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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Supreme Court >> RTI Ltd v MUR Shipping BV [2024] UKSC 18 (15 May 2024) URL: https://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKSC/2024/18.html Cite as: [2024] 4 All ER 623, [2024] 1 Lloyd's Rep 621, [2024] Bus LR 1492, [2024] UKSC 18, [2024] 2 WLR 1350, [2025] AC 675 |
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On appeal from: [2022] EWCA Civ 1406
JUDGMENT
before
Lord Hodge, Deputy President
Lord Lloyd-Jones
Lord Hamblen
Lord Burrows
Lord Richards
JUDGMENT GIVEN ON
15 May
2024
Heard on 6 and 7 March
2024
Nigel Eaton KC
Adam Woolnough
(Instructed by Rosling King LLP (London))
Respondent
Vasanti
Selvaratnam KC
James Shirley
(Instructed by Campbell Johnston Clark
Ltd
(London))
Lord hamblen and Lord Burrows (with whom Lord Hodge, Lord Lloyd-Jones and Lord Richards agree):
1. Introduction
2. The facts
MUR
Shipping
BV
("
MUR"),
a Dutch company, and
RTI
Limited ("
RTI"),
a Jersey company, entered into a contract of affreightment based on an amended Gencon form
voyage
charterparty.
MUR
was the
shipowner
(and is the appellant before us) and
RTI
the charterer. The contract provided for the carriage of about 280,000 tonnes per month, 15% more or less in
RTI's
option, of bauxite in bulk in lots of 30,000 tonnes up to 40,000 tonnes, 10% more or less in
MUR's
option, from Conakry in Guinea to Dneprobugsky in Ukraine, between 1 July 2016 and 30 June 2018. The monthly quantities and the loading rate meant that, in practice, there would be a continuous flow of
vessels
loading at Conakry, and a corresponding flow of freight payments from
RTI
to
MUR.
The specified freight payments were to be made in US dollars.
"36.1. Subject to the terms of this Clause 36, neither Owners nor Charterers shall be liable to the other for loss, damage, delay or failure in performance caused by a Force Majeure Event as hereinafter defined. While such Force Majeure Event is in operation the obligation of each Party to perform this Charter Party (other than an accrued obligation to pay monies in respect of a previous
voyage)
shall be suspended.
36.2. Following the end of the Force Majeure Event, the Parties shall consult in good faith to make such adjustments as may be appropriate to the
shipment
schedule under this Charter Party.
36.3. A Force Majeure Event is an event or state of affairs which meets all of the following criteria:
(a) It is outside the immediate control of the Party giving the Force Majeure Notice;
(b) It prevents or delays the loading of the cargo at the loading port and/or the discharge of the cargo at the discharging port;
(c) It is caused by one or more of acts of God, extreme weather conditions, war, lockout, strikes or other labour disturbances, explosions, fire, invasion, insurrection, blockade, embargo, riot, flood, earthquake, including all accidents to piers,
shiploaders,
and/or mills, factories, barges, or machinery, railway and canal stoppage by ice or frost, any rules or regulations of governments or any interference or acts or directions of governments, the restraint of princes, restrictions on monetary transfers and exchanges;
(d) It cannot be overcome by reasonable endeavors from the Party affected.
36.4. A Party wishing to claim force majeure in respect of a Force Majeure Event must give the other Party a Force Majeure Notice within 48 hours (Saturdays, Sundays and holidays excepted) of becoming aware of the Force Majeure Event. Such Force Majeure Notice shall be a notice in writing which:
(a) sets out or attaches details of the Force Majeure Event, and
(b) states that the Party giving the Force Majeure Notice wishes to claim force majeure in respect of such Force Majeure Event.
(c) give reasonable estimated duration of the Force Majeure Event to the extend [sic] it is reasonably possible to do so at the time of giving the Force Majeure Notice.
36.5. A Party which fails to give a Force Majeure Notice upon the occurrence of a Force Majeure Event in accordance with Clause 36.4 shall not be permitted to claim force majeure in respect of such Force Majeure Event.
36.6. Without prejudice to the generality of this Force Majeure Clause, time lost while waiting for berth at or off the loading port or discharge port and/or time lost while at berth at the loading port or discharge port by reason of a Force Majeure Event or one or more of the port authority imposing restrictions in relation to safe navigation in the port, the restraint of Princes, strikes, riots, lockouts of men, accidents,
vessel
being inoperative or rendered inoperative due to the terms and conditions of employments of the Officers and Crew, shall not count as laytime or time on demurrage."
RTI's
parent company (United Company Rusal plc). Although
RTI
itself was not listed, a majority-owned subsidiary of a listed entity was subject to the same restrictions as its parent.
MUR
sent a force majeure notice invoking clause 36 and noting that payment in US dollars (as required under the contract) was prevented by the sanctions. For the purposes of clause 36.3(a) and 36.4,
MUR
was the party "giving the force majeure notice"; and
MUR
was alleging that, under clause 36.3(d), it was the "party affected".
RTI
rejected the force majeure notice and offered to pay in euros instead of US dollars and to bear any additional costs or exchange rate losses suffered by
MUR
in converting euros to US dollars.
MUR
maintained its right to payment in US dollars and insisted that it was entitled to suspend performance under clause 36. It therefore refused to nominate
vessels.
MUR
resumed nominations of
vessels
under the contract of affreightment and henceforth did accept payments from
RTI
of euros which were converted into US dollars by
MUR's
bank on receipt.
RTI
making timely contractual payments in US dollars and that any such payments would have been delayed. Any US dollar transfer would have had to pass through a US intermediary bank which would have initially stopped the transfer on the basis of
RTI's
status as a sanctioned party until the bank could investigate whether the transaction complied with the US sanctions requirements. It would not have been practicable to avoid these difficulties in making timely contractual payments in US dollars by using a bank located outside the USA.
3. The Arbitral Award
RTI
commenced arbitration claiming damages for the cost of chartering-in seven replacement
vessels
in the period during which
MUR
suspended performance.
MUR
argued that it had been entitled to suspend performance under the force majeure clause (clause 36).
RTI's
parent company causing probable delay by
RTI
in paying US dollars would otherwise constitute a force majeure event or state of affairs,
MUR
could not rely on the force majeure clause because that event or state of affairs could have been overcome by
MUR's
reasonable endeavours (applying clause 36.3(d)). That was because, although
RTI's
contractual obligation was to pay US dollars,
MUR
should have accepted
RTI's
offer to pay in euros which would have been credited to
MUR
in US dollars as soon as the euros were received. There would have been no detriment to
MUR
because, as has been explained in para 7 above,
RTI
had made clear that it would bear any additional costs or exchange rate losses in converting euros to US dollars.
RTI
was entitled to damages for breach of contract by
MUR
in failing to nominate
vessels
thereby causing
RTI
to incur the cost of chartering-in replacement
vessels.
4. The judgments below
(1) Jacobs J
MUR
submitted that a reasonable endeavours proviso, whether express or implied, was directed to a situation in which the impediment could be surmounted so that the contract could be performed according to its terms. Such a proviso did not extend to
varying
the terms of the contract and/or performance. Reliance was placed on Bulman & Dickson
v
Fenwick & Co [
1894]
1 QB 179 ("Bulman") and Reardon Smith Line
Ltd
v
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1963] AC 691 ("the
Vancouver
Strikes case").
RTI
put forward a broad argument and a narrower argument. The broad argument was that the exercise of reasonable endeavours was a factual question which it was for the arbitrators to determine. Whether in any particular case reasonable endeavours would require a party to accept non-contractual performance was simply one factor to be weighed in the balance in deciding the overall question of reasonableness. Jacobs J rejected this argument, observing that there was no authority supporting it. Moreover, in Bulman and the
Vancouver
Strikes case, the courts appeared to accept, as a matter of legal principle, that reasonable endeavours did not require a party to accept an offer of non-contractual performance.
RTI's
narrower argument was that a party might be required to accept non-contractual performance of any obligation other than one which related to loading or discharging, that being the main focus of clause 36. Jacobs J rejected the suggestion that a distinction could be drawn between different contractual obligations for this purpose and emphasised that the payment obligation was an important contractual obligation.
MUR's
submissions, Jacobs J's concluding reasoning was that the contractual right to payment in US dollars formed part of the parties' bargain. The exercise of reasonable endeavours required endeavours towards the performance of that bargain; not towards a performance directed to achieving a different result which formed no part of the parties' agreement. He also reasoned that, if the loss of a contractual right turns purely on what is reasonable in a case, then the contractual right becomes tenuous, and the contract is then necessarily beset by uncertainty which is generally to be avoided in commercial transactions.
(2) The Court of Appeal
RTI
repeated their broad and narrower arguments before the Court of Appeal. Males LJ (with whom Newey and Arnold LJJ agreed on this point) observed as follows at para 52:
"...both the broad submission and the narrower submission ... must be rejected. According to the broad submission, all that matters is whether reasonable endeavours have been exercised (or ... whether the party affected has acted reasonably). But that is not what clause 36.3(d) says. The submission leaves out of account whether the endeavours in question have been successful in overcoming the force majeure event or state of affairs. So too does the narrower submission, for which there is in any event no warrant in the terms of clause 36.3."
"Terms such as 'state of affairs' and 'overcome' are broad and non-technical terms and clause 36 should be applied in a common sense way which achieves the purpose underlying the parties' obligations - in this case, concerned with payment obligations, that
MUR
should receive the right quantity of US dollars in its bank account at the right time. I see no reason why a solution which ensured the achievement of this purpose should not be regarded as overcoming the state of affairs resulting from the imposition of sanctions. It is an ordinary and acceptable use of language to say that a problem or state of affairs is overcome if its adverse consequences are completely avoided."
MUR
would have suffered no damage as a result of
RTI's
breach consisting of payment in euros; that the word "overcome" does not necessarily mean that the contract must be performed in strict accordance with its terms; and that the finding that the force majeure state of affairs could have been overcome by the exercise of reasonable endeavours was one with which the court should not interfere. He also observed that the position would have been different if "
RTI's
proposal would have resulted in any detriment to
MUR
or in something different from what was required by the contract" (para 59). He went on to say that he did not think there was anything in Bulman or in the
Vancouver
Strikes case to cast doubt on his analysis and he observed that, in neither case, was there an equivalent of clause 36.3(d).
MUR
had a contractual right to payment in US dollars, "[t]here was no question of it being required to abandon or
vary
that right". The central question at issue may, however, be described (see para 2 above) as one of whether
MUR
was "required" to abandon or
vary
that right in the obvious sense that
MUR
would not be entitled to rely on the force majeure clause unless it accepted
RTI's
offer of non-contractual performance.
view,
an "event or state of affairs" is not "overcome" by an offer of non-contractual performance. He gave the example of a contract which required carriage to port A which was strike-bound and an offer to divert the
vessel
to port B which would not in fact be detrimental to the party invoking the force majeure clause (because, for example, the goods being carried were required at place C equidistant between port A and port B). He considered that in such circumstances the party invoking the clause would not be required to accept that offer. This was because the party invoking the clause was entitled to insist on contractual performance by the other party and, if the parties to the contract intended a force majeure clause to extend to a requirement to accept non-contractual performance, clear express words were required. Although he accepted that Bulman and the
Vancouver
Strikes case could be distinguished from the present case, the underlying principle of those cases (that it is a question of contractual rights not reasonableness) was applicable.
5. The parties' main submissions to this court
MUR,
submitted that the appeal raises a fundamental point of principle in relation to reasonable endeavours provisos in force majeure clauses. He submitted that in the interests of certainty, and for other reasons of principle, reasonable endeavours provisos should not be extended to offers of non-contractual performance unless the parties expressly agree. The majority of the Court of Appeal was mistaken to cloud the answer to a clear-cut question of general principle with uncertain inquiries into whether, on the facts of individual cases, the purpose underlying particular contractual obligations has been achieved or detriment has been suffered. He further submitted that this conclusion from principle is supported by the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in Bulman and of the House of Lords in the
Vancouver
Strikes case.
Vasanti
Selvaratnam KC, for
RTI,
supported the reasoning and the decision of the majority of the Court of Appeal. She submitted that a reasonable endeavours proviso will require the party invoking the force majeure clause to accept an offer of non-contractual performance if: (i) it involves no detriment or other prejudice to the party seeking to invoke force majeure, and (ii) it achieves the same result as performance of the contractual obligation in question. She further submitted that this approach is supported by the Court of Appeal decision in B & S Contracts and Design
Ltd
v
Victor
Green Publications
Ltd
[1984] ICR 419 (" B & S Contracts ") and by analogy with cases on mitigation and frustration. She also clarified that she was not suggesting that Bulman and the
Vancouver
Strikes case should be overruled. Rather, as there were many material points of distinction between them and the present case, they could be, and should be, distinguished.
6. A narrow issue of interpretation?
MUR
who submitted before us that reasonable endeavours provisos are commonly found in force majeure clauses, either expressly or impliedly, and in materially similar terms to the clause in this case. It followed that the issue raised is one of general application which should be addressed as a matter of principle.
MUR.
It is well established that a force majeure clause will generally be interpreted (or a term will be implied to the same effect) as applicable only if the party invoking it can show that the event or state of affairs was beyond its reasonable control and could not be avoided by the taking of reasonable steps. We are therefore not dealing with an unusual feature, but rather a
very
common feature, of a force majeure clause.
view:
(i) Chitty on Contracts, 35th ed (2023),
vol
1, para 27-066:
" Although much will depend on the wording of the particular clause it is possible to deduce from the authorities some general propositions in relation to the type of event that is likely to fall within the scope of the words 'force majeure' where they are used without further amplification in the contract itself. In such a case a court is likely to conclude that the type of event that will fall within the scope of the clause is an event that was: (i) beyond the reasonable control of the parties (and so would not include an event caused by the negligence, omission or default of one of the contracting parties); (ii) causative of the non-performance; and (iii) could not have been overcome or avoided by the taking of reasonable steps."
(ii) Benjamin's Sale of Goods, 12th ed (2023), para 8-075:
" A seller able to invoke the [force majeure] clause must in addition to proving the event has occurred further prove: (i) that his non-performance was due to circumstances beyond his control; and (ii) that there were no reasonable steps that he could have taken to avoid or mitigate the event or its consequences."
(iii) Treitel, The Law of Contract, 15th ed (2020), para 19.079:
"... the contract may include a 'force majeure' clause which provides for discharge on the occurrence of specified events usually described as being 'beyond the control' of the parties, or of one of them. The concept of something beyond a person's control sets a 'comparatively high hurdle' and a force majeure clause is normally construed so as to protect the party relying on it only if he has taken all reasonable steps to avoid the operation of the event, or to mitigate its results."
view
include:
(i) In Bulman, in the context of whether an exceptions clause excused charterers for late unloading caused by a strike, the Court of Appeal indicated that a reasonable endeavours requirement was implied. In the words of Lord Esher MR (Lopes and Kay LJJ concurring) at p
185:
"a strike would in itself not be sufficient to exonerate the charterers from doing the best they could to accept delivery, and would not entitle them to fold their arms and do nothing. If, notwithstanding the strike, they could by reasonable exertion have taken delivery of the cargo within the proper time, the strike would not have afforded them any defence."
(ii) In B & S Contracts per Griffiths LJ at p 426:
"Clauses of this kind [ie force majeure clauses] have to be construed upon the basis that those relying on them will have taken all reasonable efforts to avoid the effect of the
various
matters set out in the clause... see Bulman & Dickson
v
Fenwick & Co [
1894]
1 QB 179, in the speech of Lord Esher MR at p
185.
Quite apart from that general principle this particular clause starts with the following wording: 'Every effort will be made to carry out any contract based on an estimate,' which is saying in express terms that which the law will imply when construing such a clause."
To similar effect were the following words of Kerr LJ at p 427:
"[I]t is clear that where an exception of strikes is invoked, then like all other exceptions it is subject to the principle that the party seeking to rely on it must show that the strike and its consequences could not have been avoided by taking steps which were reasonable in the particular circumstances: see ... in particular the judgment of Lord Esher MR in Bulman & Dickson
v
Fenwick & Co [
1894]
1 QB 179,
185
to which Griffiths LJ has already referred. ...
All these matters are really implicit in the words 'force majeure,' the heading of this clause. The situation and its consequences must be beyond the reasonable control of the party seeking to rely on the exceptions clause. In the present case the situation is still simpler, because what I have been referring to as being implied by law generally, is expressed in the opening words of the clause: 'Every effort will be made to carry out any contract.'"
(iii) I n Channel Island Ferries
Ltd
v
Sealink UK
Ltd
[1988] 1 Lloyd's Rep 323 per Parker LJ at p 327:
"... a party must not only bring himself within the [force majeure] clause but must show that he has taken all reasonable steps to avoid its operation or mitigate its results".
MUR's
case is that, absent express wording, a reasonable endeavours proviso does not require acceptance of an offer of non-contractual performance.
RTI's
case is that it will do so in the circumstances set out in para 24 above - ie if (i) it involves no detriment or other prejudice to the party seeking to invoke force majeure, and (ii) it achieves the same result as performance of the contractual obligation in question.
7. Considerations of principle
view,
there are several principles which provide good reasons for accepting
MUR's
case.
(1) The object of reasonable endeavours provisos
MUR
would have enabled the payment of US dollars to be made without delay. This is the only way in which the impediment to contractual performance could have been "overcome". So, for example, if a specific licence for continued performance of the contract by payment of US dollars could, and should, reasonably have been obtained then the impediment to performance would likely have been overcome. Making arrangements for non-contractual payment does not, however, enable the contract to be performed. The impediment to contractual performance remains and is not affected thereby, still less overcome. The banking delay for US dollar payments resulting from the imposition of sanctions remained in place and was not "overcome" by offering non-contractual performance. Put another way, it would be absurd to say that
MUR
caused the non-performance of the contract by failing to accept an offer of non-contractual performance.
(2) Freedom of contract
Ltd
v
Securicor Transport
Ltd
[1980] AC 827, at p 848:
"A basic principle of the common law of contract ... is that parties to a contract are free to determine for themselves what primary obligations they will accept."
And in the words of Lord Toulson in Prime Sight
Ltd
v
Lavarello [2013] UKPC 22, [2014] AC 436, at para 47:
"Parties are ordinarily free to contract on whatever terms they choose and the court's role is to enforce them."
(3) Clear words needed to forego
valuable
contractual rights
RTI
was the payment of freight. As is expected and indeed necessary, the contract set out when and how payment of freight was to be made. As is common in international trade, the currency of payment was US dollars.
RTI
was obliged to pay freight in US dollars and
MUR
was entitled to refuse any tender of payment which was not in US dollars. Subject to the possible effect of the reasonable endeavours proviso, this was accepted by Ms Selvaratnam KC.
MUR
therefore had an undoubted right to insist on payment of freight in US dollars and to refuse payment in any other currency. The effect of
RTI's
argument is that, in certain circumstances, the reasonable endeavours proviso required
MUR
to forego that
valuable
right and accept the offer of non-contractual performance. But, in our
view,
in principle a party should not be required to do so unless the contract makes clear (whether expressly or by necessary implication) that the party has given up that right. Indeed, one may regard it as a general principle of contractual interpretation that parties do not forego
valuable
rights without it being made clear that that was their intention.
Ltd
v
Gilbert-Ash (Northern)
Ltd
[1974] AC 689 ("Gilbert-Ash") or whether the Gilbert-Ash presumption against the abandonment of
valuable
rights is limited to the giving up of common law or statutory rights that are non-contractual. On the facts of Gilbert-Ash it was the giving up of a common law right to an abatement of price that was in issue (whereby a person can set up, in diminution or extinction of the price for goods or work done, defects in those goods or that work). We do not think it greatly matters whether the applicable principle is that set out in Gilbert-Ash or an analogous principle applicable to
valuable
contractual rights. In the present case there can be no doubt that
MUR
had a contractual right to be paid freight in US dollars. It therefore had a contractual right to refuse to accept payment in any other currency. In our judgment, clear words would be necessary for
MUR
to be required to forego that
valuable
right, including making clear the circumstances in which that would be so required. Neither of these matters are addressed by clause 36.3(d).
shipment
schedule". The parties thereby recognised the need for clear provision to be made for there to be any contractually required change in contract terms. The same applies to either of the parties being required to accept an offer of non-contractual performance.
(4) The importance of certainty in commercial contracts
v
Jakubowski [2023]
UKSC
19, [2023] 3 WLR 50, at para 39: "Certainty and predictability are of particular importance in the context of English commercial law, all the more so given the frequent choice of English law as the governing law in international commercial transactions". There have been many other authoritative statements to the same effect. For example, in Golden Strait Corpn
v
Nippon Yusen Kubishika Kaisha (The Golden
Victory)
[2007] UKHL 12, [2007] 2 AC 353, Lord Bingham of Cornhill said as follows at para 23:
"The importance of certainty and predictability in commercial transactions has been a constant theme of English commercial law at any rate since the judgment of Lord Mansfield CJ in
Vallejo
v
Wheeler (1774) 1 Cowp 143, 153, and has been strongly asserted in recent years in cases such as Scandinavian Trading Tanker Co AB
v
Flota Petrolera Ecuatoriana (The Scaptrade) [1983] QB 529, 540–541, [1983] 2 AC 694, 703–704; Homburg Houtimport
BV
v
Agrosin Private
Ltd
(The Starsin) [2004] 1 AC 715, 738; Jindal Iron and Steel Co
Ltd
v
Islamic Solidarity
Shipping
Co Jordan Inc (The Jordan II) [2005] 1 WLR 1363, 1370."
MUR's
case is straightforward : absent clear wording, a reasonable endeavours proviso does not require acceptance of an offer of non-contractual performance. The focus of the reasonable endeavours inquiry is clear: what steps can reasonably be taken to ensure contractual performance. The limits to that inquiry are also clear; they are provided by the contract.
RTI's
case is not anchored to the contract . It begs a number of questions and gives rise to considerable legal and factual uncertainty. It requires inquiries into whether the acceptance of non-contractual performance would: (i) involve no detriment or other prejudice to the party seeking to invoke force majeure, and (ii) achieve the same result as performance of the contractual obligation in question.
RTI's
rewording of Males LJ's suggested inquiry into "the purpose underlying" the relevant obligation and whether that purpose would be met by the alternative performance offered. The inquiry into purpose is potentially problematic because there may be no clear purpose. It also appears to assume that there will be a single purpose underlying any particular obligation. Often, however, that may not be the case. There may be a
variety
of purposes and it is unclear what is then required. Do all those purposes have to be met or is it sufficient if the main or predominant purpose is met, assuming that there is one and that it can be identified?
181-182:
"At no point did Males LJ... really address Jacobs J's concern that if the party affected by the force majeure can be required not to insist on its strict contractual rights in an attempt to overcome it, some uncertainty has been introduced which is best avoided in commercial transactions".
very
concept of "reasonable endeavours" imports an evaluative judgment and therefore some element of uncertainty. So, for example, if a specific licence for continued performance of the contract by payment of US dollars could, and should, by reasonable endeavours have been obtained then the impediment to performance would likely have been overcome. The determination of what constitutes "reasonable endeavours" in that example involves an evaluative judgment. But that evaluation is geared towards achieving contractual performance: it is concerned with reasonable efforts to overcome the sanctions by achieving payment in US dollars. In contrast, there is no justification for creating needless additional uncertainty by departing from the standard provided by the terms of the contract and hence by what constitutes contractual performance.
RTI
sought to present her submissions as ones that reasonable business people would favour; and at first sight some may think it an attractive feature of her submissions that they appear to favour reasonableness (and one might add "justice") over certainty. Indeed, Arnold LJ said at the start of his dissenting judgment in the Court of Appeal, at para 66: "On the facts of this case,
MUR's
position has no merit". With respect, we consider that statement, and the dichotomy in this context between reasonableness and certainty, to be misplaced. It is not in dispute that "reasonable efforts" import some degree of uncertainty. But for that concept to be allowed to ride rough-shod over the required contractual performance would be to introduce unwarranted uncertainty and would thereby, it might be said, undermine the expectations of reasonable business people. It is not unmeritorious or unjust to insist on contractual performance, all the more so if being precluded from doing so would introduce uncertainty contrary to the expectations of reasonable business people.
very
notion of what counts as contractual performance. On these facts, the position would have been different if
RTI
had been able to perform the contract by paying in either US dollars or euros. But it is now common ground that the contract required payment in US dollars and the importance of certainty is maintained so long as the reasonable endeavours proviso is interpreted as focusing on that as the relevant contractual performance.
8. The Authorities
MUR
and for
RTI
each relied on cases which they submitted implicitly supported their arguments. It is our
view
that the authorities relied on by
MUR
do indeed provide strong, albeit implicit, support for its submissions.
(1) The two cases relied on by
MUR
(a) Bulman
voyage
charterparty provided that, once loaded with coal in Newcastle, the
vessel
"Ashdene" should proceed to London to discharge the coal at one of certain named berths (including Regent's Canal) on the Thames as ordered by the charterers. The charterers nominated Regent's Canal before the
vessel
left the Tyne. They nominated that berth because the coal was being sold to a company which required the coal to be near Regent's Canal. There was an exceptions clause in the charterparty which included delay occasioned by strikes. The
vessel
sailed on 10 February at 01.00. At 12.00, the Regent's Canal coal porters began a strike. The charterers learned of the strike at 16.00 the same day. The
vessel
arrived at Regent's Canal on 11 February but the coal could not be unloaded because of the strike. On 16 February the charterers ordered the
vessel
to Beckton, which was one of the other berths named in the charterparty and where there was no strike. The coal was unloaded at Beckton on 19 February. The
shipowners
claimed demurrage for the delay in unloading. The essential question was whether the exceptions clause covering strikes excused the charterers for the delay in unloading.
shipowners
had argued that, once the charterers knew of the strike at Regent's Canal, they should reasonably have ordered the
vessel
to a berth not affected by the strike (eg Beckton). And, at first instance, to a question posed by Pollock B, the jury had answered that, because the charterers knew of the strike, it was not reasonable for the charterers to order the
vessel
to Regent's Canal. But Pollock B had reasoned that what mattered was that the charterers had a contractual right to order the
vessel
to Regent's Canal and they were not required to give up that right even if it was reasonable to do so (and despite the fact that there was an option in the charterparty for the charterers to order the
vessel
to a berth where there was no strike). In an important and pithy phrase, he said at p
183:
"It is not a question between the plaintiffs and defendants as to what is reasonable or unreasonable, it is a question of contract between the parties."
view
that a reasonable endeavours qualification (here implied) in respect of an exceptions clause does not require the affected party to give up its contractual right (including by exercising an option in the contract) even if it would be reasonable to do so.
ship
unload at Regent's Canal, even though that was unreasonable, so on the facts of the instant case it can be said that
MUR
was not required to give up its contractual entitlement to be paid in US dollars even if it would have been reasonable to accept
RTI's
offer of payment in euros.
(b) The
Vancouver
Strikes case
voyage
charterparties, the owners of
various
vessels
(the appeal to the House of Lords concerned three
vessels
but focused on the "Queen City") were ordered by the charterers to
Vancouver
to receive on board a full cargo of wheat. The charterers had an option of loading up to one-third of barley and up to one-third of flour. The owners of the "Queen City" gave notice of readiness to load on
18
February. On 16-17 February a strike broke out at the grain elevators in
Vancouver
which lasted until 7 May. The strike prevented a full cargo of wheat being loaded until 12 May. The
shipowners
claimed demurrage for the delay in loading. There was an exceptions clause covering strikes and the essential question was whether that exceptions clause excused the charterers for the delay in loading. In particular, were the charterers required to exercise their options to load one third barley and one third flour along with one third wheat (which, for the purposes of the argument, it was assumed was available) instead of insisting on the full cargo being wheat?
Viscount
Radcliffe at p 718:
"the exceptions clause covers delay in the
shipping
of wheat, and there is no obligation on the charterers to lose that protection by exercising their option to provide another kind of cargo that is not affected by a cause of delay, even assuming such a cargo to be readily available."
"confer true and unfettered options which leave the charterers free to exercise them or not as they find convenient."
"it was a matter entirely for the free choice of the charterers whether ... they should
ship
any barley or flour."
"Where there is no option in the business sense, the consequence of damming one channel is simply that the flow of duty is diverted into others and the freedom of choice thus restricted. If then a
shipper
cannot
ship
wheat, he must
ship
either barley or flour. The width of the alternatives is in the contract for the benefit of both parties and it can be a liability as well as a benefit for the
shipper.
But where there is a 'business option' the legal position is quite different. There is not then one contractual obligation to be performed in alternative ways, but one obligation to be performed in one way, unless the option holder chooses to substitute another way and does so by the effective exercise of his option. In exercising the option, which he has acquired solely for his own advantage, the holder is not bound to consider the convenience or the interest of the other party. If the obligation is to
ship
a full and complete cargo of wheat with the option to change to barley or flour and the
shipment
of wheat is impeded, he is not obliged to change to barley or flour simply because that is the only way in which he could
ship
a full and complete cargo."
Vancouver
Strikes case is that the charterers were able to rely on the exceptions clause to excuse the delay in loading even though they could have exercised express options as to the cargo in the charterparty that would have enabled them to perform on time, and hence would have avoided the delay, caused by the strike. Although their Lordships did not refer to, let alone rely on, Bulman, the
Vancouver
Strikes case again implicitly, and strongly, supports
MUR's
submissions. The intervention of a peril did not require the charterers to give up their contractual entitlement to load a full cargo of wheat, and there was no suggestion that the position would have been different even if it had been found reasonable for the charterers to load the alternative cargos.
Vancouver
Strikes case makes the facts of the instant case even stronger than that case. That is because in our case, the performance required by
RTI
was payment in US dollars and there was no business or true option for
MUR
to accept payment in euros. Had there been, the
Vancouver
Strikes case indicates that
MUR
would still have been entitled not to exercise that option and to insist on payment in dollars.
(2) The main cases relied on by
RTI
(a) B & S Contracts
variation
or cancellation in the event of, inter alia, a strike. The clause read as follows:
"Every effort will be made to carry out any contract based on an estimate, but the due performance of it is subject to
variation
or cancellation owing to an act of God, war, strikes, civil commotions, work to rule or go-slow or overtime bans, lock-out, fire, flood, drought or any other cause beyond our control, or owing to our inability to procure materials or articles except at increased prices due to any of the foregoing causes."
variation
or cancellation should there be a force majeure event, such as a strike. But the Court of Appeal made clear, relying on Bulman, that, even if there had been no such express words requiring "every effort", the requirement to use "reasonable efforts" would have been implied. See the quotations from Griffiths and Kerr LJJ set out at para 28 above.
"[T]he plaintiffs were perfectly prepared to pay what the men were demanding save for the fact, they said, they did not have the money available. Well, then there came the offer of the defendants to make the money available by giving them an advance. In those circumstances I can see no reason why they should not have accepted the money and paid the workforce save their own immediate economic interests, and they chose not to do that but to put pressure on the defendants by refusing the offer and indicating that the only way out was for the defendants to hand over the £4,500 as a gift rather than as an advance.
I think that was thoroughly unreasonable behaviour, and that being so they are not entitled to rely upon the force majeure clause..."
RTI
rely on this case as showing that an extra-contractual solution to the force majeure event served to defeat the force majeure defence. That is, the defendants' offer to pay earlier than required under the contract was an offer that it was reasonable for the claimants to accept and their failure to do so meant that they could not rely on the force majeure clause.
view,
however, this is a weak authority in support of
RTI's
case. This is for three linked reasons. First, there was no discussion by the Court of Appeal of the performance being non-contractual and of the relevance of Bulman to that issue. Secondly, the clause expressly referred to "
variation"
of the contract. Thirdly, and most fundamentally, the offer made was not to render a non-contractual performance in any real sense. Rather it was to render the contractual performance earlier than required. The defendants were simply offering to pay in advance the money that they were bound to pay anyway under the contract. The contrast with the facts of our case is clear.
RTI
was not offering early contractual performance. It was offering non-contractual performance. So it was that
RTI
supplemented its offer to pay in euros by the offer to indemnify
MUR
for loss caused by the non-contractual performance of not paying in US dollars. Plainly in B & S Contracts there was no possible detriment to the claimants in being paid early so that what was being offered was in effect full performance and, in contrast to our case, there was no conceivable loss that required indemnification.
(b) Payzu
Ltd
v
Saunders [1919] 2 KB 581 ("Payzu")
v
Underground Electric Railways Co of London [1912] AC 673, it was decided that the claimants should have mitigated their loss by accepting the offer of the defendants to deliver on payment of cash. That was because, on the facts, the claimants ought reasonably to have accepted that offer. The damages were therefore limited to £50 comprising a sum for business inconvenience plus what the claimants would have lost by having to pay cash rather than having a month's credit.
RTI
that the Payzu decision on mitigation is analogous to the situation with which we are concerned. Mitigation is concerned with the remedy of damages once breach has been established. It has little if anything to do with the prior question, with which we are dealing, of whether there has been a breach of the primary obligations under the contract. Put another way, the legal principles and policies applicable to the assessment of (unliquidated) damages are not the same as those applicable to determining what is the performance required under the contract.
very
clear distinction between Payzu and the facts of this case. In this case, it is
RTI
that is suing
MUR
for damages for breach not
vice
versa.
The duty to mitigate its loss therefore fell on
RTI
and not on
MUR
so that, on the facts, Payzu plainly had no role to play in respect of
MUR's
conduct in not accepting
RTI's
offer of non-contractual performance.
(c) The Suez cases on frustration
RTI
relied by way of analogy on what were described as the "Suez cases" dealing with the contractual doctrine of frustration. Two cases were being relied on under this heading. These were the Court of Appeal's decision in Ocean Tramp Tankers Corpn
v
V/O
Sovfracht, The Eugenia [1964] 2 QB 226; and the first instance decision in Palmco
Shipping
Inc
v
Continental Ore Corpn, The Captain George K [1970] 2 Lloyd's Rep 21, which applied The Eugenia. Reference was also made to Societe Franco Tunisienne D'Armement
v
Sidermar SpA, The Massalia [1961] 2 QB 278, which was overruled in The Eugenia.
RTI
was that The Eugenia and The Captain George K showed that the closure of the Suez Canal did not result in the charterparties in those cases being frustrated. The
shipowners
had instead taken the alternative route
via
the Cape of Good Hope and it was held, according to
RTI's
submission, that the charterers were bound to accept that reasonable alternative performance even though, at least arguably, it was not the contracted-for route.
RTI
submitted that, by analogy, the force majeure clause in the present case did not excuse
MUR
because
MUR
should have accepted the reasonable alternative performance of payment in euros.
voyage
charterparty was entered into to carry iron ore from Masulipatam in India to Genoa. The fastest and usual route would have been
via
the Suez Canal but that was shut. The
vessel
therefore took the longer route
via
the Cape of Good Hope. The
shipowners
argued that the contract was frustrated, and was therefore terminated, because of the closure of the Suez Canal and that they were instead entitled to payment (above the agreed contract sum) on a non-contractual quantum meruit basis. That argument succeeded. Pearson J held that the charterparty was frustrated because: the Suez Canal route was a term of the contract (p 306); the fact that closure of the Canal was foreseen as a possibility did not preclude the operation of frustration (p 299); and the route
via
the Cape of Good Hope was a fundamentally different
voyage
(pp 306-307).
view.
This concerned a time charterparty for a trip from Genoa to India. The
vessel
entered the Suez Canal and became trapped for several months and, once freed, had to go back and take the longer route
via
the Cape of Good Hope. The charterers claimed that the charterparty was frustrated and thereby terminated but the owners denied that and claimed the agreed hire. The Court of Appeal held that the contract was not frustrated either by the
vessel
being trapped in the canal or, once freed, by having to go
via
the Cape of Good Hope. As regards the latter, The Massalia was overruled. While the Court of Appeal agreed with Pearson J that, unless the event had been provided for in the contract, the foreseeability of the event did not preclude frustration, the Court of Appeal disagreed with him that the contract was made radically different by having to take the route
via
the Cape of Good Hope rather than
via
the Suez Canal. Pearson J was also incorrect to have decided that the contract had a term requiring that the Suez Canal was the route. In the words of Lord Denning MR, at p 240:
"I think that there, as here, there was no obligation to go through the Suez Canal, but only to go by the route which was customary at the time of performance; and that there is no legitimate distinction to be drawn between that case and this."
voyage
charterparty was entered into for the carriage of a cargo of sulphur from Mexico to India. The direct route
via
the Suez Canal became impossible because of the closure of the Canal and the
vessel
therefore proceeded
via
the Cape of Good Hope. The
vessel
travelled twice as many miles as it would have done had it been able to go through the Suez Canal. The
shipowners
claimed that the contract was frustrated, and thereby terminated, and that they were entitled to a higher payment than agreed under the contract. With considerable reluctance, Mocatta J held that he was bound by The Eugenia and that, therefore, the contract was not frustrated. Applying The Eugenia, the
voyage
round the Cape of Good Hope was not radically different and was merely more expensive than the
voyage
via
the Suez Canal.
view,
these cases, most importantly The Eugenia, provide little, if any support, for
RTI.
This is for two main reasons. First, whether the doctrine of frustration is made out is a different question than deciding on the application of a force majeure clause. While it is true that there is a close connection between the two, because both deal with a change of circumstances after the contract is made for which neither party is responsible, the doctrine of frustration is the default position laid down by law. It sets out a doctrine that is applicable in a narrow range of changed circumstances and has the drastic consequence that the contract is automatically terminated. Force majeure clauses can cover a far wider set of circumstances with a range of different and flexible consequences, including temporary suspension of the contract for a period of time. It follows that, even if it were the general rule in the law of frustration that the doctrine of frustration cannot be made out where the affected party could have reasonably accepted an offer of non-contractual performance, that does not mean that a force majeure clause could not be relied on in the same circumstances. So on the facts of this case, it is not being suggested that the charterparty was frustrated but that leaves open whether
MUR
can rely on the force majeure clause. As counsel for
MUR
expressed it in his written submissions, it is "inappropriate to try to draw conclusions about force majeure (or exceptions) clauses from the frustration case-law. After all, if FM clauses simply mirrored the common law of frustration, they would be pointless."
voyage
via
the Cape rather than
via
the Suez Canal). Rather Lord Denning MR was at pains to make clear that it was not a term of the contract that the
voyage
had to be
via
the Suez Canal. He precisely said that the performance only required the customary route at the time of performance to be taken; and the customary route had become
via
the Cape of Good Hope. What was being offered by the
shipowners
was a contractual performance and it is incorrect to
view
The Eugenia (or, on the best analysis, The Captain George K) as being a case where the charterers were held bound to accept, because reasonable to do so, a non-contractual performance.
(d) Two other cases mentioned by
RTI
RTI
drew to our attention two further English cases and, for completeness, we now briefly explain why they provide
very
limited assistance in relation to what we have to decide.
Ltd
v
Tullow Ghana
Ltd
[2018] EWHC 1640 (Comm), [2018] 2 Lloyd's Rep 628 ("Seadrill"), the defendant had hired from the claimant an oil rig for a term of nearly seven years at a daily rate of the order of US$600,000 when in operation. The contract contained a force majeure clause which included
various
events among which was a drilling moratorium imposed by the government of Ghana. It also included a reasonable endeavours proviso. Following the decision of an arbitration tribunal, on a dispute between states, that no new drilling in a particular oil field should take place, the defendant invoked the force majeure clause arguing that, under that clause, the contract for the hire of the rig had been terminated. Teare J held that the defendant could not rely on force majeure as, although there had been a government drilling moratorium that prevented work being carried out in an oil field as intended, it did not prevent the defendant issuing drilling instructions in relation to another oil field. That work had been prevented by the government's failure to approve a drilling programme, which was not a force majeure event.
view)
there had been a force majeure event, there had been a failure to exercise reasonable endeavours by the defendant so that the defendant could not rely on the force majeure clause. That was because the defendant was contractually bound to take up other drilling opportunities even though that may have involved the defendant acting against its commercial interests. It was argued that the defendant's choice in relation to the giving of drilling instructions was akin to a true option (what Lord Devlin in the
Vancouver
Strikes case called a "business option") which it was able to exercise purely in its own interests. This argument was rejected. Teare J noted that where there is a business option and the method of performance chosen by the option holder becomes impossible to perform the holder of the option is not bound to perform in any other way. However, in this case the defendant had an obligation to provide drilling instructions which could be performed in a number of ways; if one way became impossible then the obligation was to give instructions which could be performed in another way. The defendant was not entitled to act purely in its own commercial interests and to ignore those of the claimant. Teare J cited and applied the words of Lord Devlin in
Vancouver
Strikes set out at para 72 above: "the consequence of damming one channel is simply that the flow of duty is diverted into the others and the freedom of choice is restricted".
RTI
because it does not contradict the idea that reasonable endeavours must be geared towards the contractual performance. In Seadrill, in contrast to the
Vancouver
Strikes case and our case, the contractual performance required the defendant to perform in an alternative way that was beneficial to the claimant.
Shipping
Ltd
v
GTLK Asia M5
Ltd
[2023] EWHC 131 (Comm), [2023] 2 Lloyd's Rep 239 ("Gravelor"), concerned bareboat charterparties of two
ships.
The charterparties were financing leases under which the charterers had an option to purchase the
vessels
from the owners. Clause
18.3
of the charterparty provided that, once certain sums had been paid, title in the
vessels
was to be transferred to the charterers. The charterers wished to purchase the
vessels
but the parent company of the owners was made the subject of EU and US sanctions which meant that the charterers faced difficulties in making payment to the owners. Under clause 8.10, where a payment was incapable of being processed by the relevant bank because of sanctions against the owners, the charterers and owners were to "cooperate and promptly take all necessary steps in order for the payments to be resumed."
vessels,
one of the issues raised was whether the charterers had fulfilled their payment obligations. Foxton J (at paras 69-93) decided that there was a
valid
payment by the charterers even if it was made into a bank account from which the owners would have great difficulty accessing the funds because of the sanctions imposed. This was so even though he accepted that to treat the payment as
validly
made, when it could not be withdrawn, would mean that the owners would suffer real prejudice. But in any event, he held that clause 8.10 required the owners to nominate a new bank account and to accept payment in euros instead of US dollars. Following the majority decision of the Court of Appeal in this case, Foxton J reasoned that it did not matter that this would involve the owners accepting a non-contractual performance. As the payment had been
validly
made, the charterers were entitled to specific performance of the obligation to deliver the
vessels.
view,
therefore, Gravelor is distinguishable from this case. In any event, Foxton J was bound, as a matter of precedent, to apply what the majority of the Court of Appeal had laid down in
MUR
so that his judgment should not be read as providing independent support for the majority's approach in this case.
9. Summary and conclusion
(i) There are good reasons of principle supporting
MUR's
case that "reasonable endeavours" to overcome a force majeure event do not include accepting an offer of non-contractual performance absent clear wording to that effect.
(ii) Bulman and the
Vancouver
Strikes case provide strong implicit support for
MUR's
case and it has not been suggested by counsel for
RTI
that those two cases should be overruled. In contrast any support in the authorities for
RTI's
case is weak.
MUR,
which was accepted by Jacobs J and by Arnold LJ dissenting in the Court of Appeal. We would therefore allow
MUR's appeal.