices had been served between 2020 and 2024 in relation to a number of instances of material changes of use of the Land from agricultural to residential use and/or storage purposes, and operational development of the Land without planning permission. Such notices related, for example, to the erection of storage and other structures on the Land, the erection of fences and the siting of caravans.
(b) On 22 January 2025, enforcement notices were served in relation to the erection of a gate, gateposts, dog kennel and further construction next to a caravan on the plot occupied by Frank Green, Defendant 9.
(c) Planning officers visited the land on 11 June 2025. They issued three enforcement notices in relation to some subdivided plots, relating to the siting of a caravan, the erection of four buildings, and the erection of gates without permission. The caravan had been sited on land being occupied by Billy Chapman, Defendant 8. A conversation with Mr Chapman on 11 June, and similarly with Joseph Brazil, Defendant 5, on 16 June 2025, prompted further concerns that another part of the land would be subject to unauthorised development. Mr Brazil indicated that he wanted to discuss the prospects of using part of the Land as an official gypsy site. Mr Brazil is alleged to have said that he wanted a transit site that could be used only for gypsy families and those families were to be local families.
(d) At a further visit on 19 June 2025, the
Council
served welfare questionnaires on a number of occupants of the Land, so as to gain an understanding of their personal circumstances. Questionnaires were posted to other defendants.
(e) On 20 June 2025, the
Council
received an email request for pre-application advice about the proposed use of the land to store commercial vehicles.
(f) During three site visits in June 2025, planning officers identified further unauthorised development in the form of unauthorised fencing, new posts, the laying of more material to create hard-surfacing without planning permission, the residential use of another caravan and increasing storage on the Land. Officers also considered that the extent and intensity of previous breaches of planning control had increased.
(g) At a further site visit on 22 July 2025, planning officers identified a new post and rail fence, opposite land which was described as plot 15. That plot, too, had been enclosed with post and rail fencing.
Council
made an application for an interim injunction to address what it described as a recent escalation of unauthorised activity on the land.
Guildford
Borough
Council
v Cupid Green Ltd [2025] EWHC 2220 (KB)), that "the detailed evidence contained in the three witness statements served on behalf of the
council
is consistent with their view that unauthorised activity on the land is escalating and that further operational development causing harm to the land (such as buildings, fencing and hardcore) will continue to be developed on the land and, pertinently, without planning permission". Against that background, he was satisfied that the
Council
had demonstrated that there was a "serious question to be tried", applying the test identified in American Cyanamid v Ethicon Limited [1975] UKHL 1; [1975] AC 396. He further found that damages were not an adequate remedy.
"First, no or no good reason has been given by the defendants to justify not seeking planning permission for the operational development which has clearly taken place on the land over a significant period of time.
Secondly, … there have been serious, flagrant and repeated breaches of planning control which have already caused material environmental harm.
Thirdly, … the evidence suggests that there is a real and significant prospect of further significant unauthorised development and further environmental harm.
Fourthly, unless restrained by an injunction, … it is, in my judgment, likely that further breaches of planning control will be committed or unlikely to be committed. If an injunction is not granted and that risk is realised, it will, in my judgment, be difficult to undo the consequential environmental harm.
Further, as the relatively long planning enforcement history shows as does the content of the 20 enforcement notices, there is no sound basis on the material before me today upon which to conclude that alternative enforcement measures will, or are likely to, prevent further breaches of planning control. …. I accept that a prosecution for a failure to comply with enforcement notices served under the Act, even if successful, would not provide the redress that is necessary to ensure effective enforcement of planning control to stop unauthorised activity on the land and to preserve the status quo pending the final determination of the claim. That is because the sanction would be limited to a fine. …"
The position of the Defendants
Council
as having an interest in the Land, or who they have identified as being in occupation of it. The
Council
also seeks to restrain the activities of persons unknown. The application is resisted by a number of the named Defendants, who have either communicated their position in writing or orally during the course of this hearing. In short, their arguments are:
(a) Defendants 2, 13 and 36 submit that their activities on that part of the Land for which they are responsible are agricultural, and therefore permitted under section 55(2)(e) of the Act. They further argue that there are extant applications for planning permission and/or a Certificate of Lawfulness of Existing Use and Development, and that it is premature for injunctive relief to be granted to the
Council
before those applications have been determined.
(b) To a more limited extent, Defendants 9 and 43 submit that their use of the land was partly agricultural, in that they kept animals on the land or erected fencing to keep animals off their crops. Such use, they argue, is agricultural, and therefore permitted under section 55(2)(e) of the Act. Defendant 9 further argues that there is extant application for planning permission in his case, and that it is premature for injunctive relief to be granted to the
Council
before this has been determined.
(c) Defendants 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, and 47 submit that they are in residential occupation of the Land, that they are members of the Traveller Community for whom no other sufficient provision has been made, and that the
Council's
application violates their rights under Article 8, European Convention of Human Rights ("ECHR"). They also assert that they have (at various belated stages) made applications for planning permission for the premises that they occupy on their land and that it is premature for injunctive relief to be granted to the
Council
before those applications, and/or appeals relating to those applications, have been exhausted.
Council's
actions, by Defendants 12, 14, 23-25, 28-29, 41-42, and 44-46. At least some of these defendants have either taken action to remedy breaches of planning control in relation to their land or have expressed their willingness to do so. This raises questions as to whether these defendants should be subject to the mandatory elements of the order sought as well as the restraining aspects, and as to their position in relation to any application as to costs.
Council.
There does seem to be a degree of uncertainty in this regard, and I will return to the implications of this below.
Council's
Part 8 Claim. Such acknowledgement of service was filed either in advance of the hearing before me, or in at least 2 instances during the course of that hearing, from Defendants 1, 2, 3, 8, 12, 13, 14, 25, 28, 29, 36 and 44. The effect of CPR 8.4, is that where there has been a failure to file an Acknowledgement of Service, the relevant party, whilst permitted to attend the hearing, cannot participate without the Court's permission.
Council's
application would or could have an impact on their use and in some cases occupation of the Land, it was in the interests of justice to do so.
Preliminary matters
Council
to add two further defendants, namely Ruby Boyce and Jordan Newell. The test for doing so is that set out in CPR 19.2(2), which provides that "The court may order a person to be added as a new party if – (a) it is desirable to add the new party so that the court can resolve all the matters in dispute in the proceedings; or (b) there is an issue involving the new party and an existing party which is connected to the matters in dispute in the proceedings, and it is desirable to add the new party so that the court can resolve that issue".
Council
in his case. That takes account of the fact that there is an ongoing boundary dispute with the registered owner of title SY856046, Catherine Aikin-Sneath, who is Defendant 46, which the parties contend should be resolved before the
Council's
application is determined in relation to those Defendants.
Council's
application to await the outcome of planning permission applications and/or appeals relating to such applications relevant to their occupation and use of the land. Similarly, on the second day of the hearing, 22 January 2026, Defendants 2, 13 and 36, applied to adjourn the proceedings in relation to them to await the outcome of their application for planning permission and/or a Certificate of Lawfulness of Existing Use and Development.
Council).
He also informed me that his son is about to have heart surgery. Aside from the evidential implications of this, it was clear that Mr Brazil's focus was on his son and his imminent medical treatment rather than on the present application, and that the imminent medical treatment also created issues as to the childcare of his other children which similarly were a distraction from his meaningful engagement with these proceedings.
Council
that he was not resident on the site, and had alternative accommodation. There was, therefore, no good or sufficient reason to adjourn the proceedings in so far as he was concerned.
Council's
application for a final injunction rather than as a preliminary or otherwise distinct exercise.
Absent Defendants.
"(1) The court may proceed with a trial in the absence of a party but – (c) if a defendant does not attend, it may strike out his defence or counterclaim (or both).
(2) Where the court strikes out proceedings, or any part of them, under this rule, it may subsequently restore the proceedings, or that part.
(3) Where a party does not attend and the court gives judgment or makes an order against him, the party who failed to attend may apply for the judgment or order to be set aside
(5) Where an application is made under paragraph (2) or (3) by a party who failed to attend the trial, the court may grant the application only if the applicant – (a) acted promptly when he found out that the court had exercised its power to strike out or to enter judgment or make an order against him; (b) had a good reason for not attending the trial; and (c) has a reasonable prospect of success at the trial."
Council's
application in their absence. The decision is to be approached by reference to any information as to whether the defendants in question were aware of the hearing, if so to their reasons for not being present, and whether their interests can be properly protected in their absence.
Relevant law
Council
v Secretary of State for Levelling up, Housing and Communities [2023] EWHC 1394 (Admin) (at para.34) that it was for the Court, when determining a claim for a section 187B injunction, to determine "whether the development was an actual or apprehended breach of planning control, if there was a dispute about that".
Council
v Lee [2019] EWHC 756 (QB) (at para.46) that the Court is not required to evaluate the prospects of success for any such appeal in considering enforcement action taken by the local planning authority under section 187B of the Act. HHJ Dight (sitting as a Judge of the High Court) observed that "it would be sensible for the court not to shut its mind to the possibility of an appeal being successful, but it is not… for me to evaluate the real chances of success".
Council
v Porter [2004] UKHL 33 (referred to hereafter as "South Buckinghamshire") and more recently by Holgate J in Ipswich
Borough
Council
v Fairview Hotels (Ipswich) Ltd [2022] EWHC 2868 (KB) (referred to hereafter as "Ipswich").
(a) The Court has a discretion as to whether to grant an injunction. As Lord Bingham said (South Buckinghamshire, para.28): "The permissive "may" in subsection (2) applies not only to the terms of any injunction the court may grant but also to the decision whether it should grant any injunction. It is indeed inherent in the concept of an injunction in English law that it is a remedy that the court may but need not grant, depending on its judgment of all the circumstances."
(b) The court must decide whether in all the circumstances it is just to grant an injunction. Lord Bingham observed (South Buckinghamshire, para.29): "The discretion of the court under section 187B, like every other judicial discretion, must be exercised judicially. That means, in this context, that the power must be exercised with due regard to the purpose for which the power was conferred: to restrain actual and threatened breaches of planning control. The power exists above all to permit abuses to be curbed and urgent solutions provided where these are called for.
(c) There is no single test for the court's discretion should be exercised in favour of granting an injunction because it is a fact-specific assessment. However (South Buckinghamshire, para.29): "Where it appears that a breach or apprehended breach will continue or occur unless and until effectively restrained by the law and that nothing short of an injunction will provide effective restraint…, that will point strongly towards the grant of an injunction. So will a history of unsuccessful enforcement and persistent non-compliance, as will evidence that the defendant has played the system by wilfully exploiting every opportunity for prevarication and delay, although section 187B(1) makes plain that a local planning authority, in applying for an injunction, need not have exercised nor propose to exercise any of its other enforcement powers under Part VII of the Act…"
(d) In this regard, the Court in Chelmsford City
Council
v Mixture [2024] EWHC 1006 (KB) observed: "There can be no justification for wilful and persistent non-compliance with the Enforcement Notices and the continued use of the Land in breach of planning control" (paragraph 43) and that the fact that "The Defendant has not complied with any of the Enforcement Notices served by the Claimants and has displayed no willingness to do so" meant that "His conduct indicates a wilful, and flagrant, disregard for the integrity of the planning system" (paragraphs 45 to 46).
(e) A local planning authority cannot exercise its power under section 187B unless it considers it necessary or expedient to restrain a breach of planning control by seeking an injunction rather than some other means of enforcement (South Buckinghamshire, para.71).
(f) Although it is not for the court to question the correctness of planning decisions which have been taken, the court should come to a broad view about the degree of environmental damage resulting from the breach and the urgency, or otherwise, of bringing it to an end (South Buckinghamshire, para.38, approving the observations of Brown LJ in the Court of Appeal).
(g) The achievement of the legitimate aim of preserving the environment does not always outweigh countervailing rights or factors. Injunctive relief is unlikely to be granted unless it is a commensurate remedy in the circumstances of the case. Ultimately, it is the court's task to strike the balance between competing interests weighing one against the other. (South Buckinghamshire, para.38, approving the observations of Brown LJ in the Court of Appeal).
(h) The hardship likely to be caused to a defendant by the grant of an injunction to enforce the public law will always be relevant to the court's decision whether or not to grant the injunction. In many cases, the hardship prayed in aid by the defendant will be of sufficient weight to counterbalance a continued and persistent breach of planning control. Lord Bingham said (South Buckinghamshire, para.31): "When application is made to the court under section 187B, the evidence will usually make clear whether, and to what extent, the local planning authority has taken account of the personal circumstances of the defendant and any hardship an injunction may cause. If it appears that these aspects have been neglected and on examination they weigh against the grant of relief, the court will be readier to refuse it. If it appears that the local planning authority has fully considered them and none the less resolved that it is necessary or expedient to seek relief, this will ordinarily weigh heavily in favour of granting relief, since the court must accord respect to the balance which the local planning authority has struck between public and private interests."
(i) In that regard, Lord Scott added (South Buckinghamshire, para.102): "The hardship likely to be caused to a defendant by the grant of an injunction to enforce the public law will always, in my opinion, be relevant to the court's decision whether or not to grant the injunction. In many, perhaps most, cases the hardship prayed in aid by the defendant will be of insufficient weight to counter balance a continued and persistent disobedience to the law. There is a strong general public interest that planning controls should be observed and, if not observed, enforced. But each case must depend upon its own circumstances."
Difference of restraining and mandatory elements
Council
depending on the circumstances that apply to a particular defendant. Where, on the balance of probabilities, the Claimant can show that there are proper grounds to anticipate a breach of planning controls on land for which a particular defendant is responsible, it may be appropriate to restrain such a breach by that defendant and/or to require that defendant to prevent such a breach on that land. However, where there has either been no breach of planning controls on that land, or that defendant has not been responsible for any such a breach, it may not be appropriate additionally to impose mandatory requirements on them to make good a breach for which they are not responsible, and which they could not reasonably have prevented. Where, however, a breach has occurred for which they can be held responsible, or which they could reasonably have prevented, the position would be otherwise, and mandatory requirements in their case may be appropriate.
Breaches of planning control
Council
defendant by defendant, and those defendants who had attended the hearing were given the opportunity to make submissions in this regard. It is also convenient to address those defendants in relation to whom there is issue as to ownership of the land as part of this review.
(1) Defendant One: Cupids Green Ltd.
Council
that this title of land had been sold as sub-plots to Defendants 9-12. Defendant 1 asserts that there has been delay in the registration of its sale of the land by the Land Registry.
Council
does not suggest that Defendant 1 was responsible for these breaches of planning control. However, it is submitted that on the balance of probabilities the Court can proceed on the basis that the defendant is still responsible for Lot A1, because it has not proved that it has devolved that responsibility.
(a) Defendant 2 asserts his legal ownership of that part of Plot A1 under his control in the statement he made to support his opposition to the making of the injunction. Joanna Searle, in her third statement suggests that "he may be subject of the pending application on title SY864326", to which she also refers.
(b) Defendant 3, similarly, asserts his legal ownership of that part of Plot A1 under his control in his Acknowledgement of Service, although that is not backed up by a witness statement. Joanna Searle, in her third statement, says that "the evidence suggests that Jack Mikol owns some of the Land registered under Title SY8564326 to Cupids Green Ltd.".
(c) Defendant 4 asserted at the hearing that he owned that part of Plot A1 under his control, although he had not committed to that in any written document.
(d) Defendant 8, on a site visit by the
Council,
asserted that he was the legal owner of a part of Plot A1. He has made a witness statement to the same effect. His partner, Defendant 7, also asserted that her son, Defendant 6, was an owner of the land. The
Council
received a voicemail from Defendant 6 denying this.
(e) Defendant 9, through his responses to the
Council
and his witness statement, accepts ownership of parts of Plot A1. Joanna Searle, in her third statement, draws a distinction between parts of the land that can be shown to belong to Defendant 9, and that which is registered to Defendant 1 as to which she says "the extent of that ownership has not been evidenced".
(f) There has been no engagement during these proceedings by Defendant 10. However, Defendant 11 did tell the
Council,
in a telephone call, that he was the owner of a part of Plot A1, albeit that this has not been addressed in any evidence from him.
Council
on 5 January 2026 to that effect. The Claimant submits that where certainty has not been established through Land Registry records, it would be inappropriate for a party with arguable responsibility for the land to be absolved of responsibility for making good demonstrated breaches of planning control. The result otherwise could be that no one could be compelled to make such breaches good.
(2) Defendants 2, 13 and 36: Alfie Day, Jamie Wooton and Hogs Back Farm Ltd.
Council,
stated "the land under my control is used solely for agricultural purposes, including livestock keeping and breeding (pigs, poultry, ducks), cultivation, land care and daily farm operations". He also accepted that he was in residential occupation of the Land. Defendant 13 agreed as to this categorisation of the use of the land, save that he denied that he was in residential occupation. Through Defendants 2 and 13, Defendant 36's position is that the Land is being used for agricultural, and thus permitted, purposes.
Council
asserts that there is mixed use of the Land both for agricultural purposes, which are permitted, and residential purposes, which are not. There has also, it is asserted, been a material change of use in that a number of structures have been located on the land, such as livestock enclosures. An enforcement notice was served in December 2025 which came into effect on 15 January 2026, which required the removal of three buildings from Defendant 2's land. He has sought to appeal that enforcement notice, but has not sought planning permission for the structures on his land. He submits this is not necessary because the structures are related to his agricultural use of the land. The Defendant has undertaken further work to the site since becoming aware of the
Council's
objections, such as the erection of further fencing.
Council
contends that there have been operational developments to the land, such as the erection of fencing and livestock enclosures, which involve a mixed use of the land. Similarly, the
Council
point to Defendant 13's use of the land for the storage of vehicles and the use of containers, a caravan and a horsebox for storage and, potentially, for residential purposes. Defendant 13 denies living on site, and asserts that a horsebox with heating was an office. The Defendant has continued development of the site despite awareness of the enforcement notice of which they represent a breach.
Council's
requirements.
Council's
injunction, argued that his operation on the Land fell within the definition of agriculture in section 336 of the Act, and therefore did not require planning permission. Defendant 13 made the same assertion in his late arriving Acknowledgment of Service. In that document, Defendant 13 also asserted that their farm operated under a valid CPH number, and complied with agricultural regulations.
Council's
response to this is that it is not the agriculture use of the land that requires permission, but the erection of structures on site, and its use both for non-agricultural purposes such as storage and for residential purposes. The
Council
also rely on the Article 4 Direction which since 27th July 2018 has mandated that the erection of fences and other animal enclosures required planning permission. In relation to the residential use of the land, it is right to note that Defendant 2's position has changed with time. His position, for example in response to the Welfare Questionnaire from the
Council,
was that 24/7 occupancy of the site was necessary to monitor and feed the animals. At the hearing, he indicated that he planned, when his resources permitted, to move off site and visit it as required for animal care, and that it was his lack of means at present to acquire such off-site premises that required him to reside on site.
Council
on 7 January 2026, Defendant 2 took issue with the scope of the order as to the area of land that he would be required to make good under the injunction, if granted. It went beyond the land that he owned and occupied.
(3) Defendant 3: Jack Mikol
Council's
last visit on 27 November 2025, but a quantity of logs had appeared which the
Council
understood to belong to Defendant 2. That defendant confirmed this at the hearing. It follows that there is still unauthorised storage taking place on the land, but less clear that this is the responsibility of Defendant 3, as opposed to something that he had not prevented from occurring. The use of the land for storage was the subject of an enforcement notice, which was unsuccessfully appealed. It follows that Defendant 3 has accepted action in breach of planning control on land for which he is responsible.
(4) Defendants 4 and 5: Jack and Joseph Brazil
Council
that Joseph Brazil "has nothing to do with the land", and that he was no longer connected to the mobile home on the land. In a witness statement from Defendant 5, he stated that he had stayed with Defendant 4 on site following his separation from his wife, and that his plan was to reside there in the future. It follows that Defendant 5 accepts that he has been and wishes to use the land for residential purposes, contrary to the terms of the enforcement notice, and in breach of planning control.
(5) Defendant 6: Albert Chapman
Council
to have occupied a caravan on land with title SY856046, and to have been responsible for the hard standing on which that caravan was located. That information was provided by his mother, Defendant 7. However, on 30 July 2025, Defendant 6 informed the
Council
that he was "no longer the owner of the land". Defendants 7 and 8 now reside in the caravan, and Defendant 8 has applied for planning permission. There is therefore uncertainty as to ownership by Defendant 6 of the land, and continued responsibility for it. The
Council
argues that that uncertainty should be resolved in its favour, in the absence of any engagement by Defendant 6 with these proceedings since July 2025, lest otherwise no one be held liable to make good the breaches of planning control to the land. However, the only evidence that Defendant 6 is responsible is the hearsay provided by his mother, whereas his direct assertion is to the contrary.
(6) Defendants 9 and 47: Frank Green and Ruby Boyce
Council,
he identified himself as the owner of plots 20a-c, whereas Defendant 1 had told the
Council
that it had sold plots 20a and c to Defendant 9, which fall within SY864326 which is still recorded as the property of Defendant 1, rather than title SY892315, and had sold plot 20b to Defendant 10. Defendant 9's position is that he and his partner, Defendant 47, occupy the land and that he has done so for 5 years. He is visited on site by his children, although they otherwise reside with his ex-partner elsewhere. He describes his use of the land as a mixture of residential and agricultural. He accepts that he had not obtained planning permission for the structures erected on the land, or for its residential occupation.
Council
contends that these structures represent a further development of the site after Defendant 9 had become aware of its concerns as to such development. I am satisfied that Defendants 9 and 47 are responsible for a series of breaches of planning control before and after the Kinnier order was made. Defendant 9 has made an application for planning permission, and this may therefore be remedied.
(7) Defendants 10 and 11: William Keat and Nick Chapman
Council
that Defendants 10 and 11 had acquired sub-plots that had been part of Plot A1 from them, although such ownership is not reflected in Land Registry records. Neither defendant has engaged with these proceedings, although Defendant 11 did speak to the
Council
on 28 July 2025 to say that he was the owner of a plot of land that was, as far as he was concerned, empty. That description appears to be accepted by Joanna Searle in her third statement. So far as Defendant 10 is concerned, the breach of planning control appears to be the erection of the structures occupied by Defendant 9 on land that Defendant 1 says belongs to Defendant 10, but which Defendant 9 says belongs to him. There is, therefore, no evidence that either Defendant is responsible themselves for any breach of planning control, and there is some uncertainty as to Defendant 10's ownership or control of the land.
(8) Defendant 12: Jadwiga Szczecinek
Council
as the purchaser in 2020 of plot 6A, which appears to be part of title SY864326, a small plot to the rear of plot A1. According to Joanna Searle's third statement, Defendant 12 responded to the welfare questionnaire sent to her by the
Council
to say that she had purchased the plot of land but had not visited it since her purchase. Ms Searle records that on the
Council's
last visit in November 2025, there was a metal structure and various other items stored on the land, and there was thus a breach of planning controls. On 7 December 2025, Defendant 12 asked the
Council
to remove her from the ambit of the injunction because her plot was clear. That is a description accepted by the
Council,
as at 11 January 2026. It follows that the
Council
seeks only the restraining elements of the injunction in the case of Defendant 12, who does not dispute her ownership of the relevant part of the Land.
(9) Defendant 14: Show Site Services Ltd.
Council
visit to the land, there were piles of material dumped on site. In their Acknowledgement of Service, Defendant 14 states "we agree this needs to stop. We need a resolution on how to remove the people, cars, skips and any other material that has been illegally left on the site". In their welfare questionnaire response Defendant 14 states that the land was bought as an investment and is not used by them. They add that the state of the land would prevent its onward sale. They do not argue that they are not responsible for clearing the site of that which others have dumped there.
(10) Defendant 15: Noah Green
(11) Defendant 16: Martin Chatfield
Council
personnel attended the land to serve an enforcement notice, in part in relation to a caravan on land within title SY884043. Defendant 16 was present, threw the enforcement notice at the personnel and told them to "get off my caravan". He had also been seen by
Council
personnel on the land on other occasions. He has not otherwise engaged with the
Council.
The caravan of which he claimed ownership represents a development of the site without permission, and a breach of planning control.
(12) Defendants 17, 18 and 21: Russell Ede, Dean Early and James Ede
Council,
but could not produce evidence from the Land Registry to confirm this. In each case, there was another identified defendant to whom responsibility for actual breaches of planning control could be attributed.
(13) Defendant 19: Adam Bahou
Council
as the occupier of land registered to Defendant 18 on the adjacent plot, Title SY904705. The land occupied by Defendant 19, according to the
Council's
evidence, is being used for storage, and hard standing and fencing have been installed for this purpose in contravention both of planning control and served enforcement notices. There is also evidence of bonfires being used on site. There is no evidence that Defendant 19 is in residential occupation of the land under his control. He has not engaged with the
Council,
and there is no evidence from him before the Court to disassociate him from responsibility for making good unauthorised development of land for which he has responsibility.
(14) Defendants 20 and 27: Joseph Faam and Mohammed Faam
Council
understands Defendant 20 to have occupied one of these at one stage. On a site inspection on 19 June 2025, there was evidence that this caravan was being lived in, and Defendant 27, who was on site, told the
Council
personnel to speak to Defendant 20 about this. Defendant 27's land has also been used for storage purposes. On 23 July 2019 an enforcement notice had been issued in relation to this plot, requiring the removal of that which was stored there, including a horse box, a JCB excavator, trailers, vehicles and building materials. Defendants 20 and 27 both appealed against this enforcement notice, but their appeal was refused on the basis that the Inspector appointed by the Secretary of State rejected the defendants' assertions as to their agricultural use of the land, and the agricultural connection of the various items stored there.
(15) Defendants 23-24, 26, and 32-33: Asaf and Haleema Hosein, Olga Ustinova, Angelica Ceccarelli and Sean Ridgewell
Council's
evidence is that this plot of land appeared to be clear, and that there was nothing on which the mandatory elements of the order would bite. Defendant 26 is the registered owner of Title SY863533, also referred to as lot C1. The
Council's
evidence is that no unauthorised development of this plot has been noted. Similarly, Defendants 32 and 33 ae the joint owners of title SY851173, also referred to as lot G. As with the land of Defendant 26, the
Council's
evidence is that no unauthorised development of this plot has been noted. In the case of each of these defendants, accordingly, the
Council
seeks only the restraining elements of the injunction, to prevent future unauthorised development of the land.
(16) Defendants 25 and 280-29: Lixiang Guo, Junbo Ding and Caili Zhu
Council
site visit on 27 November 2025, this plot was being used for the grazing of pigs. This use in itself does not give rise to issues. However, fencing had been erected to confine the animals and there was evidence of other unauthorised development, in terms of piles of hardcore and other materials which Joanna Searle suggests in her third statement could have crossed onto plot B1 from the adjacent plot A1. Defendant 25, in her Acknowledgement of Service, stated that "since the land of lot B1 was purchased, I haven't done anything to this land. I was not aware of what other people did to the land". In her response to the
Council's
welfare questionnaire, Defendant 25 added that they were not living on the land and had not encouraged anyone else to do so.
Council's
efforts to clear the Land.
(17) Defendants 30-31: Bridget Cash and Joseph Mitchell
Council's
site visit of 27 November 2025, there was fencing and the remains of previous unauthorised building. This was despite an enforcement notice which had required the removal from the land of "all buildings, works and paraphernalia brought onto the land to facilitate the unauthorised equestrian use…" Although it is accepted that Defendants 30 and 31 were not the owners of the land at the time of that enforcement notice, it runs with the land, and they therefore acquired an obligation to address that notice when they acquired the land. The Defendants have not engaged with the
Council
in relation to this notice, or the present proceedings. There is therefore no basis advanced by them to dissociate them from the requirement to make good unauthorised development of this land.
(18) Defendant 39: Thomas Chapman
(19) Defendants 40 and 48: Karen Denyer and Jordan Newell
Council
on 16 September and 27 November 2025, wood was being stored on this land, which represents a breach of planning control. At the hearing on 21 January 2026 Defendant 48, as he has become, identified himself as responsible for this storage of wood, which he said was incidental to his agricultural activities at a different location (not a part of the Land with which this case is concerned). It was not possible to elicit further information from Defendant 48 about the more precise use of the wood, and whether it related to commercial activity or not, because he did not return for the second day of the hearing on 22 January 2026. In that regard, it is of note that Defendant 40, in her welfare questionnaire response, states that she had bought the land for her "tree surgeon son", who "wanted it to prepare and store logs". It is not clear whether this referred to Defendant 48, or a further person using this plot of land for similar, and similarly unauthorised, purposes.
(20) Defendants 41-42 and 44-45: Simon and Jacqueline Blanchflower, and Barry and Sheila Doyle
Council's
site inspection, there was evidence of engineering operations on this land, by reference to the levelling of the ground, introduction of hardcore material and fencing. Defendant 41 had contacted the
Council
on 8 October 2025 to advise that they had not undertaken any work to their land, and that any work there had been undertaken without their knowledge or permission. They did not oppose the injunction. In their welfare questionnaire response, they undertook to make good any unauthorised development of their land, and I was advised at the hearing that they had done so. The
Council
therefore only seeks that Defendants 41 and 42 be made subject to the restraining elements of the injunction.
Council's
site inspection, there was evidence of engineering operations on this land, by reference to fencing. In their response to the welfare questionnaire, Defendants 44 and 45 advised that they were not using their land, and that any use thereof was without their consent. Defendant 45 spoke to Joanna Searle on 6 October 2025, and it was explained that her land was covered by the ambit of the injunction, and she and Defendant 44 would be added as defendants. She raised no objection to this course, and said that she and Defendant 44 had been unaware of the works undertaken on their land.
Council
disputes this and points to the note Ms Searle made of the conversation on 6 October. However, that note reads, in this regard, "Sheila (Defendant 45) asked me what her rights were and whether she could clear her land now if she wanted to. I said I thought she could if her land but I advised her to seek legal advice" and "She said she may visit the site to gain a proper update and asked about safety on the site. I explained that our risk assessment is to attend with the police and suggested she may be able to view enough from the land she owns to the south without entering the land to the north." In my view, it would be reasonable for someone in Defendant 45's position to understand what was there recorded as a warning not to go onto the land where remedial work was required without police support.
(21) Defendant 43: Virdzhiniya Ilieva
(22) Defendant 46: Catherine Aikin-Sneath
Council
accepts that Defendant 46 was not responsible for these breaches of planning control herself, but there have nevertheless been a series of such breaches on land for which she is responsible. In her response to the welfare questionnaire, Defendant 46 acknowledges this, and supports the
Council's
action to prevent such unauthorised activity.
Overall assessment
Council
v Secretary of State for Levelling up, it is for the Court to determine whether there have been actual or anticipated breaches of planning control on the land in relation to which injunctive relief is sought. I agree with the assessment of Andrew Kinnier KC, that "…there have been serious, … and repeated breaches of planning control …" and that "… the evidence suggests that there is a real and significant prospect of further significant unauthorised development …" Direct responsibility for these breaches varies between the named Defendants, but there is a proper basis for finding that those with either ownership or occupation of the land should be restrained from future breaches in relation to further mixed or residential use of the land, and that those with a responsibility, direct or otherwise, for existing breaches should be required to make them good.
Flagrancy of breach
Council
v Mixture, it is appropriate to consider the degree to which a breach can be said to be wilful or flagrant in determining whether to impose mandative injunctive relief to prevent its continuance or recurrence. Put shortly, the more flagrant the breach, the more ready this Court should be to grant such injunctive relief. As I have just observed, direct responsibility for these breaches varies between the named Defendants, and therefore the degree to which the breaches identified above can be said to be flagrant will itself vary.
Council
shows the land to be of environmental sensitivity, by reference to its designation as within Area of Great Landscape Value and the setting of the Surrey Hills National Landscape. It is also within 400m-5km Zone of Influence for the Thames Basin Heaths Special Protection Area. In the skeleton argument served on behalf of Defendant 8, before his case was adjourned, submissions were made as to whether the land was correctly regarded as being characterised as green belt, and thus protected from development, or whether it should be regarded as grey belt, and thus more amenable to such development. The third statement of Joanna Searle, served on behalf of the
Council,
explains why the
Council
takes issue with that submission.
Council
is the "local body democratically-elected and accountable" for the determination of "planning applications" (by reference to paragraph 11 of South Buckinghamshire), that "issues as to whether or not planning permission should be granted are exclusively a matter for" local planning authorities, like the
Council,
and "respect should be accorded to the decisions" of such authorities (see paragraph 18 of South Buckinghamshire). It follows that I can, and should, approach the breaches I find there to have been of planning control to have occurred in the context of unauthorised development of green belt land which, by reason of its designation, calls for particular protection.
Council
had given permission "just across the road" from the land with which this case is concerned. Further enquiry has shown that this is fact a reference to a planning application, which was made on 22 December 2025 and is yet to be decided, to build 420 dwellings outside Tongham, and thus approximately 3.2km away from the land. Although this planning application relates to unallocated land, it is adjoining allocated land (that is land allocated for development by the
Council),
and it is not within the green belt. I am satisfied that there is no comparison between that application and the present proceedings, and that any decision to be taken by the
Council
there would not undermine its stance here.
(a) In site notes from the
Council's
inspection 19 June 2025, Defendant 2 was noted to be agitated and aggressive towards
Council
personnel;
(b) Similarly, Darren Gregory records Defendant 2 as shouting at the
Council
personnel on their further inspection on 27 July. He also noted aggressive behaviour by others on site on that occasion;
(c) Joanna Searle's second statement records the behaviour of Defendant 16 on the site visit of 11 December 2024, when he let loose his dogs and shouted abusively at the
Council
personnel;
(d) Ms Searle has also made a note if a telephone conversation with Defendant 39 in which he was abusive toward her in the most deplorable fashion.
(a) The evidence of Darren Gregory demonstrates that new breaches of planning control were identified on each of the
Council's
inspection visits, meaning that further development of the land was being undertaken despite the service of enforcement notices;
(b) As a particular example, Joanna Searle in her first statement describes new developments by Defendant 9 of the plot for which he is responsible between her site visit on 22 July 2025 and her next visit on 16 September. In particular, he had erected a structure next to his caravan which was attached to concrete blocks cemented into the ground, and erected a dog kennel. Defendant 9 addressed this at the hearing, by reference to further photographs that he provided and which on their face showed that he had made these changes after the hearing on 31 July 2025 when his case was adjourned and before the hearing on 10 October when he entered undertakings in the same terms as the interim injunction. These were nevertheless developments undertaken after that injunction had been made and served.
(c) Similarly, on the site visit of 27 November 2025,
Council
personnel identified a number of significant developments in breach of planning control in relation to the site. These included the storage of logs, for which Defendants 2 and 13 accepted that they were responsible, in connection with the making of charcoal which they contended was an agricultural pursuit. It also included the erection by them of fencing, the installation of a water butt and the importing of a horsebox which the
Council
personnel suspected was intended for residential occupation. Defendant 13 at the hearing explained that this was for use as an office, albeit with the inclusion of a wood burner for use in cold weather.
Council
is correct overall to characterise the breaches of planning control they identify as flagrant. That is particularly because of where the breaches took place, and the nature of the land. It is also because of the continuing nature of the breaches despite orders, including the interim injunction, which should have precluded them.
Planning harm
Council
contend, there has been significant planning harm to date, this would provide strong support for the case for the mandatory elements of an injunction so that such harm can be remedied, and, if there is a risk that there will be significant planning harm if further development and occupation takes place on the Land, then the case for the restraining elements of the injunction would similarly be strengthened.
Council,
was not the subject of serious challenge at the hearing. Indeed, given that it included a large number of photographs taken on a number of site visits undertaken by the
Council,
which are graphic illustrations on the harm caused by the unauthorised breaches of planning control, it would have been difficult to do so. In summary, the evidence provided by Darren Gregory, the
Council's
Senior Planning Enforcement Officer, in his first statement, dated 3 July 2025, was to the effect that:
"the breaches of planning control on the Land which have occurred previously have already made a deleterious transformation of the land from an attractive open green field site to a subdivided unsightly field with haphazard unauthorised development … It is considered that the impact of this unauthorised development within the Green Belt will harm the character and appearance of the immediate and surrounding area, including the intrinsic value of the Area of Great Landscape Value. Further, there is a serious risk that further unauthorised development will likely have an adverse ecological impact on the land. Any new unauthorised residential development would also cause harm to the Thames Basin Special Protection Area as increased residential occupation is deemed to cause harm to the habitats of the wild birds that are protected at this European Site."
Council
Planning Enforcement Team Leader, which was the foundation for the
Council's
decision to seek injunctive relief. This included the assessment of Surrey County
Council's
Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty ('AONB') Officer, which was summarised as follows:
"the landscape of this field where relatively small plots have bene sold has significantly been spoiled by the unauthorised developments that have taken place. They are clearly visible to the public passing along the adjacent main road. In my long experience it is one of the worst examples I have seen of harmful unauthorised developments… The field is within the setting of the Surrey Hills National Landscape just tot eh south. Natural England's proposal to extend the Surrey Hills National Landscape are fairly advanced and include this field. Natural England's landscape consultants whop have extensive experience in defining National Park and National Landscape/AONB boundaries, and whether they possess sufficient natural beauty for designation, assed this site before such extensive unauthorised development took place. Following the public consultation the proposed extension across this field still remains and will be included in their submission to the Secretary of State for designation toward the end of this year or early 2026. It is reasonable to conclude that the underlying landscape value and setting of this field still remain and such harmful development will be removed in time following planning enforcement and the sites will be restored".
Council's
determination in this regard, and I have proceeded on the basis of it. Had I been required to reach a determination on this issue, on the material that I have seen I would in any event have reached the conclusion for which the
Council
contends.
Council
that it is not meeting this 5 year supply. In this regard, consideration is necessary of paragraph 13 of the Planning Policy for Traveller Sites ('PPTS'). However, for reasons explained by Joanna Seale in her third statement, this consideration is to take place alongside consideration of the NPPF, rather than instead of it. It follows that the
Council
is required to consider the sustainability benefits of a site for travellers, together with consideration of its location, and shortfalls in terms of transport sustainability.
Council
has undertaken that assessment, on the material I have seen. By way of example, in her third statement, Ms Searle said "Whilst recognising the
Council
is not meeting traveller accommodation needs at this time, and noting the absence of alternative sites …given the identified harm to the Green Belt, landscape character of the area, including the area of great landscape value and setting of the National Landscape, and due to the other concerns articulated in the enforcement report pertaining to the Thams Basin Special Protection Area and ecological concerns, I am of the view that very special circumstances have not been found in this particular case and the development would not be supported if a planning application was submitted. I consider this to be the case in relation to both a temporary and permanent permission, as the harm to the Green Belt and the National Landscape is considered to be significant and something which cannot be tolerated even on a temporary basis".
Council's
submission that, as set out in South Buckinghamshire and in Ipswich, the need to enforce planning control in the public interest is a relevant consideration. There is a need to uphold the integrity of the planning enforcement system and there is a public interest in ensuring effective enforcement, particularly such as in cases like here where intentional unauthorised development has continued notwithstanding efforts by the LPA to take enforcement action.
Proportionality
Council
(pursuant to section 178), or prosecution for non-compliance with enforcement notices (pursuant to section 179) would have presented suitable remedies for such breaches.
Council
v Flynn [2025] EWHC 1458, where Alison Morgan KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, accepted that
Council's
submission that such lesser steps would have been insufficient. The learned Deputy High Court Judge said (at paragraph 75): " I note that the Claimant did not seek to remedy the position itself by removal of the site. Nor did it seek to prosecute any or all of the Defendants for non-compliance of the Enforcement Notice. Whilst these are steps that could have been taken by the Claimant as alternatives to seeking an injunction, I accept the submission of the Claimant that neither route would have led to an appropriate or proportionate remedy in the circumstances of the case. The former would have involved considerable public expenditure. The latter would have involved a criminal sanction and would not have achieved the objective of removing the materials from the site which amounted to breaches of planning control. I consider that there was good and sufficient reason for the Claimant to conclude that neither remedy was an appropriate way of dealing with the breaches."
Council
believed that trying to rely solely on less invasive statutory redresses, such as the enforcement notices which have already been served at the Land would be insufficient to address the apprehended material harm. A prosecution will, if successful, only result in a fine and will not remedy the material harm and will not offer an urgent solution. Direct action under section 178…could remedy the existing harm however the complex nature of the ownership and regular sub-division and sale of the Land is such that it is limited to the identified harm subject to an Enforcement Notice and would to prevent further harm. The
Council
believes only an injunction will provide adequate protection against the material harm to the Land and its special character."
Council
has issued a series of enforcement notices in relation to a succession of unauthorised breaches of planning control. These notices have in some cases been challenged on appeal, but more often they have been ignored, and been succeed by further breaches rather than compliance. The
Council,
to a similar end, obtained an Article 4 direction in July 2018, and issued a Community Protection Notice, in March 2025, as against Defendant 14 . These too have not prevented the very kind of unauthorised development at which each was aimed. I am satisfied on this basis that as in the East Hertfordshire case, and for similar reasons, Mr Gregory's assessment is correct and lesser measures that injunctive relief will not be sufficient.
Council
considered lesser measures before it applied for the interim injunction, and concluded that they would be insufficient for the reasons also set out by Mr Gregory in his statement.
Human rights
Council
has taken account of the personal circumstances of the defendants, and any hardship that they will be occasioned. This also involves, necessarily, my consideration of the application of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ('ECHR') to these defendants, and the extent to which the Injunction will infringe these rights.
Council
to the defendants right to private and family life, as protected by Article 8, ECHR. This states:
"1 Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
2 There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others."
"102 Where a dwelling has been established without the planning permission which is needed under the national law, there is a conflict of interest between the right of the individual under Article 8 of the Convention to respect for his or her home and the right of others in the community to environmental protection. When considering whether a requirement that the individual leave his or her home is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, it is highly relevant whether or not the home was established unlawfully. If the home was lawfully established, this factor would self-evidently be something which would weigh against the legitimacy of requiring the individual to move. Conversely, if the establishment of a home in a particular place was unlawful, the position of the individual objecting to an order to move is less strong. The Court will be slow to grant protection to those who, in conscious defiance of the prohibitions of the law, establish a home on an environmentally protected site. For the Court to do otherwise would be to encourage illegal action to the detriment of the protection of the environmental rights of other people in the community.
103 A further relevant consideration, to be taken into account in the first place by the national authorities, is that if no alternative accommodation is available, the interference is more serious than where such accommodation is available. The more suitable the alternative accommodation is, the less serious is the interference constituted by moving the applicant from his or her existing accommodation.
104 The evaluation of the suitability of alternative accommodation will involve a consideration of, on the one hand, the particular needs of the person concerned— his or her family requirements and financial resources— and, on the other hand, the rights of the local community to environmental protection. This is a task in respect of which it is appropriate to give a wide margin of appreciation to national authorities, who are evidently better placed to make the requisite assessment."
"Questions of the family's health and education will inevitably be of relevance. But so too, of course, will countervailing considerations such as the need to enforce planning control in the general interest and, importantly therefore, the planning history of the site. The degree and flagrancy of the postulated breach of planning control may well prove critical. If conventional enforcement measures have failed over a prolonged period of time to remedy the breach, then the court would obviously be the readier to use its own, more coercive powers" (p.1377D)
"Relevant too will be the local authority's decision under section 187B(1) to seek injunctive relief. They, after all, are the democratically elected and accountable body principally responsible for planning control in their area. Again, however, the relevance and weight of their decision will depend above all on the extent to which they can be shown to have had regard to all the material considerations and to have properly posed and approached the article 8(2) questions as to necessity and proportionality." (p 1377G)
Borough
Council
v Gray and others [2023] EWHC 2161 KB (hereafter 'Waverley'), when (at paragraph 112) she observed: "I remain conscious of the duty to uphold lawful decisions made by planning authorities. I must also bear in mind the consequences of a final injunction when there are no alternative sites available, and the defendants are likely to resort to unauthorised roadside camping which would lead to further environmental harm and hardship for the families and children in terms of their welfare needs not being met. These are significant factors militating against the grant of a final injunction on the facts of this case."
"• The best interests of a child are an integral part of the proportionality assessment under article 8 ECHR;
• In making that assessment, the best interests of a child must be a primary consideration, although not always the only primary consideration; and the child's best interests do not of themselves have the status of the paramount consideration;
• Although the best interests of a child can be outweighed by the cumulative effect of other considerations, no other consideration can be treated as inherently more significant;
• While different judges might approach the question of the best interests of a child in different ways, it is important to ask oneself the right questions in an orderly manner in order to avoid the risk that the best interests of a child might be undervalued when other important considerations were in play;
• It is important to have a clear idea of a child's circumstances and of what is in a child's best interests before one asks oneself whether those interests are outweighed by the force of other considerations;
• To that end there is no substitute for a careful examination of all relevant factors when the interests of a child are involved in an article 8 assessment; and
• A child must not be blamed for matters for which he or she is not responsible, such as the conduct of a parent."
Council
submits that their approach can be distinguished from that of the claimant in the Waverley case on the basis that the evidence shows that they did review their assessment of the balance of competing factors, and the implications of Article 8 and the First Protocol, Schedule 1 to the ECHR, as new information came to light, and they have continued to do so up to and including at the hearing on 21-22 January 2026. In that regard, the
Council
points to:
(a) The Enforcement Authorisation Report includes a detailed consideration of the application of Article 8 to the application of an injunction that would involve a number of persons being displaced from their homes. It noted that the
Council
had issued welfare questionnaires to those caravans that were suspected of being used for residential purposes.
(b) At the time that Andrew Kinnier KC granted the interim injunction on 31 July 2025, no replies had been received. The
Council
sent out such welfare questionnaires on a number of occasions thereafter, and the responses received are addressed in the statements served on behalf of the
Council
for the purposes of the present application, and have been considered by me.
(c) The statement of Darren Gregory provided to Andrew Kinnier KC in support of the application for the interim injunction also addressed the application of Articles 6 and 8, ECHR and of Protocol 1, Article 1. It also addressed the
Council's
Public Sector Equality Duty under section 149, Equality Act 2010.
(d) Mr Gregory's second statement addressed the further assessment of these matters in the light of further information, for example about Defendant 4, that had come to light. This specifically included consideration of the implications of action by the
Council
on Defendant 4's children.
(e) On 29 September 2025, Joanna Searle completed an Equalities Impact and Public Sector Duty Assessment, which considered the 37 identified defendants and persons unknown, and the implications of the
Council's
action, the interests of their children where applicable, and the application of Article 8, ECHR and of Protocol 1, Article 1. She undertook a further such assessment in an updated Equalities Impact and Public Sector Duty Assessment relating to 46 individuals and persons unknown, on 15 December 2025.
(f) Ms Searle developed that assessment in her third witness statement dealing with the 46 defendants that had been identified by that stage, and the position of Defendant 47 as she has since become. This involved a detailed defendant by defendant assessment by reference to their welfare questionnaire responses and, where applicable, to the interests of their children, and/or the application of Article 8, ECHR and of Protocol 1, Article 1. This, therefore, considered the implications for Defendants 2, 9 and 47 regarding their residential use of the land. It also considered the position of the children of Defendants 4, 9 and the fact that Defendant 47 is pregnant.
Council
does follow a careful reassessment of the balance of factors relevant to an application for injunctive relief in the present circumstances, by reference to all the information now available to them. This is not a case where the
Council
is "pursuing it to a final injunction without pausing to re-evaluate the appropriateness of the use of coercive measures on becoming aware as to personal circumstances of the individuals they were concerned with", as was assessed to be the case by the learned Deputy High Court Judge in Waverley
Borough
Council
(see paragraph 113). Indeed, comparison between the present case and the assessment there provides support for the
Council's
application, rather than weighing against it.
(a) Defendants 2, 13 and 36:
(b) Defendant 5
(c) Defendants 9 and 47
(d) Other Defendants
Decision re named defendants
(a) There has been widespread unauthorised development on and unauthorised use of the Land, involving material changes of use and operational development without planning control. Such breaches will continue unless they are restrained.
(b) It is necessary and expedient for the Claimant to seek to restrain existing breaches of planning control, and to prevent future breaches by way of an injunction rather than other methods of enforcement.
(c) The existing breaches have been clear and flagrant, resulting in significant planning harm within the Green Belt, to the intrinsic character of an Area of Great Landscape Value and to the setting of the National Landscape. The planning harm also has both an environmental and ecological impact, and it undermines the integrity of the planning system.
(d) The injunction sought is proportionate to this harm, and has been sought taking account of the personal circumstances of the defendants, and their rights under Article 8 of the ECHR and Article 1, Protocol 1 to the ECHR. The order has also been sought taking account of the interests of children who could be affected by it. Such interference as the order causes is lawful, proportionate and justified, as it is for a legitimate aim, taking account of the hardship it may occasion some of the defendants.
(e) I am supported in that view by the time that will be permitted for lawful planning processes to be completed, and the time that will be afforded for compliance with the mandatory terms of the order. The order is, therefore, a commensurate and proportionate measure.
Council
makes an application in relation to its costs. In relation to those whose cases I have adjourned (defendants 4, 7, 8), costs will be reserved. In general, those made subject to this order should be jointly and severally liable for the Claimants' costs. However, I do not consider that this should apply to those defendants who have never opposed the order and who have either taken steps to put right any unauthorised development, or who never had anything to make good on their land. I therefore exclude the following from the ambit of the order that I make as to costs Defendants 11, 12, 23-24, 26, 32-33, 41-42, and 44-45.
Persons unknown
Council
has amply demonstrated that, despite their best endeavours there has been and remains uncertainty as to the legal owners of the land, and thus for it so be effective the injunction needs also to address others who have or may take up occupation of the land who are at present unknown.
Council
and others London Gypsies and Travellers and others [2023] UKSC 47; [2024] 2 WLR (hereafter 'Wolverhampton'), the Supreme Court considered whether and, if so. the circumstances in which 'newcomer' injunctions may be imposed. After a detailed and careful consideration of the competing arguments, potential issues and justifications for such orders, the Court concluded (at paragraph 167) that " …there is no immoveable obstacle in the way of granting injunctions against newcomer Travellers, on an essentially without notice basis, regardless of whether in form interim or final, either in terms of jurisdiction or principle. But this by no means leads straight to the conclusion that they ought to be granted, either generally or on the facts of any particular case." The Court also made clear (at paragraph 170) that such newcomer injunctions were not "constitutionally improper" and 'so far as the local authorities are seeking to prevent the commission of civil wrongs such as trespass, they are entitled to apply to the civil courts for any relief allowed by law.'
(i) There is a compelling need, sufficiently demonstrated by the evidence, for the protection of civil rights (or, as the case may be, the enforcement of planning control, the prevention of anti-social behaviour, or such other statutory objective as may be relied upon) in the locality which is not adequately met by any other measures available to the applicant local authorities (including the making of byelaws). …
(ii) There is procedural protection for the rights (including Convention rights) of the affected newcomers, sufficient to overcome the strong prima facie objection of subjecting them to a without notice injunction otherwise than as an emergency measure to hold the ring. This will need to include an obligation to take all reasonable steps to draw the application and any order made to the attention of all those likely to be affected by it …; and the most generous provision for liberty (ie permission) to apply to have the injunction varied or set aside, and on terms that the grant of the injunction in the meantime does not foreclose any objection of law, practice, justice or convenience which the newcomer so applying might wish to raise.
(iii) Applicant local authorities can be seen and trusted to comply with the most stringent form of disclosure duty on making an application, so as both to research for and then present to the court everything that might have been said by the targeted newcomers against the grant of injunctive relief.
(iv) The injunctions are constrained by both territorial and temporal limitations so as to ensure, as far as practicable, that they neither outflank nor outlast the compelling circumstances relied upon.
(v) It is, on the particular facts, just and convenient that such an injunction be granted. It might well not for example be just to grant an injunction restraining Travellers from using some sites as short-term transit camps if the applicant local authority has failed to exercise its power or, as the case may be, discharge its duty to provide authorised sites for that purpose within its boundaries."
Council's
site visits have highlighted and (c) the breaches of the Pittaway Order. In that last regard, I am satisfied that the
Council
has carried out notification of that Order in compliance with its terms. Beyond the evidence from the
Council in this regard, I have heard submissions from Defendants 2, 4, 9 and 13 as to the activities of unknown persons fly tipping on the site both before and after the Pittaway Order was made, which fortifies me in the conclusion that an order that addresses the activities of persons as yet unknown is imperative.
(a) The terms of the Order are clear and precise and go no further than that which is necessary to restrain the apprehended breaches of planning control. The "prohibited acts" have not been "described in terms of a legal cause of action, such as trespass or nuisance" but have been defined "in non-technical and readily comprehensible language which a person served with or given notice of the order is capable of understanding without recourse to professional legal advisers" (paragraph 224 of Wolverhampton).
(b) There are geographical and temporal limits. There is a map attached to the draft Order. Further, and in line with Wolverhampton, the proposed order will have a duration of 1 year, with persons having liberty to apply as appropriate.
Decision re persons unknown