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England and Wales High Court (Technology and Construction Court) Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Technology and Construction Court) Decisions >> Município De Mariana v BHP Group (UK) Ltd & Anor [2026] EWHC 73 (TCC) (19 January 2026) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/TCC/2026/73.html Cite as: [2026] EWHC 73 (TCC) |
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BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES
TECHNOLOGY AND CONSTRUCTION COURT (KBD)
Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1NL |
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B e f o r e :
____________________
| MUNICÍPIO DE MARIANA and the Claimants identified in the Schedules to the Claim Forms |
Claimants |
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| - and - |
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BHP GROUP (UK) LTD (formerly BHP BILLITON PLC and thereafter BHP GROUP PLC) BHP GROUP LIMITED |
Defendants |
____________________
Shaheed Fatima KC, Nicholas Sloboda KC, Oliver Butler, Daniel Burgess, Tamara Kagan, Veena Srirangam, Jade Fowler and Michael Kotrly (instructed by Slaughter and May) for the Defendants
Hearing date: 17th December 2025
____________________
Crown Copyright ©
Mrs Justice O'Farrell:
i) The defendants are strictly liable as "polluters" in respect of damage caused by the collapse pursuant to Articles 3(IV) and 14, paragraph 1 of the Environmental Law.
ii) The alternative strict liability claim pursuant to Article 927, sole paragraph of the Civil Code does not arise.
iii) The defendants are liable based on fault in respect of damage caused by the collapse, pursuant to Article 186 of the Civil Code.
iv) The defendants are not liable in respect of damage caused by the collapse pursuant to Articles 116 and/or 117 of the Corporate Law.
v) The claim forms issued in the proceedings before the court contained sufficient information, as required by Brazilian Law, to stop time running for the purpose of limitation/prescription.
vi) Pursuant to Article 200 of the Civil Code, the criminal investigation and proceedings that were commenced in Brazil in November 2015 postponed the start of the prescription period until at least 2024.
vii) The ADIC CPA filed against Samarco on 17 November 2015 interrupted prescription in respect of all claims arising out of the collapse but such interruption terminated on 24 September 2018.
viii) The ambit of the thesis in Theme 999 is limited to public environmental claims, that is, claims for relief regarding the restoration of damage to the environment. It does not extend to claims for individual or collective compensation arising out of damage to the environment, which remain subject to the general rules of prescription.
ix) The prescription period for the claims is five years pursuant to Article 27 of the Consumer Defence Code.
x) The claims by the Municipalities and Utilities are subject to a five-year prescription period pursuant to the 1932 Decree.
xi) The Term of Commitment document entered into by Samarco, BHP Brasil and Vale on 26 October 2018 is of no assistance.
xii) The general rule is that the prescription period starts from the moment at which the injury to the right occurs but subject to the characterisation of the injury; a distinction must be drawn between a single harmful event, periodic violations of right, and continuous violation.
xiii) Certain claimants may be entitled to extended prescription periods, by reference to (a) filing of protests in Brazil, (b) lack of capacity and/or (c) their date of knowledge. It would be a matter for the court, in each case, to determine these issues on the facts.
xiv) The settlement agreements are regulated by the general principles of contractual interpretation contained in the Civil Code. The Consumer Defence Code does not apply to the settlement agreements because there is no underlying consumer relationship between the parties and the settlement agreements are not consumer contracts.
xv) The court has determined the issues of construction and principle arising in respect of the sample settlement agreements.
xvi) There is no constitutional impediment by way of incapacity for the Municipalities to bring proceedings in this jurisdiction and they have standing in these proceedings.
i) the claimants' application for costs, including whether any immediate order should be made, the scope of any costs order, and any reduction for issues on which the claimants lost;
ii) the claimants' application for a payment on account of costs;
iii) the claimants' application for pre-judgment interest on costs;
iv) the claimants' application for an order that there should be a detailed assessment of costs forthwith;
v) the defendants' application for permission to appeal.
Costs
Applicable costs principles
(a) the conduct of all the parties; and
(b) whether a party has succeeded on part of its case, even if that party has not been wholly successful.
(b) whether it was reasonable for a party to raise, pursue or contest a particular allegation or issue;
(c) the manner in which a party has pursued or defended its case or a particular allegation or issue; and
(d) whether a claimant who has succeeded in the claim, in whole or in part, exaggerated its claim.
Timing and scope of costs order
Percentage reduction
Basis of assessment
Payment on account of costs
i) the court will only allow costs which have been reasonably incurred and are reasonable in amount, resolving any doubt in favour of the paying party: CPR 44.3(1)&(2); and
ii) the court will only allow costs which are proportionate to the matters in issue: CPR 44.3(2).
"[23] What is a reasonable amount will depend on the circumstances, the chief of which is that there will, by definition, have been no detailed assessment and thus an element of uncertainty, the extent of which may differ widely from case to case as to what will be allowed on detailed assessment. Any sum will have to be an estimate. A reasonable sum would often be one that was an estimate of the likely level of recovery subject, as the costs claimants accept, to an appropriate margin to allow for error in the estimation. This can be done by taking the lowest figure in a likely range or making a deduction from a single estimated figure or perhaps from the lowest figure in the range if the range itself is not very broad.
[24] In determining whether to order any payment and its amount, account needs to be taken of all relevant factors including the likelihood (if it can be assessed) of the claimants being awarded the costs that they seek or a lesser and if so what proportion of them; the difficulty, if any, that may be faced in recovering those costs; the likelihood of a successful appeal; the means of the parties; the imminence of any assessment; any relevant delay and whether the paying party will have any difficulty in recovery in the case of any overpayment."
i) Profit costs – UK fee earners: £73,121,365;
ii) Profit costs – Brazil fee earners: £73,008,751;
iii) Profit costs – walk in centre and call centre fee earners: £44,056,706;
iv) Counsel fees: £14,021,945;
v) Disbursements: £8,865,394.
Trafigura Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 1150 at [104]-[114]; Weaver v British Airways plc [2021] EWHC 217 per Saini J at [41]-[51]. But, if recoverable at all, they form part of the costs of the overall proceedings, rather than the Stage 1 Trial.
Stay
Interest on costs
"The purpose of such an award is to compensate a party who has been deprived of the use of his money, or who has had to borrow money to pay for his legal costs. The relevant principles do not materially differ from those applicable to the award of interest on damages under s 35A of the Senior Courts Act 1981. The discretion conferred by the rule in respect of pre-judgment interest is not fettered by the statutory rate of interest, under the Judgments Act 1838, but is at large. Ultimately, the court conducts a general appraisal of the position having regard to what is reasonable for both the paying and the receiving parties. This normally involves an assessment of what is reasonable having regard to the class of litigant to which the relevant party belongs, rather than a minute assessment which it would be inconvenient and disproportionate to undertake. In commercial cases the rate of interest is usually set by reference to the short-term cost of unsecured borrowing for the relevant class of litigant, though it is always possible for a party to displace a "rule of thumb" by adducing evidence, and the rate charged to a recipient who has actually borrowed money may be relevant but is not determinative. See F&C Alternative Investments Ltd v Barthelemy (No. 3) CA [2013] 1 WLR at paras 98, 99 and 102 to 105; Bim Kemi AB v Blackburn Chemicals Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 889 at 18 and for example, Fiona Trust & Holding Corporation v Privalov [2011] EWHC 664 (Comm)."
Timing of assessment for costs
Application for permission to appeal
i) the court considers that the appeal would have a real prospect of success; or
ii) there is some other compelling reason for the appeal to be heard.
i) It is not suggested that the court made any error in identifying the test applicable where the claims are based on foreign law, or the summary of the Brazilian legal system as relevant to the claims before it, at paragraphs [233] to [249] of the Judgment.
ii) The Environmental Law issues were identified at paragraphs [250] to [251] of the Judgment. The competing views of the environmental law experts were set out in paragraphs [260] to [277]. The court's conclusions on these issues were set out in paragraphs [377] to [385].
iii) The issue of polluter definition was considered and determined, with reasons for the court's preference for the opinion of Professor Sarlet, the claimants' expert, rather than Professor Dantas, the defendants' expert, at paragraphs [289] to [330] of the Judgment.
iv) The defendants seek to rely on their position at trial, namely, that there is a conceptual distinction between direct and indirect responsibility under the Environmental Law. That case was put to Professor Sarlet in cross-examination but he did not accept it, as set out in the Judgment at paragraphs [292] to [295]. Likewise, the defendants' case on the need for a duty of safety was put to Professor Sarlet but not accepted - see paragraphs [314] to [317]. Both experts agreed that Justice Benjamin's observations in Mangroves STJ 650.728 and Jacupiranga STJ 1.071.741 were correct statements of the regime of environmental civil liability in respect of both direct and indirect polluters – see paragraphs [309] and [316].
i) The competing views of the experts were set out in paragraphs [260] to [277] and, specifically regarding the causation test, at [331] to [332] of the Judgment.
ii) The expert evidence on the relevant causation test, including the Vicuña case, was discussed in detail, and the reasons for the court's preference for the opinion of Professor Sarlet to that of Professor Dantas explained, by reference to the case law and the evidence, in paragraphs [302] to [304], and [333] to [361] of the Judgment.
i) The court summarised the dispute between the parties on the application of the Environmental Law to the facts at paragraphs [386] to [387] of the Judgment.
ii) The court expressly recorded the experts' agreement that the exercise of controlling shareholder power, whilst a relevant factor, was not, without more, sufficient to justify liability as set out at paragraphs [320]-[321] and [389] of the Judgment.
iii) For that reason, the court examined in detail the evidence as to the defendants' involvement in and control over the activity of Samarco to determine whether they were directly or indirectly responsible for such activity for the purpose of the Environmental Law at paragraphs [390] to [532]. The evidence before the court was the defendants' own witness statements, documents and cross-examination on the same.
iv) The defendants suggest in Ground 3.2 that the court's finding on attribution of knowledge and conduct was based on an error of law but these factors, although part of the overall evidence, were not a necessary element of strict liability under the Environmental Law test as found on the expert evidence by the court.
v) The court summarised the defendants' case on application of the Environmental Law at paragraph [387] of the Judgment and considered each of the issues identified by the defendants, including: (a) Samarco's corporate governance and management at paragraphs [390] to [431], and [517] to [522]; (b) the defendants' influence over Samarco at paragraphs [432] to [454]; (c) control over and participation in Samarco projects at paragraphs [486] to [509]; (d) risk management at paragraphs [455] to [485]; and (e) funding and benefits at paragraphs [510] to [516]. The conclusions were set out at paragraphs [523] to [532].
vi) It was not necessary or desirable for the court to respond to each and every point made by the parties, given the length of the submissions and appendices on each side. Such an approach would have resulted in a prolix judgment that obfuscated, rather than clarified the reasons for the conclusions reached.
i) There is no challenge to the court's overview of the fault-based case at [535] to [540] or the applicable principles set out in paragraphs [541] to [569], [581] to [593], [594] to [602] and [640] to [649] of the Judgment.
ii) There is no challenge to the court's findings as to the cause(s) of the collapse set out in paragraphs [91] to [232] of the Judgment.
iii) The discussion of the evidence regarding the defendants' actual or constructive knowledge of the stability issues in the dam prior to the collapse is set out in paragraphs [650] to [742] of the Judgment.
iv) The defendants' counterfactual case, that it was entitled to rely on contemporaneous reports which did not indicate any significant risk or warning, was considered against all relevant contemporaneous reports in paragraphs [743] to [793] of the Judgment.
v) The court's conclusions as to the defendants' liability under the Civil Code were summarised in paragraphs [801] to [808] of the Judgment.
vi) The fault-based claim was an alternative to the strict liability claim under the Environmental Law. It was not necessary or desirable for the court to respond to each and every point made by the parties in their lengthy submissions, particularly where the court had found in favour of the claimants on their primary case of strict liability.
i) The agreed list of issues identified the questions on fault and causation for the claim under Article 186 in very broad terms at Issues 11, 12 and 13.
ii) The court carried out a detailed analysis of the causes, risk identification, foreseeability and avoidability of the collapse of the dam at paragraphs [91] to [232] of the Judgment. It is not suggested by the defendants that there are any errors of law or principle in this analysis.
iii) The court's conclusions on fault liability, including causation, in the light of the earlier detailed findings in the Judgment, are set out in paragraphs [801] to [808].
i) The court identified the relevant issues in dispute, considered the words used in Article 200, the expert evidence and the cases identified by the experts as part of its analysis and in reaching its conclusions at paragraphs [831] to [861] of the Judgment.
ii) As recognised by the defendants, the court did engage with the application of Article 200 to non-parties to the criminal investigation or proceedings. The court was entitled to rely on Professor Tepedino's concession in cross-examination on this point.
iii) The court did not determine this issue on a literal interpretation but carried out analysis of the relevant case law in some detail against the differing views of the experts.
i) The court considered the application of Article 17 of the Consumer Defence Code at paragraphs [917] to [937] of the Judgment.
ii) Express consideration was given to the STJ's broad interpretation of consumers by equivalence, including Reporting Justice Andrighi's explanation in Pedra do Cavalo 4 STJ Special Appeal No. 2.018.386 (2023) at paragraph [931].
i) The interpretation and application of the Decree was considered by the court at paragraphs [938] to [944] of the Judgment.
ii) The issue was dealt with shortly because it was one of a number of alternative arguments which the court had already addressed.
iii) The court explained its preference for the opinion of Professor Rosenvald on this issue, which was supported by the identified cases, rather than the opinion of Professor Tepedino, which was not supported by any case law.
i) This issue is addressed by the court at paragraphs [1090] to [1108] of the Judgment. The court explained the reasons on which it preferred the opinion of Professor Sarlet over that of Professor Tepedino on this issue.
ii) The decision in Durant did not expressly consider or determine the issue that was before this court.
iii) The defendants seek to rely on a later STF reference, sent to the court under cover of a letter dated 29 August 2025 but no application was made to adduce this as evidence in the case and the experts were not given any opportunity to provide their comments on it to the court.
Order