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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> London Borough of Barnet v Ismail & Anor [2006] EWCA Civ 383 (06 April 2006) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2006/383.html Cite as: [2006] EWCA Civ 383, [2006] WLR 2771, [2007] 1 All ER 922, [2006] 1 WLR 2771 |
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COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE
BARNET
COUNTY COURT
HH JUDGE RICH QC
5BT02801
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
LORD JUSTICE LLOYD
and
LORD JUSTICE RICHARDS
____________________
THE MAYOR AND BURGESSES OF THE LONDON BOROUGH OF BARNET![]() |
Appellant |
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| - and - |
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HASSAN ISMAIL![]() MS NIMCO ABDI -and- THE FIRST SECRETARY OF STATE |
Respondents Intervener |
____________________
Barnet
) for the Appellant
Mr Nicholas Blake QC and Miss Jane Hodgson (instructed by Chambers Rutland and Crawford) for the Respondent Abdi
Mr Stephen Knafler (instructed by Bennett Wilkins) for the Respondent
Ismail
Mr Nicholas Paines QC and Miss Eleanor Grey (instructed by the Solicitor to Her Majesty's Treasury) for the Intervener
Hearing dates : 1 March 2006
____________________
Crown Copyright ©
Lord Justice Buxton :
Barnet
, who are economically inactive owing to child-care obligations, and are in receipt of income support. The local authority refused their application for housing assistance, but that decision was reversed by HH Judge Rich QC sitting in the Central London County Court.
Barnet
, is that persons from the EEA, such as the respondents, are not subject to immigration control in the sense relevant to the Regulations. To the contrary, and on one level paradoxically, Ms Abdi and Mr
Ismail
strenuously contend in these proceedings that they are indeed subject to immigration control. That is a claim that in most circumstances a person might be very reluctant to admit to. The respondents assert it in order to bring themselves, as persons subject to immigration control, within the exemption set out in regulation 3.
Barnet
, supported by Mr Paines QC for the Secretary of State intervening, strongly submitted that that view was wrong. An unqualified EEA national did not "require leave" to remain in the United Kingdom, therefore was not subject to immigration control in the sense defined in section 13(2) of the 1996 Act. Rather, he was in a sui generis position in that he was able to stay, without leave, until the Secretary of State took steps to remove him under Regulation 21(3)(a).
Barnet
says it does, and "requires leave" means "is legally obliged to make an application for leave", then 1988 would be saying that a person entitled to remain by regulation is forbidden to, "shall not", apply for such leave in the given cases. That would at best seem to be supererogatory. The explanation for that provision is, rather, that advocated by Mr Blake QC: by section 1(2) of the 1971 Act a person without right of abode has to have leave to be here unless exempted, and that is what both section 7 of the 1988 Act and section 13(2) of the 1996 Act are addressing.
Barnet
said that it did. We asked the parties to identify a category of persons who are required to apply for leave to remain, as opposed to needing such leave to regularise their immigration status. On the appellants' case, EEA nationals who are unqualified persons are not obliged to apply for leave to remain, so do not fall under the appellants' interpretation of "requires leave to enter or remain" in section 13(2) of the Asylum and Immigration Act 1996; but there must be some other category of persons who do require such leave, in the sense contended for by the appellants, since otherwise the draftsman of that sub-section would seem to have addressed himself to a non-existent group.
Barnet
, drew attention to various categories of person other than EEA nationals who require leave to enter or remain in the terms of section 13(2). Those included persons with limited leave to enter who overstay; visiting seamen who are caught by section 8(1) of the 1971 Act; and overstaying diplomats or members of visiting armed forces. Some, but not all, of those persons will commit an offence under section 24 of the 1971 by remaining in the United Kingdom. None of them are subject to the specific power to remove by which unqualified EEA nationals are governed, under regulation 21(3)(a) of the Immigration (EEA) Regulations 2000: see §5 above. That section 24 catches some, but not all, of the different categories of persons to whom section 13(2) does, on the appellants' construction of it, apply led to the submission that the obligation to make an application for leave to remain was to be found in the commission of a criminal offence by those subject to section 24; but additionally in their cases, and as a sole reason in the cases to which section 24 does not extend, in the lack of right to be here without permission that is to be found in section 1(2) of the 1971 Act (on which see §4 above).
Barnet
's construction of that expression, section 8 and the offence that it goes to the trouble of creating would seem to beat the air. And even if that is not so, the whole emphasis of section 8 relates to whether leave has been granted, and not to whether leave has been applied for. The obvious construction of section 13(2) in practical as well as in verbal terms is therefore what its words say: that everyone is subject to immigration control who cannot lawfully remain in the United Kingdom without leave to do so. That construction extends to the present applicants.
Barnet
, it did not do so in the context of the particular language of section 13(2), which latter post-dated the decision in Castelli. And the court was not concerned with that specific problem of construction, but with the more general issue of the unlawfulness of the party's presence in the United Kingdom. I am unable to think that what was said in Castelli can drive us to a construction of section 13(2) that the wording of that section simply does not support.
Lord Justice Lloyd:
Ismail and Ms Abdi may well never have been qualified persons. There is, however, no reason to treat their status in this respect as being different from that of an EEA national who once was, but is no longer, a qualified person. That seems to me to support the reasoning in my Lord's judgment, with which I agree, for saying that the judge was right and that the Respondents are correctly identified as persons subject to immigration control.
Lord Justice Richards: