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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Queen's Bench Division) Decisions >> Jeffreys v The Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2017] EWHC 1505 (QB) (04 May 2017) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2017/1505.html Cite as: [2017] EWHC 1505 (QB), [2018] WLR 3633, [2017] 4 Costs LO 409, [2018] 1 WLR 3633 |
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QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
Strand London WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
____________________
ROBERT JAMES JEFFREYS |
Claimant |
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- and - |
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THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE FOR THE METROPOLIS |
Defendant |
____________________
trading as DTI 8th Floor, 165 Fleet Street, London, EC4A 2DY
Tel No: 020 7404 1400 Fax No: 020 7404 1424
Web: www.DTIGLO BAL.com Email: TTP@dtiglobal.eu
(Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
LISA DOBIE (instructed by Weightmans LLP) appeared on behalf of the Defendant
____________________
Crown Copyright ©
MR JUSTICE MORRIS:
Introduction
The Order
"2. For the period 5 June 2014 to 27 July 2016, the Claimant do pay the Defendant's costs to be subject to detailed assessment on the standard basis in default of agreement.
3. The Claimant do pay 70% of the Defendant's costs of today, to be subject to detailed assessment on the standard basis in default of agreement.
4. As to enforcement of the costs under part 2 and 3 of this order, the Defendant be permitted under CPR 44.16(2)(b) to enforce the order for costs in its favour to the extent of only 70%."
Factual background
"The Claimant claims damages, including aggravated and exemplary damages for wrongful arrest, false imprisonment, assault and battery, malicious prosecution and misfeasance in public office arising out of the actions of the police officers acting in the purported performance of their police functions under the direction and control of the Defendant on 29 September 2009.
As a direct consequence of the actions of the police officers under the direction and control of the Defendant, the Claimant has suffered, pain suffering and loss of amenity.
Value
The value of the claim is in excess of £15,000 but not more than £50,000 to include a claim for pain suffering, and loss of amenity which exceeds £1,000..."
"By reason of the matters set out above, the Claimant has suffered pain, distress, anxiety and inconvenience, injury to feelings and loss of liberty."
Then, under the subheading "Particulars of Loss" within that paragraph, the Appellant identified four distinct elements of loss, namely: (a) loss of liberty; (b) soft tissue injuries and swelling to the hands; (c) exacerbation of existing medical condition; and (d) distress, humiliation, fear and upset.
The "existing medical condition" referred to in subparagraph (c) is a reference to the Appellant's pre-existing medical condition of paranoid schizophrenia.
Relevant provisions
"Qualified one-way costs shifting: scope and interpretation
44.13
(1) This Section applies to proceedings which include a claim for damages -
(a) for personal injuries:
(b) under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976; or
(c) which arises out of death or personal injury and survives for the benefit of an estate by virtue of section 1(1) of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934;
but does not apply to applications pursuant to section 33 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 or section 52 of the County Courts Act 1984 (applications for pre-action disclosure), or where rule 44.17 applies.
(2) In this Section, 'claimant' means a person bringing a claim to which this Section applies or an estate on behalf of which such a claim is brought, and includes a person making a counterclaim or an additional claim.
Effect of qualified one-way costs shifting
44.14
(1) Subject to rules 44.15 and 44.16, orders for costs made against a claimant may be enforced without the permission of the court but only to the extent that the aggregate amount in money terms of such orders does not exceed the aggregate amount in money terms of any orders for damages and interest made in favour of the claimant.
...
Exceptions to qualified one-way costs shifting where permission require d
44.16
(1) Orders for costs made against the claimant may be enforced to the full extent of such orders with the permission of the court where the claim is found on the balance of probabilities to be fundamentally dishonest.
(2) Orders for costs made against the claimant may be enforced up to the full extent of such orders with the permission of the court, and to the extent that it considers just, where –
(a) the proceedings include a claim which is made for the financial benefit of a person other than the claimant or a dependant within the meaning of section 1(3) of the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 (other than a claim in respect of the gratuitous provision of care, earnings paid by an employer or medical expenses); or
(b) a claim is made for the benefit of the claimant other than a claim to which this Section applies.
(3) Where paragraph (2)(a) applies, the court may, subject to rule 46.2, make an order for costs against a person, other than the claimant, for whose financial benefit the whole or part of the claim was made."
"'claim for personal injuries' means proceedings in which there is a claim for damages in respect of personal injuries to the claimant or any other person or in respect of a person's death, and
'personal injuries' includes any disease and any impairment of a person's physical or mental condition..."
The learned judge's judgment
"I am clear that only an ancillary part of the claim was the personal injury aspect of the claim and I remind myself that this was a claim where the claimant sought both exemplary and aggravated damages by virtue of the defendant's misconduct, none of which was ultimately proved."
"It is artificial if not irrational to divide up the personal injury claim from the false imprisonment, malicious prosecution and assault claim. It is all wrapped up together. It is indivisible, inseparable and the exacerbation of the paranoid schizophrenia was in effect as a result of all these matters. Thus, Miss Khan submits that the personal injury element is not a separate element of the claim, and I should reach the conclusion that 44.16(2)(b) does not apply because the claim is not made for the benefit of the claimant other than a claim to which this section applies."
"I am clear that in this case, this was a claim for serious wrongdoing, including a claim for aggravated and exemplary damages alleging against the defendant false imprisonment, malicious prosecution and assault and also a personal injury claim, but I have no doubt that this was a claim made for the benefit of the claimant other than a claim to which the section applies, in other words personal injury. It would be, in my judgment, quite impossible, looking at the claim form and the pleadings, the causes of action relied upon, the way the case was opened and importantly the disputed issues of fact which emerged after five days of evidence and which were eventually encapsulated in the questionnaire (which I formulated and left to the jury) for me to reach any other conclusion. It would be, in my judgment, quite wrong for this to be characterised as a personal injury claim alone. It plainly was not.
I reach the clear conclusion, therefore, that this was a claim made for the benefit of the claimant other than a claim to which this section applies and, for the avoidance of doubt, those claims or causes of action in this case, other than personal injuries were, in my judgment, assault, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution and misfeasance in public office. As to misfeasance in public office, it is clear to me that that stood or fell with the malicious prosecution."
The appeal
Permission to appeal
"Because there is no reported case which deals with the central question directly, and it is a matter of some potential importance, I have not refused permission as I might otherwise have been inclined to do, but have set out my tentative thoughts in case they may assist the parties and the court hearing the appeal, for which I grant permission. My observations are not to be treated as binding in any way."
The parties' submissions
(1) The Appellant's submissions
(1) The claim for the exacerbation injury was caused by the misfeasance claims.
(2) There were also non-personal injury monetary claims based on the malfeasance claims.
(3) However, the case does not fall within CPR 44.16(2)(b) because the non-personal injury claims and the personal injury claims cannot be divided. Rather they are intrinsically linked because they are based on the same cause of action. The allegation was that the whole incident caused the personal injuries and it is not possible to separate out the particular cause of action which caused the personal injury. This is to be contrasted with a case where the false imprisonment and malicious prosecution allegations caused no personal injury but where there is a separate assault which separately caused personal injury.
The Respondent's submissions
Discussion and analysis
(1) The true construction of CPR 44.16(2)(b)
"In order to give it meaning, I suspect a court should hold that it is intended to cover a situation in which a claim is made which, if it stood in proceedings on its own, would not attract Qualified One-Way Costs Shifting. If so, then in any proceedings which include both a claim and a separate claim for personal injuries, it is open to the court to permit an exception to Qualified One-Way Costs Shifting to the extent it thinks just."
(2) Did the claims in the present case fall within CPR 44.16(2)(b)
personal injury claims were not either "integral or consequential" to the personal injury claim. Further, in my judgment, there is nothing in the commentary in the White Book Q&A which supports the concept of divisibility.
(3) Can an order be made under CPR 44.16(2)(b) where the claimant's claim has been dis missed in its entirety?
Conclusion