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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Technology and Construction Court) Decisions >> Bovis Lend Lease Ltd v RD Fire Protection Ltd [2003] EWHC 939 (TCC) (06 February 2003) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/TCC/2003/939.html Cite as: [2003] EWHC 939 (TCC), 89 Con LR 169, (2003) 89 Con LR 169 |
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Queen's Bench Division
Technology and Construction Court
B e f o r e :
____________________
Bovis Lend Lease Limited (formerly Bovis Construction Limited) |
Claimant |
|
| and |
||
R D Fire Protection Limited |
First Defendant |
|
| And |
||
| (1) Huthco Limited |
First Claimant |
|
| (2) Baris UK Limited |
Second Claimant |
|
| and |
||
Bovis Lend Lease Limited (formerly Bovis Construction Limited) |
Defendant |
____________________
Bovis,
instructed by Masons, 100 Barbirolli Square, Manchester, M3SS DX: 14490 Manchester 2 Ref: MDH/MJH/CB /MAN.222508. 1.
Mr John Slater QC and Mr Sean Brannigan appeared for the first defendant, R D
Fire,
instructed by Berwin Leighton Paisner, Bouverie House, 154 Fleet Street, London, EC4A 2JD, DX: 103 London, Ref: DLJ/JLG/01132686.
Mr Mark Raeside QC appeared for the second defendant, Baris, instructed by Laura Harry, Company Solicitor, Baris UK Limited, Baris House, Nunn Brook Road, County Estate, Huthwaite, Notts, NG17 2HU.
Hearing: October 2002
____________________
VERSION
OF JUDGMENT
Crown Copyright ©
1. Introduction
very
large shopping and leisure centre in Braehead, Glasgow by
Bovis
Lend
Lease
Limited, then called
Bovis
Construction Limited ("
Bovis")
for Braehead Glasgow Limited ("Braehead"). The contract was entered into on 18 December 1997 in a heavily amended JCT Standard Form of Building Contract, with Contractor's Design, 1981 Edition and the Contract Sum was £184,240,776.00. The performance of this contract gave rise to wide ranging disputes between Braehead and
Bovis
of considerable factual complexity.
Bovis
claimed additional loss and expense and damages in the total sum of approximately £37.7m and Braehead counterclaimed recovery of alleged overpayments, liquidated damages and damages for defective work and mismanagement in the total sum of at
least
£65.8m. Thus, the sum total of the differences between the parties was at
least
£103.5m. This
vast
litigation between these parties was ultimately compromised by a settlement agreement dated 11 January 2002 and this agreement provides the basis of the preliminary issues.
Bovis
acted as management contractor for the project and the works were sub-divided into works packages entered into by
Bovis
with a large number of different sub-contractors. Two of these intended works packages were for
fire
protection
and dry lining works and a company, now called Baris UK Limited, ("Baris") was appointed by
Bovis
to undertake this particular works package. Baris contends that no contract was ever entered into but
Bovis
contend that a sub-contract incorporating the tender documents and tendered standard conditions was agreed and governed the relationship.
Bovis
and Baris on the pleadings as to which of two companies carried out work for and, if there was a contract, contracted with
Bovis.
The company who tendered for the works package, Huthco Limited, sold all its assets to, and became a wholly owned subsidiary of, Baris who contends that it was the relevant company who contracted with
Bovis,
if there was a contract at all, and who carried out work for
Bovis
on a restitutionany basis after 12 August 1998 if there was not. Formally, however, Baris' claims are brought by both companies jointly and severally against
Bovis.
In response,
Bovis
does not admit that Baris is the appropriate party to make claims against it but it claims an abatement, set-off and counterclaim solely against Baris. It would, therefore, appear to be accepted by both parties that Baris is the appropriate party if a contract was entered into. Baris would also appear to be the appropriate party for any restitutionary claim for work carried out after 12 August 1998. Both companies are, however, parties to, and will be bound by the answers to, the present issues. In this judgment, I will refer to Baris as the relevant party although, strictly speaking, that is a reference to Baris and Huthco Limited both collectively and individually.
Bovis
appointed Baris on a date which has yet to be established to carry out the
fire
protection
and dry lining works described in the two works packages, numbered 2500 and 4200. The work was defined in the main contract. The potential dates for carrying out this work were agreed to be, for the purpose of these issues, either 28 January 1998 or 12 February 1998. If, as
Bovis
contends, a sub-contract was entered into with Baris, that sub-contract was an essentially simple contract containing only certain essential terms or was one incorporating heavily amended standard DOM/2 Articles of Agreement used with heavily amended standard DOM/1 Conditions of Contract. No direct employer/subcontractor agreement between Baris and Braehead was ever entered into. Baris started work on site in April 1998 and was undertaking work on site until April 1999, by which time it had completed most but not all of the work contained within the two relevant works packages. However,
Bovis
had progressively removed parts of these works packages from Baris in reliance on clause 4.5 of the DOM/1 Conditions of Contract which allows a main contractor to employ other sub-contractors to take over parts of the works in place of a defaulting sub-contractor.
Bovis
appointed
RD
Fire
to complete the
fire
protection
works by means of a new works package numbered 4201. This sub-contract also contained the DOM/2 standard Articles of Agreement used with the DOM/1 standard Conditions of Contract, both being heavily amended in a similar way to the amendments to the sub-contract or attempted sub-contract with Baris.
RD
Fire
continued to carry out these works up to Practical Completion of the main contract on 21 September 1999 and into 2000. On 10 March 1999,
RD
Fire
provided
Bovis
with a warranty in respect of all the
fire
protection
works whose terms are relied on by
Bovis
to make claims against
RD
Fire
for defects and incomplete work arising in the totality of the
fire
protection
work including that previously carried out by Baris. For the purpose of the trial and determination of the issues that I am currently concerned with, the parties agreed that it was to be assumed that Baris carried out approximately 90% of the
fire
protection
works by
value
and
RD
Fire
approximately 10%.
Bovis
against Braehead on 14 May 2001 in which
Bovis
claimed the balance of the contract sum allegedly due to it under the main contract and damages for breaches of contract arising out of the delays and disruption it claimed that Braehead had caused it. It is these proceedings that gave rise to
Bovis'
net claim for about £37.7m having taken into account the sum it had already been paid by Braehead of about £216.4m.
Bovis'
claims. In summary, Braehead contended that:
(1) the truevalue
of
Bovis'
work was about £6m less than it had already paid
Bovis;
(2)Bovis
had by its mismanagement of the project caused Braehead loss of about £5.6m which it counterclaimed from
Bovis;
(3)Bovis'
claim for about £37.7m included at
least
about £21.7m which represented the cost of its own mismanagement which was not recoverable from Braehead;
(4)Bovis
was liable to pay Braehead damages of at
least
about £46.7m representing damages for defective work in a wide ranging list of defects including defects to the
fire
![]()
protection
work;
(5)Bovis
was liable to pay Braehead about £7.4m liquidated damages for alleged delayed completion of the main contract works.
When all these defences and counterclaims were aggregated, Braehead's claim was for a total of about £65.8m, a figure that took into account Braehead's
view
as to the overall
value
of
Bovis'
work and the sums that Braehead had already paid
Bovis.
Bovis
joined
RD
Fire
as a part 20 defendant to the Braehead counterclaim, essentially claiming an indemnity for any loss or damages it had incurred as a result of Braehead's claims based on defective or incomplete
fire
protection
works including such works as Baris had undertaken.
Bovis
also brought into this action a number of other part 20 defendants, being
various
subcontractors and
various
bondsmen of sub-contractors who were concerned with other parts of the works that also formed part of Braehead' s counterclaim.
Bovis.
The net sum claimed was about £1.9m. In these proceedings,
Bovis
disputed the sum claimed and served a counterclaim which claimed damages arising out of
Bovis'
alleged entitlement to remove work from Baris' sub-contract with the consequent need to employ
RD
Fire
to undertake at greater cost that part of Baris' work. The counterclaim also arose out of Baris' allegedly defective work. The defects included all of those relied on by Braehead in those areas where Baris undertook
fire
protection
work. Thus,
Bovis
was seeking from Baris an indemnity for all losses that it considered arose or would arise out of Baris' allegedly incomplete, delayed and defective
fire
protection
works.
fire
protection
works, were ordered to be tried together since they involved many common facts and issues. The trial, had it taken place, would have started on 23 September 2002 for 14 working days. The trial of all remaining issues in both actions would have followed in separate trials immediately following this first trial.
Bovis
action against Braehead and Braehead's counterclaim against
Bovis
were never tried because
Bovis
and Braehead settled all claims and counterclaims against each other in a settlement agreement dated 11 January 2002. This settlement was attached to the terms of an order dated 18 January 2002 staying the action between
Bovis
and Braehead. The terms of this order had been agreed to by both these parties.
Bovis'
outstanding claims against
RD
Fire
and the other part 20 defendants and the claims and counterclaims in Baris' action against
Bovis.
On 12 April 2002, the trial of all issues arising out of
Bovis'
claims against
RD
Fire
and Baris in relation to the
fire
protection
works was fixed to start on 3 October 2002 for 6 working days.
Bovis
had not, by then, sought to amend its case so as to base its respective claims against
RD
Fire
and Baris on the settlement it had reached with Braehead or even to rely on that settlement or adduce its terms in evidence.
Bovis
contended and still contends that, despite that settlement, it is entitled to present its claims against
RD
Fire
and Baris on the same basis as it had pleaded them prior to its settlement with Braehead.
RD
Fire
had not, by then, pleaded a defence and Baris had not pleaded a defence to
Bovis'
counterclaim. These pleadings were served on, respectively, 29 August 2002 and 6 September 2002. Both relied on the
Bovis
- Braehead settlement as providing a complete defence to the claims being advanced against them. If
RD
Fire
and Baris succeed in these contentions,
Bovis'
defective works claims against them will fail without the need to investigate the factual allegations on which they are based.
protection
works on a site that was not in the parties' control and which was a busy shopping mall open for trading for long hours seven days a week. This access was needed to enable the experts to investigate and report on the defects which
Bovis
was seeking both to rely on and to found its claims. As a result, shortly before trial, all parties were lacking
vital
factual, expert and
valuation
evidence that was needed for a fair trial of both liability and quantum.
Bovis'
claim on was relevant to that claim should be tried as issues of law on agreed assumed facts. I acceded to that suggested course since it was a proportionate and cost effective way of deciding these difficult threshold questions of law that arose out of the settlement.
2. The Pleaded Claims and Defences
2.1. Braehead's Claims and
Bovis'
Defences in Braehead's Action
Bovis'
general obligations to carry out and complete both the design and construction of the works. Braehead, indeed, contended that the effect of particular amended provisions of the standard conditions had the effect of making
Bovis
entirely responsible for the design of the works including the design work undertaken by consultants since their pre-existing engagements with Braehead were novated by the terms of the main contract in favour of
Bovis.
In relation to the
fire
protection
works, it was alleged that these were defective or non-compliant with statutory requirements in containing excessive gaps between different component parts, inadequate or missing materials and inadequate workmanship. The result was to compromise the integrity of the
fire
protection
system and health and safety generally. A detailed scott schedule accompanied the pleading. This listed each defect complained of and the particular provisions of the main contract relied on as giving rise to the breach. The greater part of the claim related to items of alleged bad workmanship. The claim was quantified at approximately £4.8m, a sum that was made up of costs which were, in the main, those described as being reasonably necessary to remedy the defects with a small additional sum being claimed which was described as additional work costs. A further schedule provided an abstract of these remedial costs.
Various
experts' reports served by Braehead identified the nature, scope and location of the alleged defects.
Bovis
did not serve a detailed defence to these allegations prior to the settlement but generally denied the allegations.
2.2.
Bovis'
Claims against
RD
Fire
and Baris
Bovis'
claim against
RD
Fire
is based on the works package sub-contract entered into so as to obtain the completion of the
fire
protection
works following the removal of parts of Baris' work from Baris. The pleading continues:
"If and in so far asBovis
is liable to Braehead in respect of the alleged defects to the
fire
![]()
protection,
as Braehead contends, then
Bovis
claims damages and/or an indemnity from
RD
![]()
Fire
in respect of such liability."
The same particulars of breach, remedial work, costs of repair and loss were pleaded as Braehead had pleaded against
Bovis.
Bovis
pleaded as follows:
"The sums claimed, being thevalue
of
Bovis'
contractual rights under the Main Contract with Braehead which were impaired by Braehead withholding payments against defects in the
fire
![]()
protection
works under Clauses 13.4 and 30 of the Main Contract."
One of the assumed facts is that the relevant withholding occurred at
least
from January 2001 following
Bovis'
final application for payment, being application 60 made on 11 January 2001. A global sum of £23,787,962 was withheld from sums recommended for certification and payment by Braehead's quantity surveyors and
Bovis
has elected to apportion the entirety of this particular claim by Braehead to that withholding. On a proportionate basis, the sum withheld is around 50% of the then size of the claim.
Bovis
pleaded as follows:
"Further and in any event,Bovis
has suffered its own loss and damage of the same kind and amount as suffered by Braehead, in that, as a result of the defects,
Bovis'
performance interest under the Sub-Contract was damaged, because
RD
![]()
Fire
did not provide
Bovis
with the benefit of the bargain entered into under the Sub-Contract, ie the benefit of a proper discharge of the Sub-Contract."
Bovis
and Braehead reached the settlement that lies at the heart of these issues. Following that settlement,
Bovis
served further pleadings aimed at elucidating its case against
RD
Fire
in the light of that settlement. This reiterated the claim made in the original particulars of claim save that
Bovis
now accepted and averred that Braehead's allegations were well-founded.
Bovis
alleged that the remedial works defined in the pleadings were reasonably necessary.
Bovis
contended that
RD
Fire
was liable as a result of the warranty
RD
Fire
had provided in the sub-contract to the effect that it certified and guaranteed that all structural members which required
fire
protection
had been carried out using specified boards.
Bovis'
case is that the phrase in the warranty:
"all structural members" in context refers to all members on the site including those already
fire
protected
by Baris rather than referring only to such members as
RD
Fire
was itself to
protect.
Bovis
now indicated that the quantum of each of its separate bases of claim had increased to £6.4m. This sum included the entirety of Braehead's claim against
Bovis
and further works and costs not claimed by Braehead. The overall claim was identified as being made on the basis of:
Bovis
having been exposed to a claim from and having incurred a liability to Braehead; an impairment of
Bovis'
rights to payment under the main contract; and of a loss of
Bovis'
performance interest under the subcontract. Overall,
Bovis
pleaded that it had suffered loss and damage of the kind and in the amount pleaded.
Bovis
pleaded that:
"The settlement ... was a global settlement in which no specific sum was attributed to the defects in thefire
![]()
protection.
... the settlement reflected its liability to Braehead and the impairment of its rights [to payment]."
RD
Fire
and Baris,
Bovis
contended that:
"Bovis
did make a financial loss by entering into the settlement caused by
RD
![]()
Fire's
breaches amongst other causes. But it is impossible to say what that loss was and so no claim is made in respect of it."
Bovis
also applied at the hearing for permission to amend its claim to add this alternative plea which would only be pursued if its primary case for £6.4m failed:
"In entering into the settlementBovis
... made a reduction of an unascertained amount from the sums otherwise due from Braehead to
Bovis.
The global settlement represented an overall discount on Braehead's counterclaims of 22%. On a pro rata basis 22% of £6.4m is £1.4m."
Bovis'
claim as now being made on each of the three basis previously claimed (reimbursement of loss and the impairment of
Bovis'
contractual rights and its performance interest) but as now being a claim under each head for each of three alternative sums: £6.4m (the enhanced sum) or £4.8m (the sum claimed by Braehead and previously claimed by
Bovis)
or £1.4m (a new sum based on an arithmetical reduction of 22% of the claim for £6.4m. I must decide whether to grant
Bovis
permission to amend in this way.
fire
protection
work, that Braehead does not intend to carry out any remedial works in relation to
fire
protection,
that
Bovis
has no means of carrying out such work but that the remedial works described in the pleadings are reasonably necessary to rectify the incomplete and defective nature of the
fire
protection
and that their likely total cost is £6.2m. However, the Building Control officers material to the shopping centre, it is agreed, have raised on concerns about the
fire
protection
actually installed and they have inspected and passed the Centre. Furthermore,
RD
Fire's
works were certified as having been complete and free from patent defects in December 2001. The parties accept that
Bovis
has no legal right to enter the Centre to carry out remedy the fine
protection
works. It is also agreed that it is to be assumed that Baris carried out approximately 90% by
value
and
RD
Fire
10% by
value
of the
fire
protection
works.
2.2.2. Baris
Bovis
relied on exactly the same remedial works and costs relating to the entirety of the
fire
protection
works totalling £6.4m as it is claiming from
RD
Fire.
However, in a subsequent pleading,
Bovis
made it clear that it was limiting its claim to that part of the
fire
protection
work actually installed by Baris.
Bovis
also claimed so-called domestic losses, being ones that could not be passed onto Braehead and which were not accommodated in the settlement, totalling £2.lm.
Bovis
has given notice that it will seek to amend its counterclaim against Baris to allege that, if no sub-contract was ever concluded, Baris owed
Bovis
a duty of care and was negligent. The same facts to support the existence of this duty and its breach and the resulting loss to
Bovis
will be relied on as have been alleged in relation to the breach of contract.
RD
Fire
and the same case concerning the settlement is also pleaded. However, these claims are pleaded as set offs, abatements on counterclaims against Baris' substantial claims for further payment for its works.
Bovis
seeks equivalent amendments against Baris as it seeks against
RD
Fire.
2.3. Summary of Claims and Cross Claims
RD
Fire
and
Bovis,
the final account
value
of
RD
Fire's
work has been agreed in the sum of £2,459,617.39. This made no allowance for defective or incomplete work or
Bovis'
counterclaim. All but £4,025.78 of this sum had been agreed by Braehead prior to the settlement.
2.3.2. Baris
value
of its work.
Bovis
has agreed that £3,876,062.00 of this sum is due to Baris on the basis that it takes no account of defective and incomplete work or of
Bovis'
counterclaims. Braehead had agreed that the
value
of Baris' work was £3,898,454.00 so that the difference between
Bovis
and Baris'
valuation
was £1,894,688.00 with a further £49,387.19.
2.3.3. Braehead's Withholding
least
£23,787,962 from sums recommended for payment to
Bovis
by Braehead's quantity surveyors following
Bovis'
final application for payment submitted on 19 January 2001. This withholding was on account of alleged overpayments to
Bovis
and Braehead's claims based on alleged mismanagement, liquidated damages, defective work and interest. If the sum withheld is apportioned amongst the totality of these claims, a sum of about £2.0m, being less than half of the sum then being claimed for
fire
protection
defects, would have been withheld.
3. The Issues
1. In the light of the contents of the Agreed Statement of
Assumed Facts dated [ ] January 2003 and in the light of
Bovis'
pleaded case that:
(a) bothRD
![]()
Fire
and Baris were in default, whether from breach of contract on bad workmanship, in causing the pleaded defects; and
(b) those defects causedBovis
to be in breach of its main contract with Braehead; and
(c) those breaches caused Braehead to make substantial claims againstBovis;
and
(d) Braehead andBovis
also made many other substantial claims and counterclaims against each other; and
(e)Bovis
and Braehead entered into a global settlement dated 11 January 2002 which settled all those claims and counterclaims; and
(f) the settlement causedBovis
to make a financial loss by entering into it; and
(g) the settlement was caused byRD
![]()
Fire
and Baris' defaults amongst other causes; and
(h) it is impossible to say what that loss was that was made byBovis;
and
(i)Bovis
continues to claim from
RD
![]()
Fire
and Baris for those alleged defaults both the totality of the claim that had been made by Braehead for those defects that had been pleaded against
Bovis
prior to the settlement and an additional substantial sum as well, is
Bovis
precluded from recovering from either
RD
![]()
Fire
on Baris as loss pursuant to a contractual indemnity and/or as damages for breach of contract and/or by being taken into account in any restitutionary
valuation
of Baris' work the sums pleaded by
Bovis
or any sum by reason of any or all of the following:
(1) the settlement betweenBovis
and Braehead is a global one;
(2) there is no identifiable or traceable sum in the settlement which is attributable to the default ofRD
![]()
Fire
or Baris respectively (or cumulatively);
(3) there is no acceptable means of measuring, calculating,valuing
or assessing the extent of the loss which
Bovis
asserts it suffered on account of
RD
![]()
Fire
and Baris' default by reason of the settlement;
(4) there is no basis included inBovis'
pleaded case to support a case that
Bovis
sustained any loss in the settlement as a result of the alleged default on liability of
RD
![]()
Fire
on Baris;
(5) the sums claimed byBovis
do not reflect the result of the settlement;
(6)Bovis'
reliance upon "hypothetical" remedial schemes, i.e. schemes which have not yet been carried out, which
Bovis
is not required by the terms of the settlement even to carry out, and for which there is no evidence that they will ever be carried out?
2. (1) What is the effect of the decision in Pacific Associatesv
Baxter [1990] 1 QB 993 on
Bovis'
claims against
RD
![]()
Fire
and Baris insofar as these claims are based on Braehead's pleaded claims against
Bovis
based on the direct cost of repairs?
(2) Is it the case that the settlement betweenBovis
and Braehead acted as a break in the chain of causation in respect of any or all of
Bovis'
claims for loss based on the direct cost of repairs?
(3) Is it the case that the settlement extinguished all or any of the losses claimed byBovis
based on the direct cost of repairs?
3. As toBovis'
application to amend its replies against
RD
![]()
Fire
and Baris and
RD
![]()
Fire
and Baris' applications to strike out
Bovis'
those replies:
(1) Should either or both ofBovis'
replies served on 24 September 2002 be struck out pursuant to
RD
![]()
Fire's
application to strike out dated 27 September 2002 which is also relied on by Baris in making a separate application of its own?
(2) ShouldBovis
be permitted to amend its replies to the defences of
RD
![]()
Fire
and Baris in accordance with the draft amended replies dated 3 October 2002?
4. (1) Is the claim advanced byBovis
against
RD
![]()
Fire
and Baris on the basis of the impairment of its rights against Braehead sustainable as a matter of law either at all or having regard to the fact and nature of the settlement?
(2) Is it the case that the settlement extinguished all or any of the impairment losses claimed byBovis
herein?
5. Is the claim advanced byBovis
against
RD
![]()
Fire
and Baris on the basis of the loss of its performance interest in the sub-contract with
RD
![]()
Fire
and (assuming there was such a sub-contract) in the sub-contract with Baris sustainable as a matter of law either at all or having regard to the fact and nature of the settlement?
Bovis
maintains that the settlement is irrelevant because it is entitled to elect to claim from
RD
Fire
and Baris without taking it into account and because it is not possible to place a
value
on its relevant losses resulting from the settlement nor to establish what sum was included within it for Braehead's
fire
protection
works claims albeit that the settlement contains some loss on account of those claims. In consequence,
Bovis
has elected not to establish that the settlement was reasonable and has to date adduced no evidence as to how the settlement was negotiated; as to the background facts needed to understand the content, effect and financial consequences of its crucial terms; as to the breakdown of the figures it provides for; or as to the
value
to be placed on any of its
various
provisions. However,
Bovis
alleges, without particularisation on supporting evidence, that it has been caused some, albeit unidentifiable, loss by the settlement as a result of
RD
Fire
and Baris' defaults.
RD
Fire
and Baris, in turn, do not contend that the settlement was unreasonable but both assert that unless and until the
value
or loss attributable to the defects in the
fire
protection
works within the settlement is identified, no claim for such works can be maintained by
Bovis
against them. Both sub-contractors also dispute
Bovis'
entitlement in law to claim from them direct claims, which are not linked to any claim brought against
Bovis
by Braehead.
Bovis'
pleaded case is included, in part, in an exchange of emails between counsel just before the trial was opened and this pleading is to be taken to aver that
Bovis
incurred some loss in the settlement caused by
RD
Fire
and Baris' defaults but which it is impossible to identify. This averment has neither been particularised by
Bovis
nor responded to by
RD
Fire
and Baris.
4. The Settlement Agreement
"The terms of settlement contained herein constitute the terms of settlement of the disputes that exist between….Bovis
and ... Braehead ("the Parties") which are the subject of the present proceedings ("the Proceedings") in the Technology and Construction Court ("the Disputes") concerning the management, design and construction of the works carried out by
Bovis
and/or any related remedial works concerning the contract between the parties dated 18 December 1997 ("the Contract") …
The Parties shall settle the Disputes by further payments by Braehead toBovis
of:
(i) the sum of £10,000,000 together with all accrued interest on the sum paid by Braehead into Court: and(ii) the sum of £2,500,000 if and when a formal binding Agreement is entered into for the Chaplefield development;(iii) the sum of £2,500,000 if and when a formal binding Agreement is entered into for the Chaplefield development;(together the "Settlement Sum") on the terms set out below:
1. Payment of the initial sum and of the interest on the initial sum shall be effected by the payment out of court toBovis
of the sum of £10,000,000 paid into Court by Braehead on 3 August 2001 together with all accrued interest thereon, on the express basis that there shall be no order as to costs ...
2. The first further payment shall be paid by Braehead toBovis
within 5 working days after the date on which (i) the Heads of Terms relating to the Chaplefield development which are intended to be entered into contemporaneously herewith by
Lend
![]()
Lease
Norwich Limited and Capital Shopping Centres plc shall have been entered into, and (ii) Capital Shopping Centre plc has received from
Lend
![]()
Lease
Chaplefield Partnership an exclusivity letter which provides that negotiations in relation to the Chaplefield development will be held exclusively with Capital Shopping Centres plc throughout the period up to and including 31 March 2002.
3. The second further payment shall become payable toBovis
only if and when a formal binding Agreement for the Chaplefield development has been entered into as envisaged in the Heads of Terms. Payment by Braehead of the second further payment shall be made to
Bovis
within 5 working days after the date on which such formal binding agreement is entered into. For the avoidance of doubt, if no such formal binding Agreement is entered into, the Disputes shall nevertheless be settled in accordance with these settlement terms but on the basis that only the initial sum together with interest on the initial sum and the first further payment shall be payable to
Bovis
….
5. These settlement terms are accepted by both parties in full and final settlement of all costs, claims, liabilities and demands between the parties arising out of or in connection with the Disputes including claims for contractual entitlement (including but not limited to the operation of clause 19 of the Contract), breach of contract, negligence and breach of statutory duty….Bovis
acknowledges and agrees that the Settlement Sum represents payment in full of all sums due to
Bovis
in respect of or in connection with the Works…..
6. Save as expressly provided in these settlement terms, neither the Contract norBovis'
employment thereunder shall be terminated by the agreement of these settlement terms or by the payment to
Bovis
of the Settlement Sum. Without prejudice to any other provisions of these settlement terms, the following provisions of the Contract ... shall be modified and/or exhausted as follows:
(d) clauses 30.5 to 30.8 inclusive of the Contract [concerning the ascertainment of the Final Account], together with the related provisions of the Employer's Requirements ... and together with any obligations onBovis
concerning the right of the Quantity Surveyor ... to undertake an audit on behalf of Braehead, shall be exhausted; and
(e) clause 30.9 of the Contract shall apply only to any future claims by Braehead in relation to latent defects as provided for in paragraph 7 below….
8. On the execution of these settlement termsBovis
shall deliver to Braehead all of the Employer/Sub-Contractor Agreements which
Bovis
has 'to date obtained from its sub-contractors.
Bovis
shall in addition use all reasonable endeavours to obtain further Employer/Sub-Contractor Agreements in the form required by clause 18.2.5 of the Contract from all of its other sub-contractors and shall promptly deliver all further Employer/Sub-Contractor Agreements so obtained.
9.Bovis
expressly acknowledges and agrees that:
(a) payment of any and all amounts due or which may become due fromBovis
to any of its sub-consultants or sub-contractors (including, without limitation, on the finalisation and settlement of final accounts with its sub-consultants and sub-contractor) or to any other settlement of final accounts ... arising under or in conse- quence of the Contract or the Disputes is and shall be solely and entirely the responsibility of
Bovis
and
Bovis
accordingly has and shall have no claim against Braehead in respect thereof, and shall have no obligation to account to Braehead for any proceeds arising therefrom and shall have no further obligation to liase or consult with Braehead in relation thereto;
(b) it will not make any claim against Braehead in respect of and/or by any of its sub-consultants or sub-contractors or any other third party in proceedings brought byBovis
against such entities and/or in proceedings brought by any of such entities against
Bovis
in connection with the design and/or construction of the Works or otherwise arising under or in consequence of the Contract or the Disputes whensoever and howsoever arising, whether present or future and of whatsoever nature (including, without limitation, in actions Nos. [the present actions.
11. Each Party shall provide all reasonable assistance, including access to members of its staff and access to and copies of all relevant documentation pertaining to the subject matter of the Disputes and/or the Contract, as may be required by the other Party for the purposes of finalising its financial arrangements with ... subcontractors ... arising from the design and/or construction of the Works and/or for the purposes of any claims or proceedings which the other party has commenced or may contemplate or commence in the future ... or which has been commenced or which may be contemplated or commenced against the other Party by any such third party
12. Neither Party shall seek any contribution or indemnity from the other Party respect of, or shall otherwise seek to join the other Party in as a party to, any existing or future proceedings with any third party concerning or arising in any way from any of the matters which are hereby settled between the Parties. ...".
Bovis'
maximum monetary recovery under the settlement was £15m together with some interest and
VAT.
However, this sum takes no account of any further commercial benefits of the settlement agreement including those relating to the potential development referred to in the agreement. As a matter of arithmetic only, and taking into account only the monetary recovery,
Bovis
recovered 22% of the total amount in dispute in
Bovis'
claims and Braehead's counterclaims.
5. The Basis of
Bovis'
Claims against
RD
Fire
and Baris
Bovis'
claim against both
RD
Fire
and Baris arises because each was engaged or instructed to undertake predefined
fire
protection
work for
Bovis
who was undertaking the entire works in question as a management contractor to Braehead.
Bovis'
overall obligation was to carry out and complete the works referred to in Braehead's requirements, its own proposals and both the Articles of Agreement and the Conditions of Contract comprised the main contract.
Bovis
was not, however, to perform any of the work itself, save to a limited and relatively inconsequential extent. Instead, it was to arrange for the performance of the work by sub-contracting out predefined parcels or work packages using sub-contracts with terms that were defined by the main contract.
Bovis
was to manage and co-ordinate this work and was to present a completed shopping and leisure centre to Braehead at practical completion of the main contract works within a contractually defined timescale. This management function included some design responsibilities, particularly in relation to the preparation of the Contractor's Proposals incorporated into the main contract and in on-going design work necessary to enable each works package to be executed and completed so that it co-ordinated with and fitted into the overall works being performed by
Bovis.
Bovis'
remuneration was to be whatever sum emerged as the total of the sums due to each sub-contractor from
Bovis
by the operation of the accounting provisions of each sub-contract with additional sums defined by the main contract to remunerate
Bovis
for the use of its own labour and management involved in its own management, co-ordination and design work and to provide for its overheads, commercial risk and profit.
Bovis
from either
RD
Fire
on Baris on that either of these parties entered into such an agreement with Braehead. Certainly, none was referred to at, or introduced into, the hearing.
RD
Fire
contracted to carry out the same
fire
protection
works as
Bovis
had to complete in the main contract in compliance with the sub-contract documents and to observe and comply with the provisions of the main contract in so far as they related to the sub-contract works.
RD
Fire
also agreed to indemnify
Bovis
against any breach or non-performance by it of any of the provisions of the main contract or against any act or omission of the sub-contractor which involved
Bovis
in any liability to Braehead under the main contract. Thus,
Bovis
now, in its principal claims, seeks recompense from
RD
Fire
for all sums it has to pay Braehead as damages for breach of the main contract which have resulted from
RD
Fire's
breach of the sub-contract. These claims are put forward by way of claims for damages for breach of contract and by way of a claim for an indemnity for the loss it has suffered as a result of its liability to Braehead for the defective and incomplete sub-contract
fire
protection
work, a claim which is made under the sub-contract indemnity.
Bovis'
claim against Baris is more widely based since the basis upon which Baris undertook work for
Bovis
is still in dispute. On
Bovis'
case, its contractual arrangements with Baris were similar to those with
RD
Fire
since it contends that there was in place a formal sub-contract incorporating the same DOM/2 Articles of Agreement and DOM/1 Conditions of Contract as were incorporated into the
RD
Fire
sub-contract.
Bovis'
benefit.
Bovis
claims an abatement from Baris' entitlement to be paid on account of Baris' defective and incomplete work. That abatement is not a claim for damages but is, on analysis, a plea that such work as was defective or incomplete should not be
valued
for payment at all or should be
valued
on a reduced basis to reflect those defects on incomplete elements about which both Braehead and
Bovis
complain. However,
Bovis
alleges that the basis of that abated
valuation
is to first ascertain the reasonable
value
of the work
valued
on the assumption that it was properly performed and then to set against that
value
the whole of Braehead's claim against
Bovis
based upon the cost to Braehead of remedying on completing that work coupled with the additional direct cost to
Bovis
that has resulted from the same defects and incompleteness. The resulting net alleged overpayment already made by
Bovis
to Baris is claimed back by
Bovis
on the basis of an alleged restitutionany entitlement to reclaim overpaid sums.
Bovis
is one for damages for breach of that sub-contract with no additional entitlement to claim under a contractual indemnity. Moreover, the relevant conditions of the main contract would not form part of that simple contract. On this basis,
Bovis'
claim against Baris is maintained as both a set off against Baris' contractual entitlement and as a counterclaim.
Bovis
maintains two further bases of claim. It contends firstly that the
value
of its contractual rights under the sub-contract were impaired as a result of
RD
Fire's
and Baris' breaches of their respective sub-contracts. This impairment is quantified by reference to the withholding of payments by Braehead that
Bovis
suggested occurred under the main contract on account of defect in the respective sub-contract works. Secondly,
Bovis
claims damages for breach of each sub-contract based on its own entitlement to receive from each sub-contractor satisfactory, timeous and defect-free performance and completion of the sub-contract. This basis of claim is made irrespective of any liability
Bovis
might have to Braehead for any breaches of either of the sub-contracts or of any loss that
Bovis
might have incurred as a result of such breaches of the sub-contracts or of any consequent operation of any of the terms of the main contract by Braehead.
Bovis
is seeking to recover: (1) loss pursuant to an indemnity; (2) loss arising from breaches of each sub-contract quantified by reference to its own liability under the main contract; (3) loss resulting from the impairment of its financial recovery under the main contract as a direct result of such breaches of sub-contract and (4) damages on loss resulting directly from the non or mis-performance of each sub-contract quantified without reference to any liability or obligation it has incurred under the main contract. Additionally, from Baris,
Bovis
seeks restitutionary recovery if no sub-contract relationship was concluded between these parties.
Bovis'
liability to Braehead as a result of the relevant defaults or from direct and allegedly provable expenditure that
Bovis
has incurred itself. Equally, the fifth head of claim is based on the same direct claims but arises only if there was no contractual relationship between
Bovis
and Baris with the result that Baris' entitlement to payment is a quantum meruit or restitutionary claim for the work it carried out.
Bovis'
interest and contractual entitlement in seeing the sub-contracts fully and properly performed. This gives rise to claims based on interference with two additional interests of
Bovis
that are described in some of the authorities and text-books as a performance interest and a reliance interest. These interests allegedly arise and the resulting interference and loss is allegedly caused whether or not
Bovis
suffered direct loss from meeting on settling claims made against it by Braehead. The relevant loss includes commercial and so-called contract impairment losses, wasted expenditure and the loss of net profit incurred by
Bovis
as a result of the breaches of sub-contract in question.
RD
Fire
and Baris' response to these claims is, essentially, four-fold. Firstly, they contend that
Bovis
has now compromised all liability it has to Braehead, including any liability it had previously to account to Braehead for damages recovered from each of them. Thus, each of these sub-contractor's potential liability to indemnify
Bovis
on to pay
Bovis
damages is limited to such sum as can be shown to have been included in that settlement by way of a payment to Braehead or an allowance made by it from payments it received fnom Braehead on account of
RD
Fire's
and Baris' breaches of their respective sub-contracts. However, each contends that that liability was nil or is not capable of ascertainment and, therefore, neither has any liability under this head of claim.
Bovis.
Bovis
for any impairment of
Bovis'
financial recovery under the main contract. Either such potential liability has been satisfied by the settlement between
Bovis
and Braehead or it never existed and is not recognised in law.
Bovis
to recover damages for loss of so-called performance benefits, that is loss based on its entitlement to receive a completed sub-contract performance irrespective of any liability it might have incurred to Braehead. Furthermore, the terms of the formal sub-contracts that might be said to provide for such a liability in this case do not have that effect.
6. Issue 1: Does the Settlement Bar
Bovis'
Direct Claims?
6.1. The Law Concerning Reliance on Settlement Agreements - General Discussion
value
of the completed property as appropriate occasioned by the relevant breaches or on the difference in cost to the builder between the actual work done and the work specified.[2]
"In building cases, the pecuniary loss is almost always measured in one of two ways: either the difference invalue
of the work don or the cost of reinstatement. Where the cost of reinstatement is less than the difference in
value,
the measure of damages will invariably be the cost of reinstatement. ... That is why it is often said that the cost of reinstatement is the ordinary measure of damages for defective performance under a building contract."[3]
However where it is not reasonable to reinstate, Lord Lloyd stated:
"If the court takes theview
that it would be unreasonable for the plaintiff to insist on reinstatement, as where, for example, the expense of the work involved would be out of all proportion to the benefit to be obtained, then the plaintiff will be confined to the difference in
value."
In Ruxley's case, the trial judge found that it was unreasonable to insist on reinstatement and also assessed the decrease in
value
of the pool by
virtue
of its reduced depth as being nil. Instead, he awarded, and the House of Lords upheld, an award for loss of amenity of £2,500. This award was explained by Lord Lloyd as follows:
"... If the tour operator is in breach of contract by failing to provide what the contract called for, the plaintiff may recover damages for his disappointment: see Jarvisv
Swans Tours
Ltd
[1975] 1 WLR 1468.
This was, as I understand it, the principle which [the trial judge] applied in the present case. He took theview
that the contract was one 'for the provision of a pleasurable amenity'. In the event, Mr Forsyth's pleasure was not so great as it would have been if the swimming pool had been 7 feet 6 inches deep. This was a
view
which the judge was entitled to take. If it involves a further inroad on the rule in Addis
v
Gramophone Co
Ltd
(1909] AC 488, then so be it. But I prefer to regard it as a logical application or adaptation of the existing exception."[4]
Finally, Lord Lloyd dealt with the situation where it would be unreasonable to reinstate, where there was no discernable diminution in
value
of the work and where there was no loss of amenity. In such a situation, Lord Lloyd stated:
"Is there any reason why the court should not award by way of damages for breach of contract some modest sum, not based on difference invalue,
but solely to compensate the buyer for his disappointed expectations? Is the law of damages so inflexible, as I stated earlier, that it cannot find some middle ground in such a case? I do not give a final answer to that question in the present case. But it may be that it would have afforded an alternative ground for justifying the judge's award of damages. And if the judge had wanted a precedent, he could have found it in Sir David Cairn's judgment in G.W. Atkins
Ltd
![]()
v
Scott, 7 Cnst.LJ 215, where, it will be remembered, the Court of Appeal upheld the judge's award of £250 for defective tiling. Sir David Cairns said, at p. 221:
'There are many circumstance where a judge has nothing but his common sense to guide him in fixing the quantum of damage, for instance, for pain and suffering, for loss of pleasurable activities or for inconvenience of one kind or another."[5]
RD
Fire
and Baris, assuming that clause 5.2 formed part of a subcontract with Baris, to:
"indemnify and save harmless the Contractor against and from:
5.2.1 any breach, non-observance or non-performance by the Sub-Contractor or his servants or agents of any of the provisions of the Main Contract as they relate and apply to the Sub-Contract; and
5.2.2 any act or omission of the Sub-Contractor or his servants or agents which involves the Contractor in any liability to the Employer under the provision of the Main Contract in so far as they relate and apply to the SubContract; and
5.2.3 any claim, damage, loss or expense due to or resulting from any negligence or breach of duty on the part of the Sub-Contractor, his servants or agents (including any wrongful user by him or them of the scaffolding referred to in this Sub-Contract or other property belonging to or provided by the Contractor)."
It is to be noted that this contractual indemnity covers acts on omissions of the sub-contractor which involved
Bovis
in any liability to Braehead under the main contract and separately covers any loss or expense that resulted from any negligence, which would include contractual negligence, on the part of the sub-contractor. This latter indemnity is not restricted to loss that arose from claims made by Braehead but is wide enough in its scope to include any loss or expense suffered by
Bovis
directly which was due to or resulted from the negligence of the sub-contractor.
v
Baxendale and
Victoria
Laundry
v
Newman.[7] Any loss which "involves [
Bovis]
in any liability to [Braehead]" is covered by this indemnity clause so long as that loss involves any act or omission of the sub-contractor. If default by a sub-contractor leads to a claim and then proceedings being brought against the main contractor by the employer, no loss has yet occurred and no claim is yet payable under that indemnity. The loss occurs when the claim or proceedings are compromised or a judgment results leading, in each case, to a payment to, or the non-recovery of sums otherwise due from, the employer. At that point, loss occurs. The loss is either the sum paid out by the main contractor or its liability to the employer as crystallised in a settlement agreement or judgment. Indeed, once a settlement occurs, the only liability or loss for which the main contractor could make a claim under the indemnity is the sum payable as a result of that settlement since that is the only loss that has arisen as a result of
Bovis'
liability to Braehead. This loss is covered by and recoverable from the sub-contractor as a result of the indemnity.
Bovis
but extends also to any reasonable settlement of those claims and any loss incurred, on payment made, by
Bovis
in consequence of that settlement. This is clear from Comyn Ching
v
Oriental Tube 17 BLR 56, CA where the relevant indemnity was in identical terms to clause 5.2.2 of the DOM/1 sub-contract conditions and the loss related to sums paid by a sub-contractor under a settlement agreement, following separate actions brought against the sub-contractor by the main contractor (under the sub-contract) and the employer (under a direct guarantee provided by the sub-contractor to the employer). Brandon LJ stated:
"The indemnity relied on by the plaintiffs is an indemnity against claims. That expression is somewhat telescopic; what it means is an indemnity against loss sustained in consequence of claims. A loss will be sustained in consequence of a claim if it arises from a reasonable settlement of a claim which had some prospect or a significant chance of success."[8]
least
where the contractual setting is a chain of building contracts.
v
Permanite [1951] 2 KB 314, CA, it was not clear that a sum paid by way of a reasonable settlement could be recovered as damages from a sub-contractor or a sub-seller whose breach of the sub-contract or sub-sale caused the main contractor's liability to the employer or the seller's to the buyer under the main contract or main sale. In Biggin's case, the plaintiff bought adhesive from the defendant to be used as an adhesive of roofing felt and which the defendant knew would be resold by the plaintiff to the third party. The adhesive was unsatisfactory and the plaintiff received and ultimately compromised the buyer's resulting claims. The plaintiff then claimed as damages from the defendant the sums it had paid the third party in settlement of the third party's claims against the plaintiff. At first instance, Devlin J rejected the plaintiff's claim for recovery of the sum paid in compromise of the third party's claims. He held that the appropriate measure of damages was the diminution in market
value
of the adhesive or, where the adhesive had been sold on by the plaintiff and had given rise to a claim against the plaintiff, the reasonable sum paid to settle that claim (see [1951] 1 KB 422). The judge held that the settlement sum was irrecoverable, stating:
"I, therefore, have to determine whether the defendants should have regarded it as a serious possibility that one of the consequences of their breach would be that the plaintiffs would compromise the claim. Was the compromise a foreseeable consequence of the making of the claim? In my judgment, it was not a consequence in the legal sense at all. It flowed from thevoluntary
act of the plaintiff s."[9]
In other words, the judge held that the settlement was not caused by the relevant breach and therefore could not be a foreseeable consequence of it.
v
Bussey (1887) 20 QBD 79, CA, and in particular, on the judgment of Bowen LJ, in reaching his decision. Singleton LJ's judgment is in similar terms and Birkett LJ agreed with both judgments. Somervell LJ stated:
"Parties, Bowen LJ said, have been held to contemplate litigation in the sort of circumstances which have arisen here. It would, I think, be unfortunate if they were not also held to contemplate reasonable settlements in the type of circumstances which have arisen here."[10]
Bovis
contends that it can adopt such a course and has chosen neither to rely on the settlement nor to seek to prove that it was reasonable. The particular reason for adopting that course put forward is that it is not possible, as
Bovis
sees the situation, to show what the overall
value
of the settlement was nor what part of the settlement, whatever its overall
value,
is attributable to Braehead's claims against
Bovis
for the
fire
protection
works. Thus, in the absence of any settlement sum attributable to
Bovis'
claims over against
RD
Fire
and Baris,
Bovis
seeks to recover the cost of reinstatement of the work it contends were defective even though it would appear from the terms of the settlement that whatever
value
was actually placed on Braehead's
fire
protection
claims by the parties to the settlement or, if none was, whatever part of the settlement might reasonably be ascribed to those claims, is much lower than the
value
of the claim as originally presented by Braehead and passed on by
Bovis.
6.2. Biggin & Co
Ltd
v
Permanite
Ltd
v
Permanite and the authorities that have followed it have been concerned with have involved a chain of potential liability arising from a tier of linked or related contracts. The decided cases have involved chains concerned with the sale of goods (from a supplier to a sub-buyer to a buyer); building contracts (from a sub-contractor to a main contractor to an employer) and shipping contracts (from cargo owners to shipowners to charterers).
least
two contracts and that its contractual obligations would be directly linked to those to be performed by the other contracting party under the contract forming the next link in the chain. Thus, it was foreseeable to the defendant that a breach of its contract with the claimant could give rise to a breach by the claimant of that other contract, to a consequent claim by the third party against the claimant and to a settlement of that claim by the claimant. Finally, in all cases in the Biggin line of authority, the claimant was seeking to rely on the existence and content of the settlement in order to recover from the defendant its loss measured by the amount of the payment that had been made by it to the third party under the settlement.
value
of the adhesive and any liability that the plaintiff had to the buyers for reinstatement costs. However, the overall claim that the plaintiff could present to the defendant was limited to the sum by which it had settled its liability to the buyer. This is made clear in the judgement as follows:
"I have next to consider a measure of damages alternative to the £43,000 [the sum paid in settlement] which is raised by an amendment to the statement of claim which I permitted at the trial. Under this alternative the plaintiffs claim that they were liable to pay the Dutch government [the buyers] damages in respect of breach of contract under two heads. The first head, quantified at £49,300, relates to the loss sustained by the Dutch government in respect of 1,400 tons which were not used. The second head, quantified at £52,270, covers the cost of repairs necessitated by the defects in the Permasec. In case it is not quite clear from the form of pleading, I should say that the plaintiffs do not claim more than the £43,000 odd which they paid to the Dutch government. The figures which I have given are designed to show that the plaintiffs' liability was not less than that sum."[12]
The Court of Appeal also accepted without adverse comment that the settlement figure imposed an upper limit on the sum recoverable from the defendant. Thus, Somervell LJ stated:
"the [settlement] is admittedly an upper limit"
and Singleton LJ stated:
"The claim of the plaintiffs was for damages. They said that the damages should be the sum of £43,000, the amount of the settlement, which they claimed was reasonable, They did not ask for more."[13]
Biggin & CoLtd
![]()
v
Permanite
Ltd,
Fletcher & Steward
v
Jay & Partners (1976) 17 BLR 38;
Comyn Ching & Co (London)Ltd
![]()
v
Oriental Tube Co
Ltd
(1979) 17 BUR 47, CA;
Fairfield-MabeyLtd
![]()
v
Shell UK
Ltd
[1989] CILL 514, QBD (official referee), Judge Bowsher QC;
Oxford University Pressv
John Steadman Design Group (1990) 34 Con LR 1, QBD (official referee), Judge Esyr Lewis QC;
DSL Groupv
Unisys International No 1 (1994) 67 BLR 127, QBD (official referee), Judge Hicks QC;
DSL Groupv
Unisys International No 2 (unreported, 4 May 1995), QBD (official referee), Judge Hicks QC;
General Feeds Inc. Panamav
Slobodna Plovidba Yugoslavia [1999] Lloyd's Law Reports 688, QBD (Commercial Court), Colman J;
P & O Developmentsv
Guy's
Ltd
![]()
v
Guy's & St. Thomas' National Health Service Trust [1999] BLR 3, QBD (TCC), Judge Bowsher QC; and
Royal Brompton Hospital National Health Service Trustv
Frederick Alexander Hammond and John Richard Lerche and others [1999] BLR 162 , QBD (TCC), Judge Hicks QC.
For brevity and convenience, I will summarise the relevant principles that are to be drawn from these cases without extensive citation from the judgments.
1. The Biggin principles may be relied on where the claim over arises as a claim under an indemnity or is a claim for damages for breach of contract. Equally, they are applicable both when liability to the third party had been admitted by the claimant and when it remained in issue and had been included as part of the issues being settled.
2. The principles are applicable because, ordinarily, a defendant is to be taken to have foreseen that a consequence of its breach of contract would be both that the claimant would be liable to the third party and that that liability might give rise to litigation and a compromise under which the claimant incurred financial loss.
3. The principles are not merely an aspect of a claimant's duty to mitigate its loss but also involve the law concerned with the measure of recoverable damages following a breach of contract. Thus, the settlement figure, that is the sum being paid by the claimant to settle the third party's claim, is to be taken to be the upper limit of what may be recovered from the defendant in relation to the loss caused to the claimant as reflected in the claimant's liability to the third party.
4. As a starting point, a claimant may recover the sum paid in settlement if it can establish that that settlement was reasonable and that it was reasonable to settle the third party's claim. It is only necessary for the claimant to prove, in general terms, that the settlement was reasonable. It is not necessary for it to establish in great detail the extent and quantum of the third party's claim.
5. The evidence that may be adduced to establish reasonableness willvary
but it may include, if the claimant so elects, evidence of advice given by relevant professionals to the claimant which was relied on in deciding to settle. The material that is disclosable when a settlement is relied on may, on occasion, include documents recording such advice but any consequent waiver or overriding of privilege involved in such disclosure will depend on how the claimant elects to establish reasonableness and on what material it proposes to rely on for that purpose.
6. The claimant must establish by normal methods of proof and to the normal standard of proof that the defendant was in breach of contract and that that breach caused the claims to be made. Equally, it must establish that the defendant's breaches of contract led to breaches by it of its contract with the third party.
7. To the extent that the settlement was unreasonable on unreasonably entered into, it is irrecoverable since that element of the settlement was not caused by the defendant's breach and, equally, it resulted from a failure by the defendant to mitigate its loss.
8. The Biggin principles are not confined to cases where there is only one party causing the loss being settled or where the claims being settled are confined to those based on the defendant's breaches of contract. It is necessary, however, for the court to determine what part of an overall settlement of a multi-party or multi-issue dispute is attributable to the relevant breaches of contract of the defendant, or to each separate defendant where a Biggin claim is being made against more than one defendant. Any allocation of part of a reasonable overall settlement must itself be reasonable.
6.3. Particular Problems
6.3.1. Introduction
(1) Where a potentially relevant settlement had been entered into, is it for the claimant or the defendant to establish what sum has been paid for, or a loss caused by, potentially relevant claims or causes of action?
(2) What is the consequence when the wording of a settlement, particularly a multi-issue or multi-party settlement, does not identify what sum is included for the settlement of relevant claims on causes of action and there is no allocation of the overall sum to the relevant claims or causes of action?
(3) Can a main contractor elect to by-pass the settlement and seek to recover from its sub-contractor its potential liability to the employer in full?
(4) If a claimant cannot establish what part of the settlement related to or was allocatable to the defendant's breaches of contract, does it follow that that claimant recovers nothing?
(5) Can the settlement be considered as reasonable and as one which has incurredBovis
in relevant loss given that it appears to be based on a larger claim for
fire
![]()
protection
works than was being made by Braehead against
Bovis
and given further the limited size of the
fire
![]()
protection
works claims relative to all other claims and counterclaims covered by the settlement?
(6) If the settlement is unreasonable so that its terms cannot be relied on by a claimant, what is the consequence and, in particular, do the claimant's claims over fail completely?
6.3.2. Quantification of Damage or Mitigation?
Bovis
to establish what sum, if any, was included in the settlement agreement or, if they wish to rely on the settlement agreement to limit or eliminate their liability to pay damages, for
RD
Fire
and Baris to establish this.
Bovis
to establish its loss which means that it has the burden of proving what sum Braehead's claims were settled for when there has been a settlement of the claim it seeks to pass on. Conversely, if the Biggin principles are procedural rules relating to the evidence that is admissible to prove loss, then a claimant may elect to prove its loss in some other way without reference to the settlement. In such circumstances, it will be for the defendant to adduce evidence as to what was included in the settlement for the claims or causes of action in question if the defendant regards the settlement as relevant. A defendant who wished to rely on the settlement in this way would be seeking to show that the claimant, in seeking the full claim and not the reduced sum contained in a settlement agreement, had failed to mitigate its loss. It is clear that a defendant bears the burden of proof to establish that a claimant has failed to mitigate its loss.
"Why is an agreement made with a person not a party to the action relevant or admissible at all? Bigginv
Permanite provides two answers to that question:
(a) A rule of evidence. The Court of Appeal in Bigginv
Permanite stressed that it is the policy of the court to encourage settlements. For that reason, there may be a readiness to accept that individuals settling a claim between them may be taken to have as their purpose tying to reach a settlement at a fair figure related to the claim. The extent to which the settlement may be taken as a matter of evidence to be in the right area will depend on all the circumstances. ... So if a third party's claim is settled, proof of the settlement is some evidence of its true
value,
though not conclusive. The settlement sets a maximum to the claim, an depending on the weight to be attached to it as evidence, it may reduce the degree and detail of evidence required to prove the claim in the action.
(b) The second rule in Hadleyv
Baxendale. The reasonable settlement of claims may be a matter which parties may be held to have had in reasonable contemplation under the second rule in Hadley
v
Baxendale (1854) 9 EX 341. …
To regard Bigginv
Permanite as applying both an evidentiary rule and the second branch of the rule in Hadley
v
Baxendale is workable and sensible, and I intend to apply that authority. The application of both aspects of that authority, the evidentiary rule and the Hadley
v
Baxendale approach must be fashioned to the facts of the individual case.[14]
very
high rates to commence no earlier than August 1958. After the collision, the tanker was taken out of service for repairs. Meanwhile, freight rates had dropped significantly so that, on being recommissioned, the time charter was advanced by 100 days to commence in July 1958. The defendants contended that an allowance should be made to it in the assessment of damages for the financial benefit to the owner arising from the advancement of the high rated time charter following the tanker's lay off at a time when freight rates were
very
low. In dealing with this contention and the method by which that financial off-set should be calculated, Lord Denning MR stated:
"I do not like either of those mathematical ways [suggested by the judge whose judgment was under appeal] of calculating thevalue
of the advancement. ... It is entirely uncertain and speculative. It must be remembered too, that it is for the defendant to prove the
value
of the advancement. It is he who prays it in aid in mitigation of damage. He must prove, therefore, the
value
of it."[15]
Bovis
and it would then have been for the sub-contractors, if they wished to contend that a ceiling had been placed on
Bovis'
possible recovery by the settlement, to have established what that ceiling was. This is because, like the defendant in The World Beauty, they would be seeking to identify and prove a factor mitigating
Bovis'
damage. The settlement at a lower figure would be similar to the financial advantage of the advancement to the owner of the damaged tanker that the defendant had the burden of establishing in that case. However, since the Biggin principles are also rules that govern and affect causation and remoteness of damage in settlement cases, they
vitally
shape the loss that the law allows
Bovis
to recover and, as such, impose a burden on
Bovis
to establish what if any financial detriment occurred as a result of the settlement.
6.3.3. Assessment by the Court
Bovis
has elected not to adduce any evidence of the circumstances of the settlement; of the negotiations leading up to the settlement; of the make up or contents of the settlement; as to the reasonableness of the settlement; as to the reasonableness of its having settled with Braehead on the terms and at the time that it did; or as to any assessment or
valuation
of the settlement terms. Furthermore, it contends that it made a financial loss by entering into the settlement caused by
RD
Fire
and Baris' breaches of their respective sub-contracts, but yet it is impossible to say what that loss was. However,
Bovis
has elected not to adduce any evidence to explain the respects in which it is impossible to identify its loss arising from the settlement nor to explain why it is impossible to identify, assess,
value
or allocate such a loss from the overall settlement terms. Instead,
Bovis
merely laconically assents that: "no claim is made in respect of the settlement".
fire
protection
works. The settlement is of all claims in each direction being made by Braehead and
Bovis
and of all liabilities (save for latent defects not apparent at the date of the settlement) each party has or might in the future have that arise out of the main contract. The settlement is made up by three elements, being: (1) an overall lump sum monetary payment by Braehead payable in instalments with two of the instalments being conditional on successful completion of two successive stages of the second element of the settlement; (2) the provision of an opportunity for a company related to Braehead to become involved in the development of a site owned by a company related to
Bovis
and (3) a release of any liability that
Bovis
might otherwise have to account to Braehead for any recovery it subsequently obtains from any sub-contractor in any existing or future action.
Bovis
relating to the
value
of subcontractors' work and many other claims of Braehead being passed onto sub-contractors by
Bovis
relating to defective and incomplete work. It does, however, only involve two parties. It provides three related difficulties for the court when attempting to evaluate it: (1)
Bovis
has provided only minimal evidence of its breakdown and
value;
(2) any overall
valuation
of the settlement must include an evaluation of the second and third non-monetary elements of the settlement and (3) there is little material currently available to assist in any apportionment of the overall
value
of the settlement to defects in the
fire
protection
works except for the pleadings.
value
to the settlement or a
value
of that part of the settlement that is, attributable to defects in the
fire
protection
works. Even rudimentary evidence of how the settlement was arrived at would enable it to be determined whether anything was included for
fire
protection
works claims and as to whether the overall
value
of the individual component claims being settled should be pro rated or assessed in some other way. If such an apportionment or assessment is not possible given the nature of the settlement negotiations, that difficulty could be explained and proved by evidence. Moreover, similar
valuation
exercises to those required for this settlement regularly have to be undertaken by accountants, loss adjusters,
valuers,
actuaries, tax inspectors and businessmen in a wide
variety
of situations including the assessment of tax liabilities, the identification of consideration for the sales of businesses on assets, for insurance risk assessment and claims settlement purposes and as part of the work involved in preparing accounts. Thus, without both factual and expert evidence to support the assertion, the court cannot and will not proceed on the basis that neither a global
valuation
of the settlement nor an appropriate allocation of the settlement to the
fire
protection
works claims is possible.
value
and appropriate apportionment to be placed on a settlement with only
very
limited material to work with. A particularly relevant example of the court's powers is provided by Townsend & another
v
Stone Toms & Partners (a firm) (1985) 27 BLR 26, CA. In that case a householder had engaged an architect and a contractor to undertake extensive renovation works of an old farmhouse. The project went disastrously wrong and the householder sued both in the same action. The claims against the contractor were based on allegedly defective workmanship and overpayment and those against the architect were based on allegedly defective design and negligent supervision and certification. There were three categories of claims: those that were concurrent and brought against both defendants and those which were brought either solely against the contractor or solely against the architect. At a late stage before trial, the contractor paid a sum into court in satisfaction of all claims made against it, whether concurrently with the architect or solely against it. This sum was a global figure and was not apportioned or broken down in any way. The householder accepted this payment in and the action against the architect continued to judgment. The architect was found liable for some of the concurrent claims and the question arose as to what part of the sum paid into court represented payment against those concurrent claims also being brought against the architect for which credit would have to be given by the householder. The householder argued that no credit should be given since it was not possible to apportion the payment into court in any way. He therefore contended that he could elect to attribute the payment into court entirely to claims that did not involve the architect. The judge disagreed and undertook a rudimentary assessment of the
value
of the claims against the contractor and concluded that these were worth less than the sum paid into court. In consequence, he held that the householder had already recovered in full for the concurrent claims and awarded nothing for those claims. The assessment was undertaken solely by reference to an examination of the contents of the pleaded claims.
"But granted for the moment that there may appear to be a question of apportionment of the sum between claims which are good, claims which are bad, and claims which are not concurrent, the mere fact that this may not be altogether straightforward does not, to my mind, absolve the judge from attempting the task. It is said that the burden lies on the defendant to show that a part of the claim against him has already been satisfied, and to demonstrate the extent to which recovery has already been completed by the plaintiff; and reliance is placed on the decision of The World Beauty [1970] P 144, CA. Allowing this, however, it seems to me that that initial burden is discharged when the defendant shows acceptance of a payment in, in respect of causes of action where there are concurrent claims against him. If it is to be said that the payment in relates to some claims which are not concurrent, or which could not succeed against the defendant, the only person capable of providing that guidance is the plaintiff himself, who has accepted the payment. That the payment has to be taken into account in some way seems to me to be beyond doubt, and it is, of course, always open to a plaintiff who wishes to accept a payment in or thinks that its acceptance may cause him some embarrassment in the matter of apportionment to request an amendment of the notice of payment in to apportion the sum paid among the causes of action in respect of which it is paid. In the ordinary way that would, I think solve any difficulty, though I would like to reserve the position - which of course does not arise here- where there may be grounds for asserting that the apportionment is collusive or not made bona fide.
Where, as here, the party who has to bring the money into account himself provides no material to show how any apportionment should be made (or, as in this case, invites the judge to deal with it in a particular way) the judge has to do his best with what material he has, and the only material he had in this case was the claims themselves. What he had to ascertain was what the plaintiffs had lost, and to what extent that loss had been mitigated or satisfied by what had been received. There was really no other reliable way of doing this except by assessing the truevalue
of the plaintiffs' claim against [the contractor], and comparing it with the £30,000 received."[16]
Bovis
to be irrelevant since it concerned a payment into court and involved a relatively simple apportioning exercise in a case involving only two defendants and a modest number of concurrent or overlapping claims. However, although the nature and extent of the apportioning exercise is
very
different and far more complex than that required of the judge in the Townsend case, it is a task which is, in principle, identical to the apportioning exercise required in this case. Moreover, as in the Townsend case, an apportioning exercise is necessary. Furthermore, in the Townsend case, the defendant prayed in aid and put into evidence the settlement, being the acceptance of a payment into court, and in similar fashion here the defendants pray in aid and put into evidence the terms of
Bovis'
settlement with Braehead. Finally, in both cases, the only relevant evidence of the content and apportionment of the settlement figure that could be given is that capable of being given by the plaintiff or claimant and it was in the hands of those parties to provide that evidence. In
Bovis'
case, it could have had inserted into the settlement an allocation or, at the
very
least,
have provided its own allocation with supporting evidence to justify a subjective allocation.
virtually
no evidence of the size of the diminution in
value
of the damaged adhesive, undertook an assessment based on a price allowance estimated at 50%. He stated:
"Is the plaintiff to recover nominal damages only because he cannot prove against either defendant what part of the depreciation invalue
was due to his acts? It is one thing to say, as I have said, that this is the sort of situation which parties in contemplating the measure of damages would be glad to avoid, and it is another thing to say that it is one which must necessarily result in an injured plaintiff obtaining no satisfaction. I think in such a situation the court is bound to the best that it can It is no more difficult to estimate a plaintiff's loss in such circumstances than it is to estimate the loss of earning power caused by physical disablement. ... It is a common practice in the commercial world to deal with this type of case by way of a price allowance; and claims for damaged goods are constantly met to the satisfaction of both parties by the fixing of an allowance by an adjustor or some person skilled in the trade. …".[17]
v
John Steadman Design Group (1990) 34 Con LR 1, QBD (official referee), Judge Esyn Lewis QC and Parkman Consulting Engineers
v
Cumbrian Industrials
Ltd
79 Con LR 112, CA affirming 78 Con LR 18 QBD (TCC), Judge Thornton QC.) In such cases, the evidence and available material used by the court is often as fragmentary as that currently available to the court in this case.
value
on the settlement and of apportioning from that an appropriate and reasonable overall
value
a
value
for the
fire
protection
works including, if necessary, an allocation of a nil
value.
These tasks ought to be capable of being undertaken although it would be a matter of argument and investigation whether they could be performed without the admission of some albeit limited additional evidence. What is clear is that the court should not accept
Bovis'
assertion that these tasks are impossible. The court could only proceed on that basis if it first had received and had then accepted clear and satisfactory factual and expert evidence to support it.
6.3.4. By-passing the Settlement
Bovis
seeks to recover from
RD
Fire
on the basis of the full cost of reinstatement of the allegedly defective
fire
protection
works irrespective of the size of the claims for such defects made against it by Braehead and irrespective of the settlement. At this stage, I am only concerned with
Bovis'
case that although it is claiming an indemnity for any loss it might be caused by having to meet Braehead's claims for these defects, nonetheless it can ignore the settlement and proceed as if that settlement had never taken place.
Bovis
from the
fire
protection
sub-contractors. This is because the loss for which
Bovis
is claiming an indemnity or reimbursement is its loss in reimbursing Braehead. This is made up of the sums within the settlement that
Bovis
has had to pay or forego in order to settle the
fire
protection
works. Any additional sum to those sums would not be a loss incurred by
Bovis
but would amount to a profit obtained from the sub-contractors by
Bovis
since it would exceed
Bovis'
loss. The authorities, particularly Biggin show that the settlement sum creates a ceiling of recovery.[18] Thus, in relation to the first two bases of claim advanced by
Bovis
HREF='#note19'>[19], such sum as is to be taken to have been included in the settlement for
fire
protection
defects creates a ceiling or upper limit on the sum that
Bovis
can recover.
Bovis
contends that Biggin gives rise to a rule of evidence that allows, where the case is applicable, a claimant a possible means of proving its damages. Since it is for the claimant to determine whether or not to adopt this manner of proof, it may chose, if it wishes, to prove its damages in any other admissible way. Indeed, the judgments in Biggin envisaged that reliance on a settlement was not the only way for a claimant to prove its entitlement to damages where the claim that was to be passed on to the defendant had been the subject of that settlement.
6.3.5. Impossibility of Allocation
Bovis'
position cannot establish what part of the settlement related to or was allocatable to their breaches of contract, it follows that
Bovis
can recover nothing.
Bovis,
on the other hand, contends that in such circumstances it can claim and recover from the sub-contractors as if there had been no settlement. Otherwise, it would have lost out by settling with Braehead. This would be most unfair and would constitute the reverse of what the law seeks to encourage, namely the settlement of disputes rather than their litigation.
Bovis
has pleaded that: "the settlement ... was a global settlement in which no specific sum was attributed to the defects in the
fire
protection"
and that: "
Bovis
did make a financial loss by entering into the settlement caused by
RD
Fire's
breaches amongst other causes. But it is impossible to say what that loss was and so no claim is made in respect of it." Thus,
Bovis
is able to allege, and presumably will seek to prove, that it made a financial loss by entering into the settlement. What it asserts it cannot do is to attribute a specific sum from the global sum provided for in the agreement or a specific part of the overall consideration provided by both parties to the
fire
protection
works. As already discussed, this assertion needs to be proved by evidence but
Bovis
has to date offered none and none is alluded to in the statement of assumed facts. Equally,
Bovis
will need to prove what loss it is referring to and why it can assert that such a loss was incurred and yet it can give no idea as to the order of magnitude of that loss nor any indication of its size, nature and extent. Clearly, the loss must be more than minimal for
Bovis
to be able to assert that it made a financial loss at all.
Bovis
was able to prove that it was neither possible to attribute any sum to the
fire
protection
works nor reasonable for the court to assess such an attribution, one or other of two possibilities would emerge, depending on the evidence. It might be concluded that no sum could be attributed because, in truth, no sum was included within the settlement. If so,
Bovis
would recover nothing from the sub-contractors since, following such a settlement, it had lost nothing as a result of their breaches of the sub-contracts. On the other hand, the evidence might establish that there was certainly something included within the settlement for
fire
protection
defects but that it was not possible to ascertain that sum. If so, it might nonetheless be reasonable for the court to assess a reasonable sum that it should take to represent the
value
of the
fire
protection
claims contained within the settlement. A further possibility might be that it was neither possible to ascertain that sum nor reasonable to assess it. It would then be necessary to determine why it was unreasonable to make an assessment. If this unreasonableness arose as a result of some inequitable or self induced conduct by
Bovis,
it would follow that
Bovis'
claims over against the sub-contractors would fail since it could not establish what sum it had lost. If it was unreasonable to make an assessment as a result of factors for which
Bovis
could not be held factually or equitably responsible, the conclusion might well be that there had not been, on the facts of such a settlement, any significant reduction in the loss incurred by
Bovis
as a result of the settlement so that
Bovis
would be able to proceed on the basis that it had lost the entirety of the claim that Braehead could have established at a trial and the settlement imposed no ceiling on its recovery.
Bovis
need to be ascertained before the consequences of an inability to make an attribution can be identified.
6.3.6. The Reasonableness of the Settlement
Bovis
does not seek to establish that the settlement was reasonable nor that it was reasonable for it to have settled with Braehead in the terms it did. It is, of course, open to
Bovis
to seek to establish the size of its actual liability to Braehead and then to establish the sub-contractors' actual liability to it based on that actual liability to Braehead. The recovery that
Bovis
may then make from the sub-contractors will be whichever is the smaller of the sum included in the settlement for
fire
protection
defects on the sum that it has established as being due from the sub-contractors.
RD
Fire,
however, contends that the settlement cannot have been a reasonable one. Firstly, it points to the fact that it must have included a sum for elements of
Bovis'
claim against it which had never been included in Braehead's claim against
Bovis.
In other words, the settlement with Braehead must have included within it and provided for sums or claims which Braehead was not in fact claiming from
Bovis.
That does not, however, of itself render the settlement unreasonable. This is shown by the Comyn case where the settlement did include claims that were not being advanced on the pleadings by the employer against the sub-contractor. In relation to those elements of the settlement, Brandon LJ said this:
"Goff LJ referred in his judgment to the possibility of the [employer] succeeding on the basis of express terms contained in the specifications ... in their pleaded case the [employer] did not rely on those express terms. ... In effect, what was being said on behalf of the [employer] was that they would rely on implied terms only, at any rate unless they gave prior notice of an intention to rely on others.
But as was pointed out by [counsel for the sub-contractor] in his argument, this action if it had been fought and gone on for many days, and the possibility of an amendment being made or notice being given indicating an intention to rely on these further express terms, was clearly a possibility.
In these circumstances, the fact that no reliance was expressly placed on those terms in the pleadings did not mean the possibility of those terms ultimately being relied upon did not have to be taken into account."19[20]
RD
Fire's
second argument was to the effect that its overall potential liability to
Bovis
was so small compared to the overall
value
of Braehead's claims that, in truth, nothing had been included in the settlement for that liability. The extent of
RD
Fire's
liability has still to be established and would not be as marginal as
RD
Fire
suggests if
Bovis
establish that the warranty provided by
RD
Fire
extended to the whole of the
fire
protection
work. Thus, it cannot be determined without evidence whether or not the settlement provided for
RD
Fire's
liability.
6.3.7. The Consequences of the Settlement being Unreasonable
Bovis'
loss. However, the settlement would still provide a ceiling of recovery. If it could be shown that the settlement contained a definable sum attributable to the claims and causes of action in question,
Bovis
could still seek to prove by conventional means what damages were recoverable from it by Braehead and its claim over would be limited to that sum rather than to any greater sum contained within the unreasonable settlement. On the other hand, if it could be shown that the settlement constituted a break in the chain of causation or was a wholly unreasonable failure to mitigate
Bovis'
loss, nothing would be recoverable from the sub-contractors.
"The effect of these judgments is, in myview,
that, assuming that loss attributable to a payment in settlement is not too remote, the plaintiff must prove that the fact and amount of the settlement were reasonable in all the circumstances. Unless he proves that, he fails to establish that the loss was caused by the relevant breach of contract by the defendant, for if and to the extent that an unreasonable settlement has been entered into, the loss has been caused not by the breach but by the plaintiff's
voluntary
assumption of liability under the settlement. Proving the existence of the settlement thus goes only part of the way to proving the recoverable loss. It would also be consistent with the duty to mitigate a loss to hold that if and to the extent that a plaintiff is unable to establish that the settlement on which he founds his claim has been reasonably entered into, he has to that extent failed to mitigate his loss."[21]
Bovis
argued that it could by-pass the settlement if it chose to because it had an option as to whether or not to adopt the Biggin principles whatever the
views
on wishes of the defendants. In support of this argument,
Bovis
contended that since it had an option whether or not to rely on the Biggin principles when the settlement was unreasonable, it followed that it also had such an option when the settlement was reasonable.
Bovis'
position could simply ignore the settlement and recover in full. However, as I have sought to demonstrate, that is not the consequence of a finding that a settlement is unreasonable. It follows that the consequences of a finding that a settlement was unreasonable do not
lend
any support to
Bovis'
argument that it can ignore or by-pass the settlement if it chooses to do so.
voluntary
act of the main contractor in settling on such unfavourable and unreasonable terms.
6.4. Issue 1
6.4.1. Introduction
Bovis
followed by a lock out agreement for a period of time when only those parties would negotiate the terms of a potential development agreement followed, finally, by the conclusion of a development agreement and the subsequent development of the site. The second and third tranches of the lump sum of £15m also payable by Braehead to
Bovis
were dependent on the successful conclusion of, firstly, the lock out agreement and, secondly, the development agreement. Clearly, the financial benefit or detriment of this agreement to the parties to the settlement depended on their precise relationship to the proposed developing parties and to the way that these future events and the development itself turned out.
RD
Fire
and Baris' final accounts were the subject of claims from Braehead and the settlement compromised all claims including all final account claims as well as an overall claim by
Bovis
based on a final
valuation
of the main contract works. The claim for the
valuation
of
RD
Fire
and Baris' work and Braehead's claim based on defects in the work are, in truth, mirror images of each other. Both were, therefore, settled in the settlement and such loss as
Bovis
suffered following that settlement was represented by any shortfall in net recovery from Braehead for
fire
protection
works once both claims and counterclaims had been taken into account.
Bovis
for the
value
of
RD
Fire
and Baris' work and that there was no shortfall in the recovery of those sums as a result of the settlement. No indication is given as to why it is assumed that there was no shortfall in recovery for the
value
of the work of these subcontractors' as a result of the settlement or how it can be ascertained that the "global" settlement fully recompensed
Bovis
for this work.
6.4.1. Issue 1(1)
The settlement betweenBovis
and Braehead is a global one
Bovis
is precluded from recovering the sums pleaded from
RD
Fire
and Baris. This is because
Bovis
asserts that the settlement has caused it loss that had been, in turn, caused by
RD
Fire
and Baris' breaches of contract but yet it has made no attempt to show what part of the settlement relates to that loss and those breaches. Since there has been a settlement, the sum contained in the settlement, being the loss asserted by
Bovis;
provides the ceiling of recovery and it is incumbent on
Bovis
to establish what that ceiling is. However,
Bovis
has adduced no evidence to show what that ceiling is, what the nature and extent of its loss was even in general terms on why it is able to assert that it has incurred loss yet is unable to identify in specific or general terms what that loss was. Further it has adduced no evidence as to why an attribution of its loss is impossible, as to why, in the absence of evidence of an appropriate attribution, it would be inequitable and unreasonable for a court to make an assessment of an appropriate attribution or as to why, if an attribution can neither be made nor assessed, the loss incurred by
Bovis
that has resulted from
RD
Fire
and Baris' breaches was, or is to be taken to have been, the entirety of the cost of remedying the defects in question. It is for
Bovis
to prove its loss and in the absence of evidence or an assessment of what part of the global settlement related to
RD
Fire
and Baris' breaches of contract, it has failed to prove any loss.
RD
Fire
is concerned, the global settlement precludes recovery both because
Bovis
cannot establish any relevant loss against which to claim an indemnity nor any foreseeably recoverable damages. So far as Baris is concerned, if a formal sub-contract was entered into, the same reasoning applies. If only a simple sub-contract was entered into, the second of these two reasons applies since Braehead would not have established that it has incurred foreseeably recoverable damages. If the relevant relationship requires the ascertainment of a quantum menuit, the situation is more problematic. This ascertainment will have to be undertaken as a one stage exercise, namely an ascertainment of what the reasonable
value
of Baris' work was. That
valuation
must take into account the
value
of the work to Bovjs as well as the cost of undertaking the work by Baris. The extent to which any defective work is
valued
and taken into account must depend on such factors as what
Bovis
has been paid for that work already by Braehead, what loss
Bovis
has made as a result of that work, the extent to which it is reasonable to disallow Baris' costs for the defective work and the extent to which it is reasonable to make an allowance for any costs of remediation given that no remediation is likely to take place.
valuation
would have to proceed on the basis that
Bovis
has made no loss on account of any defective work in the sense that it has not had to incur and will not incur loss by way of payments to Braehead on account of the defects nor has suffered reduced payments for the work from Braehead on that account. This is also the position for each of the other issues 1(2) - 1(6).
6.4.2. Issue 1(2)
There is no identifiable or traceable sum in the settlement which is attributable to the default ofRD
![]()
Fire
or Baris respectively (or cumulatively).
Bovis'
most recent pleading states that "
Bovis
did make a financial loss by entering into the settlement caused by
RD
Fire's
[and Baris'] breaches amongst other causes. But it is impossible to say what that loss was and so no claim is made in respect of it". Thus, the pleaded case is that it is impossible to identify what the quantum of
Bovis'
loss was but nonetheless it is possible to show that
Bovis
did suffer loss and, by inference, has evidence available if and when necessary to establish that it did suffer some loss. If that evidence is available, its seems improbable that it is sufficient to show that there was loss but insufficient to enable an assessment of the quantum of that loss to be made. Despite that pleading, the issue assumes that it is not even possible to show that there was some albeit indefinable loss.
Bovis
in circumstances where the relevant action and causes of action were settled at a loss to
Bovis.
If
Bovis
fails to discharge that burden, its claim must fail for want of proof. If, however, the issue is posed on the basis of
Bovis'
pleaded case, the answer is:
"If, but only if, it is not possible or reasonable to identify or assess a sum attributable to the default of eitherRD
![]()
Fire
on Baris despite it being established that
Bovis
has incurred some unidentifiable loss for such defaults as a result of the settlement: Yes."
6.4.3. Issue 1(3)
There is no acceptable means of measuring, calculating,valuing
or assessing the extent of the loss which
Bovis
asserts it suffered on account of
RD
![]()
Fire
and Baris' default by reason of the settlement.
value
or assess the loss assented by
Bovis.
I have already shown that a court will be ready to undertake an assessment on rudimentary material and that it is unlikely that it could be persuaded that it is impossible to undertake such an exercise. It does, however, apppear that
Bovis
is neither ready nor willing to undertake it or to seek such an assessment from the court. In the absence of any method being contended for and on the assumption that there is no such method available even if sought,
Bovis
is precluded from recovering the sums pleaded for the same reasons as set out in answer to issues 1(1) and 1(2).
6.4.4. Issue 1(4)
There is no basis included inBovis'
pleaded case to support a case that
Bovis
sustained any loss in the settlement as a result of the alleged default or liability of
RD
![]()
Fire
or Baris.
Bovis
has sustained loss in the settlement despite
Bovis
pleading, albeit at a late stage, that it had sustained some loss.
Bovis'
difficulty is its election not to adduce any evidence even to explain its difficulty in quantifying or assessing its loss in the face of being able to assert that it had suffered loss.
Bovis
has suffered loss but neither can nor will put forward any basis for identifying and quantifying that loss, the short answer to this issue is: "Yes".
6.4.5. Issue 1(5)
The sums claimed byBovis
do not reflect the result of the settlement.
Bovis'
loss is reflected by the settlement and not by Braehead's pre-existing claim that was being settled.
6.4.6. Issue 1(6)
Bovis'
reliance upon "hypothetical" remedial schemes, i.e. schemes which have not yet been carried out, which
Bovis
is not required by the terms of the settlement ever to carry out, and for which there is no evidence that they will ever be carried out?
Bovis
is not required to carry out remedial schemes and that no remedial scheme will even be carried out. However, the assumed facts also suppose that "the remedial works described in [the schedule to Braehead's pleaded claim being passed onto
RD
Fire
and Baris] are reasonably necessary in order to rectify the incomplete and/or defective nature of the
fire
protection".
It follows that, even if Braehead had and has no intention to rectify the defects, it is to be assumed that the remedial work was reasonably necessary. Furthermore, neither sub-contractor is, as yet, asserting that the settlement was unreasonable. Thus, to the extent that the settlement relies on, on incorporates recovery for such remedial schemes, it is not being asserted that it was unreasonable.
"I fully accept that the courts are not normally concerned with what a plaintiff does with his damages. But it does not follow that intention is not relevant to reasonableness, atleast
in those cases where the plaintiff does not intend to reinstate. ... The relevance of intention to the issue of reasonableness is expressly recognised by the respondent [contractor] in this case. [The respondent's counsel] says:
'The respondent accepts that the genuineness of the parties' indicated predilections can be a factor which the court must consider when deciding between alternative measures of damages. Where a plaintiff is contending for a high as opposed to a low measure of damages the court must decide whether in the circumstances of the particular case such high cost measure is reasonable. One of the factor that may be relevant is the genuineness of the plaintiff's desire to pursue the course which involves the higher cost. Absence of desire (indicated by untruths about intention) may undermine the reasonableness of the higher cost measure.'
I can only say that I find myself in complete agreement with that approach."[22]
Where a party states that it has no intention of reinstating but intends to use any damages recovered for a different purpose, the reason for adopting that course will need to be investigated and that intention, although not fatal to recovery on the basis of the cost of reinstatement, may also readily point to the unreasonableness of awarding damages on that basis.
Bovis
may not recover more than it lost in the settlement for
fire
protection
defects claims. In doings so, if it was reasonable for the settlement to be based on the recovery of the cost of "hypothetical" remedial schemes but not otherwise, it may recover loss and damages from
RD
Fire
and Baris on the basis of such a settlement.
6.5. Issue 2: Did the Settlement Break the Chain of
Causation?
6 . 5 . 1. Introduction
RD
Fire
and Baris contend that the settlement has broken the chain of causation between their breaches of contract and the loss caused to
Bovis.
Firstly, it is suggested that the settlement acts as a complete break between the two since
Bovis'
claim is based on the cost of repairs necessitated by the sub-contract breaches whereas the loss actually incurred was the admitted albeit indefinable loss arising out of the settlement. Secondly, it is suggested that the settlement constituted a release from liability so that
Bovis
never did, in fact, incur any loss. Thirdly, it is suggested that the settlement incurred
Bovis
in unnecessary loss and was, in consequence, unreasonable.
v
Baxter [1990] 1 QB 993, CA. In that case, the plaintiff undertook massive dredging work in the Persian Gulf and encountered unforeseeable conditions which it claimed caused it considerable delay and extra expense. The contract allowed recovery for additional costs incurred in working in unforseen ground conditions. It alleged that the engineer under the contract had prepared inaccurate reports of the conditions which the claimant had relied on and that these inaccuracies had contributed to its failure to foresee the actual conditions. The claims were rejected by the engineer and referred to arbitration which was compromised at a fraction of the sum being claimed. The claimant then sued the engineer alleging that the engineer had owed it a duty of care in relation to the performance of its duties under the contract, had negligently broken that duty in negligently under certifying and had incurred loss being the difference between what had been paid, including the payment following the arbitration settlement with the employer, and what it was entitled to be paid had the remuneration conditions of contract been fully and properly operated.
"Nothing suggests that the alleged negligence of the engineer was a cause of the contractor choosing to settle its claim as it did. If the engineer were not to blame for the circumstances which caused the contractor to choose to settle the claim for a fraction of what was properly due to the contractor, and if such an outcome was not a foreseeable consequence of any negligence on the part of the engineer in dealing with the contractor's claims - and it is not alleged that it was - the negligence of the engineer in rejecting the contactor's claims could be regarded as relegated to no more than part of the history and circumstances in which the contractor's decision was made to settle those arbitration proceedings."[23]
The judgments of the other two members of the court, Purchas and Russell LJJ, were in similar terms.
6.5.2. The Issues
(1) What is the effect of the decision in Pacific Associates
v
Baxter [1990] 1 QB 993 on
Bovis'
claims against
RD
Fire
and Baris insofar as these claims are based on Braehead's pleaded claims against
Bovis
based on the direct cost of repairs?
Bovis'
claims since they are based on Braehead's claims which are, in turn, based on the cost of repairs. However, those claims have been settled and it is now clear that neither
Bovis
nor Braehead will be undertaking any repairs. Thus, the settlement has led to a complete break between the sub-contractors' breaches of contract and the loss alleged both because such loss as has arisen is contained within the settlement and because no repairs have been or will be carried out. The estimated cost of remedying the defects is now merely part of the history and is no longer capable of being a direct and foreseeable consequence of the sub-contractor's breaches of contract.
(2) Is it the case that the settlement between
Bovis
and Braehead acted as a break in the chain of causation in respect of any or all of
Bovis'
claims for loss based on the direct cost of repairs?
RD
Fire
alleges that the settlement has broken the chain of causation between its assumed breaches of contract and any loss incurred by
Bovis.
This is because it is suggested that the settlement agreement releases
Bovis
of all liability to Braehead for the
fire
protection
works defects so that any loss it has suffered as a result of the settlement is not attributable to those defects but to the fact that
Bovis
entered into the settlement on the terms it did.
Bovis
and Braehead". The settlement terms are then stated to be accepted by both parties "in full and final settlement of all costs, claims, liabilities and demands between the parties". In a later clause, the settlement agreement provides that "
Bovis
shall have no further liability for defects in the Works other than latent defects".
Bovis
are not being released from liability. Rather, such liability as
Bovis
has is being compromised by certain payments and other consideration passing in both directions and, as a result of that multiple exchange of consideration, the defects claims are being compromised. It follows that if the effect of the settlement is that, in order to "buy off" the defects claims including the claims associated with the
fire
protection
works,
Bovis
has had to pay something into the settlement or to give an allowance which would not otherwise have been given,
Bovis
has lost out as a result of the defects by
virtue
of those features of the settlement albeit that, as a result, Braehead had no further ability to sue
Bovis
for damages arising from those defects. Braehead had, on that assumption, however, received something for the defects and it is that "something" which
Bovis
is entitled to maintain a claim for from
RD
Fire
and Baris.
Bovis'
loss and, hence, the sum it can claim from the two sub-contractors.
(3) Is it the case that the settlement extinguished all or any of the losses claimed by
Bovis
based on the direct cost of repairs?
Bovis
would incur loss by
virtue
of a claim against it by Braehead which would be settled at a cost to, or loss by,
Bovis.
Thus, if the settlement is reasonable, the sum payable as a result is both foreseeably connected with the original breaches and provides a ceiling of recovery. To the extent, however, that the settlement is unreasonable:
"[the claimant fails to establish that the loss was caused by the relevant breach of contract by the defendant, for if and to the extent that an unreasonable settlement has been entered into, the loss has been caused not by the breach but by the claimant'svoluntary
assumption of liability under the settlement."[24]
Bovis
is reasonably necessary to remedy the incomplete and defective nature of the
fire
protection
work and that the pleaded cost of approximately £6.4m is also reasonable. It follows that whatever loss is included in the settlement for
fire
protection
defects constitutes a reasonable settlement of Braehead's claims for such defects.
Bovis
was reasonably necessary in order to rectify the incomplete and defective nature of the
fire
protection
and its likely total cost was approximately £6.4m as also pleaded by
Bovis."
6.6. Issue 3: Procedural Applications Concerning Settlement Issues
6.6.1.
RD
Fire
and Baris' applications to strike out
Bovis'
replies
Should either or both of
Bovis'
replies served on 24 September 2002 be struck out pursuant to
RD
Fire's
application to strike out dated 27 September 2002 which is also relied on by Baris in making a separate application of its own?
Bovis'
replies added a plea which it was contended created a new cause of action which, given the lateness with which it has been pleaded, should be struck out. A further reason for striking it out, it was contended, was that this new claim was hopeless and could not possibly succeed.
"Therefore, it is impossible to know what sum was allowed by the parties against the sum of £6,485,601 [being claimed byBovis].
.. In entering into the settlement
Bovis
reasonably mitigated its loss be securing a release from Braehead's claim for £6,485,601 by making a reduction of an unascertained amount from the sums otherwise due from Braehead to
Bovis;
the global discount made against all Braehead's counterclaims was £22,778,226/£103,584,365 = 22%. ...
Bovis
gave
value
in the settlement against this claim for 22% of the sum of £6,485,601 ie £1,426,832."
Bovis
was previously claiming the cost of repair, now it was adding, so it was alleged, a second alternative claim based on the settlement. However, that is to misstate the nature of a claimant's claim following a settlement. The cause of action remains the same, all that has occurred is that the loss being recovered has had imposed on it a ceiling or cap. The loss itself can either be proved by reliance on the settlement sum or, at the election of the claimant, by recourse to exactly the same methods of proof and evidence as would have been relied on had there been no settlement. If that later method of proof is used, however, any loss in excess of the settlement sum that is proved is irrecoverable. If it is impossible to prove what sum was included in the settlement, the overall claim fails because the claimant has failed to establish causation not quantum of damage.
fire
protection
defects. In consequence, the claim for 22% of the overall sum, based on an arithmetical reduction of that claim with no evidence to support that as the appropriate method of ascertaining the loss and no pleaded basis for suggesting that that would be a reasonable assessment of loss, is both inconsistent with the pleading and is bound to fail.
Bovis'
replies should be struck out.
6.6.2.
Bovis'
applications to amend the replies
Should
Bovis
be permitted to amend its replies to the defences of
RD
Fire
and Baris in accordance with the draft amended replies dated 3 October 2002?
"The global settlement represented an overall discount on Braehead's counterclaims of £22,778,226/£103,584,365 = 22%. On a pro rata basis 22% of £6,485,601 is £1,426,832 …Bovis
claims the above mentioned loss limited to 22% of the amount claimed by Braehead ... by reason of the mitigation [in entering into the settlement] ... ".
Bovis'
case are, in summary:
1. It seeks to identify the loss made byBovis
in the settlement resulting from the
fire
![]()
protection
works defects yet
Bovis'
pleaded case elsewhere is to the effect that "it is impossible to say what that loss was". This amendment is, therefore inconsistent with
Bovis'
primary case.
2. The plea is based on the assumption that the monetary sum in the settlement was solely confined to the sum of £15m. However, account must also be taken of the monetaryvalue
of the interest recovered and the
value
to
Bovis
of the provisions concerning the commercial development that it was envisaged would be carried out on land owned by an associated company. Thus, the basis of the plea is erroneous and, as pleaded, this case is bound to fail.
3. The plea gives no explanation as to why it is factually appropriate or reasonable tovalue
or assess the loss made by
Bovis
in the settlement by recourse to an arithmetical pro rating on scaling down proportionate to the monetary recovery provided for in the settlement. Further,
Bovis
does not intend, in support of that exercise, to adduce any evidence or to contend that the court should itself evaluate the
value
of the loss by recourse to this method. On that basis, this claim is bound to fail since
Bovis
will not discharge the onus of proving what loss the settlement caused it.
Bovis
to amend any part of its pleaded case so as to advance a case based on an ascertainable ceiling of loss contained within the settlement if, in the light of this judgment, it chooses to make such an application. If it is subsequently made, any such application must be dealt with on it merits, and any decision must be based on the terms of the proposed amendment and on all the circumstances prevailing at the time of that application.
"3(1) Paragraphs 3.9, 3.10 and 3.11.2 of each reply is struck out."
"3(2) Permission is granted to amend the replies save for the last sentence of Paragraph 3(ix), paragraphs 3(x) and 3(xii)(b) and the words 'alternatively (b)' in paragraphs
3(xii)(c) and (d for which permission is refused."
7. Issue 4: Impairment of
Bovis'
Contractual Rights Against Braehead
7.1. Introduction
Bovis'
contractual rights that is alleged is limited.
Bovis
contends that once the nature and existence of the
fire
protection
defects, which on its case were latent, had been discovered, Braehead withheld from sums otherwise due and payable a sum representing at
least
part of the then
value
of its claim for these defects quantified by reference to the estimated cost of repair. The withholding occurred soon after submission by
Bovis
if its final application for payment in January 2001 and the settlement occurred in January 2002.
Bovis
in having to meet a claim from Braehead which Braehead had asserted by exercising its contractual rights of set off against sums otherwise to be paid under the main contract. The loss claimed by this head of claim is the same as the loss claimed under the first two heads of claim that are reliant on the indemnity and the claim for damages for breach of the sub-contract although the claim is also based on the further contractual terms relating to payment and withholding under the main contract which were incorporated into on formed part of the background to,
RD
Fire
and Baris' sub-contracts.
Bovis
in the period starting in January 2001 until that money was finally paid by the settlement or, subsequently, by
RD
Fire
and Baris. Such a claim is ordinarily made by reference to the interest lost on that sum which could have been earned had the sum been paid. In other words, it is a claim for interest on late payment. Ordinarily, such a claim will fail but, if the relevant loss can be brought within the second limb of Hadley
v
Baxendale, it is in principle recoverable (see Wadsworth
v
Lydall [1981] 1 WLR 598,CA and The President of India
v
La Pintada Compania Navigacion [1985] AC 104, HL). Given that the sub-contracts provided that the subcontractor had notice of the terms of the main contract, the basis for such a claim might well be present in this case but no such claim for interest on late payments has been advanced.
Bovis
or such disruption and consequent loss to the running of the main contract as could be shown to have resulted from the late payments in issue. No such loss is alleged or pleaded.
7.2. The Issues
7.2.1. Issue 4(1)
Is the claim advanced by
Bovis
against
RD
Fire
and Baris on the basis of the impairment of its rights against Braehead sustainable as a matter of law either at all or having regard to the fact and nature of the settlement?
Bovis'
rights is for interest on the delayed recovery of sums equal to those withheld by Braehead on account of the
fire
protection
defects or for other direct and ascertainable loss resulting from the withholding and late recovery of this money. No such claims are advanced. The loss that is pleaded, namely the cost of repairs, is recoverable in law on the basis of the impairment of
Bovis'
rights but, like the primary claims for an indemnity and for damages for breach of contract, is susceptible to the ceiling of recovery imposed by the loss incurred by
Bovis
in the settlement. This is because the loss claimed is identical to the loss claimed under these other two heads of claim and must, therefore, be susceptible to the same reduction arising from the application of the law relating to remoteness and foreseeability.
Bovis,
being one confined to the cost of repairs, is recoverable in law but is not recoverable having regard to the fact and nature of the settlement and to the assumptions being made about that settlement for the purposes of these issues."
7.2.1. Issue 4(2)
Is it the case that the settlement extinguished all or any of the impairment losses claimed by
Bovis
herein?
Bovis
accepts that it was caused some loss by the settlement but that its claims for payment under the main contract were settled. Thus
Bovis
has recovered all that it is entitled to recover by
virtue
of the settlement save for that part of the settlement which has caused
Bovis'
direct loss that has arisen from the defects. This loss can, of course, be claimed in any event subject to proof of its extent. Any non-recovery, save for that part directly linked to
Bovis'
loss in the settlement, has occurred because of the settlement and not because of the defects.
8. Issue 5:
Bovis'
Performance Interest
8.1. Introduction
Bovis'
case is that it is entitled to recover damages from
RD
Fire
and Baris as a result of their interference with its contractual performance interest in each sub-contract. These claims are based on
Bovis'
contention that it is entitled to receive, but did not receive, a complete and defect-free performance from
RD
Fire
and Baris of their respective sub-contracts. Instead of receiving these contractual benefits,
Bovis
was provided with a performance which included significant and extensive breaches of these sub-contracts since their work was left in a defective and incomplete state. In consequence,
Bovis
claims to be entitled to recover substantial damages from each sub-contractor irrespective of the fact that
Bovis
itself has no interest in the land or buildings under construction and has incurred no, or no identifiable, loss under its main contract with Braehead in consequence of these breaches, albeit that the same breaches have interfered with its performance interest entitling it to damages quantified on the basis of the cost of reinstatement. Such damages are said to be recoverable even though neither
Bovis
nor the building owner has incurred these costs directly since the cost of reinstatement is the normal measure of damages for defective construction in a contract for the provision of work and materials.
Bovis'
performance interest claims. Firstly, these claims are made by a main contractor with no interest in the land or buildings in question against sub-contractors. Secondly, these claims are made by a party that has incurred no loss in undertaking repairs or any other provable loss. Instead, that party's sole liability to the land owner is real but unquantifiable, is not identifiable as the cost of repairing the relevant defects and arises as a direct result of the settlement of all disputes with the landowner including those arising out of the defects. Moreover,
Bovis
has no liability or obligation to account to the land owner for any recovery that it might receive from the sub-contractors as damages for breach or impairment of its performance interests.
views
as to what constituted recoverable loss, incurred no loss recognised by law that was both foreseeable and recoverable.
view
was not supported by any direct authority and, in modern times, has had to be supported by reference to the law concerning carriage of goods where, certainly since the authoritative pronouncements of Lord Diplock in The Albazero [1977] AC 774, HL, it has been accepted that, if goods are consigned by the owner, ownership passes to the consignee whilst they are in transit and the goods are damaged by the carrier, the consignee is the appropriate party to bring proceedings. However, if the consignee is not a party to the contract of carriage, it will have no contractual remedy against the carrier. Normally, nowadays, a consignee has a statutory remedy against the carrier. The Albazero confirms that there is an exception to the rule of law that makes recovery for damage to the goods dependent upon a contractual or statutory relationship with the carrier. This rule is not applicable where the intention of the parties to the contract of carriage is that the consignor should be able to maintain a claim against the carrier even after ownership in the goods has passed to the consignee and where, otherwise, the owner of the goods would be left without a remedy.
Ltd
v
Sir Robert McAlpine
Ltd
[1994] 1 AC 85, HL and Alfred McAlpine Construction
Ltd
v
Panatown
Ltd
[2001] 1 AC 518, HL. The St Martins case established that an employer under a building contract may recover damages for defective work where the employer has assigned its ownership in the land to a third party who has no direct contractual claim for these damages and where the panties contemplated ownership in that land might be transferred after the building contract had been entered into. This is a direct application of the principle of law confirmed for goods in The Albazero.
Bovis
contends that it can bring itself within the conditions set out in the McAlpine case for the recovery of performance interest damages and can recover these damages from the sub-contractors based on the cost of repairs even though it has incurred no loss and has not undertaken those repairs.
Bovis
to bring itself within the category of case for which the interference of a contractual performance interest is to be allowed, it must show that it is immaterial that it suffered no loss and that the two recent decisions of the House of Lords are nonetheless still applicable.
8.2. Performance Interest
"I cannot accept that in a contract of this nature, namely for work, labour and the supply of materials, the recovery of more than nominal damages for breach of contract is dependent upon the plaintiff having a proprietary interest in the subject matter of the contract at the date of the breach. In everyday life contracts for work and labour are constantly being placed by those who have no proprietary interest in the subject matter of the contract."[25]
Lord Browne-Wilkinson stated:
"It is therefore necessary to consider [counsel for the main contractor's] principle argument in some detail. … Since before the date of any breach of contract by [the main contractor], [the employer] had disposed of all its interest in the property on which the building works were carried out, [the employer] has suffered no loss. ... This is a formidable, if unmeritorious, argument since it is apparently soundly based on principle and is supported by authority.
Notwithstanding the apparent logic of [counsel for the main contractor's] submission, I have considerable doubts whether it is correct. A contract for the supply of goods or of work, labour and materials (a supply contract) is not the same as a contract for the carriage of goods. A breach of a supply contract involves a failure to supply thevery
goods or services which the defendant has contracted to supply and for which the plaintiff has agreed to pay. If the breach is discovered before payment of the contract price, the price is abated by the cost of making good the defects: see ... as to building contracts Modern Engineering (Bristol)
Ltd
![]()
v
Gilbert-Ash (Northern)
Ltd
[1974] AC 689, HL. [Counsel for the main contractor] accepted that this right to abatement of the price does not depend on ownership by the plaintiff and it would be odd if the plaintiff's rights arising from breach
varied
according to whether the breach was discovered before or after payment of the price.
There is therefore much to be said for drawing a distinction between cases where the ownership of goods or property is relevant to prove that the plaintiff has suffered loss through the breach of a contract other than a contract to supply those goods or property and the measure of damages in a supply contract where the contractual obligation itself requires the provision of those goods on services. ... In myview
the point merits exposure to academic consideration before it is decided by this House. Nor do I find it necessary to decide the point since, on any
view,
the facts of this case bring it within the class of exceptions to the general rule to which Lord Diplock was referring in the Albazero."[26]
views
of the majority of the Law Lords may be obtained from these extracts from the speeches of the three Law Lords who were in the majority in that case:
Lord Clyde: "The first formulation ... are found in the speech of Lord Griffiths in the St Martin's case. ... [The employer who has no interest in the property being constructed], faced with a breach by [the contractor] of their contractual duty to perform the contract with sound materials and with all reasonable skill and care, would be entitled to recover from (the contractor] the cost of remedying the defect in the work as a normal measure of damages. He then dealt with two possible objections. First, it should not matter that the work was not being done or property owned by [the employer]. ... The second objection, that (the employer] had in fact been reimbursed for the cost of the repairs was answered by the consideration that the person who actually pays for the repairs is of no concern to the party who broke the contract. ... Thus far the approach appears to be consistent with principle, and in particular with the principle of privity."[27]
Lord Jauncey: "I respectfully agree with [Lord Goff of Chieveley's] rejection (in his speech in Panatown] of the proposition that the employer under a building contract is unable to recover substantial damages for breach of the contract if the work in question is to be performed on land or buildings which are not his property. In such a case the employer's right to substantial damages will, in myview,
depend upon whether he has made good or intends to make good the effects of the breach. ... This produces a sensible result and avoids the recovery of "uncovenanted" profit by an employer who does not intend to take further steps to remedy the breach."[28]
Lord Browne-Wilkinson: "I turn now to the broader ground on which Lord Griffiths decided the St Martins case. He held that the building contractor was liable to the promisee for more than nominal damages even though the promisee did not own the land at the date of the breach. He held in effect that be reason of the breach the promisee had himself suffered damage, being the loss of thevalue
to him of the performance of the contract. On this
view
even though the promisee might not be legally liable to the third party to provide him with the benefit which the performance of the contract by the building contractor would have provided, the promisee has lost his "performance interest" and will therefore be entitled to substantial damages being, in Lord Griffiths'
view,
the cost to the promisee of providing the third party with the benefit."[29]
1. The employer had no interest in the land or buildings.
2. The employer had incurred or would incur substantial loss in undertaking repairs or the third party owner had incurred or would incur substantial loss and the employer provided an undertaking or suitable assurance that the damages recovered from the contractor would be reimbursed to the third party owner.
3. There was no direct contractual nexus between the third party owner and the contractor that would allow for substantial recovery for the same on similar loss.
very
similar position to the employer with no interest in the property in both the St Martins and McAlpine cases.
Bovis'
performance interest must, on the present state of the authorities, be limited to situations where, although
Bovis
has no legal liability to pay for or carry out the repairs, the repairs have been or will be carried out and paid for and any damages recovered by
Bovis
will find their way to the person who is thereby out of pocket. If the loss that has been incurred is not remedial costs but diminution in
value
or other tangible loss, there again seems no reason in principle why that cannot be recovered by the employer or main contractor with no interest in the land. However, the other requirements for the recovery of performance interest damages imposed by the House of Lords in the McAlpine case would still be applicable.
8.3. Issue 5
8.3.1. The issue defined
Is the claim advanced by
Bovis
against
RD
Fire
and Baris on the basis of the loss of its performance interest in the sub-contract with
RD
Fire
and (assuming there was such a sub-contract) in the sub-contract with Baris sustainable as a matter of law either at all or having regard to the fact and nature of the settlement?
8.3.2. The Answer
Bovis
is not sustainable in law for two separate reasons if the settlement is not taken into account and, if it is, for an additional third reason. The three reasons will now be considered separately.
1. Direct Warranty
"The Contractor shall procure and deliver to the Employer an Employer/Sub-Contractor Agreement in the form set out in Appendix G to the Conditions duly executed as a deed by each sub-contractor or supplier who is undertaking a responsibility for the preparation of design for the Works or any parts thereof ...".
The form of Agreement provided for in Appendix G provided that the sub-contractor warranted to the employer, amongst other warranties:
"1.1 insofar as the Sub-Contract Works have been or will be designed by or on behalf of the Sub-Contractor, it has exercised and will continue to exercise all the reasonable skill, care and diligence to be expected of a professionally qualified and competent designer experienced in designing work of a similar scope, nature, complexity and size to the Sub-Contract Works;…
1.5. all workmanship, manufacture and fabrication shall be in accordance with the terms of the Sub-Contract;…
2. The Sub-Contractor also warrants to the Employer that:-
2.1. in all respects it has carried out and fulfilled and shall continue to carry out and fulfil the duties of a Contractor set out in the Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 1994 ...".
Bovis
agreed to use its reasonable endeavours to secure from those sub-contractors who had not entered into a direct employer/sub-contractor agreement (who included both
RD
Fire
and Baris), such an agreement and deliver it to Braehead after the conclusion of the settlement and the settlement agreement had taken effect.
Bovis
should have obtained such a employer/sub-contractor agreement from both
RD
Fire
and Baris and the circumstances in which such agreements were not obtained either before each started work or following the settlement agreement were not explained in the assumed facts document. Equally, the reason why
Bovis
was unable to procure such agreements following the settlement was not explained. However, the main contract was entered into on the basis that all relevant sub-contract work would be undertaken by sub-contractors who had already executed a direct contract and had delivered that executed contract to
Bovis
for safe-keeping. I must therefore construe and apply the main contract and the sub-contracts on the basis that there was a clear contemplation that separate contracts would be entered into by each of the sub-contractors with Braehead. This way of applying the contractual scheme arise because, to use the words of Lord Clyde in the McAlpine case:
"As part of the contractual arrangements entered into between Panatown and McAlpine there was a clear contemplation that separate contracts would be entered into by McAlpine, the contracts of the deed of duty of care and the collateral warranties. The duty of care deed and the collateral warranties were not of course in themselves building contracts. But they did form an integral part of the package of arrangements which the employer and the contractor agreed upon and in that respect should beviewed
as reflecting the intentions of all the parties engaged in the arrangements that the third party should have a direct cause of action to the exclusion of any substantial claim by the employer, and accordingly that the exception should not apply. ... Panatown cannot then, in the light of these deeds, be treated as having contracted with McAlpine for the benefit of the owner or later owners of the land and the exception is plainly excluded."[31]
A similar line of reasoning was adopted by Lord Browne-Wilkinson who stated:
"Therefore, the whole contractual matrix relating to this development envisaged that McAlpine's obligations under the building contract were to be enforceable against McAlpine not only be Panatown but also to avery
substantial extent by [the owner of the land] and its successors in title under the deed".[32]
Lord Jauncey also adopted this reasoning:
"What is important, as I see it, is that the third party should as a result of the main contract have the right to recover substantial damages for breach under his contract even if those damages may not be identical to those which would have been recoverable under the main contract in the same circumstances. In such a situation the need for an exception to the general rule ceases to apply.[33]
Bovis
as main contractor had a contractual obligation owed to Braehead as the owner of the land to establish or procure such a direct contract between the owner and each sub-contractor such as
RD
Fire
and Baris.
"I will assume that the broader ground is sound in law and that in the ordinary case where the third party has no direct cause of action against the building contractor, the employer can recover damages from the building contractor on the broader ground. Even on that assumption, in my judgment Panatown has no right to substantial damages in this case because the owner of the land has a direct cause of action under the [duty of care deed]. ... If, as in the present case, the whole contractual scheme was designed, inter alia, to give the owner of the land and its successors a legal remedy against the building contractor for failure to perform the building contract with due care, I cannot see that the employer has suffered any damage to its performance interests; subject to any defence based on limitation of actions, the physical and pecuniary damage suffered by the owner of the land can be redressed by the owner of the land exercising its own cause of action against the contractor."[34]
The speeches of Lord Clyde and Lord Jauncey were to the same effect.
Bovis
can point to some reason to justify its apparent failure to procure these direct agreements and can show that their absence is not the result of any breach of its contractual obligation imposed by the main contract requirement that it should procure such contracts, the exclusion of an enforceable performance interest provided for in the McAlpine case must take effect. Since no such justification is alleged by
Bovis,
it has no such enforceable interest against
RD
Fire
and Baris since the contractual scheme was devised on the basis that Braehead would have a direct claim against both
RD
Fire
and Baris.
2. No Expenditure
Bovis
will not incur, either with or without a legal obligation to incur it, any expenditure in undertaking remedial work. All five law lords in the McAlpine case regarded it as axiomatic that such expenditure had been or would be incurred before a performance interest claim could succeed. Thus, Lord Jauncey stated:
"I respectfully agree with [Lord Goff's] rejection of the proposition that the employer under a building contract is unable to recover substantial damages for breach of the contract if the work in question is to be performed on land or buildings which are not his property. In such a case the employer's right to substantial damages will, in myview,
depend upon whether he has made good or intends to make good the effects of the breach."[35]
Bovis
neither intends to undertake remedial work nor has the power to do so. It also appears that Braehead has no such intention either. It follows that
Bovis'
potential performance interest claim must fail.
3. The Settlement
Bovis
has no further liability to pay Braehead anything and is relieved of all obligation to account to it for any recovery it might make. In the McAlpine case, the majority of the law lords regarded it as imperative that an employer recovering performance interest damages had either itself already incurred the loss in question or would be under a duty to account to the land owner for the recovery made from the contractor. Thus, Lord Browne Wilkinson again:
"The theoretical objection to giving the contracting party substantial damages for breach of the contract by the contractor for failing to provide the owner of the land wit a benefit which it itself can enforce against the contractor is further demonstrated by great practical difficulties which such aview
would entail. ... What if the employer itself was entitled to, and did, sue for and recover damages from the contractor? Presumably the contractor could not in addition be liable to the owner of the land for breach of the duty of care deed: yet the employer would not be liable to account to an assignee of the duty of care deed for damages for breach of the duty of care deed it had recovered from the contractor. The result would therefore be another piece of legal nonsense; the party who had suffered real, tangible damage (the assignee) could recover nothing but the employer which hack 'suffered no real, tangible loss could recover damages."[36]
Bovis
been seeking from
RD
Fire
and Baris the loss it had incurred by entering into the settlement directly attributable to breaches of their sub-contracts, there is no good reason why that loss could not be recovered as damages for interference with
Bovis'
performance interest. The McAlpine principles are not confined to remedial work costs but, as is clear from the Ruxley case[37] , these principles can be extended to any other direct loss arising from an interference such as loss of
value
or loss arising from an impairment of expectation. However,
Bovis
seeks to go further and to recover the entirety of the cost of repair when its loss is limited or capped by the settlement to a lower figure.
9. Conclusion
Bovis'
claims against both
RD
Fire
and Baris are, in the light of the answers to these preliminary issues, still maintainable, which parts should be struck out and what defendant's summary judgment should be entered on behalf of
RD
Fire
and Baris without further evidence being served. Such parts of the two actions that survive that procedural investigation must then go to trial.
HH Judge Thornton QC
Technology and Construction Court
January 2003
Note 1 .See Robinson Note 2 The relevant authorities are summarised and explained in Hudson’s Building and Engineering Contracts, eleventh edition (1995), paragraphs 8-119 - 8-155B. They include Ruxley Electronics Note 3 ibid., page 366. [Back] Note 6 The principal authorities in building contract cases that establish these principles are East Ham Borough Council Note 7 (1854) 9 Ex 341; [1949] 2 KB 528, CA [Back] Note 9 ibid., page 428. [Back] Note 10 ibid., page 322. [Back] Note 11 There is a difference of opinion between judges of the TCC as to whether it is also necessary to show that it was reasonable to settle. Judge Bowsher QC, in the P & 0 Developments case (infra, paragraph 79), at page 14, thought that in an appropriate case it would be whereas Judge Hicks QC, in the DSL Group No 1 case, (infra, ibid.) at page 136 and in the Royal Brompton Hospital case, (infra, ibid.), at paragraph 20, thought that evidence on this issue would be neither relevant nor admissible. [Back] Note 12 ibid.; page 431. [Back] Note 13 ibid., at pages 321 and 324 respectively. See also the Royal Brompton Hospital case, paragraphs 25 (quoting from Biggin at page 321 and DSL Group No 1 at paragra phs 5 - 8) and paragraph 30) and the P & 0 case ibid., at page 13, left hand column: ‘The settlement sets a maximum to the claim”. [Back] Note 14 ibid., page 13. See also the discussion on this topic by Judge Hicks in the Royal Brompton Hospital case, ibid., at paragraphs 19 - 20. [Back] Note 15 ibid., page 154F - G [Back] Note 16 ibid., pages 41 - 42. [Back] Note 17 ibid., pages 41 - 42. [Back] Note 18 See paragraph 77 above [Back] Note 19 See paragraph 53 above for a definition of these two bases of claim. [Back] Note 21 ibid., page 691. [Back] Note 22 ibid., pages 372 - 373. [Back] Note 23 ibid., page 1034 [Back] Note 24 per Coleman J in the General Foods case, ibid., page 691. [Back] Note 25 ibid., page 96. [Back] Note 26 ibid., pages 111 -112. [Back] Note 27 ibid., page 533. [Back] Note 28 ibid., page 574. [Back] Note 29 ibid., page 577. [Back] Note 30 See paragraph 41 above. [Back] Note 31 ibid., page 532. [Back] Note 32 ibid., page 576. [Back] Note 33 ibid., page 568. [Back] Note 34 ibid., pages 577 -578. [Back] Note 35 ibid., page 574. [Back]
v
Harman (1848) 1 Exch 850 at 855 per Parke B; Livingstone
v
Rawyards Coal Co (1880) 5 App Cas 25 at 39 per Lord Blackburn. Both passages are set out in the passage concerned with the general principles of assessment of damages in Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract, A. Burrows (1994) cited in argument. [Back]
Ltd
v
Forsyth [1996] 1 AC 344, HL. [Back]
v
Bernard Sunley
Ltd
[1966] AC 406, HL; Bevan Investments
Ltd
v
Blackhall and Struthers [1978] 2 N.Z.L.R. 97, New Zealand CA; Dodd Property (Kent)
Ltd
v Canterbury County Council [1980] 1 WLR 433, CA. [Back]