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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Technology and Construction Court) Decisions >> London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority (LFEPA) v Halcrow Gilbert Associates Ltd [2007] EWHC 2546 (TCC) (31 July 2007) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/TCC/2007/2546.html Cite as: [2007] EWHC 2546 (TCC) |
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QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
TECHNOLOGY AND CONSTRUCTION COURT
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
Between:
____________________
LONDON FIRE AND EMERGENCY PLANNING AUTHORITY | Claimant |
|
| - and - |
||
HALCROW GILBERT ASSOCIATES LIMITED |
First Defendant |
|
| - and - |
||
HALCROW GROUP LIMITED |
Second Defendant |
|
| - and - |
||
| LORNE STEWART PLC |
Third Defendant/ Third party |
____________________
Mr Marcus Taverner QC and Ms Chantal-Aimée Doerries
(instructed by Mayer Brown Rowe & Maw LLP) for the Defendants
____________________
VERSION
OF JUDGMENT
Crown Copyright ©
| Paragraphs | ||
| 1 | Introduction | 1 – 26 |
| 2 | Court List and Witnesses of Fact | 26 – 43 |
| 3 | Expert Witnesses | 44 - 82 |
| 4 | The Law | |
| (a)Negligence | 82 – 86 | |
| (b)Damages | 87 – 107 | |
| 5 | The facts of the January 2005 fire | 108 – 257 |
| 6 | Experts Opinions | 258 – 270 |
| 7 | Allegations of negligence against Halcrow – Discussion and Conclusions |
|
| (a)Introduction | 271 – 280 | |
| (b)Failure to consider initially the effect of smoke oil in the ductwork | 281 – 298 | |
| (c)DW/142 | 299 – 312 | |
| (d)The gaskets and sealants should have been specified to be oil resistant | 313 – 319 | |
| (e)Risk assessment | 320 – 341 | |
| (f)Risk assessment after discovery of defective sealant | 342 – 347 | |
(g)Design Review after 2004 fire | 348 – 363 | |
| 8 | The allegations against Lorne Stewart – Discussion and Conclusions | 364 – 430 |
| 9 | The History after 5 January 2006 | 431 – 559 |
| 10 | The Remedial Schemes | |
| (a)The Schemes | 560 – 595 | |
| (b)The Feasibility of carrying out the work | 596 – 608 | |
| 11 | Extract Ductwork | 609 – 623 |
| 12 | LFEPA's Intentions | 624 – 647 |
| 13 | Westemp Panels | 648 – 658 |
His Honour Judge Toulmin CMG QC:
Introduction
London
Fire
and
Emergency
Planning
Authority
("LFEPA"), formerly the
London
Fire
and Civil Defence
Authority,
against
Halcrow
Gilbert
Associates
Limited, the first defendant, and its parent company,
Halcrow
Gilbert
Group Limited, the second defendant. The first and second defendants are referred to collectively as "
Halcrow"
and are a well known international multi-disciplinary engineering practice providing engineering, architectural, quantity surveying, contract administration and project management services.
Halcrow
has settled its contribution claim against Lorne Stewart. The terms of the settlement are confidential save that the court has been informed that
Halcrow
is now on the record for Lorne Stewart. A settlement has also been agreed between Lorne Stewart and P & P. The court has no knowledge of the terms of this settlement.
fire
at LFEPA's training centre, The
Firehouse
in Southwark, on 5 January 2005. The
Firehouse
was being used to provide realistic
firefighting
training facilities in simulated operational conditions including
fire,
heat and smoke. There had previously been a small
fire
in the section of the duct work in the fourth floor
plant
room in June 2004, the relevance of which I shall consider in due course.
fire
which occurred in the ceiling
void
of the Office scenario room on 5 January 2005 was not
very
extensive, was quickly brought under control and caused minimal damage.
Firehouse
for a substantial part of the training of
firefighters
for which The
Firehouse
was designed and which it claims has had to be undertaken elsewhere at substantial additional cost.
fire,
(2) the cost of investigation of the cause of the
fire,
(3) replacement of defective ductwork and
associated
equipment, (4) loss of use of The
Firehouse
based on a 45 month shutdown for the investigation, remedial works and subsequent commissioning.
fire
training for the whole of the period and alternative cold
fire
training for a period of twelve months during the remedial works. The
Authority
gives credit to take account of the reduced costs in operating the facility during this time.
Halcrow
settled other substantial claims made by LFEPA against
Halcrow.
Halcrow
for present and future claims relating to
Halcrow's
services were settled except for:
"(a) the claims which LFEPA brought againstHalcrow
in relation to the uncontrolled
fire
at The
Firehouse
on 5 January 2005 as set out in paragraphs 271-275 and 279 in LFEPA's amended Particulars of Claim re-served on 30 June 2005 including, for the avoidance of doubt, any claims by LFEPA against
Halcrow
for fees paid to
Halcrow
as part of the investigation of the
fire
post-5 January 2005 and
(b) future claims in respect of defects in TheFirehouse
which were not apparent or could not with reasonable diligence have been discovered at the date of the settlement agreement."
1.Halcrow's
alleged defective design of the ducts and the exhaust system installed in the ceiling
voids
in The
Firehouse.
The relevant ducts are identified in the pleading as those which carry smoke during training exercises (para 271)
2. Para 272 of the pleading alleges that the ductwork was wrongly specified byHalcrow
in that it was specified to comply with industry standard DW/142 when this standard was for normal commercial air conditioning and
ventilation
systems and was not designed to be airtight and was stated specifically not to be intended to handle polluted air.
3. It is alleged that the ductwork should have been specified to stainless steel fully welded construction with welded angle flanges and full faced gaskets (para 273).
4. As a result of the allegedly defective ducts LFEPA contends that oil leaked and an uncontrolledfire
occurred. In order to prevent any possibility of a recurrence LFEPA claims that all the supply ductwork and possibly all the extract ductwork in The
Firehouse
needs to be replaced (para 274).
Halcrow
was in breach of duty in
"1. failing to produce a satisfactory design;
2. insofar as it is applicable, failing to ensure that an adequate design was prepared by others and/or failed to ensure that contractors carried out their works in accordance with the terms of the construction contracts; and …
4. accepted defective works and/or allowed unauthorised relaxations to the specifications."
fire,
particularised the quantum of damage as (1) direct cost of repair £1.6m, (2) construction costs and professional fees £200,000 (plus
VAT),
(3) cost of the loss of use of The
Firehouse
based on a 24 month shutdown for the remedial works £1.4m and (4) cost of the investigation and the ductwork which was installed.
Halcrow
set out in the Re-Re-Re-Amended Particulars of Claim are:
1. Failed to prepare a specification for the distribution ductwork appropriate for the use to which it was to be put (i.e. transfer of hot oil, air and smoke as opposed to normal temperature air).
2. Wrongly specified the ductwork to be manufactured and installed in accordance with HVCA Specification DW/142.
3. Failed to specify the ductwork to be either stainless steel or zintec of fully welded construction with welded iron flanges and full faced gaskets in accordance with HVCA Specification D1/171 (kitchenventilation
systems) or some other specification appropriate for the transfer without leakage of hot air/oil and/or smoke. (This may be a misprint for DW/171.)
4. Failed to provide a specification for the ductwork that was airtight.
5. Failed to produce a satisfactory design.
6. Failed to review its design.
7. To the extent that the material design was not prepared byHalcrow,
failed to ensure that adequate design was prepared by others.
(8. Withdrawn)
9. Failed to ensure that the mechanical services contractor (Lorne Stewart) carried out works to the ductwork in accordance with the terms of the mechanical services contract by carrying out inspections of the works as completed or otherwise.
10. Acceptance byHalcrow
of defective work and/or allowing unauthorised relaxation to the specifications.
Halcrow
are summarised clearly in LFEPA's closing submissions as follows:
1.Halcrow's
ductwork design permitted the leakage of smoke oil through the cross joints in the ductwork insulation when it should not have done so.
2.Halcrow
knew or ought to have known that its design would permit such leakage. Each of the options in DW/142 provided for permitted leakage and DW/142 contained a specific warning that special consideration was required for a design where the air in the ductwork was polluted. The ductwork was tested and accepted by
Halcrow
on the basis that it permitted such leakage.
3.Halcrow
should have specified that the gaskets and sealant used in the flange joints needed to be oil resistant.
4.Halcrow
failed to review and correct its design during the works and/or after the first
fire
in 2004.
5.Halcrow
should have, but failed to ensure that Lorne Stewart corrected defects to the flange joints before accepting the work as complete and issuing taking over certificates.
1. Lorne Stewart selected and used an unsuitable sealant between the faces of the flanged joints that was incapable of withstanding exposure to smoke oil.
2. In some areas Lorne Stewart failed to apply any sealant at all and/or failed to apply it properly and/or continuously.
3. Lorne Stewart failed to install the appropriate number and spacing of clamps, cleats and fixings for the flanges at the cross joints.
4. Lorne Stewart selected and installed flanges for the cross joints that were not suitable because they did not provide air tight and/or oil tight joints.
5. Lorne Stewart was instructed to rectify the defects in the flange joints
(a) during the defects liability period and/or
(b) following the 2004fire
and/or
(c) after the 2005fire
and failed to do so adequately or at all.
associated
with the replacement of the defective ductwork with ductwork which is capable of containing and draining oil deposited within it so as to eliminate the risk of uncontrolled
fire.
fire
training.
fire
training at the Southwark
Firehouse
by carrying out Scheme 3 and that in order to do so it will be obliged to expend considerable sums in addition to those claimed in this litigation in order to rectify other design defects. It underlines that the stated purpose of The
Firehouse
is to provide real
fire
training and LFEPA claims that it is entitled to the facility for which it has paid.
Halcrow's
proposed alternative schemes are inadequate. It contends that neither
Halcrow's
Scheme 1 – repairs to the joints in the ductwork, nor its Scheme 2 – replacement of supply ductwork to
Halcrow's
original design, are adequate because they both fail to correct inherent defects in the design. LFEPA also contends that Scheme 5, advanced by
Halcrow,
providing smoke generation through local smoke generators has not been designed in sufficient detail and is, it contends, unlikely to provide any savings when compared with LFEPA's own Scheme 3. (There is no Scheme 4 for me to consider.)
| 1.Cost of ductwork replacement | £2,082,904 |
2.Cost of alternative fire training |
2,550,103 |
3. Fire and remedial scheme investigation fee |
193,373 |
| 4.Less credit for operational savings | (81,812) |
| £4,744,568 |
2. Cast List and Witnesses of Fact
Fire
and
Emergency
Planning.
He reports on behalf of his staff to a management board which I was told would have the ultimate responsibility for taking strategic decisions in relation to The
Firehouse.
Under the Commissioner, LFEPA is split into directorates, each of which has a Deputy Commissioner or equivalent. Within the Directorate of Resources Ms Barbara Riddell is Director of Resources. Reporting to her are Mr Gary Dobson, Head of Training and Development since February 2006, and Mr Nadim Moge, Head of Property Services since 2000.
Firehouse
project reporting to Mr Moge. Mr Norris now undertakes those responsibilities. His job is and was to monitor the completion of The
Firehouse
contract and to assist in co-ordinating the work to return The
Firehouse
to operation. He clearly liaised closely with Mr Richards, head of the Real
Fire
Training Team and thus responsible for the training of the
Firefighters
at Southwark. Both he and Mr Richards have written a number of important memoranda which I must consider.
various
documents including in particular the meeting on 3 May 2006. As it turns out, I do not need to refer to her oral evidence further.
Halcrow,
Mr Tovey is the Technical Director of the company and from the relatively early stages he has also been the Project Director on the Project. Mr Tough has been for most of the relevant period the Project Manager on the Project. Both gave evidence before me.
fireplaces.
Ltd
were project managers appointed by LFEPA in connection with remedial work. Their chief point of contact was Mr Livesey.
Ltd
were and are suppliers of smoke generation equipment who were retained by LFEPA to produce
various
reports and give advice.
Ltd
as sub-contractors for the insulation of the ductwork.
Firehouse.
various
Reports have been produced in relation to risk assessments in the course of the Project and in relation to the causes of the two
fires.
very
significant evidence if they had been called to give evidence, but they were not called by LFEPA and although I raised the matter directly at the trial, no explanation has been given. Ms Riddell was present at a number of the important strategy meetings. As head of the Resources Directorate she would have been in a much better position to assist me on the future
plans
for The
Firehouse
and, in particular, whether or not, if I were to award damages for the rectification of The
Firehouse,
what degree of likelihood, if any, there is that the rectification works would go ahead.
firefighters.
Mr Dobson, who did give evidence, joined LFEPA over a year after the
fire
and was only able to be of relatively limited assistance.
firefighting
training at Southwark are other than extremely competent at their jobs.
firefighting
training which is currently being provided for the
London
area is anything but of the highest standard.
Halcrow.
It is clear that whatever is the outcome of this litigation they are highly competent engineers who were conscientious in the way they gave their evidence. LFEPA generously agreed in closing that Mr Tovey was distinguished in his job. Mr Tovey in particular was
very
impressive in the way in which he gave his evidence. Mr Hood, a Senior Operations Manager, also gave his evidence effectively for Lorne Stewart.
3. Expert Witnesses
v
General Medical Council [2007] 2 WLR 286 at 297 and can be summarised as follows:-
v
Jordan [1981] 1 WLR 246 at 256 per Lord Wilberforce.
Ltd
v
Commercial Union Assurance [1987] 1 Lloyds Rep 379 at 386 and Cazalet J in re J [1990] FCR 190.
v
Weldon, The Times, November 9, 1990.
view,
having read the other parties' expert reports or for any other reason, such change of
view
should be communicated (through the legal representatives) without delay to the other party and where appropriate to the court.
plans,
calculations, analyses, measurements, or similar documents, these must be provided to the opposite party at the same time as the report (see para 15.5 of the Guide to the Commercial Court).
v
Gullis & Pile [1999] BLR 394 at 398, Lord Woolf made it clear that the provisions of the CPR confirmed the requirements set out in the Ikarian Reefer.
"1. It is the duty of an expert to help the court on the matters within his expertise.
2. This duty overrides any obligation to the person from whom he has received instructions or by whom he is paid."
"1.1 It is the duty of an expert to help the court on matters within his own expertise: Rule 35(1). This duty is paramount and overrides any obligation to the person from whom the expert has received instructions or by whom he is being paid.
1.2 Expert evidence should be the independent product of the expert uninfluenced by the pressures of litigation.
1.3 An expert should assist the court by providing objective, unbiased, opinion on matters within his expertise and should not assume the role of the advocate.
1.4 An expert should consider all material facts including those which might detract from his opinion.
1.5 An expert should make it clear
(a) when a question or issue falls outside his expertise and
(b) when he is not able to reach a definitive opinion, for example, because he has insufficient information.
1.6 If after producing a report, an expert changes hisview
on any material matter, such a change of
view
should be communicated to all the parties without delay and when appropriate to the court."
"14.3 Those instructing experts should keep experts informed of the progress of cases including amendments to statement of case relevant to the expert's opinion.
14.4 If those instructing experts become aware of material changes in circumstances or that information within their control was not provided to experts they should without delay instruct experts to review and if necessary update the contents of their reports."
v
Alfred McAlpine Homes [1995] FSR 818; Cantor Fitzgerald
v
Tradition [2000] RPC 95; Anglo Group plc
v
Winther Browne & Co
Ltd
[2000] 72 Con LR 118; and Great Eastern Hotel
v
John Laing & others [2005] EWHC 181.
Halcrow
complains about three of LFEPA's experts and in particular Mr Evans, who gave evidence on matters of professional negligence. Part of the problem may have been that Mr Evans was retained by LFEPA in a dual capacity both to devise and no doubt in due course for reward, to supervise the carrying out of his scheme for remedial works and as an expert in the litigation. This led to the situation where the
Authority
was claiming privilege for meetings which Mr Evans attended where it was claimed that the primary purpose was for him to advise in relation to this litigation, which was privileged, rather than to advise on the implementation of his own remedial scheme by the
Authority,
which would not have been privileged.
very
much later in contravention of the Guidance to which I have just referred. In this respect LFEPA itself failed to observe the guidelines to which I have referred.
very
productive time in discussing and agreeing a number of the issues entirely in accordance with the appropriate procedure.
view
Mr Evans' written and oral evidence was partial, biased, and on occasions misleading to such an extent that it could not be described as independent. The errors in his written and oral evidence cause me reluctantly to question not only his reliability but also his overall competence as an expert.
Halcrow
was in breach of the Highly Flammable Liquids and Liquified Petroleum Gas Regulations 1972. In cross-examination Mr Evans admitted that the Regulations did not apply to Ondina oil, the relevant substance in this case. He was asked when he found this out. He replied that he had known that for a long time. Mr Evans agreed in oral evidence that what he had written was "misleading" and "wrong". He claimed that he wrote it as an "oversight". He refused to accept that he had made a mistake but could give no explanation as to how he came to assert that
Halcrow
was in breach of these Regulations.
Halcrow
should have carried out a risk assessment.
planning
for any building which contains flammable liquids". The substance to which he was referring was the Ondina oil which is not defined as a flammable liquid either in the Regulations or within the industry. Mr Evans was forced to agree that paragraph 3.68 of his report would have to be quite considerably re-written if it was to give an accurate picture.
"The consultant shall also assess the mechanicalventilation
extract systems together with artificial smoke devices and materials for use within the scheme."
Halcrow
had failed to make such an assessment. Mr Evans had to agree in oral evidence that in order to give a fair picture he should have said that
Halcrow
had indeed made such an assessment.
various
remedial schemes.
Halcrow's
expert, was putting forward the case that it might be a realistic possibility. ASM told Mr Evans that it was not something that could be practically achieved. Mr Evans said that "it was probably an oversight that I did not declare it".
Halcrow
that after the
fire
in June 2004
Halcrow
should have advised LFEPA that they should have stopped providing training at The
Firehouse.
Equally, he said that if he had been drawing up the mechanical work specification he would have stated expressly that the sealant should be oil resistant.
Halcrow
had not done so.
Ltd
as their building services expert. He gave evidence on the scope of the remedial works. It is the first time that he has given evidence in court as an expert. It would appear that he was insufficiently briefed by his principal on the obligations of being an expert witness. He was a poor witness. In her final submissions on behalf of LFEPA Ms O'Farrell QC conceded, inevitably, that contrary to his obligations as an expert, Mr Walsh did not carry out sufficient investigation into the availability of replacement components for the communications equipment. As a result he reached a conclusion that was wholly unsustainable.
firefighter
location system for which he was contending was not needed. This resulted in a saving of a substantial part of LFEPA's claim. If it had not been for the cross-examination of Mr Walsh by Mr Taverner QC, the court might well have been misled into concluding that LFEPA's claim was close to a million pounds more than in fact it legitimately was.
fire
engineering expert. There is no criticism of his evidence.
fire
expert evidence for Lorne Stewart and P & P. I have not taken their reports or contributions to the Joint Statements into account except where they have been adopted by other witnesses, notably Mr Evans. In which case I have taken their
views
into account as part of his evidence.
Halcrow,
worked
very
hard to agree quantum issues. This work saved much time at trial and I acknowledge it. However, some issues remain to be resolved and each gave brief evidence at the trial.
4. The Law
(a) Negligence
Halcrow
to carry out its obligations under the contract with due care and diligence. This required
Halcrow
to carry out its obligations with the reasonable care and skill to be exercised by a professional carrying on that profession.
v
Friern Hospital Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582 at 586:
"But where you get a situation which involves the use of some special skill and competence then the test as to whether there has been negligence or not is … the standard of a skilled man exercising and professing to have that special skill. A man need not possess the highest expert skill; it is well established law that it is sufficient if he exercises the ordinary skill of an ordinary competent man exercising that particular art. I do not think that I quarrel much with any of the submissions in law which have been put before you by counsel. Mr Fox-Andrews put it in this way, that in the case of a medical man, negligence means a failure to act in accordance with the standards of reasonably competent medical men at the time. That is a perfectly adequate statement so long as it is remembered that there may be one or more perfectly proper standards; and if a medical man conforms with one of those proper standards then he is not negligent."
Halcrow
agreed to use their reasonable care and skill in the development of the project. They did not guarantee that they would bring the project to a successful conclusion. The case, rightly, is not put by LFEPA on that basis but on the basis that
Halcrow
fell below the standard of care and skill reasonably to be expected of professionals who profess a
very
high level of engineering and management skills that enable them to profess to LFEPA that they have the competence to develop and manage this innovative project.
Halcrow
should have appreciated in 1998 or later that oil would collect in the ductwork in sufficient
volume
that it would not form merely a film but would form small globules which would leak and in leaking would saturate the insulation, which would constitute a
fire
risk and whether, in failing to do so, they fell below the appropriate professional standard.
(b) Damages
v
Underground Railway of
London
[1912] AC 673 at 689 and have ever since been cited as good law for the following propositions:
1. The fundamental basis of damages is compensation for the pecuniary loss to a party naturally flowing from the breach.
2. This principle is qualified by the duty of a claimant to take all reasonable steps to mitigate its loss.
3. Where in the course of business a party has taken action arising out of the transaction which has mitigated its loss, the effect in actual diminution of the loss which it has suffered may be taken into account even if it had no duty to act. These principles were affirmed by the House of Lords in Banque Bruxelles Lambert SAv
Eagle Star [1997] AC 191.
v
Rawyards Coal Company (1880) 5 AppCas 25 at 37 that compensatory damages should as nearly as possible:
"… put a party who has been injured or who has suffered in the same position as he would have been if he had not sustained the wrong."
v
Forsyth [1996] 1 AC 344 at 357, Lord Jauncey set out the following further guiding principle:
"Damages are designed to compensate for an established loss and not to provide a gratuitous benefit for an aggrieved party from which it follows that the reasonableness of an award is to be linked directly to the loss sustained. If it is unreasonable in a particular case to award the cost of reinstatement it must be because the loss sustained does not extend to the need to reinstate."
However, Lord Jauncey emphasised in his speech (page 358) that
"What constitutes the aggrieved party's loss is in every case a matter of fact and degree."
I shall return to Ruxley in a moment.
v
De Froberville [1977] 1 WLR 1262 at 1270, in a passage often quoted, Oliver J emphasised that damages were recoverable "with the proviso, of course, that he is seeking compensation for a genuine loss and not merely using a technical breach to secure an uncovenanted profit".
"42. To award the plaintiffs the cost of reinstatement, theoretical or not, if it is intended thereby to put them in the same position as they would have been if thefire
had not occurred insofar as money can, can also be reasonable. As between themselves and the defendants one must at least be able to contemplate the possibility if not the probability that the plaintiffs were indeed minded to rebuild their billiard hall and shops."
various
passages in the speech of Lord Lloyd of Berwick and in particular the passages at pages 369H-370A where Lord Lloyd said that
"If the court takes theview
that it would be unreasonable for the plaintiff to insist on reinstatement as where for example the expenses of the work involved would be out of all proportion to the benefit to be obtained, then the plaintiff will be confined to the difference in
value."
"Ruxley also supports the proposition that, although what a claimant does with any damages he receives is irrelevant, his intention to reinstate or not to reinstate, while not conclusive, is relevant to the question whether it would be reasonable to reinstate the property – see Lord Jauncey at page 359C-D and Lord Lloyd at pages 372-373; see also for example the passage from the judgment of Sir Robert MegarryVC
in Tito
v
Waddell No.2 [1977] Ch 106 at 132 …"
Halcrow:
(a)Halcrow
was negligent in its design;
(b)Halcrow's
negligence caused LFEPA's loss as claimed;
(c) In considering (b) it is necessary to consider not only whetherHalcrow's
negligence caused the loss but whether LFEPA suffered a loss for which it should reasonably be compensated, and in particular whether it was reasonable for it to recover the cost of reinstatement of the property. In answering this question I should consider whether or not LFEPA have shown any intention to reinstate the property.
fire
training in The
Firehouse
at Southwark but that it is prudent for it to wait and see what damages are awarded before commencing the works.
"It is submitted that the contractual measure of damages for failure to review a design where a claim in respect of the original design obligations is Statute barred should be such as to put a claimant into the position that he would have been in if the design had been properly reviewed. Thus if the failure to review occurred after practical completion a claimant should be obliged to give credit for the (possibly substantial) costs which would have been incurred at that stage in correcting the design."
This would seem to be correct.
Halcrow
contends in the final written submissions that there is no difference between a Statute barred and a non-negligent original design. On the principle set out in Jackson & Powell above, LFEPA should, on this basis, give credit for the costs incurred in correcting the design. In fact,
Halcrow
makes no such pleaded claim (or counterclaim).
Halcrow
puts its case rather differently. It claims that if the design was always negligent and needed putting right the costs incurred should be regarded as part of the claims arising out of the 2004
fire
which was settled. There was no additional loss, so it contends, after the 2005
fire.
Stratification
Firehouse
at Southwark.
fire
the smoke produced is a mixture of products of combustion and air which is at a higher temperature than the surrounding air. The smoke is therefore more buoyant than the surrounding air and rises upwards forming a layer from the ceiling downwards or "stratifying" at a high level until the whole space is filled with smoke. The smoke will stratify at a high level often with clear air below it.
fire
condition.
fire
rooms, the result was the opposite. The products of combustion from the burners and the entrained air (which will contain a proportion of oil based smoked air) are at a higher temperature and lower density than the oil based smoke in the remainder of the room. The combustion products and the entrained air, being more buoyant than the remaining air, form a layer near the ceiling and the oil based smoke is displaced downwards. When the temperature reaches a certain level the oil based smoke starts to evaporate and no longer remains opaque. Since the temperature is highest near the ceiling (due to hot gasses being more buoyant than cooler air and therefore rising to ceiling level) with reducing temperature to floor level, the smoke nearest the ceiling evaporates and any oil based smoke that remains is "stratified at low level" with a clear space above. The temptation for trainees is to stand up and look over the smoke, whereas in a real
fire
it is essential that they bend down and look under the smoke.
fire
training since in a real
fire,
trainees should bend down to look under the smoke but as a result of the training would be likely to stand up to try to look over the smoke.
5. The Facts to the January 2005
Fire
firefighting
personnel had received adequate training as required by section 2(2)(c) of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974.
London
Fire
Brigade already provided
very
substantial operational training. The paper made
various
recommendations and set out the steps which were necessary in order to develop a new coherent programme. This
plan
was approved on 19 March 1992.
Authority
took was to
visit
the United States to look at what are described as "environmentally friendly
firehouses".
The result of the
visit
is set out in a detailed report dated 17 June 1993. As a result of the
visit
the
Authority
decided to press ahead with investigating the possibility of Real
Fire
Training at the Southwark Training Centre. The
Authority
Report informed members of the result of the
visit
making it clear that "this particular scheme will be unique in this country".
Halcrow,
inviting him to set out
Halcrow's
expertise and, if it had the necessary expertise, to tender for the construction of a
firehouse
training facility at Southwark. The letter noted that a single lead consultant would be appointed to carry out all the consulting work involved. The letter set out the duties which would include not only feasibility studies and detailed design, but also preparing and obtaining tenders from contractors and undertaking contract administration duties to final completion of the project.
Halcrow
Group, HGa can provide the full service you require".
Authority
issued its consultant tenderers' brief to pre-qualified tenderers including
Halcrow.
Although the design brief envisaged how The
Firehouse
was to be designed, it placed responsibility on the successful tenderer to investigate and assess
various
systems including
various
computerised systems for control of The
Firehouse,
whether existing or in the process of development and their suitability for use in the project.
"TheAuthority
intends to extend its training facilities at its Southwark Training Centre by providing a
firehouse
building and
associated
drill tower on part of the Centre's No.1 drill yard.
TheFirehouse
building and
associated
drill tower is a structure providing facilities for recruits and
firefighters
to develop, maintain and improve their skills in using
fire
service equipment. This will be undertaken in conditions which simulate operational working conditions (including real
fire)
in a safe, controlled training environment. Exercises may be of a set programme or
varied
by prior arrangement by the trainers and the results monitored and recorded.
The exercises are to be carried out in increasingly stressful conditions of heat, smoke,fire,
water and resulting humidity and steam. They are also designed to be undertaken in a
variety
of internal spaces which may need adaption as required for the particular exercise. This is required so that students do not become familiar with the building and their approach to any exercise 'incident'."
Halcrow
sent in its bid document. It started by saying that it had brought together a strong team. This included companies within the
Halcrow
Group together with two outside companies, Sleeman & Hoare and Warrington
Fire
Research, which would cover
fire
technology,
firefighting
experience and training advice. Mr Tovey said in oral evidence that they were both engaged by
Halcrow
as sub-contractors.
Halcrow's
team would, itself, have to identify many of the risks
associated
with this innovative project without being able to rely on LFEPA.
Halcrow
said that they had their own specialist engineers with the capability of providing all these services and that these services would be undertaken by
various
sections within the
Halcrow
organisation under the control of a design team leader. Mr Tovey said in oral evidence that the ductwork design was undertaken by Mr Thomas until July 1998 and after he left, by Mr Tough, who gave evidence before me.
Halcrow
responsible overall for supervision of design although it may delegate some design responsibility.
firehouses
and
very
similar complexes to
firehouses?"
"Although HGa as a company does not have specific experience in designingfirehouses,
the members of the team have considerable and relevant experience in the issues that need to be addressed in the design of
firehouses
and other similar projects that require a high level of operator interaction with a process in a hazardous environment.
"The team that HGa have drawn together represents expertise at its highest levels in each of the technology areas concerned … It is extremely unlikely that such expertise would be available purely from within a single entity."
Fire
Research, who it was said were currently advising on the provision of a
firefighting
facility to be built at a major UK airport in the south of England,
Halcrow
Design, Lyons Sleeman & Hoare who would deal with
planning
issues and
Halcrow
Gilbert
Associates
who would be involved in project management, were said to be a team providing expertise at the highest levels.
Halcrow
was appointed under a bespoke agreement in respect of phase 1 of the Project (Feasibility and Design) and phase 2 (
Planning
Application).
Halcrow's
duties included the preparation of the mechanical services specification.
Authority
and
Halcrow
were signed and witnessed. The following provisions are material:
Under Clause 1Halcrow
undertook to provide the services set out in the consultant's brief. These included:
1. Managing the Project (1.3.1)
2. Developing the design and preparing all necessaryplans
and drawings (1.3.2; 1.3.25 and 1.3.50)
3. Preparing the specification for the Project including the mechanical and engineering specification (1.3.53) and
4. Supervising any design or drawings by others, quality controls of materials, testing and commissioning (1.3.61-66 and 71)
"Accordingly, except as expressly provided for in the conditions neither party shall be obligated or liable to the other in respect of any damages or losses suffered by that other which arise out of under or in connection with the Contract or the Works whether by reason or in consequence of any breach of contract or of statutory duty or tortuous or negligent act or omission."
"Neither the contractor nor the purchaser shall be liable to the other by way of indemnity or by reason of any breach of the contract or of statutory duty, (including but not limited to negligence) for any loss of profit, loss of use, loss of production, loss of contracts or for any financial or economic loss or for any indirect or consequential damage whatsoever that may be suffered by the other."
"(a) 12 months calculated from the date of taking over the Works under Clause 29 (taking over) or
(b) 12 months calculated from the date of replacement or rectification to the Engineer's satisfaction of the defect in that Section or part of the Works whichever is the later."
"The Contractor shall be responsible for making good by repair or replacement with all possible speed at his expense any defect in or damage to any part of the Works which may appear or occur during the Defects Liability Period and which arises either:
(a) from any defective workmanship or design or
(b) from any act or omission of the Contractor done or omitted during the said period."
Halcrow
understood that they were embarking on an innovative project to provide real
fire
training for
London's
firefighters.
The purpose of the Project was to adapt the Southwark
Firehouse
to provide real
fire
training using smoke.
Halcrow
assured LFEPA that it was able either in-house or through sub-contractors to develop the design and supervise the project. It was agreed that management of risks was an important element in the carrying through of this innovative project. In this process
Halcrow
understood from the outset that LFEPA had limited practical experience itself because there was no existing gas
fired
firehouse
in the United Kingdom except the one used by the Navy. Equally, LFEPA was aware that although
Halcrow
claimed to have the necessary range of expertise, since the project was unique in this country,
Halcrow
had not undertaken such a project either.
Halcrow's
meeting with LFEPA on 14 March 1995, LFEPA set out the issues which it wished
Halcrow
to address at that meeting. They were:
[1. not relevant]
2. the provision of realistic training forfirefighters
and the agreed limits of such training;
3. the provision of realistic heat as experienced in a realfire
situation;
4. the provision of "stage" smoke to mimic smoke experienced in a realistic situation;
5. the provision of realisticfires
in
fire
rooms;
6. the provision of circumstances for simulatedfire
training for
firefighters
in reasonable and controlled conditions of safety;
7. the presentation of the four options with their pros and cons.
Halcrow
took place on 14 March 1995. By then, as Mr Tovey told us in oral evidence, he had
visited
a facility in New Jersey, USA. It appears that in the United States these facilities used artificial smoke.
Halcrow
said in relation to the application of smoke and its behaviour:
"2.iii) Artificial smoke is to be used in TheFirehouse.
It will provide realistic training conditions but as a liquid it will not behave as the carbonaceous particulate smoke created by
fires
in a house or light industrial premises that The
Firehouse
represents. It burns off at a temperature of 80 to 100 degrees C depending on the product selected."
Mr Tovey has added:
"HGa wil concentrate on artificial smoke that burns off at 180°C"
Halcrow's
tender report identified the burn off stratification problem and claimed that realistic training conditions could be provided by setting appropriate combined levels of temperature, smoke density and light.
fireplaces.
Halcrow
(Mr Coomber, then the Project Manager) on its behalf on 21 March 1997 to say
"As a general rule should any problem arise from the design, theAuthority
would seek redress in the first instance from HGa (
Halcrow)
and would call upon HGa's professional indemnity insurance."
Halcrow,
"Let's face it, no-one has constructed a
fire
project quite like this project".
Halcrow
issued a Second Round Tender Report in May 1998. It included Lorne Stewart's comments where relevant. Mr Tovey in oral evidence noted that Lorne Stewart did not provide details of the sealants which they proposed to use.
Halcrow
concluded the report with a recommendation to the
Authority
that it should place an order with Lorne Stewart subject to a satisfactory clarification of its tender. Lorne Stewart commenced work in 1998 prior to entering into their formal contract with LFEPA.
Halcrow's
site manager. The letter made it clear that all correspondence would also be copied to Mr Moge.
Halcrow.
On 10 July 1998 Mr Sturdy,
Halcrow's
Chief Architect, expressed concern in an internal note to Mr Tovey and Mr Tough that under the current design, ducts would rise in positions which restricted circulation and the flexibility of the space. He also suggested that the routing of the ductwork on the 4th floor should be reconsidered.
Halcrow
and he was primarily assisted by Mr Tough as Senior Mechanical Engineer.
verify
the ductwork design had been undertaken by
Halcrow
in accordance with
Halcrow's
quality control and wrote to
Halcrow
on 10 August 1998 to enquire whether or not this had been done. From September 1998 Mr Hark was retained by
Halcrow
to undertake this task.
Halcrow
prepared the detailed ductwork layout drawings.
Halcrow
on 7 October 1998. It is a
very
comprehensive document. It prescribed at Clause 1.61 that the equipment must be designed for a life of at least 25 years without complete replacement. It must cater for the rise and drop in temperature and adverse and extreme conditions expected during each training session for 350 days a year.
"The contractor must ensure that all the equipment provided as part of this contract is capable of withstanding the conditions of extreme heat, steam, water from a jet to afire
spray, humidity, foam and flame etc that is likely to occur as well as
Water hoses …
Breathing apparatus, air cutting cylinders and similar."
volatisation
of non-toxic food quality oil.
"Ducted supply and exhaust air shall be installed as indicated in the tender drawings. These are diagrammatic and show the philosophy and intended routing. The contractor will provide installation drawings based on those drawings …
From the supply plenum, ducted fresh air is provided to each of the smoke/heat zones as well as thefire
rooms. Attenuation is provided on each supply duct with smoke generators and zone heaters (both free issue) installed duct mounted for each smoke/heat zone. For the
fire
rooms in duct mounted smoke generators (free issue) are to be installed."
Halcrow.
firerooms)
was to be classified as a high pressure system and the exhaust ductwork classified as a medium pressure system. Both were to be installed and tested in accordance with DW/142.
"Sealants, joints and materials shall be as specified in DW/142. Where the required temperature rating for sealants, joints and materials exceed those in DW/142 the contractor shall submit with his tender full details together with the type of sealant, joints and materials for temperature ratings within DW/142."
Halcrow
contends that, properly construed, the reference to DW/142 was appropriate.
plant
room. The falls were omitted by Lorne Stewart on 9 November 1998 after discussion with
Halcrow.
LFEPA also makes complaint about this.
"All ductwork systems shall incorporate sufficient hinged access hatches to facilitate inspection of ducts and for cleaning. Seals to access hatches must be airtight and the access hatches and dust aperture must not compromise thefire
and resistance of the ductwork."
fire
rooms was to be in stainless steel but to the same standard and thickness as detailed in DW/142.
"All ductwork and connections shall be adequately braced and stiffened where necessary to prevent sagging, drumming andvibration
and shall be completely airtight."
"All site joints for metal ductwork other than flanged joints shall be properly swaged plain slip type with the inside lap in thefire
detector airflow and shall be riveted or jointed with self-tapping screws at not more than 60 mm centres. All such joints shall be sealed and rendered airtight with a suitable sealant."
fire
rooms the operating temperature should be -4°C to 300°C.
"Access openings shall be provided in the ductwork at suitable positions for the purpose of inspection and servicing ofplant
and equipment. They shall be rigidly framed with airtight covers designed for easy removal and replacement …
Access panels shall be of 1.2 mm thick galvanised sheet steel with a 25 mm by 6 mm thick approved sealing gasket fixed around the edge with suitable adhesive to form an airtight seating against the duct frame …"
"All supply and extract ductwork which has an operating static pressure greater than 500 N/m2 (Newtons) and all ductwork which will be inaccessible shall be tested for air leakage after assembly on site and before any insulation is applied …"
"The test shall be maintained for a period of 15 minutes during which period the aggregate leakage shall not exceed 1 per cent of the total design flow rate. Any leakage must at once be made good before proceeding with tests on the next section of the ductwork."
Halcrow
that the ductwork would conduct air which was polluted by smoke and oil of a temperature above those specified in Standard DW/142 and was exceptional in terms of humidity.
Halcrow's
specification made Lorne Stewart responsible for the preparation of installation drawings and for the satisfactory working of the completed works.
Halcrow
prepared a bespoke specification based on DW/142 and DW/143. The specific terms in the specification set out where joints were to be sealed. Otherwise the specification provided that leakage should not exceed 1 per cent of the total design flow rate during a 15 minute test.
"By choosing from the range of options permitted by HGa's specification LS was able to fabricate an appropriate ductwork system for TheFirehouse."
Halcrow
and Lorne Stewart over responsibility for the design of mechanical and engineering services. Lorne Stewart maintained that these rested with
Halcrow.
On 17 February 1999
Halcrow
responded:
"1. Design is not included in your scope of works. You are, however, required to carry out elements of design development in turning diagrammatic tender drawings into fabrication/workshop drawings.
2. Selection of equipment is not design … It is the contractor's responsibility to select the ductwork to comply with the specification.
3. Although the specification calls for low and medium temperature ductwork to be DW/142 there are a number of options, e.g. cross joints. DW/142 does not indicate manufacturers of sealants or gaskets. These need to be confirmed by the contractor. The suitability of the equipment, e.g. the amount of expansion in the joints that can be accommodated can only be provided by the manufacturer."
Halcrow
issued revised drawings to Lorne Stewart noting that drain points were to be provided at the bottom of
vertical
ductwork and at all low points.
Halcrow
was still waiting for details of the sealants that Lorne Stewart was proposing to use – see record of the co-ordination meeting at which representatives of
Halcrow
and Lorne Stewart were present. It was still outstanding on 29 April 1999 (see note of meeting).
Halcrow
would not permit the installation of the ductwork to begin until
Halcrow
had received the details.
Halcrow
and LFEPA emphasised the need to clean the ductwork internally to remove smoke oil deposits and it was awaiting advice on the frequency of cleaning from ICS. The note of the meeting records that
Halcrow
was of the
view
that build up would occur at bends.
Halcrow
did receive details of the sealant. No further information was supplied by Lorne Stewart but in the note of the co-ordination meeting on 10 June 1999 (see note of 5 July 1999) it is acknowledged that "LS-M had issued ductwork sealant details". I find that Lorne Stewart did send the information probably on 5 May 1999, that Mr Tough accepted the sealant on the basis that it would be Tecseal 300 and that he requested an acceptable copy. The temperature limits for Tecseal are recorded on the information sheet as - 60°C to + 200°C.
Halcrow
and Lorne Stewart were among those present. Mr Hood represented Lorne Stewart.
Firehouse
would be divided horizontally and
vertically
as needed. What was described as the radiating network was to be capable of withstanding the following temperatures:
| 1.Heat and smoke training areas | 80°C with hot spots of 100°C |
2.Ceiling voids | 80°C with hot spots of 90°C |
3. Plant rooms |
45°C with hot spots local to the heat smoke units of 50°C |
4. Fire rooms |
400°C for some rooms, other fire rooms up to 1000?C in the flames impingement areas for short durations |
| 5.Other rooms | 350°C |
6.Above fire room doors |
Within the heat and smoke rooms and some of the corridors/refuge areas: 400°C with short bursts of hot air up to 800°C from two of the fire rooms. |
validation
exercise was carried out by Mr Hark for
Halcrow.
There is some dispute as to how the document should be read but it is clear to me that the initial stage was carried out for the period to the end of 1998 and the second stage on the basis of the completed design. Someone has written "3 October 1999" on the bottom of the first page of the Report but it may well have been completed after that date. A letter from
Halcrow
dated 3 February 2000 indicates that after the review was completed
Halcrow
produced a schedule annexed to that letter showing the changes that had taken place as a result of the review and their implications on training.
"that there is no concise record of the interpreted requirements and the way in which each is to be met by the facilities provided. There is hence no clear "approval of these by [theAuthority]".
There is the possibility of difference of understanding between the parties involved …"
"Shortcomings in the level of definition of the design process, the appropriateness of design methods used and the certainty of the results"
ventilation
system had now been re-defined and that, as a result of changes, a workable ductwork layout had been achieved.
"2.2 Second Stage Review
A resolution of the questions relating to the adequacy of the facilities provided awaits a clear and final definition of the ways in which the facility will be used. This must come from the client. The actual performance of the facility under these operating conditions now becomes an issue for testing and a proper documented basis for this must be developed and agreed."
view
of the above lack of clarity (in relation to the
Fire
Places) there is a risk that current drawings and quantitative provisions may not fully meet the client's requirements. It is for consideration whether this risk should be addressed by means of further review. This may involve generating a summary of client's requirements and a corresponding note of how they are to be met, together with the current state of the process".
"Ductwork in both supply and exhaust system will routinely carry the simulated 'smoke' which consists of an aerosol suspension of mineral oil. Over a period it is to be expected that this oil will condense and collect on the internal surface of the ductwork. This may pose a risk of ductfire
which does not appear to have been addressed."
Halcrow
failed to take any steps to modify the design to eliminate or minimise the identified risk. This may well not be a fair point. Section 3.1 appears to refer to the First Stage Review. It is not clear that the whole of the Report is before the Court.
"Design Risk
On the basis of the findings to date, the effect of the issues outlined above is to constitute a serious design risk. This may be in non-achievement of certain requirements; in failure to achieve the specified equipment life or at the extreme an 'unsafe facility'."
Halcrow
and that any design risk proved to exist had implications for
Halcrow.
This statement would not change after the second Review.
vanes
and dampers became fouled the more frequently the ductwork would need to be cleaned out". This would cause major disruption and cost implications. It is clear that undertaking cleaning of the ductwork was disruptive to the training and costly for LFEPA.
Veritas,
carried out a detailed risk assessment on behalf of LFEPA and
Halcrow.
In relation to the risk of a
fire
hazard it reached positive conclusions. In paragraph 4.8.6 headed "Smoke Generation Oil" it describes
various
experiments and went on:
"The experimental results indicate that when these smoke generators are properly maintained and used in the prescribed manner under the conditions prevailing during the course of these trials there is little risk of the formation of flammable atmosphere, except possibly in the immediatevicinity
of the nozzle. When a smoke generator similar in type to those used in the trials was run for long periods in a small enclosure in a laboratory experiment, concentrations exceeding 100% LEL (lower explosive limit) were detected but such conditions are unlikely to occur in any practical application of these devices."
"This paper concluded that for droplets (of Ondina oil) below 0.014 mm, (i.e. 14 microns) that due to heat transmission these drops have time tovaporise
completely before the flame front reaches them and combustion occurs. Thus they exhibit flammability characteristics essentially the same as the fully
vaporised
material. As the smoke house concentrations are well below the lower flammable limit, these smoke mixtures should not explode."
"Both these approaches suggest 'the smoke atmosphere will not present a flammable hazard'."
Veritas
set out a risk assessment of
various
Fire
House scenarios. I deal with this in the separate section dealing with risk assessment.
Halcrow.
Halcrow
responded with queries in a letter dated 26 September 2000.
Halcrow
pressed Lorne Stewart for information regarding the continuous temperature ratings of the gaskets used between the joints of the ductwork flanges and also the access panels and the ductwork. It is not clear that this information was supplied. They also asked for confirmation that the ductwork complied with the Mechanical Services Specification.
fire
house were fully compliant with the specification.
plant
room. The work carried out was "clean up spillage and replace damaged/saturated insulation". Mr Tough says that he probably saw this at the time. He did not ask anyone about the effect of oil in the insulation as a result of this discovery.
Halcrow
clearly had a problem in obtaining the necessary information from Lorne Stewart about the sealants. Mr Baker, their Project Engineer, wrote to Lorne Stewart on 30 September 2002 asking for the manufacturer's data sheet for the seals installed between the flanges on the low temperature ductwork.
Halcrow's
attention as a result of an inspection of The
Firehouse
in October 2003. Mr Cole as
Halcrow's
resident engineer, wrote to Lorne Stewart on 24 October 2003 in relation to mechanical defects after taking over The
Firehouse.
"Following this week's inspection of the low temperature ductwork installation we find that many of the flange joints have either failed or are showing signs of impending failure …
"As a matter of urgency you are requested to provide your proposals and programme to rectify all failed joints and other joints that do not comply with the requirements of the specification."
"This failure makes the supply of all material used in the construction of your low and medium temperature ductwork systems which we have personally requested essential.
We remind you of the urgency to complete all defects as commercial use of TheFirehouse
is due to commence shortly."
I shall refer to this letter later when I deal with the section relating to the liability of Lorne Stewart.
Halcrow
and LFEPA including Mr Tovey, Mr Tough and Mr Moge it is recorded under "9. Other Issues" that:
"Halcrow
stated that there is a problem with duct work joints and the FH (
Firehouse)
had experienced leaking of smoke in some rooms. It is believed to be gasket and we don't know if the gaskets are failing due to the heat or the oil ..."
Halcrow's
letter to Lorne Stewart dated 3 December 2003 the mechanical consolidated snag list noted in relation to the low temperature ductwork:
"15.2 Failed joint sealantvisible
on some dropper ducts and in
plant
room. Insufficient flange clips provided cf manufacturers recommendations."
Halcrow
saying that its expertise in the field of ductwork was limited and that it would rely on
Halcrow
to advise as to the suitability of the products which it proposed to use for repairs to the ductwork. It noted that both products had a temperature rating in excess of that set out in the specification.
Halcrow
dated 9 January 2004 is relevant. Mr Tough wrote:
"1. Lorne Stewart's ductwork was required to be based on ductwork specification DW/142 which only requires access doors to be provided for access to control dampers. A number of access doors were included in their price for the revised ductwork and these, together with additional instructed access doors have been installed …"
ventilation
system over the last two years had been minimal compared to its intended use.
Halcrow
said that it was not aware of any build up of soot within the ductwork but that it would be a simple matter for LFEPA's Facilities Contract Manager to inspect the parts of the ductwork.
view
that "build up of soot will depend entirely on the intended use of the system and inspections should take place to monitor the internal condition of the ductwork".
Halcrow
gave Lorne Stewart the following instruction:
"As stated in our letter to you dated 24 October 2003 please rectify all failed joints and other joints that do not comply with the specification ..."
Mr Tough said in oral evidence that he did not think that Lorne Stewart had given all the details of the sealant which had been used.
Halcrow
wrote to Lorne Stewart
"Thank you for your fax of 30 March 2004 enclosing P & P method statement for remedial work to the ductwork gasket joints.
We have the following comments:
In your fax to ourselves of 17 November 2003 you enclosed copy of the facsimile from FenlandFire
Contracts
Ltd
to P & P of 18 April 2001. This states that the proposed intermescent mastic tape duct gasket material begins to soften and intumesce at 100 degrees C with full intumescent properties at above 150 degrees C. Since the design temperature for the supply ductwork from the riser is 110 degrees C the proposed mastic would be unsuitable. Please find an alternative sealant…
Please confirm that it is proposed to carry out work to all flange joints in the supply ductwork downstream of the heat smoke units and up to the point where the ducts exist in theplant
room irrespective of the state of the joint.
"The inside of the existing joints are often characterised by the excess sealant having been squeezed out … would need to be removed …
Is the sealant to be applied as a gasket strip along the joint or by a mastic gum application?"
Halcrow
expressed concern that they had not received a full method statement or answers to queries to their 2 April 2004 letter. They expressed "dismay at the time taken to resolve the failed ductwork joints which had first been reported to Lorne Stewart in
Halcrow's
letter dated 24 October 2003."
firefighters.
Firehouse.
"We have not been able to identify any substance which is designed for this type of application and it appears that TheFirehouse
is a unique installation."
Mr Cole did propose the use of a mastic silicone sealant currently installed in The
Firehouse
which appeared to be suitable.
Halcrow
wrote to Canadian Commercial Corporation, the parent of ICS, about the Westemp panels:
"The documents include ICS statements that the panels would have a life of at least five years … office room panels are showing signs of deterioration within 6 weeks of being replaced. The ceiling installation is also leaking excessively resulting in heavy smoke staining and soot deposits in the ceilingvoid.
A reasonable ceiling integrity is essential to limit temperatures within the ceiling
void
… We are more concerned that the lack of performance of the Westemp panels suggests that the panels are not suitable for the application."
fire
occurred at The
Firehouse
causing the cladding (thin rigidised sheet material) to melt adjacent to the
vertical
joint on the bend off the outlet of the H and S unit on the side next to the Zone 9 unit. The plastic sheath on the handle of the air control
valve
supplying cooling air to the adjacent Zone 4 smoke generator melted and the 12 mm nylon hose at the outlet of the
valve
was thermally distorted. No-one was hurt and
very
limited damage was done.
"2. Through direct access downstream of the joint area – there was evidence of deterioration (possible burning of the jointing compound) in the joint flange emanating from the bottom right hand corner extending upwards and horizontally to the left hand whenviewed
looking upstream. There was a light oil deposition on the bottom side of the duct.
3. Through the main access panel on the H and S unit -there was no evidence of any high temperature effect looking upward (downstream) to the flow deflection on the bend. Some light oil deposition was evident on the orifice plate around the burner."
"3. There was evidence of oil in the lagging when inserting the thermocouple and also byvirtue
of smoke emission in the hot test."
"The only combustible material is the oil in the lagging. The source of ignition is difficult to determine but the only obvious source at a high enough temperature is the nozzle of the adjacent smoke machine which could reach a temperature of 390 to 400?C. Given auto-flammability and a source of airvia
the leakage from the duct flange and a small
fire
would have occurred, thus damaging the aluminium cladding.
Zones 4 and 9 are the only heat and smoke zone units firingvertically
upwards and therefore giving rise to a possible situation of any leaked oil (due to ductwork leakage) being able to travel under gravity to contract with the smoke machine nozzle. All other zones firing
vertically
downwards would have any leaked oil travelling away from the smoke machine interface."
fire
was the nozzle of the adjacent smoke machine. He acknowledged that the report identified the leakage of oil from the ductwork into the insulation as the likely source of the
fire.
He also acknowledged therefore that from June 2004 it was a known risk that oil leaking out of the ductwork into the oil insulation could cause a
fire,
particularly when in close proximity to the smoke machine.
fire
throughout The
Firehouse
and that it was appropriate that real
fire
training should stop.
Halcrow
remained concerned that many of the snagging defects in relation to the ductwork had not been remedied. The list of outstanding works on 11 June 2004 included:
"15.2 Lower temperature ductwork and failed joint sealant inplant
rooms and insufficient flange clips provided c.f. manufacturers' recommendations."
Halcrow's
letter to Lorne Stewart dated 13 June 2004.
Halcrow
wrote to LFEPA enclosing Lorne Stewart's method statement.
Halcrow
wrote:
"In the light of experience gained so far with theventilation
system we strongly recommend that oil drainage is also installed to the supply air ductwork in the
plant
rooms for which we are currently producing a design."
This theme in relation to outstanding works was repeated in letters to Lorne Stewart dated 21 July 2004 and 19 August 2004.
Halcrow
(Mr Cole) wrote to
Vosper
Thorneycroft saying that:
"It is believed that thefire
was external to the zone duct and the medium being condensed smoke oil which had leaked into the duct work insulation through the failed joint …"
fire
was:
"3. Oil leaking down onto smoke injection probe which is directly connected to the smoke generator heater block … and is surrounded by thermal insulation … It is therefore possible that oil migrating through the thermal insulation and reaching the outside of the probe could be the cause of thefire."
fire.
Mr Tough himself said in a letter to Mr Moge dated 15 September 2004 that the ductwork in The
Firehouse
was not specified or designed to be airtight. However the joint sealing remedial work to be provided by Lorne Stewart would improve the airtightedness and that if it was done effectively the risk of oil leakage within the
plant
rooms would be significantly reduced. Mr Tough advised that the
plant
room should be inspected on a weekly basis for any signs of oil leakage and the joints inside the ductwork should be inspected as far as possible six months after the remedial work was completed.
plant
room layouts were reintroduced but not picked up by Lorne Stewart.
Halcrow
decided to review the requirement when the extent of the oil deposits inside the ductwork was known.
Vosper
Thorneycroft on 16 September 2004 representatives of
Halcrow
set out their
views
on the cause of the
fire.
They again said that the damage was caused by smoke oil laden air leaking from inside the duct and being ignited outside the duct by an unknown source of ignition. From inspection of the inside of the duct it appeared that no combustion took place inside the duct.
Halcrow
did not think that Lorne Stewart could reasonably be blamed for the
fire
that had occurred.
Halcrow
and Lorne Stewart set out a
plan
with reference to Clause 36.5 of MF/1 2003 to remedy the outstanding works and defects. These included
"15.2 Low temperature ductwork – failed joint sealant and insufficient flange clips provided. Lorne Stewart agreed to replace the failed sealant during the maintenance period. On programme 15 Nov P&P 5 days."
firefighter
location system since October 2003 except for a period of two weeks when Lorne Stewart reported that it was operational.
Halcrow
proposed to review the leaks to the ductwork during the
planned
shutdown in January 2005 and at that time to carry out any remedial works that were necessary. Mr Norris expressed concern and asked whether or not, directly or indirectly, the leaks would have a detrimental effect on the training facilities due to be used again on 7 December 2004. Mr Tovey noted in evidence that the repairs were only to the
plant
room.
Halcrow
had inspected the remedial work on the supply ductwork after the last day on which mastic could be used during the shutdown period. The remedial works were consistent with the list of defects set out in
Halcrow's
letter to Lorne Stewart after an inspection on 22 November 2004. (This letter is for some reason dated 17 February 2005.) In his letter to Mr Moge, Mr Tough concluded that some duct runs had not been addressed due to inadequate access. Some joints had been overlooked and some others had been inadequately prepared. Mr Tough said that Lorne Stewart/P & P accepted that there were defects and agreed to assess them during the January shutdown.
"We also attended site and witnessed continuous smoke leakage from the ducts during a smoke test. The leakage is not as bad as it was and consequentially will not have a detrimental effect on training."
fire
occurred in the ceiling
void
above the "office
fire
room" on the second floor of The
Firehouse.
The
fire
itself caused minimal damage and was quickly brought under control. The major concern related to the
fire
risk which had been manifested in the building.
fire
was caused by the auto-ignition of the mineral fibre ductwork insulation that had become contaminated by oil leaking from the ductwork. Since that date LFEPA has stopped all "real
fire
training" at Southwark. Currently the facility is used only for "cold
fire
training". Since January 2005 other training has been carried out through facilities provided by the Lancashire and Essex
Fire
Services.
Experts Opinions
Halcrow.
Halcrow's
specification indicated that the ductwork would be subject to oil.
Halcrow's
specification should have highlighted the fact that the ductwork would be subject to liquid deposits of oil in order to allow the contractors to recognise and provide the appropriate installation. In Mr Evans' opinion the answer is "Yes". Mr Rollason concludes that if the flanges had been installed correctly using appropriate sealant then oil would not have leaked in any event and therefore the answer is "No".
Halcrow
did not, and was not required, to specify the type of sealants to be used in the fabrication and erection of the ductwork and that in fact they were selected by P & P (Question 6).
Halcrow
specified the temperature requirements and indirectly specified that the sealant would be subjected to oil generated smoke (Question 7).
Halcrow's
specification for the medium temperature supply ductwork standard DW/142. A key point of Mr Evans' evidence is that this standard was not intended to apply to ductwork in these circumstances and should not have been used.
"It is therefore not surprising that Clause 4.3 has been included within DW/142 in order to prompt consideration of any such special environment prior to the application of DW/142.
Hence the presence of Clause 4.3 does not preclude the application of DW/142 at TheFirehouse.
It simply draws attention to the need to consider whether and in what circumstances it is appropriate."
Firehouse.
various
remedial schemes. However Mr Rollason underlines that in his opinion "Provided that liquid oil is contained within the ductwork it is not necessary to achieve zero leakage".
visual
evidence of oil leakage from the longitudinal ductwork. Mr Rollason says that there is evidence of leakage of oil from the flanges between the ductwork sections. There is no evidence of leakage through the slide on joints where the flanges slide onto the ductwork.
view
is supported by Mr Evans in relation to the sealant used in the area where on inspection they conclude that leakage occurred, i.e. between the faces of the flanged joints (Question 15).
"Visual
inspection indicated degradation and/or flow of sealant from some of these joints and these joints are leaking."
The experts therefore conclude that the sealants were not suitable for exposure to the conditions inside the ductwork.
7. The allegations of negligence against
Halcrow.
Discussion and conclusions
a) Introduction
Halcrow
on liability is that
Halcrow
was negligent in the respects set out in paragraph 35 of the Re-Re-Re-Amended Particulars of Claim dated 1 March 2007.
Halcrow
prepared/implemented and continued with an unsuitable design for the medium temperature ductwork which was not fit for purpose:
274. (a)
Halcrow
failed in the formulation of the design to consider what happened to mineral oil when it cools and/or impinges on the inside of the ductwork and therefore designed a system which failed to ensure that mineral oil could not leak and cause uncontrolled
fires.
Halcrow
designed the flanges and the joints in the ductwork to an inappropriate standard, namely in accordance with DW/142 which permitted the ductwork to have a number of potential air and oil leakage paths when it ought to have designed the flanges and joints to a standard which required it to be airtight and oiltight. In this context DW/142 was an inappropriate standard because it specifically excluded ductwork which was polluted or was otherwise exceptional in respect of temperature or humidity.
Halcrow
failed to appreciate the effect of smoke oil on the sealants and gaskets and therefore to specify in the design that the gaskets or sealants for the joints should be oil resistant. LFEPA claims that even if I accept that
Halcrow
made the initial assumption that there would be a thin film of smoke on the inner faces of the ductwork, it should have made proper provision in the specification for the sealants/gaskets that would come into contact with smoke oil to be oil resistant.
Halcrow
failed to conduct an independent risk assessment before the design was completed.
Halcrow
failed to review and correct the design
(i) when it instructed Lorne Stewart to omit the condensate drains from the ductwork on 26 November 1998 and the requirement that the ductwork be laid to falls;
(ii) when Lorne Stewart failed to provideHalcrow
with details of the sealant for the ductwork in March 1999;
(iii) after reading paragraph 3.12 of the Hark Report (for which see paragraphs 191 – 203 above).
Halcrow
failed to review and correct the design after the
fire
in June 2004.
(b) Failure to consider initially the effect of smoke oil in the ductwork
Halcrow
failed in the formulation of the design to give due consideration to the effect of smoke oil in the ductwork. It is said that as the smoke oil travelled through the ductwork, where it struck the sides of the ductwork or where it lost
velocity,
it would coalesce on the inner faces of the ductwork. The smoke oil deposited on the inner faces of the ductwork was in liquid droplet form. The effect of the design was to permit leakage. In addition to the leakage of the aerosol suspension of smoke oil, the design permitted leakage of any liquid oil deposits at the cross joints. It is claimed that even if the smoke oil was present in a small film, it would build up to present a real and foreseeable risk that it could leak through the joints.
(i) investigations to ascertain the amount of smoke oil deposits to be expected;
(ii) assessments or assumptions made for the purpose of ductwork design;
(iii) the assessment of riskassociated
with such assumptions.
Halcrow
points out more generally that there is no expert evidence before the court as to what
Halcrow
should have done when it produced its original design which it failed to do, and if it had done it, what difference it would have made to the design. None is relied on in LFEPA's closing submissions.
Halcrow
at the outset to consider what happens to mineral oil when it cools and/or impinges on the inside of the ductwork. He said that it was incumbent on
Halcrow
to ensure that mineral oil could not leak from the ductwork system leading to ignition resulting from uncontrolled
fires.
1. DidHalcrow
consider what happens to mineral oil when it cools and/or impinges on the inside of the ductwork?
2. IfHalcrow
did so, was its conclusion one which it was reasonable for it to reach?
3. What action (if any) should it have taken as a consequence? Did it fail to take action or take precautions which it should have taken or made?
4. Was the result ofHalcrow's
reasonable considerations such that it was incumbent on
Halcrow
to ensure that mineral oil could not leak from the ductwork system?
5. Was it reasonably foreseeable that if oil did leak from the ductwork it would (or might) lead to ignition resulting in uncontrolledfire?
viewpoint
of a reasonably qualified engineer with the level of expertise to engage in a project of this nature at the time when the question would have been posed, ie at the design stage.
"Our expectation was that there would be avery
fine film, that if you actually put your hand on it and rubbed it, you would be able to feel it but you would not be able to see it.
Q. So that fine film would be formed from liquid smoke oil, would it not?
A. Yes."
Halcrow
expected that small amounts of condensation may form in the ducts. He did not expect such condensation to contain oil as the suspension of oil mist particles was not so temperature dependent.
various
risk assessments carried out before 2002. I am satisfied that it would have been if it had been recognised as a known hazard.
Halcrow
failed to consider what happens to mineral oil when it cools and/or impinges on the inside of the ductwork. On the contrary, I conclude that
Halcrow
did consider what happens and on the evidence reached the reasonable (albeit mistaken) conclusion that a fine film would be formed from the liquid smoke oil. Neither of the two
very
experienced
Halcrow
engineers, Mr Tovey or Mr Tough, would have expected drops of liquid oil to coalesce on the inside of the ductwork as the smoke travelled through the ductwork.
Halcrow
reasonably did not appreciate that there was a risk of oil leaking through the ductwork leading to ignition and
fire,
it was not incumbent on
Halcrow
to ensure that mineral oil could not leak from the ductwork. To make it entirely clear, in reaching those conclusions they did not fall in any way below the standard to be expected of them as professional engineers.
"At the time of preparing his specification for the ductwork I would expect HGa to have recognised that a film of liquid oil would be deposited on the inside of the ductwork caused by the oil based smoke passing over the ductwork surface. By a 'film' I mean a light surface coating of oil such that a finger run over the inside surface of the ductwork would feel oily. I would not expect HGa to have predicted that liquid oil deposits would be in excess of a film nor that the quantity of oil would be sufficient for the oil to flow, because it is not self evident that such quantities of oil will be deposited."
Halcrow
to have ensured that no mineral oil could leak from the ductwork system. This requirement could only be to counter known risks. There is no evidence at the time of specification, and indeed for years after, that potentially dangerous liquid oil would be deposited on the inside of the ductwork. There was no requirement therefore to guard against a non-existent risk.
Halcrow
and I accept the evidence that it would amount to a film of liquid oil as he described in oral evidence.
Halcrow
should have done. Mr Evans does not say how
Halcrow
should have designed the facility so as to ensure that mineral oil could not leak from the ductwork or if the answer was his remedial scheme 3, what the effect on the project would have been.
(c) DW/142
velocity
air systems. It provides guidance on the construction, fabrication, installation and testing of ductwork. There is no dispute that, applied strictly on its own, it permits some leakage. Indeed, DW/142 specifies permitted levels of leakage.
Halcrow
should have used another industry specification, DW/171. This specification was intended for kitchen installations and did not in any event exist in 1998 at the time when
Halcrow
was preparing the specification. It was published in 1999. Wisely, LFEPA has abandoned this contention in its Amended Reply. It has not suggested any other industry-wide specification which should have been adopted by
Halcrow
as a guide.
"This specification is not intended to apply to ductwork handling air which is polluted or is otherwise exceptional in respect of temperature or humidity (including saturated air) nor is it suitable for ductwork exposed to a hostile environment, e.g. contaminated air, off-shore oil rigs etc. The design, construction, installation, supports and finishes in such cases should be given special consideration in relation to the circumstances of each case. This specification is also not intended to apply to domestic warm air installations."
Firehouse
is required to handle air which is polluted in terms of smoke and/or oil and may have to withstand temperatures in excess of those specified in DW/142. It is also agreed that the warning in Clause 4.3 of the standard applies.
Halcrow
contends that it provided no more than the basis for its specification and that Lorne Stewart was required to follow
Halcrow's
specification rather than DW/142 to the letter, as indeed Clause 4.3 of the standard suggests that it should.
Halcrow
produced relating to ductwork. The clauses refer specifically to airtight seals (2.5.8.1), connections that shall be completely airtight (2.5.8.4), joints for metalwork other than flanged joints to be rendered airtight with suitable sealants (2.5.8.5) and access openings shall be provided with airtight covers and access panels in galvanised sheet steel with an approved sealing gasket fixed around the edge with suitable adhesive to form an airtight seating against the duct frame (2.5.8.10).
Halcrow
used DW/142 to specify
(a) the material to be used for the fabrication of the ductwork, namely galvanised steel;"
(b) the method of jointing adjacent sections of the ductwork, i.e. flanged joints;
(c) the pressure class, i.e. high pressure: this restricted the choice of longitudinal seams and flanged joints, determined the spacing of flanged joints and stiffness, determined the thickness of the sheet metal and determined the test pressure and leakage rate;
(d) the temperature rating (minus 4 degrees C to 110 degrees C); and
(e) the presence of smoke based oil in the ductwork.
ventilation
systems on many occasions, including those in contaminated and polluted environments. In these circumstances Mr Rollason is of the opinion that to produce a specification by reference to DW/142 was appropriate. Mr Evans said initially that there should have been no reference to DW/142 and he has maintained this opinion but he does not go on to say whether to do so in his opinion falls below the standard industry practice.
Halcrow's
approach was not wrong and that the use of DW/142 in the specification could not properly be criticised.
(d) The gaskets and sealants should have been specified to be oil resistant
Halcrow
was aware that there would be at least a thin film of smoke oil on the inner face of the ductwork, it should have made, but failed to make, proper provision in the specification for the sealants/gaskets that would come into contact with such oil to be oil resistant.
Halcrow
provided the Health and Safety data relating to the properties of smoke oil.
Halcrow
did not specify that the material should be oil resistant and left the selection of the material to Lorne Stewart as the specialist contractor. There is no suggestion that Lorne Stewart did not know that the sealant had to be oil resistant.
"The specification identifies that the ductwork contains oil smoke and it is obvious on the face of it that any materials within the ductwork system are going to be in contact with the smoke-oil and therefore should be suitable for it."
Halcrow
was negligent in failing to specify that the gasket and sealants should be oil resistant, I would have been forced to conclude that no damage resulted from this, since Lorne Stewart has made it entirely clear that it was well aware that the gaskets and the sealants should be oil resistant.
Halcrow
reasonably reached the conclusion that the problem with the gaskets was caused by defective manufacture of the gaskets and not that they permitted leakage of oil that might be potentially dangerous.
(e) Risk Assessments – Issues (d) and (e)
Halcrow
was negligent in failing to carry out a risk assessment before the design was completed. It is also alleged that
Halcrow
failed to and should have reviewed its design in November 1998 and/or in March 1999 and/or at the time of the Hark Report.
Halcrow's
involvement with the project, a number of risk assessments were in fact carried out.
1. On 5 September 1997 International Code Services (ICS) produced a detailed Design Risk Assessment. Items 25 to 29 of the Appendix deal with the assessment of the risk of smoke oil. Mr Rollason in his oral evidence described ICS as the world leaders in this area.
2. On 29 September 1997Halcrow
produced a draft training risk register. Item A5.8.2 of Appendix A dealt with the following identified hazard:
"Emergency
![]()
ventilation
system initiated due to a person OR
fire
in duct."
3. In March 1999Halcrow
produced an Interim Risk Management Report. This updated the previous assessment in item A5.8.2 of Appendix A.
4. In October 2000, DNV Consulting produced its SouthwarkFirehouse
Safety System Study. Section 4.8.4 is entitled "Smoke Generation Oil – Concept Engineering
Ltd".
5. Also in the period 1998 to 2000 Mr Hark produced two reports consolidated into one report to which I have already made extensive reference.
Emergency
Procedures" Appendix A of
Halcrow's
1997 Training Risk Register did identify "
emergency
ventilation
system initiated due to a person or
fire"
as a risk but it noted that "Duct
fire
damage expected to be limited with little consequential damage. Hold
fire
blanket or similar in
fire
rooms or
very
close by or have safety number hold blanket". In 1999
Halcrow
Risk Assessment Report repeats the 1997 entry and adds under "Soft safeguards", "clean ducts regularly".
Emergency
procedure/trainee monitoring, "Use water to spray person or duct".
Veritas
("DNV") produced its initial report on 2 June 2000 and its final report incorporating the ICS Design Specification Revision 4 on 6 October 2000. I have already made some reference to this Report but should deal with it in more detail.
Halcrow
but from detailed discussions with LFEPA and several site
visits.
"TheFirehouse
is built to good standard, and the operations can be run safely. Several preventative mitigation measures are necessary but most of these are procedural or where technical should not prove expensive."
fire
rooms and noted that cosmetic smoke would be generated using an edible oil (Ondina). At paragraph 4.8.6 the Report set out its conclusion on the smoke oil system as follows:
"Concept Engineering submitted toHalcrow
project representative (Dr R A Cox) data supporting the general safety of their smoke-oil system. The data-pack contained several technical summaries which addressed the use of flammability and toxicity. This included a review by the HSE Research and Laboratory Services Division by Dr J J Smeed in 1982. With respect to flammability their assessment concluded:
'The experimental results indicate that when smoke generators are properly maintained and used in the prescribed manner under the conditions prevailing during the course of these trials, there is little risk of the formation of a flammable atmosphere except possibly in the immediatevicinity
of the nozzle. When a smoke generator similar in type to those used in the trials was run for long periods in a small enclosure in a laboratory experiment, concentrations exceeding 100 per cent LEL (lower explosion limit) were detected but such conditions are unlikely to occur in any practical application of these devices'."
1. Detector failure due to oil globules from the smoke.
2. Contamination of personal protective equipment without.
3. Slippery floors and walls.
1. Potential personal injury.
2. Long term exposure to oil.
3. Potentialfire
hazard in ductwork.
1.Visual
checks should determine if oil size is correct
2. Low nitrogen pressure alarm
3. Ductwork cleared once per year
These safeguards were included.
fires,
identified the hazard which caused either of the
fires.
Mr Evans thought that nevertheless DNV ought to have identified that the ductwork would be likely to leak oil through the joints and that this constituted a
fire
hazard. In his
view
any reasonably competent engineer ought to have identified this risk. Mr Rollason did not agree.
"Ductwork in both supply and exhaust system will routinely carry the simulated 'smoke' which consists of aerosol suspension of a mineral oil. Over a period it has to be expected that this oil will condense and collect on the internal surface of the ductwork. This may pose a risk of ductfires
which does not appear to have been addressed."
Ltd,
the manufacturers of the smoke machines, and the fact that this was used in America extensively, and the answer was a thin film. He went on
"So therefore we looked at the possibility of a ductfire
due to the presence of the heaters in the supply ducts which is something that no other
fire
place –
fire
training installation – at that time had and came to the conclusion that there was not a
fire
risk at this point."
Halcrow
agreed to reconfigure the same and did so. The result was Instruction EIM003 issued by
Halcrow
on 26 November 1998 to omit the condensate drains from the ductwork and the requirement for the ductwork to be laid to falls.
Halcrow
later issued drawings to Lorne Stewart showing drain points fitted into the ductwork below heat/smoke and smoke units.
Halcrow
did consider the implications before agreeing to the change. Mr Tovey said that he only expected a light film to form which would not be of a capacity to drain away, falls or not. Therefore he concluded that the omission of the falls would make no difference. I note that in Paragraph 93 of her final submissions Ms O'Farrell QC acknowledges that the provision of falls would not have prevented the leakage of oil that occurred.
Halcrow
should have reviewed their design in March 1999 when Lorne Stewart failed to provide
Halcrow
with details of the sealant. I have found that Lorne Stewart provided details in May 1999. This would be in time for the second Hark Report and the DNV Report both of which were required to assess risks
associated
with the
firehouse
as currently built.
Halcrow
was entitled to rely on these reviews.
Halcrow's
design was faulty in this respect.
various
reviews there is no reason to believe that it would not have been identified. Again, insofar as it is necessary to do so, I reject Mr Evans' contrary conclusion and I accept the evidence of Mr Rollason.
(f) Risk Assessment after discovery of defective sealants
Halcrow
had reasonably believed that at worst a harmless film might form.
Halcrow
issued its Taking Over Certificate on 22 August 2003 subject to a list of outstanding works and defects.
Halcrow
on 24 October 2003 wrote a sharp letter to Lorne Stewart to say that following that week's inspection of the low and medium ductwork installations many flange joints had either failed or were showing signs of impending failure. Lorne Stewart was asked as a matter of urgency to provide its proposals for rectifying all flange joints and other joints that did not comply with the requirements of the specification.
fire
but remedial works to the sealant were carried out by Lorne Stewart before the shutdown period in November 2004, although on inspection they were not regarded by
Halcrow
as being complete.
Halcrow
has been criticised by LFEPA for not "going back to the drawing board to see whether there was anything in their design that was causing the joints to fail before the June 2004
fire".
That seems to me to be an unreasonable criticism. At that stage it was reasonable for
Halcrow
to go to Lorne Stewart and to press them to provide proposals for rectifying failed joints.
Review after the
fire
in 2004
Halcrow
should have reviewed the design on the basis of knowledge after the
fire
in 2004 and that if it had done so it would have followed Mr Evans' current recommendations and have ensured that Lorne Stewart installed fully flanged and welded ductwork.
fire
in the
plant
room in June 2004 indicated that in his opinion oil was leaking from the joints and into the ductwork insulation. He had not been able to identify the cause of the ignition with any certainty.
Halcrow
admits that it was under a duty to review the design after the June 2004
fire
and did not do so. It did take certain steps which it regarded as reasonable but, as Mr Tovey put it in oral evidence, with hindsight he could have carried out a more general inspection. He felt that cutting back the insulation until it was dry would deal with the oil which had leaked. He acknowledged that it would not deal with future leakages. He said that he hoped that repairing the ductwork would do that.
very
small amount of oil and therefore cutting back the insulation was sufficient to solve the immediate problem.
Halcrow
had not carried out a general inspection of the ductwork in The
Firehouse
but only in the
plant
room. He agreed that there had not even been an inspection in the Zone 4 ductwork. Mr Tovey said that he had considered that the problem was not one of design but of gasket failure.
Halcrow
thought that the problem had been solved and that it would be safe for LFEPA to resume
fire
training.
Halcrow
should in the period after the June 2004 have carried out a thorough investigation into the cause of the
fire
and the sources of ignition and should have advised LFEPA to stop real
fire
training until the investigation had been completed.
fire
largely because he concluded that there were serious defects in workmanship which needed to be remedied. In oral evidence he referred to the fact that there were defective joints because the sealant was failing in the joints. In his
view
it was self evident that the sealant was unsuitable. The sealant used was Arborseal, which was only rated to be effective to a heat of 50°C. This was not the sealant that
Halcrow
had been informed by Lorne Stewart would be used.
view
have been carried out after the June 2004
fire.
He said that
Halcrow
should have reviewed with LFEPA and
Vosper
Thorneycroft the potential sources of ignition and then addressed the question of whether this posed a risk.
"I think they would have identified … that the primary candidate shall we say was the proximity of heat/smoke units to where thefire
took place and … the units where the heat/smoke units
fire
upwards are in Zones 4 and 9. So I would anticipate that perhaps remedial works would be done to these two units. Perhaps the configuration should be changed. I believe that
Halcrow
did suggest that the situation be monitored to
verify
whether or not there was leakage into the insulation at those places. In terms of
fire
sources, sources of ignition elsewhere in The
Firehouse,
whether those were considered important would depend upon the analysis that was carried out, so you might say: well, there might be a risk of flames licking up through the ceiling of the
fire
rooms if you felt the Westemp panels were going to be damaged. I would say that would be the prime
fire
source that I would identify."
fire
would have been prevented because the cause of the
fire
was found to be flames or hot gasses passing through a defective Westemp panel. If in 2004
Halcrow
had identified that as a hazard, perhaps the maintenance regime would have increased, perhaps some additional protection would have been put above the
fire
places and that could have prevented the
fire
in 2005.
Halcrow
should have taken.
Halcrow's
final written submissions it suggests that "with hindsight given the further
fire
Halcrow
was wrong but it does not follow that it was negligent".
Halcrow
says that "its approach was reasonable if ultimately wrong".
Halcrow
should have reviewed its design. I have no doubt that there should have been precisely the type of process which is set out by Mr Rollason, namely a thorough investigation into the cause of the
fire
and the source of ignition. This is not a
view
dictated by hindsight. There was a
fire
which needed to be investigated until it was explained. This was a
very
serious matter, since
firefighters
were undertaking real
fire
training and the
fire
in June 2004 demonstrated that there was a serious problem to be addressed until a conclusion could properly be reached as to the cause of the
fire
and whether the problem was a fundamental problem or not.
Halcrow's
design. I accept Mr Rollason's evidence that the review would have concentrated on the suitability of Westemp panels and the quality of the sealant and perhaps design in the limited sense of the reconfiguration of zones 4 and 9. I find that
Halcrow
was negligent in failing to carry out this limited review.
The allegations against Lorne Stewart – Discussion and Conclusion
(1) The General Conditions of Contract, MF/1 Rev 3 1988 Edition
(2) Annex 2 (incorporated documents)
(3) The special conditions which included MF/3
(a) It was responsible for design in the sense that it was responsible for the selection of materials including sealants and flanges.
(b) It was also responsible for the selection of sealants and for ensuring that such sealants were suitable for the temperature conditions which were specified and that the sealants were able to withstand attack by the presence of oil which was identified in the specification atVolume
6 Appendix 8.
(c) It was also responsible for providing flanges with intermediate clamps at 400 mm maximum spacings on ductwork slides over 400 mm and a cleat or clamp installed within 50 mm of the corner of the fixings and that fixings should not exceed 400 mm centres.
fire
on 5 January 2005 caused minimal and localised damage and was caused by leakage of oil from a faulty point as a result of the failure of the sealant and/or clips.
"The Contractor shall be responsible for making good by repair or replacement with all possible speed at his expense any defect in or damage to any part of the works which may appear or occur during the defects period and which arises either
(a) from any defective workmanship or design
(b) from any act or omission of the Contractor done or omitted during the same period."
"(a) 12 months calculated from the date of taking over the Works under Clause 29 (Taking Over), or
(b) 12 months calculated from the date of replacement or rectification to the Engineer's satisfaction of the defect in that section or part of the Works whichever is the later. …"
"If any such defect shall appear or damage occur the Purchaser or the Engineer shall forthwith inform the Contractor thereof stating in writing the nature of the defect or damage. The provisions of this Clause shall apply to all repairs or replacements carried out by the Contractor to remedy defects and damage as if the said repairs or replacements had been taken over on the date they were completed."
"The Defects Liability Period shall be extended by a period equal to the period during which the works (or that part thereof in which the defect or damage to which this Clause applies has appeared or occurred) cannot be used by reason of that defect or damage."
"If any such defect or damage be not remedied within a reasonable time the Purchaser may proceed to do the work at the Contractor's risk and expense provided that he does so in a reasonable manner and notifies the Contractor of his intention to do so. The cost reasonably incurred by the Purchaser shall be deducted from the Contract Price or be paid by the Contractor to the Purchaser."
"The Contractor's liability under this Clause shall be in lieu of any contract term implied by law as to the quality or fitness for any purpose or the workmanship of any part of the Works taken over under Clause 29 (Taking Over) and save as expressed in this Clause 36 neither the Contractor nor his sub-contractors, their respective servants or agents shall be liable whether in contract, in tort, (including but not limited to negligence) or by reason of breach of statutory duty or otherwise, in respect of defects in or damage to such part or for any damage or loss of whatsoever kind attributable to such defects or damage or any work done or service or advice rendered in connection therewith."
"For the purpose of this sub-Clause the Contractor contracts on his own behalf and on behalf of and as trustee for his sub-contractors, servants or agents. Nothing in this Clause 36 shall affect the liability of the Contractor under the Conditions in respect of any part of the works not taken over …."
"In all cases the party establishing or alleging a breach of contract or a right to be indemnified in accordance with the contract shall be under a duty to take all necessary measures to mitigate the loss which has occurred provided that he can do so without unreasonable inconvenience or cost."
"… Neither the Contractor nor the Purchaser shall be liable to the other by way of indemnity or by reason of any breach of contract or of statutory duty (including negligence for any loss of profit, loss of use, loss of production, loss of contracts or for any financial or economic loss or for any indirect or consequential damage whatsoever that may be suffered by the other."
"the Purchaser and the Contractor intend their respective rights and obligations and liabilities as provided for in the Conditions to be exhaustive of the rights, obligations and liabilities of each of them to the other arising out of under or in connection with the Contract and the works."
"Accordingly except as expressly provided for in the Conditions neither party shall be obligated or liable to the other in respect of any damages or losses suffered by that other which arises out of under or in connection with the contract or works whether by reason or in consequence of any breach of contract or of statutory duty or tortious or negligent act or omission."
fire
and the cost of alternative training pending completion of the remedial work.
authorities,
Saint Line
v
Richardsons [1940] 2 KB 99 and British Sugar
v
NEIE Power Projects
Ltd
[1997] 87 BLR 42.
v
Richardsons, Atkinson J had to construe the following clause
"Should any defect in the material or workmanship be discovered during construction or within twelve months of the trial trip and unconnected with wear and tear or inefficiency, carelessness, neglect or default of engineers, such parts in which the defects are discovered will be replaced … but their liability does not extend to any loss or damage, direct or indirect caused by the failure of such defective parts … but only to the actual cost or remedy of the part; and on and after the expiry of such twelve months all claims upon and all liability of the engine builders … shall be absolutely unenforceable and at an end nor shall their liability ever or in any case either before during or subsequent to the expiry of the said period of twelve months extend to any indirect or consequential damages or claims whatsoever."
vessel,
(b) expenses of wages, stores etc and (c) fees paid to experts were recoverable as being direct and immediate rather than indirect and consequential.
"What does one mean by 'direct damage'. Direct damage is that which flows naturally from the breach without intervening causes and independently of special circumstances while indirect damage does not so flow. The breach has brought it about but only because of some supervening event or some special circumstances unknown to the seller. In my judgment the words 'indirect' or 'inconsequential' do not exclude liability from that which is prima facie recoverable: that is do not exclude liability for damages which are the direct and natural result of breaches complained of."
v
NEIE Power Projects [1997] 87 BLR 42 the claimants engaged the defendants to design, supply, deliver, test and commission electrical equipment. The Court of Appeal had to construe the following term in the contract:
"(iv) The Seller will be liable for any loss damage costs or expense incurred by the Purchaser arising from the supply by the Seller of any such faulty goods or materials or any goods or materials not being suitable for the purpose for which they are required save that the Seller's liability for consequential loss is limited to thevalue
of the contract."
v
Baxendale (1854) 9 Ex 341 which is not damage such as would flow directly and naturally from the breach (limb 1) but damage which in the reasonable contemplation of both parties at the time of making the contract would have had a substantial degree of probability.
v
Stein Industries [1997] 87 BLR 52. This is also a Court of Appeal case heard by a different court two months after British Sugar. The case considered the MF/1 conditions in an identical form, in particular Condition 44.4. The
Vice
Chancellor (Sir Richard Scott) said at page 71:
"I do not see why the clear meaning and effect of condition 44.4 should be cut down. If parties want to limit their potential liability to one another in the manner provided by condition 44.4 there is no reason why the law should stand in their way and prevent them from doing so."
Vice
Chancellor went on to say that he could see no reason why the language of Condition 44.4 should not be given its natural meaning even if Conditions 44.2 and 44.3 were otiose.
v
ICI and in particular by reference to Clause 6.8 of that contract, where the court held that the parties at arms length had allocated the risk and a clause excluding loss of profit was upheld.
v
Baxendale, i.e. liability for that which is prima facie recoverable, i.e. damages which are the direct and natural result of breaches complained of. Clause 44.2 must be construed strictly. The claim for alternative
fire
training does not constitute loss of use of The
Firehouse
but damage directly flowing from Lorne Stewart's breach.
1. Clause 44.4 is effective in reflecting the agreement of the parties to limit their rights, obligations and liabilities to those set out in Clauses 36 and 44 of the Conditions as amended by special conditions.
v
Stein Industries. Nor is there a dispute that the Taking Over Certificate was issued on 6 August 2003.
view
this clause is subsidiary to Clause 36 in that it is Clause 36 which sets out the affirmative rights and obligations of the parties. For completeness I should add that Clause 44.1 confirms the ordinary duty of a party to mitigate its loss if it can do so without unreasonable inconvenience or cost.
v
Stein (para 392 above).
Halcrow's
letter to Lorne Stewart dated 3 December 2003 enclosed the consolidated mechanical snagging list.
Halcrow
saying that its expertise in the field of ductwork was limited and it would rely on
Halcrow
to advise on the suitability of products which it proposed to use for the rectification works.
Halcrow
followed up its letter of 24 October 2003 with the following instruction:
"Please rectify all failed joints and other joints that do not comply with the specification…"
firehouse
is a unique installation".
fire
took place.
Halcrow
in letters to Lorne Stewart dated 13 June 2004, 21 July 2004 and 19 August 2004.
Halcrow
and Lorne Stewart agreed a
plan
to remedy the outstanding works and defects. It appears from Mr Cole's email to Mr Quinn on 19 November 2004 (copied to LFEPA) that even at that stage
Halcrow
was criticising P&P's efforts in carrying out the
plan.
fire
training in December 2004. Mr Tough wrote to Mr Moge to say that he had inspected the remedial work to the supply ductwork. It is consistent with the list of defects sent by
Halcrow
to Lorne Stewart on 22 November 2004, although the letter is dated 17 February 2005. Mr Tough found that some duct runs had not been addressed due to inadequate access. Some joints had been overlooked and some others had been inadequately prepared.
fire
then intervened.
Halcrow
instructed Lorne Stewart to carry out the outstanding works. Lorne Stewart replied by letter dated 1 April 2005 saying that it wished to await the outcome of the investigation into the
fire.
Halcrow
wrote again to Lorne Stewart instructing it, as a matter of urgency, to carry out the remedial works to the ductwork in accordance with Clause 36.5 of its contract MF/1 and saying that LFEPA would provide access for the work to be carried out. LFEPA contends that this was a clear instruction and countermanded any previous instruction to 'wait and see'. I agree.
"Following our discussions and expert advice we can confirm that it is now apparent that oil leakage is brought about by an inappropriate specification for the supply and extract of the oil laden smoke. It is therefore not feasible to carry out any further works in this respect unless and until the specification is suitably amended."
Conclusions
Halcrow
and notified to Lorne Stewart in accordance with Clause 36 of the Contract. I also find that (subject to any issue of mitigation under Clause 44.1) Lorne Stewart was under a contractual obligation to rectify those defects. The question of faulty design, even if it was a relevant issue between LFEPA and
Halcrow,
was not a relevant issue between LFEPA and Lorne Stewart unless (which was not the case) Lorne Stewart had been arguing that its work was not defective.
8. The History after 5 January 2005
fire
took place on 5 January 2005 at about 17.30 p.m. in the second floor suspended ceiling over the Office
fire
room.
Halcrow's
initial finding was that there was no structural damage and the area of spalled concrete could be simply repaired. Mr Tovey agreed that the remaining damage to the system required a more detailed examination and asked that when LFEPA's
fire
investigation team had completed its work there should be a meeting between
Halcrow
and LFEPA to discuss the best way forward.
Firehouse
Management
Ltd
to the manager of The
Firehouse
dated 26 January 2005 noted that:
"Our inspection revealed that considerable amounts of oil were evident in Zone 3 bedroom, lagging of supply air ducts within theplant
room and in rockwool insulation which had been used around ducting and services where they penetrated through the
plant
room walls at high levels."
very
reasonable concern that what happened in the Office
void
could be repeated in other areas.
fire
was undertaken by the
London
Fire
Brigade and Casella Stanger (by now called Beau
Veritas).
In its report dated 17 March 2005 it concluded that:
"The most likely source of the oil contamination on the rockwool insulation was leakage of oil (either as avapour
or a liquid) through the joints in the ducts used to carry the oil
vapour.
This theory was supported by the observation that oil contamination was usually heavier on the upper layer of the rockwool insulation and was also heavier in the
vicinity
of ducts. In some areas there may have been a contribution from natural condensation of the smoke oil on metal surfaces (as observed on the Durasteel panelling). However this would have been unlikely to have caused the saturation of the insulation observed in some area."
London
Fire
Brigade Investigation Report published in May 2005 concluded that:
"4.1 The most likely cause of thefire
above the ceiling of the Office scenario room of The
Firehouse
at Southwark Training Centre appeared to be the initiation of thermal oxidation in the oil contaminated rockwool insulation above the Westemp panels."
"Your assistance will be required primarily in relation to thevariations,
delay and defects claims. In the first instance, however, you will be required to assist in advising the
Authority
on remedial works and possible re-design in relation of [to?] problems it has become aware of following the
fire
at The
Firehouse
on 5 January 2005."
Halcrow
produced its report and on 1 April 2005 Mr Tovey and Mr Tough met with Mr Moge and Mr Norris.
"Halcrow
stated that oil leaking from the ducts and ignited by soot 'sparks' was in their opinion the cause of the
fire
…
Halcrow
recommended, as well as carrying out the remedial work to seal the ducts, improvement could also be carried out to the Westemp design and the installation workmanship in order to minimise the soot 'sparks' passing through the Westemp panels although this would be an enhancement to the original specification."
"Halcrow
reconfirmed that the remedial work required to the ducts was a contract defect which was already on the defect list and is work which Lorne Stewart is required to complete."
Fire
House back into operation as soon as possible and asked
Halcrow
to produce a timetable for all the outstanding activities.
fire
was caused by a design problem which was
Halcrow's
responsibility. Lorne Stewart's letter to
Halcrow
dated 1 April 2005 said
"We would rather wait for the outcome of these [forensic] investigations before we carry out any further remedial works to a ductwork system which has an inherent design problem."
Halcrow
dated 6 June 2005 where Lorne Stewart said that:
"Following our discussions and expert advice, we confirm that it is now apparent that oil leakage is brought about by an inappropriate specification for the supply and extract of the oil-laden smoke. It is therefore not feasible to carry out any further work in this respect unless and until the specification is suitably amended."
various
experts including Mr Evans, and Mr Moge and Mr Norris and LFEPA's solicitors. The following conclusions set out in the note are relevant:
"(1) RE (Mr Evans) summarised the options for repair are to replace all supply ductwork with either welded lightweight stainless steel and use existing smoke oil system or discard use of supply ducts and add local smoke generators in eachfire
room or find an acceptable method to reseal existing ducts (
Halcrow's
proposal to seal ducts and use of chemical smoke were concluded as unacceptable.
(4) RE is to invite a competent contractor asap toview
the installation and advise on resealing the existing ducts and also installing new stainless steel ducts."
"Rob,
When determining the remedial work necessary to put thefire
places back on the run we should consider the problem the Training Team raised before Christmas that the cosmetic smoke injected into the
fire
rooms did not give realistic conditions, due to the heat the smoke hung at low level, allowing trainees to see over the top."
This makes it clear that the issue of stratification was raised before the January 2005
fire.
Halcrow
say that this raises clearly the issue that LFEPA would not have continued with hot training in the
fire
rooms because of the problems of stratification.
Fire
Training Team, on 13 May 2005 making the same point:
"From discussion with you last autumn (i.e. 2004) we were aware that generated smoke did not give realistic conditions and hung at low level, allowing trainees to see over the top. This concern was conveyed to the consultant at the time and with thefire
has faded from the discussions. I have emailed the consultant to bring back into discussions as modifications may be necessary within the work we will be required to carry out as a consequence of the
fire.
I am not aware whether this will be a minor or major change to the generation of smoke. Can you please put on paper what exactly is and is not happening, as I expect a response from the consultant to my email below (to Mr Tough)."
fire
training:
"In anyfire
situation smoke builds from the ceiling or highest point in any structure as there is a build up of unburned gas and products of combustion, the smoke thickens and the
visible
space between the base of the smoke to the ground (this is referred to as the neutral
plane)
gets lower to the ground reducing the neutral
plane.
![]()
Thefire-fighting
tactics are to pulse spray small quantities of water into this cloud to cool any unburned gas so as to prevent it from igniting. This is done beneath this cloud with the
Firefighter
crawling in the clear space of the neutral
plane.
TheFirehouse
failed to recreate those conditions as the neutral
plane
is between the top of the smoke and the ceiling. This is because the temperatures at ceiling height are greater than the temperature of the smoke. It forces people to want to stand up and look over the smoke, this reinforces negative learning, would be a dangerous practice if carried out at a real incident or carbonaceous facility and it does not simulate realistic conditions of how a
fire
would develop in a confined space."
Firehouse
before January 2005.
Firehouse
but had retired. He had been followed by Mr Pragnell and then Mr Norris, neither of whom were mechanical or electrical engineers. He suggested that the problem of stratification in the
fire
rooms would have been brought to his attention by someone in the training department and he would have asked
Halcrow
about it. He thought he might have heard about it first from Mr Richards or Mr Rigby. He assumed that it would have been raised
verbally.
fire
training at Southwark, even though the issue was clearly raised at that
very
early stage of the trial.
"LFEPA to advise on smoke performance acceptability but nothing can be done about burn-down of oil mist infire
rooms although it is less when rooms run cooler."
fire
rooms referred to in the note of 3 February 2005.
"There is nothing to be done about this. The 'burn-down' of the oil mist was accepted by Derek Watson at the start of the project as the best that technology could provide at the time. We have checked recently and the oil mist used in theFirehouse
is still state of the art. The 'burn-down' of Ondina oil will start at 200 degrees Centigrade which is a higher temperature than all the alternatives that we have found. To avoid the clear air at high level, operate the
fire
rooms at a cooler temperature."
Firehouse.
He specified the remedial works as follows:
"'Remedial Works'
In order that TheFirehouse
can be retained to the full range of training activities, it is deemed necessary to replace the supply smoke ductwork with a fully welded and flanged system compliant with HVCA/DW/171 tested to zero leakage and with adequate provisions for oil drainage. It will also be necessary to clean, re-seal with an oil-proof sealant and add drains to the Durasteel extract ductwork, replace the
fire
damaged wiring, IT, control and communications cabling above the
fire
room 4. It will also be necessary to inspect, replace and re-seal the 'Westemp' panel suspended ceilings throughout the building, add heat shields above all of the propane burners and re-commission all of the systems."
I have already noted that Mr Evans no longer relies on standard DW/171.
valuable
time in considering other options which would be unlikely to be preferable to the option currently proposed. This was showing a degree of urgency to carry out remedial works which did not continue.
Ltd
were appointed as consultants for the Project and on 3 January 2006 sent a letter which indicated that the Project Concept Stage and Development of Project Brief would need to be completed by the end of March 2006. The letter annexed a list of additional enhancement works that it proposed should be carried out. These included upgrading the
firefighters'
location system to provide quicker response times because the system previously installed as the state of the art technology had become out of date.
Firehouse
at Southwark. He wrote the following email to Mr Livesey of Jacobs before the 10 February meeting which considered Jabobs' preliminary report.
"As we discussed today, all options are for discussion and as you are aware we are at present successfully using temporary chemical smoke without environmental concerns and exhausting this smoke through the existing extract ducts and precipitator/equipment and any problems can be discussed withVT
(
Vosper
Thorneycroft). Also consider the option to remove oil smoke entirely and the use of local chemical generators. This approach will reduce the concern to future
fires
and will also reduce the on-site work to the existing ducts and ceiling. We are aware that all the insulation will require to be removed and as discussed it may not be necessary to replace all insulation including re-insulating the supply ducting as the supply duct will then for the future be used for heat only.
Halcrow's
design and cheaper alternative solutions. He said that
"In this context LFEPA would consider use of local oil smoke generation or use of chemical smoke if appropriate whether locally or centrally distributed."
various
investigations which would lead to a more in depth study. It proposed to undertake an initial feasibility study of alternative options for remediation of The
Firehouse
facility. It raised the possibility that it may be possible to modify the existing building and provide the required facility with an alternative approach at a lower cost.
Firehouse
refit". The second meeting was that of the Project Board.
Authority
meeting (at which Mr Evans was present) instructed Jacobs to finalise the programme for Mr Evans' preferred option, namely replacing the supply ducting with welded ducting and also to evaluate the alternative options with Training including costs. Those options were to include localised oil smoke generators. This evaluation seems then to have been undertaken without Mr Evans' participation or knowledge. It was foreshadowed by a draft proposed email from Mr Norris to Mr Dobson of 3 March 2003, three days after Mr Dobson had taken up his appointment, which concluded that the present method of smoke generation was determined by the original design brief interests "of many years ago" and needed to be reassessed for the performance that it had achieved in meeting the intended training requirements and in meeting present and future needs.
fire
rooms but it would be possible to locate them outside the
fire
rooms and direct the smoke into the
fire
rooms or retain the existing smoke generators and carry out work to the supply ductwork located in the ceiling
voids
which served the
fire
rooms, which would appear to be the lowest cost option.
Firehouse
refit on Training's
plans.
Mr Richards was not present. The purpose of the meeting was not to discuss training needs but the impact of the proposed works on Training's existing commitments.
view
that repairing the ductwork would be a waste of time.
Ltd
to provide specialist advice on the existing system of generating smoke and the feasibility of the alternative proposals for the provision of smoke through the building. The objective set out in Mr Livesey's email to Mr Norris of 9 March 2006 is to identify options for returning the
fire
house service such that it will meet the current LFEPA training requirements.
Ltd
was made in a letter from Mr Moge to Mr Dunnington of Concept Engineering
Ltd
dated 10 March 2006. Mr Evans said in oral evidence that he was not aware of the letter or the appointment.
firefighters'
location system and other matters. He noted that many years had passed since the initial brief and that technology had developed. The nature and scope of the training had been altered. New training had been added. Mr Norris noted that litigation against
Halcrow
was based on reinstatement but "I understand that there will be an opportunity … to offer alternatives which will benefit all parties …"
very
important because the
Authority,
acting rationally, must base any work at The
Firehouse
on current and future training needs. Among the conclusions were:
1. Achievement of future training objectives was critical. Review of the original design was unnecessary as the present concern was to ensure that Training's future smoke requirements were provided.
2. The four existingfire
rooms no longer required smoke generation as it was not possible successfully to produce smoke without stratification. Training considered that stratified smoke, whether from the existing oil smoke system or a chemical alternative, would provide smoke in a way which was detrimental to creating real
fire
training experience.
3. The existing heated areas were to remain heated as originally intended and some areas would require combined heat and smoke training facilities.
4. Jacobs should research the use of mobile smoke generators which could be located, as required, to suit training needs.
5. Jacobs should also research the possibility of installing exterior oil smoke generators. The mobile smoke generators must be able to provide realistic and sustainable smoke for training purposes.
6. Jacobs was also asked to research the use of a sacrificial layer in reinstating thefire
room ceilings. Training would be available to advise.
7. Training considered the reaction of water onfire
would produce steam which would provide real smoke training which was preferable to artificial smoke options.
very
philosophical about failures in The
Firehouse
– not convinced that heat and smoke work elsewhere in UK".
very
strong
views
which were not otherwise apparent in the presentation of LFEPA's evidence. "Steve Richards was absolutely convinced that oil smoke was not suitable for training because the stratification does not represent a real
fire
situation and in fact represents a danger to trainees who are advised not to stand up within smoke and to be low to seek out the heat source".
1. Smoke will not be provided in the fourfire
rooms and should it be required during cold training, mobile smoke generators will be used.
2. Smoke will be required in some heat and smoke zones. This smoke is anticipated to be oil based smoke as temperature of the heated areas is 80?C maximum.
3. Both Training and Jacobs will review Mr Evans' option of local smoke generators which was submitted to Mr Hood in 2005 and approved. The locations of local smoke generators in the heated areas are to be reviewed by Training "and the smoke generators indicated in thefirerooms
will be considered deleted".
4. Jacobs to research the practicalities of installing exterior smoke generators to produce smoke to the heated areas.
5. Jacobs should research the use of mobile smoke generators.
6. Jacobs should, in researching their engineering solutions, consider the possibility of deleting some existing ceilings which are not required by Training.
Copies of the note were sent to Mr Dobson, Mr Livesey and Mr Moge but not to Mr Evans.
fire
situation and in fact presents a danger to trainees …"
very
short email on 17 March 2006 to Mr Dobson describing LFEPA's user requirements for smoke generation:
" 1. No smoke is required in the fourfire
rooms.
2. Local smoke generators are to be provided to the heat and smoke zones as indicated on the drawings prepared by Training March 06 (Mr Richards)."
"2. Oil based smoke is acceptable as understood to be the only known method available that will maintain smoke at the temperatures required in the heat zones. See anticipated stratification resulting from the use of smoke oil is accepted by Training.
3. Smoke to the heat zones will be from local smoke generators and the consultant (Jacobs) is to investigate the options of locating within the heat zones or externally outside TheFirehouse.
4. Training no longer require smoke to be provided in the fourfire
rooms and consider that the steam created from water action on hot burners produces sufficient realism of smoke for
fire
training.
5. Training in the event of requiring smoke in the fourfire
rooms during cold training will used water based smoke generator mobiles."
"Following from thefire
within The
Firehouse
Jan 05 opportunity resulted to correct any unacceptable facilities which had been provided as part of the original design and for this work to be carried out as part of the
fire
repair works. The smoke generation was reviewed with Training and Development."
"During hot training in the fourfire
rooms a more realistic smoke resulted from the reaction of water from hoses on the hot burners which produces steam which does not stratify, is white and more realistic for training. As a consequence for the future T and D (Training and Development) do not require smoke to be provided to the
fire
rooms for hot training. Also in the
fire
rooms during cold training it is preferable to T and D to use artificial chemical smoke from mobiles which can be located to training needs and is a successful industry method which T and D are familiar with for providing smoke at low temperature."
"Also in the heat zones T and D will require smoke and have accepted continuing use of oil generated smoke. For convenience of future more suitable smoke generating methods becoming available and to contain cost, local smoke generators will be used. This arrangement will also benefit maintenance of TheFirehouse
with not using the ducting for distributing the oil smoke which resulted with the January 05
fire
and with lower operating cost resulting from the reduction in used oil."
"PSD will be able to combine this work with the repair works to be carried out to get TheFirehouse
back into full operation. Also as this work is a reduction on the original design, costs should be less than the cost for reinstatement of the original system proposed to be carried out as part of the repair works and without any additional cost for update to T and D current requirements."
views:
"T & D confirmed that smoke will not be required in the fourfire
rooms and presented drawings indicating the heated zones and non-heated which will require smoke. It is accepted that appropriate smoke to be provided in the heated areas is likely to be oil based as the maximum temperature requirement is 80?C. In the non-heated areas Jacobs will determine if the smoke will be oil or chemical based. Jacobs are instructed to proceed with the development of T & D's current requirements for review at 24/25 April meetings, and to consider T & D's current requirements as part of an alternative option study."
visited
The
Firehouse.
Mr Norris's email to Mr Moge gave him a report on the
visits.
Firehouse
were a "one off special design to ICS requirements". There was considerable flexibility in positioning local smoke generators because Concept's oil smoke units were small and unlikely to obstruct or interfere with room layouts. Concept also said that the stratification problem could be "designed out" but the designing out was complex and required detailed engineering and maintenance.
plan
for a system using local smoke generators. In his oral evidence Mr Dobson said that local smoke generators were used quite commonly for training purposes.
very
conscious of this litigation throughout this period. On 7 April 2006 Mr Sergeant, of Winward Fearon, sent an email to Mr Norris urging the
Authority
to prepare an update prior to the Case Management Conference on 5 May. The email noted that a final decision on how to proceed was expected to be taken at a meeting of the
Authority
in June 2006 based on the Jacobs Report which had a deadline of 19 May 2006.
very
important meeting with Ms Riddell would take place on 3 May 2006. This meeting was fixed (or more accurately re-fixed) on 5 April 2006.
"Also in discussions with P Livesey there is a major technical issue to resolve and that is how to reduce the risks of futurefires
in the ceiling
voids.
This is a resolution required for whichever option Jacobs is instructed to proceed with."
This is a reference to the problems with the Westemp panels.
Firehouse
to Ms Riddell. It sets out briefly the history and notes how the training has developed. It notes that Real
Fire
Training Strategy was being delivered at Lancashire and Essex training centres. It was also
planned
that the strategy would be given effect from June 2006 using a Mobile
Fire
Training Unit "and when The
Firehouse
is available for hot
fire
training".
Firehouse.
It notes at paragraph 3.1 that "During the period that The
Firehouse
was fully operational many lessons were learned by the Team with regard to practical issues
associated
with the
various
functions used in the selected training scenarios". This is what is to be expected of a novel and innovative initiative.
(a) dedicated smoke generators take time to reach the necessary heat level to produce smoke
(b) thevariations
of levels of smoke are difficult to control. Smoke levels could be either light, enabling students to move around or
very
heavy, making the Safety Officers' observations difficult.
(c) (i) As the temperatures infire
rooms rose above 80°C the oil based smoke started to stratify and disburse. This produced an unrealistic scenario for
firefighters.
(ii) The problem of stratification is the complete opposite offire
behaviour in real situations.
"Because of this the team were unable to reinforce a critical message to students which is to stay low infire
involved compartments in order to maintain better
vision,
location of potential casualties and reduce the impact of physiological effects for
firefighters
working in these environments."
Firehouse
training scenarios:
(a) It was decided that it would be appropriate to stop using smoke in thefire
rooms. Following this action it also became evident that the application of water to the
fires
during
firefighting
procedures produced large
volumes
of steam which acted in place of the smoke obscuring
vision
and forcing students to stay low.
(b) As smoke density levels were either light or heavy the team agreed on the alteration of scenarios invarious
areas of The
Firehouse.
Although less than ideal, reasonably realistic scenarios could be maintained.
"(c) None of the above adjustments affected the overall objectives and outcomes required for each training scenario."
"5.1 Remove hot smoke making ability in allfire
rooms as it is not possible to recreate realistic neutral
plane
conditions in
fire
compartments. There would be greater benefits for students if no smoke is present on arrival at
fire
rooms. This would enable the training team to concentrate on students'
firefighting
techniques, an essential part of RFT (Real
Fire
Training) strategy. Those applied techniques would determine how much steam is generated and the subsequent worsening of conditions to
fire
fighters without measured water application methods. The removal of hot smoke in these areas will also speed up the daily start process for The
Firehouse.
5.2 Use of portable or fixed local cold smoke generators forfire
rooms that can be used in the absence of
fires.
Occasionally crews are required to work in or travel through these areas en route to scene of operations. The ability to create smoke in these areas at these times would be beneficial.
5.3 Use of portable or fixed local cold smoke generators in selected areas ofFirehouse.
This will speed up the daily start process for The
Firehouse."
"6.1 With much of the training outcomes being reinforced during knowledge input, the above suggested changes will have no effect on achieving the desired training objectives and outcomes."
authoritative
and I find that (a) it has not been contradicted; (b) it would form a part of the basis of any consideration of the future of the
Firehouse;
and (c) LFEPA would be bound to reject any scheme which Training had rejected.
visits
to The
Firehouse.
"The steel ductwork had gaps at some transverse joints and around access panels. It is not clear if these existed before thefire
but we suspect that there was some leakage in these areas. The longitudinal joint method may not be suitable for ducts required to contain fumes laden with mineral oil.
We have concluded that although the systems were generally suitable to resist thefire
conditions, the Westemp wall and ceiling systems and the steel ductwork were not adequately smoke tight in
fire
conditions. This has resulted in a build up of mineral oil on all internal and external surfaces of the ductwork and on the framework of the wall and ceiling systems. The rock mineral wool also appeared to have oil deposits. In our opinion the
fire
within the ceiling
void
was started by the mineral oil igniting at one or more hot-spots on the upper surface of the ceiling. The hot-spot(s) may have been caused by the Westemp cover strips being too thin or cracked or by gaps between the ceiling panels and the cover strips.
In our opinion it would not be possible to carry out remedial work on the existing Westemp and steel ductwork systems to prevent a similarfire
starting in the future, particularly in those areas around the
fire
source. It may be possible to develop a suitable system based on a continuous steel skin protected by insulating boards such as the Westemp panels and ceramic blanket, but we are not aware of any access panel system that would remain smoke tight after repeated exposure to temperatures much greater than 100?C. In the heat and smoke room areas we are of the opinion that the Durasteel-based system is suitable, possibly with steel cover strips bedded on a suitable mastic or gasket over all joints. The design of any access panel would have to incorporate a suitable heat-resisting compressible seal."
Firehouse
back into operation which will require a testing of the
viability
of the suggested design solution of DSSR and the suggestion of alternative solutions to achieve this should the DSSR proposals not be feasible". In other words it was not to consider cost but only the feasibility of DSSR (Mr Evans) scheme.
1. Future smoke contamination ofvoids
leading to potential
fire
hazard. The Westemp system does not provide a barrier to the passage of smoke and gasses into the
voids.
2. Stratification of smoke inFire
rooms which they understood to have inherent problems
associated
with the base design of the facility and no immediate solution had been identified.
3. Oil residue in ductwork which represents a potentialfire
hazard. The Report noted that if an acceptable maximum level of oil residue could be determined then a routine cleaning regime could be implemented provided sufficient access could be provided throughout the ductwork systems.
4. Defective extract ductwork to heat/smoke rooms.
5. Smoke contamination of the loft work fabric. A practical cleaning methodology would need to be developed. Given the difficult geometry of this construction it was thought that this might prove difficult to achieve.
6. Water based smoke may be considered to have occupational exposure limits which LFEPA would not find acceptable in a long term training facility such as TheFirehouse.
7. Water based smoke systems have higher operating costs than oil based systems.
8. Residual oil contamination in heat/smoke rooms.
Firehouse.
It is Mr Evans' replacement scheme and includes replacing all the supply ductwork with welded DW/172 ductwork. It also includes resealing Westemp panels which Jacobs says is an impossibility.
Fire
Rooms and provision of oil based smoke to the Heat/Smoke rooms
via
local smoke generators. This option, like those following except Option 5, involves replacing all supply ductwork and defective extract ductwork to Heat/Smoke rooms but it also includes as an integral part of the option, the upgrade of the Westemp panel system.
visors
could be used to restrict
visibility
through the training. It involves cleaning the building.
Fire
Rooms and provision of water based smoke to the Heat/Smoke rooms through local smoke generators.
very
expensive scheme.
VAT)
£12.7m for Option 1A; £13.0m for Option 1; £13.3m for Option 2; £12.5m for Option 3; £13.0m for Option 4 and £5.2m for Option 5. These figures were expressed to include a provisional allowance for renewal of the Westemp panels and a 30% contingency. It is, perhaps, not surprising that LFEPA was rather daunted by these figures.
Firehouse
were intermixed with legal considerations. The note does not make full sense without reference to other documents. For example, although the note refers to a review of Jacobs' options, the actions refer to "Option A i.e. litigation requirements", Option B "barristers' requirements for LFEPA to demonstrate that they have investigated other ways to meet the training needs in a more cost effective manner than full remediation of The
Firehouse"
and Option C, "LFEPA to undertake a study into current training requirements and the necessary operational and logistical considerations."
Fire
Rooms. Jacobs explained that in its opinion the works required extensive dismantling of the wall/ceiling panels, supporting structure and service installations. In addition to ductwork replacement "a full reinstatement of the building will require the existing oil contamination from the insulation and surfaces of the walls/ceiling
voids
to be removed which involves a similar level of access work".
Firehouse
Design Expert and a
Fire
Risk assessment expert to give LFEPA the assurance that they did not face unacceptable levels of risk should the remedial scheme be implemented".
associated
with it and there would be a
very
significant operating cost.
Firehouse
decide what remedial works and other works were needed in order to achieve those needs.
viewed
a
firehouse
at Bristol and said that it was in keeping with the trailer which they now had a Southwark. Mr Livesey was reported as being certain that the existing system could be adapted to a simple
firehouse.
visited
the Bristol
firehouse
facility operated by
Vosper
Thorneycroft and
viewed
the mobile
fire
trainer which had been delivered to Southwark and which comprised a 12 m ISO shipping container fitted out to provide two
fireplaces
and a flash over simulation. The study emphasised that the
viability
of any options could not be reliably assessed without carrying out a thorough feasibility study and that no costing work had been carried out on any such scheme.
very
surprising that both of them did not see it immediately.
viable
to replace the existing system (para 4.1). Its recommendations were as follows:
"4.3 Siting of Smoke Generators - Recommendations
Heat and Smoke Areas
The siting of smoke systems locally within Training Rooms or Training Zones (combination of Rooms) would be a practical solution in the heat and smoke areas where a compartment temperature of 80?C is expected. Smoke systems could be mounted discreetly on the compartment walls, offered environmental protection from the high compartment temperature and be individually controlled from the control room …
Fire
Rooms
For theFire
Rooms we would recommend if smoke were required, that it be introduced into the
Fire
Rooms
via
dedicated smoke ducting (75-100 mm id) into which smoke would be introduced
via
a centrifugal fan. This smoke could then be concentrated between the entry door(s) and the
fireplace,
giving the smoke the greatest chance to establish itself and form an effective training tool. It would not be practical to site the smoke generators locally within the
Fire
Rooms themselves."
Fire
Rooms and £74,231 including the
Fire
Rooms.
"Based on a number of site inspections at theLondon
![]()
Firehouse,
Southwark, we have concluded that the Westemp ceiling and wall systems installed were not suitable for use with the type of oil based smoke used. In our opinion remedial work on the existing system would not be successful and it would be difficult to develop a suitable system that could remain smoke and fume tight at such temperatures. In our opinion the most likely type of steam to be successful would be based on a sealed steel liner protected on the
fire
side by a combination of ceramic blanket and calcium silicate board. Any new system would require further development work and testing in co-operation with the manufacturer.
"In those areas where the temperatures are about 450?C or lower the Durasteel based systems would be suitable in our opinion with some modifications to ensure joints are adequately sealed, including those around the perimeter of the wall and ceiling linings.
"An improved access panel also needs to be developed and cavity barriers should be added within the wall and ceilingvoids."
"LFEPA have not instructed the appointment of aFirehouse
design expert or a
fire
risk assessment expert as Jacobs had recommended and on the instructions of LFEPA Jacobs had stopped work on the project. Jacobs had already expressed its reservations about progressing the Project because of its concerns regarding the underlying design."
Firehouse,
I note that an email to Ms Riddell on 25 July 2006 said that it would never be used as a Real
Fire
Training Centre until LFEPA spent a further £10m on top of the £30m already spent.
Firehouse
back into a fully functional training facility but this, as far as I am aware, has not been done.
"Can we re-instate allFire
Rooms in The
Firehouse
except Office for all types of cold training which will include use of cosmetic smoke and water?
I envisaged the majority of use would be dry and smoke training. However if crews are moving through these areas withfirefighting
media there is always the chance that accidental water application will take place."
Fire
Rooms could prove costly and "I am not sure that it will be good
value
as we have managed without the rooms up to now".
"I thought that all recommissioning work was on hold until we have a clearerview
of the results of the mediation/litigation."
"GLA are asking about TheFirehouse
for their draft Capital
plan
because it is in our budget report's Capital programme as 'To be determined' – Can I ask them to take it out altogether?"
"We'll discuss with Barbara (Riddell) tomorrow. It is NOT recommended to remove this project from the Capital programme. I am sure that Fiona (Laurence) will also confirm this recommendation."
10. The Remedial Schemes
(a) The Schemes
Halcrow's
original specification.
"2. The flanges should be full faced stainless steel flanges welded to the ductwork, bolted and sealed with oil resistant gaskets with a temperature rating of not less than 100?C.
6. The ductwork should be pressure tested in accordance with DW/144 to 0/minimal leakage at high pressure class C."
"From the limited amount of medium temperature extract ductwork available from inspection, it is not possible to ascertain whether the joints are failing but from inspection there is evidence of oil contamination within the ductwork. For this reason the costs include for replacing the ductwork but subsequent surveys after the ceilings are removed may indicate that some of the ductwork can be retained."
Authority
has taken the position that it is not sufficiently worked out for me to be able to consider it as a
viable
alternative. The concept is to use local smoke generators (LSGs) to a design prepared by Concept which would meet the training requirements of LFEPA.
(i) the need for both hot and cold training;
(ii) different requirements forfire
rooms and other heat/smoke areas;
(iii) minimising obstruction in the training areas;
(iv) ease of installation; and
(v)
ease of maintenance.
fire
rooms. This will not be required if only heat/smoke rooms are served by LSGs. There is also an alternative scheme for
fire
rooms.
various
ancillary works which Mr Rollason has set out in detail.
view
would be a departure from the operation of the facility which
Halcrow
designed. Mr Evans thinks that it requires more investigation and is likely to be more expensive than Scheme 3. The reason for this is that the use of local smoke generators should be combined with replacement of the supply ductwork as in Scheme 3. The extract ductwork should, in Mr Evans' opinion, also be replaced as in Scheme 3.
Halcrow
and Lorne Stewart note that Scheme 1 would remedy the unsuitable sealant applied by Lorne Stewart in the medium temperature supply ductwork. There is, they contend, no evidence that the medium temperature extract ductwork is defective or requires to be remedied. They say that if LFEPA intend to carry out any remedial works to make the supply ductwork suitable to carry smoke oil, this would be the appropriate solution.
Halcrow
notes that Scheme 2 is slightly more expensive than Scheme 1 and is an alternative to which their observations on Scheme 1 applies.
1. The scheme has changed radically since theAuthority's
expert, Mr Walsh, was forced to concede that the communications system did not need to be taken out and replaced in its entirety.
2. There is no need for the ductwork to be in stainless steel. This is now conceded by LFEPA.
3. There is no evidence that the sealant in the medium temperature extract ductwork is either defective or needs replacing. Nevertheless, LFEPA contends that the remedial scheme should take in the entirety of the medium temperature extract ductwork.
4. If the medium temperature extract ductwork is excluded the quantum dispute between the parties (on figures only) are limited.
5. If theAuthority
is entitled to replace the entire ductwork system, Mr Smith says that the work should take 42 weeks, whereas Mr Wort says that it will take 46 weeks.
1. Most importantly, if any scheme is to be implemented, the professionals at theAuthority
favour the use of local smoke generators. Although unfortunately Mr Richards was not called to give evidence, it is clear that this is the scheme which he would favour. Mr Dobson has no objection to it.
2. The assertion by Mr Evans on which the pleaded case is based was made in ignorance of what had occurred and of the Concept Report.
3. There is no technical objection to the scheme.
Authority
will not undertake real
fire
training within the
fire
rooms because problems of stratification make it positively dangerous.
valuation
is £830,578. Mr Smith's
valuation
is £795,578. The differences relate to design fees, £25,000 (Mr Wort) against £10,000 (Mr Smith) and contingency £50,000 (Mr Wort) against £30,000 Mr Smith). In relation to both issues I have to consider the assessments of the experts bearing in mind the assessment of time in the case of design and their assessment of the appropriate level of contingency. I prefer the evidence of Mr Smith in both cases. Scheme 1 is therefore
valued
at £795,578.
valuation
is £854,905. Mr Smith's
valuation
is £809,905. Here the difference is £40,000 against £15,000 for design and £50,000 against £30,000 for contingency. Again, I prefer the evidence of Mr Smith. I
value
scheme 2 at £809,905.
valued
by Mr Wort at £1,243,645 to £2,082,904 and by Mr Smith at £918,242 to £1,828,544. The first figure relates to scheme 3 in its entirety, the second figure relates to carrying out the work but omitting the extract ductwork.
(1) Enabling works Mr Smith has costed on the basis that the extract ductwork is not being replaced and that as a result the cost of enabling work should be reduced from £71,514 to £43,254, i.e. a reduction of £28,260.
(2) Extract ductwork When considering the scheme without ductwork Mr Smith has deleted the cost which is included in the scenario with ductwork, i.e. £76,274. Mr Wort has not.
(3) M &E repairs The agreed cost of M & E repairs if the extract ductwork is included is £184,809. Mr Smith concludes that the sum should be reduced to £153,421 if the extract ductwork is excluded, making a reduction of £31,388.
(4) Reinstatement works Again, Mr Smith has taken the agreed figure of £130,261 and reduced it to £85,281 as a consequence of the exclusion of the extract ductwork, a difference of £44,980.
(5) Design For the full scheme Mr Wort's estimate is £237,000 and Mr Smith's figure is £100,000. Mr Wort's figure of 15 per cent is acknowledged by theAuthority
in closing to be at the top end of the range. Mr Smith's figure of 5 to 6 per cent is said to be at the bottom end of the range. The difference without the stainless steel and without the extract ductwork is £137,000 (Mr Wort) against £67,500 (Mr Smith), a difference of £69,500.
(6) Contingency For the full scheme Mr Smith has used a figure of £75,000, or about 4.7 per cent, Mr Wort has given a figure of 10 per cent or £158,000, a difference of £83,000. For the scheme without the extract ductwork and the stainless steel the figures are £120,000 (Mr Wort) against £45,000 (Mr Smith), a difference also of £75,000.
Authority
contends, the experts are agreed that the work would take 26 weeks, the same as scheme 2.
Authority
is entitled to replace the whole ductwork system Mr Wort considers that it would take 46 weeks, whereas Mr Smith estimates it at 42 weeks. This means that for time-related preliminaries the cost estimated by Mr Wort is £403,458 and by Mr Smith, £369,068, a difference of £34,360.
very
scientifically based opinion.
fire
rooms, professional fees and contingency. If smoke oil is not required for the
fire
rooms the sum is reduced to £519,711. Mr Smith used a contingency of about 10 per cent to reflect some uncertainty in the amount of work.
Halcrow
had designed. If it was to be implemented, the supply ductwork should be replaced as for Scheme 3 and the extract ductwork would continue to carry smoke oil and should be replaced as for Scheme 3. It is suggested that there is a real risk of
fire
from the existing ductwork, permitting the leakage of smoke oil and the scheme that is implemented must eliminate that risk. In relation to the supply ductwork to the heat and smoke zones it is said that it has been identified by
Halcrow
as defective and not in accordance with the specification and LFEPA is entitled to have it rectified. LFEPA also claims that
Halcrow
has not produced any evidence to show that the leakage of the existing supply ductwork would be within the limits necessary to ensure effective
ventilation.
Mr Wort
values
the work in Scheme 5 at £2,218,000. However it would appear that taking Mr Smith's figures on their own Mr Wort does not disagree with them. It is simply that he is pricing the
very
substantial additional work which is recommended by Mr Evans.
10.(b) The Experts
1. Is there any technical reason precluding the use of local smoke generators for the heat/smoke rooms in order that the existing medium temperature supply ductwork can be retained and used only forventilation?
The experts are agreed that there is no technical reason why local smoke generators cannot be used. The local smoke generators could either be mounted within risers or other accommodation adjacent to the spaces served or within the spaces served.
fire
rooms in order that the existing supply ductwork can be retained and only used for
ventilation?".
The agreed statement is that it would not be technically practicable to locate local smoke generators within the
fire
rooms but it would be possible to locate local smoke generators in adjacent spaces and to duct the smoke to the
fire
rooms or, to retain the existing duct mounted smoke generators and carry out work to the supply ductwork located in the ceiling
voids
which serve the
fire
rooms. In the case of the alternative option, Mr Evans said that the supply ductwork should be replaced by continuously welded steel ductwork laid to falls and drained. Mr Rollason's opinion was that continuously welded steel ductwork was not necessary.
fire
rooms, the insulation would need to be removed and discarded. The ductwork would then need to be cleaned and re-insulated to
Halcrow's
specification. Mr Rollason explained that Mr Evans' proposal that the joints should be broken and re-made was unnecessary because the ductwork would not carry smoked air and the possible degree of leakage would not have any detrimental effect upon the operation of the rooms.
voids
serving the
fire
rooms (Issue 6) Mr Evans concludes that it should be replaced with steel continuously welded ductwork with full face flanges laid to falls and drained. Mr Rollason's comment is the same as for the medium temperature supply ductwork serving the heat/smoke rooms.
vastly
more costly, could not reasonably be required.
11. Extract Ductwork
fire.
He
visited
the site and inspected the ductwork. He said in oral evidence that by October 2005 he had looked at the ductwork
very
carefully and had concluded that there had been no leakage of smoke oil and there was no need to carry out any remedial works. It is noteworthy that Mr Evans did not cause any tests to be carried out, although they were carried out on the high temperature ductwork (which showed no defects).
fire,
Mr Walsh prepared a document which suggested that some work should be done on the extract ductwork. Presumably this was Mr Evans' idea. In any event it was endorsed by him. Mr Evans said that "the extract ductwork should be provided with increased access openings, cleaned and provided with drain pipes".
"From the limited amount of medium temperature extract ductwork available for inspection, it is not possible to ascertain whether the joints are failing but from inspection there is evidence of oil contamination within the ductwork. For this reason the costs include for replacing this ductwork but subsequent surveys after the ceilings are removed may indicate that some of the ductwork can be retained".
view
in July 2006 that some work might be necessary on the extract ductwork, he made no effort to investigate the question further. His Report dated 13 December 2006 (paragraph 3.61(9)) said
"From the limited amount of medium temperature extract ductwork available for inspection, the joints do not appear to be leaking. When the ceilings are removed all the ductwork should be inspected to ascertain if any remedial work is necessary".
"It would be prudent to replace the extract ductwork when refurbishing because it would be a proportionately low cost item."
Halcrow
report in March 2005. Mr Rollason was asked to comment on a statement in that report that "extract ductwork leaked through the joints" and that "all remedial actions would apply to all medium temperature ductwork".
Vosper
Thorneycroft had the opportunity to establish that the extract ductwork was leaking and did not need to be replaced. LFEPA failed to provide any cogent evidence that this was the case. There is no proper basis on which it would be reasonable to require the extract ductwork to be replaced.
1. I prefer the evidence of Mr Rollason to that of Mr Evans.
2. In general I prefer the evidence of Mr Smith to Mr Wort.
3. Scheme 3 is unnecessarily expensive and I exclude it from my considerations.
4. I accept Mr Rollason's evidence that Schemes 1 and 2 would beviable
remedial schemes but are not favoured by Mr Richards and Training.
5. There is no need to do any remedial work on the medium extract ductwork.
6. With regard to Scheme 5, this is aviable
scheme but represents a departure from the Scheme which
Halcrow
devised. It arises out of a development of LFEPA's requirements.
7. Scheme 1 isvalued
at £795,578. Scheme 2 is
valued
at £809,905. Scheme 5 is
valued
at £519,711 if smoke is not required for the
fire
rooms and £619,309 if it is required.
12. LFEPA's Intentions
Firehouse
as a consequence of any loss or damage incurred in relation to the original work. To this issue I have added that on the basis of the judgment of Clarke LJ in Southampton Containers the question arises as to whether it would be reasonable to reinstate The
Firehouse
in the circumstances which now apply.
void
will have to be addressed by carrying out the additional measures in Mr Nimmo's report. I shall deal with this as a separate topic.
Authority
agrees that the scope of the remedial works has not yet been determined but say that that is because it does not know what sum it will recover in this litigation. It says that any remedial scheme would need to take into account LFEPA's requirement for smoke in the
fire
rooms.
plans.
"Having agonised over the issues raised by Jacobs' advice and having reviewed our revised quantum advice in the scheme from Mr Wort and having had numerous discussions within theAuthority,
we took the decision that we should at this stage simply press on with the litigation in order to see what we are able to obtain by way of compensation. Once we know what we have recovered and how much we have to spend we can then review the options open to us and take a
view
as to what remedial scheme should be implemented."
value.
I observe that about eighteen months had elapsed since the
fire
before any such discussion was taken.
Authority's
Firehouse
Annual
Plan
indicating that works will be carried out in The
Firehouse
in 2007/8 and Mr Moge's email dated 7 December 2006 stating that the capital budget item in the Greater
London
Capital
Plan
should remain in the
Plan.
firefighters
and if it is not provided at Southwark it will have to continue to provide it by using outside facilities and mobile training units. The best evidence that I have on this is Mr Richards' Report of 8 April 2006 which emphasises that as of that date the existing training objectives were being met. It has not been suggested by Mr Dobson that the position has changed.
Halcrow
contend that notwithstanding the considerable additional cost which they are incurring, LFEPA have taken no steps since the
fire
more than two years ago to implement a remedial scheme. Since June 2006 they have stood down their advisor, Jacobs. They have not even sought tenders or even drawn up specifications for carrying out remedial works.
Authority
suggests, so the defendants say, a lack of frankness with the court. Mr Moge did his best. He said that he was waiting for a decision from Training and sensibly was prepared to comprehend a possibility that the initial decision would depend on what Training wanted. This is all
very
vague.
1. Independent of any problems with the ductwork LFEPA had stopped hotfire
training before January 2005 because of the stratification problem.
2. After thefire,
in addition to the stratification problem, there were problems with the Westemp panels in the ceilings and walls which were such that extensive and unspecified additional works would need to be carried out, the cost of which would not be recovered in the present action.
3. If any smoke was required for training, such smoke would only be required in the smoke/heat zones and could and should be provided by LSGs. The only way of overcoming the stratification problem would be to make alternative provision for training.
4. I should take into account that the Westemp panels were not fit for purpose and any scheme which would require extensive work on them (not covered by this litigation) would be unlikely to be implemented because of the cost to theAuthority.
Fire
Authority.
Mr Moge asserted that it was his understanding that the Corporate Management Board was committed to bringing The
Firehouse
back into operation. He said that the
Authority
would make a rational choice based on advice that it received. He argued that The
Firehouse
would not be used for any purpose for which safety could not be guaranteed.
variance
with LFEPA's case that they would carry out Scheme 3. They have persisted in pursuing this case despite the documentary evidence that such a scheme is not wanted by Mr Richards. The recommendation in the internal memorandum from Mr Norris dated 24 March 2006 is that the installation is unsuitable for hot real
fire
training because of the problem of stratification. Further documents dated 27 March 2006 and 7 April 2006 confirm that smoke would not be required in the four
fire
rooms. The note of 7 April 2006 put it succinctly:
"For health and safety reasons it is thought that smoke production in these rooms is inadvisable."
fire
rooms. He said he did not know of any such document and agreed with Mr Taverner QC that if there had been such a review it would have been minuted. He agreed with me that there would be no point in him making a recommendation that the facility should be provided when it was not wanted by those who would use it.
fire
training in the four
fire
rooms was dangerous because it was not realistic. Indeed, it was positively harmful. The problem encouraged the
firefighters
to do the reverse of what they should do in a real
fire.
fire
rooms.
fire
training.
Fireroom.
This Scheme would cost £519,711.
13. Westemp Panels
Firehouse
by remedying the defective ductwork and whether it would be reasonable for it to do so I must first consider the position of the Westemp panels.
Halcrow
contends that the Westemp insulating panels used for lining the walls and ceilings of The
Firehouse
were and are not adequate for the purpose and represent another serious and costly problem to be overcome before The
Firehouse
could safely be used for real
fire
training.
Halcrow.
It was included in paragraph 20 of the Amended Particulars of Claim dated 24 June 2005 and is therefore within the settlement agreement between the parties.
"2. Westemp insulating panels have been used for lining the walls and ceilings; these were not adequate for the purpose and as a result have cracked and/or now show other damage. Alternatively the panels were damaged in the course of installation;
"5.Halcrow
failed to design the ceiling adequately or alternatively failed to supervise the work of the contractors in relation to the ceilings such that smoke and propane can access the ceiling
voids
(in particular above the garage flashover)."
London
Fire
Brigade Investigation Report published in May 2005 raised the following real problem in relation to the Westemp panels:
"3.18 If the temperature of the Westemp panel was to reach for example 400 to 500 degrees C due to its proximity to a burner the temperatures within the lower levels of the insulation above the panel could reach 200 to 300 degrees C (or higher). The temperature would be more than sufficient to initiate an oxidation reaction in oil soaked insulation and lead to afire
several hours later.
3.21 … high concentrations of oil in an area above the Westemp panel where the temperature was high enough may have undergone thermal oxidation leading to ignition. This progressive process could have taken a considerable period of time and in my opinion had probably started when TheFirehouse
was first commissioned and put into full operation.
4.1 The most likely cause of thefire
above the ceiling of the Office scenario room of The
Firehouse
at Southwark Training Centre appeared to be initiation of thermal oxidation in the oil-contaminated rockwool insulation above the Westemp panels."
London
Fire
Brigade Investigation Group made the same point when it said at paragraph 8.38:
"8.38 It is therefore most likely that the process of thermal oxidation was initiated when sufficient radiated heat has passed through the Westemp panel to start an oxidation reaction in the oil-soaked installation which led to thefire
several hours after The
Firehouse
had last been used."
"Future smoke contamination avoids leading to a potentialfire
hazard as described in Technical Consideration Constraints Table, page 2 of 4. The Westemp system does not provide a barrier to the passage of smoke and gases into the
voids.
Proprietary systems that meet the overall performance specification required for this application are not readily available and a customised solution would need to be developed and tested to prove its suitability for the purpose. It is not certain that a practical and technically
viable
![]()
viability
system could be developed within acceptable timescale and cost."
"Oil contamination of the base wood through long term use of oil-based smoke in this area represents a potentialfire
hazard. The existing condition of the loft room fabric would need to be assessed by a suitably qualified and experienced expert and a scheme for the treatment of the fabric developed. An acceptable maximum level of surface oil contamination for ongoing operations would need to be determined. A practical cleaning methodology would need to be developed. Given the difficult geometry of the construction, this may prove difficult to achieve. "
Firehouse,
I fully understand the point which the Jacobs Report is making.
fire
expert and an expert in risk management. It has not done so. It is
very
significant that LFEPA claims that it will need to spend substantial sums in addition to those recovered in this litigation if The
Firehouse
is to be used again for hot
fire
training. Is there any evidence that they will do it?
14. CONCLUSIONS
Authority's
intention. Mr Moge is simply not in a position to know what it is. There are no documents to support LFEPA's case that it would carry out Scheme 3 or any Scheme apart from Training's reports which suggest that Training might consider Scheme 5. This scheme can hardly be described as a remedial scheme. It is a product of the knowledge and experience gained since
Halcrow
designed the original scheme.
fire
training.
Firefighters
for whose benefit any works must be carried out.
Halcrow's
initial design for the
Firehouse
was accepted. As Mr Richards made clear in his 8 April 2006 Report, the problem turned out to be crucial in that experience derived from the use of The
Firehouse
made it clear that the hot
fire
training was in fact detrimental to the training of the
firefighters.
The problem of stratification was identified before the 2005
fire.
This meant that alternative training would have had to have been found in any event.
view
is reinforced by Jacobs' 3 May 2006 option paper in which they say that there was no known solution and in the Concept Report paragraph 5.1.
fire
risk or a potential
fire
risk. The evidence before me on this is not conclusive but is sufficient for me to reach the conclusion on the balance of probabilities that to replace the panels would involve a
very
substantial additional cost.
Authority
at present provides real
fire
training using mobile smoke generators. The first was bought on lease purchase on 10 March 2006. Mr Dobson gave oral evidence that a second unit was to be bought on lease purchase in April 2007.
fire
training. Mr Richards' Report of 8 April 2006 made it clear that many lessons had been learnt by his team as was to be expected of "a novel and innovative initiative". The Report makes it clear that the current training regime will have no adverse effect on achieving the desired training objectives and outcomes.
Firehouse
Annual
Plan
which indicates that unspecified works will be carried out in 2007-8 and Mr Moge's email dated 7 December 2006. The reference to Ms Laurence in Mr Moge's email indicates the relevance of considerations relating to this litigation. If there had been no reference in the draft Capital programme this would, no doubt, have been thought to imply that no Capital works would be carried out. If Capital works were to be carried out in 2007-8 I should have expected a fully costed programme to have been drawn up by now, or at least a draft outline programme with appropriate figures indicating what scheme was likely to be brought into existence.
Firehouse.
It may well be that the
firefighters
were well aware that the problems of stratification and the defective Westcamp panels represented an insuperable hurdle to the effective reinstatement of The
Firehouse.
Authority
was warned at a
very
early stage in the trial that I was concerned that no-one in a position of real
authority
was giving evidence and that two years after the
fire
there were still no concrete
plans
to carry out remedial works. I offered to consider postponing the trial on quantum for six months to enable the
Authority
to put
plans
in place. They declined the offer but instead decided to rely on Mr Evans' expert evidence and Mr Moge's evidence.
authoritative
view
was offered from a person who was going to take the decision. Ms O'Farrell QC for the
Authority
had to answer, "No, I don't have any explanation for that".
fire
training would have been incurred but for the
fire
in January 2005. By then the problem of stratification had been raised. It was an insuperable problem and even if the
fire
had not occurred, the training would have been reviewed and alternative training of the nature which LFEPA in fact provided, using the facilities of Essex and Lancashire
Fire
Services would have been used in any event.
Halcrow:
i)Halcrow
was negligent in failing to carry out the limited review of its design identified by Mr Rollason after the
fire
in June 2004. It was not negligent in the other respects alleged. I note in this context that this was a unique and innovative project.
ii) If Hacrow had done so it would have had to conclude on the basis of the experience gained in the operation of theFirehouse
that it was not possible to reinstate the building to the existing design to provide effective hot
fire
training for the
fire-fighters
because of the problems of stratification and those
associated
with the Westemp panels.
iii)Halcrow
would have had to formulate a fundamentally new design in order to eliminate these problems.
iv) The consequence of the review would therefore have been to identify the problems with the innovative design which, had they carried out the review then they would have identified a few months earlier.
v)
The actual
fire
damage of the 2005
fire
was minimal.
vi)
LFEPA must establish on the balance of probabilities that it was reasonable for it to recover the or any cost of reinstating the
Firehouse
and if so what cost. On the facts as I have found them I cannot be so satisfied.
a) LFEPA two years after thefire
has not taken any scheme for reinstatement to the stage of even outline agreement within the
Authority
let alone detailed costing;
b) Scheme 3 for which LFEPA contends is not supported by its ownfire-fighters;
![]()
c) Any scheme, apart from perhaps Scheme 5, would require theAuthorities
to spend substantial sums to replace the Westemp panels, sums which could not be recovered from
Halcrow
in any event;
d) All schemes except Scheme 5 have the problem of stratification. Unless that problem is overcome thefire-fighters
will not regard the scheme as fit for purpose. In this context the
fire-fighters
will not regard schemes other than Scheme 5 as fit for purpose.
e) The actual works of reinstatement, ie, repair of damage caused by the 2005fire
are minimal.
f) The major concern relates to damage which had manifested itself and was a result of a design for whichHalcrow
has not been found to be negligent.
g) The reinstatement which is being considered goes to the consequences of the original design and not the 2005fire.
h) It is doubtful whether Scheme 5, which is the only scheme which has found any support from thefire-fighters
themselves, can properly be described as reinstatement. It is, in effect, a new scheme which is derived from the knowledge and experience gained since
Halcrow's
design.
i) The current method of providing training is satisfactory and there is no need to spend additional money on theFirehouse.
Halcrow,
I have not addressed the cost of repair of damage caused by the 2005
fire.
My understanding is that it is minimal. The cost of the investigation
associated
with investigating the cost of repair work directly referable to the 2005
fire
will also be minimal. The major cost of investigating the
viability
of using the
Firehouse
for hot
fire
training was not a consequence of the failure to carry out the review advocated by Mr Rollason after the 2004
fire.
That wider Review, on the future use of the
Firehouse
would have had to have taken place in any event.
Halcrow
for the cost of ductwork replacement and the cost of alternative
fire training.